Administrative United Kingdom

Olaoluwa Michael Salu v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: HU/57159/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Birmingham
On 6 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Khurram

Between

OLAOLUWA MICHAEL SALU

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Toora, Counsel instructed by SMK Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr Lee, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the Appellant’s appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 5 June 2024 refusing his human rights claim, made in the context of a decision to deport him.

Background

2. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained within myHMCTS. Although I may not refer specifically to all those documents, I have read all of them.

3. The Appellant is a national of Nigeria, born in 2001. He entered the United Kingdom on 1 March 2012, when he was aged 10. On 16 January 2020, he was granted limited leave to remain on private-life grounds, valid until 16 July 2022. On 16 September 2022, an application was made for further leave to remain.

4. On 19 October 2022, at Warwick Crown Court, the Appellant was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of theft from the person. He was sentenced on 7 November 2022 to a total term of 28 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, that sentence was reduced to 18 months’ imprisonment.

5. On 19 April 2023, the Respondent served the Appellant with notice of a decision to make a deportation order. On 2 May 2023, the Appellant made representations relying upon Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

6. On 5 June 2024, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s human rights claim and made a deportation order against him. The Appellant appealed against the refusal of his human rights claim. The immigration and criminal history set out above was not disputed.

The Hearing

7. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using a Tascam handheld device. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing. I informed the parties that the Tribunal may publish the final decision.

8. At the outset of the hearing, I clarified the issues with the representatives. The Appellant’s immigration and criminal history was not materially disputed. The Appellant accepted that he is a foreign criminal for the purposes of section 117D of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and that the statutory deportation regime applies.

9. Mr Toora accepted that the Appellant could not satisfy the first requirement of Exception 1 because he had not been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. The remaining dispute under Exception 1 was whether there would be very significant obstacles to his integration in Nigeria.

10. The Respondent accepted that the Appellant’s partner, Megan Kennedy, is a British citizen resident in the United Kingdom. By the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondent also accepted that their relationship is genuine and subsisting. It was not disputed that the relationship was formed when the Appellant’s immigration status was precarious. The Respondent did not contend that Ms Kennedy could reasonably be expected to relocate to Nigeria. The disputed issue was whether it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without the Appellant.

11. The Appellant also relied upon his relationship with his British daughter, who was born in 2025. The Respondent consented to the Tribunal considering that matter and, by the conclusion of the hearing, accepted that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with her. The Respondent did not contend that the child should relocate to Nigeria. The disputed issue was whether it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without the Appellant. Although no formal application was made for the child’s identity to be anonymised, I indicated that I would avoid including details capable of identifying her unless necessary for the determination of the appeal.

12. I treated Ms Kennedy as a vulnerable witness in view of the evidence concerning autism, anxiety, panic attacks and her mental health following childbirth. With the agreement of the representatives, appropriate adjustments were made to the pace and manner of questioning, and breaks were available if required. I am satisfied that those adjustments were observed throughout the hearing. Neither party submitted otherwise. In assessing Ms Kennedy’s evidence, I have taken appropriate account of the effect her vulnerability may have had upon the manner in which she gave evidence.

13. The Appellant’s 19-page supplementary bundle was filed shortly before the hearing. It contained updated evidence concerning his family circumstances, Ms Kennedy’s mental health, employment and claimed rehabilitation.

14. Although I was not satisfied that the explanation fully accounted for the late filing, Mr Lee confirmed that he had considered the material and did not object to its admission or identify any prejudice. Having regard to the overriding objective and the relevance of the evidence to the Appellant’s current circumstances, I admitted the supplementary bundle.

Issues

15. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) whether the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria;

(b) whether the effect of the Appellant’s deportation upon his qualifying partner would be unduly harsh in the “stay” scenario;

(c) whether the effect of the Appellant’s deportation upon his qualifying child would be unduly harsh in the “stay” scenario; and

(d) if neither statutory exception was met, whether there were very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the Appellant’s deportation.

