Commercial United Kingdom
MPP (Services) Ltd v Ratio Law Solicitors LLP
Approved Judgment
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2852 (Comm)
Case No: CC-2025-MAN-000018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS & PROPERTY DIVISION
CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT IN MANCHESTER
Manchester Civil Justice Centre,
1 Bridge Street West, Manchester M60 9DJ
Date handed down: 6 November 2026
Before:
HIS HONOUR JUDGE STEPHEN DAVIES
SITTING AS A JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between:
| MPP (SERVICES) LTD | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| RATIO LAW SOLICITORS LLP | Defendant |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
George Rowell (instructed by HF Limited, Blyth NE24) for the Claimant
Zachary Bredemear (instructed by Edesia Law LLP, London EC3N) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 29 – 30 September,1 October 2026
Draft judgment circulated 2 November 2026
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
APPROVED JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10:30am on 6 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to The National Archives.
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A paragraph 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
His Honour Judge Stephen Davies
His Honour Judge Stephen Davies:
Sections
Summary and conclusions pars. 1-29
The parties, other relevant persons or entities and my assessment of the witnesses pars. 30-86
Fact-finding chronology pars. 87-166
Conclusion par. 167
Summary and conclusions
1. This is a claim for damages for professional negligence brought by the Claimant company against the Defendant solicitors.
2. It concerns the legal services provided by the Defendant regarding the production, amendment and registration of a legal charge entered into between the Claimant, as the chargor, and a Ms Lesley Hearne, as the chargee, in respect of Ms Hearne’s house at 6 Laurel Bank, Hyde, Tameside, SK14 5DX (Laurel Bank).
3. In short, the Defendant admits that, as a result of a simple human error by the relevant fee-earner, Ms Alberici, a crucial part of the text included by the Claimant in the first draft of the legal charge (in panel 9 of the draft legal charge, which was in the standard CH1 form, promulgated by HM Land Registry) sent to the Defendant under an email asking whether it had been drafted correctly, was removed and not replaced.
4. The relevant terms of the legal charge read, in the draft version sent by the Claimant to the Defendant: Panel 7 “The borrower … charges the property by way of legal mortgage as security for the payment of the sums detailed in panel 9”; Panel 9 “2nd Charge of £180,000 payable within 24 months of the date of this agreement”.
5. Ms Alberici removed the words “2nd Charge of £180,000” and did not insert anything else in their stead, so that the version as returned by her to the Claimant and as executed by Ms Hearne read as follows: “The borrower … charges the property by way of legal mortgage as security for the payment of the sums detailed in panel 9”; Panel 9 “Payable within 24 months of the date of this legal charge”.
6. It follows that there was nothing in the legal charge as executed which stated whether any, and if so what, sums were the subject of the legal charge.
7. Although there are various other pleaded allegations of breach of duty which are in issue, it is accepted by the Defendant that: (a) this error was a breach of duty; and (b) the consequences were that, after a dispute had arisen between the Claimant and Ms Hearne, she was able to and did plead (among other things) a case that the legal charge was void for uncertainty, because it did not identify any sum which was secured by the legal charge (the legal uncertainty defence).
8. After some time the Claimant, advised by new solicitors and by counsel, accepted that the legal uncertainty defence was, realistically, unanswerable. It therefore agreed at a mediation to cancel the registration of the legal charge, with the result that it lost the benefit of the legal charge as security for its claims against Ms Hearne.
9. The resultant claim for damages for professional negligence has proceeded to a full trial because, as well as raising arguments based on the scope of the duty imposed on the Defendant, the lack of a sufficient nexus between the duty and the loss suffered by the Claimant, and issues of remoteness and failure to mitigate loss (these being respectively: (a) the scope of duty question; (b) the duty nexus question; and; (c) the legal responsibility question, as identified by the Supreme Court in Manchester Building Society v Grant Thornton [2021] UKSC 20; [2022] AC 783 at par. 6), the Defendant also raises arguments about the assessment of the loss of the chance which the Claimant had of recovering the sums claimed against Ms Hearne due to its inability to rely on the legal charge.
10. The Defendant’s arguments in relation to loss of a chance are substantially premised on a dispute as to the underlying facts relating to the pre-existing relationship between the Claimant and Ms Hearne.
11. The Claimant was an investment company owned and operated by its directors and shareholders, Steven Reel and Stephen Carroll. They were often referred to at the time as the two Steves, reflecting the fact that they very much operated as a team, and I adopt that reference in this judgment for convenience.
12. Ms Hearne was an experienced children’s care home manager and was also a longstanding friend of Mr Reel.
13. In later 2017 / early 2018 the two Steves and Ms Hearne agreed to enter into a joint venture under which they would identify suitable properties to acquire, set up and run as children’s care homes. The plan, in short, was that using Ms Hearne’s knowledge of what was required of a successful children’s care home the three would work together to identify suitable properties for conversion into and operation as children’s care homes. The two Steves, through the Claimant, would: (a) provide the funding (both personally, and through two particular investors who were willing to trust the two Steves to deliver the venture and produce a good return on their investment); and (b) organise the acquisition of the properties and any necessary conversion works. Once completed, Ms Hearne would run them as care home manager. The hope and expectation was that they would be extremely profitable. The two Steves would use a subsidiary company of the Claimant, Cathmor Limited (Cathmor), as a vehicle for this joint venture, of which the two Steves and Ms Hearne would be directors.
14. Two suitable properties in Cheadle, Manchester, were duly identified and acquired, at Cheadle Road and Beatrice Road respectively (the Cheadle properties).
15. However, ultimately the venture did not get off the ground, for two reasons. The first was that after some time and effort had been invested in the process, it became clear that planning approval to allow the Cheadle properties to be operated as children’s care homes was unlikely to be granted. The second was that in October 2019 the two Steves and Ms Hearne ultimately fell out irreparably, before the alternative agreed option of using Laurel Bank as the first children’s care home instead could come to fruition.
16. The principal trigger for the fall out was the decision by the two Steves, in the face of continuing delays in securing Ofsted registration for Laurel Bank as a children’s care home, to refuse to pay rent for Laurel Bank until registration was achieved, as they were entitled to do under the lease as signed.
17. At the same time, however, Ms Hearne first began to question whether she was bound by the legal charge. In short, whilst she admitted that she executed the legal charge, she disputed that she had agreed to give the legal charge with full knowledge of its contents and alleged that her signature was procured by misrepresentation.
18. In contrast, the two Steves allege, but she denies, that she agreed in full knowledge to give the legal charge as security for what she fully accepted was a pre-existing liability on her part to pay the Claimant an agreed liability for £180,000, primarily for the wasted costs incurred due to the failure of the Cheadle properties project, for which they allege, but she denies, she had accepted responsibility. The two Steves hold Ms Hearne responsible, on the basis that she failed to identify and advise about the problems with securing planning permission for converting the properties for use as children’s care homes. Ms Hearne argues that she never held herself out as an expert in planning issues and that any fault was due to the initial decision of the two Steves not to use a planning consultant from the start and/or their decision to abandon the appeal against the refusal of permission.
19. Due to the settlement these disputes were never resolved by a court. Although it would have been open to the Claimant to pursue a claim against Ms Hearne for the underlying liability, and then to seek to enforce it against the equity in Laurel Bank, that was obviously a much less attractive proposition than enforcing a legal charge. At trial, the Defendant made it clear that it did not contend that the Claimant failed to mitigate its loss in not so doing. That in my view was a realistic concession because, based on the authorities in relation to mitigation, it cannot be said in my judgment that the Claimant was obliged to pursue litigation against Ms Hearne on an unsecured basis at its own risk as to costs when, on its case, and on my findings, it had lost the opportunity to pursue a secured claim due to the Defendant’s breach.
20. As between the Claimant and the Defendant, the latter has pleaded that what Mr Reel told Ms Alberici was that the charge was intended to secure a future loan to be made to a friend, Ms Hearne. In the circumstances, the Defendant contends that they cannot be legally liable for what the Claimant says – and has always said – was a substantial admitted claim for loss caused by Ms Hearne’s breach of contract.
