Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Loughton Contracts Plc v The Amtico Company Limited
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2814 (TCC)
Case No: HT-2025-000335
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
IN THE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 03/11/2026
Before :
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE CONSTABLE
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Between :
LOUGHTON CONTRACTS PLC
Claimant
– and –
THE AMTICO COMPANY LIMITED
Defendant
Mr Peter Brogden (instructed by Edwards Duthie Shamash) for the Claimant
Mr Mek Mesfin (instructed by Osborne Clarke LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 27 October 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 3 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Mr Justice Constable:
A. Introduction
1. This judgment concerns competing applications arising from a claim brought by the Claimant, Loughton Contracts PLC (“Loughton”), against the Defendant, The Amtico Company Limited (“Amtico”), in relation to flooring products supplied by Amtico and installed by Loughton at residential developments at Wembley Park between 2018 and 2020 for the main contractor, McLaren Construction (Regeneration) Limited (“McLaren”). The flooring has failed and, in pre-action protocol correspondence, McLaren holds Loughton responsible for replacement costs which it puts at £2,907,908. No proceedings have yet been brought by McLaren.
2. Loughton issued these proceedings on 15 October 2025. The Claim Form was deemed served on 23 December 2025 and Particulars of Claim were due on 7 January 2026. None were served. Loughton applied for a stay on 30 January 2026. On 5 February 2026 O’Farrell J stayed the claim until 5th October 2026 or further Order (“the O’Farrell Order”). The O’Farrell Order expressly recorded that the claim had been issued as protective proceedings to ensure that any claim is brought within the limitation period, and gave liberty to Amtico to apply to set aside or vary on 3 days’ notice. No application to vary or discharge the order was made.
3. By applications dated 15 September 2026 and 1 October 2026, Loughton seeks a further stay of the proceedings. It contends that the claim should remain dormant pending clarification of McLaren's position, on the basis that it cannot yet quantify its loss and that any proceedings brought by McLaren ought, so far as possible, to be managed together with this claim. Amtico opposes any further stay and, by application dated 25 September 2026, seeks strike out of the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or (c) and/or summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.3.
4. The applications therefore raise both procedural and substantive issues. Procedurally, Amtico relies upon Loughton's failure to comply with the requirements of the Civil Procedure Rules and the Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes, in particular its failure to serve Particulars of Claim by the deadline prescribed by CPR 7.4 and its failure to seek relief from sanctions in respect of that default. Loughton accepts that Particulars have not been served but contends that the circumstances justify an extension of time and that strike out would be a disproportionate response.
5. Substantively, Amtico contends that the claim has no real prospect of success. Mr Mesfin submits that the overwhelming majority of the claim is statute-barred, that any surviving claim is either excluded or substantially limited by contractual provisions contained in its terms and conditions, and that the claim is barred by a contractual two-year knowledge-based time limit. It further contends that the causes of action pleaded in tort and contribution are not legally sustainable. Mr Brogden, for Loughton, disputes each of those propositions, arguing that there are substantial factual and legal issues concerning, amongst other matters, the incorporation and effect of the relevant contractual terms, the date upon which it acquired sufficient knowledge of the alleged defect, the applicability of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, and the viability of its claims in tort and contribution.
6. The most sensible order in which to consider the submissions is as follows:
(1) whether summary judgment should be entered for Amtico on any or all of the grounds relied upon by it;
(2) whether the claim should be struck out by reason of Loughton's procedural defaults;
(3) whether the proceedings should be stayed and, if so, on what terms;
(4) if neither strike out nor summary judgment is appropriate, what consequential directions should be made for the future conduct of the proceedings.
B. Summary Judgment
7. Mr Mesfin argues that summary judgment should be entered for the following reasons:
(1) The very large bulk of the claim is time barred;
(2) Clause 10(a)(ii) caps any remaining liability at £18,677.95;
(3) Clause 10(a)(i) prevents McLaren’s claim from being passed on;
(4) Clause 10(d), no action may be brought unless proceedings are brought within 2 years after Loughton became or ought to have become aware of the circumstances giving rise to the claim, which actual or constructive knowledge existed before 15 October 2023;
(5) Clause 4(c) bars any warranty claim unless notified in accordance with its provisions, and no compliant notification was given.
Legal Framework
8. Under CPR 24.3, the court may grant summary judgment if it considers that (a) the respondent has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or defence and (b) there is no other compelling reason why the issue or case should be disposed of at a trial.