Evidence and Submissions

16. I first heard oral evidence from the Appellant, who adopted his witness statements dated 28 April 2025 and 2 October 2026. He was cross-examined principally about his ties to Nigeria, employment and financial circumstances, rehabilitation, and his relationships with his partner and daughter. In re-examination, he addressed his wider family connections, living arrangements and the financial consequences of his deportation.

17. I next heard evidence from Megan Kennedy, who adopted her witness statements dated 29 April 2025 and 2 October 2026. She was cross-examined about her relationship with the Appellant, mental health, employment, finances, accommodation and available family support. In re-examination, she addressed the effect of the Appellant’s deportation upon her mental health, employment, childcare and ability to maintain her home.

18. The Appellant’s mother, Oluwatoyin Ruth Salu, adopted her witness statement dated 29 April 2025. She was cross-examined about the family’s remaining connections with Nigeria, her employment, studies and ability to support the Appellant financially or practically if he were deported.

19. The Appellant’s father, Suraj Adewumi Lateef, adopted his witness statement dated 29 April 2025. He was cross-examined about his recent visit to Nigeria, any remaining family or property there, and his ability to provide the Appellant with financial or practical support.

20. The Appellant’s brother, Adeoluwa Gabriel Salu, adopted his witness statement dated 29 April 2025. He was briefly cross-examined about his present studies and, in re-examination, about his anticipated completion of university.

21. I then heard closing submissions from both representatives. Those submissions are recorded in the record of proceedings. I refer below to the principal points advanced where relevant to my findings, but I have considered all the oral and written evidence and submissions in reaching my decision.

Legal Framework

22. Section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 states:

(1) The deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest.

(2) The more serious the offence committed by a foreign criminal, the greater is the public interest in deportation of the criminal.

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal ("C") who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C's deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where—

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C's life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C's integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C's deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

(7) The considerations in subsections (1) to (6) are to be taken into account where a court or tribunal is considering a decision to deport a foreign criminal only to the extent that the reason for the decision was the offence or offences for which the criminal has been convicted.

23. Although section 117C(6) expressly concerns a person sentenced to at least four years’ imprisonment, a foreign criminal sentenced to less than four years may also resist deportation by establishing very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2: NA (Pakistan) v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 662. Where either exception is satisfied, section 117C(3) provides that the public interest does not require deportation.

24. The expression “unduly harsh” denotes a degree of harshness going beyond that which would necessarily be involved for any partner or child faced with the deportation of a foreign criminal. The assessment is directed to the actual partner and child concerned and must take account of their individual circumstances. There is no requirement for the consequences to be unusual or extraordinary. The seriousness of the offending is not brought into the discrete assessment under Exception 2: KO (Nigeria) v SSHD [2018] UKSC 53 and HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22.

25. In HA (Iraq), the Supreme Court confirmed that the assessment of very compelling circumstances requires a proportionality evaluation of all the relevant circumstances. Relevant considerations may include:

(a) the nature and seriousness of the offence committed by the applicant;

(b) the length of the applicant's stay in the country from which he or she is to be expelled;

(c) the time elapsed since the offence was committed and the applicant's conduct during that period;

(d) the nationalities of the various persons concerned;

(e) the applicant's family situation, such as the length of the marriage, and other factors expressing the effectiveness of a couple's family life;

(f) whether the spouse knew about the offence at the time when he or she entered into a family relationship;

(g) whether there are children of the marriage, and if so, their age; and

(h) the seriousness of the difficulties which the spouse is likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled …

(i) the best interests and well-being of the children, in particular the seriousness of the difficulties which any children of the applicant are likely to encounter in the country to which the applicant is to be expelled; and

(j) the solidity of social, cultural and family ties with the host country and with the country of destination.

26. The seriousness of the offending is relevant both to the strength of the public interest and to the overall proportionality assessment. The sentence imposed will ordinarily provide an important indication of seriousness, but the nature and circumstances of the offending must also be considered. Where the sentence reflects matters other than the intrinsic seriousness of the offence, including a guilty plea or personal mitigation, appropriate regard must be had to those matters when assessing the weight of the public interest.

Findings

27. I make the following findings of fact having considered all of the evidence in the round and having applied the relevant burdens and standards of proof. My findings are based on a holistic assessment of the oral and documentary evidence. I refer to the evidence and submissions only to the extent necessary to explain my findings and the reasons for them.