21. Further, the Defendant also contends, adopting Ms Hearne’s case in the previous proceedings and relying on her evidence in this case, that the true position was that: (a) Ms Hearne had never agreed to pay compensation of £180,000 and nor was she liable to pay such sums to the Claimant; and (b) the two Steves had induced Ms Hearne to give the legal charge by misrepresentation.
22. It follows, as Mr Bredemear put it in closing submissions, that this case effectively involves an investigation of two separate disputes, namely the live claim for professional negligence as between the Claimant and the Defendant and the compromised claim between the Claimant and Ms Hearne. However, as he acknowledged, and as I agree, the task for the court in this case is not to make findings on the balance of probabilities in relation to the disputes as between the Claimant and Ms Hearne. Instead, its task is to assess the true value of the loss of the chance which the Claimant would have had to recover sums from Ms Hearne in the hypothetical counter-factual scenario where the Defendant had properly performed its duty to the Claimant and secured a legal charge which was not ineffective for legal uncertainty.
23. This involves deciding what would have happened had the Defendant not removed the wording inserted by the Claimant. It may also involve considering what would have happened had the wording been replaced by something which more accurately reflected the position, either as contended for by the Claimant or the Defendant. In short, the Claimant contends that the Defendant ought to have enquired and then drafted the legal charge so that it recorded that Ms Hearne was securing payment of her admitted liability to the Claimant in the sum of £180,000, whereas the Defendant contends that it was instructed only to draft a legal charge which would secure repayment of an intended loan, rather than an existing alleged but not admitted or agreed liability.
24. This thus involves considering what would have happened in the hypothetical counter-factual scenario where the Defendant had performed its duty. As made clear by the Court of Appeal in Allied Maples Group Ltd v Simmons & Simmons, [1995] 1 W.L.R. 1602, approved by the Supreme Court in Perry v Raleys Solicitors [2019] UKSC 5, [2020] A.C. 352 at [21], and as discussed in detail in Jackson & Powell on Professional Liability, 9th ed. Chapter 11 at 11-276 ff, this involves assessing the overall loss of the chance of what the Claimant contends was its right to full recovery of the £180,000. The Defendant has raised a number of detailed arguments to contend that in fact the chance which was lost was no more than speculative or, if it was substantial, was nonetheless far less than £180,000.
25. In some of the decided cases the court has undertaken a broad-brush assessment of the loss of a chance, in others it has made a detailed assessment. Even in such cases the court is careful not to apply a percentage assessment to a percentage assessment to produce what is, overall, an unrealistically low result.
26. In this case I have adopted the approach of steering a middle path between these two courses. Rather than seeking to arrive at a percentage assessment to every contingency, I will seek to identify the particular arguments advanced by the Defendant as being either: (a) entirely or almost entirely speculative; (b) somewhere along a continuum between very weak to very strong; (c) entirely or almost entirely conclusive. Where they fall into category (a) they should be disregarded. Where they fall into category (c) they will completely extinguish the value of the lost chance. Otherwise, I will factor my conclusions together into a blended overall assessment, which I shall express in money terms.
27. In terms of my approach to the evidence, given that the issues as between the Claimant and the Defendant relate to events in March 2019 and the issues as between the Claimant and Ms Hearne relate principally to events from late 2017 to late 2019, it would be surprising if any of the participants could have a clear memory of the details which is not substantially based on reconstruction. I did not find any of the four witnesses compellingly reliable although, as I explain later, I found the two Steves more reliable overall than either Ms Alberici or Ms Hearne, both of whom I am afraid I found deeply unconvincing in many respects. Generally, in such circumstances, it is safer to place most reliance on such contemporaneous documentary evidence as there is, together with suitable inferences from the absence of documentary evidence which might be expected to be available on one side’s case and together also with such inferences as I can reasonably draw from my assessment of the inherent probabilities.
28. In summary, my decision is that the Claimant succeeds and is entitled to damages of £100,000 plus interest.
29. I start by referring to the parties involved in this case and to other relevant persons and entities and continue by stating my assessment of the witnesses. I continue by undertaking my detailed fact-finding chronology. which also contains my relevant findings. I deal with any other matters in the conclusions section.
The parties, other relevant persons or entities and my assessment of the witnesses
30. The Claimant
31. The Claimant, MPP (Services) Limited, is and was at all relevant times a company, operated as an investment vehicle by and owned and controlled by the two Steves, putting in their own funds as well as funds introduced by other investors. I accept their evidence that they had no previous knowledge or experience in setting up or running care homes, whether for children or otherwise, and that their previous experience was largely in renovating terraced houses, where planning permission and other land acquisition and development issues were not as significant as with more substantial projects.
32. The Claimant carried on business under the trading name Resicon, as was stated on its bank statements, which showed that it was financially active over the periods from 1 October 2017 to 18 January 2022, with October 2017 being the beginning of the period in which payments were made from that account to Ms Hearne’s bank account under the reference “Resicon, Steves”.
33. The two Steves also had “Resicon.co.uk” email addresses, which they provided to Ms Hearne and which she used to communicate with them.
34. It is nonetheless the case that the Claimant filed dormant accounts for the years ending 31 July 2017 and 2018, whereas it filed accounts showing it as active in the following two years.
35. Mr Reel and Mr Carroll gave evidence that filing dormant accounts can only have been a mistake. They also said that, when this point was raised by Ms Hearne in the previous proceedings, they had instructed their new accountants to address the mistake. However, it appears from Companies House records that no updated accounts have actually been filed which remedy this error. They were unable to explain why their accountants had not filed updated accounts. On any view, this unexplained omission is concerning. However, it is apparent from the evidence that the Claimant was not in fact a dormant company over this period, and it was not put to the two Steves in cross-examination that the reason for filing dormant accounts was something which was otherwise relevant to the issues or to their credibility more generally.
36. Further, although Ms Hearne stated, reasonably enough, that she did not know that Resicon was a trading name for the Claimant company, she also accepted that she knew that she was being paid by Resicon, which was the trading name of the business operated by the two Steves, and she had no positive knowledge or belief as to the precise legal identity of that business.
37. In the circumstances, it is apparent that on an objective analysis Ms Hearne was content to contract with whichever legal entity operated under the name Resicon, as she essentially admitted in cross-examination. That, as is clearly the case from the bank statements, was the Claimant. Any argument to the contrary would in my judgment always have been almost entirely speculative.
38. The Defendant
39. Ratio Law Solicitors LLP was at all relevant times a firm of solicitors based in city centre Manchester and specialising in commercial property and property finance work. Ms Alberici was a designated member of the firm at all relevant times and practised in property-related matters.
40. Cathmor Limited
41. Cathmor is a company which was incorporated specifically to operate the proposed children's homes as a subsidiary of the Claimant. During the relevant period its directors were Stephen Reel, Stephen Carroll and Lesley Hearne.
42. On 21 November 2017 Mr Carroll emailed Ms Hearne informing her that Cathmor had been set up and that the draft employment contract under which she was to be employed as director of care at a salary of £72,000 p.a. was with Cathmor.
43. The evidence shows that all payments made to Ms Hearne in relation to this relevant project were made to her by the Claimant, albeit shown as related to Cathmor.
44. Mr Reel
45. Mr Reel gave evidence first for the Claimant and was subject to detailed cross-examination from 11:45am to 16:00pm (with a break for lunch) on the first day of trial.
46. In my judgment he came across as a reasonably honest and a reasonably reliable witness in relation to this case. He clearly has a good head for business and did not pretend to have any particular knowledge of legal issues or terminology.
47. I say reasonably honest because, like many businessmen, he (and the same applies to Mr Carroll) was not above making misleading statements in the pursuit of his objectives, as was explored in their cross-examination in relation to a statement made to an estate agent and what may have been an attempt to persuade Ms Hearne to backdate a document with a view to obtain a council tax rebate. As against this, there is no hard evidence in my judgment that they have been consistently dishonest in such a way as fundamentally damages their overall truthfulness.
