Civil United Kingdom
RM v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1416
Case No: CA-2025-001703
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MANUELL
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 04/11/2026
Before:
LADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING
LADY JUSTICE FALK
and
LADY JUSTICE LIEVEN
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Between:
| RM | Appellant | |
| – and – | ||
| THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | Respondent |
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Jonathan Greer (instructed by George Madubuike of Broudie Jackson Canter Solicitors) for the Appellant
Gavin Dingley (instructed by Nicole Bedford of Government Legal Department) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 13 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 11.30am on 04 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Lady Justice Lieven:
Introduction
1. The Appellant (“RM”) appeals, with the permission of Newey LJ, against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the UT”) dismissing his appeal from a determination of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”). The FTT had dismissed RM’s appeal from the Secretary of State’s decision dated 4 September 2023 to refuse RM’s protection claims (“the FTT Decision”).
2. RM was represented by Mr Jonathan Greer and the Respondent, the Secretary of State for the Home Department “SSHD”, was represented by Mr Gavin Dingley.
3. RM applied for and was granted permission to appeal on five Grounds, but now only pursues Grounds Three and Five. Ground Three relates to a concession made by the SSHD before the UT but not accepted by the UT. Ground Five relates to RM’s political activities.
The Facts
4. RM is a 28 year old man from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He applied for asylum on 23 February 2021. On 25 February 2021 he underwent a “Screening Interview” during which the interviewer completed an “Initial Contact and Asylum Registration Questionnaire”. Significant passages of that form, including 4.1, which asked the question, “Please BRIEFLY explain ALL of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country?” were left blank. In that interview he said that he had left Iraq because of a feud between families, and he was in fear of his life because of that. The record of this interview is described as the Screening Interview Record (“SIR”).
5. On 12 May 2021 RM’s solicitors sent an email to the Asylum Operations Team handling his application for asylum, seeking to clarify some of the answers that he had given in the Screening Interview. I will refer to this as the “Clarificatory Letter”. It relevantly stated as follows (references to question numbers are to responses recorded in the SIR):
“Meanwhile, we have now had the opportunity of reading back the SIR to applicant, with the assistance of an interpreter. He has made the following comments with clarifications, which he wishes the UKVI to take into account when considering and deciding his case. …
4. SIR Q3.1: I wish to clarify that I have two reason for fleeing my country. Firstly, I fled because I attended and participated in demonstrations against the KRG authority. Secondly, I fled also because I got involved in an honour crime. Both of these twin reasons are connected.
…
6. SIR Q4.1: This question was not asked. However, I wish to clarify that from when I was in my 1st year in university, I started to demonstrate against the KRG authority. As a result, all the security officials knew my name. This resulted in them preventing me from visiting Erbil. I could only visit Sulaymaniyah. Even after I graduated from university and got a job in Sulaymaniyah, the KRG authority created problems for me, which led to me getting fired from my job.
7. During my study in university, I was in a relationship with a girl. We decided we would get married on completing our respective degrees. Both families were aware of our relationship. But we could not get married because I did not have a decent job after I graduated and when I did find a job, I got fired and the KRG authorities created problems for me.
8. One day she decided to come to come to stay and live with me without her family knowing. When her family found out, they came and took her back. When my family knew about what happened, they did not say anything to me, but they approved for my girlfriend’s family to carry out on me, any punishment they deemed fit, including death.
9. My girlfriend knew that her family was coming to get her and to inflict punishment on me, so, she told me and I fled and went into hiding.
10. When they took back their daughter, they went to my family to ask about my whereabouts. They were told I was not there. However, in trying placate them, my family approved for them to do whatever they liked to me when they find me.
11. After this, when I went back to my family, they were angry with me and asked me to leave the house. They said to me that I have to flee the country to escape the punishment from my girlfriend’s family. They said the only thing they can do for me, is to fund my illegal exit from the country
…..
14. I also could not seek protection from the KRG authorities because I have previously come to their adverse attention on many occasions, when I demonstrated against them.
15. SIR Q5.5: I wish to clarify that I stated I participated in demonstrations against the KRG authorities during this interview. I did not understand the question.”
6. On 18 July 2023 RM was subject to an asylum interview. References to questions in this interview are to “AIRx”. A number of answers to questions in this interview are important to the FTT Decision. At Question 10 (“Q10”) RM said that he had been sacked as a civil engineer. At Q27-29 RM explained that he had had a sexual relationship with G that led him to be in fear of honour-based violence from her father.
7. Q31 stated:
“31. Question (required)
Other than this that was briefly described, are there any other reasons that you are claiming asylum
31. Response (required)
The other reason I’m claiming asylum, when I was at university I participated in demonstrations against the ruling government, this is what led me to get fired from the company and no other company would employ me based on their word.”
8. The interviewer at Q43 turned to “the main basis of your claim”, namely the relationship with G. At Q48 he said that both sides of the families had been aware of the relationship. At Q52-57 it is recorded as follows:
“52. Question (required)
You mentioned earlier but for clarity, what event caused your girlfriends family to turn against you
52. Response (required)
The problem started when we finished university, her family were aware and my family were as well. Her family was expecting me to ask for her hand in marriage but because of my financial situation I couldn’t do this so I asked my girlfriend to break up due to my situation and she heard that, left her house and came to me without permission from her family. The problems started then.
