Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Association for Governmental Responsibility, Ethics and Transparency v. Borough of Mantoloking

Official source
                                     SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

      Association for Governmental Responsibility, Ethics and Transparency
                  v. Borough of Mantoloking (A-71-24) (089508)

Argued January 5, 2026 -- Decided October 29, 2026

JUSTICE FASCIALE, writing for the Court.

       In this appeal, the Court considers whether, under the unique circumstances of
this case, the identity of the sender of an email is subject to disclosure under the
New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA) or the common law right of access.

       In a municipal court case arising out of a civilian complaint filed by a former
State Trooper charging Donald F. Burke, Sr., with traffic violations, Burke Sr. filed
a pretrial motion to compel production of the Trooper’s criminal record and
disciplinary history. The municipal court judge denied that motion, and Burke Sr.
appealed. Elizabeth J. Leahey was appointed to prosecute the charges for the
Borough of Mantoloking due to a conflict of interest on the part of the municipal
prosecutor, and she represented the Borough on appeal.

       Prior to oral argument, in response to a request for legal advice about the
admissibility of expunged records, Leahey received an email in her private email
account that quotes two statutes and indicates that revealing information related to
expunged charges could be a disorderly persons offense and an ethics violation.
During oral argument on the motion, Leahey informed the judge that the former
Trooper had stated his records were expunged and thus not admissible at trial.
Leahey also relied on the email to address the potential legal consequences of
revealing expunged records. Leahey shared printed copies of the email with the
judge and defense counsel. The sender’s name and email address had been redacted.
The Special Civil Part judge upheld the denial of the motion to compel production.
The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed, finding that Burke Sr.
had demonstrated good cause and a compelling need to inspect the expunged
records. The State dismissed the municipal court charges against him.

      While the municipal court case was pending, the Association for
Governmental Responsibility, Ethics, and Transparency (AGREAT), represented by
Burke Sr., served a request seeking the unredacted email between Leahey and her
colleague. The Borough denied the request, and the Law Division upheld the denial
                                           1
on appeal, finding that the email was not a government record under OPRA because
it was a private communication maintained on a private email server.

      The Appellate Division affirmed in a divided opinion. 

478 N.J. Super. 470

(App. Div. 2024). The majority concluded that the email is not a government record
under OPRA or a public record under the common law. 

Id. at 492-93

. In dicta, the
majority added that the sender’s identity was protected by the work product doctrine
and that a balancing of the factors under Doe v. Poritz, 

142 N.J. 1, 88

 (1995), and
Loigman v. Kimmelman, 

102 N.J. 98, 113

 (1986), did not warrant disclosure of the
disputed information. Id. at 492-96. The dissent balanced the Doe factors and
determined that “OPRA compel[led] disclosure of the sender’s name and email
address.” Id. at 504 (Smith, J.A.D., dissenting).

       AGREAT appealed as of right based on the dissent, and the Court granted its
petition for certification to challenge the majority’s Loigman determination of its
common law claim. 

260 N.J. 597

 (2025). The Court directed the trial judge to
conduct an in camera inspection of the redacted part of the email and to provide,
under seal, additional information about the person who sent the email. The Court
learned that the sender was an attorney not connected to the municipal court case
and was someone Leahey had contacted confidentially for litigation assistance on
complex municipal court matters many times over the course of her career.

HELD: Under the facts of this case, the information sought is a government record
subject to disclosure under OPRA, and it is not shielded by the work product
doctrine. It is the sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy, which outweighs any
interest in disclosure here, that protects the sender’s identity.

1. Here, Leahey was an “officer of the State” while acting as the conflict prosecutor
for the Borough, and she received and maintained the email at issue in her official
business. See N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. “Emails, whether created on a government
official’s government or personal account, can certainly fall within OPRA’s
definition of a government record.” Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High
School Bd. of Educ., 

264 N.J. 166

, 180 (2026). Accordingly, notwithstanding the
fact that Leahey received the email on her private account, the email is a government
record subject to disclosure under OPRA. The Court therefore considers (1) whether
the sender has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity and, if so, (2)
whether that privacy interest outweighs the interest in disclosure. (pp. 14-17)

2. As to the first step, the sender has a sufficient privacy interest here: emailing the
confidential legal advice here -- to a professional colleague -- does not indicate any
expectation that the information would be shared broadly; Leahey’s redaction
confirms that Leahey did not believe the contact information would be revealed
publicly; and the sender had in the past indicated an intent to maintain the
                                           2
confidentiality of any communications about advice sought. As to the second step --
the Doe balancing test, see 

142 N.J. at 88

, the first two factors -- “the type of record
requested” and “the information it . . . contain[s]” -- do not weigh in either direction.
The third through sixth factors -- which focus on the harm disclosure might cause,
“the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,” and “the degree of
need for access” -- favor non-disclosure given the potential chilling effect upon
sharing advice among attorneys, a practice that is in the public’s interest; the
absence of any way to prevent the information from being disclosed in a harmful
manner if released; and the fact that the email sender’s identity is inconsequential on
the new record, particularly because the expungement issue addressed in the email is
no longer at issue. And, as to factor seven, there is no specific “express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized public interest militating
toward access” in this case. The balance of the Doe factors thus falls against
disclosure under OPRA. (pp. 18-22)

3. Turning to the common law right of access, both AGREAT’s “private need” and
the public’s interest in the information sought is minimal. And as for the third prong
of the common-law test -- in which courts balance the requestor’s interest in
disclosure against the government’s interest in confidentiality -- the balance of the
Loigman factors weighs against disclosure under the common law just like the
balance of Doe factors under OPRA. (pp. 22-27)

4. The inquiry for the work product doctrine, like the balancing inquiries under OPRA
and the common law, must focus on the precise information sought: the sender’s
identity. On this expanded record, the sender’s “identity” is not work product
entitled to standalone protection under the work product doctrine. (pp. 27-28)

      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.

       JUSTICE NORIEGA, dissenting, agrees that the email is a government
record and that the sender’s identity and email address is not protected work-product.
In Justice Noriega’s view, however, respondents did not establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the sender’s name and email address after Leahey chose to
reveal and use the email in open court. Justice Noriega explains that once the
government voluntarily discloses a government record in that manner, it cannot
continue to maintain that the record’s source-identifying information is protected by
a reasonable expectation of privacy absent some separate basis for confidentiality,
which is not present here. Noting that OPRA’s purpose is to maximize transparency
and public access to government records, Justice Noriega would require disclosure.

JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and
HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion. JUSTICE NORIEGA filed
a dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins.
                                           3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-71 September Term 2024
                       089508


                   Association for
                   Governmental
                Responsibility, Ethics
                 and Transparency,

                 Plaintiff-Appellant,

                          v.

             Borough of Mantoloking,
               Municipal Clerk of the
             Borough of Mantoloking,
             and Custodian of Records,

              Defendants-Respondents.

       On certification to the Superior Court,
   Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at
       

478 N.J. Super. 470

 (App. Div. 2024).

       Argued                       Decided
   January 5, 2026              October 29, 2026


Donald F. Burke argued the cause for appellant (Law
Office of Donald F. Burke, attorneys; Donald F. Burke
and Donald F. Burke, Jr., on the briefs).

Robin La Bue argued the cause for respondents
(Rothstein, Mandell, Strohm, Halm & Cipriani, attorneys;
Robin La Bue, on the briefs).

Ezra D. Rosenberg argued the cause for amici curiae
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and

                          1
              Libertarians for Transparent Government (American
              Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey Foundation, and
              Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys; Ezra D.
              Rosenberg, Jeanne LoCicero, and CJ Griffin, on the
              brief).


             JUSTICE FASCIALE delivered the opinion of the Court.


      This appeal arises from unique circumstances: during oral argument in a

municipal court case, the prosecutor handed defense counsel a copy of an

email that she had received on her private email account. The email was sent

by an attorney with whom the prosecutor had a longstanding professional

relationship, and it was written at her request for confidential litigation advice

about how to respond to defense counsel’s demand for the release of expunged

records of a witness. The sender of the email was not connected to the

municipal court case and was someone the prosecutor had contacted

confidentially for litigation assistance on complex municipal court matters

many times over the course of her career. To protect the sender’s privacy, the

prosecutor redacted the sender’s name and email address, before handing a

printed version of the email, which included the text of relevant statutes, to

defense counsel. The charges in the municipal court case were ultimately

dismissed.




                                         2
      The defendant in the municipal court case represents plaintiff

Association for Governmental Responsibility, Ethics, and Transparency

(AGREAT). To obtain the identity of the sender, AGREAT requested the

unredacted email under the New Jersey Open Public Records Act (OPRA),

N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13, and the common law right of access. That request

was denied. AGREAT filed this action seeking disclosure of the redacted

information under OPRA and the common law. Without conducting an in

camera inspection of the redacted part of the email, the trial judge determined

that the email was not a government record, dismissed AGREAT’s complaint,

and denied AGREAT’s OPRA request. The Appellate Division affirmed the

order denying AGREAT’s OPRA request in a divided opinion.

      The appeal presents three legal questions: (1) whether the email is a

government record under OPRA; if so, (2) whether the Borough of

Mantoloking has a lawful basis for not disclosing the name and email address

of the person who sent the email; and (3) whether the sender’s identity is

disclosable under the common law right of access.

      We hold that the email received by the municipal prosecutor on her

private email account is a government record under OPRA because it was

received and maintained in the course of her official business. While this

appeal was pending, we directed the trial judge to conduct an in camera

                                       3
inspection of the redacted part of the email and to provide to the Court, under

seal, additional information about the person who sent the email. Having now

reviewed that information, we hold further that, under OPRA, a balancing of

the factors from Doe v. Poritz, 

142 N.J. 1, 88

 (1995), does not favor disclosure

of the sender’s identity. Likewise, under the common law, a balancing of the

factors from Loigman v. Kimmelman, 

102 N.J. 98, 113

 (1986), does not favor

disclosure. We therefore affirm as modified the judgment of the Appellate

Division.

                                       I.

                                       A.

      In 2020, Jakob Weingroff, a former New Jersey State Trooper, filed a

civilian complaint in Mantoloking Municipal Court against Donald F. Burke,

Sr.1 Suspecting that Weingroff had previously falsified records in the course

of his employment as a State Trooper, Burke Sr. filed a pretrial motion in

municipal court to compel production of Weingroff’s criminal record and

disciplinary history. The municipal court judge denied that motion, and Burke

Sr. moved for leave to appeal from the order denying his motion. A judge in

the Special Civil Part (SCP) of the Law Division conducted oral argument on


1
  The civilian complaint charged Burke Sr. with four motor vehicle and traffic
violations: (1) improper turn; (2) failure to maintain travel on a marked lane;
(3) improper use of a cellphone while driving; and (4) careless driving.
                                        4
the motion for leave to appeal. During that oral argument, the email at issue in

this matter surfaced.

       Donald F. Burke, Jr. served as defense counsel for his father at the

hearing in the SCP. Elizabeth J. Leahey, who had been appointed to prosecute

the charges for the Borough due to a conflict of interest on the part of the

Borough’s municipal prosecutor, also appeared before the SCP judge. Leahey

was not a full-time prosecutor. In addition to municipal court work, her

private practice concentrated on real estate transactions, family law, and estate

law.

       Prior to the oral argument, Leahey contacted the sender of the email to

request legal advice about the admissibility of expunged records. From the

limited remand proceedings that we ordered during the pendency of this

appeal, we learned that the sender was not an employee, attorney, or contractor

for the Borough, and that the sender had no connection whatsoever to the

municipal court case. That individual was simply someone whom Leahey had

contacted previously in other matters for litigation assistance. In response to

Leahey’s request for professional guidance, the sender sent the email to her

private email account. The subject line of the email states, “Lizzy - please

review this.” The body of the email reads:

             Lizzy - Two things:

                                        5
First, [t]he information related to the expunged arrest
and PTI is not admissible at trial: Here is the statute:

2C:52-27. Effect of expungement

Unless otherwise provided by law, if an order of
expungement is granted, the arrest, conviction and any
proceedings related thereto shall be deemed not to have
occurred, and the petitioner may answer any questions
relating to their occurrence accordingly, except as
follows:

a. The fact of an expungement, sealing or similar relief
shall be disclosed as provided in section 2C:52-8b.

b. The fact of an expungement of prior charges which
were dismissed because of the person’s acceptance into
and successful completion of a supervisory treatment or
other diversion program shall be disclosed by said
person to any court that is determining the propriety of
accepting said person into a supervisory treatment or
other diversion program for subsequent criminal
charges;

--------------------------------------------------

Second, if your adversary knowingly reveals this in
open court he himself is guilty of a d/p offense as well
as an ethics violation RPC 8.4(b)[.]