48. To take a small example, Ms Hearne had made a point of saying that she had only signed the legal charge due to a misrepresentation by the two Steves that it was only needed to “reassure the Chinese investors that we would not walk away from the project”. Mr Reel was asked whether the investors were Chinese. He replied that one was Mr Carroll’s father-in-law and the other was a friend of Mr Carroll’s father-in-law. He paused and added that he thought that the friend was either from Hong Kong or from the Philippines. (Mr Carroll confirmed in evidence that the friend was Portuguese, but lived in Macao, which was consistent with Mr Reel’s evidence.) Mr Reel was quite willing to venture this piece of information, even though it obviously provided some support for Ms Hearne’s case.
49. To take a rather more important example, in the Particulars of Claim a detailed case was pleaded by the Claimant about a telephone conversation between Ms Alberici and Ms Hearne, which the Claimant said happened when Ms Hearne attended the Claimant’s offices to sign the legal charge and before she did so. Mr Reel’s evidence was that he was the only other person present when this conversation took place.
50. That this telephone conversation took place was challenged in terms in the Defence as being a dishonest fabrication, intended to improve the Claimant’s chances of showing that Ms Hearne knew full well what she was signing.
51. In his witness statement, which he was at pains to emphasise had been made entirely from memory and without reference to contemporaneous or other documents, all that he said was: “I told [Ms Hearne] that before she signed the form she would need to speak to Ms Alberici. I telephoned Ms Alberici, they had a conversation for about 30 seconds and then signed the charge. I can still picture Ms Hearne having the telephone conversation with Ms Alberici and then signing the charge”.
52. In cross-examination he accepted that this was all he could recall about what had happened. He seemed to me to be rather perplexed at how the detailed case in the POC had come to be pleaded, although he did say that if that was what was in the POC he must have believed that it had been said at the time.
53. Whilst I will make my findings on this point below, my clear view is that this was not, and never was, a dishonest fabrication case. If it had been, his evidence in his witness statement and cross-examination would have been very different, in that either he would have stuck to his guns or would have managed to come up with some explanation, however unconvincing, as to how the Particulars of Claim had come to be drafted in those terms. My conclusion is that, having told his legal advisers about the phone call, he was prepared to allow himself to be tempted to speculate as to its content and for a case to be pleaded based on that speculation. Whilst I accept that his willingness to do so damages his reliability, it does not make him a dishonest witness, which is what the Defendant set out to prove.
54. Mr Carroll
55. Mr Carroll was the only other witness for the Claimant and gave evidence on day 2 from 10am to 11:20am.
56. My impression of Mr Carroll was essentially the same as Mr Reel and his evidence was substantially the same.
57. To that extent, his evidence did not materially assist or harm the Claimant’s essential case in any significant way.
58. Ms Alberici
59. Ms Alberici is and was at the relevant time a partner in the Defendant firm, which she had founded with colleagues in 2010.
60. She is a non-contentious commercial property specialist.
61. I am afraid that I found her an unimpressive witness, on whose evidence I can place little reliance, for a number of reasons.
62. First, her complete lack of concern about ensuring that her witness statement was correct or showing any apparent concern about inconsistencies between her evidence in her witness statement, which she adopted without qualification, and her oral evidence. For example, in par. 10 she said that she had acted for the two Steves and the Claimant on seven matters. When it was suggested to her in cross-examination that they were well-established clients, she replied that she had only acted for them previously in two or three transactions. The difference is not material in itself, yet it showed a desire to minimise the true position, even though it was apparent from her evidence in her witness statement and, indeed, the contemporaneous documents that the only reason she was willing to undertake this work for the Claimant was because they were regarded as good clients. She did not seem to be at all worried that she had given a different answer in evidence to what was in her witness statement without, so it appeared, having undertaken any cross-check as to the number of previous occasions she had acted for them either before making her witness statement or giving evidence.
63. Second, her attempt to argue that she had not treated the work undertaken for the Claimant as “as an actual instruction / transaction” (witness statement, par.15). This was plainly not credible, since the Defendant had, on Ms Alberici’s instructions, charged the Claimant for an hour’s work together with disbursements. However, when she was asked about this in cross-examination, she initially maintained her position, saying that no legal work had been carried out. It was only when I suggested to her that her firm had obviously provided legal services, even if what had been done was – on her case – essentially administrative, that she accepted that it had provided legal services and had charged for them on that basis.
64. Third, the Defendant had placed great emphasis on Ms Alberici having been told that the legal charge was to secure a future loan of £180,000 to Ms Hearne and that it was a “small loan”. She had claimed in her witness statement at par. 13(a) to remember that Mr Reel had referred to a future loan of £180,000 in the first telephone call on 29 March 2019, yet: (a) neither her initial email to Mr Reel of that date, nor his response or draft completed legal charge, makes reference to this (b) under cross-examination she accepted that she did not know whether reference was made to an existing or a future loan; and (c) her contemporaneous email to her trainee of 23 April 2019 referred to the Claimant having “lent money” to Ms Hearne. The Defendant had pleaded the reference to the small loan, but again there was no contemporaneous reference to this, and when asked in cross-examination she said that she did not recall this. I am satisfied that the true position is that she did not ask or find out whether it was an existing or future loan, and she cannot seriously have thought that it was a small loan, given the references to £180,000, so that what was stated in the Defence and in her witness statement amounted to complete speculation in an attempt to advance the Defendant’s case.
65. Fourth, it is a matter of great concern that, in her letter of response to the letter before action, she made no reference to having inadvertently removed the existing words in panel 9 “2nd legal charge of £180,000”. This omission made the rest of the letter positively misleading, and it cannot have been a simple mistake, especially when it was made plain in the letter that she had reviewed the file before sending the letter. Under cross-examination she initially queried whether that omission was relevant, when it plainly was, as she must have known. When asked whether she had deliberately left this information out of the letter, the best she could say was that she didn’t recall. Whilst it is not possible for me to conclude whether she bears personal responsibility for this, or whether it was drafted by the Defendant’s insurers or their solicitors, she was ultimately responsible for reviewing and signing off the letter under her reference.
66. Fifth, what makes this worse is that when, in subsequent correspondence, her attention was drawn to the fact that it was plainly she who had made the alteration to panel 9, the response from the Defendant’s solicitors was to assert that “these amendments would only have been made on express instructions”, when there was no basis whatsoever for this assertion to have been made. Again, it is not possible for me to make a finding as to who was responsible for this obviously wrong and misleading statement, but it does not reflect well on whoever drafted it, reviewed it or signed it off.
67. Ms Hearne
68. I have also found Ms Hearne to be an unimpressive witness upon whose evidence I can place little reliance. I am satisfied that she is unable to give dispassionate or reliable evidence because she feels betrayed by the two Steves who, because they were her friends, she believed would not ultimately withdraw financial support from her or seek to enforce the legal charge to recover the sums expended in the expectation that the Cheadle properties were suitable to operate as children’s care homes. Once it became clear to her that they were not prepared to make any further payments to her and would look to the legal charge, she swiftly persuaded herself that she was not at fault at all and only signed the legal charge as a result of their pressure and misrepresentation. My principal reasons for reaching this conclusion are as follows.
69. First, and foremost, as someone: (a) with wide experience of involvement in the children’s care home business, who had already set up and managed care homes, which involved a detailed knowledge of the legal and regulatory requirements for care home operation; (b) who had sat as a lay magistrate for a number of years; (c) who, for both these reasons, was familiar with legal documents and their consequences, it is inherently unlikely in my judgment that in the circumstances alleged by her she would have signed what was obviously a formal legal document in the belief that it was not such a document. That is especially so when it: (i) was prominently marked “HM Land Registry – Legal charge of a registered estate”; (ii) related – as was clearly shown on the front page – to the only property which she owned; (iii) referred to her on the same front page as “the Borrower” and the Claimant as “the Lender”; (iv) her signature was written immediately above the words “EXECUTED AS A DEED by Lesley Jane Hearne in the presence of [the named witness to her signature]”.