53. Question (required)
Why did you decide to end the relationship
53. Response (required)
Because of my financial situation I couldn’t find a job and I couldn’t afford to do that, that’s why
54. Question (required)
Could you have turned to her family for assistance given his power and influence
54. Response (required)
No I couldn’t because her family wanted us to break up because they wanted us to breakup because they considered me not at the same level as them in society.
55. Question (required)
You previously said that the relationship was accepted amicably by both sides of the family
55. Response (required)
Because when I was in university at that period of time, they were aware of their daughter being in a relationship with me but not aware of my financial standing, when they found this out they were opposed to the relationship
56. Question (required)
Was there a particular event that caused the issue to get much worse
56. Response (required)
When she came to my house she remained 4 days in my home without her family being aware. After this time she called her mother and told her where she was so her family came to take her back home but before they came I left the house. After they took her to the hospital to examine her to see if she has something or had slept with me, she was found to not be a virgin so the problems started there.
57. Question (required)
What happened after her family made that discovery
57. Response (required)
After they found out about what happened between us they visited my family and told them that we have to find your son and kill him because he brought shame to our family. After that my father called me and told me what has happened, that they will kill me. He said that my family had to take me to them to kill me which they can not do. He said that the only way that you can escape this is to flee the country. They said that they will help me to flee the country but after that they don’t want to hear from me again. My father arranged the money for me to flee the country.”
9. At Q65 onwards he was asked further questions about his political activities. He said at Q65 that he was a leader of a demonstration against the KDP (the government party). When he was 18 years old, he had attended a demonstration at Qaladez and attacked the KDP base there. Then at Q74 he said he had attended other demonstrations whilst at university against the PUK, and that had led him to be sacked from his work. He said he was arrested (Q76-80) on 25 November 2018 during a demonstration at which time he was tasered. He was released the next day.
10. The SSHD Decision Letter (“DL”) is dated 4 September 2023. The evidence considered includes the Clarificatory Letter of 12 May 2021, as well as the two interviews. The DL states that RM provided “inconsistent evidence without reasonable explanation” and that some elements of his account were “implausible and inconsistent with external information”.
11. RM appealed to the FTT and made a Witness Statement dated 22 January 2024, in support of his appeal. In the witness statement he said:
“10. After we graduated, we did not have the opportunity to seek her [G’s] hand from her family because her family sent us a message advising us not to come to seek her hand in marriage, as we were in a lower class than them i.e. financially and in societal standing, but this was because I had gotten involved in demonstrations against the authorities, which they afterwards discovered.
11. [G]’s father is connected with the PUK, so my participating in demonstrations was something that annoyed him and this is why he and his family refused for us to take [G]’s hand in marriage anymore.
12. At this time, I was employed, but I got fired from my job due to participating in anti-regime demonstrations.
…
41. In response to the decision maker’s comments about my participation in UK demonstrations, I do not agree I have not provided adequate details about this. I also do not believe I have not been passionate about my motivations.
42. I will state that my motivation is the Kurdish government’s corruption and the Kurdish people’s poor living conditions and the loss of part of Kurdistan under control of PUK and PDK for example, Kirkuk and Shingal respectively.
…
47. In response to the decision maker’s comments about the history of my demonstrations in Iraq and about getting arrested, but stating during my screening interview that I was not detained, I will clarify that I provided that answer due to my understanding of the question, as I had not been processed and or found guilty. This is why I answered no, during my screening interview.
48. I thought and understood the question was if I had been detained due to criminal and or terror related activities.
49. After the attack of the base of the PDK (i.e. KDP) in Qaladizah during the demonstration I also attended, I never went to Erbil and or to the Yellow Zone, where the PDK has influence. So, I have never been arrested due to the attack of the PDK base in Qaladizah, resulting from that demonstrations.
50. Afterwards, I got arrested on 25/11/2018 following my participation at a demonstration in the Green Zone, where the PUK are in control.
51. In response to the decision maker’s comments about evidence of my sur place activities in the UK i.e. my participation in UK demonstrations and my posts against the Kurdish authorities, I will clarify that it is true I have attended many demonstrations in the UK against the authorities in my country.
52. However, I was not focused on providing evidence of these to the Home Office at the time, rather I was occupied with making my stance against the regime known.
53. Now that the decision maker makes it clear that this is an issue, I am able to provide more [than] 60 pages of my Facebook evidence, which shows my anti-regime posts, many of them are dated pre decision.
54. The Facebook evidence also confirms the many UK demonstrations I have participated in and again there are places in the evidence with dates, which confirms many of them took place before my case was decided and afterwards.
….
58. This late knowledge or discovery of my anti-regime activities was what I believe triggered the collapse of our relationship because [G’s] father changed his mind about the family approval previously given to us to date ourselves.
59. In response to the decision maker’s comments that low level protesters attract no adverse attention in Iraq from the Kurdish authorities, I will clarify that I am not a low level protester because those whose names now feature on social media platforms, such as Kawa Garmaini, Sherwan Sherwany, Chalakwani Badinan, Sorani Mama Hama and others were just like me before they were killed by the authorities, after which, we the survivors, started using their names in counting and recollecting the innocents the regime has killed.
