Administrative United Kingdom
BB v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/76818/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 23 October 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE zindi
Between
BB
(anonymity direction Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Waterson (Counsel for the Appellant)
For the Respondent: Mr Ogbewe, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant is a citizen of Nigeria born on 11 November 1996. He appeals against the Respondent's decision dated 24 June 2025 refusing his protection and human rights claim. The Appellant claims to be a bisexual man who fears persecution in Nigeria due to his sexual orientation. The Respondent accepts that openly gay and bisexual individuals in Nigeria may face persecution and further accepts that, were the Appellant's sexuality established, neither sufficiency of protection nor internal relocation would be available. The principal issue in dispute is therefore whether the Appellant is bisexual and whether his account is credible.
2. The Appellant appeals under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 on the basis that his removal would breach the United Kingdom's obligations under the Refugee Convention and that he is entitled to humanitarian protection.
ANONYMITY DIRECTION
3. I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
BACKGROUND
4. The Appellant was raised in Nigeria within a conservative and religious family. He states that he first became aware of same-sex attraction during adolescence and later came to understand his sexuality whilst studying at university. He maintained relationships with women but states that he experienced stronger emotional attraction towards men. He claims that social attitudes and the criminalisation of homosexuality in Nigeria caused him to conceal his sexuality.
5. The Appellant travelled to the United Kingdom in December 2023 as a visitor. Whilst here, he entered into his first openly same-sex relationship with MS. Following a brief return to Nigeria in January 2024, he disclosed his sexuality to his brother. According to the Appellant, this resulted in hostility from family members, a physical assault by his father, wider disclosure within the community, and threats to involve the police. The Appellant returned to the United Kingdom shortly thereafter and has remained here since.
6. Since his return, the Appellant states that he has lived openly as a bisexual man, entered into a further relationship with ES, engaged with the LGBTQ+ community and become involved with African Rainbow Family. He has also featured publicly in LGBTQ+ social media activity as a bisexual Nigerian man.
7. The Appellant further relies upon a psychological report diagnosing PTSD, anxiety and depressive symptoms. Subsequent to the refusal decision, a child, MB, was born to the Appellant and AS, a Ukrainian national here in the UK, with limited leave. The Respondent consented to the Tribunal considering that matter as a new matter.
HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE
8. The hearing took place by way of a face to face hearing. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.
9. I confirmed with the parties that all necessary documentary evidence was included in the bundle uploaded.
10. At the commencement of the hearing, I dealt with an application to admit late evidence. Mr Ogbewe for the Respondent raised objection to the admission of the evidence, on the grounds that failures to comply with procedural directions created unfairness.
11. Applying the principles identified in Dawrani (judicial discretion; late evidence) and having regard to the overriding objective, I was satisfied admission of the additional material was fair. A significant proportion of the material had been served on the Respondent on 7 October, and thus the Respondent had been aware of it for 2 weeks before the hearing and had given consent to the new article 8 matter being raised after having reviewed the same.
12. The medical report had been filed late, however its significance primarily related to the assessment of the Appellant’s evidence and the measures necessary for the hearing.
13. I treated the Appellant as a vulnerable witness, with the offer of breaks during the course of the proceedings.
14. I agreed the issues to be determined with the parties.
Issues
Disputed Issues
15. The representatives agreed that the principal issues in dispute were as follows:
(i) whether the Appellant is bisexual;
(ii) whether his account concerning disclosure to family members is credible;
(iii) whether he would face persecution upon return applying HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31;
(iv) whether Article 8 ECHR is engaged through his relationship with his son and co-parenting arrangements.
Agreed Issues
16. The Respondent accepted that, if the factual basis of the claim was established, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation would not provide viable alternatives.
Evidence and Submissions
17. I heard oral evidence from the Appellant. He adopted his witness statement as his evidence-in-chief. He was cross-examined and thereafter re-examined.
18. I further heard evidence from two supporting witnesses, AS and EB. They remained outside of the court room until they gave their evidence, to preserve the integrity of the evidence.
