Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

City of Phila., Aplt. v. FOP, Lodge No. 5

Official source
                                    [J-70-2025]
                      IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


     CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,                        :   No. 59 EAP 2024
                                                  :
                        Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                  :   Commonwealth Court entered
                                                  :   January 8, 2024, at No. 39 CD 2023,
                 v.                               :   affirming the Order of the Court of
                                                  :   Common Pleas of Philadelphia
                                                  :   County, Civil Division, entered on
     FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE             :   December 13, 2022, at No. 2544
     NO. 5,                                       :
                                                  :   ARGUED: September 11, 2025
                        Appellee                  :


                                          OPINION


 JUSTICE DONOHUE                                              DECIDED: October 29, 2026
         Appellant the City of Philadelphia (“City”), asks the Court to overturn Pennsylvania

 State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 

656 A.2d 83

 (Pa. 1995),

 or, alternatively, to overturn Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’

 Ass’n (Smith), 

741 A.2d 1248

 (Pa. 1999). Betancourt held that appeals of grievance

 arbitration awards rendered pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining

 Act1 are subject to the narrow certiorari scope of review.2 Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

.

 Smith, decided four years after Betancourt, declined to add a limited public policy


 1   Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12 (“Act 111”).
 2 “The narrow certiorari scope of review limits a reviewing court to questions regarding:
 (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess
 of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights.” Betancourt, 

656
A.2d at 85

.
exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1252-53

. In

reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis, we uphold our decisions in Betancourt and Smith

and affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court.

      I. Background

        Marc Hayes is a lieutenant in the City’s Police Department responsible for

supervising officers in the City’s 24th Police District. On August 13, 2018, Hayes sent

multiple inappropriate and sexual text messages to two female officers (“Officer One” and

“Officer Two”) under his supervision.     In the texts, Hayes made numerous sexual

innuendos, boasted about his sexual prowess, discussed Officer One’s use of the

restroom, and sent a video showing a dog performing oral sex on a woman.

        On October 30, 2018, an anonymous letter was found at District Headquarters

which claimed that Hayes sent the sexually explicit bestiality video to two subordinate

officers during work hours. The Police Department forwarded the letter to its Internal

Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), which investigated the allegation through its Investigative Support

Services (“ISS”) and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) teams. Representatives of

the ISS and EEO interviewed Officers One and Two and reviewed the text messages

between Hayes and the officers, including the bestiality video. The City claims that on

October 31, 2018, the day after receipt of the anonymous letter, Hayes attempted to

influence the statement of Officer One by telling her that she could tell the investigators

that she could not recall anything. City’s Brief at 12. The City also claims that Hayes

approached Officer Two in the hallway later that day and, after asking her whether she

still had the video on her phone, mentioned that he submitted her name for a promotion.

Id.


        After its investigation, the City charged Hayes with violations of four different

sections of the collectively bargained Disciplinary Code:




                                     [J-70-2025] - 2
               Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§024-10: Any act,
               conduct, or course of conduct which objectively constitutes
               sexual harassment.

               Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§021-10: Any
               incident, conduct, or course of conduct which indicates that
               an employee has little or no regard for his/her responsibility
               as a member of the Police Department.

               Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§025-10: On duty
               or job-related inappropriate sexually based communication(s)
               conveyed in any manner.

               Article VIII: Failure to Supervise, Section 8-§003-10: Failure
               to properly supervise subordinates.
Philadelphia Police Department Disciplinary Code, July 2014, at 10, 12, 37. On July 9,

2020, the City’s Police Commissioner determined that Hayes committed each offense

and that he should be dismissed from the Department. The Commissioner ordered that

Hayes be suspended for thirty days with the intent to dismiss.

       Hayes, by and through the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 (“FOP”),

challenged his termination by filing a grievance, demanding arbitration as provided by the

parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).3 The parties stipulated that the issues

to be decided at arbitration were whether the City had just cause to discharge Hayes, and

if not, what the remedy should be. The arbitration consisted of hearings on June 17, and

June 22, 2022, where the arbitrator heard testimony from Lieutenant Brent Conway and

Detective Jeanette Smith, each of whom investigated the matter. Officer One and Hayes

also testified at the arbitration.4

       In rendering his decision, the arbitrator first noted that the City had to prove by a

preponderance of credible evidence that Hayes committed the charged offenses.

3  The parties agreed to select David J. Reily, Esq. to preside over the arbitration.
Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 9.
4 Office Two did not testify at the arbitration. Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 6 n.8.
The transcript of the arbitration proceedings, if it exists, is not a part of the record.


                                      [J-70-2025] - 3
Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 14. Concerning the sexual harassment charge, the

arbitrator relied on the City’s Department Directive 8.7, which provides, that “[i]t is sexual

harassment if one employee attempts to impose their sexual desires, will or wish, fantasy

or preference on another employee through an offensive act, deed, gesture or comment

and such conduct interferes with the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.”

Department Directive 8.7-2, 10/21/2011. The arbitrator also relied on the City’s Sexual

Harassment Policy which states “[s]exual [h]arassment is defined legally as unwelcome

sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, or other unwelcome verbal or

physical conduct of a sexual nature when … the conduct has the purpose or effect of

interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or

offensive work environment.” City’s Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy, 7/19/2018, at

3.

       After considering the testimony and all the text messages, the arbitrator concluded

that there was not a sufficient basis to find that the texts “were unwelcome or rose to the

level of creating a sexually hostile work environment.” Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at

16. To the arbitrator, “the texts reflect[ed] some questionable banter in which Hayes,

Officer One and Officer Two all appeared willing to engage.” Id. The arbitrator relied on

Officer One’s testimony and prior statements that she did not consider the texts to be

sexually harassing, but instead an attempt at humor by Hayes. Id. at 16-17. The arbitrator

highlighted that Officer Two did not testify at arbitration and explained, “[w]ithout the

context that her testimony would have provided, I cannot draw any conclusions from her

entries in the … text exchange relative to whether she considered Hayes’ texts to be

sexually offensive or harassing. Her statements during the … investigation represent

hearsay.” Id. at 17 n.12.




                                       [J-70-2025] - 4
       As for the video, the arbitrator acknowledged that it was “very disturbing” and had

“the potential to offend and create a hostile work environment based upon sex.” Id. at

17. However, the arbitrator again analyzed whether the video subjectively constituted

sexual harassment, explaining

              I cannot simply look to the content of the video itself and the
              fact that Hayes, a male supervisor, sent it to two female
              subordinates, Officer One and Officer Two. Instead, I must
              find that Officer One and/or Officer Two were, in fact, offended
              by the video, and it had the effect of rendering their work
              environment sexually hostile.

Id.
       The arbitrator noted that Officer One never watched the video and explained that

her knowledge of its contents “is limited to the still image that appears at the start of the

video before it is played.” Id. at 17-18. While Officer One testified that she found the

video to be “gross,” the arbitrator highlighted that she did not consider it to be an attempt

by Hayes to sexually harass her. Id. at 18. The arbitrator further explained that Officer

One did not claim that receiving the video adversely affected her work environment. Id.

The arbitrator acknowledged that Officer Two texted “please don’t send me things like

that” after receiving the video. Id. at 18 n.13. However, the arbitrator explained this text

was inconclusive to determine whether transmission of the video constituted sexual

harassment as to Officer Two. Id. The arbitrator found that Hayes’ sending of the video

was highly inappropriate, but it did not rise to the level of sexual harassment in violation

of Directive 8.7. Id. at 18.

       On the remaining three charges, the arbitrator found that Hayes violated each

respective section of the Disciplinary Code. Id. at 18-21. The arbitrator imposed a fifty-

day suspension for the three violations. Finding that the City did not have just cause to




                                      [J-70-2025] - 5
discharge Hayes, the arbitrator ordered the City to reinstate Hayes to his former position

with the Department and awarded him backpay. Id. at 25.

        The City filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing first that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by

rewriting the terms of the Disciplinary Code, Directive 8.7, and the City’s Sexual

Harassment Policy by applying a different standard for sexual harassment than the

standard collectively bargained for by the parties. City’s Petition to Vacate Arbitration

Award, 8/22/2022, at 11. Alternatively, the City argued that the trial court should modify

the narrow certiorari scope of review for grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant

to Act 111. Id. at 13.

        The trial court denied the City’s petition. The trial court explained that it was bound

by the narrow certiorari scope of review when reviewing the arbitration award and

therefore could only consider questions regarding “(1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2)

the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) a

deprivation of constitutional rights.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2023, at 2 (quoting City of

Washington v. Police Dep’t of Washington, 

259 A.2d 437, 440-41

 (Pa. 1969)). The trial

court concluded that the arbitrator acted within his authority in altering the discipline

imposed on Hayes. Id. at 4. Further, the trial court noted that it did not have the authority

to modify the narrow certiorari scope of review. Id.

        The Commonwealth Court affirmed, reiterating the trial court’s pronouncement that

in Act 111 cases, judicial review is confined to narrow certiorari.5 City of Phila. v. Fraternal

Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5, 

307 A.3d 1263

, 1267 (Pa. Commw. 2024) (citing Borough of

State Coll. v. Borough of State Coll. Police Ass’n, 

303 A.3d 248

, 255-56 (Pa. Commw.

2023)). The City argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because he fully


5   President Judge Cohn Jubelirer dissented without opinion.


                                        [J-70-2025] - 6
reformed the parties’ CBA by replacing its objective standard for sexual harassment with

a subjective standard based on the specific perspectives of the officers who received the

messages.    The Commonwealth Court rejected the City’s argument, relying on this

Court’s discussion in City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No.

1, 

224 A.3d 702

 (Pa. 2020):

              Certainly, an Act 111 grievance arbitrator should not
              undertake to equitably reform a collective bargaining
              agreement.        Absent an indisputably overt instance of
              reformation, however, we find the task of distinguishing
              between such an innovation and errors of law in the
              interpretation to be unmanageable. Cf. Smith, 

741 A.2d at
1252-53

 (refusing to incorporate review for violations of public
              policy into narrow certiorari, since such a focus “-- however
              that nebulous concept may be defined by a particular
              appellate court -- would greatly expand the scope of review ...
              undercut[ting] the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted
              litigation in this arena.”).

Id. at 1268

 (emphasis removed) (quoting City of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 714).

       Here, the Commonwealth Court explained that, “[a]t most, the arbitrator erred as

a matter of law[.]” Id. However, it stressed that “[a] mere error of law is insufficient to

support a court’s decision to reverse an Act 111 arbitrator’s award.” Id. (quoting Borough

of State Coll., 303 A.3d at 255). The City also argued that the arbitrator acted outside of

his authority by ruling on a matter of managerial prerogative. The Commonwealth Court

explained that the propriety of Hayes’ discharge was submitted to the arbitrator as all

matters of discipline are grievable pursuant to the CBA. Id. Thus, the Commonwealth

Court determined that the arbitrator addressed an issue that was properly before him. Id.

Lastly, the Commonwealth Court explained that it was not permitted to modify the narrow

certiorari scope of review because it was constrained by this Court’s holding in

Betancourt. Id. at 1268-69.




                                      [J-70-2025] - 7
       The City filed a petition for allowance of appeal which we granted, limited to the

following question:

             Where a police lieutenant sent a series of [ ] sexualized texts
             to two subordinate officers … and then encouraged one of the
             officers to cover it up, but where the grievance arbitrator
             reinstated the employee, should this Court modify the narrow
             certiorari scope of review set forth in Pa. State Police v. Pa.
             State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 

656 A.2d 83

 (Pa. 1995),
             and instead apply the essence test or judgment n.o.v. test, or
             at least incorporate a limited public policy exception into the
             narrow certiorari test?
City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5, 

326 A.3d 87

 (Pa. 2024) (per

curiam).6

    II. Judicial Review under Act 111

       Before addressing the arguments of the parties, it is necessary to recount the

history of the narrow certiorari scope of review in the context of Act 111 cases and our

decisions in Betancourt and Smith. In our recent decision of Northern Berks Regional

Police Commission v. Berks County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 71, 

230 A.3d

1022

 (Pa. 2020), we explained:

             Act 111 was enacted in the wake of Erie Firefighters Local No.
             293 v. Gardner, 

178 A.2d 691

 (Pa. 1962) (per curiam), which
             held that its predecessor was not binding on municipalities on
             constitutional non-delegation grounds. 

Id.

 at 695 (citing PA.
             CONST. art. [III], § 20 (repealed)). That former law “prohibited
             strikes and attempted to provide for the adjustment of
             grievances through negotiations” but did not allow for
             collective bargaining. Moon Twp. v. Police Officers of Moon
             Twp., 

498 A.2d 1305, 1308

 (Pa. 1985). “This double denial of
             rights to police and fire personnel fueled the growing tension

6  We denied allowance of appeal of the City’s second issue concerning whether the
arbitrator exceeded his authority under the narrow certiorari scope of review. See Petition
for Allowance of Appeal, 2/6/2024, at 6; City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge
No. 5, 

326 A.3d 87

 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam). Therefore, we do not analyze the
Commonwealth Court’s determination that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in
rendering the award.


                                     [J-70-2025] - 8
                between labor and management, tension which culminated in
                ‘illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication
                between public employers and their employees.’” [Smith],
                741 A.2d [at] 1251 … (quoting Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

).
                Following Erie Firefighters, the electorate authorized an
                amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art.
                [III], § 31,[7] which allowed “the adjustment or settlement of
                grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between
                policemen and firemen and their public employers.” That
                amendment cleared the way for new legislation.

