Civil United Kingdom

Central Bedfordshire Council v Bernard McDonaugh & Ors

Official source

Approved Judgment Central Bedfordshire Council v. McDonaugh and Ors

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2860 (KB)

Case No: KB-2023-BHM-000225

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KINGS'S BENCH DIVISION

BIRMINGHAM DISTRICT REGISTRY

Date: 5 November 2026

Before :

MR NICHOLAS BACON KC

SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

CENTRAL BEFORDSHIRE COUNCIL
Claimant
– and –
1) MR BERNARD McDONAUGH
(2) MR JOHN SHERIDAN
(3) MS KATY DOHERTY MAUREEN DOHERTY
(4) MR MICHAEL DOHERTY
(5) MS BREDA STOKES
(6) MR SIMON DOHERTY
(7) MR SAM PRICE
(8) PERSONS UNKNOWN BRINGING CARAVANS ON TO THE LAND AT THE REAR OF HOME FARM, DUNSTABLE ROAD, TILSWORTH, LEIGHTON BUZZARD LU7 9PU TO LIVE IN OR UNDERTAKING DEVELOPMENT AS DEFINED BY SECTION 55 OF THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1990
Defendants
(9) MR PADDY MAUGHAN
(10) MS MAUREEN MAUGHAN STOKES
(11) MR DENIS STOKES
(12) MR FONO MAUGHAN
(13) MS BRIDGET MCGINLEY
(14) MS EILEEN DOYLE
(15) MR DENIS DOYLE
(16) MR MICHAEL STOKES
(17) MS MARTINA STOKES
(18) MS “MARY” STOKES
(19) MS LUCY STOKES
(20) MR CONOOR DOYLE
Defendants to the Contempt
and/or Variation Application only

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Mr Jack Smyth for the claimant

Mr Peter Ricketts for the 1st, 3rd, 4th,10th, 13th, 18th and 19th defendants

Hearing date: 4 November 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

APPROVED JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down remotely at 2pm on 5 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to The National Archives.

MR NICHOLAS BACON KC

(SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT)

INTRODUCTION

1. This judgment follows my judgment handed down on 19 October 2026 – [2026] EWHC 2675 (KB) (“Judgment No.1”). The purpose of this judgment is to determine the appropriate sentence to impose on each of those defendants I found to have been in breach of the Injunction made by HHJ Tindal sitting as Judge of the High Court on 10 November 2023, hereafter referred as (“the Order”).

2. I do not consider it necessary to rehearse the background in any detail. It is addressed in detail in Judgment No.1, suffice to say that this sentencing exercise arises out the claimant’s application for orders for committal against each of the defendants following their failure to comply with the terms of the Order. The Order was made consequential to the unauthorised development of Home Farm, Dunstable Road, Tilsworth, Leighton Buzzard, LU7 9PU (“the Land”) which commenced on the weekend of the 4th of August 2023. The unauthorised development consisted of the importation of materials onto the Land and the siting of caravans on the Land to form a residential caravan site for Gypsies and Travellers. The Land is currently occupied by some of the defendants.

3. References herein to defined terms are to be taken as references to the defined terms in Judgment No.1.

4. For the reasons I explained in Judgment No.1, I am satisfied to the criminal standard that the defendants breached the terms of the Order. I provide a summary of my findings in tabulated form set out in paragraph 248 of Judgment No. 1.

SERVICE

5. Pursuant to my Order of 19 October 2026, I gave permission to the claimant to serve a copy of Judgment No.1 and the Order of 19 October 2026 by leaving them in a waterproof envelope at the entrance to the site and to attach copies on the door of each caravan in the event that personal service could not be secured. I granted that Order as it was necessary to do so given the difficulties that the claimant has faced in personally serving papers as summarized in paragraphs 37 – 52 of Judgment No.1.

6. As he did at the trial, Mr Ricketts represented Bernard McDonaugh, Maureen Doherty, Michael Doherty, Maureen Stokes, Bridget McGlinly at the hearing yesterday.

7. Of these defendants, Maureen Stokes and Bridget McGlinly (who both made admissions of breach and were not required to attend the committal hearing) chose not to attend today’s hearing.

8. The unrepresented Defendants are:

i) Paddy Maughan – Defendant 9

ii) Denis Stokes – Defendant 11

iii) Fono Maughan – Defendant 12

iv) Eileen Doyle – Defendant 14

v) Denis Doyle – Defendant 15

vi) Michael Stokes – Defendant 16

vii) Martina Stokes – Defendant 17

viii) Conoor Doyle – Defendant 20

9. The unrepresented defendants did not attend the sentencing hearing. Mr Ricketts did however have instructions to inform me of the reasons for Eileen Doyle’s absence – she had been required to attend on her aunt who I was told was seriously ill.

