Administrative United Kingdom
CE v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/61398/2023
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
| Heard at Priory Court, Birmingham | Promulgated on |
| On 29 October 2026 | |
| ………………………………… |
Before
Judge Chohan
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
Between
CE
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Appellant
and
The Secretary of State for the home Department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A Islam of Counsel (instructed by Burton & Burton)
For the Respondent: Ms C Newton, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
I make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Case Summary
1. The appellant is a national of Nigeria, born on 30 October 1975. She appeals under section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (“the 2002 Act”) against the respondent’s decision refusing her protection claim.
2. The appellant came to the United Kingdom in May 2021 and subsequently claimed asylum. She has remained in the United Kingdom since that time.
3. The appellant’s case is that she would be at risk of persecution or serious harm on return to Nigeria. She relies upon a history of domestic violence by her former husband, from whom she separated in 2018. The respondent accepts that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence.
4. The appellant also claims to fear Fulani herdsmen. She relies upon an incident in February 2021 when violence broke out near her shop and her son was assaulted by persons whom she identifies as Fulani. She further refers to a fear of Boko Haram and persons from whom money was borrowed to finance her departure from Nigeria.
5. The appellant maintains that the Nigerian authorities would not provide sufficient protection and that internal relocation would not be reasonable, having regard to her personal circumstances, lack of financial resources and support, history of domestic violence, and physical and mental health difficulties. She relies upon medical and country evidence in support of her claim.
6. The respondent accepts the appellant’s identity and nationality and that she was a victim of domestic violence. The respondent does not, however, accept that she would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from her former husband, Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen or creditors on return to Nigeria.
7. The respondent disputes material aspects of the appellant’s account and relies upon the geographical concentration of Boko Haram activity and the country information concerning violence involving Fulani herdsmen. In relation to domestic violence, the respondent relies upon the appellant having separated from her husband in 2018 and having had no subsequent contact with him.
8. The respondent further considers that the appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to establish a real risk from creditors. The respondent’s overall position is that the appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm on return to Nigeria and that the appeal should therefore be dismissed.
The Hearing
9. The matter came before me on 29 July 2026 but was adjourned for lack of court time. I subsequently issued a Case Management Order recording the matters agreed between the parties.
10. Mr Islam confirmed that this was a pre-NABA appeal. He confirmed that the protection claim was advanced on the basis that the appellant feared persecution by Fulani herdsmen because she is a Christian, the Refugee Convention reason relied upon being religion. No reliance was placed upon any fear of Boko Haram or upon domestic violence as a separate basis of the protection claim. The Article 3 and Article 8 claims were said to stand or fall with the protection claim.
11. Ms Newton confirmed that the respondent accepted that the appellant had been a victim of domestic violence but maintained the challenge to the credibility of her protection account. In the alternative, the respondent’s position was that there would be a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant and that internal relocation would be reasonable.
Issues
12. The issues for consideration are:
(i) Whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, namely religion, arising from her claimed fear of Fulani herdsmen targeting Christians.
(ii) Whether there is a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant in Nigeria and/or whether internal relocation would be reasonable.
Legal Framework
13. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, an appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof is on the appellant. This being a pre-NABA case, as per the decision in Karanakaran v SSHD [2000] 3 All ER 449 the single standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood. I must determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(i) Taking the claim at its highest, there is a Convention reason;
(ii) Considering the credibility of the account, the appellant fears persecution for that Convention reason;
(iii) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(iv) There would not be sufficient protection available; and
(v) The appellant could not internally relocate.
Findings
(i) Whether the appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, namely religion, arising from her claimed fear of Fulani herdsmen targeting Christians.
14. I have considered the evidence in the round, including the appellant’s screening interview, asylum interview, witness statement and oral evidence; the witness statement and oral evidence of her son; the medical evidence; the visit visa applications; the objective country material; the remaining documentary evidence; and the submissions of Ms Newton and Mr Islam. I have applied the lower standard of proof applicable to a protection claim. The claim pursued before me is that the appellant and her son were attacked by Fulani herdsmen because they are Christians and would be at risk for that reason on return to Nigeria.
15. I accept that the appellant and her son have physical and mental health difficulties and have taken those matters into account when assessing their evidence. The medical records principally record histories provided for the purposes of treatment. They do not independently establish that the claimed attack occurred in the circumstances alleged, the identity of those responsible or their motivation. There is no medico-legal evidence specifically addressing the extent to which the mental health conditions of either witness affected their ability to recall or recount the incident.
16. I do not find the appellant’s account of the claimed incident credible. At screening, she described a fight between Fulani and Yoruba people during which shops were burned and her son was beaten. At her asylum interview, she said that Fulani herdsmen had attacked people at the market and that Yoruba people were affected, but accepted that she had not herself been targeted. In her later evidence, the incident developed into an account in which her son had been subjected to a serious machete attack and had been targeted because of his Christian faith. The assertion that he was targeted because he was a Christian is central to the protection claim. I find its emergence in the later evidence to be a material development for which there is no satisfactory explanation.
