Administrative United Kingdom
Profad Care Agency Limited v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2870 (Admin)
Case No: AC-2026-LON-001035
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
6 November 2026
Before:
Deputy High Court Judge Eleanor Grey KC
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Between:
| PROFAD CARE AGENCY LIMITED | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | Defendant |
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The Claimant was represented by Mr Eric Fripp (Counsel)
The Defendant was represented by Mr Jay Gajjar (Counsel)
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Hearing date: 05.11.26
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
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Deputy High Court Judge E. Grey KC:
Introduction and History of the Application
1. This is the Claimant’s renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant (“the SSHD”) dated 21 January 2026 revoking the Claimant’s sponsor license. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by an Order promulgated on 7 August 2026 made by Thomas Raphael KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge (‘the DHCJ’). The judge gave detailed and full reasons for his decision.
2. The SSHD extended a sponsor license to the Claimant, a domiciliary care provider. This was suspended in April 2024 and revoked on 3 September 2024 but returned to suspension in October 2024 and finally reinstated on 3 April 2025.
3. The SSHD then suspended the licence again on 10 October 2025. The Claimant (“C”) by a letter dated 6 November 2025 provided representations seeking to address the concerns raised by the Defendant. However, the SSHD revoked the Claimant’s license by a decision dated 21 January 2026. The SSHD relied on findings of breach of duty which included, in particular:
i) General Sponsor Duty 1 – these concerns related to whether a sponsored senior social worker was genuinely filling a post at that level;
ii) General Sponsor Duty 2 – these concerns related to whether C was supplying workers as labour to other organisations, which was not permitted.
iii) General Sponsor Duty 3 – the SSHD raises issues related to whether those sponsored were properly paid, earning wages at the Minimum Wage requirements at least and as set out in the Certificates of Sponsorship;
iv) General Sponsor Duty 4 – there was an allegation that travel time was not paid.
4. It is a significant feature of this Decision Letter (“the DL”) that it clearly stated, in respect of each of the identified breaches of General Sponsor Duties (“SDs”) 1, 2, and 3 that “independent of the other concerns contained in this letter, this issue alone is sufficient to revoke your sponsor licence.”
5. The Claimant sent a letter before claim and the SSHD responded. In that response the SSHD accepted that the revocation decision was flawed in respect of the breaches of SD2, but declined to resile from the overall conclusions she had reached on the remaining issues. The Claimant then initiated proceedings.
6. After permission was refused on the papers (para 1 above), C filed a notice of renewal, with Reasons for Reconsideration, dated 11 August 2026. I heard oral submissions in the afternoon of 5 November 2026, and decided to deliver this judgment remotely the following day, given the number of issues addressed in argument. I was greatly assisted by the submissions of Counsel on both sides.
7. Because it has been handed down, this refusal of permission is perhaps longer and more detailed than might be customary. However, nevertheless in the interests of brevity: (i) I have not set out the background statutory regime and caselaw, when it is common ground, and (ii) I have focussed on the Grounds that seem to me to be the most significant, and any details provided of these Grounds have to be read with the underlying papers, which elaborate them.
8. I have born in mind throughout that, at this permission stage, the issue is whether the claim, including issues within in, has a realistic prospect of success, i.e., it is ‘arguable’.
Grounds 1 and 2
9. Ground 1 relates to the breach found by the SSHD of SD1. The SSHD found that the actual role of one of the sponsored workers (“Ms A”) did not accurately reflect the role stated in her Certificate of Sponsorship (“COS”), that of a Senior Social Worker. She was working at more routine or administrative tasks.
10. In the Grounds, C challenged SSHD’s alleged failure in the earlier suspension letter (which provided the gist of the SSHD’s concerns, to enable effective representations) to ask for categories of evidence which in the DL, C was then criticised for not providing. It is said this was a breach of procedural fairness. Ground 2 challenges the rationality of the overall decision on this issue.
11. C’s challenge relates to passages in the DL (paras 25 and 33) in which the SSHD states she would have expected to see an abundance of documentary evidence to show the role actually performed by Ms A, and outlines what she says should have been made available.
12. I am prepared to accept, for the purpose of the permission stage, that it is arguable that the SSHD acted either unfairly or unreasonably in requiring further evidence of Ms A’s tasks, beyond the Time Sheets that were supplied, in the specific circumstances of this case. That is, when the concerns raised about Ms A’s role were raised, C provided staff Time Sheets for Ms A over 4 weeks, which detailed the tasks performed by her. A long list of the duties performed, drawn from the Time Sheets, was then set out at para 21 of the DL. Taken at face value, this work was arguably consistent with the job description set out at DL para 11, against which it was being tested.
13. However at DL para 25 it was said that C had not provided evidence to support the claim that Ms A carried out the daily tasks in her Time Sheets, and that D would expect to see documents such as “details of the Care Plan Reviews undertaken with Service Users, copies of spot check reports and supervision notes, copies of the “one to one” reports with regard to the supervision of care staff, client visits, copies of Emergency Visit requests/notifications, Copies of the assessment of Medication and Manual Handling competencies undertaken with care staff and so on.” That is a statement that a very significant level of detailed evidence should have been submitted, including considerable sensitive personal data relating to clients (and other staff members) whose disclosure would have required justification and which would (as a minimum) have to be anonymised.
