Administrative United Kingdom

Basanta Gurung v The Entry Clearance Officer

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: HU/52427/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Newport
On 20 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L Salkeld

Between

BASANTA GURUNG

Appellant

and

THE ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER

Respondent

The Tribunal may publish the final decision. Any anonymity order or other restricting disclosure or publication of information made in these proceedings will continue to apply.

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Mughal, Counsel

For the Respondent: Mr Jenkins, Counsel

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 28 December 2025.

Background

2. The background to the appeal is contained in the documentation in MyHMCTS.

3. The Appellant is a national of Nepal, born on 26 January 1985. He appeals against the Respondent’s decision refusing his application for entry clearance as the adult child of a former member of the Brigade of Gurkhas.

4. The Appellant’s father, whom I refer to as the sponsor, served in the Brigade of Gurkhas. He was discharged on 18 July 1988 after more than ten years’ service.

5. The sponsor and his wife were granted settlement in the United Kingdom under the arrangements for former Gurkhas. Although entitled to reside in the United Kingdom, they have continued to live principally in Nepal with the Appellant, making periodic visits to the United Kingdom.

6. The Appellant applied for entry clearance on 12 December 2024. The Respondent refused the application on the basis that he did not meet the requirements of Appendix AF (GHK) of the Immigration Rules. The Respondent was also not satisfied that refusal amounted to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

7. The Appellant appeals on human rights grounds.

The Hearing

8. The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Issues

9. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) whether the Appellant satisfies the requirements of Appendix AF (GHK) of the Immigration Rules; and

(b) whether the Respondent’s decision amounts to a disproportionate interference with the Appellant’s right to respect for family life under Article 8 of the ECHR.

Evidence

10. Mr Mughal applied to rely upon a supplementary bundle which had been served late. Mr Jenkins did not object to its admission. I was satisfied that the evidence was relevant to the issues in the appeal and that it was in the interests of justice to admit it.

11. The Appellant’s sister gave oral evidence. She adopted her witness statement and was cross-examined by Mr Jenkins. Although she was able to speak English, she gave her evidence through a Nepali interpreter, which enabled her to explain some words and expressions more clearly.

12. Whilst MyHMCTS indicated that the sponsor might be in attendance, the Appellant’s sister confirmed that both of her parents remained in Nepal. The Appellant did not attend.

13. I heard submissions from the representatives and reserved my decision.

Legal Framework

14. The relevant Immigration Rules are contained in Appendix AF(GHK), which applies to eligible former members of the Brigade of Gurkhas discharged before 1 July 1997 and their eligible family members.

15. In so far as they rely on Article 8 outside the Rules it is for the Appellant to show that Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the Respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under Article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

Findings and Reasons

16. I have considered all the evidence in the round. I refer to that evidence so far as is necessary to explain my findings and reasons.

The Immigration Rules

17. The Respondent refused the application under AF (GHK) 13.2(b), (c), (d) and (e). The Respondent proceeded on the basis that, after being granted settlement in 2011, the Appellant’s parents settled in the United Kingdom and thereafter lived in a household separate from the Appellant for more than two years. I do not accept that this reflects the evidence.

18. At paragraph 28 of his witness statement, the Appellant sets out the dates upon which his parents visited the United Kingdom. Those visits were generally of limited duration, after which they returned to the family home in Nepal. The sponsor’s evidence is consistent with that account. The passport copies contain endorsements which correspond with a number of the dates identified by the Appellant, including visits in 2011, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2021 and 2023. However, some of the stamps are faint, overlapping or otherwise unclear and do not independently verify every date in the schedule. I am nevertheless satisfied that the passport evidence is broadly consistent with the parents making periodic visits to the United Kingdom rather than establishing their principal home here.

19. The Appellant’s sister confirmed in her written and oral evidence that her parents stayed with her when visiting the United Kingdom but returned to Nepal because they did not wish to leave the Appellant. Her last visit to Nepal was in April 2025, when she stayed partly with her parents and the Appellant. She was therefore able to give some direct evidence of the household arrangements.

20. I accept that the parents’ principal home remained in Nepal and that, apart from their visits to the United Kingdom, they continued to live in the same household as the Appellant.

21. The Appellant had previously lived in a different household when he joined his wife in the United Kingdom as her dependant. They lived together in rented accommodation, while his parents stayed with his sister during their visits to the United Kingdom. The evidence is not sufficiently clear as to the precise dates or duration of that arrangement to enable me to reach a reliable conclusion on whether the Appellant had lived in a different household for more than two years continuously.

22. It is unnecessary for me to resolve whether the Appellant satisfies each of the requirements in AF (GHK) 13.2(b), (c) and (d). The requirements in AF (GHK) 13.2 are cumulative. For the reasons set out below, I am satisfied that the Appellant cannot meet AF (GHK) 13.2(e) and therefore cannot meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.