17. I have considered Mr Islam’s submission that the appellant experienced difficulty expressing herself in English during interview. I accept that an ability to communicate in English does not necessarily mean that a person will understand every question or express herself with complete precision. However, the appellant identified English as her preferred language in the visit visa applications, the medical records indicate that she speaks and can read and write English, and she was able to provide substantive answers during interview. I am not satisfied that linguistic difficulty adequately explains the material development in her account concerning the nature and motivation of the alleged attack.
18. There are also significant inconsistencies concerning the nature of her son’s injuries and his treatment. In oral evidence, the appellant described witnessing him being repeatedly struck with machetes, sustaining numerous cuts, extensive bleeding and lasting scars. At her asylum interview, however, she referred to bruising and said that he was taken to a private hospital. In oral evidence, she said that he did not attend hospital but was treated at home with medication obtained from a medicine store or pharmacy, with assistance from a pastor and neighbours. While I accept that the terms medicine store and pharmacy may have been used interchangeably, that does not explain the material difference between attendance at a private hospital and treatment at home, or between bruising and the substantially more serious injuries subsequently described.
19. The appellant’s son supported the later account of an attack involving a machete and said that he was treated at home. I have taken account of his mental health difficulties and his evidence that recalling the incident causes him anxiety. His evidence does not, however, resolve the material inconsistencies in the appellant’s accounts concerning the nature and severity of his injuries, the treatment he received or the motivation for the alleged attack. I am therefore unable to place significant weight upon his evidence insofar as it is relied upon to resolve the material inconsistencies identified above.
20. The medical records contain histories in which the appellant and her son reported that shops had been burned, weapons had been carried and the son had been beaten. I give those records appropriate weight and accept that they are consistent with the appellant and her son having reported a frightening incident. However, they do not independently establish that the son was subjected to the machete attack subsequently described, the identity of those responsible or that he was deliberately targeted because of his Christian faith.
21. I have considered the 2014 and 2021 visit visa applications. As the 2021 application preceded the alleged incident, I do not rely upon it as undermining the appellant’s account of events said to have occurred subsequently. The differences in the evidence concerning her wider family circumstances are peripheral to the protection claim and I place limited weight upon them. I have also considered the interval between the appellant’s arrival in the United Kingdom in May 2021 and her asylum claim in September 2021. Having considered her explanation that she did not initially understand the asylum process and claimed after receiving advice, I place no significant adverse weight upon that delay.
22. I have also considered the church evidence. I accept that the appellant and her son are practising Christians and that they are involved in their church community in the United Kingdom. That evidence does not, however, provide independent support for the claimed events in Nigeria or establish that they would be at risk from Fulani herdsmen because of their faith.
23. Ms Newton submitted that the account contained material inconsistencies concerning the nature of the incident, the son’s injuries and his treatment, and that there was no reliable evidence that the appellant or her son had been subjected to a religiously motivated attack by Fulani herdsmen. Mr Islam relied upon the references to Fulani people from the screening interview onwards, the evidence concerning the burning of shops and the assault upon the son, and the objective evidence concerning violence by Fulani groups against Christian communities. I have considered both submissions.
24. I accept that the objective material demonstrates that serious violence involving armed Fulani groups occurs in Nigeria, including violence affecting Christian communities. It therefore provides general contextual support for the possibility of such violence. It does not, however, overcome the material deficiencies in the evidence concerning this particular claim or establish that the appellant and her son experienced such an attack.
25. Assessing the evidence cumulatively and applying the lower standard of proof, I find that the inconsistencies are material and concern the essential features of the protection claim rather than peripheral matters. They concern the nature and severity of the alleged attack, the injuries sustained by the appellant’s son, whether he received hospital treatment and, importantly, whether he was deliberately targeted because of his Christian faith. I am not satisfied that the explanations advanced adequately account for those matters.
26. I accept that the appellant and her son have consistently reported that there was a disturbance at a market during which shops were burned. I am not, however, satisfied, even to the lower standard, that the appellant’s son was subjected to the machete attack subsequently described, that the appellant has established that those responsible were Fulani herdsmen who targeted him because of his Christian faith, or that either the appellant or her son thereby came to the adverse attention of Fulani herdsmen. The essential factual basis of the claimed protection risk has therefore not been established.
27. Although the objective evidence records serious violence involving Fulani groups, including attacks affecting Christian communities, it does not establish that the appellant or her son would personally face a real risk of persecution on return to Nigeria. In the absence of a credible factual basis establishing past targeting or any continuing adverse interest in them, I am not satisfied that there is a real risk on return.
(ii) Whether there is a sufficiency of protection available to the appellant in Nigeria and/or whether internal relocation would be reasonable.
28. As I have not accepted the factual basis of the protection claim and have found that the appellant has not established a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return, it is unnecessary to consider the issues of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation.
Conclusion
28. I therefore find that the appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Nor has she established substantial grounds for believing that she or her son would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 on return to Nigeria. As acknowledged by Mr Islam, the Article 8 claim stands or falls with the protection claim. It therefore also fails.
Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
I make an anonymity order in the following terms:
Pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, until this appeal is finally determined the appellant (and/or any member of her family, expert, witness or other personthe Tribunal considers should not be identified) is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant (and/or other person). Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Fee Award
The appeal is dismissed and therefore I make no fee award.
Signed S S ChohanDate 9 November 2026
Judge Chohan
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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