70. I acknowledge her evidence that she regarded the two Steves as her friends, especially Mr Reel, whose best friend was her cousin and whom she had known for many years, and I also acknowledge that even experienced businesspeople can make mistakes by trusting people and not reading important documents before signing them. However, it is also obvious from the previous correspondence and events that she: (a) was an experienced businesswoman with legal and regulatory, as well as business, experience; (b) was perfectly able to assert herself and drive a good bargain to persuade the two Steves to appoint her as their consultant; (c) was plainly aware that the project had been subject to delays and difficulties and significant costs, due to the fact that it could not proceed as planned using the Cheadle properties, with the result that there was pressure, not just from the two Steves but from their investors as well, to rescue the project by using Laurel Bank as an alternative care home. It is difficult to see how she could genuinely have believed that she was signing this obviously formal legal agreement, on her case only explained to her on the same day that she signed it, as being “just something to reassure the investors”. There is no suggestion or evidence that she had already been regularly asked by the two Steves to sign formal legal documents of a similar nature, so that she had become blasé about signing them without reading them.
71. I do accept that it is likely that the two Steves would have told her, as was undoubtedly the case at the time, that they were under pressure from the two investors to repay their investment. In my judgment the true position is that Ms Hearne very quickly persuaded herself, when things went wrong, that she would not voluntarily have signed a legal charge over Laurel Bank as her sole asset of substance and has, in that frame of mind, reconstructed what happened and now genuinely believes that she only signed it because she was misled that it would not have any legal effect and was only required to re-assure the investors. In short, she has conflated in her mind the reason for being asked to sign the legal charge and the substance of the legal charge.
72. Further, although she said that she signed it without reading it or understanding its true nature and effect because she was in a hurry, she did not give any real explanation for why she had to treat it as so urgent that she would have signed it without reading it sufficiently to see that it was a formal legal document and not just some general re-assurance letter. Objectively, there was no reason why she could not have spent a couple of minutes reading the document and, if she had wanted, asking for more time to read and discuss it with her partner or, indeed, anyone else in whom she placed trust. She did not suggest that she was placed under pressure to sign the document there and then, and it is obvious from the contemporaneous correspondence that she was no shrinking violet who was unable to assert herself in strong terms when she believed that she needed to. To the contrary, it is clear from her previous and subsequent conduct that she is an intelligent and confident businesswoman who was perfectly capable of asserting herself as and when she believed she needed to and was not remotely over-awed by the two Steves.
73. Furthermore, she plainly was not telling the truth in denying that £20,000 of the amount which the two Steves said she owed her was a loan to her from the Claimant, when her contemporaneous messages at the time plainly said and made clear that it was. In particular, her statement in her text message of 15 October 2018 – “I could put 90k into the business (20k being the money I owe you)” – was incontrovertible evidence that she had accepted that she owed this amount to them at this time.
74. Further, the evidence indicated that she was not above using her position to obtain payment from a third party (Dan Wiskin) and, instead of sharing it with Cathmor through whom it had been provided, keeping both shares for herself. Given the two Steves’ need for funds for Cathmor to balance the expenditure it was incurring, her explanation that they were happy for her to keep it for the time being is implausible.
75. Further, despite saying that she had and claimed no experience in planning matters, and despite saying that she made it clear that she was relying entirely on Mr Stannard, it is clear from the contemporaneous emails that: (a) she presented herself as knowledgeable about planning matters, insofar as they related to children’s care homes, for example in relation to one under consideration at Snowdonia Way, Hyde in November 2017 as well as one of the Cheadle properties on 21 March 2018; (b) she made the initial planning applications for the Cheadle properties without involving Mr Stannard, and there is no evidence to support her assertion that she only did so because she was persuaded by the two Steves, given that she made no reference to this in her email to the two Steves dated 15 August 2018 when she reported on the failure of the then current application.
76. To the contrary, the fact that she was willing to agree to pay for his work herself, when Mr Stannard later became involved at her instigation after the first refusal of permission, tends to confirm that she regarded herself as responsible for the problem. Her explanation in cross-examination that she never expected to have to pay him, so that it did not cost her anything to make this gesture, was either untrue or showed that she was willing to lie in contemporaneous correspondence.
77. The penultimate nail in the coffin of her credibility came towards the end of her cross-examination when, having claimed that Mr Reel must have taken the identity documents required by Ms Alberici to register the legal charge at HM Land Registry from those previously used by her to submit to Ofsted to obtain the appropriate permission to manage the care home, she was shown the copy of her own utilities bill dated 29 March 2019, which was in the Defendant’s file, showing that she must have provided this document to be sent to the Defendant, and that she could only have received it days before she signed the legal charge.
78. Realising that this completely contradicted her evidence that she had not produced this utilities bill to Mr Reel in connection with the legal charge, and that there was no reason why she would have needed to do so save in connection with the legal charge, after some rapid thought she suggested that he must have taken the bill from her desk in the office, because she was in the habit of taking personal correspondence into the office and leaving it there. This explanation was completely implausible and, in my judgment, confirmed her as someone who was prepared to lie as and when she believed it suited her purposes to do so.
79. The final nail came when she was shown a letting agreement signed by her as landlord and Cathmor as tenant for the use of Laurel Bank as a children’s care home, in circumstances where the final fallout came in October 2019 after she had complained bitterly that the Claimant was not adhering to the agreement to pay rent under that agreement. What appeared immediately above her signature to that agreement was a prominent special condition which clearly stated that, apart from the first payment, no further payment would be made to her under that agreement until Ofsted had accepted Laurel Bank as a suitable children’s home, which clearly justified the refusal to pay her rent at that point in time. Shown this, she said that she had not seen this special condition and had simply signed the agreement without reading it.
80. The coincidence between her case about the circumstances in which she signed this obviously important legal document, which is also implausible, and her case about signing the legal charge in similar circumstances, is striking.
81. I am conscious that in making these adverse credibility findings I have had the advantage of hearing Ms Hearne cross-examined in detail whereas, when I am assessing the loss of the chance case, that is not something which would have been known at the time.
82. However, it must also be borne in mind that at the time it was always known that the essential primary case which Ms Hearne always had to establish in the claim she had brought against the Claimant as the defendant in that litigation was that grounds existed to set aside the legal charge. Apart from the legal uncertainty ground which, for obvious reasons, was the first argument advanced by her legal team, in order to succeed in her claim she had to plead and rely upon arguments of non est factum or misrepresentation in circumstances where – as she would have been advised – the first argument would be extremely difficult to establish in the case of an experienced business person such as Ms Hearne and the second suffered from the difficulty of there being a complete absence of contemporaneous documentary evidence or independent witness evidence to support it.
83. Furthermore, the same difficulties infected her alternative claim that she did not owe anything under the legal charge. If that was the case, and it represented her belief at the time, why did she sign the legal charge in the first place? It is also worth noting that Ms Hearne provided no details at all in her Particulars of Claim as to that contention, whereas the Claimant pleaded a detailed case in response. In her Reply she pleaded certain things which are clearly untrue (for e.g. in par. 10 that she did not know whether the two Steves had any experience in establishing or operating children’s care homes, when she plainly did know they had none, and in par. 33 in denying that the £20,000 was a loan). She pleaded other things that are inconsistent with or not supported by the contemporaneous evidence, such that the two Steves proceeded with the Cheadle properties, including incurring expenditure in advance of obtaining planning permission, despite her express advice and warnings.
84. I do accept that she did raise her concern about the circumstances in which she had signed the legal charge in October 2019, contemporaneous with the breakdown of her relationship with the two Steves. However, in my judgment this is equally consistent with her deciding that attack was the best form of defence as with this being something she had always believed. Indeed, it may be questioned why she should have come out with this point at that time when, so far as I have been made aware, the two Steves had made no reference to seeking to enforce the legal charge at that point. Her adopting a combative approach at that point in time is consistent in my view with her general approach to life, as revealed by the documentary evidence in this case (in particular the tenor of her text messages of 11 October 2019) and my assessment of her character from her giving evidence in this case. That is not a criticism of her, but it does tend to help me understand how she can and would behave and why.