19. The parties each made oral submissions. Whilst I have addressed the key or determinative points of evidence made on each party’s behalf; I have taken the parties’ submissions into account in their entirety, alongside all relevant documentary evidence adduced and the Appellant’s oral evidence
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
20. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must establish he is a refugee as defined in Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. Given his asylum claim was lodged after 28th June 2022, I must apply a two-stage test pursuant to section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘the 2022 Act’). I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to him by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether he does in fact fear persecution on return to Nigeria as a result of that characteristic.
21. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic and fears persecution as a result, I must determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that he would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, there would not be effective state protection available to him and he could not safely relocate to another part of Nigeria.
22. If I am not satisfied the Appellant is a refugee, I must consider whether he meets the requirements for humanitarian protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. To qualify, he must show there are substantial grounds for believing he faces a real risk of suffering serious harm in Nigeria and is unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself of state protection there. I must consider whether the decision to refuse, and as a consequence of that decision his removal to Nigeria, breaches his human rights on grounds that he faces a real risk of inhumane or degrading treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR.
Country Evidence
23. The objective country evidence demonstrates that sexual minorities in Nigeria continue to face profound societal hostility and legal discrimination. Same-sex sexual activity between men remains criminalised under federal law and is punishable by up to fourteen years' imprisonment, whilst the Same-Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act prohibits same-sex unions, the operation of gay organisations and the public expression of same-sex relationships.
24. In the twelve northern states where Sharia law applies, consensual same-sex conduct may attract significantly harsher penalties, including the death penalty in certain circumstances. More broadly, the country evidence records widespread hostility from both state and non-state actors. The June 2025 Home Office CPIN concludes that actual or perceived LGBT+ persons are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm and that effective state protection is not generally available. The evidence further demonstrates that arrests, harassment, extortion, violence, blackmail and intimidation of LGBT+ persons continue to occur, fuelled by the criminalisation of same-sex relationships and entrenched societal prejudice.
25. The evidence also establishes that negative social attitudes towards sexual minorities are deeply embedded within Nigerian society and are reinforced by cultural, religious and political discourse. Public opinion surveys consistently reveal overwhelming opposition to homosexuality and same-sex relationships. Afrobarometer research found that approximately 85% of respondents would dislike having homosexual neighbours, whilst a 2024 social perception survey reported that 90% of respondents did not regard homosexuality as natural and that a substantial majority supported its criminalisation.
26. The country evidence records that LGBT+ persons are frequently subjected to discrimination, family rejection, eviction, violence, extortion and social exclusion. Whilst conditions may be somewhat less severe in major urban centres such as Lagos, the evidence indicates that acceptance remains limited even there. Significantly for the present appeal, the CPIN notes that bisexual men are among the groups affected by these attitudes and that many individuals conceal their sexual orientation because of a well-founded fear of persecution, a factor which the guidance expressly identifies as supporting an entitlement to international protection.
FINDINGS
27. In ascertaining the credibility of the Appellant’s historical account, I have applied the principles established in AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123. I accept that factors such as the passage of time, are factors that will have impacted upon his recollection of events.
28. I have further given full consideration to the guidance provided in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491, in which it was made clear that indicators such as sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility provide a helpful framework within which to conduct a credibility assessment.
29. I remind myself that credibility findings must be reached holistically and that the rejection of one aspect of a claim does not require rejection of the entirety of the evidence.
Alleged Homophobic Attack
30. It is the Appellant’s evidence that he was the victim of a homophobic attack in 2019.
31. I place little weight upon the hospital letter relied upon by the Appellant to support this attack. The letter is not a hospital record. It bears a date inconsistent with the Appellant's explanation that it was obtained in 2025 and there is no satisfactory evidence establishing its provenance. Whilst I accept the Appellant bears scarring, I am not satisfied that the documentary evidence demonstrates that those injuries arose in the manner claimed. I therefore do not find established, even to the lower standard, that the stabbing attack occurred because the Appellant was perceived to be gay.
32. That finding does not, however, determine the remainder of the appeal.
Sexual Orientation
33. I find the Appellant's evidence concerning his sexuality to have been consistent throughout the asylum process, his witness statements and oral evidence.