23. In his skeleton argument, Mr Mughal accepted that the Appellant did not meet the Immigration Rules because he had formed an independent family unit. At the hearing, Mr Mughal sought to withdraw that concession. Mr Jenkins did not object. I therefore considered the issue on its merits rather than treating the earlier concession as determinative.

24. Mr Mughal submitted that the requirement should not be interpreted as excluding an applicant merely because he had formed an independent family unit at some point in the past. He relied upon the fact that the Appellant’s marriage had ended and that, by the date of the application, he was again living in the same household as his parents and receiving their support. He submitted that, had the Secretary of State intended the requirement to mean that an applicant must never have formed an independent family unit, the Rule could have said so expressly.

25. I do not accept that submission. AF (GHK) 13.2(e) requires that the applicant “has not formed an independent family unit”. The natural meaning of that wording requires consideration of whether such a family unit has been formed, rather than merely whether it continues to exist at the date of the application. The fact that a marriage or other family unit subsequently comes to an end does not mean that it was never formed.

26. The Appellant married in December 2007 and became a father. His wife travelled to the United Kingdom as a student and the Appellant subsequently joined her as her dependant. While in the United Kingdom, they lived together in rented accommodation separate from his parents. The Appellant also obtained employment. Those circumstances provide clear evidence that he formed a family unit comprising himself, his wife and their daughter.

27. I have taken into account that, while living in Nepal, the Appellant and his wife lived in the parental home and continued to receive assistance from his parents. Membership of a shared household and the receipt of parental assistance did not prevent the Appellant, as a married adult with a child, from forming a family unit of his own. Nor does the fact that the marriage was arranged by his parents alter that conclusion.

28. The marriage subsequently broke down and was dissolved in 2022. The ending of that relationship is relevant to the nature of the relationship between the Appellant and his parents at the date of the hearing. It does not alter the historical fact that the Appellant had formed an independent family unit.

29. I therefore reject Mr Mughal’s submission and find that the Appellant cannot satisfy AF (GHK) 13.2(e). He does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.

Article 8 Family Life

30. The Appellant’s failure to meet the Immigration Rules does not determine whether family life exists between him and his parents for the purposes of Article 8. The requirements of AF (GHK) 13.2(e) and the existence of family life at the date of the hearing are distinct questions.

31. I have approached the Appellant’s claim under Article 8 by applying the structured approach set out in R (Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27. The relevant questions are whether the Appellant enjoys family life within the meaning of Article 8(1); whether the refusal of entry clearance constitutes an interference with that family life of sufficient gravity to engage Article 8; whether the interference is in accordance with the law and in pursuit of a legitimate aim; and whether it is proportionate.

32. The test for engagement of Article 8(1) is fact-sensitive. In IA & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 1516, the Court of Appeal confirmed that parents and adult children must demonstrate “additional elements of dependence involving more than normal emotional ties”. The court confirmed that complete, total or exclusive dependence is not required, however, the word “dependency” denotes a significant relationship.

33. The Appellant married in December 2007 and became a father. His wife travelled to the United Kingdom as a student and the Appellant subsequently joined her as her dependant. While in the United Kingdom, they lived in rented accommodation separate from his parents. Those matters form part of the relevant history but are not determinative of whether family life existed between the Appellant and his parents at the date of the hearing.

34. There is some uncertainty as to when the marital relationship ended. The Appellant states that his wife left the family home in about 2012. The divorce documentation records her account that she had lived at her parental home for the two years before the divorce proceedings in 2022. It is unnecessary for me to determine the precise date of separation. It is not disputed that the marriage ended and that the divorce was finalised in June 2022.The Appellant thereafter continued or resumed living with his parents in the family home.

35. I have reservations about the explanation for the Appellant’s prolonged unemployment. He is now an adult aged 41. He has married, become a father, lived separately from his parents in the United Kingdom and obtained employment while here. He has also assumed legal responsibility for his daughter. There is no evidence that he has any physical or mental health condition which prevents him from working. His sister said that he had tried to find work but that employment opportunities in Nepal were limited and wages were low. That may explain some of the difficulty he has experienced, but it does not fully explain why he has remained unemployed for such a substantial period.

36. The ward office certificate states that the Appellant was unemployed and dependent upon his parents. I have considered that document in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] UKIAT 00439. The certificate is written in English. No explanation was provided as to whether English is ordinarily used by the issuing authority or whether the certificate was prepared in that language specifically for use in the application. That does not, without more, establish that the document is unreliable. More significantly, the certificate does not explain how the issuing authority verified either the Appellant’s unemployment or his dependency upon his parents. I therefore attach limited weight to it as independent evidence of dependency.

37. The sponsor’s bank statements show credits to his account and frequent cash withdrawals. They are consistent with his account being used to meet the expenses of the shared household. However, they do not identify payments made to the Appellant, expenditure incurred specifically on his behalf, or the proportion of the household expenses attributable to him or his daughter. I therefore attach limited weight to them as independent evidence of the extent of the Appellant’s personal financial dependency.