60. I have the firm opinion that both the PUK and PDK (i.e. KDP) have already opened a file for me and this is why I fear involuntary return, as I do not wish to take that risk.”
The FTT Decision
12. The FTT Decision is dated 6 June 2024. At [6] the FTT recorded that there were three agreed issues; credibility; risk from sur place activities; and whether RM could obtain the documentation required to live in Iraq.
13. The FTT found against RM on his credibility. At [9]-[15] it said:
“9. The appellant’s claim is advanced on the basis of his relationship with a young woman, G. The respondent takes a number of issues which in his view, are indicative of a lack of credibility. First, the appellant’s description of his relationship with G is said to be inconsistent. Initially, the appellant claimed to have been in a relationship with G for three years with the knowledge of her family (AIR 48). The explanation given for the disapproval of her family is that ‘her family was expecting me to ask for her hand in marriage but because of my financial situation I couldn’t do this so I asked my girlfriend to break up due to my situation’. The appellant goes onto explain this situation was ‘I couldn’t get a job’ (AIR 53).
10. The account given in the witness statement is a different account. In the witness statement, the appellant says he was told by G’s family not to seek her hand in marriage, because it was discovered the appellant was involved in political demonstrations, and that he had been fired for participating in those demonstrations. Neither of these factors were mentioned in the appellant’s asylum interview, and I find that is a factor which undermines his credibility.
11. I also find it difficult to accept that after three years of being in a relationship, the financial situation of the appellant would not be known to G’s family. The family were aware of the relationship, and the possibility of marriage was clearly contemplated, and I do not accept the appellant’s financial circumstances and social standing would not have been a factor known to G’s family earlier in their relationship. This is all the more so when the appellant claims G’s father worked for the financial interior ministry (AIR 50).
12. The catalyst the appellant points to is an event after their breakup, when G came to stay at his home without the permission of her parents (AIR 56). It appears from his witness statement that his family were aware of G being in their home. I do not find it plausible the appellant’s family, no doubt aware of G’s father and his position, and the overall prevalence of honour crimes in Kurdistan, would have sheltered G in this way for 4 days.
13. I am further troubled by the appellant’s apparent discrepancy in how the situation was handled by his own family. It seems that although disapproving, they tolerated G’s presence within their home. They then appear to approve of the appellant’s death, but also then fund his exit from Iraq (p.980, SB). I am not of the view the appellant’s family would have allowed G in their home and not contemplated the negative outcome of this situation.
14. The appellant also claimed in oral evidence that G is still alive, having heard this from friends who remain in Iraq. His explanation for her remaining alive even after her alleged transgression of losing her virginity to him before marriage, is that in Kurdish culture, both the male and female are killed together in honour crimes. This is not borne out by the background evidence, and I find G being alive is a factor which further undermines the appellant’s credibility and is indicative of there being no risk to him.
15. The appellant’s claimed fears in Iraq also extend to his involvement in political demonstrations, and the fact he had been detained in Iraq as a result of his political activity in November 2018. This is not mentioned in his screening interview despite being asked specifically whether he had ever been detained (SI 5.4). In my view, the appellant has invented this aspect in an attempt to strengthen his weak claim to be at risk as a result of a relationship with G.”
14. At [16] the FTT referred to s.8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 in relation to RM’s failure to claim asylum in Belgium or France.
15. At [17] the FTT concluded, “I find his account is riddled with inconsistencies to the point where it cannot be considered credible”.
16. The FTT then turned to whether RM would be at risk by reason of his sur place political activities. The FTT rejected RM’s claim to have attended demonstrations in Iraq, or to have come to the attention of the Iraqi authorities. The FTT therefore found that there is no risk of return on that basis:
“20. I have rejected the appellant’s claim to have attended demonstrations whilst in Iraq. I do not accept he has ever come to the attention of the Iraqi authorities before. The unreliable nature of his Facebook evidence notwithstanding, I do not find the appellant has shown his Facebook activity has, or is likely to, come to the attention of the authorities within the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. I do not find he is at risk upon return on this basis.
21. The appellant’s attendance at demonstrations is the second aspect of his sur place activity. In his oral evidence, the appellant details his attendance at demonstrations. He has provided photographic evidence of his attendance and I accept he was in attendance as claimed. Having found the appellant attended these demonstrations, I now consider what his role at the demonstrations was. The case of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC), in its fourth headnote, outlines a number of factors to be considered when looking at an individual’s role in demonstrations. The appellant does not claim to be a leader or organiser of the demonstrations.
22. I am not told any of the demonstrations have been reported on in the media either here or in Iraq, nor am I told the appellant’s attendance is detailed anywhere other than in Facebook posts. In the absence of evidence his attendance was noticed or publicised in the media, I find that no risk would arise from his attendance at these demonstrations. The appellant was at most, a face in a large crowd.”
17. The FTT considered RM’s attendance at demonstrations in the UK and found that at most he was a face in a large crowd. At [23] the FTT said:
“23. I make clear at this point, the motivation for the appellant’s sur place activity is irrelevant as far as the risk on return is concerned. I do not however, find the appellant’s activities in the United Kingdom are reasonably likely to have been discovered by the authorities in Iraq, and therefore I do not find he is at risk upon return on this basis either.”