9. The principles applicable to applications for summary judgment were formulated by Lewison J (as he then was) in Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom Ltd [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch) at [15] and approved by the Court of Appeal in AC Ward & Sons Ltd v Catlin (Five) Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1098; [2010] Lloyd’s Rep IR 301. This summary was restated more recently by Nicklin J in Amersi v Leslie [2023] EWHC 1368 (KB) at [142(1)-(7)], drawing on other relevant authorities:
“(1) The court must consider whether the claimant has a ‘realistic’ as opposed to a ‘fanciful’ prospect of success: Swain -v- Hillman [2001] 1 All ER 91. The criterion is not one of probability; it is absence of reality: Three Rivers DC -v- Bank of England (No.3) [2003] 2 AC 1 [158] per Lord Hobhouse.
(2) A ‘realistic’ claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products -v- Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 [8];
(3) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a ‘mini-trial’: Swain -v- Hillman. This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products -v- Patel [10]; Optaglio -v- Tethal [2015] EWCA Civ 1002 [31] per Floyd LJ.
(4) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust -v- Hammond (No.5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550; Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd -v- Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63.
(5) Nevertheless, to satisfy the requirement that further evidence ‘can reasonably be expected’ to be available at trial, there needs to be some reason for expecting that evidence in support of the relevant case will, or at least reasonably might, be available at trial. It is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may ‘turn up’. A party resisting an application for summary judgment must put forward sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that s/he has a real prospect of succeeding at trial (especially if that evidence is, or can be expected to be, already within his/her possession). If the party wishes to rely on the likelihood that further evidence will be available at that stage, s/he must substantiate that assertion by describing, at least in general terms, the nature of the evidence, its source and its relevance to the issues before the court. The court may then be able to see that there is some substance in the point and that the party in question is not simply playing for time in the hope that something will turn up: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd -v- TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725 [14] per Moore-Bick LJ; Korea National Insurance Corporation -v- Allianz Global Corporate & Speciality AG [2008] Lloyd's Rep IR 413 [14] per Moore-Bick LJ; and Ashraf -v- Lester Dominic Solicitors & Ors [2023] EWCA Civ 4 [40] per Nugee LJ. Fundamentally, the question is whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that disclosure may materially add to or alter the evidence relevant to whether the claim has a real prospect of success: Okpabi -v- Royal Dutch Shell Plc [2021] 1 WLR 1294 [128] per Lord Hamblen.
(6) Lord Briggs explained the nature of the dilemma in Lungowe -v- Vedanta Resources plc [2020] AC 1045 [45]: ‘… On the one hand, the claimant cannot simply say, like Mr Micawber, that some gaping hole in its case may be remedied by something which may turn up on disclosure. The claimant must demonstrate that it has a case which is unsuitable to be determined adversely to it without a trial. On the other, the court cannot ignore reasonable grounds which may be disclosed at the summary judgment stage for believing that a fuller investigation of the facts may add to or alter the evidence relevant to the issue…’
(7) The Court may, after taking into account the possibility of further evidence being available at trial, and without conducting a 'mini-trial', still evaluate the evidence before it and, in an appropriate case, conclude that it should ‘draw a line’ and bring an end to the action: King -v- Stiefel [2021] EWHC 1045 (Comm) [21] per Cockerill J.”
Statutory Time Bar
10. Amtico alleges that any contractual breach (whether of warranty or implied term, about which there is dispute considered further below) would occur upon delivery. Any cause of action for contractual breach would therefore have accrued at the latest upon delivery. The six-year period under section 5 of the Limitation Act 1980 accordingly bars any claim in respect of goods delivered before 15 October 2019. As a matter of principle, this starting analysis was not disputed by Mr Brogden, counsel for Loughton.
11. It is Amtico’s position that this applies to 97% of the orders. On the basis of order and invoice records, only 18 orders, worth £18,677.95, carried scheduled delivery dates after 15 October 2019. Every other order, whose values total £578,071.54, was due for delivery before that date. The table provided in support of this submission, the content of which was not substantively disputed in any responsive evidence, showed that in relation to one of the two blocks, the due date preceding, but closest to, the 15 October 2019 was 13 August 2019. The equivalent date for the other block was 19 September 2019.
12. Mr Brogden’s first short point is that the documentation shows only the dates upon which delivery was due, not the dates upon which delivery in fact occurred. Mr Mesfin argues that as the buyer, Loughton took delivery of each consignment. Evidence of when each consignment actually arrived is therefore within its own knowledge and control. He points out that Loughton has not identified a single consignment that arrived later than scheduled, and, in reliance on the dates in the table, there is some margin between the immediately preceding due dates and the cut off date. By reference to a very small sample of documents, he demonstrated that the invoice date (which generally followed delivery) was consistent with delivery on or around the evidenced due date.
