Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
City of Phila., Aplt. v. FOP, Lodge No. 5
[J-70-2025]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, : No. 59 EAP 2024
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court entered
: January 8, 2024, at No. 39 CD 2023,
v. : affirming the Order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Philadelphia
: County, Civil Division, entered on
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE : December 13, 2022, at No. 2544
NO. 5, :
: ARGUED: September 11, 2025
Appellee :
OPINION
JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: October 29, 2026
Appellant the City of Philadelphia (“City”), asks the Court to overturn Pennsylvania
State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt),
(Pa. 1995), or, alternatively, to overturn Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Ass’n (Smith),
(Pa. 1999). Betancourt held that appeals of grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant to the Policemen and Firemen Collective Bargaining Act1 are subject to the narrow certiorari scope of review.2 Betancourt,
. Smith, decided four years after Betancourt, declined to add a limited public policy 1 Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.12 (“Act 111”). 2 “The narrow certiorari scope of review limits a reviewing court to questions regarding: (1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights.” Betancourt,
. exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Smith,
. In
reliance on the doctrine of stare decisis, we uphold our decisions in Betancourt and Smith
and affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court.
I. Background
Marc Hayes is a lieutenant in the City’s Police Department responsible for
supervising officers in the City’s 24th Police District. On August 13, 2018, Hayes sent
multiple inappropriate and sexual text messages to two female officers (“Officer One” and
“Officer Two”) under his supervision. In the texts, Hayes made numerous sexual
innuendos, boasted about his sexual prowess, discussed Officer One’s use of the
restroom, and sent a video showing a dog performing oral sex on a woman.
On October 30, 2018, an anonymous letter was found at District Headquarters
which claimed that Hayes sent the sexually explicit bestiality video to two subordinate
officers during work hours. The Police Department forwarded the letter to its Internal
Affairs Bureau (“IAB”), which investigated the allegation through its Investigative Support
Services (“ISS”) and Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) teams. Representatives of
the ISS and EEO interviewed Officers One and Two and reviewed the text messages
between Hayes and the officers, including the bestiality video. The City claims that on
October 31, 2018, the day after receipt of the anonymous letter, Hayes attempted to
influence the statement of Officer One by telling her that she could tell the investigators
that she could not recall anything. City’s Brief at 12. The City also claims that Hayes
approached Officer Two in the hallway later that day and, after asking her whether she
still had the video on her phone, mentioned that he submitted her name for a promotion.
After its investigation, the City charged Hayes with violations of four different
sections of the collectively bargained Disciplinary Code:
[J-70-2025] - 2
Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§024-10: Any act,
conduct, or course of conduct which objectively constitutes
sexual harassment.
Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§021-10: Any
incident, conduct, or course of conduct which indicates that
an employee has little or no regard for his/her responsibility
as a member of the Police Department.
Article I: Conduct Unbecoming, Section 1-§025-10: On duty
or job-related inappropriate sexually based communication(s)
conveyed in any manner.
Article VIII: Failure to Supervise, Section 8-§003-10: Failure
to properly supervise subordinates.
Philadelphia Police Department Disciplinary Code, July 2014, at 10, 12, 37. On July 9,
2020, the City’s Police Commissioner determined that Hayes committed each offense
and that he should be dismissed from the Department. The Commissioner ordered that
Hayes be suspended for thirty days with the intent to dismiss.
Hayes, by and through the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 (“FOP”),
challenged his termination by filing a grievance, demanding arbitration as provided by the
parties’ Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”).3 The parties stipulated that the issues
to be decided at arbitration were whether the City had just cause to discharge Hayes, and
if not, what the remedy should be. The arbitration consisted of hearings on June 17, and
June 22, 2022, where the arbitrator heard testimony from Lieutenant Brent Conway and
Detective Jeanette Smith, each of whom investigated the matter. Officer One and Hayes
also testified at the arbitration.4
In rendering his decision, the arbitrator first noted that the City had to prove by a
preponderance of credible evidence that Hayes committed the charged offenses.
3 The parties agreed to select David J. Reily, Esq. to preside over the arbitration.
Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 9.
4 Office Two did not testify at the arbitration. Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 6 n.8.
The transcript of the arbitration proceedings, if it exists, is not a part of the record.
[J-70-2025] - 3
Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at 14. Concerning the sexual harassment charge, the
arbitrator relied on the City’s Department Directive 8.7, which provides, that “[i]t is sexual
harassment if one employee attempts to impose their sexual desires, will or wish, fantasy
or preference on another employee through an offensive act, deed, gesture or comment
and such conduct interferes with the employee’s terms or conditions of employment.”
