Property United Kingdom
Johnson Aboaba & Anor v Steven Philip
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] UKUT 00424 (LC)
Case No: LC-2025-650
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (LANDS CHAMBER)
AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 84 OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY ACT 1925
Bristol Magistrates’ Court
Marlborough Street
Bristol BS1 3NU
5 November 2026
TRIBUNALS, COURTS AND ENFORCEMENT ACT 2007
RESTRICTIVE COVENANT – DISCHARGE OR MODIFICATION – retrospective planning permission to use outbuilding as annexe and holiday let – covenant not to convert or use any building as a dwellinghouse – application made out under section 84(1) ground (aa) – discretion to order modification not exercised
BETWEEN:
JOHNSON ABOABA (1)
LENA BUHLER (2)
Applicants
-and-
STEVEN PHILLIP
Objector
Land at Shride Barn, Othery, Bridgwater, TA7 OGL
Mrs Diane Martin TD MRICS FAAV
19-20 August 2026
Ms Antonia Halker for the applicants, instructed by Kingsley Smith Solicitors LLP
The objector representing himself
© CROWN COPYRIGHT 2026
The following cases were referred to in this decision:
Alexander Devine Children’s Cancer Trust v Housing Solutions Ltd [2020] 1 WLR 4783 (SC)
Caradon DC v Paton & Bussell (2001) 33 H.L.R. 34
Re Fermyn Wood [2018] UKUT 0411 (LC)
Introduction
1. This is an application by Mr Johnson Aboaba and Ms Lena Buhler to discharge or modify a restrictive covenant (“the restriction”) affecting their land at Shride Barn, Othery, Bridgwater, Somerset TA7 0GL (“the application land”). The application land is adjacent to the applicants’ house at Shride Barn and also adjacent to the house of the objector, Mr Steven Phillip, at Shride Farm House. It has on it a former barn, now known as the annexe, which was redeveloped in 2008 to provide a home office/laboratory/workshop. A certificate of existing lawful use was granted by Somerset Council on 12 February 2024 as “ancillary residential accommodation”.
2. The applicants purchased the application land and the house at Shride Barn on 3 July 2024. They have since used the annexe intermittently for holiday lettings, as well as for stays by friends and family. On 20 April 2026 Somerset Council granted retrospective planning permission for “change of use of outbuilding to annexe and holiday let”.
3. The restriction was imposed in a transfer dated 9 May 2003 of part of the title of Shride Farm House from Evelyn June Meaker (Transferor) to Clive Antony Griffiths and Wendy Griffiths (Transferee). The Transferee covenanted as follows:
“12.2 The Transferee hereby covenants with the Transferor for the benefit and protection of each and every party of the Retained Land so as to bind the Property into whosoever hands it may come to observe and perform the following covenants but not in the case of restrictive covenants so as to render themselves liable after they shall have Parted with all interest in the Property:-
12.2.1 not to erect any dwellinghouse or dwellinghouses on the Property
12.2.2 not to convert any buildings on the Property for use as or use any buildings on the Property as a dwellinghouse or dwellinghouses.”
4. The benefit of the covenant lies with the objector, who purchased the Retained Land at Shride Farm House on 9 June 2023.
5. The applicants were represented by Ms Antonia Halker and the objector represented himself. I inspected the application land and the objector’s property on 18 August 2026, accompanied by the objector and by Ms Halker and Mr Aboaba for the applicants. At the hearing I heard evidence from Ms Buhler and from the objector.
Factual background and chronology
6. The plan below shows the location of the respective titles. The application land, title 216479, was formerly part of title ST199372, described as Shride Farm House. The land in title ST215838, described as part of Shride Farm, was transferred out of titles ST199372 and ST199370 (not shown) and included buildings which are now the dwelling known as Shride Barn.