13. Mr Mesfin’s observations were justified, as far as they went. But this is Amtico’s application for summary judgment. The only documentary factual evidence before the Court relates to due date, and that documentary evidence is not supplemented by factual evidence from a witness that, in fact, delivery was on each occasion on or around the due date. The provision of invoice date and/or payment date for each order (as opposed to a very small sample), on the basis of the evidence before the Court that these were issued following delivery, may well have been a straightforward way to establish a prima facie case for summary judgment purposes in respect of all deliveries. However, this relatively simple exercise has not been provided. Similarly, in his written submissions, Mr Mesfin noted that the contractual terms make its (or its carriers’) receipts conclusive evidence of delivery, but this merely underscores the fact that there is a further audit trail which would probably have been capable of determining the matter which has not been put before the Court.
14. I do not lose sight of the fact that, on the material presently available, it appears probable that a significant proportion of the contractual claim will face limitation difficulties. However, the prospect that the underlying delivery documentation may materially alter the present evidential picture is a real one. In circumstances where Amtico bears the burden on its application and has not produced documentation which appears capable of easily establishing the actual dates of delivery, I am not satisfied that it has established the extent of its statutory limitation defence to the standard required for summary judgment.
15. The second point raised by Mr Brogden in relation to statutory limitation is that the Claim Form also pleads negligence and breach of a tortious duty owed to McLaren and to Loughton. Mr Mesfin points out that the only loss alleged is the cost of rectifying the flooring, which would be pure economic loss. In the absence of a special relationship, no duty of care in tort is owed to avoid causing such loss. In this regard, Mr Mesfin points to the fact that the Claim Form alleges nothing more than that Amtico supplied the products, pleading no assumption of responsibility, no advice and no design role. Where Amtico owed no such duty to Loughton or to McLaren, there could be no claim in tort nor contribution.
16. The claim for summary judgment is being brought on the basis of the claim advanced on the Claim Form. There may be a material distinction between the alleged duty owed directly to Loughton and that allegedly owed to McLaren. As presently formulated, Loughton’s own claim appears to concern the economic consequences of acquiring an allegedly defective product. A claim based upon a duty owed to McLaren may depend upon different facts, including any relevant dealings or advice and the nature of the damage for which McLaren seeks compensation. Those claims have not yet been particularised. The Claim Form itself alleges the existence of a tortious duty of care, owed both to Loughton and to McLaren. The duties are pleaded in the bare manner to be expected on a Claim Form. Whilst the points made by Mr Mesfin fairly raise the readily understandable difficulty faced by a party in Loughton’s position where bringing a tortious claim for pure economic loss, directly or indirectly through a contribution, it cannot be said, given the stage the litigation is at that (on the assumption the claim is not struck out for procedural failures) it would be appropriate to determine substantively at this stage that an alleged tortious duty has no real prospect of success. It would in my judgment be premature to determine that issue upon the necessarily abbreviated formulation contained in the Claim Form, before Loughton has been required to plead the material facts upon which the alleged duty is said to arise. The same applies to the contribution claim: in the absence of Particulars of Claim identifying the basis upon which Amtico is said to be liable in respect of the same damage, I do not consider that the viability of that claim should be determined summarily.
Amtico’s contractual defences/limitations: incorporation
17. The remaining grounds upon which Mr Mesfin seeks to argue that summary judgment should today be entered relate to various terms which Amtico say govern the contract between it and Loughton. Before turning to the individual provisions relied upon, however, there is a logically prior question: has Amtico established, to the standard required for summary judgment, which contractual terms governed the relevant supplies?
18. Mr Sanaullah, solicitor at Osborne Clarke LLP, who gives evidence in support of the strike out/summary judgment application, states that he understands from Amtico that the contractual terms that govern the relationship between the parties are what he calls “the Amtico Standard Terms and Conditions”. He exhibits to his statement the documents that he contends are the revisions of the Terms and Conditions for 2018, 2019 and 2020 which he says therefore apply to the relevant orders (“the Sanaullah T&Cs”).
19. Amtico served evidence from Laura Townsend and Leigh Pavey dealing with how contracts were entered into. Laura Townsend is a UK and European Sales Support Manager at Amtico and has worked there since 2007. She states that her recollection was that throughout Amtico’s dealings with Loughton, Loughton would issue a purchase order and Amtico’s sales team would issue an order confirmation and terms and conditions would not be circulated at these stages, but that the Amtico terms would be appended to the invoice issued thereafter. Ms Townsend said that as far as she could recall, Loughton didn’t contact her or her sales team to dispute the terms and conditions appended to the invoices on the Wembley (or other) projects. Leigh Pavey gives evidence that up to 2023, invoices with appended Amtico’s terms and conditions would be sent in hardcopy by post to the customer, and this happened with Loughton. She exhibits a sample of scans of hardcopy invoices appending the Amtico terms and conditions issued by post following shipment (“the Invoice T&Cs”). Loughton has not provided any evidence responsive to the description of the course of dealing contained in these two factual witnesses’ accounts.