34. I reject the Respondent's criticism that the Appellant demonstrated insufficient emotion when describing his sexuality. The criticism adopts too narrow an understanding of how sexual identity may be expressed. The Appellant's account of developing feelings towards another male in Nigeria, his internal conflict within a conservative society and the manner in which he described those experiences, were coherent and plausible.
35. I attach weight to the photographic evidence concerning MS because that material pre-dates the asylum claim and was not created for litigation purposes.
36. I place limited weight upon the letter from ES in isolation because it is not a witness statement and he did not attend for cross-examination. Nevertheless, considered cumulatively alongside the photographs, booking confirmations, travel records, social media messages and call logs, the evidence supports the existence of a genuine romantic relationship.
37. In particular, the communications between the Appellant and ES have the hallmarks of genuine interpersonal communication rather than material manufactured for an asylum claim. The messages contain ordinary conversational exchanges over a sustained period. They lack the artificial quality frequently associated with fabricated evidence.
38. Most significant, however, was the oral evidence.
39. I found AS to be a credible and straightforward witness. She confirmed that the Appellant disclosed his bisexuality from the outset, long before the birth of their child. Her evidence was candid. She made clear that the relationship was not romantic and that they were instead co-parenting. That evidence enhanced rather than diminished her credibility.
40. I similarly accepted the evidence of EB. Whilst she was mistaken about one aspect concerning MS and later accepted some confusion between MS and another individual named Moses, I found her overall evidence reliable and honestly given. She has observed the Appellant over a substantial period within LGBTQ+ spaces and personally witnessed aspects of his relationship with ES.
41. I have also attached weight to the Appellant's involvement with African Rainbow Family and his public participation within that organisation. Whilst membership alone cannot establish sexuality, it forms part of the broader evidential picture.
42. Drawing all matters together, I find that the Appellant has established on the balance of probabilities that he is bisexual.
Family Disclosure
43. I further accept the Appellant's account concerning disclosure of his sexuality to his brother and the subsequent reaction of his family. I have considered this aspect of the claim with particular care because it forms the foundation of the events said to have followed in early 2024.
44. Whilst there is limited independent documentary evidence of those events, I am satisfied that the Appellant's account has remained materially consistent across his screening interview, substantive asylum interview, witness statements and oral evidence. He has provided a coherent chronology explaining how he disclosed his sexuality to his brother during his visit to Nigeria, how that information subsequently came to the attention of other family members, and how the resulting hostility caused him to leave the country and return to the United Kingdom. I did not identify any material inconsistency in his evidence relating to this aspect of the claim.
45. The account is also consistent with the objective evidence concerning attitudes towards sexual minorities in Nigeria. The country evidence demonstrates that disclosure of an individual's sexual orientation frequently results in rejection by family members, community ostracisation and exposure to wider risks from non-state actors. Against that background, I find it entirely plausible that disclosure to a close family member could rapidly become known within the wider family and community and provoke a hostile reaction. Whilst plausibility alone cannot establish credibility, the objective evidence provides a context within which the Appellant's account sits comfortably.
46. I have also considered the Appellant's conduct following these events. In my judgment, his actions are broadly consistent with the account he advances. Following his return to the United Kingdom, he became increasingly involved with LGBTQ+ organisations, developed same-sex relationships openly and ultimately sought international protection. Whilst the delay in claiming asylum engages section 8 considerations, which I address below, I find that the chronology of events supports rather than undermines the credibility of his account.
47. I accept that certain aspects of the Appellant's evidence concerning the aftermath of disclosure, including assertions regarding police involvement and warrants, are not supported by reliable documentary evidence and I do not make positive findings in those respects. However, applying the guidance in Lucas, the rejection of one aspect of an account does not require rejection of the whole. The core account, namely that the Appellant's sexuality became known to his family and was met with a strongly hostile response, was given in a straightforward manner and was entirely consistent with my findings regarding his sexual orientation and the wider country evidence. Taking all matters together, and applying the lower standard of proof where appropriate, I accept that the Appellant's family became aware of his sexuality and reacted adversely to that disclosure, resulting in a genuine and well-founded fear of further hostility should he return to Nigeria.
Psychological Evidence
48. The report of Ms Lindsay Kirkwood is detailed and professionally prepared. The diagnosis of PTSD, anxiety and depressive symptoms does not prove the core claim. I am mindful that it is a report based entirely on the Appellant’s subjective account.
