Family United Kingdom

M and S (FGM and FM Protection Orders: Nigeria), Re

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2865 (Fam)

Case No: LE25F00559 and LE25F00573

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 06/11/2026

Before :

MS JUSTICE HARRIS

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

NOTTINGHAMSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL Applicant
– and –
FIA First Respondent
-and-
M
(By her children’s guardian, Emily Breffitt)
-and-
S
Second Respondent

Third Respondent

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Sara Davis and Kathryn Moran (instructed by Sophie Preece of Nottinghamshire County

Council) for the Applicant

Teertha Gupta KC and Nick Brown (instructed by Shabina Begum of Goodman Ray Solicitors) for the First Respondent

Samuel Skinner KC and James Cleary (instructed by Hannah-Marie Davis of Elliot Mather Solicitors) for the Second Respondent

Amanda Weston KC and James Holmes (instructed by Ravi Mahey of Cartwright King) for the Third Respondent

Hearing dates: 30 July 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Friday 6 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

MS JUSTICE HARRIS

This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this version of the judgment to be published on condition that (irrespective of what is contained in the judgment) in any published version of the judgment the anonymity of the children and members of their family must be strictly preserved. All persons, including representatives of the media, must ensure that this condition is strictly complied with. Failure to do so will be a contempt of court.

Ms Justice Harris :

1. Female genital mutilation and forced marriage are particularly abhorrent forms of violence against women and girls, constituting fundamental breaches of their most basic human rights and engaging the State’s positive obligations under articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human rights.

2. This matter concerns the protection of two young women, S, who is 21 years old, and her younger sister, M, who is 15 years old. The local authority applies for Female Genital Mutilation Protection Orders (‘FGMPOs’) and Forced Marriage Protection Orders (‘FMPOs’) to protect the girls against the risk posed to them by both paternal and maternal family members in Nigeria. Whilst their father, FIA, is opposed to such practices, it is alleged and he concedes that he would be unable to protect the girls against senior members of his family in Nigeria who would wish for the girls to be circumcised and married. All parties to these proceedings are now agreed that the making of these orders is necessary and proportionate to the assessed level of risk in Nigeria.

3. The Court is exceptionally grateful to all parties and their counsel for the careful, balanced and considered way in which these applications have been progressed. The local authority was represented at the final hearing by Sara Davis and Kathryn Moran; the respondent father was represented by Teertha Gupta KC and Nick Brown; M was represented through her guardian Emily Breffitt by Samuel Skinner KC and James Cleary; and S was represented by Amanda Weston KC and James Holmes. All parties have produced detailed skeleton arguments and contributed to an agreed note on the facts and law to assist the Court in the preparation of this judgment.

4. Although this matter has ultimately been resolved, with the Court’s approval, by way of consensus, this judgment is published to provide some assistance to others regarding the process to be adopted if faced with similar applications.

Background

5. The family are of Nigerian nationality and Igbo ethnicity. FIA arrived in the UK from Nigeria in September 2021. FIA’s family originate from and continue to live in Ebonyi state in Nigeria. The family had however previously been residing in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria in accommodation linked to mother’s employment. M and S were born in Abuja and, prior to coming to the UK, had lived there all their lives. M and S, accompanied by their mother, arrived in the UK on 29th December 2021. S was travelling on a student visa. Very sadly, the children’s mother passed away on 8th January 2022. Unfortunately, upon her death they lost their accommodation in Abuja. The father remained in the UK with his daughters under a postgraduate visa which expired on 15th March 2025.

6. The father applied for a Humanitarian visa for him and the children in April 2025. On 21st June 2025 the Home Office confirmed that the applications of the father, S and M for leave to remain had been refused with no right of appeal. FIA thus purchased flights for all of them to return to Nigeria with the intention of leaving the UK on 21st October 2025.

7. On 13th October 2025, M disclosed to her school’s Designated Safeguarding Officer that she was worried that she would be subjected to FGM upon returning to Nigeria. M and S also reported those concerns to a family friend who notified the police. On 14th October 2025, a referral was made to the Safeguarding Disruption Intervention Unit for Nottinghamshire Police by a third party that there was a concern that M and S would be subject to FGM if they returned to Nigeria.

8. The family’s position is that having lost their accommodation in Abuja, they will have no alternative other than to return to the shared paternal family home in Ebonyi state. The paternal grandmother still resides there and not only is very supportive of FGM but is a respected ‘cutter’ within the community. M and S both believe that FGM will be forced upon them if they return to the village and FIA would be powerless to protect them. The family report that within their community FGM can be carried out at any age before marriage, FIA explaining that the procedure is considered to be essential before a girl marries. M is also worried that if she returns to live in the paternal family village she will be forced into marriage. M and S wish to remain in the UK and not to return to Nigeria.

9. An urgent strategy meeting took place on 15th October 2025, and a section 47 enquiry commenced. On 17th October 2025, the local authority applied for a FGMPO in respect of M. At the first hearing before HHJ Birk, FGMPOs were made in respect of both M and S and an order made that the family’s passports were to be retained by the Home Office until further order. M and S were joined as parties to proceedings. The local authority made a formal application for a FGMPO in respect of S on 24th October 2025. The local authority applied for FMPO’s for both M and S on 14th January 2026.

