Property United Kingdom
Palais Europe Limited v Christain Gurdin & Anor
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKUT 428 (LC)
Case Nos: LC-2026-296
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)
AN APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL (PROPERTY CHAMBER)
Ref: LON/00AU/HMF/2025/0716
3 November 2026
TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007
HOUSING – RENT REPAYMENT ORDER – offence ceasing to be committed once a Temporary Exemption Notice notification had been made by the landlord – recalculation of the amount to be repaid – utilities – Council Tax – First-tier Tribunal's discretion.
BETWEEN:
PALAIS EUROPE LIMITED
Appellant
-and-
CHRISTAIN GURDIN (1)
JUTHARAT NOPPAKAOKESKUL (2)
Respondents
29B Landseer Road,
London,
N19 4JU
Judge Elizabeth Cooke
Determination on written representations
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026
The following cases were referred to in this decision:
Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC)
Vadamalayan v Stewart [2020] UKUT 183 (LC)
Introduction
1. This appeal arises from a rent repayment order made by the First-tier Tribunal against the appellant. The appeal is not against the order itself but from the amount ordered. The appeal has been decided under the Tribunal’s written representations procedure. The landlord has been represented by its director, Mrs Natalia Thannhaeuser; the respondents have chosen not to take part in the appeal.
The legal background
2. The Housing Act 2004 requires certain rented houses to be licensed, including some (but not all) houses in multiple occupation ("HMOs"). Section 72(1) of that Act provides that it is an offence to manage or be in control of an HMO that is required to be licensed but is not so licensed. Section 61(1) provides an exception, so that no offence is committed where there is a temporary exemption notice (a “TEN”) in force under section 62; a TEN may be put into effect by the local housing authority in response to a notification from the landlord or other relevant persons that they are taking particular steps to ensure that the house is no longer required to be licensed.
3. An obvious example where such a notice is necessary would be where someone purchases a house and discovers that it is an HMO, required to be licensed and not so licensed; the sensible thing to do in those circumstances is to apply for a TEN while seeking to regularise the situation.
4. Section 72(4) says this:
“(4) In proceedings against a person for an offence under subsection (1) it is a defence that, at the material time–
(a) a notification had been duly given in respect of the house under section 61(1), or
(b) an application for a licence had been duly made in respect of the house under section 63,
and that notification or application was still effective (see subsection (8)).”
5. The practical effect of that is that as soon as a landlord (or other manager etc) applies for a licence, or makes a notification under section 61(1) in order to get a TEN, they are no longer committing the offence. The reason for that is obvious; once the notification or application is made, the person concerned has done all they can and they should not be left in a position where they are committing an offence while waiting for the local housing authority to grant the licence or the TEN.
6. The offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act is one of those in respect of which a tenant may apply for a rent repayment order under the Housing and Planning Act 2016. The effect of section 16 of that Act is that when the FTT decides to make a rent repayment order in response to a section 72 offence, the amount to be repaid “must relate to the rent paid during … a period, not exceeding 12 months, during which the landlord was committing the offence”.
7. Section 44 goes on to say:
“(4) In determining the amount the tribunal must, in particular, take into account—
(a) the conduct of the landlord and the tenant,
(b) the financial circumstances of the landlord, and
(c) whether the landlord has at any time been convicted of an offence to which this Chapter applies.”
8. In Acheampong v Roman and others [2022] UKUT 239 (LC) the Tribunal gave the following further guidance:
“20. The following approach will ensure consistency with the authorities:
a. Ascertain the whole of the rent for the relevant period;
b. Subtract any element of that sum that represents payment for utilities that only benefited the tenant, for example gas, electricity and internet access. It is for the landlord to supply evidence of these, but if precise figures are not available an experienced tribunal will be able to make an informed estimate.
c. Consider how serious this offence was, both compared to other types of offence in respect of which a rent repayment order may be made (and whose relative seriousness can be seen from the relevant maximum sentences on conviction) and compared to other examples of the same type of offence. What proportion of the rent (after deduction as above) is a fair reflection of the seriousness of this offence? That figure is then the starting point (in the sense that that term is used in criminal sentencing); it is the default penalty in the absence of any other factors but it may be higher or lower in light of the final step:
d. Consider whether any deduction from, or addition to, that figure should be made in the light of the other factors set out in section 44(4).”
9. In light of that guidance, it is in the interests of landlords against whom an application is made for a rent repayment order to tell the FTT how much of the rent is composed of items that only benefit the tenant as described in paragraph 20b in Acheampong.