20. Mr Brogden nevertheless identifies a number of difficulties with Amtico's case on incorporation by a course of dealing.
21. First, the sample order acknowledgements exhibited by Ms Townsend make no reference to any terms and conditions. Terms supplied only after an individual contract has been concluded will not ordinarily be incorporated into that contract merely by their appearance on a subsequent invoice. They may, however, become incorporated into later contracts through a sufficiently regular and consistent course of dealing. Whether that occurred here depends upon what documents were in fact sent, with what regularity, and whether the terms were consistent. Mr Brogden’s point does not of itself therefore dispose of Amtico's case. Amtico relies not upon terms accompanying the order acknowledgements, but upon the course of dealing described by Ms Townsend and Ms Pavey.
22. Secondly, Mr Brogden challenges the evidential value of the invoices upon which Amtico relies. The invoices exhibited by Ms Townsend and Ms Pavey are later reprints. Each is marked "DUPLICATE"; they contain an EORI number using the "XI" designation; and they provide Barclays bank details, whereas the corresponding order acknowledgements provide Lloyds bank details. Mr Brogden also identifies a specific discrepancy: a 2019 acknowledgement records purchase order 42940/53355, whereas the duplicate invoice said to correspond to the same sales order, and Amtico's order list, record 42940/59894. He submits that these matters raise a proper question whether the duplicate invoices reliably reproduce the documents, including the terms, which were in fact supplied to Loughton during 2018 to 2020.
23. Thirdly, and potentially more significantly, the Invoice T&Cs are not the same documents as the Sanaullah T&Cs upon which Amtico's application was initially advanced. The former add “Brexit” and “Variation” clauses and a clause 1(d) on acceptance by order confirmation. More significantly, unlike the Sanaullah T&Cs, clause 1(a) of the Invoice T&Cs states that:
“These conditions together with the terms and conditions set out in the flooring specialist agreement between the Seller and the Buyer and the customer account application form in respect of the Buyer's customer account with the Seller (together the “Contract”) contain the entire agreement between the parties in connection with the products.”
24. This appears to incorporate two further documents as part of the ‘Contract’. Neither of those documents are before the Court. Whilst accepting that this was not in evidence before the Court, Mr Mesfin submitted on instructions that these documents were not relevant to the type and size of orders undertaken for Loughton. There is, however, no evidence before the Court which establishes that proposition. I do not consider that an issue of this kind, arising from the language of the very contractual terms upon which Amtico (now) relies, can satisfactorily be resolved on counsel's instructions.
25. The import of the forensic matters raised by Mr Brogden should not be overstated. There is evidence of a substantial course of dealing between the parties; the evidence of Ms Townsend and Ms Pavey as to Amtico's practice has not been contradicted by Loughton; nor has Loughton advanced any positive case identifying some different set of terms which it says governed the relevant supplies.
26. That, however, is not the test on an application for summary judgment. The present evidence leaves unresolved both the precise terms said to have been supplied to Loughton during the relevant course of dealing and the significance, if any, of the additional contractual documents expressly identified in the Invoice T&Cs. Mr Brogden's points arise from Amtico's evidence, which presents inconsistencies about which there is no evidenced explanation. There is a real prospect that disclosure and the evidence at trial will provide a materially fuller picture of the contractual documentation and the course of dealing between the parties.
27. I am therefore not satisfied that Amtico has established the applicable contractual terms with sufficient certainty for the Court safely to determine, on a summary basis, defences which depend upon particular provisions of those terms. As I explain below, however, that conclusion is not essential to the outcome of the application. Even assuming in Amtico's favour that the terms upon which it relies were incorporated, I do not consider that the particular contractual defences advanced provide a proper basis for summary judgment against Loughton.
The Contractual Defences
28. Amtico relies upon 3 clauses by way of contractual defence for the purposes of its summary judgment application as advanced orally: clauses 10(a)(i), 10(a)(ii) and 10(d). Mr Mesfin clarified that he no longer relied upon clause 4(c) as part of the application.
29. The relevant clauses state, pursuant to the Invoice T&Cs:
“10(a) without prejudice to any other limitation of seller's liability (whether effective or not):
(i) in no circumstances whatever shall seller be liable (in contract, tort or otherwise, and irrespective of any negligence or other act, default or omission of seller or its employees or agents) for any indirect or consequential loss, loss of or damage to goodwill, loss of sales or business or anticipated savings, loss of agreements or contracts, loss of profits or use, or (subject to clauses 4(e)10(f) and 8(a)) any third party claims, in connection with the products or the contract.