Department Directive 8.7-2, 10/21/2011. The arbitrator also relied on the City’s Sexual
Harassment Policy which states “[s]exual [h]arassment is defined legally as unwelcome
sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, or other unwelcome verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature when … the conduct has the purpose or effect of
interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.” City’s Sexual Harassment Prevention Policy, 7/19/2018, at
3.
After considering the testimony and all the text messages, the arbitrator concluded
that there was not a sufficient basis to find that the texts “were unwelcome or rose to the
level of creating a sexually hostile work environment.” Arbitration Opinion, 7/22/2022, at
16. To the arbitrator, “the texts reflect[ed] some questionable banter in which Hayes,
Officer One and Officer Two all appeared willing to engage.” Id. The arbitrator relied on
Officer One’s testimony and prior statements that she did not consider the texts to be
sexually harassing, but instead an attempt at humor by Hayes. Id. at 16-17. The arbitrator
highlighted that Officer Two did not testify at arbitration and explained, “[w]ithout the
context that her testimony would have provided, I cannot draw any conclusions from her
entries in the … text exchange relative to whether she considered Hayes’ texts to be
sexually offensive or harassing. Her statements during the … investigation represent
hearsay.” Id. at 17 n.12.
[J-70-2025] - 4
As for the video, the arbitrator acknowledged that it was “very disturbing” and had
“the potential to offend and create a hostile work environment based upon sex.” Id. at
17. However, the arbitrator again analyzed whether the video subjectively constituted
sexual harassment, explaining
I cannot simply look to the content of the video itself and the
fact that Hayes, a male supervisor, sent it to two female
subordinates, Officer One and Officer Two. Instead, I must
find that Officer One and/or Officer Two were, in fact, offended
by the video, and it had the effect of rendering their work
environment sexually hostile.
Id.
The arbitrator noted that Officer One never watched the video and explained that
her knowledge of its contents “is limited to the still image that appears at the start of the
video before it is played.” Id. at 17-18. While Officer One testified that she found the
video to be “gross,” the arbitrator highlighted that she did not consider it to be an attempt
by Hayes to sexually harass her. Id. at 18. The arbitrator further explained that Officer
One did not claim that receiving the video adversely affected her work environment. Id.
The arbitrator acknowledged that Officer Two texted “please don’t send me things like
that” after receiving the video. Id. at 18 n.13. However, the arbitrator explained this text
was inconclusive to determine whether transmission of the video constituted sexual
harassment as to Officer Two. Id. The arbitrator found that Hayes’ sending of the video
was highly inappropriate, but it did not rise to the level of sexual harassment in violation
of Directive 8.7. Id. at 18.
On the remaining three charges, the arbitrator found that Hayes violated each
respective section of the Disciplinary Code. Id. at 18-21. The arbitrator imposed a fifty-
day suspension for the three violations. Finding that the City did not have just cause to
[J-70-2025] - 5
discharge Hayes, the arbitrator ordered the City to reinstate Hayes to his former position
with the Department and awarded him backpay. Id. at 25.
The City filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the Court of Common
Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing first that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
rewriting the terms of the Disciplinary Code, Directive 8.7, and the City’s Sexual
Harassment Policy by applying a different standard for sexual harassment than the
standard collectively bargained for by the parties. City’s Petition to Vacate Arbitration
Award, 8/22/2022, at 11. Alternatively, the City argued that the trial court should modify
the narrow certiorari scope of review for grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant
to Act 111. Id. at 13.
The trial court denied the City’s petition. The trial court explained that it was bound
by the narrow certiorari scope of review when reviewing the arbitration award and
therefore could only consider questions regarding “(1) the jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2)
the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator’s powers; and (4) a
deprivation of constitutional rights.” Trial Court Opinion, 3/9/2023, at 2 (quoting City of
Washington v. Police Dep’t of Washington,
(Pa. 1969)). The trial
court concluded that the arbitrator acted within his authority in altering the discipline
imposed on Hayes. Id. at 4. Further, the trial court noted that it did not have the authority
to modify the narrow certiorari scope of review. Id.
The Commonwealth Court affirmed, reiterating the trial court’s pronouncement that
in Act 111 cases, judicial review is confined to narrow certiorari.5 City of Phila. v. Fraternal
Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5,
307 A.3d 1263
, 1267 (Pa. Commw. 2024) (citing Borough of State Coll. v. Borough of State Coll. Police Ass’n,
303 A.3d 248
, 255-56 (Pa. Commw.
2023)). The City argued that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because he fully
5 President Judge Cohn Jubelirer dissented without opinion.
[J-70-2025] - 6
reformed the parties’ CBA by replacing its objective standard for sexual harassment with
a subjective standard based on the specific perspectives of the officers who received the
messages. The Commonwealth Court rejected the City’s argument, relying on this
Court’s discussion in City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Order of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No.