                Act 111 was passed two years later. It continued to withhold
                the right to strike from police and firefighters but conferred “the
                right to bargain collectively with their public employers
                concerning the terms and conditions of their employment[.]”
                43 P.S. § 217.1.[8] This process, deemed interest arbitration,

7   Article III, Section 31 provides:
                The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special
                commission, private corporation or association, any power to
                make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement,
                money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
                or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.
                Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision
                of the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws
                which provide that the findings of panels or commissions,
                selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment
                or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective
                bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public
                employers shall be binding upon all parties and shall
                constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision
                which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the
                Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with
                respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative
                action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision
                or of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which
                require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry
                out such findings.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
8   Section 1 of Act 111 provides:
            Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of
            the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through
(continued…)

                                         [J-70-2025] - 9
               is “in essence, the process by which the parties, through a
               neutral arbitrator or panel, create a collective bargaining
               agreement.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of F[raternal Ord.
               of Police] v. City of Phila[.], 

129 A.3d 1221, 1226

 (Pa. 2015).
               Interest arbitration is distinct from grievance arbitration, which
               involves the disputes over how the governing bargaining
               agreement should be interpreted and/or applied. …

               Grievance arbitration is not specifically mentioned in Act 111
               as its language speaks only to the resolution of disputes
               arising from “the collective bargaining process,” i.e. interest
               arbitration, which must be settled before a board of arbitration
               composed of three persons. 43 P.S. § 217.4(b). However,
               Section 1 of Act 111 states that police and firefighters “shall
               have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their
               grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this
               act,” 43 P.S. § 217.1, and in Chirico v. B[oar]d. of
               Sup[ervisor]s for Newton T[ownship], 

470 A.2d 470, 474-75

               (Pa. 1983), we held that the General Assembly intended for
               Act 111 and the concomitant body of case law regarding the
               appellate scope of review to apply to grievance disputes.
               Therefore, an arbitrator’s decision in an Act 111 case, whether
               grievance or interest, “shall be final on the issue or issues in
               dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer ... No
               appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” 43 P.S. §
               217.7(a).[9]


               labor organizations or other representatives designated by
               fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the
               right to bargain collectively with their public employers
               concerning the terms and conditions of their employment,
               including compensation, hours, working conditions,
               retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the
               right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or
               disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.
43 P.S. § 217.1.
9   Section 7(a) of Act 111 provides:
            (a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration
            thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute
            and shall be binding upon the public employer and the
            policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be
            in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties
            to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to
(continued…)

                                        [J-70-2025] - 10
N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1032-33.

       Although Act 111 does not allow for appeals of arbitration awards, this Court in

City of Washington “adopted the narrow certiorari mechanism for a combination of

pragmatic, historical, and constitutional reasons.” N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1033. There,

after the City of Washington could not reach an agreement with its police officers, the

parties went to arbitration where a three-member panel issued an interest arbitration

award. The City of Washington subsequently filed an appeal in the court of common

pleas, challenging a portion of the award which ordered it to provide “at its sole expense,

hospitalization coverage for the members of the family of each member of the Police

Department of the City of Washington, equal to the coverage now provided … for the

member himself.” City of Washington, 

259 A.2d at 439

 (quoting arbitration award). The

City of Washington claimed that it was illegal to make such payments to family members

of police officers. After the trial court concluded that the City of Washington had no right

to appeal under Act 111, the City petitioned for allowance to appeal to this Court.

       The City of Washington Court first rejected the City’s claim that it had a

constitutional right to appeal an interest arbitration award to the court of common pleas.

Id.

 The Court observed that Act 111 “clearly provides that ‘the determination of the

majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in

dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen

              any court. Such determination shall constitute a mandate to
              the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or
              to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the
              Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which
              can be remedied by administrative action, and to the
              lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the
              Commonwealth with respect to matters which require
              legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out the
              determination of the board of arbitration.
43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (emphasis added).


                                      [J-70-2025] - 11
involved. … No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” Id. (quoting 43 P.S. §

217.7(a)).    Given that an arbitration panel “is neither a court nor an administrative

agency[,]” the Court determined that Act 111’s prohibition on appeals of arbitration awards

did not conflict with Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which only

provides a right of appeal from cases arising from a court or administrative agency.10

        Nonetheless, the City of Washington Court examined the appeal pursuant to then-

existing Supreme Court Rule 68 ½, explaining that

                If an appeal is prohibited by an Act, or the decision of the
                Agency is stated to be final or conclusive, the law is well
                settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the nature of a
                narrow certiorari and this Court will review only (1) the
                question of jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings
                before the Agency; (3) questions of excess in exercise of
                powers; and (4) constitutional questions: Cf. Devito v. Civil
                Service Commission, 

172 A.2d 161

 [(Pa. 1961)] (and cases
                cited therein); Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers, 

164
A.2d 86

 [(Pa. 1960)].
City of Washington, 

259 A.2d at 441

 (quoting Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness

Racing Comm’n, 

173 A.2d 97, 99

 (Pa. 1961)). Given that “[n]o adjudicatory body has

unlimited discretion” and that “each and every adjudicator is bound by the Constitution[,]”

the City of Washington Court reasoned that applying the narrow certiorari scope of review

would ensure “the protection of constitutional rights.” Id. at 440-41.

10   Article V, Section 9 provides:
                There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record
                from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of
                appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency
                to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of
                such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such
                other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. It is questionable whether the City of Washington Court’s finding
that a decision of an Act 111 arbitration panel is not a decision of an administrative agency
remains true in light of subsequently enacted statutes. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(b); 42
Pa.C.S. § 933(b).


                                        [J-70-2025] - 12
       Analyzing the third prong of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the Court

concluded that the arbitration panel exceeded the scope of its authority in ordering the

city to carry out an illegal act, noting that the city was forbidden by statute from paying

hospitalization premiums for non-city employees.         Id. at 443.    Notably, the City of

Washington Court did not draw a distinction between interest arbitrations and grievance

arbitrations in finding that the narrow certiorari scope of review applied to review of

arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111.11

       In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newton Township, 

470 A.2d 470

 (Pa. 1983),

the Court addressed, inter alia, whether a court of common pleas had jurisdiction to

resolve a grievance between Newton Township and its police officers, stemming from the

interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement.         After an impasse in

collective bargaining negotiations, a board of arbitrators entered an award setting forth

11  In 1970—two years following the passage of Act 111—the General Assembly enacted
the Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§
1101.101-1101.2301 (“PERA”).            PERA outlines more detailed procedures and
requirements for the representation of public employees, the scope of collective
bargaining between representatives of public employees and public employers, and
provides that “[a]rbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory.” 43 P.S. § 1101.903.
Section 903 of PERA further provides that “[t]he procedure [for arbitration] to be adopted
is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a
binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may
agree.” Id. In 1977, this Court held that the proper scope of review of grievance
arbitration awards rendered pursuant to PERA is the essence test, which provides that
“[t]he arbitrator’s award must be ‘respected by the judiciary if the interpretation can in any
rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context,
and any other indicia of the parties’ intention[.]’” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7
v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers.
Ass’n, 

939 A.2d 855, 862

 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty. v. Cmty. Coll.
of Beaver Cnty., Soc. of the Fac., 

375 A.2d 1267

, 1275 (Pa. 1977)). However, PERA is
clear that it does not apply to employees covered by Act 111. See 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2)
(“‘Public employe’ or ‘employe’ … shall not include … those employees covered under
the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111)[.]”). This Court has explained that PERA “has no
application to proceedings initiated under Act 111.” Geriot v. Council of Darby, 

417 A.2d
1144, 1147

 (Pa. 1980).


                                      [J-70-2025] - 13
the terms and conditions of employment for police officers for the 1975 calendar year.

Chirico, 

470 A.2d at 471

. When the Township refused to implement certain aspects of

the award, the Police Department filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of common

pleas. 

Id. at 472

. During the pendency of that mandamus action, another board of

arbitrators entered an award for the 1976 calendar year. Neither the Township nor the

Police Department filed an appeal from either award. Relevant here, the 1975 award

provided that police officers were entitled to one to five weeks of vacation, but the award

did not define the term “week.” As a result, the parties disputed whether a “vacation week”

was five or six days. In deciding the Police Department’s mandamus action, the trial court

interpreted the phrase “vacation week” but refused to enforce other ambiguous provisions

of the awards to the extent the directives were illegal. On appeal, the Commonwealth

Court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to interpret the phrase in the

award as this was exclusively for the arbitration panel.

       On appeal, this Court affirmed, explaining that “[a] dispute over the interpretation

of a provision in an existing award falls within the ambit of grievance arbitration.” 

Id.

 at

474 (citing Geriot, 

417 A.2d at 1144

 (holding that a police department could seek

mandamus against its municipality to enforce a wage provision in the CBA)). The Chirico

Court continued:

              Grievance disputes are properly handled within the framework
              of [S]ection 1 of Act 111, which provides that “[Employees]
              shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their
              grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this
              act.” [43 P.S. § 217.1]. Act 111 does not set forth the specific
              mechanism by which grievance, as compared with interest,
              disputes are to be arbitrated. We acknowledge it is clearly
              inadequate to recognize a right “to a settlement of grievances
              or disputes[,]” while failing to provide any method for the
              implementation of those rights. This obvious vacuum must
              not be countenanced. Yet resort to the courts to meet this
              need would contravene the strong affirmance of the use of
              non-adversarial methods for the resolution of disputes


                                      [J-70-2025] - 14
               between governmental employers and police and firemen
               embodied in [S]ection two of the Act.

               First, Act 111 specifically avoids the use of the courts for
               dispute resolution. This policy is so strong that [S]ection seven
               of the Act, 43 P.S. [§] 217.7, provides for binding arbitration
               and contains the unique provision that “[n]o appeal therefrom
               shall be allowed to any court.” Thus the only method for
               settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of
               Act 111 is arbitration. This objective would be completely
               frustrated if we were to superimpose, by judicial fiat, a layer of
               court intervention.
Id. at 474–75. The Court also highlighted that labor arbitrators, given their particular

expertise in labor law, are best suited to resolve disputes as to the meaning of an award.

Id. at 475.

        Two years later, in Moon Township v. Police Officers of Moon Township, 

498 A.2d

1305

 (Pa. 1985), the Court addressed whether an Act 111 interest arbitration panel may

include in its award a procedure for binding grievance arbitration and, subsumed within

that question, it addressed whether Act 111 requires that grievance arbitration procedures

conform with the arbitration procedures set forth in Section 4 of Act 111.12 After Moon

12   Section 4 provides:
               (a) If in any case of a dispute between a public employer and
               its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining
               process reaches an impasse and stalemate, or if the
               appropriate lawmaking body does not approve the agreement
               reached by collective bargaining, with the result that said
               employers and employes are unable to effect a settlement,
               then either party to the dispute, after written notice to the other
               party containing specifications of the issue or issues in
               dispute, may request the appointment of a board of
               arbitration.
               For purposes of this [S]ection, an impasse or stalemate shall
               be deemed to occur in the collective bargaining process if the
               parties do not reach a settlement of the issue or issues in
               dispute by way of a written agreement within thirty days after
               collective bargaining proceedings have been initiated.
(continued…)

                                       [J-70-2025] - 15
Township and its police officers reached an impasse in their collective bargaining

negotiations, the parties proceeded to arbitration pursuant to Act 111. Relevant here, the



             In the case of disputes involving political subdivisions of the
             Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not
             approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not
             approved by the appropriate lawmaking body within one
             month after the agreement is reached by way of collective
             bargaining.
             In the case of disputes involving the Commonwealth, the
             agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning
             of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the Legislature within
             six months after the agreement is reached by way of collective
             bargaining.
             (b) The board of arbitration shall be composed of three
             persons, one appointed by the public employer, one
             appointed by the body of policemen or firemen involved, and
             a third member to be agreed upon by the public employer and
             such policemen or firemen. The members of the board
             representing the public employer and the policemen or
             firemen shall be named within five days from the date of the
             request for the appointment of such board. If, after a period of
             ten days from the date of the appointment of the two
             arbitrators appointed by the public employer and by the
             policemen or firemen, the third arbitrator has not been
             selected by them, then either arbitrator may request the
             American Arbitration Association, or its successor in function,
             to furnish a list of three members of said association who are
             residents of Pennsylvania from which the third arbitrator shall
             be selected. The arbitrator appointed by the public employer
             shall eliminate one name from the list within five days after
             publication of the list, following which the arbitrator appointed
             by the policemen or firemen shall eliminate one name from
             the list within five days thereafter. The individual whose name
             remains on the list shall be the third arbitrator and shall act as
             chairman of the board of arbitration. The board of arbitration
             thus established shall commence the arbitration proceedings
             within ten days after the third arbitrator is selected and shall
             make its determination within thirty days after the appointment
             of the third arbitrator.
43 P.S. § 217.4.


                                     [J-70-2025] - 16
interest arbitration panel issued an award which included a contractual grievance

procedure that required binding arbitration of grievances between Moon Township and

its police officers. Moon Twp., 

498 A.2d at 1306

 n.2. Notably, the grievance procedure

set forth in the award differed from the procedure set forth in Section 4 of Act 111. 

Id.