10. Mr Ricketts fully understood that I would be proceeding today in her absence and in the absence of any of the other unrepresented defendants all of whom have chosen to absence themselves from the hearing.

11. On 23 October 2026 Stephen Ralston, a process server instructed by the claimant, attended the Land for the purposes of serving:

i) A letter dated 22 October 2026 addressed to the unrepresented defendants in which it was made clear that the defendants were required to attend court on today’s hearing for sentencing. They were told that if they did not attend the hearing the court may proceed in their absence.

ii) Judgment No.1

iii) Order dated 19 October 2026 in which I directed the listing of the sentencing hearing to take place on 4 November 2023. I included warnings in that letter making it clear that the court had the jurisdiction to determine the sentence in the absence of the defendants were they not to attend or it could issue a warrant for their arrest to secure attendance.

12. Mr Ralston has provided me with a witness statement in which he states that when he attended on 23 October 2026 to serve the above documents none of the defendants were present. He attended again on 28 October 2026 and again the defendants were not present. In accordance with my order of 4 November 2023 he placed the above documents in a sealed weatherproof clear plastic box at the site entrance, he left copies in clear weatherproof envelopes at each of the caravans on plots 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. He left a copy in the letterbox of Plot 3, and a copy within a clear weatherproof envelope attached to the locked gate at plot 5, and a further copy in a similar weatherproof envelope at plot 10.

13. I am satisfied that all of the defendants have been effectively served with the abovementioned documents. They are therefore to be treated as having had proper notice of today’s hearing. I am proceeding on the basis that those who have chosen not to attend, without providing any explanation, have chosen voluntarily to absent themselves from the hearing.

14. I considered whether or not the appropriate thing to do is to issue a bench warrant to secure the attendance of the defendants at the sentencing hearing but, in my judgment, it is more appropriate to deal with the sentencing hearing in their absence rather than issuing a warrant now and putting it back until a warrant is executed.

15. I have made provision for substituted service in the Order that I have made today. I have at the end of this judgment given the standard directions as to rights of appeal.

CORRECT APPROACH TO SENTENCING

16. In Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15, the following guidance on sentence was given by the Supreme Court, at para 44:

“General guidance as to the approach to penalty is provided in the Court of Appeal decision in Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] EWCA Civ 392; [2019] 1 WLR 3833, paras

57 to 71. That was a case of criminal contempt consisting in the making of false statements of truth by expert witnesses. The recommended approach may be summarised as follows:

1. The court should adopt an approach analogous to that in criminal cases where the Sentencing Council's Guidelines require the court to assess the seriousness of the conduct by reference to the offender's culpability and the harm caused, intended or likely to be caused.

2. In light of its determination of seriousness, the court must first consider whether a fine would be a sufficient penalty.

3. If the contempt is so serious that only a custodial penalty will suffice, the court must impose the shortest period of imprisonment which properly reflects the seriousness of the contempt.

4. Due weight should be given to matters of mitigation, such as genuine remorse, previous positive character and similar matters.

5. Due weight should also be given to the impact of committal on persons other than the contemnor, such as children of vulnerable adults in their care.

6. There should be a reduction for an early admission of the contempt to be calculated consistently with the approach set out in the Sentencing Council's Guidelines on Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea.

7. Once the appropriate term has been arrived at, consideration should be given to suspending the term of imprisonment. Usually, the court will already have taken into account mitigating factors when setting the appropriate term such that there is no powerful factor making suspension appropriate, but a serious effect on others, such as children or vulnerable adults in the contemnor's care, may justify suspension.”

17. Griffiths J provided a helpful summary of the principles in Maidstone BC v King [2026] EWHC 1965 (KB) – handed down by Griffiths J on 31 July 2026. I respectfully adopt what he said at paragraphs 87-98, and for the purposes of fullness I make no apology for setting it out in full below:

87. The court may impose an immediate custodial sentence of up to two years (s14(1) Contempt of Court Act 1981) or an unlimited fine or order sequestration (s14(2)). The maximum sentence of two years applies regardless of how many separate acts of contempt are proved: In re R (A Minor) (Contempt: Sentence) [1994] 1 WLR 487 per Sir Thomas Bingham MR at 491A-F.