18. On the third issue the FTT found that RM could obtain the requisite documentation.
The Concession
19. RM appealed the FTT Decision and on 28 August 2024 was granted permission by UTJ Owens. Ground Three of the appeal was that the FTT had in the judgment at [10] overlooked the fact that RM had written to the SSHD after the screening interview saying that he had been unable to find work because of his political activities in Iraq, i.e. the Clarificatory Letter.
20. On 29 October SSHD responded to the Grounds of Appeal under Rule 24. Paragraph 5 of that document stated:
“Ground 3 it is accepted that the Judge appears to have overlooked paragraph 6 on page 980 of the stitched bundle[i.e. paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter], however it is submitted this is not a material error in light of all the other well made adverse credibility findings.”
This is described below as “the Concession”.
The Upper Tribunal Decision
21. The UT dismissed the appeal on all Grounds. At [21] the UT referred to the inconsistency between the screening interview and the Asylum Interview, saying:
“21. One of the main inconsistencies in the evidence was the Appellant’s declaration that he had not been detained in Northern Iraq (screening interview Q.5.4) and his claim in his asylum interview (Qq 76 to 79) that he had been arrested and detained overnight after attending a demonstration. The Judge observed at [10] of his decision that the Appellant’s witness statement conflicted with the asylum interview record. At [17] the Judge observed that the Appellant’s claim that G would not be killed until he returned when they would be killed together had no support in any of the country background evidence. That was no challenge to that at the error of law hearing. The Appellant’s claim that his family had disowned him and was prepared to see him dead was wholly inconsistent with their raising $15,000 for him to leave Iraq. The Appellant’s claim that he had been politically active in Iraq can be seen as inconsistent with his statement that he belonged to no political party or organisation.”
22. I note that in this paragraph the UT is highlighting a different inconsistency, namely that at Q5.4 of the SIR RM had said that he had not been detained in any country. This was not a matter referred to in the Clarificatory Letter. This was different from the matters relied upon by the FTT judge at [10]. It is correct to record therefore that there were a number of inconsistencies.
23. At [24] – [25] the UT said:
“24. Despite the Respondent’s concession in the Rule 24 notice that the Judge had failed to consider the letter of explanation sent following the Appellant’s screening interview, the Tribunal is not bound to accept any such concession. As the Tribunal considers that there is nothing in the Judge’s decision to suggest any factual error in his examination of the claim, the Tribunal rejects the concession. The Appellant’s bundle was lengthy, probably excessively so, and the Judge was required to discuss only the parts which seemed to him of relevance and importance. The asylum interview record, the Appellant’s witness statement and the Appellant’s oral evidence, all of which post-dated the letter of correction, were plainly such items and they were fully addressed.”
25. The submission that the Judge had made no finding about whether the Appellant would continue his political activities or to express his claimed opposition views on return to Northern Iraq is not well-founded. The Judge rejected the Appellant’s claimed political commitment at [20] of the decision. His statement that the Appellant’s motivation was irrelevant, i.e., that the question was one of perception by the authorities, was an accurate reference to the well-known case of Danian [1999] EWCA Civ 3000. The Judge found that the Appellant had had no political involvement in Iraq and had never come to the notice of the authorities there. Thus the Appellant’s claim of conscience-driven political activity was rejected. The Appellant’s sur place activities in the United Kingdom were unlikely to come to the attention of the Northern Iraqi authorities either. Thus the Judge dealt sufficiently with this issue in the context of a claim which was found incredible for multiple sustainable reasons.”
Ground Three
24. Before the UT the SSHD had conceded that the FTT “appears to have overlooked paragraph 6 on page 980…”, i.e. the Concession. Mr Greer accepts that the UT was not bound by the Concession, but he submits that if the UT was going to reject the Concession, then it was required to give RM the opportunity to address the reasoning upon which it was rejected.
25. He focuses on [10] of the FTT Decision and the alleged inconsistency between RM’s account referred to in [9] and what he had said in his witness statement. There are two points of disagreement between the parties about what the FTT was saying in these paragraphs. Firstly, Mr Greer submits that the reference in the last sentence of [10] is to the Screening Interview in February 2021, whereas Mr Dingley says it is to the Asylum Interview in July 2023. This matters because the Clarificatory Letter, the subject of the Concession, related to the Screening Interview and could not have related to the Asylum Interview, as that post-dated the Letter by two years.
26. In my view FTT decision at [10] must be a reference to the Asylum Interview, because if [9] and [10] are read together the FTT must be referring back in [10] to what it was relying on as being inconsistent from [9]. [9] is undoubtedly referring to the Asylum Interview because the Judge uses the acronym “AIR”. When the Judge wishes to refer to the Screening Interview, as he does at [15], he uses the acronym “SI”.
27. The second area of disagreement is whether in [10] the first sentence of the paragraph is saying that there were two reasons G’s family rejected RM: his involvement in political demonstration and because he had lost his job by reason of them; or alternatively whether there were two entirely independent inconsistencies firstly, G’s family’s rejection of him because of the demonstrations and separately that he had lost his job because of the demonstrations.
28. In my view a sensible reading of the decision indicates that the Judge was referring to RM’s relationship with G, and why her family rejected him. [10] is phrased as being in contrast with [9], which is entirely focused on that relationship and why its breakdown allegedly put him at risk. What the Judge was dealing with at [10] is what he viewed as RM’s inconsistent accounts of why G’s family had said he could not marry her.