10. The Home Office have been notified of these proceedings and invited to intervene. They have not done so and have not participated in any way. In December 2025, they were invited not to take any steps to enforce the immigration decisions until the conclusion of these proceedings. The Home Office agreed to that request, and the Court records its thanks to the Home Office for its cooperation.

Evidence

11. In addition to the evidence filed by FIA and S, the Court granted permission for the following expert evidence to be obtained within the proceedings.

12. A risk assessment of FGM and forced marriage with respect to S and M in Ebonyi state, Nigeria was directed to be carried out in two stages: a) a contextual assessment of the risk (looking at the ‘macro’ factors); b) a more particularised in-depth and individualised analysis of the risk (examining the ‘micro’ factors on the ground). The first was carried out by Professor Tamsin Bradley, Professor of International Development Studies at Portsmouth University. It is important to note that the court only gave permission for the second stage of the assessment to be carried out once it had received the macro assessment and had been able to more properly assess the risks of any assessment being carried out in Nigeria, particularly directly involving individuals on the ground.

13. The second stage of the risk assessment was completed by Professor Nkechi Bridget Emma-Echiegu, Professor of Medical Social Work and Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Nigeria. Again, however, it is important to note, that even at this second stage of the risk assessment, no permission was given for Professor Emma-Echiegu to engage with individual family and/or community members in Nigeria, pending further advice from her as to the potential risks of doing so. In light of the evidence contained within the first two completed risk assessments, the Court in fact determined it could and should properly proceed without any direct engagement with family and/or community members in Nigeria.

14. As regards whether it was procedurally appropriate to proceed in that way, the Court recognises that in any analysis of risk it would be preferable to engage directly with those individuals from whom the risk is said to emanate in order to gauge and assess their response. Certainly, within the context of legal proceedings, one would usually expect anyone caught within the terms of an order to have been afforded the opportunity to respond to the application and evidence and to be heard on the necessity of any orders being sought against them. There are however a number of instances where the nature of the risk being safeguarded against is such that direct engagement with the alleged source of the risk is not deemed necessary nor appropriate (within the context of family proceedings see, for example, Re A (Adoption: Notification of Fathers and Relatives) [2020] EWCA Civ 41, on whether family members should be notified of a mother’s decision to relinquish a baby for adoption).

15. The possibility of proceeding without engaging with the alleged source of the risk has been confirmed within the specific context of protective orders where the article 6 rights of an individual caught within the terms of the order are arguably more obviously engaged and a balance between the competing rights must be struck. In Chief Constable and AA v YK and others [2010] EWHC 2438 (Fam), it was held:

“100. The difficulties which arise – or may arise – come into focus when an application is made to set the order or orders aside. In such circumstances, I fully recognise that factual issues may arise which the court is required to investigate. However, not only is that not this case, but, even if it were, it does not seem to me that that special advocates have any role to play. The police – or the alleged victim – argue that certain information likely to lead to a breach of the rights provided by ECHR Articles 2, 3 or 8 should not be disclosed. Balanced against that are the ECHR Article 6 (and possibly 8) rights of the persons subject to the order. Given the protective nature of the court’s jurisdiction, it seems to me that the court can decide the issue of whether or not the order should stand without either detailed investigation of the factual issues nor the intervention of special advocates.

101. Furthermore, when I come to analyse the ECHR Article 6 rights of the parties affected, I am tempted to the view that ECHR Article 6 is not engaged at all. Article 6 protects a party’s right to a fair trial ‘in the determination of his civil rights and obligations’. To force a person into marriage is manifestly not a civil right, still less an obligation. In my view, accordingly, it is arguable that ECHR Article 6 is not engaged in an application for a FMPO. In any event, since the court permits the exercise of jurisdiction ex parte and on the basis of the applicant’s belief, it does not seem to me that a respondent’s right to apply to set the order aside entitles him or her to access to information which, if abused, will lead to serious breaches of the rights of the person to be protected.”

16. Furthermore, in the context of FGM and forced marriage, under the Immigration Rules para 339IA, information provided in support of an asylum claim is not to be disclosed to alleged actors of persecution, nor is the fact of there being an asylum claim to be disclosed (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWHC 3147 (Fam) para 72). In determining an application for a FGMPO or FMPO, the Immigration Rules do not act as a legal bar to approaching family or community members to discuss the allegations but they are a relevant consideration for the Court when determining whether individuals should be approached or attempts made to engage them in any expert assessment. The Immigration Rules do however counsel caution, the Court noting that any such approach to family or community members could undermine a key protective feature of the asylum system. Furthermore, at least as far as M is concerned, these are “children proceedings” (as defined in FPR 2010 r 25.2(1)(a)) meaning any expert assessment must be determined in accordance with s 13 of the Children and Families Act 2014, which provides the court must “have regard in particular to – any impact which giving permission would be likely to have on the welfare of the children concerned.”

17. Current Home Office/FCDO multi-agency statutory guidance for dealing with forced marriage (13th April 2023) emphasises the importance of adopting a cautious approach. It states:

“5.2 The danger of involving the family and community

Involving families in cases of forced marriage (i.e. visiting the family to ask them whether they are intending to force their child to marry or writing a letter to the family requesting a meeting about their child’s allegation) is dangerous:

• It may increase the risk of serious harm to the victim. Experience shows that the family may not only punish the victim for seeking help, but are also likely to deny that the victim is being forced to marry and could expedite any travel arrangements and bring forward the marriage.