(ii) except as provided under clauses 4(e)10(f) and 8(a), seller's total aggregate liability in connection with the products or the contract (in contract, tort or otherwise, and whether or not related to any negligence or other act, default or omission of seller or its employees or agents), is limited to the contract price, ex-works and ex vat
[…]
(d) without prejudice to clause 4(c) no action may be brought against seller in connection with the products or the contract unless proceedings are issued against seller within two years after buyer became or ought to have become aware of the circumstances giving rise thereto.”
30. In relation to 10(a)(i), Mr Mesfin relies in his written submissions upon ‘any indirect or consequential loss’ as excluding the losses passed on by McLaren. There is, for the purposes of summary judgment, a reasonable prospect of Loughton arguing that that does not apply to McLaren’s loss claimed from Loughton, which would arguably constitute a direct loss or one occurring in the ordinary course of events.
31. Insofar as Mr Mesfin relies upon ‘any third party claims’, this might more readily be construed as covering the claim made by McLaren, insofar as the precise nature of that claim can presently be discerned. There is a properly arguable question whether “third party claims” refers to claims made directly against Amtico by third parties, or extends to losses incurred by Loughton by reason of a claim made against it by McLaren. The commercial context and the contractual scheme as a whole may bear upon that question. For the reasons set out further below, it is not necessary for me to resolve that point of construction on this application.
32. It is on the basis of clause 10(a)(ii), coupled with its statutory limitation argument, that the maximum claim against Amtico is said by Mr Mesfin to be £18,677.95. The immediate difficulty is that the contracts and supplies to which any cap would attach cannot reliably be identified on the present evidence for the reasons already given. In making that observation I make no determination of whether, on the proper construction of the terms as a whole, the cap operates separately by reference to each supply or by reference to some wider contractual aggregate.
33. In relation to 10(d), the parties differ as to the proper construction of “the circumstances giving rise” to the action. Amtico submits that knowledge of the manifestations of failure in a small number of flats and the attribution of responsibility to Amtico were sufficient to constitute such circumstances. Loughton submits, relying upon Nobahar-Cookson v The Hut Group Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 128, that the clause requires awareness of a sufficient basis for the particular action later brought. For the reason that follows, it is also unnecessary to determine either the proper construction of ‘circumstances giving rise to the claim’ or whether, on that construction, Loughton's knowledge was sufficient to engage the clause before 15 October 2023.
34. Each of the clauses relied upon is a limitation or exclusion clause. On Amtico’s case, these form part of its written standard terms of business. To the extent that Amtico relies upon them to exclude or restrict liability arising in contract, section 3 of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (‘the 1977 Act’) requires the terms to satisfy the requirement of reasonableness. To the extent that the claim concerns the terms implied by section 14 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, sections 6 and 13 of the 1977 Act are also engaged.
35. Mr Brogden relies on Last Bus Ltd v Dawsongroup Bus and Coach Ltd [2023] EWCA Civ 1297. In that case, Phillips LJ (with whom Singh and Bean LJJ agreed) said at [53] that “Apart from the general point that such a fact-sensitive issue would ordinarily require a trial (although I do not say that the issue could never be determined on a summary basis), in this case there were obvious matters that required investigation”.
36. In the present case, as Mr Mesfin conceded, Amtico has served no evidence in respect of the reasonableness of the exclusion clauses relied upon. It is right that Mr Brogden’s reliance upon the 1977 Act was not foreshadowed in the evidence of Mr Brownjohn, Finance Director and Company Secretary of Loughton, responsive to the summary judgment application. But Mr Mesfin did not suggest it was not open to Mr Brogden to raise the defence to Amtico’s reliance upon the contract terms, and the point having been raised, it is, pursuant to section 11(5) of the 1977 Act, for those claiming that a contract term or notice satisfies the requirement of reasonableness to show that it does. The Court needs to consider whether the terms were fair and reasonable ones to be included having regard to the circumstances which were, or ought reasonably to have been, known to or in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. Section 11(2) requires that regard ‘shall’ be had to the matters specified in Schedule 2 to this Act. The Schedule lists various factual matters about which Amtico has served no factual evidence. As Phillips LJ pointed out, there may be cases where the evidence served on a summary judgment application is so one sided that it is possible for the Court to decide summarily that a particular clause is reasonable and, as such, enforceable. That is likely not normally to be the position. However, with no evidence before the Court, and with the burden resting on Amtico, and even assuming incorporation of the Invoice T&Cs in Amtico’s favour, I cannot conclude that Loughton has no real prospect of successfully resisting Amtico's reliance upon those terms on the ground that they fail the statutory requirement of reasonableness.