29. Mr Greer makes three submissions on Ground Three – procedural unfairness in respect of the Concession; error by the FTT at [10]; and that those errors were material.
30. Firstly, he says that the UT was procedurally unfair in going behind the Concession without expressly putting the point to RM. Secondly, he says that the FTT erred in at [10] in not taking into account the critical parts of the Clarificatory Letter. I will deal with both those submissions together.
31. Mr Greer relies upon HA v SSHD (No2) [2010] CSIH 28; 2010 SC 457 at [9], where the Scottish Extra Division of the Inner House of the Court of Session said;
“[9] Even where a point is expressly conceded by one party, the tribunal is not obliged to accept the concession; but in that situation, as was observed in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Maheshwaran (para 4):
‘[I]t will usually be unfair to decide the case against the other party on the basis that the concession was wrongly made, unless the Tribunal indicates that it is minded to take that course.’”
32. I note however that they went on to say at [10];
“There is, on the other hand, no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may rely in reaching its decision.”
33. In IM (Pakistan) v SSHD [2018] EWCA Civ 626 the SSHD had accepted that the Appellant had entered into an engagement agreement, see [19]. The Court of Appeal said at [23]-[24]:
“23. Secondly, neither the FTT nor the UT were bound to accept the concession made by the respondent in the RL. As stated in the case of Kalidas (agreed facts – best practice) [2012] UKUT 00327 (IAC):
“35. Judges, unless in exceptional circumstances, do not look behind factual concessions. Such exceptional circumstances may arise where the concession is partial or unclear, and evidence develops in such a way that a judge considers that the extent and correctness of the concession must be revisited. If so, she must draw that immediately to attention of representatives so that they have an opportunity to ask such further questions, lead such further evidence and make such further submissions as required. An adjournment may become necessary.”
24. The FTT found that there had only been “preliminary negotiations” with regard to the marriage. As is accepted, this was contrary to the respondent’s concession that there had been an engagement agreement, but the error of law found by the UT was not that the FTT went behind the concession made, but that it did so without giving notice that it might do so, thereby depriving the appellant any opportunity to address the issue. This was the error of law alleged in the application for permission to appeal to the UT in which it was said that the FTT had erred by “cutting across” the respondent’s concession “without the FTT providing the parties with any warnings of its intention to do so”. The appropriate recourse in such a case is clearly remission.”
34. Mr Greer submits that there would need to be exceptional circumstances for it not to be procedurally unfair for the tribunal to reject a concession without drawing it to the parties’ attention.
35. On this issue Mr Dingley relies onMH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession)Albania [2025] UKUT 351 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) was reconsidering the circumstances in which a concession could be withdrawn. The Tribunal conducted a review of the relevant authorities, and at [48] said that “there is likely to be wider scope to permit a concession to be withdrawn if the concession was productive of an error of law”. They cited Bahamas International Trust Co Ltd v Threadgold [1974] 1 WLR 1514 and Rauf v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1276. In that case Sir Ernest Ryder drew the distinction between concessions concerning an erroneous reading of the Immigration Rules and factual concessions.
36. Mr Dingley submits that the UT was not bound by the Concession and there was no unfairness in the UT departing from it without expressly informing RM. Unlike the concession in IM (Pakistan) the concession was qualified, using the word “appears”; was narrow and expressly denied that the error made by the FTT was material.
37. Mr Greer’s second and closely interlinked submission was that the FTT had failed to take into account paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Clarificatory Letter, which set out RM’s political activities and that those activities were related to the fact that he could not marry G. This material was critical to any determination about RM’s consistency of account, and therefore to a conclusion on his credibility.
38. Mr Greer’s case proceeded on the basis that the last sentence of [10] of the FTT decision was referring to the Screening Interview. The Clarificatory Letter was therefore critical because it explained the gaps in the Screening Interview and set out RM’s position in May 2021. For the reasons I have given at [26] above, I think it is clear that [10] was referring to the Asylum Interview, which post-dated the Clarificatory Letter. However, Mr Greer submits that if the FTT was referring to the Asylum Interview then the Judge was again wrong and failed to properly consider the evidence. RM had referred in his Asylum Interview to having lost his job because of his political activities, see Qs 10, 31 and 74 referred to above at [6], [7] and [9]. If the Judge was referring to the Asylum Interview, then he had to deal with Q74 where RM had said in terms that he was sacked because of his political involvement. This answer was highly material to any finding of RM giving inconsistent accounts.
39. Mr Dingley submits that it was plain from the FTT decision that the Judge did have regard to the Clarificatory Letter, see [13] where the Judge expressly refers to paragraph 8 of the same Letter and to RM’s family approving G’s family carrying out punishment on him, including death.