The award provided, in pertinent part, that “the issue may be submitted to arbitration in

accordance with the rules and regulations, then prevailing, of the American Arbitration

Association except as may be limited or expanded by the Uniform Arbitration Act,[13]

[(“UAA”)] of the Commonwealth[,]” and that “[a]ny arbitration award shall, to the extent

permitted by law, be final, binding, and not subject to review except as provided for in the

said [UAA].” 

Id.


        Moon Township appealed to the court of common pleas, seeking, inter alia, to

vacate the grievance procedure. Specifically, Moon Township argued that the interest

arbitration panel was without constitutional or statutory authority to impose a binding

grievance arbitration procedure on the parties because Act 111 is limited to interest

arbitrations and does not permit grievance arbitrations at all. 

Id. at 1308

. The trial court

disagreed, reasoning that the interest arbitration panel had the authority to establish a

binding grievance arbitration procedure. Nonetheless, the trial court remanded the matter

to the interest arbitration panel because the grievance arbitration procedure set forth in

the award did not comply with the procedure described in Act 111. Moon Township then

appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the trial court; however, instead of

remanding the matter to the arbitration panel, the Commonwealth Court modified the

grievance arbitration procedure so that it mirrored the procedures set forth in Act 111.

        This Court modified the Commonwealth Court’s order, permitting the grievance

arbitration procedures referencing the UAA in the interest arbitration award to stand as


13   42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301–7320.


                                     [J-70-2025] - 17
is. Id. at 1313. The Court began its analysis by discussing the legislative history and

purpose of Act 111, describing that the Act sought to harmonize the employment

relationships with police and fire personnel by granting them the right to collectively

bargain. Id. at 1309. Given this legislative intent, the Court reasoned that “it is difficult to

accept [Moon Township’s] underlying premise that the legislature intended to exclude

grievance arbitration as a method for the resolution of disputes as to meaning,

interpretation and implication of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id.

The Court also referenced the 1967 amendment to Article III, § 31 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, see supra note 7, explaining that it provides the constitutional predicate for

binding resolution of grievances or disputes as well as for collective bargaining. Id. at

1310. The Court also observed that although Act 111 only provides a mechanism for

interest arbitrations, if the Act were not interpreted to also cover grievance arbitrations, it

“would render meaningless Section 1’s assurance that the resolution of grievances and

disputes comprised part of the subject matter to be addressed in the Act.” Id. Therefore,

the Court concluded that the interest arbitration panel “could properly include in its award

a mechanism for binding arbitration of grievances and disputes arising under the terms

of the collective bargaining provisions set forth under its award.” Id. at 1311-12.

       The Court next analyzed whether the panel exceeded its authority in establishing

a binding arbitration procedure pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act. On this issue, the

Court explained:

              Although we have found that Act 111 expresses a clear
              intention to provide for grievance and dispute resolution by
              way of binding arbitration, there is no clear intent that can be
              derived from the language of the Act to suggest that the
              procedure set forth in [S]ection 4 must be followed. In fact the
              procedure described in [S]ection 4 sets forth time limits that
              are clearly related to a contract negotiation impasse and not
              to an alleged grievance. Moreover, there is nothing unique
              about a tripartite arbitration panel that would make it more


                                       [J-70-2025] - 18
               suitable for grievance arbitration than the other forms of
               binding arbitration that have been approved by the legislature.
               … Unquestionably, the parties could have voluntarily agreed
               to a grievance procedure in accordance with the Uniform
               Arbitration Act[.] … Therefore, we can find no reason for
               holding that an arbitration panel should not have the same
               latitude in this area.
Id. at 1312 (internal citations omitted).

        This lengthy history of Act 111 jurisprudence brings us to Betancourt, which was

decided in 1995 and involved the consolidated cases of three state troopers who were

initially suspended or discharged for unrelated, wrongful conduct. The troopers each filed

grievances and proceeded with grievance arbitrations where the separate arbitrators

either ordered the reinstatement of the trooper at issue or imposed a lesser punishment.14

Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 85-87

. The State Police then appealed the arbitration awards

directly to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(b).                      The

Commonwealth Court found that “the source of the authorization for police and fire

grievance arbitration is the [UAA],” not Act 111, and therefore reasoned that the proper

scope of review is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d) of the UAA.15 Pa. State Police v. Pa.

14 Trooper James Betancourt was charged with unbecoming conduct for exposing his
penis to other troopers while on duty. Trooper Betancourt initially received a thirty-day
suspension without pay but a grievance arbitrator later determined that his conduct did
not rise to the level of unbecoming conduct as defined by the parties’ CBA.
Trooper Scott Gibson was discharged for wrongful conduct after failing to pay his debts,
issuing bad checks, and failing to file reports properly. A grievance arbitrator
subsequently found that Gibson’s conduct did not rise to the level of extremely egregious
behavior and ordered the reinstatement of Gibson.
Trooper Joseph DiRaimo was discharged for wrongful conduct after using a
Commonwealth credit card to pay for five dollars’ worth of gasoline for his wife’s personal
vehicle. Trooper DiRaimo pled guilty to a summary offense and was dismissed.
Subsequently, Trooper DiRaimo requested a grievance arbitration where the arbitrator
concluded that the conduct did not warrant his firing and reduced the discipline to a fifteen-
day suspension.
15   Section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA provides:
(continued…)

                                       [J-70-2025] - 19
State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt), 

633 A.2d 1278, 1287

 (1993), rev’d, 

656 A.2d 83

 (Pa.

1995).

         This Court subsequently granted allowance of appeal in Betancourt to determine

the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration awards under Act 111. Initially, the

Court noted that while City of Washington adopted the narrow certiorari scope of review

in a case involving an Act 111 interest arbitration award, the Court there “did not

circumscribe [its] holding … so that it would apply only to interest arbitration awards.”

Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 85

 n.3. The Court then explained that it was Act 111, not the

UAA, which specifically authorized grievance arbitrations, pointing to our decision in

Chirico where we determined that “[g]rievance disputes are properly handled within the

framework of [S]ection 1 of Act 111, which provides that ‘[Employees] shall have the right

to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the

terms of this act.’”    Chirico, 

470 A.2d at 474

.    The Betancourt Court rejected the

Commonwealth Court’s reasoning that this Court’s decisions in Chirico and Moon,

“established the UAA as the progenitor of Act 111 grievance arbitration.” Betancourt, 

656

A.2d at 87

. According to the Betancourt Court, “[n]either [Chirico nor Moon] provide[d]

justification for the [Commonwealth] Court’s views.” 

Id.


         The Betancourt Court explained that in Moon, the Court focused on whether it was

permissible for an Act 111 grievance arbitration panel to decline to follow “some of the

procedures set forth for interest arbitration in Section 4 of Act 111, and instead follow

               (2) Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an
               arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall,
               notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify
               or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is
               such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have
               entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding
               the verdict.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2).


                                     [J-70-2025] - 20
some of the procedures set forth in the UAA.”            Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 87

.     The

Betancourt Court explained that the Moon Court “determined that a grievance arbitration

panel need not conform in all particulars to the procedures set forth in Section 4 [of Act

111].” 

Id.

 While the Moon Court permitted parties to utilize certain UAA procedures for

grievance arbitrations, the Betancourt Court stressed that Moon “did not, however, make

any statements which could be construed as giving support for the proposition that it was

the UAA, and not Act 111, that gave authority for grievance arbitration under Act 111.”

Id. at 88

. The Betancourt Court also highlighted that although Moon permitted the

grievance procedures to differ from the procedures set forth in Section 4 of Act 111, Moon

did not discuss the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration awards. 

Id.

 at 88 n.11

(“Section 4 [of Act 111] concerns the procedures to be employed; it does not, however,

touch upon judicial review of arbitration awards.”). Therefore, the Betancourt Court

clarified that Moon “should not be read as condoning the UAA’s essence test as the scope

of review for Act 111 grievance arbitration awards.” 

Id.


       The Betancourt Court next addressed the State Police’s argument that because

Act 111 does not specifically provide for grievance arbitration procedures, the scope of

review set forth in the UAA should apply. 

Id. at 88

. The Court rejected the State Police’s

argument, explaining that “Act 111 is not devoid of direction on this issue[,]” and

referenced Section 1 of Act 111 which provides that “policemen or firemen … shall have

the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with

the terms of this act.” 

Id.

 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1). Based on Section 1 of Act 111, the

Court concluded that “[t]he legislature … expressed the unqualified intent that issues

relating to grievance resolution be covered under Act 111.” Id. However, the Court also

acknowledged that “[a]rguably, this intent is obscured by the legislature’s failure to provide

as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did for interest arbitration.” Id.




                                      [J-70-2025] - 21
Given the lack of clear direction in Act 111, the Court looked to the history of Act 111 to

ascertain whether the General Assembly intended for a different scope of review for

grievance arbitration awards compared to interest arbitration awards.

       The Betancourt Court observed that prior to Act 111, police officers and firefighters

were prohibited from going on strike and had no collective bargaining rights. Id. (citing

Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, 43 P.S. § 215.1). The Court noted that “[b]y the later

1960s, the failure of labor relations law to protect the rights of public employees had led

to illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication between public employers

and their employees” causing the General Assembly to “enact sweeping reforms of public

labor relations law.” Id. at 89. According to the Court, “Act 111 was created to strike a

more perfect balance between the need of the Commonwealth to insure public safety and

the rights of the worker. To protect the need of the Commonwealth, police and fire

personnel were still denied the right to strike.” Id. The Court emphasized that the

“restraint on judicial activism [wa]s the linchpin of the Act[.]” Id. (citing City of Washington,

259 A.2d at 443

). Thus, the Court concluded that there was nothing in Act 111 nor its

history showing that the General Assembly intended for “grievance arbitration awards to

be subject to greater judicial involvement than interest arbitration awards.” 

Id.

 The Court

declined to “allow a scope of review which is markedly boarder than narrow certiorari for

Act 111 grievance arbitration.” 

Id.

 The Court also reiterated that the UAA’s essence test

is inconsistent with the narrow certiorari scope of review such that the UAA cannot apply.

Id.

 at 89 n.17 (citing Appeal of Upper Providence Police Delaware Cnty. Lodge No. 27

Fraternal Ord. of Police, 

526 A.2d 315, 320

 (Pa. 1987) (upholding the narrow certiorari

scope of review for Act 111 arbitration awards and reasoning that “[t]he legislature did not

intend that the comprehensive scheme and procedures created for arbitration under Act




                                       [J-70-2025] - 22
111 be somehow modified implicitly by the scope of review provided under [S]ection

7302(d) of the UAA or by any of the other inconsistent provisions”)).

       Four years following Betancourt, this Court in Smith analyzed whether there should

be a limited public policy exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Smith

involved the consolidated cases of two state troopers who were each disciplined for

separate, wrongful conduct.16 On appeal, the Smith Court first reiterated Betancourt’s

holding that narrow certiorari is the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration

awards and that the “severe limits placed on our appellate authority were not self-

imposed” but instead “dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1251

. Applying

the narrow certiorari scope of review, the Court first held that the arbitrators did not exceed

their powers in ordering the reinstatement of the troopers because the reinstatement “did

not mandate that the State Police perform an illegal act” and because the reinstatement

“clearly related to the terms and conditions of employment.” 

Id. at 1252

.

       The Court next addressed the State Police’s argument that an arbitrator could

“exceed his or her powers … by issuing an order which contravenes public policy.” 

Id.


(internal quotations omitted). We unequivocally rejected this argument, explaining that

“allow[ing] the courts to interfere with an arbitrator’s award whenever that award could be

deemed to be violative of ‘public policy’—however that nebulous concept may be defined

by a particular appellate court—would greatly expand the scope of review in these


16 Trooper Rodney Smith, after drinking at a bar while off duty, got into an argument with
his ex-girlfriend and jammed his police-issued weapon into her mouth, threatening to kill
her. Trooper Smith pled guilty to five criminal charges stemming from the incident and
was dismissed from the force. After filing a grievance, an arbitrator determined that
Smith’s dismissal was excessive and ordered his reinstatement.
Trooper Robert Johnson was charged with retail theft after stealing $27.58 in
merchandise from a department store. After being notified of his dismissal from the force,
Johnson filed a grievance. The arbitrator concluded that the State Police did not have
just cause to dismiss Trooper Johnson.


                                      [J-70-2025] - 23
matters.”   

Id.

   The Court further explained that adopting such an exception “would

undercut the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.” 

Id. at

1253

.

        Then-Justice Castille authored a concurring opinion, suggesting that the narrow

certiorari scope of review “be expanded in grievance arbitration cases to include review

of arbitrators’ powers where it appears that an arbitrator’s decision is manifestly,

unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.” 

Id. at 1253

 (Castille, J., concurring). Justice

Nigro also concurred, proposing that, based on Trooper Smith’s egregious conduct, the

Court expand the narrow certiorari scope of review to examine “whether the arbitration

decision is repugnant to public policy or shocks the conscience of the court.” 

Id. at 1254


(Nigro, J., concurring). Lastly, Justice Newman dissented, finding that the arbitrators

exceeded the limits of their powers by reinstating troopers who were “guilty of serious

crimes.” 

Id. at 1255

 (Newman, J., dissenting). Justice Newman reasoned that because

police are “responsible for enforcing the laws of this Commonwealth and protecting the

safety of the citizens of this Commonwealth, the public policy of binding arbitration must

cede to the public policy of insuring that the employees who are bound to carry out these

duties are of the highest integrity and character.” 

Id.