7. A timeline of the main events which gave rise to the application is set out below.
| 4 Apr 2003 | Three parcels of land, now title ST215838 at Shride Barn, transferred by members of the Meaker family to Mr and Mrs Griffiths |
| 9 May 2003 | Application land transferred by Mrs Meaker to Mr and Mrs Griffiths, subject to the restriction |
| 20 Dec 2007 | Application by Mr and Mrs Griffiths for permission to provide single storey oak barn for home office/laboratory/workshop in place of derelict barn |
| 4 Mar 2008 | Planning permission granted for “erection of single storey building for use as home office/laboratory/workshop” |
| 9 Jun 2023 | Objector purchased Shride Farm House from the Meaker family |
| 12 Feb 2024 | Certificate of lawful use of annexe at Shride Barn as ancillary residential accommodation granted to Mr and Mrs Griffiths |
| 3 Jul 2024 | Applicants purchased Shride Barn and the application land from Mr and Mrs Griffiths |
| 4 Apr 2025 | Letter before action sent by objector’s solicitors to applicants asserting that they were in breach of the restriction |
| 23 Oct 2025 | Applicants applied to the Tribunal for discharge or modification of the restriction under s84(1) |
| 5 Jan 2026 | Applicants applied for retrospective planning permission for change of use of outbuilding to annexe and holiday let |
| 20 Apr 2026 | Retrospective planning permission granted |
8. The planning permission dated 20 April 2026 was granted subject to a number of conditions, including that holiday use should be managed in accordance with the submitted and approved management plan. The management plan included an occupancy limit of four guests; no group bookings, parties or day visitors; quiet hours between 9.00 pm and 7.00 am; no amplified music. Although not stated in the plan the applicants do not accept pets.
9. The larger scale plan below shows the relative positions of the objector’s house and outbuildings, the building which became the annexe and the buildings which became the applicants’ house at Shride Barn.
10. The letters A, B and C identify points relevant to the evidence, which I viewed during my inspection. A is the small area of the objector’s land over which the applicants have a right of way from the shared access road before turning left onto their gravelled drive across the application land round to the Shride Barn and the annexe. Entry onto the objector’s land from the shared access road is over a cattle grid. The objector has erected a new gate across the drive where it continues to Shride Farm House in order to deter visitors to Shride Barn and the annexe from continuing down his drive in error.
11. B is the site of a temporary yurt erected at some stage by the objector in his orchard. C is a small enclosed garden area behind the objector’s outbuilding.
12. The first photograph below shows the annexe and, to the left hand side, a square grey jacuzzi (hot tub) on the terrace. The second photograph shows the location of the annexe and the jacuzzi relative to the objector’s house and garden behind the hedge.
Legal background
Legislation
13. Section 84(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925 gives the Tribunal power to discharge or modify any restriction on the use of freehold land on being satisfied of certain conditions.
14. Ground (a) of section 84(1) is satisfied where it is shown that by reason of changes in the
character of the property or neighbourhood or other circumstances of the case that the
Tribunal may deem material, the restriction ought to be deemed obsolete.
15. Ground (aa) of section 84(1) is satisfied where it is shown that the continued existence of the restriction would impede some reasonable use of the land for public or private purposes or that it would do so unless modified. By section 84(1A), in a case where condition (aa) is relied on, the Tribunal may discharge or modify the restriction if it is satisfied that, in impeding the suggested use, the restriction either secures “no practical benefits of substantial value or advantage” to the person with the benefit of the restriction, or that it is contrary to the public interest. The Tribunal must also be satisfied that money will provide adequate compensation for the loss or disadvantage (if any) which that person will suffer from the discharge or modification.
16. Ground (c) is satisfied where it is shown that discharge or modification would cause no injury to persons entitled to the benefit of the restriction.
17. In determining whether the requirements of sub-section (1A) are satisfied, and whether a restriction ought to be discharged or modified, the Tribunal is required by sub-section (1B) to take into account “the development plan and any declared or ascertainable pattern for the grant or refusal of planning permissions in the relevant areas, as well as the period at which and context in which the restriction was created or imposed and any other material circumstances.”
18. If the applicant is able to establish that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to modify the covenant, the Tribunal must then decide whether to exercise its discretion to do so. If it does, the Tribunal may also direct the payment of compensation to any person entitled to the benefit of the restriction to make up for any loss or disadvantage suffered by that person as a result of the discharge or modification, or to make up for any effect which the restriction had, when it was imposed, in reducing the consideration then received for the land affected by it.
19. If the applicant agrees, on modifying a restriction the Tribunal may also impose some additional restriction over the land.
The restriction
20. The wording of the restriction prevents development or use as a “dwellinghouse” or “dwellinghouses” without the qualifying word “private”. Ms Halker submitted that the case of Caradon DC v Paton & Bussell (2001) 33 H.L.R. 34 is authority for the proposition that use of a property for short term holiday lettings is not use as a private dwellinghouse, but acknowledged that she could find no authority to assist where a dwellinghouse is not described as private.