40. The balance to be undertaken by a court in determining what fairness requires is necessarily highly fact sensitive. Mr Dingley relies on Abdi v Entry Clearance Officer [2023] EWCA Civ 1455; [2024] Imm AR 2 at [29] and [32], where Popplewell LJ said;
“29. …What fairness requires is essentially an intuitive judgment which is dependent on the context of the decision; although it is possible to identify a number of general principles, they cannot be applied by rote identically in every situation. An overall judgment must be made in the light of all the circumstances of a particular case. Whether there is procedural unfairness is fact-sensitive. See [4] and [13]. The tribunal may identify an issue which has not been raised by the parties to the proceedings, but it will be unfair, ordinarily at least, for it to base its decision upon its view of the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to address it upon the matter (see [7]). As an expert body, the tribunal is entitled to reject evidence notwithstanding that the evidence has not been challenged before it. Fairness may, however, require it to disclose its concerns about the evidence so as to afford the parties an opportunity to address them (see [8]). There is, on the other hand no general obligation on the tribunal to give notice to the parties during the hearing of all the matters on which it may relay in reaching its decision (see [10]). Where an applicant can generally be expected to be aware that the tribunal will have to assess their credibility, there will generally be no unfairness in a tribunal proceeding without drawing attention to a point which the applicant could reasonably expect to be plainly relevant to that assessment (at [11] – [12]).
…
[32] In WN v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKIAT 00213, Ouseley J (President) emphasised that a failure to follow the Surendran Guidelines was not itself conclusive of procedural unfairness. At [34] he said that paragraph 5 needs also to cover the position where no issue of credibility has been raised in the Refusal Letter and yet it may be obvious that further material provided to the adjudicator raises issues of credibility. They should be raised or put to the appellant so that he may answer them, but it does not mean that the hearing is unfair where that does not take place, at least where the appellant is represented. That depends on whether the points are obvious ones going to the appellant’s credibility which he could be expected to realise needed addressing in any event, such as inconsistencies with previous statements or a failure to raise a particular matter earlier.”
41. He submits that the issue of the Concession was fully ventilated before the UT, and RM had the opportunity to make every submission he wished about the Clarificatory Letter, therefore there was no more that could have been said. I find it hard to see forensically where this point goes. If the FTT was wrong not to refer to the Clarificatory Letter, then the fact that there was a full opportunity at the UT to address the Letter does not change the error in the FTT’s decision. Equally, if the FTT did not err in respect of the Letter, then there is highly unlikely to have been any error of law by the UT in not itself expressly referring to the Concession.
42. Mr Greer’s third submission went to the materiality of the alleged errors. He relies on the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in Osei-Bonsu v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 1304 at [70]-[73];
“2. What is the test for deciding whether or not that error of law was material?
70. The next question is whether, despite that unfairness, the F-tT’s decision can or should be upheld on an appeal on a point of law. When it detects and error of law in a determination of the F-tT, the UT may, but is not obliged to, set aside that determination (section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007). That discretion recognises that the presence of an error of law in the decision of a statutory tribunal does not lead automatically to success in an appeal on a point of law, because, if the error of law is immaterial, the appellate body should not set aside the decision of the tribunal below.
71. The parties did not address any argument to the question how a court decides whether or not an error of law is material, no doubt because they thought that it was obvious. It is nevertheless necessary to spell it out. The common law which enabled the High Court, before the enactment of section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, to refuse relief when it held that a decision-maker had acted unlawfully is a useful analogy. The High Court had a discretion to refuse relief where the court was satisfied that, if the error which the court had found had not been made, the outcome would necessarily, or inevitably, have been the same (see, for example, Simplex GE (Holdings) v Secretary of State for the Environment (1988) 57 P & CR 306, 327, per Purchas LJ; and p 329, per Staughton LJ; R (Smith) v North East Derbyshire Primary Care Trust [2006] 1 WLR 3315, paragraph 10, per May LJ; and Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government v South Gloucestershire Council [2016] EWCA Civ 74 at [25], per Lindblom LJ (as he then was)).
72. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 Sales LJ (as he then was) put the relevant question in this way: it is whether ‘it is clear on the materials before [the F-tT] any rational tribunal must have come to the same conclusion’. In ASO (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 1282; [2024] Imm AR 145, this court applied AJ (Angola) to the question whether errors of law by the F-tT had been material in an asylum appeal. A similar issue arises in the Employment Appeal Tribunal when it finds an error of law in the judgment of an Employment Tribunal and has to decide whether or not to remit the case. The test applied there was described by Laws LJ in paragraph 21 of his judgment in Jafri v Lincoln College [2014] EWCA Civ 449; [2015] QB 781 ‘If therefore the appeal tribunal detects a legal error by the employment tribunal, it must send the case back unless (a) it concludes that the error cannot have affected the result…’. His alternative formulation is irrelevant to this case. The other members of this court agreed with his judgment.
3. Is that test met?
73. There is no doubt that, however the relevant test is understood or expressed, it is met in this case. To put it at is simplest, despite wrongly ignoring the Secretary of State’s concession, the F-tT went on to consider the very issue which it would have had to consider had it accepted the concession, and dismissed the appeal because the statutory test was not met. That separate conclusion was not flawed by any error of law.”
43. He says that the test is whether the outcome would inevitably have been the same. He submits that here the error goes to the heart of the FTT’s assessment of RM’s credibility. The conclusion at [10] was critical to the overall conclusion at [17] that “I find his account is riddled with inconsistencies to the point where it cannot be considered credible”. He submits that the FTT only refers to two inconsistencies and one of those is undermined by the error in respect of the Clarificatory Letter.