Summary judgment: Conclusion
37. For these reasons, the application for summary judgment fails.
38. For completeness, I do not consider that the Claim Form should be struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a). Under CPR 3.4(2)(a) the question is whether the claim is bound to fail on the facts alleged. The limitation and contractual points relied upon by Amtico are defences, which depend on facts outside the claim form, and are therefore not grounds under (a). Although the claims in negligence and contribution are presently expressed at a high level of generality and may face substantial legal difficulties when particularised, the Claim Form identifies the product, the alleged failure and the causes of action relied upon. At this stage, and before Loughton has been ordered to serve Particulars of Claim, it cannot properly be concluded that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing any claim.
C. The Application to Strike Out
Procedural Chronology
39. Loughton issued its Claim Form on 15 October 2025, with Particulars of Claim “to follow”. It had taken no step under the Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes (the “Protocol”). Mr Brogden accepts that the Claim Form was the first notice Amtico had of any claim.
40. Loughton served the Claim Form early, by recorded delivery under cover of a letter of 18 December 2025, although it had until mid-February 2026 to do so. The letter proposed a stay pending a claim Loughton “anticipate[d]” from McLaren. Service of the Claim Form was deemed on 23 December 2025, and Particulars of Claim therefore fell due by 7 January 2026 (CPR 7.4(1)(b)). None has ever been served. No application for relief from sanctions has been made.
41. After that deadline for Particulars of Claim had passed, Loughton wrote on 8 and 12 January 2026 pressing for a stay. On 16 January 2026 Amtico, then unrepresented, asked when Loughton said service had taken place, why the matter was urgent, and what order it sought and for how long.
42. On 30 January 2026, Loughton applied without notice for a stay. It served the application on Amtico on 2 February 2026. On 5 February 2026 O’Farrell J, without submissions from Amtico, stayed the claim until 5 October 2026. It provided specifically that as the Order had been made without the benefit of written or oral submissions from Amtico, there was general liberty to apply to set aside or vary this Order on 3 days’ notice to the other party. The stay operated prospectively and gave no relief from sanctions.
43. On 9 February 2026, Osborne Clarke (‘OC’), solicitors for Amtico, wrote to Edwards Duthie Shamash (‘EDS’), before it was aware of the substance of the O’Farrell Order. It noted that the Particulars of Claim are therefore significantly overdue (by over one month), and the claim was liable to be struck out pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(c) (failure to comply with a rule or practice direction) on that basis. It sought a withdrawal of the stay application so as to avoid incurring costs contesting the Stay Application and any application by Amtico for the strike-out of the claim. A copy of the order was then served on Amtico on 11 February 2026.
44. Two days later, OC responded informing EDS that Amtico did not intend to take any further procedural steps in the Claim, including the making of applications to the Court, whilst the stay was in place, primarily for reasons of time and proportionality. It said:
“The overriding objective for civil proceedings promotes the Court dealing with cases justly and at proportionate cost, which includes saving expense where possible. In circumstances where Loughton has stated its prosecution of the Claim is contingent on McLaren first bringing a claim against Loughton, Amtico considers it appropriate to minimise the risk of wasted time and costs associated with procedural issues until such time as Loughton's intentions become clearer.”
45. That position was understandable in terms of cost and proportionality. At the same time, OC put EDS on notice that it maintained its position that the Claim is liable to be struck out pursuant to, without limitation, CPR 3.4(2)(c) (failure to comply with a rule or practice direction) on the basis that Loughton's Particulars of Claim were significantly overdue at the time that the O’Farrell Order was made, and that Loughton's procedural failure has not been addressed or explained and is not relieved by the imposition of the stay of proceedings. OC also maintained its position that Loughton has failed to engage at all with the Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes in respect of the Claim, despite having had ample opportunity to do so.
46. Consistent with the position taken in its letter, OC did not apply to set aside or vary the stay. There was no engagement in the Protocol as between Loughton and Amtico during the stay. Loughton and McLaren held a pre-action meeting on 12 May 2026, following an earlier exchange of Protocol correspondence. At this point, McLaren treated the Protocol as complete and reserved the right to commence proceedings against Loughton without further notice. It has not yet done so, at least to the knowledge of EDS.