The facts, and the decision in the FTT
10. I can summarise the facts briefly. The respondents to the appeal were tenants of the appellant at 29B Landseer Road, London N19, a three-bedroom flat with shared kitchen and bathrooms. Each had a separate assured tenancy agreement; Mr Gurdin lived in the flat from 1 August 2024 to 8 March 2025, paying £875 per month, and Ms Noppakaokeskul from 20 July 2024 to 22 March 2025, paying £960 per month. Each tenancy agreement stated:
“3.1 Monthly rent … includes council tax, water, internet. Energy (gas and electricity) are included up to £50 per person per month. Energy bills will be provided and in case it exceeds the scheduled payment … additional payment/s should be made upon request.”
11. The local housing authority, the London Borough of Islington, designated the area where the property is situated as an area of additional licensing (under section 56 of the Housing Act 2004) on 1 February 2021, so that from that date an HMO occupied by three or more persons in two or more households required a licence. It is not in dispute that a third tenant, who has not taken part in these proceedings, lived at the property throughout the time Mr Gurdin and Ms Noppakaokeskul lived there, so that the property required an HMO licence and it was an offence under section 72(1) of the 2004 Act to manage or be in control of it whilst it was not so licensed.
12. After leaving the property the respondents applied to the FTT for a rent repayment order.
13. The applicant’s position was that whilst it accepted that an offence had been committed, it had applied for a TEN on 10 February 2025, and a TEN had been granted on 12 March 2025, so that it was not liable to make repayment for the full period of the tenants’ occupation. The FTT said this:
“Mrs Thannhaeuser said in her statement, “I accept that there should have been a Licence in place for the period the Property was let to the Applicant and there may not be a reasonable excuse for one being absent.” She repeated this in her oral submissions. Based on the written documents, the Tribunal is satisfied that she was right to make this concession, save that there is a defence under section 72(4)(a) of the Act as from 12th March 2025 due to the temporary exemption notice.”
14. The FTT therefore calculated the amount to be repaid on the basis that no offence was committed after 12 March 2025, thus cutting some days from the end point for Ms Noppakaokeskul. It deducted £50 per month (£350 in total) from each applicant’s total to reflect the energy charges. It considered the seriousness of the offence and took the view that it was appropriate to order repayment of 65% of that adjusted total, and made no further adjustment to reflect the conduct of the parties. It concluded:
“55. In the light of the above matters, the Tribunal has concluded that the RROs should be set at 65% of the maximum amounts after deduction of the amount included in the rent for utilities:
(a) The First Applicant (£6,441.44 – £350) x 65% = £3,959.44
(b) The Second Applicant (£6,720 – £350) x 65% = £4,140.50”
15. The appellant applied to the FTT for permission to appeal on a number of grounds, and permission was refused. On two of those grounds this Tribunal has granted permission to appeal
Ground 1
16. The appellant applied to the FTT for permission to appeal on the ground that it had a defence from 10 February 2025, rather than from the later date on which the TEN was granted. In refusing permission to appeal the FTT said this:
“The evidence before the Tribunal was that the Temporary Exemption Notice applied from 12th March 2025. The Respondent asserts that they have a screenshot showing Mr Healy applied for the TEN on 10th February 2025 (which was not shown to the Tribunal) but, unlike with licensing itself, the date of application is not the relevant date.”
17. It will be clear from the terms of section 72(4)(a) (paragraph 4 above) that that was an error on the judge’s part. Once a notification under section 61(1) has been made, and for as long as it is effective (meaning that the local housing authority has not yet granted a TEN or refused to grant one), the landlord has a defence. The appellant was granted permission to appeal by this Tribunal, and the appeal quite simply succeeds on this point.
18. The only matter of doubt must be whether the date of 10 February is correct. The hearing bundle before the FTT included a copy of an email from the local housing authority to the appellant’s director explaining how to apply for a TEN, so obviously the application had not yet been made. The TEN itself was served on the appellant with a letter of the same date as the TEN 12 March 2025, so clearly the application was made some time before that date. In the absence of any suggestion to the contrary by the tenants in the course of the appeal, and in the absence of any indication that they challenged the date of the notification at the hearing before the FTT, I proceed on the basis that the TEN notification was made on 10 February 2025. From (and including) that date the offence was not being committed, and the amount to be repaid has to be adjusted accordingly. I come back to that below.