88. A period of imprisonment is imposed by way of an order of committal. Execution of the order requires the issue of a warrant of committal. The court may suspend execution of the order or warrant of committal under CPR 81.9(2). (HM Solicitor General v Yaxley-Lennon [2024] EWHC 2732 (KB) per Johnson J at para 36.)

89. The object of the penalty is to both punish conduct in defiance of court orders as well as serving a coercive function by holding out the threat of future punishment as a means of securing the protection which the injunction is primarily there to do (Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch) per Lawrence Collins J at 8).

90. In JSC BTA Bank v Solodchenko (No 2) [2011] EWCA Civ 1241, [20212] 1 WLR 350 a sentence of 21 months’ immediate imprisonment was passed on a contemnor who was in continuing breach of an order to provide information ancillary to a freezing order, of which 9 months was identified as the punitive element, the balance of 12 months being coercive. Per Jackson LJ at paras 55-57 and para 67 (with whom Lord Neuberger MR and Carnwath LJ agreed):

“(…) Where there is a continuing failure to disclose relevant information, the court should consider imposing a long sentence, possibly even the maximum of two years, in order to encourage future co-operation by the contemnor.

56 In the case of continuing breach, out of fairness to the contemnor, the court may see fit to indicate (a) what portion of the sentence should be served in any event as punishment for past breaches and (b) what portion of the sentence the court might consider remitting in the event of prompt and full compliance thereafter. Any such indication would be persuasive, but not binding upon a future court.

57 It should also be noted that what the court is passing is a nominal sentence. The actual time spent in prison will be less, because of remission, possible release on tagging and so forth. The court does not have regard to those factors in determining the proper sentence in any case.

67. In the Shalson case (unreported) 9 July 2001 Neuberger J made the point that the shorter the punitive element of the sentence the greater the incentive on the contemnor to comply by disclosing the information required. I agree. On the other hand, there is also a public interest in requiring contemnors to serve a proper sentence for past non-compliance with court orders, even if those contemnors are in continuing breach. The punitive element of the sentence both punishes the contemnor and deters others from disregarding court orders.”

91. Per Hamblen and Holroyde LJJ in Financial Conduct Authority v McKendrick [2019] EWCA Civ 524, [2019] 4 WLR 65, at paras 40-41:

“40 Breach of a court order is always serious, because it undermines the administration of justice. We therefore agree with the observations of Jackson LJ in the Solodchenko case (see para 31 above) as to the inherent seriousness of a breach of a court order, and as to the likelihood that nothing other than a prison sentence will do to punish such a serious contempt of court. The length of that sentence will, of course, depend on all the circumstances of the case, but again we agree with the observations of Jackson LJ as to the length of sentence which may often be appropriate. Mr Underwood was correct to submit that the decision as to the length of sentence appropriate in a particular case must take into account that the maximum sentence is committal to prison for two years. However, because the maximum term is comparatively short, we do not think that the maximum can be reserved for the very worst sort of contempt which can be imagined. Rather, there will be a comparatively broad range of conduct which can fairly be regarded as falling within the most serious category and as therefore justifying a sentence at or near the maximum.

41 As the judge recognised, it may sometimes be necessary for the sentence for this form of contempt of court to include an element intended to encourage belated compliance with the court’s order. Where that is the case, that element of the sentence is in principle one which may be remitted if the contemnor subsequently purges his contempt by complying with the order.”

92. Per Leech J in Solicitors Regulation Authority Ltd v Khan [2022] EWHC 45 (Ch) at para 52:

“(1) There are no formal sentencing guidelines for sentence/sanction in committal proceedings.

(2) Sentences/sanctions are fact specific.

(3) The Court should bear in mind the desirability of keeping offenders and, in particular, first-time offenders, out of prison: see Templeton Insurance Ltd v Thomas [2013] EWCA Civ 35 and Otkritie International Investment Management Ltd v Gersamia [2015] EWHC 821 (Comm).”

93. In Crypto Open Patent Alliance v Wright [2024] EWHC 3316 (Ch), Mellor J at para 77 gave four examples of sentences which were structured in order to maximise their coercive as well as their punitive effect:

“i) Addou v Bennabi [2024] EWHC 2702 (Fam) at para. 15: The respondent, who was responsible for removing a child from the jurisdiction, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended

on terms that it would not take effect if he returned the child to the jurisdiction in a set time.

ii) Tonstate Group Ltd v Wojakovski [2023] EWHC 3447 (Ch) at paras. 46-48: The defendant, who was in contempt for dealing in assets contrary to a court order, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms that it would be activated if he breached any court order in the actions within a period of one year. However, I note that at [46] Edwin Johnson J. specifically exempted (a) any breach of an order to pay costs and (b) any breach of a case management direction.