   III. Parties’ Arguments

City’s Arguments

        The City provides two main reasons why the Court should overrule Betancourt.

First, it argues that the Betancourt Court erred in holding that narrow certiorari applies to

grievance arbitrations because the text of Act 111 is silent on judicial review of grievance

arbitrations. City’s Brief at 28. The City highlights that it was not initially clear that Act

111 permitted grievance arbitrations because the Act does not provide a specific provision

pertaining to such arbitrations. Id. at 30. Although Act 111 states that “[n]o appeal [from




                                      [J-70-2025] - 24
an arbitration award] shall be allowed to any court[,]” id. (citing 43 P.S. § 217.7(a)), the

City maintains that this “clearly applies to interest arbitration only” because “[i]t is

preceded and followed by sections describing the interest arbitration panel’s powers” and

“specifically refers to the ‘determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[.]’” Id.

at 30-31 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.7(a)). The City observes that courts only employ the

narrow certiorari scope of review “as a backdrop where a statute has made clear that it is

precluding review[.]” Id. at 31 (citing Dauphin Deposit v. Myers, 

130 A.2d 686

 (Pa. 1957)).

However, here, because in the City’s view Act 111 does not prohibit the appeals of

grievance arbitrations, narrow certiorari should not apply.

       Second, the City contends that Betancourt misunderstood the history and policy

rationale of Act 111. Id. at 32. Specifically, the City attacks Betancourt’s conclusion that

the “swift resolution of [grievance arbitration] disputes [would] decrease[] the chance that

the workforce would be destabilized by protracted litigation.”            Id. at 33 (quoting

Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

). The City contends that this was not a concern of the General

Assembly in passing Act 111, but to the extent it was, the concern was aimed at interest

arbitrations which affect the entire workforce. 

Id.

 at 33-34 (citing Pa. State Police v. Pa.

Lab. Rels. Bd., 

810 A.2d 1240

, 1247 n.6 (Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“Good reason

exists to differentiate legislative purposes related to impasses and grievances, since

bargaining impasses implicate a far more immediate and direct potential for

destabilization in the workforce (the seminal concern of Act 111) than does the resolution

of individual grievances.”)).

       The City believes that the narrow certiorari scope of review is harmful as it has led

to the wrongful reinstatement of police officers who have betrayed the public trust,

“taint[ing] the entire investigative process” and “failing to protect the public against the

most powerful employees.” City’s Brief at 36. According to the City, “[a] minimally altered




                                      [J-70-2025] - 25
scope of review would restore at least some discretion to the [Police] Commissioner, who

directly understands how derelict officers impact the police mission.” Id. at 41.

       Instead of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the City asks the Court to adopt

the J.N.O.V. scope of review set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) of the UAA, or the

essence test, which is the scope of review applied to grievance arbitrations under PERA.

City’s Brief at 43. The City explains that the J.N.O.V. scope of review is specifically

employed for grievance arbitration awards arising out of a public CBA. In such matters,

42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) provides that

              a court in reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to this
              subchapter shall … modify or correct the award where the
              award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict
              of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or
              a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2). Pursuant to this scope of review, a court should enter judgment

notwithstanding the verdict when “no two reasonable minds could disagree that the

outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” City’s Brief at 43 (quoting

Lockwood v. Pittsburgh, 

751 A.2d 1136, 1138

 (Pa. 2000)).

       The City alternatively advocates for the essence test, which “considers whether

the issue is within the CBA’s terms and, if so, whether the award ‘can rationally be derived

from the’ CBA.” 

Id.

 (quoting State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll.

Univ. Pro. Ass’n, 

743 A.2d 405, 413

 (Pa. 1999)). The City notes that the essence test is

applicable to arbitrations arising under PERA, which, similarly to Act 111, provides that

arbitration awards under the Act are final and binding.        

Id.

 at 44 (citing 43 P.S. §

1101.903).

       If the Court declines to replace the narrow certiorari scope of review with either the

J.N.O.V. scope of review or the essence test, the City seeks a narrow public policy

exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Id. at 49. Although it acknowledges



                                      [J-70-2025] - 26
that the Court declined to add such an exception in Smith, the City explains that three

Justices would have adopted a public policy exception in that case. Id. at 49-50 (citing

Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1253

 (Castille, J., concurring); 

id. at 1254

 (Nigro, J., concurring); 

id. at

1255

 (Newman, J., dissenting)). The City also notes that this Court has relied on public

policy exceptions in other scenarios. 

Id.

 at 50 (citing Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v.

Greenfield, 

855 A.2d 854, 869

 (Pa. 2004) (OAJC) (finding that based on public policy, an

“[i]nsurance [c]ompany is not required to defend or indemnify against damages arising

out of its insured’s criminal acts where the voluntary participation of the victim in an illegal

heroin-transaction caused her death”); Dinardo v. Kohler, 

304 A.3d 1187

, 1205 (Pa. 2023)

(rejecting the no-felony-conviction-recovery rule as it conflicts with public policy); Socko

v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc., 

126 A.3d 1266, 1273

 (Pa. 2015) (explaining that the at-will

employment doctrine is subject to “judicially-created notions of public policy”); Waychoff

v. Waychoff, 

163 A. 670, 672

 (Pa. 1932) (refusing to enforce a contract that is against

public policy); McCormick v. Hanover Twp., 

92 A. 195, 197

 (Pa. 1914) (same)).

       The City also highlights that in PERA cases, the Court has adopted a limited public

policy exception aimed at “finding a balance between ‘the sometimes competing goals of

dispute resolution by final and binding arbitration and protection of the public weal.’” 

Id.


at 52 (quoting Westmoreland, 

939 A.2d at 865-66

). The limited public policy exception in

PERA cases consists of the following three-part test:

              First, a reviewing court must identify precisely what remedy
              the arbitrator imposed. Next, the court must inquire into
              whether that remedy implicates a public policy that is well-
              defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws
              and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
              supposed public interests. Finally, the reviewing court must
              determine if the arbitrator’s award compels the employer to
              violate the implicated policy, given the particular
              circumstances and the factual findings of the arbitrator.




                                       [J-70-2025] - 27

Id.

 (quoting Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n, 

210

A.3d 993, 1011

 (Pa. 2019)). Based on this Court’s adoption of a limited public policy

exception in PERA cases, the City rejects the Smith Court’s contention that such an

exception would be unworkable in the Act 111 context. Id. at 51.

FOP’s Arguments

       The FOP argues that the history, purpose, and text of Act 111 support the narrow

certiorari scope of review for grievance arbitration awards as interpreted by this Court in

City of Washington and Betancourt. FOP’s Brief at 21-25. The FOP relies on the doctrine

of stare decisis and our specific pronouncement that “[i]n cases resolved upon statutory

interpretation, stare decisis does implicate greater sanctity because the legislature can

prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Id. at 28

(quoting Commonwealth v. Doughty, 

126 A.3d 951, 955

 (Pa. 2015)). Here, because the

General Assembly has not amended Act 111 since Betancourt, the FOP maintains that

Betancourt correctly interpreted Act 111. 

Id.

 Moreover, because the narrow certiorari

scope of review has been “repeatedly applied and essentially unchanged” since

Betancourt, the FOP claims that stare decisis further compels the rejection of the City’s

arguments in this case. Id. at 29.

       The FOP also contends that the Betancourt Court correctly recognized that Act

111 plainly declares that “policemen and firemen … shall have the right to an adjustment

or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.’” Id.

at 30 (quoting Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 88

 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1)). Although Betancourt

noted that Act 111 did not provide “as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as

it did for interest arbitration,” the FOP explains that the Court based its decision on the

purpose and text of Act 111 which was to prevent arbitration awards “from miring down

in litigation.” Id. at 32 (quoting Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

).




                                      [J-70-2025] - 28
       Next, the FOP rejects the City’s argument that the Court should apply the J.N.O.V.

scope of review set forth in the UAA because, in the FOP’s view, the UAA does not apply

to Act 111 arbitration awards. Id. at 33. Specifically, the FOP relies on our precedent

holding that the enactment of the UAA did not necessitate a lower scope of review for Act

111 arbitrations. Id. at 33-34 (citing Appeal of Upper Providence, 

526 A.2d at 316

). The

FOP notes that Betancourt similarly rejected the argument that the J.N.O.V. standard

applied to Act 111 because it would conflict with the text of Act 111. 

Id.

 at 35 (citing

Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 88-89

).

       In addition, the FOP rejects the City’s reliance on PERA’s essence test because,

in the FOP’s view, PERA is inapplicable to Act 111 arbitration awards. Id. at 36. Although

PERA generally covers “any individual employed by a public employer,” it specifically

excepts employees covered by Act 111. 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2).               The FOP further

distinguishes PERA from Act 111 by noting that PERA has no statutory provision barring

appeals of labor arbitration awards.

       Lastly, the FOP rejects the City’s attempt to create a limited public policy exception

to the narrow certiorari scope of review given our decision in Smith which specifically

rejected such an exception. FOP’s Brief at 39-40 (citing Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1250-51

).

Based on the “severe limits” the General Assembly placed on appellate review of

arbitration awards under Act 111, the FOP explains that the Court reasoned that a public

policy exception “would undercut the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation

in this arena.” Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1252

.

City’s Reply

       In its reply, the City responds to the FOP’s invocation of stare decisis, claiming that

because “Betancourt is both clearly wrong and egregiously unworkable, it is not binding.”

City’s Reply Brief at 9 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 

501 U.S. 808, 827

 (1991)). The City




                                       [J-70-2025] - 29
also addresses the additional factors we examine when deciding whether to overturn

precedent, “including the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established,

its consistency with other related decisions, ... and reliance on the decision.” 

Id.

 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Alexander, 

243 A.3d 177

, 196 (Pa. 2020)).                 As to the quality of

Betancourt’s reasoning, the City reiterates its position that the General Assembly did not

intend to limit the scope of review for grievance arbitrations in passing Act 111. 

Id.

 at 9-

10. The City also discounts the FOP’s contention that stare decisis is given more weight

in matters of statutory construction, explaining that the Court has been willing to overrule

prior cases involving statutory construction. 

Id.

 at 10 (quoting William Penn Sch. Dist. v.

Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 

170 A.3d 414, 456-57

 (Pa. 2017)). Additionally, the City places little

value on the fact that the General Assembly has not amended Act 111 since Betancourt.

Id.

 (quoting Commonwealth v. Small, 

238 A.3d 1267

, 1285 (Pa. 2020) (“[The] Court’s

departure from the plain language of a statute should not be viewed categorically as

placing the burden upon the General Assembly to detect our error and to marshal the

resources to correct it.”)).

       As to the consequences of Betancourt, the City emphasizes that the narrow

certiorari scope of review has “proven disastrously unworkable, leading to the

reinstatement of police officers who have betrayed the public trust.” Id. at 13. The City

also diminishes the fact that courts have consistently followed Betancourt, because, in

the City’s view, these subsequent decisions have failed to “re-evaluat[e] [Betancourt’s]

wisdom.” Id. at 14. Lastly, regarding the reliance upon Betancourt, the City frames the

reliance interest as being “the right to take actions in reliance upon the narrow scope of

review of Act 111 grievance arbitrations[.]” Id. at 17. According to the City, this reliance

is not protected by stare decisis because “reliance upon a narrow scope of review does

not provide a guide to lawful behavior (and, on the contrary, frequently supports unlawful,




                                       [J-70-2025] - 30
or at least highly inappropriate, behavior).” Id. at 17-18 (emphasis in original). The City

also mentions in passing that “the scope of review is a procedural rule” but fails to develop

an argument as to why this would have an impact on stare decisis. Id. at 17.

Amici17

       The City’s Amici collectively highlight that continuing to follow Betancourt is

untenable because unreasonable and egregious arbitration decisions undermine the

public trust, especially when police officers play such an important role in society. The

City’s Amici highlight that sexual harassment is a “harmful and pervasive problem in

Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies” that poses a threat to public safety by

undermining officer and squad effectiveness. Women’s Law Project Amicus Brief at 5,

16-18; Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Amicus Brief at 19-23.

       The FOP’s Amici each reiterate that the narrow certiorari scope of review comports

with the text and history of Act 111 and that stare decisis compels the Court to uphold

Betancourt. Amicus Pennsylvania AFL-CIO additionally argues that modifying the scope

of review will undermine contractual provisions agreed to by public employers and unions.

Pennsylvania AFL-CIO’s Amicus Brief at 8-9.




17  The following amici filed briefs in support of the City: 1) Citizens Police Oversight
Commission; 2) Women’s Law Project and the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence; 3) the Advocacy for Racial and Civil Justice Clinic at the University of
Pennsylvania Carey School of Law, Defender Association of Philadelphia, & American
Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania; 4) the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association;
5) Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, Pennsylvania Municipal
League, Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs, and Pennsylvania State
Association of Township Commissioners; and 6) the City of Pittsburgh.
The following amici filed briefs in support of the FOP: 1) the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO;
2) Pennsylvania Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police; and 3) the Pennsylvania Professional
Firefighters Association, and the International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1.


                                      [J-70-2025] - 31
   IV. Analysis

       As the City asks us to overturn Betancourt, or alternatively, Smith, we must

address the doctrine of stare decisis. As this presents a pure question of law, our

standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Tincher v. Omega

Flex, Inc., 

104 A.3d 328, 351

 (Pa. 2014). Stare decisis “derives from the Latin maxim

‘stare decisis et non quieta movere,’ which means to stand by the thing decided and not

disturb the calm.” Alexander, 243 A.3d at 195 (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana, 

590 U.S. 83,

115

 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)). It is “preferable for the sake of certainty,

… to follow even questionable decisions because stare decisis promotes the

evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance

on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial

process.” 