1,
224 A.3d 702
(Pa. 2020):
Certainly, an Act 111 grievance arbitrator should not
undertake to equitably reform a collective bargaining
agreement. Absent an indisputably overt instance of
reformation, however, we find the task of distinguishing
between such an innovation and errors of law in the
interpretation to be unmanageable. Cf. Smith,
(refusing to incorporate review for violations of public
policy into narrow certiorari, since such a focus “-- however
that nebulous concept may be defined by a particular
appellate court -- would greatly expand the scope of review ...
undercut[ting] the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted
litigation in this arena.”).
(emphasis removed) (quoting City of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 714).
Here, the Commonwealth Court explained that, “[a]t most, the arbitrator erred as
a matter of law[.]” Id. However, it stressed that “[a] mere error of law is insufficient to
support a court’s decision to reverse an Act 111 arbitrator’s award.” Id. (quoting Borough
of State Coll., 303 A.3d at 255). The City also argued that the arbitrator acted outside of
his authority by ruling on a matter of managerial prerogative. The Commonwealth Court
explained that the propriety of Hayes’ discharge was submitted to the arbitrator as all
matters of discipline are grievable pursuant to the CBA. Id. Thus, the Commonwealth
Court determined that the arbitrator addressed an issue that was properly before him. Id.
Lastly, the Commonwealth Court explained that it was not permitted to modify the narrow
certiorari scope of review because it was constrained by this Court’s holding in
Betancourt. Id. at 1268-69.
[J-70-2025] - 7
The City filed a petition for allowance of appeal which we granted, limited to the
following question:
Where a police lieutenant sent a series of [ ] sexualized texts
to two subordinate officers … and then encouraged one of the
officers to cover it up, but where the grievance arbitrator
reinstated the employee, should this Court modify the narrow
certiorari scope of review set forth in Pa. State Police v. Pa.
State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt),
(Pa. 1995),
and instead apply the essence test or judgment n.o.v. test, or
at least incorporate a limited public policy exception into the
narrow certiorari test?
City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge No. 5,
326 A.3d 87
(Pa. 2024) (per
curiam).6
II. Judicial Review under Act 111
Before addressing the arguments of the parties, it is necessary to recount the
history of the narrow certiorari scope of review in the context of Act 111 cases and our
decisions in Betancourt and Smith. In our recent decision of Northern Berks Regional
Police Commission v. Berks County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 71,
230 A.3d
1022
(Pa. 2020), we explained:
Act 111 was enacted in the wake of Erie Firefighters Local No.
293 v. Gardner,
(Pa. 1962) (per curiam), which
held that its predecessor was not binding on municipalities on
constitutional non-delegation grounds.
at 695 (citing PA.
CONST. art. [III], § 20 (repealed)). That former law “prohibited
strikes and attempted to provide for the adjustment of
grievances through negotiations” but did not allow for
collective bargaining. Moon Twp. v. Police Officers of Moon
Twp.,
(Pa. 1985). “This double denial of
rights to police and fire personnel fueled the growing tension
6 We denied allowance of appeal of the City’s second issue concerning whether the
arbitrator exceeded his authority under the narrow certiorari scope of review. See Petition
for Allowance of Appeal, 2/6/2024, at 6; City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Lodge
No. 5,
326 A.3d 87
(Pa. 2024) (per curiam). Therefore, we do not analyze the
Commonwealth Court’s determination that the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in
rendering the award.
[J-70-2025] - 8
between labor and management, tension which culminated in
‘illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication
between public employers and their employees.’” [Smith],
741 A.2d [at] 1251 … (quoting Betancourt,
).
Following Erie Firefighters, the electorate authorized an
amendment to the Pennsylvania Constitution, PA. CONST. art.
[III], § 31,[7] which allowed “the adjustment or settlement of
grievances or disputes or for collective bargaining between
policemen and firemen and their public employers.” That
amendment cleared the way for new legislation.
Act 111 was passed two years later. It continued to withhold
the right to strike from police and firefighters but conferred “the
right to bargain collectively with their public employers
concerning the terms and conditions of their employment[.]”
43 P.S. § 217.1.[8] This process, deemed interest arbitration,
7 Article III, Section 31 provides:
The General Assembly shall not delegate to any special
commission, private corporation or association, any power to
make, supervise or interfere with any municipal improvement,
money, property or effects, whether held in trust or otherwise,
or to levy taxes or perform any municipal function whatever.