49. I do accept that it is supportive of a person who has experienced significant stress, rejection and fear and moderate weight is given to the report in this respect.
50. I attach moderate weight to the report insofar as it supports the Appellant's presentation and subjective fear, whilst recognising it cannot independently establish the truth of the core account.
Section 8
51. I am required to consider section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The Appellant did not claim asylum immediately upon his return to the United Kingdom in January 2024 and only made his protection claim on 27 January 2025. That delay constitutes conduct capable of damaging credibility and I have taken it into account.
52. However, section 8 does not dictate the weight to be attached to such conduct and credibility must still be assessed in the round. I accept the Appellant's explanation that, until discussions with members of the LGBTQ+ community and African Rainbow Family, he did not appreciate that asylum protection could be available on the basis of sexual orientation and believed asylum was principally associated with individuals fleeing war and armed conflict.
53. That explanation was consistently maintained in his oral evidence and is supported by the evidence of EB, who described advising him of the possibility of claiming asylum. Even if the delay causes me to exercise a degree of caution when assessing the evidence, it does not materially undermine the substantial body of evidence regarding the Appellant's sexuality, his relationships, his engagement with LGBTQ+ organisations, or the credible oral testimony I have accepted.
54. Having considered the appeal holistically, I find that the section 8 conduct carries only limited weight and does not displace my finding that the Appellant is a bisexual man who faces a real risk of persecution on return to Nigeria.
Internal Relocation and Sufficiency of Protection
55. Although Nigeria is a large and diverse country, the evidence demonstrates that hostility towards LGBT persons is widespread, arising both from state actors and wider society. The objective evidence records criminalisation, police harassment, extortion, family rejection and societal discrimination across the country.
56. I therefore accept the Respondent's concession that neither sufficiency of protection nor internal relocation would provide a reasonable or durable means of avoiding the risk faced by this Appellant.
Risk on Return
57. Applying HJ (Iran):
58. First, I have found that the Appellant is bisexual.
59. Second, I am satisfied from both country evidence and the Respondent's own position that openly bisexual men in Nigeria face a real risk of persecution.
60. Third, I am satisfied that the Appellant would not choose to conceal his sexuality voluntarily. His evidence demonstrates that he has increasingly lived openly in the United Kingdom, participated in LGBTQ organisations and pursued same-sex relationships.
61. Fourth, any future concealment in Nigeria would arise solely because of fear of adverse societal reaction, violence and state intervention. Applying HJ (Iran), an individual cannot be expected to modify or suppress a fundamental aspect of his identity in order to avoid persecution.
62. The HJ (Iran) test is therefore satisfied.
63. Given the Respondent's concession, I find there is neither sufficient protection nor a viable internal relocation option available.
64. I am satisfied that bisexual men in Nigeria constitute a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. Sexual orientation is an innate and immutable characteristic fundamental to identity. The objective evidence further demonstrates that bisexual men are perceived by wider Nigerian society as a distinct group and are subject to criminalisation, discrimination and societal hostility on that basis.
65. The Appellant has thus established a well-founded fear of persecution for reason of membership of a particular social group, namely bisexual men.
Sur Place Activity
66. I accept that the Appellant has engaged publicly with LGBTQ organisations in the United Kingdom and that aspects of that activity have appeared on social media. Whilst the appeal does not depend exclusively upon sur place activity, I find that this conduct is genuine and reflects the Appellant's lived sexuality rather than activity undertaken to create an asylum claim.
67. Such visibility would be capable of increasing his risk profile on return.
Article 8 ECHR
68. Although I have allowed the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds, I address Article 8 ECHR in the alternative.
69. I am satisfied that the Appellant enjoys family life within the meaning of Article 8(1) with his son, and with AS, the child's mother. The evidence before me demonstrates a genuine and subsisting parental relationship. I accept the oral evidence of AS, which I found to be credible and balanced, that the Appellant was present throughout the pregnancy, attended the birth, plays an active role in caring for the child and remains significantly involved in the child's daily life. I am satisfied that theirs is a genuine co-parenting arrangement and not one established for immigration purposes. The evidence was notable for its candour. AS readily accepted that there is no romantic relationship between herself and the Appellant and that the Appellant is bisexual. That evidence enhances rather than diminishes its reliability.