Id. at 196

 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

       However, because “precedent is not infallible, … judicial honesty demands

corrective action in appropriate cases.” Tincher, 

104 A.3d at 352

. To overturn precedent,

we “require[] a ‘special justification, over and above the belief that the precedent was

wrongly decided.’” Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 

309 A.3d

808

, 850 (Pa. 2024) (quoting Alexander, 243 A.3d at 196) (internal citations omitted). In

determining whether there is a special justification to depart from precedent, we analyze

“a number of factors, including the age and lineage of the decisions, as well as ‘the quality

of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other

related decisions, … and reliance on the decision.’” Id. (quoting Alexander, 243 A.3d at

196-97).

       Another important consideration informing the analysis is whether the precedent

involves a question of statutory interpretation or constitutional interpretation. As to the

former, stare decisis “implicate[s] greater sanctity because the legislature can




                                      [J-70-2025] - 32
prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Doughty, 

126

A.3d at 955

.     Conversely, stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the

Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by a constitutional amendment

or by overruling our prior decisions.” Alexander, 243 A.3d at 177-78 (quoting Agostini v.

Felton, 

521 U.S. 203, 235

 (1997)).

   A. Betancourt and narrow certiorari scope of review

         i.   Age and lineage of Betancourt

       When analyzing the age and lineage of a decision, we note that “[c]ases with a

long lineage tend to have multiple precedents to overcome, making it challenging to

overrule one decision without disrupting an entire area of law.” Allegheny Reprod. Health

Ctr., 309 A.3d at 887.      In addition, we “are generally more hesitant to overturn

longstanding decisions involving questions of statutory interpretation, reasoning that the

longer the decision has been on the books, the longer the legislature had to step in if they

felt something needed to be corrected.” Id.

       Betancourt was decided in 1995, and this Court has repeatedly followed its holding

in Act 111 grievance arbitration cases ever since. See N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1027; City

of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 713; City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5

(Breary), 

985 A.2d 1259, 1266

 (Pa. 2009); Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police

Officers Ass’n, 

901 A.2d 991, 996

 (Pa. 2006); Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1251

. Given this Court’s

frequent and consistent application of Betancourt and the narrow certiorari scope of

review, it would be a significant departure to now reverse course and hold that Betancourt

was wrong ab initio.

       Moreover, as described, Betancourt based its holding in large part on cases that

preceded it. See City of Washington, 

259 A.2d at 441

 (holding that narrow certiorari is

the proper scope of review of arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111, without




                                     [J-70-2025] - 33
distinguishing between grievance arbitrations and interest arbitrations); Chirico, 

470 A.2d

at 474

 (determining that “the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within

the framework of Act 111 is arbitration[,]” even though Act 111 does not set forth a specific

procedure for the arbitration of grievances). Betancourt was not decided in a vacuum,

and it did not break new ground in clarifying that the narrow certiorari scope of review

applies to grievance arbitrations in the same manner as interest arbitrations. If we were

to overturn Betancourt, it would not only disrupt the long lineage of cases decided

subsequently but also call into question the cases preceding Betancourt.

       We also emphasize that the General Assembly has not amended the pertinent

language of Section 7 of Act 111, which precludes the appeals of grievance arbitration

awards, in the thirty years following Betancourt. We recently rejected a similar call to

overturn precedent involving a matter of statutory interpretation where the General

Assembly did not amend the statute at issue following our initial decision in 1999. See

Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc., 

345 A.3d 668

 (Pa. 2025). In Yoder, the appellant

requested that this Court overturn Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 

724 A.2d 903

 (Pa. 1999),

which reiterated that Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a general

contractor with statutory employer immunity from common law negligence claims. We

noted that “[n]otwithstanding jurists’ qualms with Fonner’s result and explicit calls that the

General Assembly act, that policy-making branch has enacted no change to suggest that

our decades-old interpretation of the Act is contrary to its intent.” Yoder, 345 A.3d at 683.

We again emphasized that stare decisis “implicate[s] greater sanctity” in matters of

statutory interpretation “because the legislature can prospectively amend the statute if it

disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Id. (quoting Doughty, 

126 A.3d at 955

).




                                      [J-70-2025] - 34
       Here, the General Assembly has similarly failed to act following Betancourt.18

While this alone is not dispositive, it is a significant hurdle to overcome when claiming a

special justification to depart from precedent. See Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr., 309

A.3d at 887.      Unlike amendments to the Constitution—which require two layers of

legislative approval in consecutive sessions and a vote by the people before becoming

effective—statutes may be amended in the normal course of the General Assembly’s

business as the legislative branch of government.             Given that there are fewer

impediments for correcting alleged errors of statutory interpretation, we reason that the

General Assembly’s failure to act following our decision in Betancourt supports the notion

that the Court’s initial interpretation was correct. While the City is correct that the burden

of correcting departures from the plain language of a statute should not be placed on the

legislature, as we later discuss, we conclude that Betancourt did not so depart.

Accordingly, the age and lineage factor weighs in favor of following Betancourt and stare

decisis.

           ii.   Quality of Betancourt’s reasoning

       To overcome stare decisis, it is not enough to demonstrate that the decision was

wrongly decided or that the reasoning of the decision was flawed. Rather, one must show


18  The General Assembly enacted a law in 1996—one year after Betancourt was
decided—which allows for the collective bargaining between school administrators
employed by school districts in first class cities and their public employers. See Act of
April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, added by Act of July 11, 1996, P.L. 619, as amended, 71 P.S. §
371 (“Section 371”). Section 371 is virtually identical to Act 111 in that it provides
administrators with “the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or
disputes in accordance with the terms of this [S]ection[,]” 71 P.S. § 371(a), sets forth an
identical procedure and timeline to Act 111 for composing a board of arbitration, id. §
371(e), and includes the familiar language that “[n]o appeal shall be allowed to any court”
in reference to the determination of the board of arbitration. Id. § 371(h). The
Commonwealth Court has concluded that, like Act 111, the appropriate scope of review
for arbitration awards under Section 371 is narrow certiorari. Commonwealth Ass’n of
Sch. Adm’rs ex rel. Axelrod v. Bd. of Educ., 

740 A.2d 1225, 1228

 (Pa. Commw. 1999).


                                      [J-70-2025] - 35
that the reasoning of the decision was “egregiously wrong” or “patently flawed.” Id. at 883

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a preliminary matter, the Betancourt

Court explained that in City of Washington, the Court held that narrow certiorari applied

to review of Act 111 arbitration awards, and the Court did not limit its holding to apply only

to interest arbitrations. Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 85

 n.3 (citing City of Washington, 

259

A.2d at 440

). The Betancourt Court also observed that “this Court plainly declared in

Chirico … that it was Act 111 that authorized grievance arbitration” and that “grievance[s]

must be arbitrated in accordance with Act 111.” Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 87

 (citing Chirico,

470 A.2d at 474

) (“[T]he only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the

framework of Act 111 is arbitration.”)).       Arguably, the general holding in City of

Washington that narrow certiorari applies to the review of Act 111 arbitration awards,

coupled with the specific holding in Chirico that “the only method for settling grievance

disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration[,]” would have constituted

a sufficient legal basis to conclude that narrow certiorari applies to the review of grievance

arbitration awards.

       Nonetheless, the Court continued its analysis, highlighting that because Act 111

“plainly declare[s] that ‘policemen or firemen … shall have the right to an adjustment or

settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act[,]’” the

General Assembly “expressed the unqualified intent that issues relating to grievance

resolution be covered under Act 111.” 

Id.

 at 88 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1). Despite this

overarching statement of intent, the Court recognized that it was “obscured by the

legislature’s failure to provide as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did

for interest arbitration.”   Id.   Given the perceived ambiguity in Act 111, the Court

“review[ed] the history behind Act 111” in order “[t]o determine whether the legislature




                                       [J-70-2025] - 36
intended that grievance arbitration awards have a different scope of review from interest

arbitration awards[.]” Id.

       The Court’s preliminary analysis was not egregiously wrong nor patently flawed. It

relied on past precedent for the threshold determination that grievance arbitration awards

were controlled by Act 111 and then examined the language of Act 111 to ascertain

whether the General Assembly intended to prohibit appeals of such awards. After finding

no clear answer in the text of Act 111, the Court reasonably looked at the history of Act

111 to determine the intent of the legislature. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(7) (“When the

words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be

ascertained by considering, among other matters … [t]he contemporaneous legislative

history.”).

       The City argues that “Act 111 is silent on the scope of review of grievance

arbitrations[,]” and contends that “Betancourt over-relied upon the fact that Act 111

mentioned the word ‘grievances’ once.” City’s Brief at 29-30. However, this argument

ignores the Court’s holding in Chirico that “the only method for settling grievance disputes

allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.” Chirico, 

470 A.2d at 475

. Aside

from a passing reference to Chirico in its reply brief,19 the City does not offer any

meaningful discussion of the case, let alone challenge the Betancourt Court’s reliance on

it for the threshold determination that grievance arbitrations are governed by Act 111.

       While the City here does not dispute that Act 111 authorizes the arbitration of

grievances, it argues that Section 7’s prohibition of appeals applies only to interest

arbitrations given that the prohibition references determinations by the board of arbitration

set forth in Section 4 of the Act, which it maintains does not apply to grievance arbitrations.

19 See City’s Reply Brief at 6 n.1 (attempting to distinguish Chirico only by noting that it
“did not concern the scope of appellate review of an arbitration appeal, but rather
addressed whether the court of common pleas had jurisdiction in the first place”).


                                      [J-70-2025] - 37

Id.

 at 30-31 (citing 43 P.S. §§ 217.4(b), 217.7(a)). Consistent with the City’s argument,

Section 7’s prohibition on appeals makes clear that “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be

allowed to any court.”20 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (emphasis added). The word “therefrom”

means “from that or it.”            Therefrom, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/therefrom (last visited Dec. 11, 2025). Based on the preceding

sentences of Section 7, it is apparent that “therefrom” refers to “[t]he determination of the

majority of the board of arbitration[.]” 43 P.S. § 217.7(a). It is equally apparent that “[t]he

determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[,]” id., refers to the board of

arbitration outlined in Section 4(b). See 43 P.S. § 217.4(b) (“The board of arbitration shall

be composed of three persons, one appointed by the public employer, one appointed by

the body of policemen or firemen involved, and a third member to be agreed upon by the

public employer and such policemen or firemen.”). Thus, upon reading Section 7 and

Section 4(b) together, it becomes clear that Section 7’s prohibition on appeals applies to

arbitration awards rendered by a tripartite board of arbitration set forth in Section 4(b).

         The Betancourt Court bound itself to the reasoning of its prior decision in Moon.

The Moon Court explained that Section 4 “clearly relate[s] to a contract negotiation

impasse and not to an alleged grievance” and held that “there is no clear intent that can

be derived from the language of the Act to suggest that the procedure set forth in [S]ection

4 must be followed [in grievance arbitrations].” Moon, 

498 A.2d at 1312

. The unexamined

20   To reiterate, Section 7(a) provides, in pertinent part:
                (a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration
                thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute
                and shall be binding upon the public employer and the
                policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be
                in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties
                to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any
                court.
43 P.S. § 217.7(a).


                                        [J-70-2025] - 38
holding in Moon that the procedures outlined in Section 4 of Act 111 do not apply to

grievance arbitrations deserves attention. In Chirico—decided two years prior to Moon—

this Court similarly concluded that the procedures outlined in Section 4 pertain to interest

arbitrations. Chirico, 

470 A.2d at 474

. However, the Chirico Court reasoned that “it is

clearly inadequate to recognize a right ‘to a settlement of grievances or disputes[,]’ while

failing to provide any method for the implementation of those rights.” 

Id.

 (quoting 43 P.S.

§ 217.1). Explaining that “[t]his obvious vacuum must not be countenanced” to permit

grievances to be resolved by courts in a manner contrary to Act 111, the Chirico Court

held that “the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework

of Act 111 is arbitration.” Id. at 475. As Section 4 is the only section of Act 111 that

outlines the method of arbitration, Moon’s holding that Section 4 does not apply to

grievance arbitrations is difficult to reconcile with Chirico’s holding that “the only method

for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.”

Id.