iii) Deutsche Bank AG v Sebastian Holdings Inc [2023] EWHC 2563 (Comm), 4 WLR 76 at para. 32: The second defendant, who was in contempt for failing to comply with asset disclosure orders, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms that it would not take effect if he complied with a series of very detailed provisions requiring further disclosure.

iv) Dattani v Rasheed [2022] EWHC 3671 (Ch) at para. 11: The first defendant, who was in contempt for failing properly to comply with an order for provision of information about proceeds of sale of an asset, was made subject to a sentence that was suspended on terms which included (i) that he provide the requisite information and (ii) that he comply with all further orders which the court should make for a period of one year.”

94. Section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020 does not apply to sentencing for contempt of court: see section 222(2) of the Sentencing Act. Therefore, there is no presumption in favour of suspension for those convicted after 22 March 2026: Khan v North of England Coachworks [2026] EWCA Civ 656 per Coulson LJ at para 53.

95. However, with that qualification, it is “always a good idea” for the court to consider the Sentencing Council’s guideline on Imposition of community and custodial sentences, per Coulson LJ in Khan at para 49, citing Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan [2019] EWCA Civ 392, [2019] 1 WLR 3833, paras 30 and 58.

96. The guideline, in respect of sentences (such as those I am now considering) which are not subject to section 277A of the Sentencing Act 2020, identifies the following relevant factors.

i. Factors indicating that it may be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence are:

a. Realistic prospect of rehabilitation in the community.

b. Offender does not present high risk of reoffending or harm.

c. Strong personal mitigation.

d. Immediate custody will result in significant harmful impact upon others, including any dependent children or where the offender is pregnant or postnatal (has given birth in the previous 12 months).

j.

k.

l.

m.

n.

o.

p.

q.

r.

s.

t.

u.

v.

w.

x.

y.

z.

aa.

ab.

ac.

ad.

ae.

af.

ag.

ah.

ai. Factors indicating that it may not be appropriate to suspend a custodial sentence are:

a. Offender presents a risk to any person.

b. The seriousness of the offence means that appropriate punishment can only be achieved by immediate custody.

c. History of poor compliance with court orders AND unlikely to comply in the future.

97. I have cited these cases because of the guidance they give on matters of principle. However, per Coulson LJ in Khan v North of England Coachworks [2026] EWCA Civ 656 at para 31:

“On the issue of sanction, it is unlikely that the appeal court will be assisted by the citation of other first instance cases where particular sanctions were imposed on particular contemnors on particular facts. The law of contempt is so broad, and arises in so many different ways, that the precise sanctions imposed in other cases are usually unilluminating.”

98. In the absence of a sentencing guideline, and given the variety of situations in which contempt proceedings arise, checklists cannot be applied slavishly. What is relevant and significant will vary from case to case as will the weight to be given to different factors. However, it is right to recognise the widespread influence of the factors identified by Lawrence Collins J in Crystal Mews Ltd v Metterick [2006] EWHC 3087 (Ch) at para 13, cited (for example) by the Court of Appeal in Business Mortgage Finance 4 plc v Hussain [2022] EWCA Civ 1264, [2023] 1 WLR 396 at para 120, with an additional point added by Popplewell J in Asia Islamic Trade Finance Fund Ltd v Drum Risk Management Ltd [2015] EWHC 3748 (Comm):

“(a) whether the claimant has been prejudiced by virtue of the contempt and whether the prejudice is capable of remedy;

(b) the extent to which the contemnor has acted under pressure;

(c) whether the breach of the order was deliberate or unintentional;

(d) the degree of culpability;

(e) whether the contemnor has been placed in breach of the order by reason of the conduct of others;

(f) whether the contemnor appreciates the seriousness of the deliberate breach;

(g) whether the contemnor has co-operated;

(h) whether there has been any acceptance of responsibility, any apology, any remorse or any reasonable excuse put forward.”

18. The exercise of punishing for contempt in the civil courts is different from sentencing within criminal proceedings. Having found that the contemnor is in contempt of court, a judge must then consider the question of a penalty, rather than sentencing for an offence. It seems to me however, by reference to the authorities to which I referred above, that I should have regard to the core principles of criminal sentencing and to this end I have had regard to the following definitive guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council for use in the criminal courts:

i) General Guideline: overarching principles (operative from 1 October 2019) (last updated 5 October 2026);

ii) Imposition of Community and Custodial Sentences (effective from 1 September 2025 (last updated on 1 October 2026));

iii) Definitive Guideline Reduction in Sentence for a Guilty Plea, and

iv) Definitive Guideline Offences Taken Into Consideration and Totality.