85. James Stannard
86. Mr Stannard was a planning consultant engaged in connection with planning related matters both for the Cheadle properties and Laurel Bank. He was introduced to the two Steves by Ms Hearne, with whom he had an existing professional relationship. He was not involved in the matters directly relevant to this claim and was not called as a witness by either party.
Fact-finding chronology
87. The circumstances leading up to the initial agreement between the Claimant and Ms Hearne
88. Although there is little hard documentary evidence about this, and some contradictory evidence, I am satisfied that before the events the subject of this case occurred Mr Reel and Mr Carroll were long-established business colleagues who invested, with a combination of their own funds and funds from other investors, into various business opportunities such as property development. They used the Claimant company as a vehicle into which to channel investment monies and they tended to set up separate SPV companies to undertake the specific business opportunities in question.
89. As at November 2017 the Claimant had around £737,000 in its bank account, which the two Steves both confirmed in their evidence had been provided principally by the two investors, but also included money which they had provided. They said that the two investors were not providing money specifically for the care home project, but instead for the two Steves to invest into projects which would provide a good return, with the investment decisions being made by the two Steves.
90. It was on 6 November 2017 that Ms Hearne produced and submitted a written proposal to the two Steves.
91. In terms of what she represented as to her knowledge of what was required in relation to planning permission, in her written proposal: (i) she identified that Ofsted would require an “application to [the] local council for change of use to a home”; (ii) within the specification of what she would provide in relation to the setting up of a children’s care home she included (a) management of the application for registration (with Ofsted as a care home); and (b) support and advice in the identification of suitable premises.
92. It is also worth noting that Ms Hearne was proposing a fee of £35,000 for the first home (payable in two instalments, one at the start and the other on home registration) and £30,000 for the second home. She did not identify any need for separate planning consultants to be involved. It follows, in my judgment, that the two Steves were reasonably entitled to assume that she was offering to provide all of the consultancy expertise which they required from start to finish, for what was a reasonably substantial fee.
93. Although there is no email formally accepting the proposal, on 16 November 2017 she received the first payment of £35,000 from the Claimant, which was the total payable for the first home.
94. On 17 January 2018 Mr Reel emailed Ms Hearne, stating that she would be “an asset to Cathmor” and that they wanted to work with her going forwards. He proposed terms, which included a second payment of £35,000 once both homes were up and running, and for her to be employed to run the homes for a salary of £4,000 per month. Ms Hearne replied the next day, stating that she was willing to be a director of Cathmore but did not want to be a shareholder in it, and that she was willing to accept a further £35,000 immediately for the first two homes and then be paid a £70,000 salary once the two homes were registered with Ofsted.
95. It was put to Mr Reel that Ms Hearne was not making any promise that the two homes would be registered or would be opened and nor was she accepting personal responsibility for ensuring that they were opened. I accept that this is true, in the sense that she was not offering an unqualified promise to this effect. However, equally it is apparent that she was proposing to undertake the services identified in her written proposal, which included taking responsibility for undertaking or managing the steps necessary to achieve registration of and opening the first two care homes, and that she owed the usual contractual duties of undertaking that degree of reasonable skill and care to be expected of someone with her professed skills and experience in performing her role.
96. Mr Reel accepted Ms Hearne’s counter-proposal and, on 19 January 2018, she received a second payment of £35,000 from the Claimant.
97. By this stage the Cheadle properties had been identified as suitable properties. The schedule of expenditure incurred by the Claimant in relation to Cathmor shows that from 3 January 2018 onwards significant expenditure was being incurred in relation to the project.
98. There is a lively dispute as to whether Ms Hearne negligently failed to advise that the Cheadle properties were never realistic options, because they were semi-detached properties and the planning authority would never have approved their use as a children’s home for that reason alone. There is also a dispute as to whether or not the two Steves went ahead and entered into leases of the Cheadle properties without any reassurance from Ms Hearne that they were realistic options. I shall address these issues below, but it is worth observing here that: (a) there is no contemporaneous written advice or warning from Ms Hearne that there was any risk that planning approval would not be obtained for the Cheadle properties; and (b) in my judgment, it is inherently unlikely that the two Steves would have proceeded to enter into leases in relation to the Cheadle properties if Ms Hearne had advised that there was a real risk that planning approval would not be obtained.
99. The problems with obtaining the requisite planning approvals
100. By August 2018 Mr Reel was chasing Ms Hearne for progress on the planning position in a text, expressing concern that they were “paying £7k a month out”, which was a reference to the regular payments being made as regards rent on the Cheadle properties and the salary paid to the care home manager they had already employed, they said on Ms Hearne’s advice and recommendation.
101. This was in the context that Ms Hearne had just reported to the two Steves by email on 15 August 2018 that the planning department had refused a certificate of lawful development (“LDC”) for the properties and explained that the options were either to appeal the refusal or apply for a change of use (“COU”). It was in this context that she stated that she had asked Mr Stannard to make the COU applications, ostensibly at her expense. It is clear that Ms Hearne had previously made the LDC application without involving Mr Stannard, in circumstances where there is no contemporaneous evidence that she had advised that she was not qualified to make the application or advised that in her view the LDC application was unlikely to succeed. Further, in my view the fact that she stated that she would pay for Mr Stannard’s services herself is an indication that she was aware that things had not gone to plan and that she was accepting some degree of responsibility for the position.
102. Significantly, in my judgment, it is apparent from an email sent by Mr Stannard to Mr Reel and Ms Hearne dated 5 November 2018 that it was planning policy that a COU for a care home would be permitted where it was for a detached dwelling or a pair of semi-detached dwellings, whereas the Cheadle properties were both semi-detached properties with privately occupied homes as the other pair. Mr Stannard explained that it followed that the COU applications were “in direct conflict” with that policy and would have to be presented as a justified departure from it. He explained that to succeed it would be necessary to show that there would not be an impact on the amenity of the neighbouring properties.
103. There is no previous contemporaneous documentary evidence from Ms Hearne advising about this policy or that it presented difficulties in terms of obtaining planning permission for the intended change of use of the Cheadle properties, or that it would be precipitate to enter into leases until planning approval had been obtained. Her email of 5 November 2018 made clear that the above issue had come as a complete surprise to her.
104. By December 2018 applications had been made for a COU, with Mr Stannard formally acting as agent. However, by January 2019 Mr Stannard was giving advice to withdraw these applications, on the basis that they would very likely be refused due to the conflict with policy and harm to amenity, as well as parking provision and objections from the Highways department.
105. By this time the option of seeking permission in relation to Laurel Bank instead was being considered. This alternative option proceeded swiftly, so that by 28 Feb. 2019 the application for a LDC had been submitted and validated by the planning authority.
106. By this stage the schedule of Cathmor related expenditure by the Claimant stood at just short of £180,000, which is consistent with the two Steves’ evidence that this was the amount which they regarded as having been wasted by this point, in the sense that it had been laid out in the expectation that Cathmor would be able to operate the children’s care homes from the Cheadle properties, which had not materialised due to the planning difficulties which had sabotaged that plan.
107. Further, it included a contemporaneous entry for £20,000 as a payment to Ms Hearne, which was identified as a loan for a short (3/4 week) period with interest at 10% compounded, which is consistent with the two Steves’ case that they had been asked to and had agreed to loan this amount on these terms to Ms Hearne.
108. The circumstances in which Ms Hearne executed the legal charge
109. Mr Reel’s evidence, supported by Mr Carroll, was that by the time the application for Laurel Bank had been submitted they were both aware that the Claimant had incurred substantial wasted expenditure as a result of the failure of the Cheadle properties project, but that they far preferred to ensure that Ms Hearne continued to work on the project and made a success of Laurel Bank, rather than to walk away from the project and the relationship and have to seek a financial recovery from Ms Hearne. Their evidence was that although Ms Hearne promised to pay them back the £180,000 they had identified as representing their losses at that point, including fees paid to Ms Hearne, advances made to her, and expenditure incurred in following her instructions, rental payments, refurbishment costs and staffing, they made clear that they would not seek to do so as long as she delivered on Laurel Bank and provided Laurel Bank as security in the meantime. They say that she identified that its value was around £300,000 and the existing mortgage was around £100,000, so that there was sufficient security for the £180,000 identified as wasted expenditure. They say that the proposition was attractive to Ms Hearne, because she would receive payment as the care home director as well as rental income from the use of Laurel Bank once it was up and running. They say it was on that basis that she willingly agreed to the proposal.