38. Nevertheless, the Appellant’s sister has maintained regular contact with the family and has some direct knowledge of their circumstances. She last visited Nepal in April 2025 and stayed partly with her parents and the Appellant. I accept her written and oral evidence that the Appellant continues to live in the family home and that his parents provide his accommodation and meet the household expenses.

39. I also accept that there is emotional and practical support between the Appellant and his parents. I do not accept that the parents are wholly dependent upon him. They have travelled to and remained in the United Kingdom for periods without him. Nor am I satisfied that the Appellant is incapable of managing the household or supporting his daughter during their absence. Complete, total or exclusive dependence is not, however, required.

40. I attach weight to the parents’ pattern of residence since they obtained settlement. Their daughter is established in the United Kingdom and accommodates them when they visit. Nevertheless, their visits have been temporary, and they have repeatedly returned to Nepal, where they resume living with the Appellant.

41. I accept the sister’s evidence that her parents wish to live in the United Kingdom but do not wish to do so at the cost of leaving the Appellant behind. That evidence is consistent with the parents’ written evidence and their conduct over a substantial period. Their continued residence in Nepal is therefore part of the evidence that the family relationship and support have endured.

42. I have taken into account the inadequate explanation for the Appellant’s continuing unemployment, the limited objective evidence of financial dependency and the absence of oral evidence from the Appellant and his parents. Against those matters, the Appellant has no demonstrated independent income, continues to live in the family home and receives accommodation, financial and emotional support from his parents. There is also mutual emotional and practical support.

43. I have taken into account the Appellant’s marriage, parenthood and period living separately from his parents. I do not consider it necessary to determine whether family life with his parents ceased during that period. The relevant question is whether family life existed as a matter of fact at the date of the hearing.

44. Considering the evidence as a whole and applying the approach in IA & Ors, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the relationship between the Appellant and his parents involved additional elements of dependence going beyond normal emotional ties. To the extent that family life may have been interrupted or weakened during the Appellant’s marriage, I am satisfied that it had been re-established and subsisted at the date of the hearing. Article 8(1) is therefore engaged.I have also taken into account the Respondent’s reliance upon Rai v Entry Clearance Officer, New Delhi [2017] EWCA Civ 320. I do not consider it necessary to determine whether family life with the Appellant’s parents continued uninterrupted throughout his marriage; the relevant question is whether family life existed as a matter of fact at the date of the hearing.

45. I am also satisfied that the Respondent’s decision interferes with that family life to a degree sufficient to engage Article 8. I accept that the Appellant’s parents would live in the United Kingdom, where their daughter is established, if they could do so without leaving the Appellant behind. The effect of the refusal is that they must either continue to live principally in Nepal with him or exercise their entitlement to reside in the United Kingdom without him.

Historic injustice and proportionality

46. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest pursuant to section 117B(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. I attach significant weight to that consideration and to the fact that the Appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules.

47. The sponsor was discharged from the Brigade of Gurkhas in July 1988. At that time, the Appellant was approximately three years old and his sister was approximately two years old. They were dependent children forming part of their parents’ family unit.

48. The sponsor’s written evidence is that, had he been permitted to settle in the United Kingdom following his discharge, he would have done so. I accept that evidence. There is nothing in the family’s circumstances at that time to suggest that he would have left his wife and young children behind. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would have accompanied his parents as their dependent child.

49. The Appellant’s subsequent marriage and formation of an independent family unit do not alter that. His marriage took place many years after the date upon which he would otherwise have entered and settled in the United Kingdom with his parents.

50. The Appellant and the sponsor have therefore been adversely affected by the historic injustice suffered by former Gurkhas who were previously unable to settle in the United Kingdom. I have also found that family life between the Appellant and his parents was re-established and subsisted at the date of the hearing.

51. Applying R (Gurung) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 8 andGhising and others (Gurkhas/BOCs: historic wrong; weight) [2013] UKUT 567 (IAC), I attach very substantial weight to the historic injustice. The Respondent has not identified any consideration beyond the ordinary public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. There is no evidence of criminality, deception, adverse immigration conduct or any other substantial countervailing consideration.

52. The Appellant’s failure to meet the Immigration Rules is relevant to the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. It does not, however, constitute an additional countervailing consideration sufficient to outweigh the very substantial weight attributable to the historic injustice.

53. I therefore find that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control does not outweigh the interference with the family life which presently exists. The refusal of entry clearance is disproportionate.

Notice of Decision

54. The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

55. As I have allowed the appeal I have considered whether or not to make a fee award. I have decided to make a fee award for any fee which has been paid or is payable because there is no reason for the fee award not to follow the outcome of the appeal.

Signature

Signed Date 26 October 2026

L Salkeld

First-tier Tribunal Judge L Salkeld

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