• Relatives, friends, community leaders and neighbours should not be used as interpreters – despite any reassurances from this known person.

• It is important that agencies do not actively initiate, encourage or facilitate family counselling, mediation, arbitration or reconciliation – whether offered by community councils, religious groups, professional groups or others. Mediation can place someone at risk of further emotional and physical abuse.”

18. The evidence of FIA within these proceedings is that both he and the girls would be placed at greater risk if family members in Nigeria were alerted to the fact of this application and that the authorities in the UK had been approached to intervene in what would be regarded as a private family matter. FIA asserts that there is a real risk he would be subject to honour-based violence as a result of his actions. The view of Professor Emma-Echiegu is that whilst the risk of honour-based violence in modern-day Ebonyi is over-stated, there does remain a risk that the family would be psychologically and socially ostracised.

19. The Court already has a wealth of information before it from FIA and the appointed experts to support a robust assessment of risk for the purposes of these proceedings. Balancing the advantages of direct engagement with family and community members in Nigeria against the risks such engagement would expose the family to further harm, the Court is satisfied it is unnecessary and disproportionate to direct any further risk analysis.

20. The Court also gave permission for an expert in Nigerian law, Mr Badejo, to provide advice about protections against FGM and forced marriage and the enforceability in Nigeria of any orders made by the High Court in England. The Court did so being cognizant of the fact that FIA, the first respondent and sole family member present in this jurisdiction, poses no risk to the girls and would pose no direct risk to them in Nigeria. The risk all emanates from family members in Nigeria who are not parties to these proceedings and not subject to the jurisdiction of our courts. The question of the purpose and enforceability of making a FGMPO or FMPO in such circumstances was thus understandably raised.

Law

21. The Court repeats its thanks to counsel for their agreed note on the law, which the Court is able to gratefully adopt.

Female Genital Mutilation Protection Order (FGMPO)

22. The power to make an FGMPO is set out in section 5A and schedule 2 of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003. Schedule 2 states.

“1(1) The court in England and Wales may make an order (an ‘FGM protection order) for the purposes of –

(a) protecting a girl against the commission of a genital mutilation offence, or

(b) protecting a girl against whom any such offence has been committed.

(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this paragraph and, if so, in what manner, the court must have regard to all the circumstances, including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the girl to be protected.

(3) An FGM protection order may contain –

(a) such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements, and

(b) such other terms, as the court considers appropriate for the purposes of the order.

…

(6) An FGM protection order may be made for a specified period or until varied or discharged…’.”

23. A particular feature of the legislation is its extra-territorial effect. Schedule 2 provides:

“1(4) The terms of a FGM protection order may, in particular, relate to –

(a) conduct outside England and Wales as well as (or instead of) conduct within England and Wales as well as (or instead of) conduct within England and Wales;

(b) respondents who are, or may become, involved in other respects as well as (or instead of) respondents who commit or attempt to commit, or may commit or attempt to commit, a genital mutilation offence against a girl;

(c) other persons who are, or may become, involved in other respects as well as respondents of any kind.

(5) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (4) examples of involvement in other respects are –

(a) aiding, abetting, counselling, procuring, encouraging or assisting another person to commit, or attempt to commit, a genital mutilation offence against a girl;

(b) conspiring to commit, or to attempt to commit, such an offence.”

24. The statute thus places no limit upon the Court, nor draws any distinction in determining from where the risk emanates. It could be a risk overseas, a risk posed by parents/carers or a section of society/community. The protective powers invested in the Court are very wide.

Forced Marriage Protection Order (FMPO)

25. The power to make an FMPO is set out in section 63A (2) of the Family Law Act 1996:

“(1) The court may make an order for the purposes of protecting—

(a) a person from being forced into a marriage or from any attempt to be forced into a marriage; or

(b) a person who has been forced into a marriage.

(2) In deciding whether to exercise its powers under this section and, if so, in what manner, the court must have regard to all the circumstances including the need to secure the health, safety and well-being of the person to be protected.

(3) In ascertaining that person’s well-being, the court must, in particular, have such regard to the person’s wishes and feelings (so far as they are reasonably ascertainable) as the court considers appropriate in the light of the person's age and understanding.

(4) For the purposes of this Part a person (“A”) is forced into a marriage if another person (“B”) forces A to enter into a marriage (whether with B or another person) without A’s free and full consent.

(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) it does not matter whether the conduct of B which forces A to enter into a marriage is directed against A, B or another person.

(6) In this Part—

“force” includes coerce by threats or other psychological means (and related expressions are to be read accordingly); and

“forced marriage protection order” means an order under this section.”