44. Mr Dingley submits there was no unfairness or prejudice to RM by the UT because the relevance of the FTT having appeared to have overlooked paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter was fully ventilated. Ms Rushforth, who appeared in the UT for the SSHD, referred to it and argued that the error was not material.
45. Further, or in the alternative, Mr Dingley submits that even if the FTT did make an error by not referring to paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter it was not material. Firstly, the premise of the concession was wrong, because the Judge had read the Letter and referred to it at [13]. Therefore, he must have had it in mind.
46. Secondly, [10] of the FTT decision is not referring to the Screening Interview, so the Clarificatory Letter is immaterial to that paragraph. Thirdly, the inconsistency that the Judge is referring to at [10] is plainly made out on the material before him, in the different accounts by RM at different stages of the process. There remain inconsistencies between the Asylum Interview, the Clarificatory Letter and the witness statement. For example, at [58] of his witness statement RM said that it was his political activities which had led to G’s father turning against the relationship, but he did not say that at Q52 of the Asylum Interview.
47. Fourthly, Mr Dingley relies on the now unchallenged parts of the FTT decision between [11] and [16]. The Judge made findings about the credibility of RM’s account in those paragraphs that mean it is inevitable that only one conclusion could be reached.
Conclusions on Ground Three
48. In my view Ground 3 succeeds on the basis that the FTT failed to take into account a material consideration, namely the entirety of RM’s account in the Clarificatory Letter.
49. It is common ground that the UT were entitled to depart from the Concession. The Concession itself was a narrow one and did not concede the materiality of the FTT having apparently overlooked paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter. The necessity or otherwise for a Tribunal to inform the parties if they are proposing to depart from a concession and give them an opportunity to make submissions about that will depend on the nature of the concession and its centrality to the issues in the case. Here, the Concession was a highly qualified one, which on its express terms did not go to the materiality of the alleged error.
50. In my view it was the underlying error of law by the FTT which was critical, rather than the failure by the UT to inform the parties that it was minded not to accept the Concession, and which leads to Ground Three succeeding.
51. The UT at [24] said “As the Tribunal considers that there is nothing in the Judge’s decision to suggest any factual error in his examination of the claim, the Tribunal rejects the concession”. However, the FTT did not refer in its decision to paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 of the Clarificatory Letter and therefore did not explain how those paragraphs impacted upon the finding of inconsistency at [10]. RM sets out at paragraph 4 of the Letter that he fled Iraq for two reasons, his political activities and his fear of honour based violence. He then explains those matters further in paragraphs 6 and 7. This is largely consistent with what he said in January 2024 in his witness statement about involvement in political activity and the breakdown of his relationship and G’s family. There remains to some degree an inconsistency in accounts, because in his witness statement RM places considerably more weight upon his political activities impacting G’s father’s view, than he does in the AIR, where the two issues are dealt with separately and not linked. However, the generality of the account has remained the same between the Clarificatory Letter and the witness statement.
52. This is a case, as are so many asylum application determinations, where credibility was central to the decision. RM’s credibility turned to a significant degree upon the consistency of the accounts that he had given over time. It was therefore of great importance that the FTT, which is the fact-finding appellate body, properly and fairly considered each stage of RM’s account in order to fairly determine the degree of consistency or inconsistency between those accounts.
53. There were undoubtedly inconsistencies in some parts of RM’s various accounts. However, in order to reach a lawful conclusion, the FTT needed to take into consideration each account and explain by reference to them what inconsistencies it was relying upon. The FTT judgment, at [10] in particular, does not, at least not expressly, take into account those key parts of the Clarificatory Letter of May 2021 that refer to his political activities. Given that this account was largely consistent, it needed to be properly considered. It is not sufficient for Mr Dingley to say that the FTT had regard to other paragraphs in the Letter and therefore must have considered the Letter as a whole, because the part of the Letter that is referred to in [13] does not go to the alleged inconsistency that the FTT was relying upon. This is not an issue of having to refer to every page in a 1062-page bundle, but rather of having to refer to and expressly take into consideration a key part of RM’s account.
54. The failure to take into account and refer to those parts of the Letter was material, because RM’s credibility was central to the decision, as is apparent from [17] of the FTT decision. It may be that a decisionmaker or judge would still consider the inconsistency in regard to why G’s father rejected RM sufficient to undermine his credibility. But if that is the case it needs to be clearly set out and reasoned.
55. As Mr Dingley says, there are a number of other reasons to consider RM’s evidence to be implausible and to reject his application, which are now unchallenged. However, given the importance of the alleged inconsistencies in the FTT’s assessment of credibility at [10] and [17] , it is not possible to conclude that any rational tribunal must necessarily have come to the same decision if the relevant parts of the Clarificatory Letter had been taken properly into consideration.
56. For these reasons I would allow Ground Three.
Ground Five
57. Ground Five concerns RM’s alleged sur place activity. Mr Greer submits that the FTT failed to determine whether RM genuinely held the political opinions which he asserted and therefore how he would behave if returned to Iraq, and what risk he would be placed at there.
58. The Appellant relied upon his opposition to the KRG; his attendance at demonstrations; and his evidence that he would not delete his Facebook account because “that's my opinions and I'm entitled to my opinions”, as he told the FTT.