28. It is not in dispute, and I find, that the Appellant has established family and private life within the meaning of Article 8(1) ECHR. I have regard to section 117C(1) of the 2002 Act, which affirms that the deportation of foreign criminals is in the public interest. I also remind myself, in accordance with section 117C(2), that the more serious the offence committed by the Appellant, the greater the public interest in his deportation.

29. It is accepted, and I find, that the Appellant is a foreign criminal within the meaning of section 117D of the 2002 Act. On 19 October 2022, he was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of theft from the person. He was sentenced on 7 November 2022 to an aggregate term of 28 months’ imprisonment, later reduced on appeal to 18 months.

30. The offences arose from a scheme involving the purported sale of laptop computers through social media. Prospective purchasers were induced to transfer or hand over money, after which they were deprived of the money without receiving the laptop. Force was used during the robberies. The sentencing judge found that the offending was planned and described the Appellant’s conduct as demonstrating a high level of dishonesty. Significant planning, his leading role and group activity were identified as aggravating features. In mitigation, the Appellant was aged 21, had no previous convictions, came from a supportive family and had pleaded guilty. The sentencing judge had regard to those matters, together with the contents of the pre-sentence report.

31. The OASys assessment, dated 18 April 2023, identified concerns relating to the Appellant’s susceptibility to negative associates, consequential thinking, problem-solving and awareness of the consequences of his conduct. It assessed him as presenting a medium risk of serious harm to the public in the community. However, it recorded a low actuarial risk of general and violent reoffending and a low risk of serious recidivism. It also recorded that he accepted responsibility, recognised that the offences would not have occurred had he refused to participate, expressed remorse for their effect upon the victims and was highly motivated to address his offending behaviour.

32. The Appellant said that he has rehabilitated. He relied upon the victim-awareness and other courses undertaken in custody, his work in the prison workshop and his subsequent engagement with probation. The probation officer’s letter dated 4 April 2025 records that he attended 18 planned office appointments, six appointments with the education, training and employment service, and four appointments concerning finance, debt and benefits. It describes his engagement as positive and records that he completed focused work concerning anger management, the consequences of his conduct and the influence of his peers.

33. The Appellant also relied upon the absence of further offending since his release in August 2023, his compliance with bail and reporting requirements, and his cessation of contact with the associate involved in the offending. He has worked as a groundworker since March 2026 and provided documentary evidence of that employment. He further relied upon his relationship with his partner, his daily involvement in caring for his daughter and the responsibilities he has assumed towards his family.

34. I accept that the Appellant has made material progress since his release. His rehabilitative work, positive engagement with probation, employment, family responsibilities and absence of further offending are relevant evidence of a change in his circumstances. However, there is no updated professional risk assessment replacing the 2023 OASys assessment. I therefore take his subsequent conduct into account as evidence of rehabilitation and a reduction in risk, while recognising that the earlier assessment remains relevant to the overall evaluation.

35. Against that background, I adopt the structured approach required by the statutory scheme and turn first to Exception 1. Although it was common ground that the Appellant could not satisfy all three requirements, I consider each requirement because the underlying facts remain relevant to the assessment of whether there are very compelling circumstances.

Exception 1

36. The first requirement of Exception 1 is that the Appellant must have been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. The Respondent’s records, which were not disputed, show that he entered the United Kingdom on 1 March 2012, aged 10, but was not granted leave to remain until 16 January 2020. Mr Toora accepted that this requirement was not met. It follows that the Appellant cannot satisfy Exception 1, as its three requirements are cumulative.

37. The second requirement concerns social and cultural integration. The Respondent accepted that it was met, and I find accordingly. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom when he was aged 10 and has lived here since March 2012. He completed his secondary and further education in this country and has worked here in several roles. At the date of the hearing, he had been employed as a groundworker since March 2026. His parents, brother, partner and daughter all live in the United Kingdom. He speaks English and said that, although he understands some Yoruba spoken by his parents, he does not speak any language other than English.