26. Both the making of FGMPOs and FMPOs are based on an assessment of future risk and whether protective orders are necessary to secure the health, safety and well-being of the person to be protected. The overall ‘route’ to the determination of such applications was set out by the Court of Appeal in In Re K (Forced Marriage: Passport Order) [2020] EWCA Civ 190. The case was concerned with an application for a FMPO but is of equal application in cases of FGMPOs. The Court of Appeal established a clear 4-stage ‘route’ for judges:

“i) Determine the underlying facts using admissible evidence by applying the civil standard of proof (para 46);

ii) Based on the facts that have been found, assess if there is a real need for protection (para 50);

iii) Based on the facts that have been found, analyse the risks and protective factors that relate to the particular circumstances of the individual and consider whether or not the facts found are sufficient to establish a real and immediate risk to the subject of the application (para 51 and 52);

iv) If the facts are sufficient to establish a risk the order should be a bespoke order which is strictly necessary and proportionate; (para 53 and 54).”

27. The correct approach to the assessment of risk in cases of FGM was the subject of detailed consideration by Cobb J (as he then was) in Re X (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Order) (No 2) [2019] EWHC 1990 (Fam) para 91:

“91. In looking at risk of travel in the instant case, I have sought to separate out the 'contextual' factors relevant to the case (at the hearing these became known as the 'macro-factors') from the 'individual' and specific features (or 'micro-factors') applicable to this case alone. Both sets of factors are highly relevant to the determination of risk. In helping me to form a view, and it may be for others charged with a similar task, I have set out below a set of questions which I have found it helpful to ask, to tease out the risk factors:

Contextual considerations / 'Macro' factors:

i) What is the prevalence of FGM in the country to which it is proposed that the child will be taken?

ii) What are the societal expectations of FGM in the country?

iii) If known, what is the prevalence of FGM in the specific region of the country to which it is proposed that the child will be taken?

iv) Is FGM illegal in the country to which it is proposed that the child will be taken?

v) If illegal, how effective are the authorities in the country in question in enforcing the prohibition on FGM?

vi) Given the extra-territorial reach of the 2003 Act, and the fact that the act of carrying out FGM (and aiding and abetting, counselling or procuring the act) is a crime punishable on indictment to imprisonment not exceeding 14 years, is there an extradition treaty between the UK and the country to which the child will be taken (Egypt in the instant case) in the event that there is evidence of a breach of the order?

vii) What formal safeguards are available in the country to which it is proposed to take the child to mitigate the risks (access to local tourist police, FCO representatives / consular assistance, NGO workers)?

viii) At what age are girls commonly cut in the country to which it is proposed that the child will be taken? (how does this compare with the age of the subject child?).

Individual considerations / 'Micro' factors:

ix) Is there a history of FGM in the child's wider family, or in the family to which the child will be exposed abroad?

x) If so, on which generation or generations of women has this been perpetrated? Specifically, what is the position in relation to the younger generation(s)?

xi) What are the attitudes of the mother and/or father to FGM generally, and/or in relation to their daughter?

xii) Is FGM / circumcision regarded as a woman's issue or a man's issue within the family? Where is the power-balance in the family?

xiii) What are the attitudes of the wider family to female circumcision generally, and/or in relation to the subject child?

xiv) What safeguards can the family themselves devise and impose to mitigate the risk?

xv) How well have the family co-operated with the authorities?

xvi) What is the professional assessment of family relationships and of the capabilities of the parents?

xvii) Are there any other specific features of the case which make FGM more or less likely?”

28. As noted above, whilst it will not always be necessary, in this case the Court determined that it should direct a two stage risk assessment looking first at the macro factors before determining if it was necessary, and indeed safe, to give permission for a more individualised assessment.

29. When it comes to the assessment of future risk it is helpful to bear firmly in mind the nature of the harms against which protective measures are sought. It is well established in the authorities that FGM and forced marriage are particularly abhorrent practices which involve “a gross abuse of human rights and a form of domestic violence which dehumanises people” (per Munby P in Re B and G (Children)(No2) [2015] EWFC 3 para 55-57). As Baroness Hale observed in Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] 1 AC 412, FGM “will almost inevitably amount either to torture or to other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 [of the ECHR].” The State is thus under a clear positive obligation to safeguard women and girls from being subjected to such harm.

30. The grave nature of the harm to be protected against, is inextricably linked to the level of risk that needs to be established before protective orders are deemed necessary. When deciding how to exercise its powers, the Court must balance a number of factors. In Re X (A Child) (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Order) [2018] EWCA Civ 1825 at para 31, the Court of Appeal observed, that the court will have to consider: the degree of the risk of FGM, which must be at least a real risk; the quality of any available protective factors (which could include a broad range of matters including the Court’s assessment of the parents); and the nature and extent of the interference with family life which any proposed order would cause.

31. Focusing on the nature and extent of the interference with family life, the Court emphasises the need to ensure any order remains necessary and proportionate to the established risk. The grave nature of the alleged harm does not remove the need for a careful and disciplined approach to the question of what restrictions should be imposed and for how long, bearing in mind that these orders can be highly restrictive of the protected persons own rights, particularly to travel. As I held in AS v Waltham Forest LBC [2024] EWHC 2808 (Fam), at para 84 – 85:

“Care should be taken that orders are focussed, targeted and proportionate to the specific risks established.Indefinite orders are highly draconian and should only be made in the most exceptional of cases. Orders should ordinarily be time-limited or subject to a process of an in-built review, the same way as other highly interventionist protective orders made in the family courts. It cannot be left to individual family members, many of whom reside within marginalised communities, to bring matters back before the court for review.”