14. It seems to me that it is arguable that to require this level of proof of actually carrying out the tasks evidenced by time sheets was unreasonable and/or unfair, at least without specific prior notice to C that the contents of the Time Sheets were not regarded as sufficient. I accept the submission of Mr Gajjar (Counsel for the SSHD) that there cannot be a duty on the SSHD to engage in ever-extending correspondence, commenting on the adequacy of material supplied to date and giving further opportunities to add more. But, in the circumstances of this case, there is a qualitative difference between expecting records relating to Ms A’s employment and those relating to her assessments, etc, of service users and also other care workers. It seems to me that it is at least arguable that the SSHD should have considered this issue, and explicitly addressed the justification, before concluding that this material should be supplied (and relying on its absence). I bear in mind that it was not suggested that the Time Sheets lacked time sheets lacked specificity or that their contents were otherwise incredible.
15. This impacts on Ground 2, as the tasks detailed on the Time Sheets were, potentially, evidence of higher level supervisory tasks (e.g., supervising and monitoring compliance of care workers), but this evidence was discounted and Ms A’s interview record took primacy. Whilst weight is a matter for the SSHD, the issue of whether it was fair or reasonable to wholly discount what had been provided (ie the time sheets) as part of that evidential material to be considered, seems to me to be arguable.
16. However, any grant of permission on this point must be subject to the point highlighted already, that the SSHD also said that the failings on SD3 alone were enough to revoke the Licence. I have returned later to the issue of whether arguable failings on SD1 and also those relating to SD2 are sufficient.
Ground 3
17. Before turning to SD3 (Ground 4), I note that Ground 3 related to SD2, where the SSHD has accepted that she was in error.
Ground 4
18. Ground 4 relates to the SSHD’s findings as to underpayment, under SD3. The Decision identified that a large number of workers had been substantially or severely underpaid compared to the salary stated in their COS, and that these alterations had not been reported to the SSHD, as required. In its representations, C had recognised the requirement for sponsors to ensure that the gross salary stated on the COS reflected the total amount payable to the worker. But C asserted that in all cases discrepancies had legitimate explanations. Sample explanations as to some (6 out of 12) but not all, were given. It was also said that the requirement to notify the Home Office if salaries were reduced related to a reason not related to absence or justifiable exceptions, and it was asserted that this requirement had not been breached.
19. The SSHD assessed the details submitted, and only accepted the case-specific explanations given in a few of these cases (either in whole or in part). She concluded that sponsored workers had been paid substantially less than it was stated on the COS would be paid and that there had been a failure to declare those underpayments, without an acceptable reason. Her PAP response letter further explains that the breaches were both significant and persistent:
20. The Grounds originally put forward on this issue stated:
“44. Annex C1 provides that revocation may occur where a sponsor:
“Pays the worker less than the amount stated on the Certificate of Sponsorship, unless a permitted exception applies.”
44 The Guidance recognises permitted exceptions, including:
(a) maternity leave;
(b) unpaid leave;
(c) reduced hours where lawful.
Unlawfulness
45. The Defendant treated any discrepancy between CoS hours and paid hours
as determinative.
46. In doing so, the Defendant:
(a) failed to consider maternity leave, unpaid leave, delayed starts, and
lawful absences;
(b) ignored RTI data, payroll reconciliations, and explanations provided;
(c) made no finding of exploitation or dishonesty.
47. The Defendant applied a mechanistic approach inconsistent with Annex C1
and committed an error of law.”
21. In refusing permission on this issue, the DHCJ stated:
“The Statement of Grounds identifies no concrete public law basis to challenge these findings which gives this ground a realistic prospect of success. The allegations made are vague and insubstantial. It is for the SSHD as primary decision maker to assess the facts and no irrationality or other public law challenge is substantiated. Thus, the SSHD did not ignore maternity leave and other lawful absences (§46(a), but assessed and as she thought appropriate rejected the explanations given. Further, the SSHD did not ignore the documents and explanations provided, but assessed them.”
22. I entirely accept that approach to the Grounds put before the DHCJ.
23. At the oral hearing Mr Fripp (who did not draft the Grounds) focussed instead on the specific argument that the SSHD did not address the issue of work that could not be, or was not, undertaken in the lengthy period when the licence had previously been suspended (see para 2 above). It was submitted that the SSHD did not take into account the effects of that suspension on workers during that period, when (C’s representations stated) “employees worked reduced hours due the uncertainty surround the licence status and, in some cases, their decision to explore alternative opportunities – effectively constituting a temporary inability to work their full contracted hours, not a reduction in salary terms.” C submits that such reasons for lower payments did not trigger the reporting requirements.
24. However, D points out, the specific issue now relied on has not been pleaded. I accept that, both in relation to the Grounds (see above para 20) but also in the Reasons for Reconsideration. The Grounds would require amendment to deal with this.