Remind him of this statute in open court on Thursday!!!

N.J.S.A. 2C:52-30 - Except as otherwise provided in
this chapter, any person who reveals to another the
existence of an arrest, conviction or related legal
proceeding with knowledge that the records and
information pertaining thereto have been expunged or
sealed is a disorderly person. Notwithstanding the
provisions of section 2C:43-3, the maximum fine which
can be imposed for violation of this section is $200.00.
                               6
      During the oral argument before the SCP judge, defense counsel

mentioned Weingroff’s previous criminal record. A long colloquy between

defense counsel and the SCP judge followed, in which they discussed

admissibility, evidentiary concerns, and prematurely revealing expunged

records without a court order. Defense counsel informed the SCP judge that

he would need to pull up the relevant evidentiary rules. Leahey then stated, “I

think I can clear this all up without [defense counsel] having to do anything

further.” She informed the SCP judge that Weingroff had revealed to her that

his records were expunged. Relying on the legal advice in the email, Leahey

cited N.J.S.A. 2C:52-27 and argued to the SCP judge that “information relating

to an expunged . . . record . . . [is] not admissible at trial.”

      Leahey also relied on the email to address the potential legal

consequences of revealing expunged records. Along those lines, Leahey

expressly added, “I’m not saying now. . . . I just want to make him aware of

this, because I don’t want him to have a problem with that later.” Defense

counsel responded that “it would have been nice to have this so we could brief

the issue of expungement” and suggested that, when records are expunged,

“the facts don’t go away,” just the legal consequences. The following

discussion then took place, which led to Leahey sharing the email with the

SCP judge and defense counsel:
                                           7
            THE COURT: But see, . . . that’s the problem. When
            you take a look at that statute when it references --

            LEAHEY: I have the statute for [defense counsel],
            Your Honor, if he wants to see it. I thought it would be
            helpful.

            THE COURT: Well, sure. . . .

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: [N]ow I have to address on the
            fly this issue . . .

            THE COURT: This is not the statute that I was
            referring to.

            LEAHEY: Oh, okay. Well, do you want me to show it
            to him, anyway?

            THE COURT: Sure, why not? . . .

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: I don’t know if you want me to
            respond to it, Judge. I don’t see anything in here that
            says that I can’t utilize this information for purposes of
            cross examination. Can I get copies of these?

            LEAHEY: Okay. If you want to keep that . . . I have
            copies.

            DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yeah, that would be great.
            Thanks.

      During that exchange, Leahey provided a printed copy of the email to

defense counsel, in which the sender’s identifying address in the “From” field

had been redacted.

      At that point, the SCP judge upheld the order entered by the municipal

court judge denying the motion to compel production of Weingroff’s criminal
                                        8
record and disciplinary history, and advised defense counsel that the procedure

for seeking expunged records was to make a motion under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19,

which permits the inspection of expunged records under certain circumstances.

Rather than returning to municipal court and making that motion, as the SCP

judge had indicated, Burke Sr. instead filed a motion for leave to appeal from

the SCP court’s order denying his discovery motion.

      The Appellate Division granted leave to appeal and reversed the order

entered by the SCP judge. It reached two conclusions: First, Weingroff’s

criminal records were relevant as impeachment evidence in the municipal court

case; second, under N.J.S.A. 2C:52-19, Burke Sr. had demonstrated good

cause and a compelling need to inspect the expunged records. In other words,

the appellate court concluded that Burke Sr. had the right to use the expunged

records to cross-examine Weingroff in the municipal court case. The

Appellate Division then remanded the matter to municipal court for further

proceedings.

      Once the discovery dispute regarding Burke Sr.’s right to inspect

Weingroff’s expunged records was resolved, the State dismissed the municipal

court charges against Burke Sr.




                                       9
                                       B.

      While the municipal court case was pending, AGREAT served the

OPRA request seeking the unredacted email between Leahey and her

colleague. The Borough denied the request, responding that the requested

email was not a government record under OPRA. AGREAT -- represented by

Burke Sr. -- then filed an order to show cause and a verified complaint against

the Borough, the Municipal Clerk, and the Custodian of Records, alleging

violations of OPRA and the common law. Because Leahey had turned over the

body of the email in open court to defense counsel, AGREAT’s OPRA and

common law allegations in this matter relate solely to the redacted

information: the name and email address of the email sender.

      A Law Division judge found that the email was not a government record

under OPRA because it was a private communication maintained on a private

email server. The judge therefore did not consider whether the Borough could

establish a lawful basis to exempt the redacted information from disclosure

under OPRA. Nor did the trial judge reach AGREAT’s common law claims.

At that point, the trial judge had not inspected the name and address of the

sender in camera.

      AGREAT appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed in a divided

opinion. Ass’n for Governmental Resp., Ethics & Transparency v. Borough of

                                       10
Mantoloking, 

478 N.J. Super. 470

 (App. Div. 2024). The majority concluded

that the email is not a government record under OPRA or a public record under

the common law. 

Id. at 492-93

. In dicta, the majority added that even if the

email itself is a government record under OPRA or a public record under the

common law, the sender’s identity was protected by N.J.S.A. 47:1A-9(b), the

work product doctrine, and that a balancing of the factors under Doe v. Poritz

and Loigman v. Kimmelman did not warrant disclosure of the disputed

information. 

Id. at 492-96

. The majority found that if the appellate court

compelled disclosure of the email sender’s identity, the potential for harm

would be high due to the potential chilling effect on the collegial relationship

among attorneys. 

Id. at 492

.

      The dissent agreed that the sender has a reasonable expectation of

privacy. 

Id. at 496, 501

 (Smith, J.A.D., dissenting). But after it concluded

that the email was a government record under OPRA, the dissent balanced the

Doe factors and determined that “OPRA compel[led] disclosure of the sender’s

name and email address.” 

Id. at 504

. The dissent did not reach AGREAT’s

request for disclosure under the common law. 

Id. at 496

.

      AGREAT appealed as of right from the Appellate Division’s judgment.

See R. 2:2-1(a)(2). AGREAT additionally petitioned for certification to

challenge the majority’s dicta Loigman determination of its common law

                                       11
claim, and we granted that petition. 