32. In that regard, I emphasised the need for ongoing support and intervention by the local authority to seek to address and mitigate the risks:

“Whilst a protective order is in place, it remains incumbent on the local authority to continue to support the family, including facilitating direct work with the child as is appropriate to the child’s age, to improve their understanding and insight into the risks and harms of FGM. The objective must be to reduce or remove the risk to obviate the need for the order remaining in place.”

Of course, efforts to alleviate risk will be significantly compromised where, as in this case, the risk emanates from family members living outside the jurisdiction. In such circumstances, there may be an ongoing need for protection.

Interaction of the Family and Immigration Justice Systems

33. After these proceedings were issued, the family indicated made their intention to make fresh asylum applications based on the risk S and M will be subjected to FGM and forced marriage if returned to Nigeria. Those applications remain to be determined by the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The question of whether the family should be granted asylum rests with the Home Secretary. The question of whether a FGMPO or FMPO should be made rests with the Family Court. In reaching her decision, the Home Secretary is not bound by any decision the Court makes within these proceedings. The converse is also true, in that the fact of an extant asylum application does not bar or fetter the Court’s decision-making within the family proceedings. It is obviously the case however that whilst the systems are separate, they complement one another. Thus, the family and immigration systems will exchange and share relevant information, will actively endeavour to remain cognisant of what is happening within the other proceedings and may consider and find persuasive the evidence and any decision made within the complementary process.

34. The position is clearly set out by Sir Andrew McFarlane P in Re A (A Child: Female Genital Mutilation: Asylum) [2020] 1 FLR 253, where he made the following observations on the ability of the family courts to use an FGMPO to effectively ‘injunct’ the Secretary of State for Home Affairs in respect of any decision on the immigration status of the protected individual:

“[44] The authorities to which reference has been made firmly establish that in proceedings under the CA 1989 or in wardship proceedings the Family Court does not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive orders against the Secretary of State for the Home Department aimed at restricting his or her exercise of powers with respect to the regulation of immigration and asylum. The question raised in the present case is whether proceedings in the family jurisdiction under the FGMA 2003 are in a different category such that the court when making a FGM protection order does have power to restrain the Secretary of State from removing a person from the jurisdiction of the UK.

[45] Ms Monaghan submits that there is indeed a distinction between FGM cases and other family proceedings. The distinction is said to arise from Art 3 of the European Convention which, it is accepted by all parties, imposes a positive obligation upon the State to take steps to protect an individual from ‘inhuman or degrading treatment’.

[46] It is, again, common ground that FGM is treatment which is highly likely to amount to a breach of Art 3 of the European Convention. The purpose of the FGMA 2003, which establishes criminal liability which can attract a sentence of up to 14-years’ imprisonment, is to outlaw the practice of FGM. The Act gives the Family Court wide-ranging and extensive powers to protect girls and women from being exposed to FGM either in this jurisdiction or abroad. An application for a FGM protection order must therefore be considered through the prism of Art 3.

[47] Despite the ease with which Ms Monaghan is able to establish FGM within the context of Art 3 of the European Convention, it is not possible to travel with her to the next stage of her argument which is that, because FGM engages Art 3, the Family Court has in FGM protection order cases jurisdiction to injunct the Secretary of State in contrast to the court’s inability to do so in any other family proceedings.

[48] First, although by focusing on one specific behaviour which is very likely to engage Art 3 of the European Convention, FGM has to be seen in that context, it is the case that many, possibly very many, asylum cases will also involve an alleged risk of behaviour which may also fall within Art 3. There is, however, no suggestion in any of the authoritative judgments on this issue to the effect that there is an exception to the blanket prohibition on the Family Court granting orders against the Secretary of State where a risk of Art 3 treatment has been established by findings in the Family Court. On the contrary, the words of Lord Scarman in Re W, of Hoffmann LJ in ex parte T and of Sir James Munby in Re A, R (Anton) and GD (Ghana) are firmly couched in terms of structure and principle, with no contemplation of any exception.

[49] As Lord Scarman, Hoffmann LJ and Sir James Munby separately make clear, the Secretary of State and the Family Courts are each operating a different and entirely distinct jurisdiction that has separately been entrusted to them by Parliament. Whilst, as Mr McKendrick submitted, the two jurisdictions may be complementary, they are wholly separate with no potential for any structural crossover. Notwithstanding the probable engagement of Art 3 of the European Convention, there is simply no jurisdictional space in the structure that has been created by Parliament in which the Family Court can reach across and directly interfere in the exercise by the Secretary of State’s exclusive powers with respect to the control of immigration and asylum.

[50] Secondly, in the light of the clear and well-established authority on the point, if Parliament had intended to create an exception with respect to the Family Court’s jurisdiction under the FGMA 2003, one would have expected the Act to have contained an express provision to that effect.

[51] Thirdly, the discharge by a State of its positive obligations under Art 3 is to be contemplated by looking at the operation of the State’s engagement with the issue as a whole. In this regard, I accept the Secretary of State’s analysis of the Family Court’s FGMA jurisdiction being complementary to the separate scheme regulating immigration and asylum operated by the Secretary of State and specialist tribunals. Where a Family Court has undertaken a risk assessment with respect to FGM relating to a family which is also the subject of immigration control, then the Secretary of State and the tribunals will take account of that assessment when making any relevant determination, or, if the family proceedings have (as here) followed the immigration process, may reconsider the immigration decision under r 353.