110. Ms Hearne says that whilst she agreed to using Laurel Bank as a children’s care home and for Cathmor to take a lease of Laurel Bank, she never agreed to give a legal charge over Laurel Bank to secure any alleged indebtedness, which she did not and would not have accepted. She says that she was induced to enter into the legal charge because it was misrepresented to her as a document to reassure the Chinese investors that all three individuals would not walk away from the project. She says that she told them that she would not walk away, because she was employed by Cathmor. She says that Mr Reel re-assured her that signing it was just something to reassure the investors and, on that basis and because she was in a hurry, she signed the document at the offices under the mistaken belief that “it was a promise to Mr Carroll’s and Mr Reel’s business investors that I would not walk away from the proposed children’s home venture”.
111. For all of the reasons I have given in explaining why I find Ms Hearne’s evidence as a whole unreliable, I am unable to accept this explanation as at all credible.
112. The account which she pleaded in her claim against the Claimant lacks any credibility, apart from the ultimately unanswerable case as to legal uncertainty due to the Defendant’s drafting error, and is unsupported by contemporaneous documentary evidence.
113. Whilst it is true that the Claimant’s case is not itself supported by unanswerable contemporaneous documentary evidence, the real problem with Ms Hearne’s case is that: (a) she signed the legal charge, when as a capable business person and a lay magistrate it is very difficult to see how she could have believed even from a cursory glance that it was not a legal document about Laurel Bank which was intended to have legal effect; and (b) it is inherently unlikely that the two Steves would have practised a calculated deception on Ms Hearne which: (i) was likely to backfire badly if she took the trouble of reading it before she signed it; (ii) would inevitably lead to trouble in the event that they ever sought to rely on it.
114. In my judgment, having regard to all of these points the prospects of the Claimant failing to establish that Ms Hearne signed the legal charge, knowing full well that she was providing security for the Claimant over her house at Laurel Bank for her liabilities arising out of the delays in relation to the children’s care home project, are very unlikely, so that apart from the legal uncertainty defence Ms Hearne had very poor prospects of successfully having the legal charge set aside.
115. I do not accept, however, that the Claimant had equally strong prospects of establishing that it had been expressly agreed that the amount which Ms Hearne was liable for under the legal charge was £180,000, such that in legal terms it was an agreed liquidated sum which Ms Hearne had agreed to repay without the need for proof. There is no hard documentary evidence to this effect and more reason to expect that there would have been, had it been agreed at the time. In my view this is also inconsistent with the essentially pragmatic nature of the agreement, made as it was between business colleagues who were also friends. In my judgment it is far more likely that what was agreed was that so long as Ms Hearne delivered the children’s care home at Laurel Bank the Claimant would not seek to enforce the legal charge to recover its wasted expenditure due to the failure of the Cheadle properties project, which the two Steves had put at £180,000, including the £20,000 loan, but which had not been formally worked through or agreed as such.
116. The circumstances in which the Claimant instructed the Defendant to produce the legal charge
117. In Mr Reel’s first email to Ms Alberici of 3 April 2019, he stated “basically we want a charge behind the mortgage of up to £180,000”.
118. The effect of what he was saying, especially when read with his entries on the draft charge, was not wholly clear. It does not make clear whether this was an existing liability, ascertained or otherwise, or a future liability, whether a fixed amount or a liability the extent of which would depend upon future contingencies. Although I have put this in legal terms, it would have been possible for Mr Reel to have explained himself in non-legal language to the same effect.
119. Mr Reel’s evidence, in particular at par. 9 of his witness statement, was that “I telephoned Ms Alberici, told her that we wanted to put a charge on Ms Hearne’s house in favour of the Claimant as the Claimant had expended substantial sums in reliance on Ms Hearne’s involvement in the children’s home project and these sums were now due and owing from Ms Hearne to the Claimant”. In cross-examination he said rather more simply that he had told her that we want a £180,000 charge on Laurel Bank. He agreed he did not explain the complexities to her but had just told her that Ms Hearne owed them £180,000 to do with two care homes, that Laurel Bank was to be used as a care home and that the charge would be removed if we got it as a care home.
120. I reject the suggestion that he said what was pleaded at par. 9, which seems to me to be a “lawyered” version of his real evidence. I find on the balance of probabilities that the substance of what he told Ms Alberici was that Ms Hearne had agreed to give a charge over Laurel Bank as security for up to £180,000, which she owed the Claimant under an agreement in relation to setting up and running two care homes, but he had agreed to give up the claim and the charge if Laurel Bank was opened as a care home instead.
121. My clear impression from Ms Alberici’s evidence, coupled with the contemporaneous documents, is that she was not really interested in or paying any attention to the details, because as she saw things she was only agreeing to do the bare minimum in order to keep an existing client happy. As can be seen from her email dated 29 March 2019, she was expecting Mr Reel to complete the blank legal charge and return it to her, and all that she needed to know was the bare minimum, being the amount secured by the legal charge to calculate the fee payable to register the charge and the identity documents needed for Land Registry purposes.
122. This, in my judgment, explains why she read and amended the draft so quickly and so carelessly that she deleted the text in panel 9 and did not spot that she had done so.
123. I reject her evidence that she was told that the legal charge was to secure a future loan or that it was to secure a small loan which was to be given to a friend. Since neither explanation would have been true, it is difficult to see what motive Mr Reel would have had for misrepresenting it in this way to his own solicitor. If it be suggested that it was because he wanted to keep it simple, because he wanted to keep the costs down, that seems implausible, because it is obvious that to him the actual explanation was not particularly complicated or particularly problematic.
124. In closing submissions Mr Rowell contended that in the light of Mr Reel’s request for advice (“Have we completed this correct?”) Ms Alberici ought to have asked for further instructions and, had she done so, would have received instructions to the effect that the £180,000 represented an agreed pre-existing liability in that sum which the legal charge was intended to secure. He submitted that on that basis Ms Alberici ought to have re-drafted panel 9 of the legal charge so that it read “the borrower covenants to pay [the Claimant] £180,000 within 24 months of the date of this legal charge”.
125. I do not accept this submission. The draft charge as completed by Mr Reel identified that it was a “2nd charge of £180,000 payable within 24 months of the date of this agreement”. In my judgment there is no basis for considering that Mr Reel’s request was specifically to do with this particular entry, as opposed to a general request from a non-lawyer to his lawyer for confirmation that he, as a non-lawyer, had not made any mistakes in completing this legal form. There was nothing obviously wrong from a legal perspective in the wording included by Mr Reel in panel 9. As I have found, nothing in what Mr Reel said or wrote ought reasonably to have conveyed to Ms Alberici that the transaction was sufficiently complicated that she needed to understand the actual details so that she could re-draft panel 9 as necessary. There is nothing in the pleaded case which provides a proper basis for concluding that this duty arose. I reject the pleaded case at par. 17 of the Particulars of Claim, which as I have said was disclaimed by Mr Reel in his oral evidence anyway.
126. It follows that I do not accept the Claimant’s submission that, if the Defendant had performed its duty properly, it would not have been open to Ms Hearne to contest what amount, if any, was secured on the legal charge, by taking the point that she had no liability at all to the Claimant and/or by taking individual points as to the nature or extent of the individual losses which the Claimant claimed had been incurred as a result of any such liability. I accept that the general principle is that the chargor is entitled to challenge the chargee as to the amount, if any, secured by the charge: see Mainland v Upjohn (1889) 41 CH D 126, Kay J, applied by the Court of Appeal in Close Asset Finance Ltd v Taylor [2006] EWCA Civ 788 and cited by Mr Bredemear.