260 N.J. 597

 (2025). We also granted the

motions of the American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey and the

Libertarians for Transparent Government (collectively, ACLU) to appear as

amici curiae. In July 2026, we entered an order directing the trial judge to

conduct an in camera inspection of the sender’s identity and to provide this

Court with additional facts under seal regarding the factual context in which

the email was sent.2

                                       II.

      AGREAT argues that the entire email from Leahey’s colleague,

including the redacted information, is subject to disclosure under OPRA and

the common law. AGREAT asserts that the majority erroneously interpreted

the common law because divulging the name of the person who prepared the

email -- which in AGREAT’s view directed Leahey to “threaten . . . defense

[counsel] in open court” -- outweighs the Borough’s interest in preventing

disclosure.

      The Borough contends that the email is not a government record under

OPRA because it was a private communication maintained on Leahey’s private

email account. The Borough further argues that, even if the email constitutes a



2
  We acknowledge that the appellate court did not have the benefit of an
amplified record.
                                     12
government record, the redacted information is protected work product under

Rule 4:10-2(c). As for the balancing of applicable interests, the Borough

asserts that AGREAT does not have a compelling interest in the identity of the

sender. The Borough argues that, as Leahey’s remarks before the SCP judge

confirm, she handed the email to defense counsel, not as a threat, but rather to

protect against the possible consequences of prematurely disclosing expunged

records. Moreover, the Borough maintains, there could be no prejudice to

Burke Sr. or AGREAT from denying disclosure of the sender’s identity

because the appellate court granted Burke Sr. permission to inspect the

expunged records, AGREAT has the full text of the email, and the charges

have been dismissed.

      The ACLU argues that OPRA provides a right of access to the identity

of the person who prepared the email. Pointing to Rule 7:7-7(d) (addressing

discovery disputes on work product grounds in municipal court) and N.J.R.E.

530(c)(1)(C) (addressing work product waiver limitations on an “undisclosed

communication”), the ACLU contends that production of the email in open

court waived any work product protection to the redacted portion of the email.

As to privacy interests, the ACLU argued that attorneys generally do not have

a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identities and that, regardless of

any applicable privacy expectations, the sender’s identity is of particular

                                        13
importance here, given the originally appointed municipal prosecutor’s

conflict of interest.3

                                       III.

      We first consider whether the email is a “government record” and is

subject to public disclosure under OPRA.

      “[D]eterminations about the applicability of OPRA and its exemptions

are legal conclusions and are therefore subject to de novo review.” Simmons

v. Mercado, 

247 N.J. 24

, 38 (2021) (alteration in original) (quoting In re N.J.

Firemen’s Ass’n Obligation, 

230 N.J. 258, 273-74

 (2017)). Thus, the inquiry

whether the email is a government record is a legal question, and “we owe no

deference to the interpretive conclusions reached by either the trial court or the

Appellate Division.” 

Ibid.

 (quoting Paff v. Galloway Township, 

229 N.J. 340,

351

 (2017)).

                                       A.

      “OPRA was ‘designed to promote transparency in the operation of

government,’” ACLU of N.J. v. Cnty. Prosecutors Ass’n of N.J., 

257 N.J. 87

,

101 (2024) (quoting Firemen’s Ass’n, 

230 N.J. at 276

), and “to minimize the

evils inherent in a secluded process,” Mason v. City of Hoboken, 

196 N.J. 51

,


3
  We now know from the limited remand that the sender of the email was not
the prosecutor who had a conflict of interest in the matter.
                                       14
64 (2008) (quoting Asbury Park Press v. Ocean Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 

374

N.J. Super. 312, 329

 (Law Div. 2004)). In enacting OPRA, the Legislature

“declare[d] it to be the public policy of this State that[] government records

shall be readily accessible.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. OPRA provides that “any

limitations on the right of access . . . shall be construed in favor of the public’s

right of access.” 

Ibid.

 The statute broadly defines a “government record” in

relevant part as “any . . . document . . . [or] information stored or maintained

electronically . . . that has been made, maintained[,] kept on file[,] . . . [or]

received in the course of . . . official business by any . . . officer . . . of the

State.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.

      Here, Leahey was an “officer of the State” while acting as the conflict

prosecutor for the Borough. She received and maintained the email at issue in

the course of her official business as the prosecutor.4 Indeed, she requested the

email in preparing for the municipal court case and to respond in the SCP

hearing directly to defense counsel’s request to reveal Weingroff’s

expungement records. The substance of the email dealt with expungement, an

issue in the case that Leahey prosecuted in municipal court against Burke Sr.

Accordingly, because the email was received in the course of Leahey’s official


4
  We note that OPRA’s “government record” definition excludes “inter-
agency or intra-agency advisory, consultative, or deliberative material.”
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1.
                                     15
prosecutorial business for the Borough, the email is a government record under

OPRA.

      The trial judge concluded otherwise, agreeing with the Borough’s

argument that the email cannot be a government record because it was received

on Leahey’s personal email account and was thus “maintained on her private

server” as a “private communication.” As we recently explained in Rosetti v.

Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education however, that

overly limited view is inaccurate:

             OPRA makes clear that a “government record” includes
             any “information stored or maintained electronically”
             that “has been made, maintained or kept on file in the
             course of [a government official’s] official business.”
             N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1.1. Emails, whether created on a
             government official’s government or personal account,
             can certainly fall within OPRA’s definition of a
             government record.

             [

264 N.J. 166

, 180 (2026) (alternation in original).]

Indeed, as we cautioned in that case, “emails related to government business,

whether stored on government or private servers, are within OPRA’s reach, so

using a private email account will not shield those government records from

production under OPRA.” Id. at 183. A contrary holding could subvert

OPRA’s purpose by potentially inviting public officials to exploit the use of

third-party email accounts for official business in efforts to circumvent public

oversight.
                                        16
      Accordingly, notwithstanding the fact that Leahey received the email on

her private account, the email is a government record subject to disclosure

under OPRA because it was received and maintained in the course of Leahey’s

official prosecutorial business.

                                        B.

      Government-record status alone does not end the disclosure inquiry,

however. Under OPRA, government records are presumptively “subject to

public access unless exempt from such access.” N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 (listing

sources of exemptions). At the same time, however, OPRA provides that “a

public agency has a responsibility and an obligation to safeguard from public

access a citizen’s personal information with which it has been entrusted when

disclosure thereof would violate the citizen’s reasonable expectation of

privacy.” Ibid.