38. I have also taken account of the Appellant’s offending and imprisonment. Those matters are relevant to the assessment but are not necessarily determinative of integration. Since his release in August 2023, he has undertaken rehabilitative work, engaged with probation, obtained employment and assumed responsibilities towards his partner and daughter. Applying the broad evaluative approach in SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15, and assessing his circumstances at the date of the hearing, I find that the Appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.

39. The third requirement is that there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Nigeria. I have applied the broad evaluative approach described in SSHD v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813, Parveen v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 932 and SC (Jamaica). The question is whether the Appellant would be enough of an insider in Nigeria to understand how life there is carried on, participate in it and operate on a day-to-day basis, and whether he would have a reasonable opportunity, within a reasonable time, to develop human relationships giving substance to his private life. The threshold is a demanding one.

40. I accept that the Appellant left Nigeria when he was aged 10 and has not returned since. His parents, brother, partner and daughter live in the United Kingdom. He said that he has no relatives, property or other support network in Nigeria. His evidence was that he speaks only English, although he understands some Yoruba. His mother said that she had not returned to Nigeria since coming to the United Kingdom. His father had returned once, following the death of his mother. Both parents said that they had no property or remaining relatives in Nigeria.

41. I accept that those matters would make the Appellant’s return difficult. However, he was born in Nigeria and lived there until he was aged 10. He was raised by Nigerian parents who spent most of their lives there and continue to speak Yoruba between themselves. Although the Appellant does not speak Yoruba, he has some understanding of it and speaks English, which is the official language of Nigeria. His parents would remain able to provide information, guidance and emotional support from the United Kingdom as he adjusted to life there.

42. The Appellant’s parents said that they would be unable to support him financially. His mother referred to the cost of her studies, while his father said that he had savings of about £500. I accept that they would be unable to provide substantial or sustained financial support. Given the close and supportive nature of the family relationships, I do not exclude the possibility of modest assistance in the event of immediate need. However, my conclusion does not depend upon the availability of financial support from the Appellant’s family.

43. The Appellant is a fit and healthy adult with no identified physical or mental-health condition. He is educated and has experience of business administration, vehicle detailing and construction work. At the date of the hearing, he had been employed as a groundworker since March 2026. He said that he had obtained a CSCS card and a dumper licence and had also established a property-maintenance company. He had savings of approximately £2,000 and owned a vehicle worth about £800. This evidence demonstrates his capacity to work, manage his affairs and take practical steps towards supporting himself.

44. I have considered that the Appellant has no accommodation or employment arranged in Nigeria and has made no substantive enquiries about either. I do not treat the absence of such enquiries as determinative. His qualifications and experience are transferable skills capable of assisting him in seeking employment and supporting himself. There was no meaningful evidence of any personal circumstance that would prevent him from seeking employment or accommodation in Nigeria.

45. The Appellant’s parents referred in their oral evidence to general insecurity and safety concerns in Nigeria. Those matters had not been raised in their witness statements, were not developed in the Appellant’s closing submissions and were unsupported by country evidence demonstrating that the Appellant would personally be at risk or that such concerns would materially impede his integration. I therefore attach little weight to those general assertions.

46. Considering the evidence cumulatively, I am not satisfied that the Appellant would face very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria. His return would involve considerable disruption and hardship, particularly given his lengthy absence and the absence of established accommodation, employment or close family members there. However, for the reasons given, I find that he would be able, within a reasonable time, to understand and participate in life in Nigeria, operate on a day-to-day basis and establish a private life there. The third requirement of Exception 1 is not met.

Exception 2

47. I turn first to the Appellant’s relationship with his partner, Megan Kennedy. By the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondent accepted that Ms Kennedy is a British citizen resident in the United Kingdom and that their relationship is genuine and subsisting. The Respondent did not contend that she should relocate to Nigeria. The issue is whether it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without the Appellant.

48. I accept that the Appellant and Ms Kennedy are in a committed relationship and function as a family. They began their relationship in 2023 and lived together at the Appellant’s parents’ home during her pregnancy. Ms Kennedy and their daughter moved to separate accommodation in August 2026. The Appellant is not named on the tenancy and does not remain there overnight because his bail conditions require him to maintain his parents’ address as his primary residence. Their homes are approximately three minutes apart, and both said that he visits every day after work.