47. On 8 September 2026, EDS issued a letter to OC noting there had been no change in circumstances with McLaren and invited the Defendant to agree a further 6 month extension of the stay. Amtico refused on 14 September 2026 and asked EDS to withdraw the claim. Before expiry of the stay, on 15 September 2026, Loughton applied to extend the stay to 5 April 2027, again without seeking Protocol directions. Amtico applied on 25 September for strike-out and/or summary judgment, having asked the court to hear both applications together. OC refused a consent order continuing the stay meanwhile, saying that it “should never have been granted in the first instance”. On 6 October 2026 I listed both applications to be heard together.
48. At no point has a formal application for relief been issued by Loughton. Mr Brogden apologised to the Court for this. The relief issue was squarely addressed in both parties’ skeleton arguments and in oral submissions. Amtico did not suggest that it required further evidence or an adjournment in order to meet the application. In those circumstances, and having regard to the overriding objective, I consider it appropriate to determine the oral application for relief.
Legal Framework (2)
49. Late service of Particulars of Claim requires an application by the claimant, determined under the relief from sanctions framework. Although Loughton made no application for relief from sanctions under CPR 3.9, nor any application under CPR 3.1(2)(a) to extend time for its Particulars of Claim, Mr Brogden advanced such applications orally.
50. It was common ground that the applicable test is set out in the well known authority of Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3926. This requires the Court to:
(1) address whether the breach of the order, rule or practice direction was serious or significant;
(2) consider why the default has occurred; and
(3) evaluate all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application.
Serious or Significant Breach
51. As at the date of the application to stay, the Particulars of Claim were just over three weeks late. No application for an extension of time had been made prior to the expiry of the deadline, and the application for stay, similarly, had not been made prior to the expiry of the time required for compliance under the CPR. At the time the stay was sought, whilst relief was not expressly sought, the application acknowledged the requirement to serve Particulars of Claim, stating that it ‘seeks to be excused’ from serving Particulars of Claim. A preferable route would undoubtedly have been for Loughton to follow the guidance in the Protocol. Paragraph 12.1 provides that a Claimant who commences proceedings without complying with all, or any part, of this Protocol must apply to the Court on notice for directions as to the timetable and form of procedure to be adopted, at the same time as he requests the Court to issue proceedings. The Court will consider whether to order a stay of the whole or part of the proceedings pending compliance with this Protocol. Loughton did not do so, and its failure to have done so has led to the difficulties it now faces.
52. From 5 February 2026 onwards, the continuing non-service of Particulars coincided with a stay ordered by the Court which Amtico thereafter elected not to seek to vary or discharge. Whilst Amtico’s decision not to do so did not waive its procedural objections or remove its reservation of rights, it materially affects the practical significance of the continuing non-service during the period of the stay. The position is not identical to an agreed stay, but the practical effect is sufficiently analogous to the circumstances considered by Henshaw J in Excotek Ltd v City Air Express Ltd [2021] EWHC 2615 (Comm) at [52] in which he said:
“The fact that the delay in serving the Particulars of Claim was consistent with a stay that the parties had, for good reason, agreed should be put in place in my view mitigates both the seriousness and the significance of the breach.”
53. In that case, it should be noted that Excotek had secured agreement for a stay prior to the date upon which the Particulars of Claim were due to be served – and thus were in a stronger position than Loughton in the present case. On the other hand, they overlooked notifying the Court by lodging a Consent Order, as required by a Commercial Court Practice Direction, which did not therefore endorse the stay. The proceedings were not, in fact, subject to a stay and at least strictly, the period of default ticked by for a year. Loughton’s successful application for a stay therefore places Loughton in a stronger position in this regard.
54. At the end of September, prior to the expiry of the stay, both parties made applications to the Court: Loughton’s for an extension of the stay; Amtico’s for summary judgment/strike out. Technically, the stay expired on 5 October 2026. Whilst it weighs against Loughton that it did not formally recognise its requirement for relief from sanctions, this is mitigated by the wider context in which it seeks to extend the stay. This remains its primary case management submission. Irrespective of whether it is ultimately the position adopted by the Court, it has a comprehensible position, in terms of cost savings and proportionality, as to why the provision of Particulars of Claim at this stage should be further stayed pending clarification of McLaren’s position.
55. EDS must be taken to have been aware of the deadline to serve the Particulars of Claim once it served the Claim Form. I conclude that the failure to serve them prior to the expiry of the deadline, or to seek an extension or a stay before expiry, was serious and significant. The failure to comply with paragraph 12.1 of the Protocol is not itself the procedural breach for which relief under CPR 3.9 is sought, but it is relevant to all the circumstances of the case. The subsequent stay did not cure those failures, although it bears materially upon their practical effect and upon the third stage of the Denton analysis.