      Before finding a record subject to disclosure under OPRA, therefore, we

must first determine (1) whether the email sender -- Leahey’s longstanding

professional contact without any connection to the Borough who provided

confidential legal guidance from one attorney to another about expunged

records -- has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their identity and, if so,

(2) whether that privacy interest outweighs the interest in disclosure.




                                        17
                                        1.

      In Doe, we recognized that “home addresses often are publicly

available” but that “[a]n individual’s interest in controlling the dissemination

of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve simply because

that information may be available to the public in some form.” Doe, 

142 N.J.

at 83

 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Def. v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 

510 U.S. 487, 500


(1994)). We recognized further that “privacy interests may be implicated

where disclosure of a person’s address results in unsolicited contact,” as by

“expos[ure] to uninvited harassment.” Id. at 83-84. Thus, despite frequently

being publicly available, addresses are treated with more concern than

“[m]atters exposed to public view [that] may be disclosed without implicating

privacy interests.” Id. at 82. Under the very unusual facts of this case, we

conclude that those same concerns apply to the sender’s identifying

information.

      Emailing the confidential legal advice here -- to a professional colleague

-- is not an inherently public activity. The fact that the sender necessarily

shared their name and email address with Leahey does not indicate any

expectation that the information would be shared broadly. See id. at 85

(“[T]he fact that ‘an event is not wholly “private” does not mean that an

individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of the

                                        18
information.’” (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reps. Comm. for Freedom of

Press, 

489 U.S. 749, 770

 (1989))). Leahey redacted the sender’s name and

email address, confirming that Leahey did not believe -- or intend -- that the

contact information would be revealed publicly. Moreover, we learned from

the remand proceedings that the sender had provided legal advice to Leahey in

the past and had indicated an intent to maintain the confidentiality of any

communications about issues discussed and advice sought.

      Based on the entirety of the expanded record, we also conclude that the

email sender has a sufficient privacy interest to move on to the next step: the

Doe balancing test.

                                       2.

      We look to the factors laid out in Doe “[t]o balance OPRA’s interests in

privacy and access.” Burnett v. County of Bergen, 

198 N.J. 408, 427

 (2009).

Those factors are:

            (1) the type of record requested; (2) the information it
            does or might contain; (3) the potential for harm in any
            subsequent nonconsensual disclosure; (4) the injury
            from disclosure to the relationship in which the record
            was generated; (5) the adequacy of safeguards to
            prevent unauthorized disclosure; (6) the degree of need
            for access; and (7) whether there is an express statutory
            mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognized
            public interest militating toward access.

            [Doe, 

142 N.J. at 88

 (quoting Faison v. Parker, 

823 F.
Supp. 1198, 1201

 (E.D. Pa. 1993)).]
                                       19
Balancing those factors on this unique trial record leads to the conclusion that

the redacted information should not be disclosed under OPRA.

      Factors one and two do not weigh one way or the other; they simply

frame what information is being sought -- the email sender’s name and email

address.

      Factors three and four weigh in favor of non-disclosure. We share the

Appellate Division’s very important concern that “compelling disclosure of the

name and email address of attorneys who render advice to one another has the

potential for a chilling effect on the [collegial] relationship among attorneys

and their private communications concerning their shared legal advice.” Ass’n

for Governmental Resp., Ethics & Transparency, 478 N.J. Super. at 492. The

practice of seeking advice from colleagues, especially those with greater

expertise in a particular subject matter, like here, is certainly in the public’s

interest and should be encouraged, not disincentivized. Requiring disclosure

of the sender’s contact information in this case could deter attorneys from

responding to requests for legal guidance and limit the exchange of critical

information. Here, for example, the sender’s email content not only assisted

Leahey, who requested it, but also helped defense counsel properly seek the

expunged records, which ultimately resulted in the dismissed charges.


                                         20
      Factors five and six also favor non-disclosure. Factor five examines

whether mechanisms exist to ensure the sender’s contact information remains

confidential once disclosed, or whether disclosure would allow the information

to spread freely without restriction. Were that information to be disclosed,

there is no guarantee it would remain contained. We see no way to implement

adequate protections that would prevent the sender’s contact information from

being disclosed in a harmful manner if released.

      As for factor six, our review of the amplified record reveals that the

sender is a longstanding professional colleague who is completely unrelated to

the municipal court prosecution. Thus, the email sender’s identity is

inconsequential on this new record, particularly because AGREAT’s need for

the redacted information at this point is minimal: the municipal court

proceeding was dismissed years ago, so the expungement issue addressed in

the email is no longer at issue.

      Under factor seven, while OPRA itself aims to promote transparency in

government affairs, there is no specific “express statutory mandate, articulated

public policy, or other recognized public interest militating toward access” of

the name and email address of Leahey’s professional colleague in this case.




                                       21
      In sum, we find that the balance of the Doe factors falls against

disclosing the sender’s identity under OPRA. We therefore turn to the

common law.

                                        IV.

      Like determinations about disclosure under OPRA, “[o]ur review of [a]

determination regarding the common law right of access is de novo.” N.

Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s Off., 

447 N.J. Super.

182, 194

 (App. Div. 2016). Here, we find under the expanded record that the

email sender’s name and email address likewise should not be disclosed under

the common law.

      In addition to the access created under OPRA, “[t]he common law right

of access remains a distinct basis upon which to access public records.”

Firemen’s Ass’n, 

230 N.J. at 280

. A request to obtain records under the

common law must meet the following “requirements: (1) the records must be

common-law public documents; (2) the person seeking access must ‘establish

an interest in the subject matter of the material’; and (3) the citizen’s right to

access ‘must be balanced against the State’s interest in preventing disclosure.’”

Keddie v. Rutgers, 

148 N.J. 36, 50

 (1997) (citations omitted).




                                         22
                                         A.

        The first prong requires the record to be a common-law public

document:

              [A] public record is

                    one required by law to be kept, or necessary to be
                    kept in the discharge of a duty imposed by law,
                    or directed by law to serve as a memorial and
                    evidence of something written, said, or done, or
                    a written memorial made by a public officer
                    authorized to perform that function, or a writing
                    filed in a public office. The elements essential to
                    constitute a public record are that it be a written
                    memorial, that it be made by a public officer, and
                    that the officer be authorized by law to make it.