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation or any other provision
of the Constitution, the General Assembly may enact laws
which provide that the findings of panels or commissions,
selected and acting in accordance with law for the adjustment
or settlement of grievances or disputes or for collective
bargaining between policemen and firemen and their public
employers shall be binding upon all parties and shall
constitute a mandate to the head of the political subdivision
which is the employer, or to the appropriate officer of the
Commonwealth if the Commonwealth is the employer, with
respect to matters which can be remedied by administrative
action, and to the lawmaking body of such political subdivision
or of the Commonwealth, with respect to matters which
require legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry
out such findings.
PA. CONST. art. III, § 31.
8 Section 1 of Act 111 provides:
Policemen or firemen employed by a political subdivision of
the Commonwealth or by the Commonwealth shall, through
(continued…)
[J-70-2025] - 9
is “in essence, the process by which the parties, through a
neutral arbitrator or panel, create a collective bargaining
agreement.” Michael G. Lutz Lodge No. 5, of F[raternal Ord.
of Police] v. City of Phila[.],
(Pa. 2015).
Interest arbitration is distinct from grievance arbitration, which
involves the disputes over how the governing bargaining
agreement should be interpreted and/or applied. …
Grievance arbitration is not specifically mentioned in Act 111
as its language speaks only to the resolution of disputes
arising from “the collective bargaining process,” i.e. interest
arbitration, which must be settled before a board of arbitration
composed of three persons. 43 P.S. § 217.4(b). However,
Section 1 of Act 111 states that police and firefighters “shall
have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their
grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this
act,” 43 P.S. § 217.1, and in Chirico v. B[oar]d. of
Sup[ervisor]s for Newton T[ownship],
(Pa. 1983), we held that the General Assembly intended for
Act 111 and the concomitant body of case law regarding the
appellate scope of review to apply to grievance disputes.
Therefore, an arbitrator’s decision in an Act 111 case, whether
grievance or interest, “shall be final on the issue or issues in
dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer ... No
appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” 43 P.S. §
217.7(a).[9]
labor organizations or other representatives designated by
fifty percent or more of such policemen or firemen, have the
right to bargain collectively with their public employers
concerning the terms and conditions of their employment,
including compensation, hours, working conditions,
retirement, pensions and other benefits, and shall have the
right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or
disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.
43 P.S. § 217.1.
9 Section 7(a) of Act 111 provides:
(a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration
thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute
and shall be binding upon the public employer and the
policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be
in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties
to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to
(continued…)
[J-70-2025] - 10
N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1032-33.
Although Act 111 does not allow for appeals of arbitration awards, this Court in
City of Washington “adopted the narrow certiorari mechanism for a combination of
pragmatic, historical, and constitutional reasons.” N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1033. There,
after the City of Washington could not reach an agreement with its police officers, the
parties went to arbitration where a three-member panel issued an interest arbitration
award. The City of Washington subsequently filed an appeal in the court of common
pleas, challenging a portion of the award which ordered it to provide “at its sole expense,
hospitalization coverage for the members of the family of each member of the Police
Department of the City of Washington, equal to the coverage now provided … for the
member himself.” City of Washington,
(quoting arbitration award). The
City of Washington claimed that it was illegal to make such payments to family members
of police officers. After the trial court concluded that the City of Washington had no right
to appeal under Act 111, the City petitioned for allowance to appeal to this Court.
The City of Washington Court first rejected the City’s claim that it had a
constitutional right to appeal an interest arbitration award to the court of common pleas.
The Court observed that Act 111 “clearly provides that ‘the determination of the
majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in
dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen
any court. Such determination shall constitute a mandate to
the head of the political subdivision which is the employer, or
to the appropriate officer of the Commonwealth if the
Commonwealth is the employer, with respect to matters which
can be remedied by administrative action, and to the
lawmaking body of such political subdivision or of the
Commonwealth with respect to matters which require
legislative action, to take the action necessary to carry out the
determination of the board of arbitration.
43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (emphasis added).
[J-70-2025] - 11
involved. … No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.” Id. (quoting 43 P.S. §
217.7(a)). Given that an arbitration panel “is neither a court nor an administrative
agency[,]” the Court determined that Act 111’s prohibition on appeals of arbitration awards
did not conflict with Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which only
provides a right of appeal from cases arising from a court or administrative agency.10
Nonetheless, the City of Washington Court examined the appeal pursuant to then-
existing Supreme Court Rule 68 ½, explaining that
If an appeal is prohibited by an Act, or the decision of the
Agency is stated to be final or conclusive, the law is well
settled that an appeal will lie to the Courts in the nature of a
narrow certiorari and this Court will review only (1) the
question of jurisdiction; (2) the regularity of the proceedings
before the Agency; (3) questions of excess in exercise of
powers; and (4) constitutional questions: Cf. Devito v. Civil
Service Commission,
172 A.2d 161
[(Pa. 1961)] (and cases
cited therein); Dauphin Deposit Trust Company v. Myers,
[(Pa. 1960)]. City of Washington,
(quoting Keystone Raceway Corp. v. State Harness Racing Comm’n,
(Pa. 1961)). Given that “[n]o adjudicatory body has
unlimited discretion” and that “each and every adjudicator is bound by the Constitution[,]”
the City of Washington Court reasoned that applying the narrow certiorari scope of review
would ensure “the protection of constitutional rights.” Id. at 440-41.