Reason
56. No formal application for relief has been served. There is, therefore, no evidence from anyone at EDS focussing specifically on explaining the failure. The evidence amounts to a neutral commentary on the chronology, and does not acknowledge the failures to have complied either with the Protocol or the CPR. That is not impressive.
57. It is clear, however, that the reason for non-compliance was intimately linked with an intention to obtain, by consent or court order, a stay pending the clarification of McLaren’s position.
58. This is plainly a reason. It is not a good reason. If EDS considered, as seems to have been the case, that upon service of the Claim Form the immediate step should be a stay on grounds of proportionality and convenience, this is the application it ought to have made at the outset.
All the circumstances
59. Whilst acknowledging that the exercise of the discretion to grant relief from sanctions is inherently fact specific, Mr Mesfin placed particular weight in his written submissions on parallels that could be drawn with the decision of Edwards-Stuart J in North Midland Construction plc v Geo Networks Ltd [2015] EWHC 2384. The judge had to consider two failures to serve Particulars in time in different proceedings. In the “Project Yellow” proceedings, although the breach was serious and the explanation unsatisfactory, particulars had been served only a little over two weeks late and relief was granted. In the “Fibrespeed” proceedings, by contrast, proceedings had been issued without Protocol compliance, no extension had been sought, Particulars remained unserved more than six weeks late, there was no good explanation and the delay threatened the trial date. The judge was also strongly critical of the claimant’s solicitors’ conduct and their “fairly cavalier attitude towards the rules”. Applying Denton, relief was refused and the claim struck out.
60. Mr Mesfin submits that this case resembles Fibrespeed: Loughton issued without a Protocol letter, failed to serve particulars by 7 January 2026 or seek an extension, and has still not served them. There is force in that criticism, particularly insofar as it relates to the period up to 5 February 2026. The stay did not retrospectively cure the default. There are, however, material differences from Fibrespeed. The proceedings were stayed for most of the period upon which Amtico relies. There is no trial date which has been jeopardised, nor any equivalent of the conduct which attracted the particular criticism in Fibrespeed. Further, as O’Farrell J recognised, the stay was granted because these proceedings were issued protectively and because Loughton’s claim depends substantially upon McLaren’s threatened claim against it. That does not excuse the original default, but it is relevant to all the circumstances under Denton. A further material consideration is that strike-out would not merely require Loughton to begin again. It may prevent it doing so in respect of claims which were not time-barred when these proceedings were commenced. That is a potentially substantial consequence which must be weighed against the nature and practical effect of the procedural default when considering proportionality.
61. Looking at matters in the round, I consider that to strike out the Claim would be disproportionate.I will accordingly grant Loughton relief from the consequences of its failure to serve its Particulars of Claim within time and extend time for their service. The period of that extension is a matter to be considered in the context of next steps.
D. Next Steps
62. Mr Brogden seeks an order staying proceedings for a further 6 months to 5 April 2027, with an order that the time for serving particulars of claim under CPR 7.4(1)(b) and 7.4(2) is extended to 28 days after the stay ends. He conceded in oral argument that such direction could be made subject to an Unless Order. In addition, it is proposed that Loughton would send the Defendant a letter of claim under the Pre-Action Protocol for Construction and Engineering Disputes within 28 days, and the Defendant is to have the period the Protocol allows to respond.
63. By contrast, Mr Mesfin resisted the suggestion of any further stay and submitted that the Court should consider adjourning rather than dismissing the summary judgment application if it failed for want of sufficient evidence, as it has done.
64. I consider that arguments canvassed have identified issues which may substantially narrow, or potentially determine, the scope of the proceedings: in particular, it may be straightforward to resolve the actual dates of delivery relevant to statutory limitation; and the enforceability under the 1977 Act of the contractual limitations upon which Amtico relies, and in particular clauses 10(a) (i) and (ii) could, if Amtico succeeded, be dispositive in a practical sense, as Mr Brogden broadly accepted.
65. Those issues could not summarily be determined on the evidence before me. The appropriate order is to dismiss the summary judgment application rather than adjourn aspects of it. Particularly in circumstances where McLaren has not yet brought proceedings, there may in the meantime be considerable advantage in determining one or more issues at an early stage, provided that this can be done without disproportionate pleading, disclosure and evidence.
66. What I do not consider appropriate is for the claim simply to remain in its present state for a further six months. I am not persuaded that a further stay to 5 April 2027 is justified. I will hear the parties as to whether there should instead be a short and tightly defined stay to permit Protocol correspondence or further clarification of McLaren's position, and as to directions for the service of pleadings, targeted disclosure and evidence and, if appropriate, the determination of one or more preliminary issues.
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