              [Firemen’s Ass’n, 

230 N.J. at 281

 (emphasis added)
              (quoting Nero v. Hyland, 

76 N.J. 213, 222

 (1978)).]

Before appearing in court, Leahey personally redacted the sender’s name and

email address of the email and then printed the redacted document. For

purposes of the first prong, we will assume this printed format is a public

record because it constitutes a “written memorial made by a public officer.”

Ibid.


                                         B.

        To satisfy the second prong, a requesting party must demonstrate an

interest in access to the requested information that may be either a “private

need” or one that “further[s] a public good.” Loigman, 

102 N.J. at 104

.

                                         23
      Here, AGREAT’s “private need” at this point is minimal. As discussed

above, on this new amplified record supplemented by the remand findings by

the trial judge under seal, the email sender’s identity is inconsequential to the

now-resolved municipal court proceedings. The contents of the email

provided relevant statutory provisions and advice about expungement requests

for use in that municipal proceeding. Burke Sr. was able to legally inspect the

expunged records, and his counsel, Burke Jr., could not be exposed to an ethics

violation or a disorderly persons charge for prematurely revealing the records.

The email sender’s identity is not an essential fact, is not necessary for

impeachment, and could not be used in any way to prove or disprove any claim

in dispute. Preventing disclosure of content that bears no significance to an

already terminated proceeding cannot be said to be unfair.

      Finally, AGREAT’s argument -- in fairness, made before we directed the

judge to conduct an in camera inspection and provide context for the email in

question -- that the email “directed” Leahey to “threaten defense [counsel] in

open court” -- is seriously misplaced. Looking at the entire expanded record in

context, Leahey did not disclose the email’s contents to gain a litigation

advantage. Rather, Leahey relied on the body of the email to inform defense

counsel about the law governing expunged records, an area with which neither

of them was extensively familiar in the moment. She did so following a

                                        24
lengthy colloquy between defense counsel and the SCP judge about the

procedure for inspecting expunged records. Leahey utilized her colleague’s

legal advice to inform defense counsel about potential consequences of

improperly revealing those records prematurely because, as she expressly

stated in the SCP hearing, she did not “want him to have a problem with that

later.” Under these unusual circumstances, Leahey’s decision to share the

body of the email with defense counsel while withholding the sender’s

information reflects a good-faith intention to facilitate resolution of the

expungement issue. Although perhaps less than perfectly executed, we discern

no misconduct in Leahey’s utilization of the email and its advice.

      The public interest is similarly minimal. Had the email sender been the

prosecutor who was conflicted out of the municipal court proceedings, the

public interest in knowing who influences prosecutorial decisions would be

substantial. But we now know that that is not the case here.

      For all the reasons discussed above, the purported interest is minimal on

this record where Leahey received advice from a longstanding professional

colleague.

                                        C.

      As for the third prong, “[l]ike OPRA, when confidentiality concerns are

raised under the common law right of access, courts balance the requestor’s

                                        25
interest in disclosure against the government’s interest in confidentiality.”

Firemen’s Ass’n, 

230 N.J. at 281

. We look to the factors laid out in Loigman

to strike that balance. Those non-exclusive factors are:

            (1) the extent to which disclosure will impede agency
            functions by discouraging citizens from providing
            information to the government; (2) the effect disclosure
            may have upon persons who have given such
            information, and whether they did so in reliance that
            their identities would not be disclosed; (3) the extent to
            which agency self-evaluation, program improvement,
            or other decisionmaking will be chilled by disclosure;
            (4) the degree to which the information sought includes
            factual data as opposed to evaluative reports of
            policymakers; (5) whether any findings of public
            misconduct have been insufficiently corrected by
            remedial measures instituted by the investigative
            agency; and (6) whether any agency disciplinary or
            investigatory proceedings have arisen that may
            circumscribe the individual’s asserted need for the
            materials.

            [Loigman, 

102 N.J. at 113

.]

      Balancing those factors on the expanded record before us leads to the

conclusion that the redacted information should not be disclosed under the

common law.

      Factors one and three weigh in favor of non-disclosure. Attorneys might

be discouraged from reaching out to their colleagues to discuss legal issues --

and their colleagues may be reluctant to respond -- if they believe personal

identifying information might be released as a result. As discussed above, this

                                       26
is especially concerning to the extent it chills constructive attorney

communications such as those here.

      Factor two similarly weighs in favor of non-disclosure. Considering that

Leahey redacted the sender’s information and, as we learned from the remand

proceedings, the sender informed Leahey that the sender would not betray the

confidentiality of their discussions, it is more than reasonable to believe

Leahey and the sender thought the sender’s contact information would remain

private -- and intended for it to remain so.

      Factor four arguably weighs in favor of disclosure. Generally, a name

and email address are more akin to factual data than an evaluative report.

Under the facts as expounded in this case, however, this one factor does not tip

the balance in favor of disclosure.

      Factors five and six are not applicable to this case.

      In short, just as we concluded above in the Doe balancing section for

OPRA, we conclude that the Loigman factors weigh against disclosure under

the common law.

                                        V.

      Finally, we disagree with the appellate court’s dicta that the redacted

information is protected from disclosure under the work product doctrine. The

Borough argued that the email itself was protected under the doctrine but did

                                        27
not claim that the sender’s name and email address, specifically, were

“prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial” or that the identifying

information of the sender bears on the “mental impressions, conclusions,

opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party

concerning the litigation.” R. 4:10-2(c). Indeed, the Borough did not redact

the name and email address in this OPRA/common law case relying on the

work product doctrine. Rather, Leahey herself redacted that information in the

municipal court matter, not because it was protected by the work product

doctrine but rather to honor the sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy.

We reiterate that the body of the email message itself is not at issue here -- it

was voluntarily disclosed by Leahey. The inquiry for the work product

doctrine, as for the balancing inquiries under both OPRA and the common law,

must focus on the precise information sought: the sender’s identity. On this

expanded record, we conclude that the sender’s “identity” is not work product

entitled to standalone protection under the work product doctrine.

                                        VI.

      We reach the same result as the Appellate Division but for entirely

different reasons. Under the facts of this case, the information sought is a

government record subject to disclosure under OPRA, and it is not shielded by

the work product doctrine. It is the sender’s reasonable expectation of privacy,

                                         28
which outweighs any interest in disclosure here, that protects the sender’s

identity.