10 Article V, Section 9 provides:
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record
from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of
appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency
to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of
such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such
other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. It is questionable whether the City of Washington Court’s finding
that a decision of an Act 111 arbitration panel is not a decision of an administrative agency
remains true in light of subsequently enacted statutes. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(b); 42
Pa.C.S. § 933(b).
[J-70-2025] - 12
Analyzing the third prong of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the Court
concluded that the arbitration panel exceeded the scope of its authority in ordering the
city to carry out an illegal act, noting that the city was forbidden by statute from paying
hospitalization premiums for non-city employees. Id. at 443. Notably, the City of
Washington Court did not draw a distinction between interest arbitrations and grievance
arbitrations in finding that the narrow certiorari scope of review applied to review of
arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111.11
In Chirico v. Board of Supervisors for Newton Township,
(Pa. 1983), the Court addressed, inter alia, whether a court of common pleas had jurisdiction to resolve a grievance between Newton Township and its police officers, stemming from the interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. After an impasse in collective bargaining negotiations, a board of arbitrators entered an award setting forth 11 In 1970—two years following the passage of Act 111—the General Assembly enacted the Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101-1101.2301 (“PERA”). PERA outlines more detailed procedures and requirements for the representation of public employees, the scope of collective bargaining between representatives of public employees and public employers, and provides that “[a]rbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory.” 43 P.S. § 1101.903. Section 903 of PERA further provides that “[t]he procedure [for arbitration] to be adopted is a proper subject of bargaining with the proviso that the final step shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator or a tri-partite board of arbitrators as the parties may agree.” Id. In 1977, this Court held that the proper scope of review of grievance arbitration awards rendered pursuant to PERA is the essence test, which provides that “[t]he arbitrator’s award must be ‘respected by the judiciary if the interpretation can in any rational way be derived from the agreement, viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties’ intention[.]’” Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit No. 7 Classroom Assistants Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n,
(Pa. 2007) (quoting Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty. v. Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., Soc. of the Fac.,
, 1275 (Pa. 1977)). However, PERA is clear that it does not apply to employees covered by Act 111. See 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2) (“‘Public employe’ or ‘employe’ … shall not include … those employees covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111)[.]”). This Court has explained that PERA “has no application to proceedings initiated under Act 111.” Geriot v. Council of Darby,
(Pa. 1980).
[J-70-2025] - 13
the terms and conditions of employment for police officers for the 1975 calendar year.
Chirico,
. When the Township refused to implement certain aspects of the award, the Police Department filed a complaint in mandamus in the court of common pleas.
. During the pendency of that mandamus action, another board of
arbitrators entered an award for the 1976 calendar year. Neither the Township nor the
Police Department filed an appeal from either award. Relevant here, the 1975 award
provided that police officers were entitled to one to five weeks of vacation, but the award
did not define the term “week.” As a result, the parties disputed whether a “vacation week”
was five or six days. In deciding the Police Department’s mandamus action, the trial court
interpreted the phrase “vacation week” but refused to enforce other ambiguous provisions
of the awards to the extent the directives were illegal. On appeal, the Commonwealth
Court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to interpret the phrase in the
award as this was exclusively for the arbitration panel.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, explaining that “[a] dispute over the interpretation
of a provision in an existing award falls within the ambit of grievance arbitration.”
at 474 (citing Geriot,
(holding that a police department could seek
mandamus against its municipality to enforce a wage provision in the CBA)). The Chirico
Court continued:
Grievance disputes are properly handled within the framework
of [S]ection 1 of Act 111, which provides that “[Employees]
shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their
grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this
act.” [43 P.S. § 217.1]. Act 111 does not set forth the specific
mechanism by which grievance, as compared with interest,
disputes are to be arbitrated. We acknowledge it is clearly
inadequate to recognize a right “to a settlement of grievances
or disputes[,]” while failing to provide any method for the
implementation of those rights. This obvious vacuum must
not be countenanced. Yet resort to the courts to meet this
need would contravene the strong affirmance of the use of
non-adversarial methods for the resolution of disputes
[J-70-2025] - 14
between governmental employers and police and firemen
embodied in [S]ection two of the Act.