Ground 2
19. The appellant says that the FTT should have deducted a sum for water and utilities and for council tax.
20. What Ms Thannhaeuser said in her statement to the FTT was this:
“The rent paid by the applicants in the Tenancy Agreements included council tax, water, energy and internet. Therefore, out of the rental figure the Company received from the tenants, the Company had to pay those utilities for the property. At the time of this statement, I have not been able to locate the relevant bills but I will endeavour to do so before the Tribunal hearing on 13 November 2025. I believe that these amounts should be deducted from any sum the Tribunal awards the applicants as RRO.”
21. In refusing permission to appeal the FTT said:
“In relation to deductions for utilities, Council Tax is not a utility and there is no statutory basis for deducting it. As for water and internet, not only did the Respondent make no submissions, written or oral, in relation to them, the Tribunal was not provided with any evidence as to cost or whether that cost varied with tenants’ usage.”
22. In the appeal, so far as water and internet are concerned Mrs Thannhaaeuser argues that the FTT should have adopted a notional figure since she had not supplied any details. As to Council Tax, Mrs Thannhaeuser acknowledges that it is the landlord’s liability (section 8(1) of the Local Government Finance Act 1988, as amended by the Council Tax (Owner’s Liability) Order 1992, but says that it is a payment in respect of occupation and therefore for the tenants’ benefit, so that it should be deducted just as utilities are.
23. The appeal fails on this ground.
24. The FTT rightly followed the guidance in Acheampong. But it is important to bear in mind, and worth re-stating in this appeal, that that is indeed guidance, and that what the Tribunal said was simply that the approach there set out was “consistent with the authorities”. The amount awarded is in the discretion of the FTT, and moreover does not have to be a matter of precise calculation. The appellant did not give the FTT any information about the amount paid in respect of water and the internet; there was not even any evidence that the amount paid by it varied with the tenant’s consumption (which is the justification for deducting utilities payments). It is hardly surprising that the FTT was not prepared to guess at an appropriate deduction. The decision to make no deduction for water and internet was well within the FTT’s discretion.
25. So far as council tax is concerned, it has not been the practice of the FTT to deduct council tax along with payments for utilities and I do not see any legal reason why it should do so. Again, this is not a sum that varies with the tenants’ usage; it seems to me to be on a par with other payments such as maintenance costs that arise because of the tenancy but in respect of which no deduction is made, following the Tribunal’s decision in Vadamalayan v Stewart [2020] UKUT 183 (LC).
Consequences of the appeal
26. The consequence of the successful appeal is that from and including 10 February 2025 the appellant was not committing an offence. The effect of section 44 of the Housing and Planning Act 2016 (paragraph 6 above) is that any rent paid by the respondents in respect of the period after 9 February 2025 cannot be included in the rent repayment order.
27. I set out above the FTT’s calculation of the final order, which I repeat:
To Mr Gurdin (£6,441.44 – £350) x 65% = £3,959.44
To Ms Noppakaokeskul (£6,720 – £350) x 65% = £4,140.50
28. I do not understand how the starting figures in each case were calculated, but neither party has challenged them. The figure for Ms Noppakaokeskul is particularly odd because she was paying £960 per month and the starting point is said to be £6,720, which is seven times £960, yet she was in occupation from 20 July and the FTT was calculating with an end date of 12 March, which is eight months.
29. However, that is an error in the appellant’s favour, and the respondents have not challenged the FTT’s figures and so I start from them.
30. I have to adjust the FTT’s total on the basis that the last day on which the offence was committed was 9 February, not 12 March. It is not appropriate for the FTT to undertake elaborate calculations in terms of day rates; what is wanted is a broad brush approach rather than precise calculation. As a result of the appeal the end point of the offence is brought forward by about a month (a couple of days less for Mr Gurdin and a couple of days more for Ms Noppakaokeskul). Accordingly it is appropriate to reduce the repayment in each case by the amount payable in respect of a month.
31. For Mr Gurdin the total of £3,959 (I am ignoring pence) is therefore to be reduced by is 65% of [one month’s rent less £50], which is 65% of £825, = £536.
32. For Ms Noppakaokeskul the total of £4,140 (I am ignoring pence) is therefore to be reduced by is 65% of [one month’s rent less £50], which is 65% of £910, = £591. The appellant is to repay:
To pay to Mr Gurdin: £3423
To Ms Noppakaokeskul: £3,549
33. The appellant has made a part payment to each respondent as a condition of the grant of permission to appeal; the balance is now payable immediately.
Judge Elizabeth Cooke
3 November 2026
Right of appeal
Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.
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