PLANNING CONSENT

19. On the last day of the trial I enquired with the claimant as to its likely approach and attitude to any future applications for permission to develop the site were applications to be made. This turned out to be a somewhat prophetic question because I was informed in reply that in fact there had been a change to government policy underpinning developments for the grant of Gypsy and Traveller sites and that as a consequence the Council had received a revised application for retrospective planning permission to be granted in respect of the Land.

20. At paragraphs 15- 26 of Judgment No.1 I summarised the history of the planning applications made in respect of the Land. A planning application was submitted in October 2025 by D16. It was not validated until February 2026 as documents were missing (this was after the committal was issued). I was told at the hearing on 19 September 2026 that:

“… because of a relaxation of national policy, the Council is minded to allow the planning application provided a Unilateral Undertaking is executed by deed to provide the financial contribution of around £45,000 to protect the Chiltern Beechwood SAC (“the UU). It equates to £4,952.54 per plot (there are 9 plots) together with the Council’s legal costs for dealing with the UU (which presently stand at £2,862). D1 (as the appellant to the EN appeal) was required to provide the UU, but it was not forthcoming [B305, para 30]. This was one reason why the appeal failed. The Council has told D16 that the UU was required since the Spring 2026. A draft UU was sent by the Council to the defendant’s planning consultant on 15.5.26. It has not been returned. It is not just the question of the money. There are 9 registered owners. The difficulty arises because the names on the UU do not correlate with those who hold the legal title. The Council cannot help to resolve this issue. It lies entirely in the hands of others. Therefore, it can be seen that a UU has been needed for over 2 years. Given the passage of time, the Council is doubtful that it will be provided. If it is, the Council will proceed to determine the planning application. That the residential use may be retrospectively regularised upon provision of the UU does not provide a defence to the committal which relates to allegations in 2023-25. It could go to sentence.”

21. The claimant’s position is that had the defendants provided the Unilateral Undertaking (“UU”) and made sensible admissions, the Council would have considered that carefully and with an open mind. It may well have been that the trial would have been unnecessary. That is not what happened. The claimant maintains, with some force, that it cannot force the defendants to submit an executed UU. Nor can the Council force the defendants to make admissions.

22. Mr Smyth submitted at the hearing on 19 September 2026 that “when it comes to sentence, later in the year, it would be open to the defendants to rely upon the grant of planning permission as potent evidence of mitigation. But, as things stand, that is speculative. The ball is in the defendants’ court…..Finally, the Council draws attention to the fact that there are a number of unauthorised gypsy traveller sites close to this one (land North of Dunstable Road, Greenacres in Billington and Kingswood Nursery). There is another High Court injunction freezing the status quo (land North of Dunstable Road). The Council deals with this case on its own merits but it does not overlook the risk that if it is seen to indulge or take a “soft” approach to the site it could encourage the other sites to disobey their injunction or the conditions attached to a planning permission. This local authority has a very difficult task trying to balance competing interests and ensure ‘good planning’ in its area. The committal application has not been issued or pursued, lightly. The Council is firmly of the view that it is in the public interest for the serious and multiple breaches of the injunction are dealt with by the Court even if the residential use itself may ultimately be regularised. It undermines public confidence in the Court and the planning system if injunctions are seen to have been disobeyed without consequence. That is a point which has particular resonance given the defendants failed to comply with the TSN and EN.”

23. Mr Smyth was able to update matters for me. Over the course of the summer this year Council Officers have resolved to grant planning permission for the site for up to 9 pitches. The grant would be retrospective and subject to the UU being provided. There was an issue over the summer concerning legal ownership of the Land and the need for any UU to be provided by the owners of the Land rather than other third parties. An updated UU was provided to the Council last week and I am told that the Council is likely to treat that UU as being in satisfactory form so that the decision to grant retrospective planning permission will be granted soon. I understand that there is a Council meeting taking place on 19 November 2026 where a final decision will be made.

24. It does seem to me that it is relevant to have regard to the Council’s intentions as regards any future planning application when it comes to sentencing. It can be said with some force that whilst the defendants have breached the Order, it is fair to acknowledge that they have been taking positive steps to secure retrospective planning permission and that this is likely to be granted.