          Neither Moon nor Chirico called attention to the structure of Section 4, which

contains two separate subsections, (a) and (b).21 While Section 4(a) clearly outlines the

21    For reference, Section 4 provides, in its entirety:
                 (a) If in any case of a dispute between a public employer and
                 its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining
                 process reaches an impasse and stalemate, or if the
                 appropriate lawmaking body does not approve the agreement
                 reached by collective bargaining, with the result that said
                 employers and employes are unable to effect a settlement,
                 then either party to the dispute, after written notice to the other
                 party containing specifications of the issue or issues in
                 dispute, may request the appointment of a board of
                 arbitration.
            For purposes of this [S]ection, an impasse or stalemate shall
            be deemed to occur in the collective bargaining process if the
            parties do not reach a settlement of the issue or issues in
(continued…)

                                         [J-70-2025] - 39
             dispute by way of a written agreement within thirty days after
             collective bargaining proceedings have been initiated.
             In the case of disputes involving political subdivisions of the
             Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not
             approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not
             approved by the appropriate lawmaking body within one
             month after the agreement is reached by way of collective
             bargaining.
             In the case of disputes involving the Commonwealth, the
             agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning
             of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the Legislature within
             six months after the agreement is reached by way of collective
             bargaining.
             (b) The board of arbitration shall be composed of three
             persons, one appointed by the public employer, one
             appointed by the body of policemen or firemen involved, and
             a third member to be agreed upon by the public employer and
             such policemen or firemen. The members of the board
             representing the public employer and the policemen or
             firemen shall be named within five days from the date of the
             request for the appointment of such board. If, after a period of
             ten days from the date of the appointment of the two
             arbitrators appointed by the public employer and by the
             policemen or firemen, the third arbitrator has not been
             selected by them, then either arbitrator may request the
             American Arbitration Association, or its successor in function,
             to furnish a list of three members of said association who are
             residents of Pennsylvania from which the third arbitrator shall
             be selected. The arbitrator appointed by the public employer
             shall eliminate one name from the list within five days after
             publication of the list, following which the arbitrator appointed
             by the policemen or firemen shall eliminate one name from
             the list within five days thereafter. The individual whose name
             remains on the list shall be the third arbitrator and shall act as
             chairman of the board of arbitration. The board of arbitration
             thus established shall commence the arbitration proceedings
             within ten days after the third arbitrator is selected and shall
             make its determination within thirty days after the appointment
             of the third arbitrator.
43 P.S. § 217.4.


                                     [J-70-2025] - 40
specific events which shall constitute an impasse or stalemate in collective bargaining

negotiations sufficient to trigger interest arbitration, Section 4(b) is limited to defining the

composition of the board of arbitration, the timeframe and procedure for appointing the

arbitrators, and the timeframe for commencing the arbitration after the arbitrators are

selected.   See 43 P.S. § 217.4(a)-(b).       Section 4(b) makes no specific mention of

impasses or stalemates. Instead, Section 4(b) sets forth generally applicable arbitration

requirements that could apply to any grievance or dispute. Given that arbitration is the

only method for resolution of disagreements between public employers and public

employees under Act 111, it would have been reasonable to interpret Section 4(b) to

apply to any arbitration conducted pursuant to the statute. In departing from this method

for grievance resolution, the Moon Court reasoned that “there is nothing unique about a

tripartite arbitration panel[,]” Moon, 

498 A.2d at 1312

, without reckoning with the fact that

the legislature preferred a tripartite arbitration panel. The General Assembly treated

dispute and grievance resolutions similarly: “policemen or firemen … shall have the right

to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the

terms of this act.” 43 P.S. § 217.1. Based on Section 1’s clear statement of intent that

grievances shall be resolved in accordance with the Act, and the generally applicable

arbitration procedures in Section 4(b), the Moon Court could have looked to the entirety

of Act 111, including the arbitration procedures in Section 4(b), to conclude that the

procedures in Section 4(b) were applicable to grievance arbitrations.22

       Betancourt relied upon Moon’s procedural distinction between interest and

grievance arbitration. Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 87

 n.10. Indeed, the Court’s primary


22 The parties do not question Moon. Pursuant to the CBA, the instant grievance was
decided by a single arbitrator, see supra note 3. We observe that in another recent case
a grievance was decided by a tripartite board of arbitration. See City of Pittsburgh v.
Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1, 

344 A.3d 429

, 434 (Pa. Commw. 2025).


                                       [J-70-2025] - 41
reason for finding an ambiguity in Act 111 was “the legislature’s failure to provide as

detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did for interest arbitration.” Id. at 88.

Given this perceived failure of express intention, Betancourt broadly sought to ascertain

“whether the legislature intended that grievance arbitration awards have a different scope

of review from interest arbitration awards[.]” Id. at 89 (emphasis in original). In analyzing

this question, the Court did not engage with Section 7’s specific language prohibiting

appeals from a “determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[.]” 43 P.S. §

217.7(a). Thus, if there is a failure of Betancourt, it emanates from Moon and its failure

to account for the fact that Section 4(b) was not necessarily limited to interest arbitrations.

If Moon had concluded that the method for arbitration detailed in Section 4(b) applied to

both interest and grievance arbitrations, there would be no disconnect between Section

4(b) and Section 7’s prohibition of appeals “therefrom.” Id.

       However, even if this was an interpretive error, it is not an error that impacts the

correctness of Betancourt’s holding because under either analysis, the narrow certiorari

scope of review applies to grievance arbitration decisions. Betancourt, and Chirico before

it, correctly discerned the comprehensive intention of the legislature by concluding that it

“eschewed judicial interference in grievance arbitration” and “that the objective of Act 111

‘would be completely frustrated if we were to impose, by judicial fiat, a layer of court

intervention.’” Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

 (quoting Chirico, 

470 A.2d at 475

). That this

conclusion is correct is supported by recognizing that grievance arbitrations resolve

differences of opinion over the application and interpretation of collective bargaining

agreements, the formation of which are indisputably authorized by Act 111 and that any

impasses in their negotiations are subject to non-appealable arbitration decisions. If

negotiation of the contract is subject to non-appealable arbitration, then enforcement

through grievance arbitration should be afforded the same protection.




                                      [J-70-2025] - 42
      Given the ambiguity in Act 111, we address the City’s argument that Section 4

should be read in its entirety to apply only to interest arbitrations and thus, Section 7’s

prohibition on appeals from an award of a tripartite board of arbitration also only applies

to interest arbitrations. However, this construction does not account for Section 1’s

directive that both grievances and disputes be resolved pursuant to the Act. Even if we

assume for the sake of stare decisis analysis that the City’s incomplete interpretation is

reasonable, any disagreement with Betancourt is based on a different interpretation of an

ambiguity in Act 111. Such a disagreement does not make that historical precedent

egregiously wrong so as to support overruling it.

      As to the history of Act 111, the City argues that the Betancourt Court conflated

the legitimate policy reasons for preventing protracted appellate litigation stemming from

interest arbitrations as having the same relevance in the grievance arbitration context.

City’s Brief at 33-34. The City explains that while it makes sense to prohibit appeals of

interest arbitrations to avoid scenarios where entire departments are out of work for

extended periods of time, the same logic does not apply to grievances involving only one

or few employees.     

Id.

 (citing Pa. State Police, 

810 A.2d at 1247

 n.6 (Saylor, J.,

dissenting) (“Good reason exists to differentiate legislative purposes related to impasses

and grievances, since bargaining impasses implicate a far more immediate and direct

potential for destabilization in the workforce (the seminal concern of Act 111) than does

the resolution of individual grievances.”)).   While impasses certainly have a greater

potential for destabilization, it was not unreasonable to recognize the potential

reverberations of prolonged individual grievances on the workforce.

      In sum, the City essentially repeats the same arguments raised by the State Police

in Betancourt. We explained in Yoder that when seeking to overturn precedent, the

appellant “must do more than proclaim [the precedent] is wrong to prevail now. In other




                                     [J-70-2025] - 43
words, it is not enough for [an appellant] to rehash the appellant’s arguments from [the

case sought to be overturned].”       Yoder, 345 A.3d at 681. Ultimately, although the

Betancourt Court could have reached a different result based on the text of Act 111, or

could have reached the same result based on a different analysis, we reiterate that the

Court’s reasoning in reaching its holding was not egregiously wrong nor patently flawed.

In light of existing precedent, the Court, after detecting an ambiguity in the text of Act 111,

reasonably relied on the history of the Act to resolve the ambiguity. See 1 Pa.C.S. §

1921(c)(7).

        iii.   Workability of narrow certiorari scope of review

       The City contends that the scope of review is unworkable in the sense that it leads

to the “reinstatement of officers who have betrayed the public trust.” City’s Brief at 24.

Here, the City conflates controversial outcomes of grievance arbitrations with the

workability of the narrow certiorari scope of review itself. Precluding judicial review of

grievance arbitration awards—whether the awards are correct or outrageously wrong—is

exactly what the General Assembly intended, as interpreted by Betancourt. The fact that

questionable grievance arbitration awards are subject to the narrow certiorari scope of

review is not proof that the scope of review is unworkable. The City does not claim that

any of the four areas of inquiry set forth in the narrow certiorari scope of review are unable

to be applied by courts reviewing grievance arbitration awards.           Instead, the City’s

workability argument is based on its disagreement with the outcome of narrow certiorari

review as applied to controversial arbitration decisions. While we might also find some

outcomes distasteful, correcting course by allowing more robust judicial review is a matter

for the General Assembly. See Yoder, 345 A.3d at 684 (“[W]e again direct Yoder and

other proponents of changes to the Act to appropriate policy-making branch—the General

Assembly.”).




                                      [J-70-2025] - 44
        iv.   Betancourt’s consistency with other related decisions

       As discussed with respect to our discussion of the quality of reasoning factor,

Betancourt relied on precedent from this Court to reach its conclusion that the narrow

certiorari scope of review applies to grievance arbitration awards. See supra p. 36. This

Court has consistently applied Betancourt’s holding in Act 111 grievance arbitration

cases. See supra p. 33. The City diminishes these subsequent cases because, while

the Court has followed Betancourt, the Court has not “re-evaluat[ed] its wisdom.” City’s

Reply Brief at 14. The City’s argument only strengthens the support for stare decisis as

this Court’s consistent following of Betancourt demonstrates that this issue has long been

settled. The City’s justification for overturning Betancourt would flip stare decisis on its

head because the entire point of the doctrine is to respect precedent that has been

decided. If we revisit precedent simply to “re-evaluate its wisdom[,]” id., stare decisis

would be meaningless.

       The City also claims that the holding from Betancourt “is inconsistent when

compared to other government workers [under PERA,]” which was enacted in 1970.

City’s Reply Brief at 16. However, this argument ignores that the General Assembly

specifically intended for police officers and firefighters to be excluded from PERA. See

43 P.S. § 1101.301(2) (“‘Public employe’ or ‘employe’ … shall not include … those

employees covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111)[.]”). Indeed, the

exclusion of Act 111 employees from PERA’s scope indicates a clear legislative intent to

establish different procedures for other public employees. This Court does not have the

authority to rewrite Act 111’s prohibition on appeals, nor does this Court have the authority

to substitute its own policy judgment in place of the General Assembly’s.




                                      [J-70-2025] - 45
         v.    Reliance on Betancourt

        “[W]here there has been substantial public or private reliance on precedent—and

where overruling a decision would ‘dislodge settled rights and expectations or require and

extensive legislative response[,]’ stare decisis has added force.” Allegheny Reprod.

Health Ctr., 309 A.3d at 888 (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Railways Comm’n, 

502 U.S. 197,

202

 (1991)). The FOP, as the party seeking to uphold Betancourt, makes no developed

reliance argument. Rather, in one sentence, the FOP argues that Betancourt “has been

standing law relied upon by police and firefighters for decades.” FOP’s Brief at 33. Given

the FOP’s lack of a developed argument, we do not address this factor.

        Based on our foregoing discussion of the stare decisis factors, we conclude that

the City has not established a special justification to depart from Betancourt. Accordingly,

we reaffirm Betancourt and reiterate that the proper scope of review for grievance

arbitration awards under Act 111 is narrow certiorari.23

     B. Smith and the limited public policy exception

        Alternatively, the City argues that we should adopt a limited public policy exception

to the narrow certiorari scope of review. The City faces the same stare decisis hurdle in

advocating for this limited exception given our decision in Smith where we specifically

rejected the same argument, explaining:

               Broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to include a
               provision which would allow the courts to interfere with an
               arbitrator’s award whenever that award could be deemed to
               be violative of “public policy”—however that nebulous concept
               may be defined by a particular appellate court—would greatly
               expand the scope of review in these matters. If we were to
               adopt the State Police’s recommendation to include this ill-

23  Given that we reject the City’s call to overturn Betancourt, we have no reason to
analyze the City’s arguments in support of adopting either the J.N.O.V. scope of review
set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) of the UAA, or the essence test applied to review of
arbitration awards arising under PERA. See City’s Brief at 43-48.


                                      [J-70-2025] - 46
              defined term within the narrow certiorari scope of review, we
              would markedly increase the judiciary’s role in Act 111
              arbitration awards. This would undercut the legislature’s
              intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.
Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1252-53

.

       The City does not separately address the stare decisis factors to support its

alternative argument to overturn Smith. See City’s Brief at 49-52. Rather, it merely

“note[s] that the Smith Majority itself was narrow, with three Justices reasoning that an

arbitrator should be reversed if he violated public policy.” 

Id.

 at 49-50 (citing Smith, 

741

A.2d at 1253

 (Castille, J., concurring); 

id. at 1254

 (Nigro, J., concurring); 

id. at 1255


(Newman, J., dissenting). A narrow majority is certainly not a special justification to

overturn precedent, as many of our decisions are based on narrow majorities. Moreover,

the Smith Court grounded its decision to reject the limited public policy exception based

on Betancourt and the rationale that the “severe limits placed on our appellate authority

were not self-imposed” but instead “dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith, 

741 A.2d at 1251

.

Thus, the Court concluded that “[i]f we were to broaden the narrow certiorari scope of

review to the extent propounded by the State Police, we would not be interpreting Act 111

but rather would be rewriting it.” Id. at 594.