70. Although section 117B(6) is not directly engaged because the child is not a qualifying child, the provision reflects Parliament's recognition of the significance of genuine parental relationships. That is a relevant consideration when assessing proportionality. As emphasised by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4, the best interests of a child are a primary consideration, although not the sole consideration. I therefore begin my assessment by identifying the child's best interests before undertaking the wider proportionality exercise.
71. I find that the best interests of the child lie overwhelmingly in maintaining a close and continuing relationship with both parents. The child is of a very young age and consequently requires stability, continuity of care and the benefit of regular contact with both parents. There is no evidence that either parent presents any safeguarding concern. On the contrary, the evidence establishes that both are actively involved in the child's upbringing. Separation from the Appellant through his removal from the United Kingdom would significantly interfere with the development and maintenance of that parental relationship. Consistent with ZH (Tanzania), I attach substantial weight to those considerations.
72. I am also required to consider the practical reality of family life rather than merely its legal form. The Appellant cannot reasonably be expected to enjoy his family life through modern means of communication alone. In GM (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 1630, the Court of Appeal reiterated that family life requires a fact-sensitive assessment directed to the realities of the relationships concerned. Here, the evidence demonstrates ongoing physical involvement in the child's upbringing. Remote contact could not replicate the day-to-day parenting presently undertaken by the Appellant. Removal would therefore have consequences extending well beyond ordinary emotional hardship. It would substantially diminish the meaningful exercise of parental responsibilities.
73. I further find that there are significant obstacles to the continuation of family life outside the United Kingdom. AS is a Ukrainian national, settled here on temporary leave. There is no realistic prospect that she would relocate to Nigeria. Equally, I accept that relocation to Nigeria would not be reasonable when viewed through the lens of the child's welfare. The evidence indicates that the existing family unit is established in the United Kingdom and centred upon the child's care. The practical consequence of removal would therefore be long-term separation between father and child.
74. In conducting the proportionality assessment, I have regard to Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, including section 117B. I recognise the public interest in maintaining effective immigration control. I further recognise that much of the Appellant's private and family life was established whilst his immigration status was precarious. Pursuant to section 117B(4) and (5), I attach limited weight to those aspects of private life. However, the relationship with his child is of a different character. The ultimate question remains whether removal would constitute a disproportionate interference with protected family life.
75. Standing back and considering all of the evidence in the round, I conclude that removal would have consequences of such gravity as to engage Article 8. Applying the structured approach identified in Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27, I find that any interference would be in accordance with the law and in pursuit of the legitimate aim of immigration control. The critical issue is proportionality. In light of the genuine and subsisting parental relationship, the best interests of the child, the absence of any realistic means by which family life could continue abroad, and the significant detriment that would arise from separating father and child, I am satisfied that the public interest is outweighed by the compelling circumstances of this case. Removal would therefore constitute a disproportionate interference with the Appellant's right to respect for family life under Article 8 ECHR.
76. Accordingly, had I not allowed the appeal on asylum grounds, I would in any event have allowed the appeal on human rights grounds pursuant to Article 8 ECHR.
Conclusion
77. The Appellant has established that he is a bisexual man. I accept that he now lives openly as such in the United Kingdom. Applying HJ (Iran), I find that he would face a real risk of persecution in Nigeria for a Refugee Convention reason. The Respondent accepts that sufficient protection and internal relocation are unavailable. Accordingly, the Appellant is entitled to refugee protection.
78. In the alternative, I would have allowed the appeal under Article 8 ECHR because of the Appellant's established family life with his son and co-parenting relationship with AS.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.
The appeal is allowed on human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly, any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, the Immigration Advice Authority, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
As I have allowed the appeal and because a fee has been paid or is payable, I have considered making a fee award. Costs should ordinarily follow the event. However, it was the evidence at the appeal that was decisive. Thus, an appeal was necessary to resolve the appeal and so I decline to make a fee award.
Signed T. Zindi Date 27 October 2026
Tribunal Judge Zindi
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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