49. The Appellant described returning from work at about 5.00 pm and spending the evening with Ms Kennedy and their daughter. He said that he plays with the child, prepares food, assists with bathing and bedtime, and cares for her alone when Ms Kennedy attends the gym. Their evidence concerning his daily involvement was broadly consistent. I accept that he provides substantial practical support and plays an important role in their family life.

50. I have considered carefully the evidence concerning Ms Kennedy’s health. She said that she was diagnosed with autism following an assessment when she was aged 16. Only the first page of that assessment was provided. The Respondent had expressly raised the absence of the remaining pages in the review, but they were not subsequently produced. I therefore approach the documentary evidence of the diagnosis with some caution. Irrespective of the precise diagnostic position, I accept Ms Kennedy’s evidence concerning the difficulties she experiences, including longstanding anxiety, difficulty making telephone calls and attending appointments, problems communicating with unfamiliar people, and episodes of panic and feeling overwhelmed.

51. Ms Kennedy said that the Appellant accompanies her to appointments, assists her in communicating with medical professionals and assumes responsibility for their daughter when she needs time to recover. The medical evidence is consistent with her experiencing genuine mental-health difficulties. The July 2025 records refer to anxiety, low mood and possible postpartum depression, with an Edinburgh Postnatal Depression Scale score of 21 out of 30. They record a referral to the community perinatal mental-health team and identify the Appellant’s immigration position as a source of stress.

52. The GP record dated 4 September 2026 records worsening anxiety associated with the deportation proceedings and concern about the relationship between the Appellant and their daughter. Ms Kennedy was prescribed sertraline 50 mg daily and was awaiting counselling. In her oral evidence, she became upset when describing the possibility of separation. I accept that the uncertainty surrounding the Appellant’s position has exacerbated her anxiety and that his deportation would be likely to cause significant emotional distress.

53. However, I am not satisfied that Ms Kennedy is medically dependent upon the Appellant. Although he provides significant emotional and practical support, the evidence does not establish that her treatment or ability to manage her conditions is dependent upon his presence. She would continue to have access to NHS treatment, prescribed medication and such counselling or other support as her clinicians considered appropriate. I take those matters into account while recognising that professional support would not replace the distinct emotional and practical support provided by the Appellant.

54. The Appellant also provides financial support. He has been employed as a groundworker since March 2026, and the documentary evidence records net monthly pay of approximately £1,900. Ms Kennedy works full time as a teaching assistant and said that she earns approximately £1,400 to £1,500 each month. She receives child benefit, housing support and assistance with nursery fees. She said that she was living from one salary payment to the next, was unable to save and relied upon the Appellant’s contributions towards household and child-related expenses.

55. I accept that the Appellant’s deportation would reduce the resources available to Ms Kennedy and make it more difficult for her to maintain the household. His practical contribution also assists her in continuing to work. She explained that when their daughter was recently unwell, she and the Appellant had shared the resulting absence from work. She was concerned that further absences, without his assistance, might place her employment at risk. She also said that changing employment would be difficult because her present work enables her to be available during school holidays.

56. However, Ms Kennedy would not be without practical support. Her mother collects the child from nursery at about 1.30 pm on each working day and cares for her until Ms Kennedy finishes work at about 4.45 pm. The Appellant’s mother has also cared for the child when she has been unwell, and the Appellant’s parents live approximately five minutes away. I accept that those relatives work and could not reproduce the Appellant’s daily role. Nevertheless, the evidence establishes an existing network of regular childcare and practical support.

57. I have also considered Ms Kennedy’s evidence that returning to her mother’s home would not be a realistic long-term option. She described that home as overcrowded and explained that her two younger brothers have behavioural and additional needs. She said that, while living there previously, she and the child occupied a converted dining room and that the noise and overcrowding adversely affected the household. I accept that returning there would be undesirable and that her present accommodation provides greater stability. However, the evidence did not establish that the Appellant’s deportation would necessarily result in the loss of that accommodation or that she would be unable to obtain alternative housing assistance. She remains in full-time employment and presently receives housing support, child benefit and assistance with nursery costs.