[52] Although this court heard submissions that the complementary scheme that has been described would fail to discharge the State’s duties under Art 3, such submissions were neither expanded upon nor supported by reference to any detailed evidence of any failure. To succeed in establishing the need for the Family Court to have jurisdiction to prevent the Secretary of State from exercising her jurisdiction to remove an individual, it is not sufficient, in my view, to indicate that it might be helpful or desirable for such a jurisdiction to exist; what is required is evidence that, without the Family Courts having the power to injunct, the State would plainly be in breach of its obligations under Art 3. In short, the jurisdiction for the Family Court to injunct the Secretary of State in the exercise of her immigration and asylum jurisdiction could only be established as an essential element to meet the State’s Art 3 obligations if there is clear evidence that this is necessary.”

35. The former President then summarised the position, emphasising the different tasks and assessment criteria within the two processes:

“[54] The extent of the family court’s jurisdiction in such matters is to invite the Secretary of State and/or the relevant tribunals to consider any determinations made by the court in proceedings under the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003…

[56] The approach to risk assessment in a family case is a different exercise from that undertaken in the context of immigration and asylum. The family court has a duty by FGMA 2003, Schedule 3, para 1(2) to have regard to all the circumstances and to discharge that duty the court must consider all the relevant available evidence before deciding any facts on the balance of probability and then moving on to assess the risk and the need for a FGM protection order…the family court has a duty to form its own assessment…a materially different process in the immigration jurisdiction.”

36. The Court acknowledges the existence of High Court authority questioning the purpose of proceeding within the Family Court when the risks to the young woman or girl will only materialise if an asylum application fails. In BA & Anor v JA & Ors (Female Genital Mutilation Protection Orders and Immigration Appeals) [2018] EWHC 1754 (Fam) (para 5, 7-9), Holman J considered the respective roles of the family and immigrations justice systems, and suggested it would not be appropriate for the family court to exercise its powers to make protective orders in such circumstances:

“…the parents have now made an application for asylum here. That has been rejected by the Secretary of State for the Home Department who has indicated a desire to remove the parents and children from the United Kingdom to Nigeria. The parents have appealed, as they are entitled to do, to the immigration appeal tribunal and their appeal is due to be heard in October 2018. It is quite clear from the witness statements and stated position of the parents that they will not themselves voluntarily send, or take, either of their daughters to Nigeria. It is indeed the very last thing that they would wish that their daughter be present in Nigeria where, they say, they are at extreme risk of being mutilated as I have described. Accordingly, it will only be as a consequence of an unsuccessful asylum appeal and the actual removal in due course by the Secretary of State of this family to Nigeria that the risk of female genital mutilation realistically arises…

It seems to me, therefore, that there is, in fact, no necessity or justification for the family court today, in early July 2018, to make any kind of female genital mutilation protection order at all. Such orders are discretionary and ought only to be made when there is an appropriate level of current risk against which the person concerned needs to be protected. Further, however, it seems to me obvious that the making of a genital mutilation order in this case might be seen as impacting upon, or influencing in some way, the discretionary decision which requires to be taken in October by the immigration appeal tribunal.

If there was a current cogent risk of female genital mutilation of either of these girls, then I would unhesitatingly make an order for their immediate and current protection. However, currently, there is no such risk and the only effect of such an order would be to impact in some way upon the immigration and asylum proceedings. It is of the utmost importance that family courts properly respect the discretion in immigration matters which reposes in the first instance with the Secretary of State for the Home Department, and ultimately in the immigration tribunal system upon any appeals to that system. So it seems to me that I should decline to make any order today, and the tribunal system must decide whether or not the asylum claim has been made out or whether the Secretary of State should be in a position to remove these children.

In the event that the asylum claim is ultimately unsuccessful (after any further appeals), and the Secretary of State does then resolve to remove this family and these two girls to Nigeria, he will still have to give a removal notice and there will be an interval of time before the children are actually removed to Nigeria. If, during that interval of time, the applicants consider that there is still a purpose or benefit for the children in Nigeria in obtaining a female genital mutilation protection order here in the very last period before the children are actually removed to Nigeria, then, of course, they can make a further application.”

37. The question of whether the making of a protective order within the Family Court serves any material purpose will turn on the facts of each individual case. The Court is now properly seized of an application, and the ongoing uncertainty and delay is causing M and S considerable distress. It should thus be determined now and not postponed to some future uncertain event. The Court is satisfied on the evidence before it that a FGMPO and FMPO will afford important additional protection to S and M in the event of a forced return to Nigeria that justify the Family Court/High Court exercising its own protective powers outside of and separate to any asylum process.

38. The assessment of risk to S and M within this case is based on the unchallenged sworn evidence of FIA and S and the risk assessments completed by Professor Bradley and Professor Emma-Echiegu, assisted by the legal analysis of Mr Badejo.

39. Turning first to the macro factors, the Court takes note of the publicly available information produced by organisations with access to expertise in respect of FGM in Nigeria: information produced by the Home Office (updated as recently as April 2026); UNICEF; and 28 Too Many/the Orchid Project. The information produced by the Home Office is of particular importance. It is relied upon by decision makers and judges within the immigration/asylum system and is of equal assistance to family judges assessing risk within family proceedings. There is an obvious benefit to ensuring consistency in the country information relied upon within the asylum and family justice systems.