      The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed as modified.



      JUSTICES PATTERSON, PIERRE-LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and
HOFFMAN join in JUSTICE FASCIALE’s opinion. JUSTICE NORIEGA filed a
dissent, in which CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER joins.




                                       29
                                Association for
                                Governmental
                             Responsibility, Ethics
                              and Transparency,

                              Plaintiff-Appellant,

                                       v.

                          Borough of Mantoloking,
                            Municipal Clerk of the
                          Borough of Mantoloking,
                          and Custodian of Records,

                           Defendants-Respondents.


                       JUSTICE NORIEGA, dissenting.


      I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. The central issue in

this case is whether a sender’s name and email address, contained in a

government record received by a municipal prosecutor in the course of her

official duties, may be withheld from disclosure under OPRA after the

prosecutor voluntarily disclosed the email’s contents. I agree with the

majority that the email is a government record and that the sender’s identity

and email address are not protected work-product. I part company with the

majority, however, because respondents did not establish a reasonable

expectation of privacy in the sender’s name and email address after Leahey


                                       1
chose to reveal and use the email in open court. Because OPRA’s purpose is

to maximize transparency and public access to government records, and

because no cognizable privacy interest justifies withholding the sender’s

identity and email address on this record, I would require disclosure.

                                       I.

      To begin, I agree with the majority that the email address at issue is

contained in a government record subject to OPRA. The email was received

by the municipal prosecutor, Leahey, in the course of her official duties, and

directly concerned the prosecution of a municipal court case. Ante at ___ (slip

op. at 5-7). That conclusion does not end the inquiry, however, because

government-record status alone does not resolve whether particular

information may be withheld from disclosure under OPRA. The remaining

question is whether respondents established a lawful basis to redact the

sender’s email address.

      I agree with the majority that the sender’s email address is not work-

product and that the work-product doctrine therefore provides no basis for the

redaction. Rule 4:10-2(c) protects materials prepared in anticipation of

litigation and mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of

counsel. An email address is none of those things. It is merely identifying

information. To the extent the Appellate Division suggested otherwise, I

                                        2
would reject that view as inconsistent with the Rule’s text and purpose. Thus,

an email address cannot be work-product.

      Although the majority does not expressly characterize the disclosure as

waiver under N.J.R.E. 530, it acknowledges that Leahey voluntarily disclosed

the body of the email and treats only the sender’s identifying information as

remaining in dispute. I likewise recognize that Leahey could have withheld

the entire email by asserting the work-product privilege under Rule 4:10-2(c).

But once she voluntarily disclosed in open court the email’s substantive

contents -- the “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories”

that Rule 4:10-2(c) protects -- she waived any work-product protections as to

those contents, see N.J.R.E. 530, and the email address alone carried no such

protections.

                                       II.

      Because the sender’s name and email address are not work-product, the

dispositive question is whether respondents established another basis to

withhold that information. The majority credits Leahey’s claimed reasonable

expectation of privacy. I respectfully disagree. In my view, respondents did

not raise a colorable claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the

sender’s identity and email address after Leahey voluntarily introduced the

email in open court, and no extended Doe analysis is needed.

                                       3
      OPRA does not compel disclosures that “would invade a person’s

reasonable expectation of privacy.” Brennan v. Bergen Cnty. Prosecutor’s

Off., 

233 N.J. 330, 333

 (2018). When an expectation of privacy is established,

the court considers the Doe factors to balance the interest in broad public

access to government records against reasonable expectations of privacy in the

information. See Doe v. Poritz, 

142 N.J. 1, 88

 (1995) (finding that “the state

interest in public disclosure [in that case] substantially outweigh[ed the]

plaintiff’s interest in privacy”). However, when the public entity seeking to

avoid disclosure fails to establish a colorable claim of a reasonable expectation

of privacy, the court need not conduct a detailed Doe analysis. Bozzi v. City

of Jersey City, 

248 N.J. 274

, 287 (2021) (“Because [the city] has not

established a colorable claim that public access to the [information] would

violate a reasonable expectation of privacy, we need not conduct an extended

Doe analysis.”).

      Here, no analysis of the Doe factors is required because Leahey waived

any claim of privacy she might have had when she voluntarily introduced the

email in open court. Leahey could have summarized the advice she received in

her own words. Instead, she elected to reveal the document itself. By doing

so, she waived any colorable privacy claim in the document, and she has

offered no other reasonable basis to conclude that, despite that disclosure, she

                                        4
retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the sender’s identity or email

address. Similarly, in Asbury Park Press v. County of Monmouth, the

Appellate Division declined to find a colorable claim of privacy regarding a

confidential settlement agreement between the County and its former employee

after resolving a sexual harassment case because “litigation is done in a public

forum and is subject to public knowledge.” 

406 N.J. Super. 1, 9-10

 (App. Div.

2009), aff’d, 

201 N.J. 5

 (2010). The court found that the Legislature did not

assure privacy as to publicly litigated disputes and that a term of

confidentiality in the parties’ agreement could not “override the public’s right

of access under OPRA.” 

Id. at 9

.

      Much like Asbury Park Press, this case does not implicate the type of

privacy concerns underpinning Burnett v. County of Bergen, 

198 N.J. 408


(2009). The OPRA request in Burnett encompassed “eight million pages of

land title records of all types, extending over a period of twenty-two years,

which contain[ed] names, addresses, social security numbers, and signatures of

countless citizens” -- information highly susceptible to identity fraud. 

Id. at

414, 418

. The Court determined that “OPRA’s privacy provision [was]

directly implicated . . . because the requested documents contain SSNs along

with the names, addresses, signatures, and marital status of a substantial

number of New Jersey residents.” 

Id. at 428

. Only after finding such

                                        5
vulnerability did we apply the Doe balancing test. 

Ibid.

 Here, no such

sensitive information is at issue.

      Today’s ruling turns accepted practice regarding reasonable expectations

of privacy on its head. An email address and the identity of a document’s

author are generally not the sort of information withheld from disclosure. If

anything, it is the content of the communication, not the identity of its author

or sender, that is ordinarily protected. For instance, we see this regularly with

privilege logs in federal as well as state practice, which depend upon

disclosure of basic identifying information precisely so that courts and

requesting parties may assess the claimed basis for withholding a document.