25. That said, and as I have indicated to the parties throughout this case, it must not be thought acceptable for others to assume that they can just occupy land, develop it, and then look to secure retrospective permission with a view to avoiding proceedings of this kind. That is not the right way of going about things and it’s not what the law is. Planning consents and necessary development consents must be obtained in advance of development. In this case, the defendants were prohibited from developing the land. They chose to ignore that Order and proceeded to do quite the opposite. That is why I have found them to be in breach of the Order in Judgment No.1. It is therefore now necessary to sentence the defendants against that background.

CLAIMANT’S SUBMISSIONS

26. The Council accepts that it not the role of the Council to promote a particular sentence. The appropriate sentence is exclusively a matter for me. However, the Council maintains, in assisting the court, that when addressing the question of harm, I should treat the harm as “medium-low”. This is because any harm to the land is reversible (albeit there is intangible and difficult-to-measure harm to public confidence in the planning system and the integrity of the civil justice system). The Council submits that the fact that the Council is willing to grant planning permission for the residential use of the site indicates that it is an acceptable use at this location, albeit that the defendants ‘jumped the gun’. This, the Council submits “reduces the harm considerably”.

27. The Council also invite me to take account of the fact that to date, no defendant has indicated any remorse and that to date, no defendant has purged their contempt.

28. The Council accepts that D10 and D13 deserve credit for their admissions in respect of Allegation 2A (that they remained living on the Land when they knew the terms of the Injunction did not permit that). However, the Council also submits that the fact that they have persisted living there throughout the litigation and even after their admission indicates defiance. The Council submits that the fact that they have continued to disobey the injunction post-admission eliminates the credit arising from the admission.

29. The Council submits that in respect of the represented defendants: D1 and D4 are the most culpable defendants, followed D15 and D16 and D20, followed by D9, D11 and D12. They had contended that D3 was more culpable than D15 D16 and D20 but in the course of submissions Mr Smyth sensibly accepted that D 3 and D14 could probably be grouped together with lesser culpability.

30. In respect of the unrepresented defendants the Council submits that the Court was satisfied that they were served but they have chosen not to attend any of the hearings and this is a signal of some defiance on their part. It was submitted that I should treat this as an aggravating feature.

31. As regards the culpability of D1 & D4 the Council submits that it is high because:

i) Their contempts were serious, deliberate and consequential.

ii) They were not committed at the direction of or under pressure from anyone else. They were a choice made by them.

iii) They continued over a significant period of time and still continue.

iv) Notwithstanding the warnings and the benefit of legal advice, they have chosen not to purge their contempt at all.

v) Their decisions not to make any admissions at all (notwithstanding a clear hint from the trial judge) and to give evidence on oath which the Court found unconvincing and misleading are aggravating features.

vi) Their personal mitigation is limited.

32. The Council submits that given the fact that it is likely that planning permission will soon regularise that which had been unlawful, there is less need for a coercive element to any sentence. The Council submits that this results in more emphasis on the punitive element.

DEFENDANTS’ SUBMISSIONS

33. Mr Ricketts focused with some force on the fact that although those he represents have been found to be in breach of the Order, they have taken steps to put right their wrongs by seeking retrospective planning permission to develop the Land.

34. He identified differences in culpability between the defendants which ought to be reflected in any sentence.

35. He submitted that if the court considered that the custody threshold had been past, the court should consider suspending the sentencing to meet the justice of the case.

SENTENCE

36. It is necessary to deal with each of the defendants separately. I have decided to group the defendants into categories to meet the differences between them as regards culpability and harm.

D1 and D4

37. I agree with the claimant that D1 and D4 are the most culpable defendants and I should begin by addressing the appropriate sentence to impose on them and move to consider all other defendants in the order of diminishing culpability/harm.

38. I regard the harm and culpability applicable to D1 and D4 as indistinguishable in any meaningful sense. Their contempt’s were serious. They were deliberate. They were consequential. They were not committed at the direction of or under pressure from anyone else. They were a choice made by D1 and D4 and they knew that they were acting in breach of the court Order. Their refusal to comply with the Order continued over a significant period of time and still continues. In my judgment culpability is high.

39. Both D1 and D4 are however deserving of the mitigation which arises from their attempts to regularise the planning status of the site and follows from a change in Government policy underpinning planning controls for Gypsie and Traveller sites. They have managed to secure from the Council a commitment to grant planning permission for the site to permit 9 pitches. Mr Smyth on behalf of the council invites me to proceed on the basis that there is every expectation that retrospective planning permission will be granted. It is on that basis that I proceed today.

40. Given the planning developments that I have described, I agree with the Council that the D1 and D4’s failure to comply with the Order results in harm properly categories as medium to low.