40. The Country Policy and Information Note on Nigeria produced by the Home Office (April 2026) reports:

• Over 53% of women in Ebonyi state have undergone FGM which is the third highest prevalence rate amongst Nigeria’s 37 zones/states (p32; p33 para 4.6.2; p34 para 4.6.3);

• Over 30% of women/girls among the Igbo ethnic group/tribe (mainly located in the South East of Nigeria) have undergone FGM (p10 para 2.4.8; p29 para 4.5.2; p30 para 4.5.3). This is the second highest prevalence rate amongst Nigeria’s 374 identifiable ethnic groups;[1]

• “The SIRP Executive Director noted that parents of girls who do not undergo FGM/C ‘are ostracized and denied social recognition’ in their extended family and community … The same source noted that this applies across Nigeria but is ‘more pronounced among the Igbos and Yorubas of the South East and South West Regions of Nigeria…” (p56 para 9.3.5);

• The negative impact that grandmothers can have on the probability of a granddaughter being circumcised was also acknowledged by Emmanuel Abah, the director of the National Orientation Agency (NOA) in Ebonyi in an article in Business Day in 2020 … The Population Council study from 2018 also referred to grandmothers’ considerable influence over decision-making about FGM, citing an example where a grandmother took her granddaughter to be circumcised against the mother’s will … An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRBC) response to information request update from October 2021 and citing various sources stated: ‘… most of the time’ the paternal grandparents will ‘order [FGM/C] to be done’ and the ‘grandmother always has the upper hand’ and the mother ‘does not have the right to question her…” (p18 para 3.4.7ff).

41. Professor Emma-Echiegu also consulted and relied upon this publicly available material in carrying out her risk assessment, including, in particular, the Country Policy and Information Note produced by the Home Office.

42. The Court also weighs the following key points contained within the expert report of Professor Bradley dated 23rd February 2026:

• The Population Council reported in 2020 that “’… the extent to which FGM/C is practised in Nigeria varies greatly across the country’s six geopolitical areas, with the South West and South East leading in the prevalence of the practice. Over time, the prevalence among women declined in south eastern states but increased substantially in the north western states from almost zero in 2003 to 39.3% in 2016-17, with a roughly similar pattern observed among girls in these geopolitical zones. The prevalence of FGM/C was higher among women and girls from Yoruba and Igbo ethnic groups in southern states”’.

• Ebonyi “is predominantly inhabited by the Igbo ethnic group”.

• Latest available data indicates that:

i) As at 2013, 24.8% of girls/women aged 15-49 in Nigeria had undergone FGM;

ii) As at 2017, 43.2% of girls/women aged 15-49 in Ebonyi had undergone FGM.

• The decision to cut a child does not rest with parents but rather is made by wider senior family members and even community members. To be uncut is considered shameful and the level of pressure placed on parents who do not wish their daughters to be cut is high. Girls are often taken against parents’ wishes to be cut.

• Funding for civil society, NGO and government work with women and girls has been reduced due to many major donors massively reducing their commitment (e,g, US Aid) so whilst there is stakeholder presence the ability of the sector to maintain a robust response to FGM will dwindle. The gains in reducing FGM may well reverse due to the lack of visible advocacy and safeguarding activities”.

• Female genital mutilation (FGM) remains present in parts of Ebonyi State in south-eastern Nigeria despite national prohibition and ongoing intervention programmes. While prevalence has declined nationally, “the persistence of FGM in Ebonyi can be understood through a combination of social norms, gendered power structures, economic incentives, and uneven law enforcement. Rather than being reducible to ‘culture’ alone, FGM operates as a socially regulated institution embedded within broader political-economy structures”.

• The societal expectations in respect of FGM and FM and the reasons for the practices will be broadly the same across Ebonyi.

• FGM and forced marriage are linked – “Being uncut and unmarried will be consider (sic) highly shameful”.

• Customary laws will vary and FGM and forced marriage are traditionally not necessarily seen as an individual parental decision but a community and family decision.

43. Professor Bradley opines that the Overall Risk Rating is High. Her assessment assumes that the father’s statement that FGM is still practiced in his family is accurate. She notes that whilst the prevalence of FGM has reduced significantly in Ebonyi State, the risk of such practices remains, exacerbated by the recent withdrawal of significant aid money and supporting organisations and programmes.

44. Professor Emma-Echiegu concurs with that contextual assessment.

45. Turning next to the individual ‘micro factors’. The father’s evidence, which it is noted has not been challenged within these proceedings, asserts the following:

• The family will have to move back to a village in Ebonyi State if removed from the UK.

• Father is of the Igbo ethnic group/tribe as was the children’s mother.

• In the village there is a lack of access to the police.

• The accommodation in which the family previously lived in Abuja is no longer available to them because that was dependent upon the late mother’s employment.

• The family is without funds and so cannot simply set up their own home away from wider family.

• A number of family members pose a particular risk:

i) Paternal grandmother and previous local cutter: C;

ii) Paternal uncle: S;

iii) Maternal cousin, local marriage broker: O;

iv) Maternal great uncle: I;

• Paternal grandmother has been a respected local cutter.