58. I have assessed the consequences cumulatively and by reference to Ms Kennedy’s particular circumstances. The Appellant’s deportation would remove an important source of emotional, practical and financial support. It would cause her considerable distress, increase the demands of employment and childcare, and would be likely to exacerbate her existing anxiety. I do not minimise those consequences.

59. Nevertheless, Ms Kennedy presently maintains full-time employment while acting as the child’s primary carer and managing her longstanding difficulties. She would continue to have regular childcare from her mother, practical assistance from the Appellant’s nearby family and access to medical treatment. If she were unable to continue working, she and the child would remain able to seek such welfare and housing assistance as they were eligible to receive. The evidence did not establish that separation would render her unable to function or care for her daughter, or that she would necessarily lose her employment or accommodation. Considering the evidence cumulatively and by reference to Ms Kennedy’s particular circumstances, I am not satisfied that the effect of the Appellant’s deportation upon her in the “stay” scenario would be unduly harsh.

60. I turn to the effect of the Appellant’s deportation upon his British daughter. By the conclusion of the hearing, the Respondent accepted that the Appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with her. The Respondent did not contend that the child should relocate to Nigeria. The issue is whether it would be unduly harsh for her to remain in the United Kingdom without him.

61. The child’s best interests are a primary consideration, although not the paramount consideration. I find that her best interests are to remain in the United Kingdom with both parents, within the family unit they have established. She is a British citizen, is settled in the care of her mother and has a close relationship with the Appellant, who is involved in her life on a daily basis.

62. Many of the relevant circumstances overlap with my findings concerning Ms Kennedy, which I bring forward. The Appellant visits the family home each day after work. He plays with his daughter, prepares food, assists with bathing and bedtime, and cares for her alone when Ms Kennedy attends the gym or requires time to recover from her anxiety. I accept that he is an active and involved father who provides the child with regular care, affection and practical support.

63. The Appellant’s deportation would deprive the child of his physical presence and daily care. Given her young age, telephone and video communication would not provide a meaningful substitute for his direct involvement. Regular visits to Nigeria would also be difficult financially and practically. I accept that separation would be contrary to her best interests and would cause significant disruption to the family life she presently enjoys.

64. However, the child would remain in the United Kingdom with Ms Kennedy, who is her primary carer and has cared for her throughout her life. There was no suggestion that the child has any health or developmental difficulty, and the Appellant described her as being in good health. She would remain in familiar surroundings and, at present, has established nursery arrangements and a settled routine. She also receives regular care from her maternal grandmother, who collects her from nursery each working day, and practical support from the Appellant’s parents, who live nearby.

65. I have considered the effect upon the child of the additional emotional, practical and financial pressures that Ms Kennedy would experience. Those consequences would indirectly affect the child. However, for the reasons already given, the evidence does not establish that Ms Kennedy would be unable to continue caring for her, that the child would necessarily lose her home, or that the wider family support would cease to be available.

66. I have considered the child’s circumstances individually and cumulatively. I do not minimise the loss of the Appellant’s daily presence or the disruption that his deportation would cause. Nevertheless, the child would remain in the care of her mother, within familiar surroundings and with established support from both sides of the family. I am not satisfied that the consequences, whether considered directly or through their effect upon Ms Kennedy, would meet the demanding threshold of undue harshness.

67. Drawing those matters together, I accept that the “stay” scenario would be harsh for both Ms Kennedy and the child. However, having considered their circumstances separately and cumulatively, I am not satisfied that the consequences would be unduly harsh. Exception 2 is therefore not met.

Very compelling circumstances

68. I now consider whether there are very compelling circumstances, over and above the exceptions, capable of outweighing the strong public interest in the Appellant’s deportation. Applying the structured statutory framework and having regard to HA (Iraq), I bring forward my earlier findings, consider the matters relied upon outside the statutory exceptions, and assess cumulatively all factors weighing for and against deportation.