21. I have no jurisdiction to make a determination binding on the parties and their successors on whether the use of a property as a holiday let is use as a dwellinghouse, but I am asked to consider the applicants’ case for discharge or modification on the assumption that it is and that the restriction impedes the current use. For what it is worth, I consider that such use is clearly use as a dwellinghouse, notwithstanding each occupier may be there only for a short period.
The application for discharge or modification
22. The applicants seek discharge or modification of the restriction under grounds (a), (aa) and (c) of s84(1), to permit them to continue using the annexe as a holiday let.
23. Ms Halker submitted that the restriction should be deemed obsolete under ground (a) because there has been substantial change in the character of the neighbourhood since it was imposed, in 2003, by an elderly lady who valued living in an extremely quiet and peaceful area. Since that time there has been a substantial increase in the number of residential tourist businesses in close proximity to Shride Farm, including the objector’s glamping activity at Shride Farm House. The adjacent Thornhills caravan park had expanded its activity with 12 additional pitches in 2014, holiday lettings of the main farmhouse and a separate residential annexe, and the recent addition of a shepherd’s hut. Also, nearby at Othery, a glamping business called Tractors and Cream was set up in 2012, which now includes a self-catering cottage. Thus the neighbourhood remains a quiet rural area but is now pocketed with residential tourist businesses. The fact that the objector has his own tourist activity is a material circumstance that the Tribunal should take into account.
24. Under ground (aa) Ms Halker submitted a suggested wording for modification, as follows:
“The covenant imposed by clause 12.2.2 of the transfer dated 9 May 2003 is modified to permit the building situated on the land at the date of modification to be used for the purposes provided for in the grant of planning permission dated 20 April 2026, namely as an annexe and holiday let, subject to the following conditions:
a. Paying guests staying in the holiday let will not be permitted to bring pets on to the land;
b. A maximum of 4 paying guests may occupy the building as a holiday let at any one time;
c. Paying guests staying in the holiday let will not make noise outside between the hours of 9pm and 7am.
d. Paying guests staying in the holiday let will not be permitted to use the jacuzzi after 7pm.”
25. The suggested conditions expand on those already within the management plan by formalising the policy of excluding pets and imposing an earlier time of 7pm for latest use of the hot tub.
26. Ms Halker submitted that the use of the annexe as a holiday let, with planning permission and in an area where other tourist activities take place, is clearly reasonable. The objector’s focus on impeding the holiday use, whilst accepting that the annexe could be used as a residential annexe for friends and family, is not rational unless it is to prevent competition with his own tourist business. If there are any practical benefits secured by the restriction then they are not substantial and the objector has chosen not to instruct an expert to provide an opinion on their value. Ms Halker submitted that the objector’s complaints about his experience of increased traffic, car headlights, overlooking and loss of privacy, trespass, straying animals and noise are massively exaggerated. All of those issues could arise from use of the annexe by the applicants and their family and friends, to which he does not object. The management plan is followed to ensure that the impact of guest activity on the neighbours is minimised, but the activity of family and friends would not be subject to any management plan or conditions. Ms Buhler had confirmed that the annexe remains subsidiary to Shride Barn, having no independent water or drainage and no separate postal address.
27. Ms Halker relied on her submissions to contend that ground (c) was met because discharge or modification would cause no injury to the objector.
The grounds of objection to discharge or modification
28. The objector has a number of complaints about the way in which planning permission for the annexe has been obtained retrospectively, firstly under a certificate of lawful use as ancillary residential accommodation and then for use as a holiday let. Despite the wording of the restriction, the annexe now provides self-contained residential accommodation. The planning officer’s report for the certificate of lawful use confirms that the annexe was not constructed as originally consented in 2008. It has a larger footprint and a first floor bedroom rather than a mezzanine. The objector also says that plans submitted for the 2008 and 2025 applications contained errors in showing the location of Shride Farm House and its title boundary. He acknowledges that these issues are separate from the matters in this application, but relies on them as context for how the use of the building has expanded well beyond the original stated intentions in the 2008 planning consent.