       The City does not advance any compelling reason to revisit Smith. The City claims

that because the Court has adopted a limited public policy for arbitrations arising under

PERA, “the Smith Majority’s concern that the public policy test would be vague and ill-

defined has not proven correct.” City’s Brief at 51. As noted previously, see supra p. 45,

the City’s reliance on precedent interpreting PERA is misplaced because PERA explicitly

excludes “employees covered under [Act 111].” 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2). If we were to

adopt a limited public policy exception based on our precedent involving PERA, we would

rewrite the legislatively created distinction between Act 111 and PERA. Since PERA’s

inception in 1970, this Court has always employed the essence test as the scope of review



                                      [J-70-2025] - 47
for grievance arbitrations arising under PERA. Westmoreland, 

939 A.2d at 862

-63 (citing

Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 375 A.2d at 1275). While we have since adopted a limited

public policy exception to the essence test, it is clear that the exception only applies to

PERA arbitrations.24 Id. at 865 (explaining that “like our adoption of the federal essence

test for purposes of PERA, we conclude that the federal public policy exception is

appropriately applied to arbitrator’s awards arising under PERA as well”).

       For similar reasons, we reject the City’s reliance on this Court’s recognition of

public policy in other contexts to support its argument that we should adopt a limited public

policy exception here. See supra p. 27. None of the cases relied upon by the City arise

under Act 111, nor did our invocation of public policy in those circumstances conflict with

a legislatively enacted statute. Pursuant to stare decisis, we have no basis to look beyond

Smith and its clear rejection of a limited public policy exception in Act 111 cases.

     V. Conclusion

       For the reasons stated, the City has failed to establish a special justification to

overturn our decisions in Betancourt and Smith. Thus, we adhere to stare decisis and

affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court. Since we reaffirm Betancourt and the


24  We acknowledge the City’s and the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion’s argument
that under the limited public policy exception applicable to PERA, we have recognized
that an arbitrator’s award of reinstatement with back pay “violate[d] a well-defined and
dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace, a public policy which
is grounded in both the federal and state law against sex discrimination in employment,
including Title VII, the regulations of the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission],
and this Commonwealth’s own [Pennsylvania Human Relations Act].” Phila. Hous. Auth.
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., 

52 A.3d 1117, 1127

 (Pa. 2012). Our decision
in the instant case does not in any way alter our determination that the Commonwealth
has a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the
workplace. However, given this Court’s interpretation of Act 111 in Betancourt and Smith,
we are constrained by stare decisis to conclude that this public policy cannot expand the
“severe limits placed on our appellate authority … dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith,

741 A.2d at 1251

. It is for the General Assembly to address any public policy
inconsistencies.


                                      [J-70-2025] - 48
application of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the General Assembly again has the

opportunity and prerogative to correct course if our decision is not consistent with its

intent.

          Justices Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.

          Chief Justice Todd files a concurring and dissenting opinion.




                                       [J-70-2025] - 49

Opinion concurring in part

                            [J-70-2025] [MO:Donohue, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 EASTERN DISTRICT


 CITY OF PHILADELPHIA,                          :   No. 59 EAP 2024
                                                :
                      Appellant                 :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                :   Commonwealth Court entered
                                                :   January 8, 2024, at No. 39 CD 2023,
               v.                               :   affirming the Order of the Court of
                                                :   Common Pleas of Philadelphia
                                                :   County, Civil Division, entered on
 FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE               :   December 13, 2022, at No. 2544.
 NO. 5,                                         :
                                                :   ARGUED: September 11, 2025
                      Appellee                  :


                      CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION


CHIEF JUSTICE TODD                                         DECIDED: October 29, 2026

       Police officers hold a unique and exalted position in our Commonwealth. The lives

of the members of our communities are entrusted to police officers who maintain public

order; ensure our safety; prevent, detect, and combat crime; enforce the laws; and

provide social services, such as rendering aid in emergencies. See Petro v. Kennedy

Township Board of Commissioners, 

411 A.2d 849, 852

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Officers

place their lives on the line every day to protect the citizens of Pennsylvania, and we are

indebted to them for their service.

       However, because police officers hold positions of trust, and occupy such a special

and elevated role, they also carry with them special obligations and expectations. They

are vested with significant authority and discretionary powers, distinct from other public

employees, requiring a high degree of judgment. They are charged with the execution of

warrants and the apprehension of suspected criminals, and, to facilitate those
responsibilities, they have search, seizure, and arrest powers, including, in certain

circumstances, without a warrant. Indeed, while carrying out these duties a police officer

is empowered to resort to lawful, and in some cases lethal, force.

       Related thereto, the public’s reliance upon, and perception of, police officer

integrity is integral to the protection and safety of our communities. Because of the need

to protect members of the community, as well as the safety of other officers, it is essential

to foster trust and confidence among officers, with other law enforcement agencies, and

with our citizens. Such trust and confidence is closely tied to public perceptions, and the

citizenry must trust police departments and police officers. When that trust is breached,

individuals are less likely to report crime and to cooperate in investigations, negatively

impacting the community, and ultimately hampering the ability of the police department

to carry out its functions. Simply stated, the public expectation is clear: “The public,

including fellow law enforcement agents, expect that police officers will not violate the

laws they are charged with enforcing.” United States v. Foreman, 

926 F.2d 792, 796

 (9th

Cir.1990). Thus, “[t]he government has a substantial interest in retaining public trust in

the police department and in removing police officers allegedly implicated in criminal

activity who might betray that trust or who may pose a threat to the health, safety and

welfare of the public.” City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5, 

592

A.2d 779, 785

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).

       Accordingly, in light of their foundational role in our society, the significant authority

and discretionary powers in which they are invested, the public’s reliance upon police

officer integrity, as well as public expectations, “police officers are held to a higher

standard of conduct than other citizens, including other public employes” due to the

“compelling state interest in the maintenance of a high degree of public respect for police




                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
officers.” Faust v. Police Civil Service Commission of Borough of State College, 

347 A.2d

765, 768

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1975).

       Given the unique stature of police officers in Pennsylvania, I join in the majority’s

reaffirmance of the application of the narrow certiorari standard of judicial review of Act

111 grievance arbitration awards as determined in Pennsylvania State Police v.

Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association (Betancourt), 

656 A.2d 83

 (Pa. 1995).1

However, given police officers’ unique authority and responsibilities, as well as the

public’s expectations of law enforcement officers, unlike the majority, I would adopt a

limited public policy exception to narrow certiorari review. My reasoning follows.

       The General Assembly’s intent in granting collective bargaining rights to police

(and fire personnel) is essential to understanding my position, so I briefly recount the

history of public sector labor relations. The late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of

great labor unrest. These tumultuous times were, in part, a result of individual employees

lacking full freedom of association and liberty of contract, as well as an inequality of

bargaining power, which substantially and adversely affected the welfare of the

Commonwealth and the country. Such adverse impacts included widespread strikes,

employer lockouts, and violence, all deemed inimical to the public safety and weal.

       In response, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and two

years later, in 1937, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Pennsylvania Labor

Relations Act (“PLRA”).      Through the PLRA, the legislature granted private sector

employees in Pennsylvania the statutory right, inter alia, “to self-organization, to form, join

or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own


1 Fire fighters also enjoy collective bargaining rights pursuant to Act 111, and, given their

similar and essential role in our Commonwealth, significant authority and discretionary
powers, and the public’s reliance upon their integrity, my reasoning applies equally to
these necessary public servants.


                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3
choosing,” and mandated bargaining between an employer and a union over wages,

hours, and other conditions of employment. 43 P.S. § 211.5; see Borough of Ellwood

City v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, 

998 A.2d 589, 594

 (Pa. 2010). However,

these pieces of legislation only applied to those working in the private sector.2

       Historically, collective bargaining rights for those employed in the public sector was

seen as contrary to the public welfare and not permitted. Philadelphia Housing Authority

v. PLRB, 

499 A.2d 294, 297

 (Pa. 1985). Accordingly, public sector unionization lagged

far behind its private sector counterpart. Indeed, public employees, including police

officers, enjoyed no collective bargaining rights during the first half of the 20th Century.

Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 88-89

. Thus, while the 1930s brought a change for private sector

labor relations, labor unrest in the public sector continued and attempts at collective

bargaining rights for these employees were met with fierce resistance in Pennsylvania

and across the country.3 4

2 Section 3 of the PLRA excludes from the definition of employers, “the United States or

the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal authority . . . .”
43 P.S. § 211.3(c).
3 Perhaps the most famous example of the quelling of public sector organizing attempts

was then-Massachusetts Governor, later-President, Calvin Coolidge’s suppression of a
1919 Boston police strike, undermining subsequent efforts at unionizing police officers,
as well as other public employees. The 1919 strike resulted in “the complete destruction
of the policemen's trade union movement,” with municipal officials throughout the country
opposing unionization and collective bargaining for police officers. William A. Herbert,
Public Sector Labor Law and History: The Politics of Ancient History?, 

28 Hofstra Lab. &
Emp. L.J. 335

, 352 (2011).
4 Ten years after passing the PLRA, the General Assembly enacted the Act of June 30,

1947, P.L. 1183, § 1 et seq., in an attempt to quell increased concerns over disruptive
work stoppages in the public sector. Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township
of Moon, 

498 A.2d 1305, 1308

 (Pa. 1985). While this legislation granted employees the
right to resolve grievances through negotiations, there was no provision for collective
bargaining as to terms and conditions of employment and striking was prohibited. Thus,
the Act of 1947 failed to achieve labor stability in the public sector, ultimately leading to
the belief in the late 1960s, that the right to collectively bargain should be granted to public
employees. 

Id.



                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 4
       Due to the persistence of labor unrest among public employees, the belief that

collective bargaining should have no application in the public sector slowly lost support.

As a result, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the General Assembly enacted sweeping

reforms. In 1968, the General Assembly passed Act 111, which granted police officers

and fire fighters collective bargaining rights: “The law relating to police and fire personnel,

whose services are so vital to an ordered society . . . was created to strike a more perfect

balance between the need of the Commonwealth to insure public safety and the rights of

the worker.” Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89

. As our Court stated in Township of Moon, “the

General Assembly was committed to the view that the right to collective bargaining over

terms and conditions of employment was critical to the restoration and maintenance of

harmony in the public employment sector.” Township of Moon, 

498 A.2d at 1309

. Two

years later, in 1970, the legislature enacted the Public Employe Relations Act (“PERA”),

granting collective bargaining rights to other public employees.           The public policy

underlying PERA was similar to that of Act 111, “to promote orderly and constructive

relationships between all public employers and their employes subject, however, to the

paramount rights of the citizens of this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees

for their health, safety and welfare.” 43 P.S. § 1101.101. Thus, it was the General

Assembly’s intent, through these labor laws, to balance public health, safety, and welfare

with workers’ rights as well as promote harmony in public sector labor relations.

       One aspect of collective bargaining is the resolution of grievances, including those

disputes that arise out of contract interpretation. Arbitration is the “highly valued and

greatly favored” means of resolving labor disputes--in both the public and private sector.

State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College Professional

Association (PSEA-NEA), 

743 A.2d 405, 409

 (Pa. 1999). As with federal labor policy, the

basis for Pennsylvania's strong policy in favor of arbitration is that it is considered to be




                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5
“a prime force in the policy of reducing industrial strife,” partly because it has the attributes

of being less formal, less expensive, and faster than traditional dispute resolution in the

courts. 

Id.

 Indeed, both Act 111 and PERA contain provisions that clearly envision an

arbitration award as final and binding.5

       Notwithstanding the labor policy in favoring the final and binding arbitration of

disputes, and the statutory language expressly supporting such finality, our Court has

nevertheless determined that the judiciary has the authority to review labor arbitration

awards. See City of Washington v. Police Department of the City of Washington, 

259

A.2d 437

 (Pa. 1969) (allowing for judicial review of Act 111 arbitration awards pursuant

to then-Supreme Court Rules R. 68 1/2); Community College of Beaver County v.

Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 

375 A.2d

1267, 1271

 (Pa. 1977) (determining judicial review of PERA arbitration award permissible

under Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 2101).

       Police officers deserve procedural protections against arbitrary employment

actions, nevertheless, it is generally accepted that these protections should not be so

cumbersome as to unreasonably impair the ability of police supervisors to control their

departments or promote reform. Stephen Rushin, Police Arbitration, 

74 Vand. L. Rev.

1023

, 1073-74 (2021). Thus, in my view, the challenge in this appeal is determining the



5 See 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (“The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration

thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon
the public employer and the policemen or firemen involved. . . . No appeal therefrom shall
be allowed to any court.”); 43 P.S. § 1101.903 (“Arbitration of disputes or grievances
arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is
mandatory. . . . The procedure to be adopted . . . [and] the final step shall provide for a
binding decision by an arbitrator . . . .”); Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v.
Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support
Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA, 

939 A.2d 855, 861

 (Pa. 2007) (stating that “labor
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement be resolved by final and binding
arbitration”).


                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 6
extent of judicial review of arbitration awards to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent

to balance the interests of essential public employees with the public health, safety, and

welfare.

       Our Court’s experience regarding the review of arbitration awards under PERA is

highly instructive. Judicial review of an appeal from a PERA arbitration award is governed

by the deferential “essence test.” Under the essence test, the reviewing court first

determines if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement. If the issue is embraced by the agreement, and, thus, appropriately before

the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can

rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement; a court will vacate an

arbitrator's award only where the award “indisputably and genuinely is without foundation

in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.”          Cheyney

University, 

743 A.2d at 413

.

       Nevertheless, in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 

7, supra,

 our Court determined

that the essence test was subject to a narrow public policy exception. 