See Torres v. Kuzniasz, 

936 F. Supp. 1201, 1208

 (D.N.J. 1996) (“A proper

privilege log must include, for each withheld document, the date of the

document, the name of its author, the name of its recipient, the names of all

people given copies of the document, the subject of the document, and the

privilege or privileges asserted.” (emphasis added)); Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.

v. Bull Data Sys., 

145 F.R.D. 84, 88

 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (“For each document, the

[privilege] log should identify the date, the author and all recipients, along

with their capacities. The log should also describe the document’s subject

matter, purpose for its production, and a specific explanation of why the

document is privileged or immune from discovery.” (original emphases

                                        6
removed; new emphasis added)); see also Paff v. Dep’t of Labor, 

392 N.J.

Super. 334, 341

 (App. Div. 2007) (reviewing the Department of Labor’s denial

of a claimant’s OPRA request and requiring that the agency include “[a]n

accurate [privilege log,]” which “is necessary for substantive review by the

requesting party as well as the reviewing court,” along with a sworn statement

that the agency provided claimant with all responsive, non-confidential

information still intact). Among other concerns, the majority’s privacy-based

conclusion today risks impairing the efficacy of privilege logs.

      And, in addition to such generalized concerns, respondents’ assertion

that there is a colorable privacy claim does not withstand scrutiny on this

record. First, Leahey introduced the email, read its contents into the record,

and provided a copy to defense counsel. Second, her choice to do so was

entirely voluntary and intentional. A government actor cannot voluntarily

disclose the substance of a government record in a public court proceeding and

then continue to claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the record’s

sender. See Asbury Park Press, 

201 N.J. at 8

. Subsequent regret in turning

over the document instead of simply reading its contents aloud does not

convert Leahey’s choice -- to turn over the email with the redacted address --

into a colorable claim of privacy.




                                        7
      The majority relies on the notion that Leahey “utilized her colleague’s

legal advice to inform defense counsel about potential consequences of

improperly revealing those records prematurely” and that withholding the

sender’s information reflected “a good-faith intention to facilitate resolution of

the expungement issue.” Ante at ___ (slip op. at 25). However, in concluding

that the email sender has a sufficient privacy interest, the majority overlooks

the initial question of whether Leahey waived that interest.

      I see the email as conveying something different. As the majority notes,

the subject line of the email states “Lizzy - please review this,” followed by

“Lizzy - Two things. . . .” The first sentence explains that records of an

expunged arrest and Pretrial Intervention are not admissible at trial and quotes

the relevant statute. The second provides the prosecutor with the following

directions:

              Second, if your adversary knowingly reveals this in
              open court he himself is guilty of a d/p offense as well
              as an ethics violation RPC 8.4(b)[.]

              Remind him of this statute in open court on Thursday!!!

The sender’s insistence that this information be conveyed in “open court” is

deliberate. “Open court” implies both the creation of a public record and that

the recipient cannot claim ignorance of the information being relayed. At

minimum, the sender’s direction that the advice be raised “in open court”

                                         8
undermines the claim that the communication was understood to remain

wholly private in all respects. Indeed, Leahey chose to use the document

itself, not just its substance. She did so in a public hearing. Once the

government voluntarily relies on and discloses a government record in that

manner, it cannot continue to maintain that the record’s source-identifying

information remains protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy absent

some separate, concrete basis for confidentiality. No such separate basis

appears on this record.

      It is clear from Leahey’s conduct in handling the email and its disclosure

that she did not believe or expect it to remain confidential. Moreover, I

disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the sender necessarily expected

the advice to remain confidential. The majority bases that conclusion on the

sender’s offer to maintain confidentiality as to Leahey’s request for advice --

not upon any request that Leahey treat the sender’s identity as confidential.

See ante at ___ (slip op. at 27). And the remand proceeding did not establish

that Leahey independently promised the sender confidentiality as to the

sender’s identity, nor did it overcome Leahey’s later decision to reveal the

email in open court. Whatever expectation of privacy may have once existed,

Leahey’s voluntary use of the email in open court defeats respondents’ claim




                                        9
that the sender’s identity and email address remained subject to a reasonable

expectation of privacy under OPRA.

      In any event, following the requirements of OPRA, which favors

transparency and disclosure of government records, would not chill collegial

relationships among attorneys. As a general rule, their private

communications and advice to one another would still be protected -- unless

one of the attorneys chose to publicly disclose the advice given and conceal

only the source. That is rare and unlikely. Indeed, the parties cite no other

cases in which that has happened.

      Nor does the majority’s observation that the municipal proceeding has

long since ended alter the OPRA analysis. A requestor’s purpose, private

interest, or present litigation need does not ordinarily govern the right to

access under OPRA. See Burnett, 

198 N.J. at 435

 (“As a general rule, we do

not consider the purpose behind OPRA requests.”); K.L. v. Evesham Twp. Bd.

of Educ., 

423 N.J. Super. 337, 359-60

 (App. Div. 2011) (noting that, in

contrast to the common law, OPRA’s disclosure requirements do not depend

on the reason for the request). The question is whether the record is

disclosable, not whether the requestor can show a continuing tactical use for

requesting it. See MAG Ent., LLC v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 

375

N.J. Super. 534, 545

 (App. Div. 2005) (“A party’s right to access public

                                        10
records is not abridged because it may be involved in other litigation with the

governmental agency required to respond to the OPRA request.”); see, e.g.,

Bozzi, 248 N.J. at 286 (“[T]he commercial nature of plaintiff’s request is

immaterial to our analysis; he ‘has the same right to [the records] as anyone

else.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Burnett, 

198 N.J. at 435

)).

      Because OPRA itself requires disclosure, I would not separately analyze

the common law. To the extent that the majority does so, I disagree for the

same reason: due to Leahey’s voluntary public use of the email, respondents

cannot establish a cognizable confidentiality interest in the sender’s name and

email address. And the results of the remand -- the discovery that the sender

of the email is a benevolent colleague completely removed from the case as

opposed to the “prosecutor who was conflicted out of the municipal court

proceedings,” see ante at ___ (slip op. at 26) -- should not be used to

retroactively tilt the public interest - privacy balance.

                                        III.

      In sum, the majority’s approach fails to advance the transparency

required by OPRA. For that reason, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of

the majority. I would reverse and remand the matter to the trial court and

order that the email sender’s name and email address be disclosed to the

petitioner.

                                         11

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our administrative lawyer.


Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.