• FGM is a pre-requisite to marriage in the village.

• All father’s sisters have been subjected to FGM.

• Mother was subjected to FGM.

• Mother’s cousin was subjected to FGM.

• Mother was opposed to FGM.

• Paternal grandmother used to call mother to place pressure on her to take M and S to the village to undergo FGM and mother refused.

• Mother and paternal grandmother argued on several occasions due to mother’s refusal to subject M and S to FGM.

46. Upon analysis of both the contextual and individualised factors, Professor Emma-Echiegu concludes that M is at a ‘moderate-high’ risk of FGM and a ‘moderate risk’ of forced marriage. She concludes that S is at moderate risk of FGM and low-moderate risk of forced marriage. She clarifies that a low-moderate risk means a real and appreciable risk, clearly above the negligible, but well short of an even chance (indicatively of the order of 10 to 25%). Moderate means a substantial and real risk that must be taken seriously and actively managed, though still below ‘more likely than not’ (indicatively of the order of 25 to 50%). Moderate-High means a risk at or around the even-chance threshold (indicatively of the order of 50 to 70%). High means more likely than not to materialise absent effective protection (indicatively above about 70%)’.

47. The Court must consider the assessed risk alongside any available protective measures. As identified by Professor Emma-Echiegu in her expert report, a number of steps could be taken to try and manage the risk, but nearly all are dependant upon S and M not residing near their paternal family.

48. Legal measures which may be available in Nigeria to protect S and M against FGM and forced marriage are detailed in the expert report provided by Mr Badejo. Firstly, it is clear that any order made by this court will not be recognised or enforceable in Nigeria. Furthermore, anyone who breaches a FGMPO or FMPO in Nigeria will not be subject to extradition. The making of a FGMPO or FMPO in this jurisdiction may however carry some ‘soft power’. In Mr Badejo’s opinion, the existence of such orders would likely mean that potential perpetrators may be wary of attempting to engage in FGM because Ebonyi State has a zero tolerance policy to FGM and if the community are aware that there are protective orders from England potential perpetrators are likely to be scared off.

49. Legal safeguards against FGM and forced marriage are also found within Nigerian domestic law. FGM is illegal in Nigeria by Virtue of the Violence Against the Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015. This law is a federal law that only applies in the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja. For such a law to be effective in the States of the Federation each State must pass their own local law. Ebonyi State has done so by virtue of the passing of its own Violence Against the Persons (Prohibition) Law 2018 (as amended in 2022). This law criminalises the act of FGM or attempts to carry out FGM in Ebonyi State. By virtue of the VAPP Law in Ebonyi State, forced marriage is also criminalised in Ebonyi State.

50. Protective orders are also available on application to the courts in Ebonyi State following a complaint of violence by the complainant. Such orders if granted are effective irrespective of the location of the complainant and no time limits apply. The application may be brought on behalf of the complainant by any other person including a police officer, a protection officer, an accredited service provider, social worker, or teacher who has interest in the well-being of the complainant. The court will make the order if satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the respondent has committed, is committing or that there is an imminent likelihood that he may commit an act of domestic violence.

51. The difficulty is in ascertaining the effectiveness of these legal remedies. Mr Badejo is unable to assist with how readily available these legal safeguards are for persons in need of protection. He notes from discussions with a colleague that the State Government has been working very closely with traditional rulers in the various local government areas in Ebonyi State with a view to preventing FGM being inflicted on girls and women and documents are available which appear to show that the traditional rulers in various local government areas renounced the practice of FGM in 2019. It is however telling that Mr Badejo has not been able to find any reported cases of persons convicted of having perpetrated or enabled FGM or forced marriage.

Conclusion

52. On the evidence now before the Court, I am satisfied that FGMPOs and FMPOs should be made to secure the health, safety and well-being of S and M. The degree of risk of both S and M being subjected to FGM and forced marriage if returned to Nigeria are real and substantial. The gravity of the harm to which these two young women would be exposed and the fundamental nature of the rights at stake quite properly weigh heavily with the Court. Whilst protective steps could be taken by FIA in Nigeria to try and secure the protection of his daughters, the Court is not satisfied those measures are realistic and thus effective. Most depend upon FIA, M and S residing away from paternal family, something which FIA makes clear is not possible in his current circumstances.

53. As to the necessity and proportionality of the orders being sought, S and M welcome the protection they would bring. The orders will not interfere with their day to day lives. The Court notes that if S and M are returned to Nigeria, whilst the orders will not be directly enforceable in Nigeria, there is the potential for orders of the High Court of England and Wales to carry some ‘soft force’ with paternal and maternal family in Nigeria. They therefore serve a constructive, albeit highly compromised, protective purpose. However, with the Court’s focus very clearly on safeguarding S and M against these particularly abhorrent abusive practices against women and girls, the Court takes the firm view that any step which may assist in securing that protection, should be taken.

54. For all those reasons, the Court will make the orders as sought.

Notes

[1] 28 Too Many/Orchid Project FGM/C in Nigeria Key Findings March 2023 p7; 28 Too Many/Orchid Project FGM/C in Nigeria Country Profile Update March 2023 p10; p30; p31; p35; p54.

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