939 A.2d at 865

-

66. Specifically, initial judicial review was to be conducted under the essence test. If the

arbitration award satisfied essence test review, our Court explained that a court could

nevertheless further consider whether the award violated public policy.           Our Court

narrowly defined the public policy to be applied as one which was well-defined, dominant

and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general

considerations of supposed public interests. 

Id.


       Act 111’s narrow certiorari standard is stricter than application of the essence test.

That is to say, an arbitration award may be judicially vacated under the essence test

where such award would be upheld under narrow certiorari.             Indeed, under narrow

certiorari, a court is limited to reviewing only questions concerning: (1) the jurisdiction of




                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 7
the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator's

powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. Betancourt, 

656 A.2d at 89-90

. This

makes some sense, as most employees covered by PERA have a limited right to strike,

however, under Act 111, due to the essential nature of their services, police officers and

fire fighters are denied the right to strike. Thus, under narrow certiorari review, an

arbitrator’s award under Act 111 is insulated from judicial vacatur in the extreme. The

circumscribed instances in which an arbitrator’s award may be rejected under narrow

certiorari raises one of the questions at issue in this appeal ─ the propriety of a public

policy exception to narrow certiorari review, akin to our Court’s recognition of a public

policy exception to the essence test under PERA.

       Over 25 years ago, we rejected the possibility of a public policy exception to narrow

certiorari review in Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’

Association (Smith), 

741 A.2d 1248

 (Pa. 1999). I believe the reasoning undergirding our

decision in Smith was flawed when decided, and that its reasoning has become outdated

in light of subsequent decisions by our Court. Thus, I do not believe that Smith should

constitute a bar to our reconsideration of the adoption of a public policy exception to

narrow certiorari.

       In Smith, a state trooper, while off duty, became intoxicated and got into an

argument with an ex-girlfriend.    The argument was highlighted by the state trooper

jamming his loaded, police-issued weapon into his ex-girlfriend's mouth and threatening

to kill her. The state trooper was arrested later that day for driving under the influence,

simple assault, and making terroristic threats, charges to which he subsequently plead

guilty. The Pennsylvania State Police then terminated the officer's employment.

       The trooper grieved his termination, and while an arbitrator determined that Smith

had committed the acts in question, the penalty of discharge was too excessive, primarily




                            [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 8
finding that the trooper’s conduct was less egregious than actions of other troopers who

received less discipline in similar circumstances. He also relied on the fact that Smith

had an exemplary record over a 13-year career and had been under stress as a result of

working at the Pittsburgh crash site of a commercial passenger plane in the fall of 1994.

The State Police challenged the arbitrator's award, arguing, inter alia, that the decision

was contrary to public policy and, thus, that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under

narrow certiorari review. The Smith Court rejected that argument.

       First, the Court found that adopting the State Police’s position would impermissibly

broaden the narrow certiorari scope of review. The Court concluded that “public policy”

was a “nebulous concept” and that broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to

include such a basis for review would “greatly expand the scope of review in these

matters” and “markedly increase the judiciary's role in Act 111 arbitration awards.” 

Id. at

1252-53

. Second, our Court warned that, if adopted, a public policy exception would “not

be interpreting Act 111 but rather would be rewriting it.” 

Id. at 1253

.

       In my view, our decision in Smith should not prevent our Court from adopting a

public policy exception to narrow certiorari review. The doctrine of stare decisis mandates

courts generally follow established precedent to ensure predictability, consistency, and

stability in legal principles, fostering reliance on judicial decisions. However, adherence

is not absolute; courts may deviate when prior rulings were wrong when decided, prove

unworkable, or become outdated by changing circumstances or societal developments.

There are several factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a past decision,

including the age and lineage of the decision, as well as “‘the quality of [its] reasoning,

the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related decisions, . . .

and reliance on the decision.’” Commonwealth v. Alexander, 

243 A.3d 177

, 196 (Pa.

2020) (quoting Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 

588 U.S. 180, 203

 (2019)).




                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 9
Indeed, our Court is not “bound to follow precedent when it cannot bear scrutiny, either

on its own terms or in light of subsequent developments.” William Penn School District

v. Pennsylvania Department of Education, 

170 A.3d 414, 456

 (Pa. 2017). As our Court

has oft stated, stare decisis does not lock our decisions in stone, but, rather, is a “legal

concept which responds to the demands of justice, and, thus, permits the orderly growth

process of the law to flourish.” Allegheny Reproductive Health Center v. Pennsylvania

Department of Human Services, 

309 A.3d 808

, 850 (Pa. 2024).

       In my assessment of these factors, Smith fails to withstand scrutiny. First, the

quality and soundness of the Smith Court’s reasoning was lacking when rendered, and

fails to withstand the test of time. In an analysis spanning barely two paragraphs, the

Court rejected the adoption of a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review for two

reasons. First, the Court reasoned that “public policy” was a “nebulous concept” which

“may be defined by a particular appellate court,” and adopting it would “greatly expand

the scope of review in these matters” and “markedly increase the judiciary's role in Act

111 arbitration awards.” Id. at 1252-53.

       However, the Smith Court’s characterization of public policy considerations as

“nebulous” and capable of differing judicial definitions is belied by prior and subsequent

decisions of our Court. Indeed, our Court has made clear that it is quite capable of

defining vague terms. See William Penn School District, 

170 A.3d at 455

 (“Courts give

meaning routinely to all manner of amorphous constitutional concepts, including those

that lie at the intersection of legislative prerogative and judicial review. And they do so

while still leaving room for future development by whatever government body or

mechanism the law fairly prescribes.”).

       As to notions of public policy, our Court has routinely employed the concept of

policy to thwart injustice and protect the public weal. See, e.g., Socko v. Mid-Atlantic




                           [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 10
Systems of CPA, Inc., 

126 A.3d 1266, 1273

 (Pa. 2015) (finding at-will doctrine subject to

exceptions including “judicially-created notions of public policy.”); Minnesota v.

Greenfield, 

855 A.2d 854, 866

 (Pa. 2004) (precluding recovery of damages pursuant to

an insurance contract on public policy basis); Waychoff v. Waychoff, 

163 A. 670

 (Pa.

1932) (rejecting agreement for layperson to receive portion of an attorney’s fees for

procuring litigation as contrary to public policy); McCormick v. Hanover Township, 

92 A.

195, 197

 (Pa. 1914) (determining employment contract with township for unconscionable

amount contravened public policy). Thus, the quality of the Smith Court’s reasoning in

this regard was faulty from its inception.

       Even more importantly, Smith’s reasoning has become outdated in light of our

subsequent 2007 decision in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7, wherein we embraced

a narrow public policy exception under PERA. In that decision, there was no suggestion

that the concept of public policy was too vague, ill-defined, or subject to differing court

interpretations, or that it would improperly increase the role of the judiciary in reviewing

arbitration awards under PERA. Thus, in my view, the Smith Court’s first stated basis for

rejecting a public policy exception was flawed at the time, and has become unsustainable

in light of our subsequent express adoption of a public policy exception under PERA.

Simply stated, perpetuating Smith’s reasoning does not account for changes in labor

relations and prevents “the orderly growth process of the law to flourish.” Allegheny

Reproductive Health Center, 309 A.3d at 850.

       Related thereto, the Smith Court feared that a public policy exception would

expand the scope of review and increase the judiciary's role in Act 111 arbitration awards.

Of course, any exception to narrow certiorari review would expand the judiciary’s role.

However, the same can be said of the public policy exception to the essence test, and,




                            [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 11
yet, the Court’s experience under that standard has not led to protracted litigation or

undue judicial intervention, due to the limited nature of public policy review.

       The second rationale in Smith for rejecting a public policy exception under Act 111

was equally flawed. The Court contended that, if a public policy exception were adopted,

the Court would “not be interpreting Act 111 but rather would be rewriting it.” Smith, 

741

A.2d at 1253

.

       This reasoning failed to appreciate the nature of a public policy exception, which

is judicially created, and, thus, ipso facto, not an interpretation, or a rewriting, of a statute.

Moreover, such statement is somewhat disingenuous coming on the heels of our Court’s

finding authority to review of Act 111 arbitration awards where Act 111 not only did not

speak of such review, but specifically eschewed any judicial intervention. 43 P.S. §

217.7(a) (stating that regarding an arbitration award, “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be

allowed to any court.”). Of course, as noted above, our Court has found judicial review

of arbitration awards under Act 111 to be proper, without “rewriting it,” as would the

adoption of a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review.

       Further, this flaw in the Smith Court’s reasoning becomes obvious in (again)

considering our Court’s subsequent decision to allow for a public policy exception to the

essence test under PERA. Our Court in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit expressed no

hesitation in embracing a narrow public policy exception due to “rewriting” PERA, which

by its terms called for “final” and “binding” arbitration. 43 P.S. § 1101.903         Again, the

Smith Court’s stated reasons for rejecting a public policy exception to narrow certiorari is

not longer valid in light of subsequent developments in the law.

       Our decision in Smith is a quarter century old; its reasoning was dubious when

written and cannot withstand the subsequent developments and passage to time in this

area of the law. Accordingly, Smith should be overruled, and at least not constitute a bar




                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 12
to adopting a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review in this case. Estate of

Fridenberg v. Commonwealth, 

33 A.3d 581, 590

 (Pa. 2011) (“When precedent is

examined in the light of modern reality and it is evident that the reason for the precedent

no longer exists, the abandonment of the precedent is not a destruction of stare decisis,

but rather a fulfillment of its proper function.”).6

       With Smith placed aside, I believe we can and should address whether a public

policy exception to narrow certiorari should be adopted under Act 111. And, in my view,

we should do so.

       First, as noted above, the intent of the General Assembly in enacting both Act 111

and PERA was to balance the rights of workers with the protection of public health, safety,

and welfare. The recognition of a limited public policy exception would be consistent with

that balance and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the sometimes competing

goals of dispute resolution by final and binding arbitration and the protection of the public

weal. Simply stated, I do not believe that our Court should countenance an arbitration

award that contravenes our Commonwealth’s public policy.

       In my view, such an exception is especially necessary considering law

enforcement’s essential role in our Commonwealth.           Due to police officers holding

positions of trust in our communities, the significant authority and powers which police

officers possess, our citizenry’s reliance upon police officer integrity, as well as essential

public expectations and trust in our police, and the negative ramifications when that trust


6 The majority primarily rejects a public policy exception to narrow certiorari on the basis

that Smith is binding precedent. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully disagree.
The majority also rejects any analogy to the adoption of a public policy exception under
PERA, as PERA excludes employees covered by Act 111 and the public policy exception
only applies to PERA arbitrations. This is true as far as it goes; however, it does not
account for whether a judicially adopted public policy exception would be appropriate for
the employees covered by Act 111 in light of the changes in the law and our Court’s
willingness to adopt a public policy exception under a similar labor statute.


                             [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 13
is breached, I believe it entirely appropriate to hold police officers to a higher standard of

conduct than other citizens, including other public employees. Accordingly, I find it

eminently reasonable to allow for a limited exception to narrow certiorari review to

consider whether an arbitrator’s award violates our Commonwealth’s public policy.

       We adopted a public policy exception under PERA 20 years ago to ensure that our

Court does not enforce an arbitration award that contravenes public policy.              That

recognition of such an exception has not resulted in protracted litigation, labor unrest, or

undermined the goals of PERA. I conclude that adopting a limited public policy exception

to narrow certiorari review is even more appropriate here. Indeed, the need for such a

public policy inquiry is made manifest by the circumstances in this appeal involving an

arbitrator’s reinstatement of a police lieutenant who sent sexually explicit texts and a

pornographic bestiality video involving a dog and a women to female subordinates and

then pressured one of the officers to lie to and not to cooperate with internal investigators.

       Moreover, it has been almost 60 years since the enactment of Act 111. The

relationship between police officers and their employers that was once characterized by

chaos and violence is now largely characterized by harmony and peace. It is a mature

labor relationship. I do not believe that the adoption of a limited public policy exception

to narrow certiorari review would upset this status; it has not done so in the last 20 years

under PERA.

       Additionally, our Commonwealth would not be an outlier in this regard, as

numerous other states courts have recognized a narrow public policy exception regarding

judicial review of arbitration awards involving police officers. See, e.g., State v. Public

Safety Employees Association, 

257 P.3d 151, 160

 (Alaska 2011); Town of South Winsor

v. South Winsor Police Union Local 1480, 

770 A.2d 14, 23-24

 (Conn. 2001); City of

Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association, 

78 N.E.3d 66, 73-74

 (Mass. 2017);




                            [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 14
Police Officers Association of Michigan v. County of Manistee, 

645 N.W.2d 713, 717-18


(Mich. App. 2002); City of Richfield v. Law Enforcement Services, Inc., 

923 N.W.2d 36,

40-41

 (Minn. 2019) (assuming but not deciding existence of a public policy exception);

City of Livingston v. Montana Public Employees Association, 

339 P.3d 41, 47

 (Mont.

2014).

         For these reasons, I would adopt a public policy exception to narrow certiorari

review under Act 111. Under this exception, a court would not enforce a grievance

arbitration award that contravenes public policy, if such public policy is well-defined,

dominant, and ascertainable by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from

general considerations of supposed public interests. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit,

939 A.2d at 865-66

. Accordingly, given that I would adopt this exception, I would remand

this matter to the Commonwealth Court for consideration of whether the arbitrator's award

is violative of the public policy of the Commonwealth.




                            [J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 15

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