First, Act 111 specifically avoids the use of the courts for
dispute resolution. This policy is so strong that [S]ection seven
of the Act, 43 P.S. [§] 217.7, provides for binding arbitration
and contains the unique provision that “[n]o appeal therefrom
shall be allowed to any court.” Thus the only method for
settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of
Act 111 is arbitration. This objective would be completely
frustrated if we were to superimpose, by judicial fiat, a layer of
court intervention.
Id. at 474–75. The Court also highlighted that labor arbitrators, given their particular
expertise in labor law, are best suited to resolve disputes as to the meaning of an award.
Id. at 475.
Two years later, in Moon Township v. Police Officers of Moon Township,
1305
(Pa. 1985), the Court addressed whether an Act 111 interest arbitration panel may
include in its award a procedure for binding grievance arbitration and, subsumed within
that question, it addressed whether Act 111 requires that grievance arbitration procedures
conform with the arbitration procedures set forth in Section 4 of Act 111.12 After Moon
12 Section 4 provides:
(a) If in any case of a dispute between a public employer and
its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining
process reaches an impasse and stalemate, or if the
appropriate lawmaking body does not approve the agreement
reached by collective bargaining, with the result that said
employers and employes are unable to effect a settlement,
then either party to the dispute, after written notice to the other
party containing specifications of the issue or issues in
dispute, may request the appointment of a board of
arbitration.
For purposes of this [S]ection, an impasse or stalemate shall
be deemed to occur in the collective bargaining process if the
parties do not reach a settlement of the issue or issues in
dispute by way of a written agreement within thirty days after
collective bargaining proceedings have been initiated.
(continued…)
[J-70-2025] - 15
Township and its police officers reached an impasse in their collective bargaining
negotiations, the parties proceeded to arbitration pursuant to Act 111. Relevant here, the
In the case of disputes involving political subdivisions of the
Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not
approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not
approved by the appropriate lawmaking body within one
month after the agreement is reached by way of collective
bargaining.
In the case of disputes involving the Commonwealth, the
agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning
of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the Legislature within
six months after the agreement is reached by way of collective
bargaining.
(b) The board of arbitration shall be composed of three
persons, one appointed by the public employer, one
appointed by the body of policemen or firemen involved, and
a third member to be agreed upon by the public employer and
such policemen or firemen. The members of the board
representing the public employer and the policemen or
firemen shall be named within five days from the date of the
request for the appointment of such board. If, after a period of
ten days from the date of the appointment of the two
arbitrators appointed by the public employer and by the
policemen or firemen, the third arbitrator has not been
selected by them, then either arbitrator may request the
American Arbitration Association, or its successor in function,
to furnish a list of three members of said association who are
residents of Pennsylvania from which the third arbitrator shall
be selected. The arbitrator appointed by the public employer
shall eliminate one name from the list within five days after
publication of the list, following which the arbitrator appointed
by the policemen or firemen shall eliminate one name from
the list within five days thereafter. The individual whose name
remains on the list shall be the third arbitrator and shall act as
chairman of the board of arbitration. The board of arbitration
thus established shall commence the arbitration proceedings
within ten days after the third arbitrator is selected and shall
make its determination within thirty days after the appointment
of the third arbitrator.
43 P.S. § 217.4.
[J-70-2025] - 16
interest arbitration panel issued an award which included a contractual grievance
procedure that required binding arbitration of grievances between Moon Township and
its police officers. Moon Twp.,
n.2. Notably, the grievance procedure set forth in the award differed from the procedure set forth in Section 4 of Act 111.
The award provided, in pertinent part, that “the issue may be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the rules and regulations, then prevailing, of the American Arbitration Association except as may be limited or expanded by the Uniform Arbitration Act,[13] [(“UAA”)] of the Commonwealth[,]” and that “[a]ny arbitration award shall, to the extent permitted by law, be final, binding, and not subject to review except as provided for in the said [UAA].”
Moon Township appealed to the court of common pleas, seeking, inter alia, to
vacate the grievance procedure. Specifically, Moon Township argued that the interest
arbitration panel was without constitutional or statutory authority to impose a binding
grievance arbitration procedure on the parties because Act 111 is limited to interest
arbitrations and does not permit grievance arbitrations at all.
. The trial court
disagreed, reasoning that the interest arbitration panel had the authority to establish a
binding grievance arbitration procedure. Nonetheless, the trial court remanded the matter
to the interest arbitration panel because the grievance arbitration procedure set forth in
the award did not comply with the procedure described in Act 111. Moon Township then
appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the trial court; however, instead of
remanding the matter to the arbitration panel, the Commonwealth Court modified the
grievance arbitration procedure so that it mirrored the procedures set forth in Act 111.