41. There is some personal mitigation. Both defendants accept through Mr Ricketts that they should have gone about things differently and as explained above, to their credit they have sought to put right want has gone wrong in the past. Mr Doherty accepted through Mr Ricketts that he appreciates the position he has got himself in, but he has tried to put things right. He remains on the Land. He is a roofer by trade, but he is not in employment at present and is reliant on benefits. Mr McDonough is similarly out of work in receipt of benefits.

42. Given the Council’s change of attitude to the development which came about as a result of a change in government planning policy, and what appear to me to be realistic chances that development approval will be granted at some point in the medium term, I consider it important to reflect that in the form of the order I make.

43. Having regard to all of the facts as I have found them to be including the mitigation advanced on their behalf, I am satisfied that the failures to comply with the Order are so serious, that only a custodial penalty will suffice.

44. The shortest sentence I can pass for each of these defendants is one of 6 months’ imprisonment each.

45. In relation to the possibility of suspension, and bearing in mind the factors in the Sentencing Council’s guidelines the following factors are relevant:

i) The breaches are serious and continuing.

ii) The defendants present a high risk of both non-compliance and reoffending in the absence of coercion but the sentence I pass can deter that through appropriate conditions.

iii) There is personal mitigation, but it is not very strong.

iv) Immediate custody will result in some harmful impact on others.

v) The D1 and D4 do not present a risk to any person.

vi) There is a prospect of “rehabilitation” in the sense that steps are being taken to put right what has gone wrong in the past. Both of these defendants gave evidence to the fact that ultimately they took the steps they did for the purposes of providing a safe and secure home and environment for their families to live.

46. It is a priority to my mind that the defendants be required to ensure that no further development takes place on the Land beyond what is currently on the Land as of today (today’s status quo), subject to any further permissions for development issued by the claimant.

47. It is also critical to my order that the defendants comply with any conditions or development requirements imposed by the council hereafter. To that end I will suspend the custodial sentences, on the following terms:

i. The sentence will be suspended for two years, that is, until 4 November 2028 on condition that D1 and D4:

a. Shall not whether by themselves or encouraging, instructing or allowing another undertake any further development (as defined by section 55 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990) on the Land without the grant of planning permission or the written consent of the claimant’s solicitor, and

b. That they shall comply with any grant of planning permission in relation to the residential use of the Land that is hereafter granted by the claimant.

48. An appropriate order will need to be drawn up to reflect these conditions. The messaging is I hope clear; for the avoidance of doubt, no more caravans, mobile homes, structures, buildings may be brought on to the Land unless and until it is permitted by the fresh grant of planning permission.

D15 and D16 and D20

49. I regard the proven breaches as falling into a similar but lesser bracket as regards culpability and harm than as regards D1 and D4. However, I regard the culpability and harm in respect of D15, D16 and D20 as largely indistinguishable and therefore I will address the appropriate sentence to impose on them collectively.

50. There are no distinguishing factors of personal mitigation. They have absented themselves from attending the hearing of the committal application and the hearing today. I was satisfied that they had been properly served in respect of the committal hearing that took place in September and I am satisfied that they were properly served with my judgment and the Order of 19 October 2026.

51. Their contempt was serious. It was deliberate. They were consequential. They were not committed at the direction of or under pressure from anyone else. They were a choice made by each of them and they knew that they were acting in breach of the Order. Their refusal to comply with the Order continued over a shorter period than that of the D1 and D4 and this is a distinguishing feature.

52. In my judgment culpability is high.Given the planning developments that I have described, I agree with the Council that the failure of these defendants to comply with the Order is, like D1 and D4’s, indicative of harm properly categorised as medium to low.

53. The shortest sentence I can pass is one of 4 months’ imprisonment for each of these defendants.

54. For the reasons that I have given above in relation to D1 and D4, I consider it appropriate to suspend the custodial sentence for a period of 2 years on the same conditions as will apply to the suspended committal order imposed on D1 and D4.

D9, D11 and D12.

55. I regard the culpability applicable to the breaches of the Order by D9, D11 and D12 as lessor to that of D15, D16 and D20 in that the breach proven against them concerned failures to remove buildings/the “new” caravans rather than the development of the site in terms of laying of hardcore and construction work.

56. There are no distinguishing factors of personal mitigation. They have absented themselves from attending the hearing of the committal application and the hearing today. I was satisfied that they had been properly served in respect of the committal hearing that took place in September and I am satisfied that they were properly served with my judgment and the Order of 19 October 2026.