29. In response to the application under ground (a) the objector disputes that the restriction should be deemed obsolete. He contends that the original purpose of the restriction, to preserve the quiet residential character of Shride Farm House and prevent additional dwellings or commercial intensification, can still be achieved. Shride Farm House continues to be occupied as a rural home and its fields are used as part of a working farm. The character of the immediate neighbourhood has not changed substantially since the restriction was imposed. The neighbouring working farm at Bennetts Farm, which shares the access road, still operates as a farm of over 100 acres, including a three acre field which separates the application land from Thornhills caravan park. The tourist activity at Thornhills caravan park and farm house has independent access from the main road and does not have an impact on the enjoyment of his property. By contrast, the holiday letting activity at the annexe is in close proximity to the house and has a substantial impact on the enjoyment of his property. Regarding glamping activity at Shride Farm House, the objector says that a single tent was offered as a temporary seasonal activity whilst he recovered from major surgery and was unable to work. Commercial use ceased in September 2025.
30. In response to ground (aa) the objector submits that the restriction provides practical benefits of substantial advantage to him in the enjoyment of his property and that money would not adequately compensate him if the practical benefits were found not to be substantial. The difference between use of the annexe as a residential annexe to Shride Barn and as a holiday let is that occupation as a holiday let is use as a dwellinghouse, which is expressly prohibited by the covenant. The annexe has a close physical, visual and acoustic relationship with his property which cannot be removed by a management plan for the lettings. The practical benefits of preventing holiday use include preservation of privacy and security, and protection from repeated intensified occupation by changing groups of paying guests, with the associated noise and external activity close to his boundary.
31. For the same reasons the objector submits that ground (c) cannot be made out because modification to permit holiday use would cause him injury.
32. Finally, the objector submits that there are reasons why, even if I find that one of the applicant’s grounds is made out, I should not exercise my discretion to discharge or modify the restriction. In particular he relies on the fact that the applicants purchased Shride Barn and the application land in full knowledge of the restriction. This is evidenced by email exchanges with the applicants’ solicitors in March 2024, when the objector was asked if he would be prepared to agree an amendment of the covenant with the restriction. The objector made clear that he would not agree to an amendment and the applicants proceeded with their purchase. They subsequently commenced use of the annexe for holiday lettings without either an amended covenant or planning permission. They only applied for planning permission after commencing their application to the Tribunal.
Ground (a) – Should the restriction de deemed obsolete?
33. In the case of Re Fermyn Wood [2018] UKUT 0411 (LC) the Tribunal (Deputy President Martin Rodger QC and Mr Andrew Trott FRICS) identified four connected matters to be considered for an application under ground (a):
“35. In determining whether the 1929 covenant can be discharged under ground (a) it is therefore necessary to consider a number of connected matters. It is first necessary to identify the purpose or object of the covenant, which may be stated in the instrument imposing the restriction or may be inferred from the nature of the restriction or from the known circumstances. Next it is necessary to ask whether the character of the property or the neighbourhood has changed since the covenant was imposed. Thirdly, whether the restriction has become obsolete by reason of those changes, in the sense that the object for which the restriction was imposed can no longer be achieved. Fourthly, and finally, whether some material circumstance other than a change in the character of the property or the neighbourhood has had that effect.”
34. We do not have evidence of a stated purpose of the restriction when it was imposed, but we know that it was for the benefit of the retained land, which included Shride Farm House. The previous month the buildings at Shride Barn had been sold for residential conversion, so it can be inferred that there was a desire to protect Shride Farm House from residential conversion or development closer to it on the application land.
35. Ms Halker’s submissions on obsolescence of the restriction relied heavily on evidence of change in the character of the neighbourhood arising from tourist activity at the objector’s own property. Evidence was adduced of a video tour of the property, made just before the purchase and available on YouTube, which had a voiceover from Ms Brown describing how they intended to convert parts of the property to provide guest accommodation. Further evidence was adduced of website entries and social media posts from 2024 and 2025 promoting glamping at the property, described as “Faraway Farm”, and evidence of guest reviews. Online posts in 2025 referred to a “Summer House” becoming available to rent later in the year and in April 2026 the yurt was still advertised on website with updated prices.
36. Ms Halker submitted that the objector was being disingenuous to say that his guest business was intended to be temporary and that in reality it had only been terminated in in the knowledge that this application was to be made. When cross-examined at length by Ms Halker, the objector denied vehemently that he and his partner Emily Brown had purchased Shride Farm House in anticipation of running their own tourist business.