This Court modified the Commonwealth Court’s order, permitting the grievance
arbitration procedures referencing the UAA in the interest arbitration award to stand as
13 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301–7320.
[J-70-2025] - 17
is. Id. at 1313. The Court began its analysis by discussing the legislative history and
purpose of Act 111, describing that the Act sought to harmonize the employment
relationships with police and fire personnel by granting them the right to collectively
bargain. Id. at 1309. Given this legislative intent, the Court reasoned that “it is difficult to
accept [Moon Township’s] underlying premise that the legislature intended to exclude
grievance arbitration as a method for the resolution of disputes as to meaning,
interpretation and implication of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.” Id.
The Court also referenced the 1967 amendment to Article III, § 31 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, see supra note 7, explaining that it provides the constitutional predicate for
binding resolution of grievances or disputes as well as for collective bargaining. Id. at
1310. The Court also observed that although Act 111 only provides a mechanism for
interest arbitrations, if the Act were not interpreted to also cover grievance arbitrations, it
“would render meaningless Section 1’s assurance that the resolution of grievances and
disputes comprised part of the subject matter to be addressed in the Act.” Id. Therefore,
the Court concluded that the interest arbitration panel “could properly include in its award
a mechanism for binding arbitration of grievances and disputes arising under the terms
of the collective bargaining provisions set forth under its award.” Id. at 1311-12.
The Court next analyzed whether the panel exceeded its authority in establishing
a binding arbitration procedure pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act. On this issue, the
Court explained:
Although we have found that Act 111 expresses a clear
intention to provide for grievance and dispute resolution by
way of binding arbitration, there is no clear intent that can be
derived from the language of the Act to suggest that the
procedure set forth in [S]ection 4 must be followed. In fact the
procedure described in [S]ection 4 sets forth time limits that
are clearly related to a contract negotiation impasse and not
to an alleged grievance. Moreover, there is nothing unique
about a tripartite arbitration panel that would make it more
[J-70-2025] - 18
suitable for grievance arbitration than the other forms of
binding arbitration that have been approved by the legislature.
… Unquestionably, the parties could have voluntarily agreed
to a grievance procedure in accordance with the Uniform
Arbitration Act[.] … Therefore, we can find no reason for
holding that an arbitration panel should not have the same
latitude in this area.
Id. at 1312 (internal citations omitted).
This lengthy history of Act 111 jurisprudence brings us to Betancourt, which was
decided in 1995 and involved the consolidated cases of three state troopers who were
initially suspended or discharged for unrelated, wrongful conduct. The troopers each filed
grievances and proceeded with grievance arbitrations where the separate arbitrators
either ordered the reinstatement of the trooper at issue or imposed a lesser punishment.14
Betancourt,
. The State Police then appealed the arbitration awards
directly to the Commonwealth Court pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 763(b). The
Commonwealth Court found that “the source of the authorization for police and fire
grievance arbitration is the [UAA],” not Act 111, and therefore reasoned that the proper
scope of review is set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d) of the UAA.15 Pa. State Police v. Pa.
14 Trooper James Betancourt was charged with unbecoming conduct for exposing his
penis to other troopers while on duty. Trooper Betancourt initially received a thirty-day
suspension without pay but a grievance arbitrator later determined that his conduct did
not rise to the level of unbecoming conduct as defined by the parties’ CBA.
Trooper Scott Gibson was discharged for wrongful conduct after failing to pay his debts,
issuing bad checks, and failing to file reports properly. A grievance arbitrator
subsequently found that Gibson’s conduct did not rise to the level of extremely egregious
behavior and ordered the reinstatement of Gibson.
Trooper Joseph DiRaimo was discharged for wrongful conduct after using a
Commonwealth credit card to pay for five dollars’ worth of gasoline for his wife’s personal
vehicle. Trooper DiRaimo pled guilty to a summary offense and was dismissed.
Subsequently, Trooper DiRaimo requested a grievance arbitration where the arbitrator
concluded that the conduct did not warrant his firing and reduced the discipline to a fifteen-
day suspension.
15 Section 7302(d)(2) of the UAA provides:
(continued…)
[J-70-2025] - 19
State Troopers’ Ass’n (Betancourt),
(1993), rev’d,
(Pa.
1995).
This Court subsequently granted allowance of appeal in Betancourt to determine
the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration awards under Act 111. Initially, the
Court noted that while City of Washington adopted the narrow certiorari scope of review
in a case involving an Act 111 interest arbitration award, the Court there “did not
circumscribe [its] holding … so that it would apply only to interest arbitration awards.”