25. However, I would not be minded to dismiss a challenge with arguable merits solely on that basis. It would be possible to grant permission coupled with an undertaking to make an application to amend (or even to adjourn).
26. The real point is that I am not persuaded that it is arguable that the SSHD overlooked this issue, or that it is right to say that the reasons in the DL ignored it. See for example para 81 (recitation of submissions including reference to the licence suspension); and paras 116 – 123 which specifically referred to the examples from 2024, and in which the SSHD noted that sponsored workers were able to continue to work during the period of suspension (para 121) and continued:
“123. You have not provided any evidence to demonstrate that these sponsored workers were actively seeking alternative sponsorship, did not accept full contracted hours, or your organisation was legally/operationally restricted in assigning shifts as stated by you and outlined above.”
27. See also para 127 – 131. Furthermore, there were also findings about lower payments made across 2023, which was before the licence was first suspended (e.g. paras 91 – 96; 103 – 106).
28. Overall, it seems to me that it is not arguable that the SSHD failed to address this issue or acted irrationally in making the findings that she did. Rather, she rationally assessed the evidence before it. She was not sufficiently persuaded by the explanations of the wages provided, in respect of a significant number of workers. Overall, it seems to me that there is no reasonable prospect of challenging the very detailed factual assessment carried out by SSHD under this heading. The result is that it seems to me that the challenges to SD3 is unarguable.
29. The treatment of SD4 was not challenged in the Grounds and in any event would suffer from similar difficulties.
30. The remaining Grounds were not elaborated in oral submissions by Mr Fripp and I accept that Grounds 5 – 6 are unarguable for the reasons given by the DHCJ, as further developed by Mr Gajjair, whose submissions on the absence of a duty to consider the cumulative effect, or impact of the decision on care users and staff, I accept.
Whether any arguable errors were material or would have made a difference
31. In refusing permission on the papers, the DHCJ stated:
“the Decision makes clear that other bases were independently capable of justifying revocation, specifically General Sponsors Duties 1, and General Sponsors Duties 3. These were breaches within Annex C1. In addition, the Decision has found multiple other breaches of Annex C2. In the PAP Response the Secretary of State conceded the “third party” point but maintained the revocation decision because of the other breaches found. In this context, the SSHD contends that s. 31(2A) applies.”
32. He continued:
“While the Court must be cautious about this basis for refusing a judicial review, it seems to me that if the Decision is read as a whole, it is clear, indeed obvious, that it is highly likely that the SSHD would have reached the same conclusion even had the “General Sponsors 2” section of the Decision not been included. It is freestanding and does not affect the other conclusions. Consequently, Ground 3 does not warrant the grant of any relief.”
33. Today, I have accepted that there is an arguable case in relation to SD1. As a result, I must assess whether the arguable errors in relation to SD 1 and the admitted errors on SD 2 (which is Ground 3) are sufficient to justify the grant of permission, or whether it is highly likely that the outcome for C (revocation) would have been the same even without them.
34. Mr Fripp challenges the application of s31(2A) Senior Courts Act 1981 at the permission stage. Mr Gajjar points out that at this stage the matter is specifically catered for by s31(3C) and (3D):
(3C) When considering whether to grant leave to make an application for judicial review, the High Court—
(a) may of its own motion consider whether the outcome for the applicant would have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not occurred, and
(b) must consider that question if the defendant asks it to do so.
(3D) If, on considering that question, it appears to the High Court to be highly likely that the outcome for the applicant would not have been substantially different, the court must refuse to grant leave.
(3E) The court may disregard the requirement in subsection (3D) if it considers that it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest.
35. It is not suggested that (3E) is relevant.
36. I accept that caution is needed, not least because of the dangers of ex post facto justifications or reasoning about alternative outcomes. However:
i) This is a case in which the DL said, in terms at the time of decision, that independently of other concerns, the breaches found relating to (relevantly) SD3 were enough to terminate the license (see para 134). There is evidence, in other words, of what D’s attitude would have been to revocation on this basis alone.
ii) It apparent that the failings found under SD3 were substantial and persistent, lending weight to the SSHD’s statement about her intentions (if needed).
iii) Whilst the language used in respect of SD4 is not so unequivocal (para 146, “normally revoke”, reflecting the nature of that duty), still those findings, as well as those in relation to the remaining matters dealt with at DL para 147 onwards, add further weight to an assessment of what would have happened, had breaches of SD 1 and 2 been removed from the equation.
iv) The SSHD’s statements can be set alongside the general Guidance and also law regarding the expectations of sponsors: see for example the principle that sponsorship is a privilege not a right and the contents of C1 Part 3 of the SSHD’s Guidance to sponsors; and the principles set out by Baker LJ in R(Prestwick Care Ltd) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 184 at paras 19 – 21, including the observations upon the “light trigger” approach and also the institutional competence and experience of the SSHD in this sphere.
37. Overall, it seems to me that this is a case in which it must be concluded that it is “highly likely” that the outcome for the claimant would have been the same, if the breaches of SD 1 and 2 had not been found.
38. I refuse permission on this basis.
Costs.
39. There will be no order as to costs.
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