37. Despite Ms Halker’s submissions, I am not prepared to make any findings regarding tourist enterprises that the objector and his partner may have run or intend to run at their property. Any such enterprises are within the control of the objector and do not prevent the purpose of the restriction – protection of his property from residential development on the application land – from being achieved.
38. Moreover, I do not consider that evidence of a handful of other tourist businesses in the locality is evidence of a change in the character of the neighbourhood. From my inspection it is clear that both Shride Farm House and Shride Barn benefit from a peaceful rural location, unaffected by any external tourist activities.
39. The character of the application land has certainly changed since the restriction was imposed, by the replacement of a redundant building with a stylish contemporary building now used as a residential annex. But, rather than making the restriction obsolete because its purpose can no longer be achieved, the effect of the restriction in preventing use of the annexe as a dwellinghouse is now even more important. There is no history of tolerated breach of the restriction by holiday letting such as would prevent the restriction from being enforced by injunction, so it cannot be said to have lost its purpose in that sense either.
40. My conclusion is that the restriction should not be deemed obsolete and therefore ground (a) is not made out.
Ground (aa) –– Does the restriction impede a reasonable use of the application land, without securing to the objectors practical benefits of substantial value or advantage, and would money be an adequate compensation for any loss or disadvantage suffered on discharge or modification?
41. It is not in dispute that use of the annexe as a holiday let can be considered reasonable, insofar as it has been granted planning permission. It is also not in dispute that the restriction preventing use as a dwellinghouse impedes that use.
42. Unlike cases where objectors have to imagine what impact a proposed discharge or modification would have on the enjoyment of their property, in this case the objector and his family have experienced the impact of holiday guests in the annexe. From their kitchen and their bedroom they can hear noise from the guests outside on the terrace, particularly when they are using the jacuzzi. If alcohol is being consumed this noise can be loud and involve swearing. One occasion the noise had continued until 3.00 am. While the applicants may intend that the rules should be kept, their own house is further from the annexe, and their bedroom faces away from it, so they are less aware of the noise, particularly during the “quiet hours” after 9.00 pm. The objector submits that the applicants cannot continually supervise activity outside and inside the annexe.
43. The objector accepts that he has not objected to the applicants having family or private guests staying in the annexe, with no management plan to control their behaviours, but says that holiday use is intensive. As holiday guests come and go, so the patterns of behaviour are constantly changing, with each set of guests needing to understand how the “house rules” operate. When asked how he would be able to distinguish between personal guests and holiday guests he admitted that he would not know which type of guests were staying unless they were with one of the applicants, whose voices he would recognise.
44. In addition to the intrusion of noise, the objector says that holiday guest traffic using the shared single track access road is disruptive and, until he provided a new gate across his own drive, guest cars would often drive straight down to Shride Farm House rather than turning left into the application land. As cars drive across the application land at the end of his garden the occupants look across and into his property affecting the privacy of his family. At night the car lights shine into the property as they cross the cattle grid before turning left and the engine noise is a disturbance. He does acknowledge that this could happen at any time if the applicants had a party or other private guests or family coming and going at night. The objector also accepted, from the evidence presented to him of the visitor activity on his own property, that it was possible to run a tourist business which was not disruptive.
45. This is a sad case where previously friendly relations between neighbours have broken down and each couple has become highly sensitive to the activities and intentions of the other. Ms Halker submitted that the objector’s complaints were exaggerated. I do not go that far and would say that the intensity of his feelings reflects a genuine concern that he has lost something precious, which is the ability for his family to enjoy the property and its peaceful location free from intrusive activity in close proximity.
46. I have inferred that the purpose of the restriction was to protect the objector’s property from residential conversion or development on the application land. It is unfortunate that over the 21 year period that the application land was in the hands of Mr and Mrs Griffiths, who had accepted the restriction when they purchased, the protection was effectively eroded incrementally by erection of a new building which then became used, without planning permission, as a residential annexe. By the time the certificate of lawful use was granted in 2024, just prior to its sale, the change of use was established. However, since use as a residential annexe does not constitute use as a dwellinghouse, the objector accepts that the practical benefits remaining to him under the restriction are the marginal ones secured by preventing use of the annexe for holiday lettings.