57. Their contempt was serious. It was deliberate. They were consequential. They were not committed at the direction of or under pressure from anyone else. They were a choice made by each of them and they knew that they were acting in breach of the Order. Their refusal to comply with the Injunction continued over a shorter period than that of the D1 and D4 and as I have indicated above, the role they played is to be distinguished from both D1 and D4, but also to that of D15, D16 and D20.

58. In my judgment culpability is medium to high. Harm is properly categorised as medium to low.

59. The shortest sentence I can pass is one of 3 months’ imprisonment for each of these defendants.

60. For the reasons that I have given above in relation to the D1 and D4, I consider it appropriate to suspend the custodial sentence for a period of 2 years on the same conditions as will apply to the suspended committal order imposed on D1 and D4.

D3 and D14

61. I have decided that the role played by Ms Maureen Docherty (D3) and Eileen Doyle (D14) is not such that the custody threshold has been passed. That is not to say that the breach is not serious because it is. However, as indicated in my judgment there is mitigation which applies to these two defendants which does not apply to the other defendants referred to above.

62. I regard the mitigation as including the fact that both of these two defendants were to my mind under the direct control and influence of D1 and D4 and D20 (in the case of Eileen Doyle). Both defendants attended the trial, and they both attested to the fact that what was happening on the site was “men’s business” and not theirs. Whilst this does not provide a defence to the breach, it is to my mind important mitigation.

63. Ms Doyle has two young children.

64. I have decided not to make any separate order beyond requiring them to pay the defendants costs on a joint and several basis with all other defendants.

D10 and D13

65. Both Maureen Stokes and Bridget McGinley made admissions wherein they accepted that they had been living on the Land knowing that they were not permitted to do so. Mr Ricketts explained that Maureen Stokes (D10) (referred to previously as Maureen Mauchan) lives with her mother and father and both are in poor health. Her mother is in a wheelchair having had a stroke and her father suffers from the effect of a heart attack. Ms Stokes is 51 years old. She is in receipt of universal credit and care allowance.

66. Ms Bridget McGinley is 27 years old. She is unemployed. Mr Ricketts explained that she was not able to attend court today as she had been required to visit her aunt in Ireland who is seriously ill.

67. The council’s position is that it would be open to me not to make any order against these two defendants. They were not required to attend the committal hearing and to their credit have not been the cause of any costs being incurred by the council independently of those costs which would have been incurred in any event in pursuing the other defendants.

68. Whilst I do take the view that D10 and D13’s failure to comply with the order was serious, given their admissions and the limited role that they have played in this case, I have decided not to impose any sentence on them for breach.

COSTS

69. Mr Smyth informed me that the Council’s total costs of the committal proceedings were in the order of £87,000. He submitted with some force that it is important that any order I make should result in some element of those costs being recovered from the defendants who have been found to be in breach of the Order. The council is concerned that because the Land is not owned by the contemnors before the court there is a serious risk that any order for costs will not be enforceable by way of charges on the Land. Accordingly, he invited me to summarily assess the costs today and impose orders for payment against the contemnors.

70. I am not prepared to carry out a summary assessment of the costs. The case lasted more than a day and was very involved. It seems to me the standard order for detailed assessment should prevail.

71. I will however, order that the defendants D1, D3, D4, D9, D11, D12, D14, D15 D16 and D20 must pay the claimant’s costs on a joint and several basis, to be subject to detailed assessment if not agreed.

72. The defendants are required to make a payment on account of the Claimants’ costs in the sum of £45,000 to be paid by 4pm on 4 May 2027.

CONSEQUENTIAL MATTERS

73. Should the defendants who are the subject of suspended prison sentences find themselves in custody, they will only be required to serve up to one half of the applicable sentence in custody. I explained to those present at the hearing and do so herein, that at the halfway point or (other release day) of the applicable custodial sentence, they will be released, like other prisoners who have served up to half their sentence. However, they will continue to be bound by the sentence I imposed. It has a duration of 2 years.

74. In the event of any breach of my sentencing order the defendants will be brought back to court, and the custodial sentence may be activated and made immediate, in whole or in part, in addition to any other penalty the court may impose.

75. The defendants have a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal (Civil Division) (section 13(2)(c) of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 read with section 53(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981). They do not require permission to appeal against the orders I have made. Any notice of appeal must be filed with the Court of Appeal, and also the High Court, within 21 days (CPR 52.12 and paragraph 9.1 of CPR PD 52D).

76. I am required to and do direct that a transcript of these sentencing remarks should be obtained at public expense and should be published on a website of The Judiciary of England & Wales once that transcript has been approved by me and that should be done at the earliest possible opportunity.

End.


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