69. In favour of deportation, I bring forward my findings concerning the nature and seriousness of the Appellant’s offending. He was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of theft from the person and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment. The offending involved planning, a leading role, group activity and the use of force on separate occasions. It engages a substantial public interest in deportation, comprising not only the prevention of further offending but also deterrence and public concern.

70. I also bring forward my findings concerning the 2023 OASys assessment. Although the actuarial assessments indicated a low risk of reoffending and serious recidivism, the Appellant was assessed as presenting a medium risk of serious harm to the public in the community. There is no updated professional assessment superseding that conclusion. His subsequent rehabilitation is relevant and weighs in his favour, but does not remove the wider public interest arising from his offending.

71. The Appellant’s relationship with Ms Kennedy was formed after his conviction and after deportation proceedings had commenced. She knew of his conviction and was aware of the deportation proceedings, although she did not initially appreciate their full seriousness. That does not diminish the genuineness of the relationships or the child’s best interests, but is relevant to the proportionality assessment.

72. Although the Appellant has lived in the United Kingdom since childhood and is socially and culturally integrated here, much of his residence was not lawful. In assessing the weight to be attached to that matter, I take account of the fact that he was a child and was not responsible for his immigration status during a substantial part of that period. I accordingly reduce the adverse weight attributable to his unlawful residence. For the reasons already given, he would not face very significant obstacles to integration in Nigeria. The factual findings underlying my conclusions on Exceptions 1 and 2 remain relevant to the cumulative proportionality assessment.

73. Against deportation, I bring forward my findings concerning the Appellant’s lengthy residence in the United Kingdom. He arrived when he was aged 10 and has lived here since March 2012. He completed his secondary and further education here and is socially and culturally integrated.

74. I also bring forward my findings concerning the Appellant’s ties to Nigeria. He has not returned since leaving as a child, has no established accommodation, employment, property or close family members there, and does not speak Yoruba, although he understands some of it. His immediate family and the substance of his private and family life are in the United Kingdom. While I have found that these matters do not amount to very significant obstacles to integration, they remain relevant to the overall proportionality assessment.

75. I attach weight to the Appellant’s conduct since his release in August 2023. He has not committed any further offence, has complied with his bail and reporting requirements, and is no longer in contact with the associate involved in the offending. He undertook rehabilitative work in custody, including victim-awareness work, and engaged positively with probation.

76. The Appellant has also obtained employment and assumed family responsibilities. He has been employed as a groundworker since March 2026, has obtained construction-related qualifications and has established a property-maintenance company. He provides emotional, practical and financial support to Ms Kennedy and is actively involved in the daily care of their daughter. I accept that these matters demonstrate material progress and a greater degree of stability and responsibility since his release.

77. I bring forward my findings concerning Ms Kennedy. She has genuine mental-health difficulties, including longstanding anxiety, and the uncertainty surrounding the Appellant’s position has exacerbated them. His deportation would remove an important source of emotional, practical and financial support, cause her considerable distress and increase the demands upon her as the child’s primary carer. Although I have found that those consequences would not be unduly harsh, they carry weight in the cumulative assessment.

78. The child’s best interests are to remain in the United Kingdom with both parents. She is a British citizen and has a genuine and subsisting relationship with the Appellant, who is involved in her care each day. His deportation would deprive her of his physical presence and daily involvement. Given her young age, remote communication would not provide a meaningful substitute. Although I have found that the consequences would not meet the unduly harsh threshold, her best interests and the disruption to her family life weigh against deportation.

79. I also take account of the Appellant’s close relationships with his parents and brother, all of whom live in the United Kingdom. Their evidence described a supportive family unit and the changes they had observed in him since his release. There was no evidence of dependency beyond the ordinary emotional ties between adult family members. Although deportation would disrupt those relationships, they could be maintained through modern means of communication and, where practicable, visits.

80. Having undertaken the required balancing exercise, I find that the circumstances relied upon by the Appellant, considered individually and cumulatively, do not amount to very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2. They do not outweigh the strong public interest in his deportation.

81. I therefore find that the Appellant’s deportation would be a proportionate interference with his private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. His deportation would not breach Article 8.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signature

Signed Date 04 November 2026

A. Khurram

First-tier Tribunal Judge Khurram

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Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

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Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
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IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.