47. From my inspection I can see that the proximity of the annexe to the objector’s property is such that he and his family are exposed in particular to noise intrusion from people staying there, especially when they are using the terrace and jacuzzi. The boundary between the terrace and the objector’s garden is a hedge, supplemented by a timber panel fence which he has erected on his own side. I understand the objector’s frustration at the experiences which he has described, and I accept his submission that when paying guests are staying the level of intrusion might well be more intensive than when private guests of the applicants are staying. But the test which I must consider under ground (aa) is whether the restriction, in preventing use for holiday lettings, secures practical benefits of substantial value or advantage.
48. I have received no evidence on the value which may be secured by the restriction, but in terms of advantage I am clear that the marginal benefits of preventing holiday lettings are not sufficient to be described as substantial. This means that in principle, and subject to my discretion, I would have jurisdiction to modify the restriction under ground (aa), provided that money will be an adequate compensation for the loss or disadvantage suffered.
49. The objector says that a one off sum of money would not be adequate compensation for an ongoing loss of benefits which he would suffer if use for holiday lettings was permitted. The applicants maintain that no injury would be suffered and have not proposed any figure for compensation.
The Tribunal’s discretion
50. My conclusion on ground (aa) is that I do have jurisdiction to modify the restriction, but I must now decide whether I should exercise my discretion to do so.
51. S.84(1B) requires the Tribunal to take into account the development plan and any declared or ascertainable pattern for the grant or refusal of planning permissions in the relevant area. In this case I am bound to consider that, when granting the certificate of lawful use as a residential annexe in February 2024, Somerset Council had only to consider whether the annexe had been used for an unlawful purpose for a period of at least 10 years. The delegated report supporting the certificate noted that the annexe was unlawful in that the original purpose was for business use, and also because it had not been built in accordance with the plans approved in 2008. It had a larger footprint and a first floor rather than a mezzanine. Present use as a residential annexe is therefore lawful by default, rather than in accordance with the development plan or any pattern for granting planning permissions.
52. The planning officer’s report to committee on the application for retrospective permission for holiday letting stated: “As the building is existing and the proposal is for a flexi use alongside an annex use it is considered that the information provided and its location is considered acceptable to comply with (policies) CO1 and D17 of the local plan.” Insofar as this statement depended on the pre-existing use as a residential annexe it was, in fact, dependent on a use which had been unlawful under the local plan until February 2024.
53. The objector was unrepresented and so did not rely on case law to support his arguments. Had he been represented I would undoubtedly have heard submissions that the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander Devine Children’s Cancer Trust v Housing Solutions Ltd [2020] 1 WLR 4783 (SC) was support for not exercising discretion in this case because the conduct of the applicants in letting the annexe for holidays, in the knowledge that they were in breach of the restriction and after a request for consent had been refused in solicitors’ correspondence, was a cynical breach with a view to making profit. Such a submission would have merit.
54. There has been a history on the application land, by the previous owners and the applicants, of carrying out activity without planning permission and, in the case of the new tourist enterprise, knowingly in breach of the restriction. I have heard the evidence of the objector on the practical benefits that he would lose on modification of the restriction and, whilst those may not be substantial, they are real. The applicants have adopted an approach which seeks retrospective approval of their activities and I do not consider that it would be fair and just to reward that approach by modifying a restriction which was imposed for the protection of the objector’s property.
55. I therefore decline to exercise my discretion to modify the restriction.
56. Insofar as the Tribunal is also required to take into account the period at which and context in which the restriction was created or imposed and any other material circumstances, I have considered those matters in my decision.
Determination
57. I determine that I have no jurisdiction to modify the covenant under ground (a), that it ought to be deemed obsolete.
58. I find that I do have jurisdiction to modify the restriction under ground (aa), but I decline to exercise discretion to do so for the reasons stated.
Mrs Diane Martin TD MRICS FAAV
5 November 2026
Right of appeal
Any party has a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal on any point of law arising from this decision. The right of appeal may be exercised only with permission. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal must be sent or delivered to the Tribunal so that it is received within 1 month after the date on which this decision is sent to the parties (unless an application for costs is made within 14 days of the decision being sent to the parties, in which case an application for permission to appeal must be made within 1 month of the date on which the Tribunal’s decision on costs is sent to the parties). An application for permission to appeal must identify the decision of the Tribunal to which it relates, identify the alleged error or errors of law in the decision, and state the result the party making the application is seeking. If the Tribunal refuses permission to appeal a further application may then be made to the Court of Appeal for permission.
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