127. Hence, I am satisfied that this is genuinely a loss of a chance case. However, I am also satisfied that the risk of the loss of the opportunity to rely on the legal charge to recover the true extent of Ms Hearne’s liability to the Claimant was within the scope of the Defendant’s duty. There is no basis for saying that the Defendant could only have been liable for any loss of the opportunity to recover any loan advanced by the Claimant to Ms Hearne after the date of the legal charge. Further, there was plainly a sufficient nexus between the loss of that opportunity and the subject matter of the Defendant’s duty. There was no need for Mr Reel to have given Ms Alberici chapter and verse as to the underlying business arrangement or the underlying basis of the claim for £180,000.
128. Although a case was pleaded that Ms Alberici would not have agreed to act had she been instructed to prepare the legal charge on the basis that it secured an existing liability which was based on a failure by Ms Hearne to perform her contract to manage the obtaining and opening of two children’s care homes, I do not accept this case. First, I have found that this was substantially what Ms Alberici was told or, at least, she was not told that it was a legal charge to secure an intended loan. Second, if what she was told was unclear, if she thought that was important she should have asked for more information. Third, based either on what she was told or what she would have been told had she asked for more information, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that she would have said the wording on Mr Reel’s draft appeared acceptable but that she was not providing advice on the drafting of the legal charge, only obtaining its registration, and that if he wanted more advice he would have to pay for it. I am satisfied that Mr Reel would have proceeded on the basis that he was happy for Ms Alberici to proceed on this limited basis, as the last thing he wanted was to have to pay more for advice he did not believe he needed.
129. Further, based on my findings, I reject the Defendant’s case that the Claimant was guilty of contributory negligence in providing inaccurate information to Ms Alberici. I have found that the information provided was not in substance inaccurate or, insofar as it was, that Mr Reel as a director of the Claimant in the position he was in was not guilty of contributory negligence in not providing more accurate information.
130. I also reject the Defendant’s submission that, if the legal charge Ms Hearne had been asked to sign had referred to a second charge of £180,000, she would not have signed it. In my judgment there are no more than essentially speculative grounds for considering that she would not have signed the legal charge if had included reference to the figure of £180,000. That is on the basis that I am satisfied that this is the amount which the two Steves had told Ms Hearne was the total of the wasted expenditure and the £20,000 loan, which was the figure which appeared in the spreadsheet at the time. It must not be forgotten that Ms Hearne would have been aware of these amounts anyway, at least in general terms, since much of it related to payments made to her or for rent on the Cheadle properties or for staff salary, and of course she was aware of the £20,000 loan made to her.
131. In my judgment, since Ms Hearne had agreed that she would provide the legal charge to provide security for what the two Steves believed she was responsible for if the children’s care home did not open at Laurel Bank, and since she was aware that the two Steves were saying that this was £180,000, and since she was not disputing – and had no basis for disputing – that this was the total expenditure in broad terms, there would have been no particular reason for her to quibble about the reference to £180,000 in the legal charge.
132. Even, however, if she had, it could only have been on the basis that she wanted to preserve her right to contest the actual amount. In such circumstances, it would have been straightforward to reword the wording proposed by Mr Reel so that it read “2nd legal charge of up to £180,000” in accordance with his covering email, because that would have comforted Ms Hearne that she was not prevented from challenging the amount, if any, of her liability to the Claimant in the event of Laurel Bank falling through. It is not suggested that this would not have been legally effective to allow the Claimant to recover its actual loss from Ms Hearne and I am satisfied that it would have been.
133. Did Ms Alberici speak to Ms Hearne on 4 April 2019?
134. Although disputed as between Mr Reel and Ms Alberici, the real reason why this is important is that if this conversation took place then – whatever the precise content of the conversation – it strikes a further very significant blow to Ms Hearne’s contention that she did not know what she was signing and that she signed it without reading it because the nature and effect of what she was signing had been misrepresented to her by the two Steves.
135. Based on my assessment of the relative credibility of Mr Reel on the one hand and Ms Alberici and Ms Hearne on the other I regard his evidence that there was a telephone conversation as he said in his oral evidence as more credible, although I accept by a relatively fine margin due to the factors identified below.
136. First, the lack of a contemporaneous file note from Ms Alberici recording this conversation would normally be a factor against Mr Reel, but not in this case given Ms Alberici’s evidence that she did not tend to make file notes anyway.
137. However, there are two further factors against Mr Reel’s account, which are that: (a) in her email sent on the same day, enclosing the draft legal charge and giving instructions about the need for witnessing its execution, Ms Alberici did not state or confirm that she needed to speak to Ms Hearne first; (b) Ms Alberici did not state or confirm in any later email that she had spoken to Ms Hearne to ensure that she was aware of what she was signing and that she was doing so without legal advice. Even if Ms Alberici was not in the habit of making file notes, she did send emails, but she did not do so either before or after the alleged conversation took place which made any reference to it.
138. As against that: (a) the email sent by Ms Alberici to Mr Reel on 4 April 2019 did confirm that the Defendant could not accept money from Ms Hearne as she was not a client; (b) the emails sent by Ms Alberici on 23 April 2019, when she was progressing the matter, also refer to Ms Hearne not being legally represented and also to it being “an unusual matter that just now needs registering”.
139. Mr Reel’s evidence in cross-examination was that he called Ms Alberici because she had asked him to do so to make sure that Ms Hearne was happy to sign without legal advice. He said that if Ms Alberici had not asked him to do so he would not have called her and that it did not matter to him what they talked about.
140. It does seem to me to make sense that Ms Alberici would have wanted to ensure that she made Ms Hearne aware that the Defendant was not acting for her and that if she wanted legal advice before signing the legal charge she would need to obtain it. Whilst I have already acknowledged that the absence of a contemporaneous email to record this supports the Defendant’s case, I am satisfied that this is explained by Ms Alberici’s general unwillingness to spend any more time that the absolute minimum on this piece of work and what appears to have been a fairly cavalier approach to recording matters, at least on this piece of work, which she obviously regarded as a loss leader.
141. I am therefore satisfied on the balance of probabilities as between the Claimant and the Defendant that this conversation took place and, if necessary to make a separate finding as to the chance of that happening, regard the Defendant’s case as on balance more unlikely than likely.
142. This is significant because, if Ms Hearne had been operating under the mistaken belief that she was not signing a formal legal document, that conversation must have been sufficient to disabuse her of that mistaken belief. On my assessment of Ms Hearne, if her account of what Mr Reel and Mr Carroll had said was the nature and purpose of the document had been true, then the call with Ms Alberici would have made clear to her the reality and she would not then simply have signed anyway.
143. The Claimant’s prospects of success in showing that Ms Hearne was liable to it for its wasted expenditure of £180,000
144. I am satisfied that the Claimant had a good case on the evidence overall, and specifically on the contemporaneous documents, of showing that: (a) Ms Hearne had taken responsibility for dealing with all matters, including planning related matters, and had not said from the start that she was not qualified either to give planning advice or to make a planning application, albeit I accept that she had never specifically presented herself as a planning expert; (b) Ms Hearne had not advised at the time when the Cheadle properties were first under active consideration or subsequently that there were potential problems and difficulties with obtaining planning approval, especially given that the two properties were semi-detached, and had not advised that it would be sensible to take planning advice before incurring any significant expenditure or liabilities in relation to the Cheadle properties; (c) if planning advice had been given or taken, it would have become apparent that there were real risks and problems with obtaining planning approval for the Cheadle properties; (d) significant time and cost, in the region of £160,000, had been wasted as a result of proceeding on this basis and that Ms Hearne was indebted to the Claimant for a loan of £20,000; and (e) Ms Hearne was in breach of her contractual duties by failing to advise as to the planning risks and by failing to advise the Claimant not to incur significant expenditure on the basis that there was no guarantee that the Cheadle properties could in fact be successfully opened and operated successfully as children’s care homes.