59. Mr Greer submits that the FTT only made findings about his past activities and failed to make findings on his present political convictions and on his future actions if returned.
60. He relies upon HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31; [2011] 1 AC 596 at [35]:
“(b) The next stage is to examine a group of questions which are directed to what his situation will be on return. This part of the inquiry is directed to what will happen in the future. The Home Office’s Country of Origin report will provide the background. There will be little difficulty in holding that in countries such as Iran and Cameroon gays or persons who are believed to be gay are persecuted and that persecution is something that may reasonably be feared. The question is how each applicant, looked at individually, will conduct himself if returned and how others will react to what he does. Those others will include everyone with whom he will come in contact, in private as well as in public. The way he conducts himself may vary from one situation to another, with varying degrees of risk. But he cannot and must not be expected to conceal aspects of his sexual orientation which he is unwilling to conceal, even from those whom he knows may disapprove of it.”
61. This case concerned whether a gay man could be expected to hide his sexual orientation if he was returned to Iran. In RT (Zimbabwe) v SSHD [2012] UKSC 38; [2013] 1 AC 152 at [26] Lord Dyson JSC applied the same principle to political beliefs:
“26 The HJ (Iran) principle applies to any person who has political beliefs and is obliged to conceal them in order to avoid the persecution that he would suffer if he were to reveal them.”
62. In XX (PJAK – sur place activities Facebook) v SSHD [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC) the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) considered a situation quite similar to that being advanced in the present case. They said at [102]:
“102. We consider that it may be perfectly permissible for a decision maker to ask what a returnee to Iran will do, in relation to a contrived Facebook account or fabricated protection claim. Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis, but factors which may point to that question not being impermissibly speculative include: where a person has a past history of destroying material, such as identification documents, or deception or dishonesty in relation to dealings with state officials; whether the government has well-established methods of questioning (in the Iranian state’s case, these are well-documented and therefore predictable); and whether the risks around discovery of social media material, prior to account deletion, are minimal, because a personal’s social graph or social media activities are limited.”
63. Mr Greer submits that both parties at the FTT invited the Judge to deal with RM’s possible future political activities, but the Judge failed to do so. He was correct in say at [23] that motivation was irrelevant in relation to the risk from sur place activities, but Mr Greer submits that RM’s motivation, i.e. the genuineness of his political beliefs, was not irrelevant in respect of what he was likely to do if returned to Iraq.
64. Mr Dingley says that the FTT made clear findings that RM had made up his political activities in Iraq, in order to strengthen his weak case, see [15]. The FTT had also made findings that in terms of political activity in the UK, RM was at most a face in a large crowd, see [22], and that he was not likely to come to the attention of the authorities in Iraq.
65. He submits that the first stage, as set out in HJ (Iran)is to establish whether RM holds the political opinions asserted. He says the FTT addressed that issue and answered the question negatively against RM in [15] and [20]. It was not therefore necessary to go on and consider whether he would act upon his political beliefs if he was returned to Iraq, because the FTT had found that his political beliefs were not genuine.
66. In respect of the argument that RT (Zimbabwe)makes clear that the political beliefs do not have to be genuinely held, Mr Dingley submits that Lord Dyson’s comments were in the context of a state where there was a need to show express loyalty. Here the evidence suggested that the risk only arose in Iraqi Kurdistan to people who were actively engaged in political protest against the regime. Therefore, he says, once it had been found that there was no evidence that RM had any genuinely held political beliefs, there was no need for the FTT to go further in its reasoning.
Conclusions on Ground Five
67. The FTT made clear findings about RM making up his political activities in Iraq for the benefit of his asylum claim. However, it did not make any express findings about his political motivation, if any, in the UK, or what actions he might take in Iraq if returned. At [20] the FTT said, “I have rejected the appellant’s claim to have attended demonstrations in Iraq”. This is a reference back to [15]. However, this conclusion is itself flawed for the same reasons as Ground Three, by the fact that the Judge refers to the Screening Interview but does not refer to paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter, where RM sets out his political activities in Iraq.
68. It might be said to follow from its findings about RM’s past actions in Iraq, that the FTT had sufficiently considered his political motivations and likely future intentions. However, the FTT’s findings in respect of past actions, in particular at [15], are necessarily linked to its findings on RM’s credibility. I accept Mr Greer’s submission that credibility was central to the entire decision.
69. The determination on political beliefs and future activity does therefore to some degree turn on the assessment of RM’s credibility and the two Grounds are necessarily linked.
70. Having found that the FTT failed to reach a lawful conclusion on RM’s credibility, because of its failure to properly take into account the Clarificatory Letter, it follows that its finding about RM’s political activities is tainted by the unsafe finding on credibility. If the Tribunal had had express regard to paragraph 6 of the Clarificatory Letter, and therefore the fact that RM had been referring to his political activities from that early stage in the process, then it is possible that a different conclusion would have been reached on credibility and on the truthfulness of his account of those activities. This could then have led to a conclusion that his political beliefs were genuine, and that he would be at risk in Iraq. In these circumstances the correct course is to allow Ground Five and remit the matter to the FTT for reconsideration. I would invite written submissions on the terms of the remittal.
71. For these reasons I would allow the appeal on Ground Five.
Lady Justice Falk
72. I agree.
Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing
73. I also agree.
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