145. I accept that there would have been scope for Ms Hearne to argue that she could not have been expected to have given advice on the basis that she had not held herself out as a planning consultant or that knowledge of planning related matters was outside the scope of her expertise. However, it seems to me that the Claimant would have had a strong case that, since she had held herself out as having sufficient expertise in relation to identifying suitable properties for use as children’s care homes, she ought to have been able at least to identify potential risks and to advise that a planning consultant should be involved from the outset to advise on this point. Although Ms Hearne says that she gave this advice and it was rejected, in the absence of any contemporaneous documentary evidence to this effect that seems to me to be a difficult case successfully to advance. The same is true of her case that she advised that Mr Stannard should be involved but the two Steves rejected that advice and instructed her to submit the application herself. If that really had been the position, I would have expected that she would have made her advice clear in writing, whether by email or by text. She was plainly sufficiently experienced in business matters to understand the need to commit important points to writing.
146. Indeed, the fact that Ms Hearne was, I am satisfied, prepared to and did agree to put forward her own property Laurel Bank as an alternative children’s care home and, I am satisfied, was prepared to and did agree to give a legal charge to secure the expenditure which the Claimant had incurred and which would be wholly wasted unless Laurel Bank could be opened as a children’s home instead is also powerful evidence that at the time she recognised that this was the case.
147. In closing submissions Mr Bredemear argued that there was no basis for including the £70,000 fees paid to Ms Hearne in the secured claim, on the basis that these fees would have been incurred had she properly performed her duties and that at the point of the execution of the legal charge there was no total failure of consideration. I do not accept that there was no basis for claiming these fees, whilst acknowledging that it was a point which could have been taken by Ms Hearne. If, as I have accepted, the Claimant had to prove its claim against Ms Hearne, then the claim would have been advanced after October 2019, by which time the option of using Laurel Bank as well as using the Cheadle properties had failed, as regards Laurel Bank due to what was essentially Ms Hearne’s repudiation of the consultancy agreement as varied, and Ms Hearne had made clear she was no longer willing to work with the Claimant. In such circumstances, it seems to me that in principle the fees paid to her could have been recovered on the basis that they represented part of the wasted expenditure on the project. The same arguments apply in relation to his further argument about the £60,000 identified as representing works, wages and other avoidable costs.
148. Rather than putting a figure on the loss of the chance of recovery at this point, in my view it is more sensible to address matters as a whole once I have considered the issues as to: (a) what was the value of and the equity in Laurel Bank at the relevant times; and (b) what were the prospects that the Claimant would have obtained recovery of the full equity in Laurel Bank from Ms Hearne?
149. What was the value of and the equity in Laurel Bank at the relevant times?
150. On 3 September 2019, Ms Hearne obtained what was described as a valuation report from local estate agents giving a value of £300,000. Although it was not a formal valuation, conducted by a qualified valuation surveyor, it was nonetheless represented as being a realistic price based on a viewing and recent comparative sales and local market trends. In cross-examination Ms Hearne did not disagree that this was what Laurel Bank was worth at the time.
151. There is no reason in my judgment not to take this valuation as representing the true value at all relevant times.
152. As to the available equity, both Mr Reel and Mr Carroll stated that Ms Hearne had told them in early 2019 that the mortgage was around £100,000. Ms Hearne denied this, saying that she believed it was still around £160,000 to £170,000 on the basis that it was £168,000 when she purchased the property in 2016. However, there is no documentary or other reliable evidence of this. If the Defendant had wanted to ensure that evidence was available as to the amount secured by the first legal charge at the time, they could and should have asked Ms Hearne to provide mortgage statements, if necessary by issuing a summons requiring her to produce them at trial, and there appears to be no reason why she could or should not have taken steps to obtain this information.
153. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the strong likelihood is that the available equity in Laurel Bank at all relevant times was in the region of £180,000.
154. What are the prospects that the Claimant would have obtained recovery of the full equity in Laurel Bank from Ms Hearne?
155. This raise a number of issues.
156. It is apparent from her actual conduct and the contemporaneous evidence as to her financial means that Ms Hearne would not have been able to pay the Claimant the full outstanding amount or, probably, to have funded repayment by obtaining a loan for that full amount against the available equity in Laurel Bank.
157. Further, given the way in which she expressed herself in her email of 10 October 2019, when she stated that she was taking advice about what she could do about the charge on the house, and given the fact that she subsequently instructed solicitors, it is plain that she would not have given up Laurel Bank without a fight.
158. However, whilst she would of course have been able to raise the other arguments she raised in her claim against the Claimant, in my judgment any competent lawyers would have advised her that without the legal uncertainty defence her prospects of successfully challenging the legal charge were fairly poor, but that she would have had grounds for seeking to challenge all matters relevant to the fact or amount of any liability secured by the legal charge.
159. In such circumstances, for both parties the available options were of course to contest the case down to trial or to reach a compromise.
160. Whilst I acknowledge that this dispute had a personal element, and was not just a dispute between two commercial organisations about money, nonetheless the likelihood in my judgment is that the parties would have reached a settlement, essentially for the following reasons: (a) most Business and Property Division cases do settle before trial; (b) the parties were in fact able to settle this case at a mediation (albeit, I accept, only once the two Steves had been advised that they would almost certainly lose due to the legal uncertainty issue); (c) the two Steves are, in my assessment, essentially pragmatic businessmen who would not willingly spend money against sensible legal advice; (d) whilst Ms Hearne obviously took matters more personally, it is material to take into account the facts that: (i) this was not her home, because she had moved in to live with her partner, so there was less of a personal attachment to the property; and (ii) she would not have wanted to run the risk of bankruptcy or other reputational damage, given that she wanted to secure – and has, on her evidence, obtained – alternative remunerative positions in the children’s care home sector.
161. Of course, in a case such as this a party would need to consider the legal costs as well as the primary amount. The Claimant had incurred total costs of £27,000 odd by the time of the actual settlement with Ms Hearne, and there is no reason to think that they would have been substantially different if the claim had been advanced and defended on the basis that the legal uncertainty defence had not been available to Ms Hearne.
162. The Claimant would have needed to take into account that, even on the basis of the valuation of Laurel Bank and the mortgage as given to them, there was little headroom to recover substantial costs from the available equity in the property, especially if the case went to a fully contested trial and it then proved necessary to enforce the claim by forced sale.
163. In the real world, any compromise would also have needed to factor in the availability of funding to Ms Hearne from which she could have raised money to pay off the Claimant without needing to sell Laurel Bank.
164. In my judgment, and taking all relevant factors into account, the most likely outcome is that the parties would have settled on the basis of Ms Hearne raising enough by remortgage to fund an all-inclusive payment of £100,000. This can be justified in various different ways, but one in particular which I identify as sufficient to persuade both parties to reach this as an agreed figure would be by taking it as the total of the £70,000 fees paid to Ms Hearne plus the £20,000 loan and interest thereon.
165. If one considers the alternative scenario where the case went down to trial, in my view the Claimant had fairly good prospects of establishing liability and fairly good prospects of recovering a good proportion of the overall £180,000 claimed but, when one takes into account the risks on liability and quantum, the extra costs of fighting the case down to trial and having to recover any available equity by forced sale, it cannot realistically be said that the loss of a chance, if assessed on this basis, would be much different than the £100,000 figure.
166. Given this finding, it is not appropriate to make any separate award in relation to the actual costs incurred by the Claimant in relation to the claim against Ms Hearne. In any event, it could fairly be said that these costs would not all have flowed from the Defendant’s breach of contract since, on my findings, the Claimant would probably still have had to litigate the underlying liability and quantum claim against Ms Hearne in any event even if the legal charge had not been altered by the Defendant. Further, there would have been issues as to mitigation of loss in relation to some at least of these costs given that, as Mr Bredemear submitted, it appears to have taken the Claimant two firms of solicitors and a long delay before obtaining counsel’s advice as to the problems about defending the legal uncertainty defence until the case was eventually settled at mediation.
Conclusion
167. Accordingly, I will enter judgment for the Claimant for £100,000 plus interest as appropriate. Although I will hear submissions on the amount and period of interest, my provisional views are that interest should be at a commercial rate of 3% over base and that the period should run from 10 October 2021, being two years from the date when the relationship between the parties effectively broke up, which allows a reasonable time for the Claimant (or Ms Hearne, as in fact happened) to have brought and compromised a claim.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).