Betancourt,
n.3. The Court then explained that it was Act 111, not the UAA, which specifically authorized grievance arbitrations, pointing to our decision in Chirico where we determined that “[g]rievance disputes are properly handled within the framework of [S]ection 1 of Act 111, which provides that ‘[Employees] shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.’” Chirico,
. The Betancourt Court rejected the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning that this Court’s decisions in Chirico and Moon, “established the UAA as the progenitor of Act 111 grievance arbitration.” Betancourt,
A.2d at 87
. According to the Betancourt Court, “[n]either [Chirico nor Moon] provide[d] justification for the [Commonwealth] Court’s views.”
The Betancourt Court explained that in Moon, the Court focused on whether it was
permissible for an Act 111 grievance arbitration panel to decline to follow “some of the
procedures set forth for interest arbitration in Section 4 of Act 111, and instead follow
(2) Where this paragraph is applicable a court in reviewing an
arbitration award pursuant to this subchapter shall,
notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, modify
or correct the award where the award is contrary to law and is
such that had it been a verdict of a jury the court would have
entered a different judgment or a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2).
[J-70-2025] - 20
some of the procedures set forth in the UAA.” Betancourt,
. The Betancourt Court explained that the Moon Court “determined that a grievance arbitration panel need not conform in all particulars to the procedures set forth in Section 4 [of Act 111].”
While the Moon Court permitted parties to utilize certain UAA procedures for grievance arbitrations, the Betancourt Court stressed that Moon “did not, however, make any statements which could be construed as giving support for the proposition that it was the UAA, and not Act 111, that gave authority for grievance arbitration under Act 111.”
. The Betancourt Court also highlighted that although Moon permitted the grievance procedures to differ from the procedures set forth in Section 4 of Act 111, Moon did not discuss the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration awards.
at 88 n.11 (“Section 4 [of Act 111] concerns the procedures to be employed; it does not, however, touch upon judicial review of arbitration awards.”). Therefore, the Betancourt Court clarified that Moon “should not be read as condoning the UAA’s essence test as the scope of review for Act 111 grievance arbitration awards.”
The Betancourt Court next addressed the State Police’s argument that because
Act 111 does not specifically provide for grievance arbitration procedures, the scope of
review set forth in the UAA should apply.
. The Court rejected the State Police’s argument, explaining that “Act 111 is not devoid of direction on this issue[,]” and referenced Section 1 of Act 111 which provides that “policemen or firemen … shall have the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.”
(quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1). Based on Section 1 of Act 111, the
Court concluded that “[t]he legislature … expressed the unqualified intent that issues
relating to grievance resolution be covered under Act 111.” Id. However, the Court also
acknowledged that “[a]rguably, this intent is obscured by the legislature’s failure to provide
as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did for interest arbitration.” Id.
[J-70-2025] - 21
Given the lack of clear direction in Act 111, the Court looked to the history of Act 111 to
ascertain whether the General Assembly intended for a different scope of review for
grievance arbitration awards compared to interest arbitration awards.
The Betancourt Court observed that prior to Act 111, police officers and firefighters
were prohibited from going on strike and had no collective bargaining rights. Id. (citing
Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, 43 P.S. § 215.1). The Court noted that “[b]y the later
1960s, the failure of labor relations law to protect the rights of public employees had led
to illegal strikes and a general breakdown in communication between public employers
and their employees” causing the General Assembly to “enact sweeping reforms of public
labor relations law.” Id. at 89. According to the Court, “Act 111 was created to strike a
more perfect balance between the need of the Commonwealth to insure public safety and
the rights of the worker. To protect the need of the Commonwealth, police and fire
personnel were still denied the right to strike.” Id. The Court emphasized that the
“restraint on judicial activism [wa]s the linchpin of the Act[.]” Id. (citing City of Washington,
). Thus, the Court concluded that there was nothing in Act 111 nor its history showing that the General Assembly intended for “grievance arbitration awards to be subject to greater judicial involvement than interest arbitration awards.”
The Court declined to “allow a scope of review which is markedly boarder than narrow certiorari for Act 111 grievance arbitration.”
The Court also reiterated that the UAA’s essence test is inconsistent with the narrow certiorari scope of review such that the UAA cannot apply.
at 89 n.17 (citing Appeal of Upper Providence Police Delaware Cnty. Lodge No. 27 Fraternal Ord. of Police,
(Pa. 1987) (upholding the narrow certiorari
scope of review for Act 111 arbitration awards and reasoning that “[t]he legislature did not
intend that the comprehensive scheme and procedures created for arbitration under Act
[J-70-2025] - 22
111 be somehow modified implicitly by the scope of review provided under [S]ection
7302(d) of the UAA or by any of the other inconsistent provisions”)).
Four years following Betancourt, this Court in Smith analyzed whether there should
be a limited public policy exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Smith
involved the consolidated cases of two state troopers who were each disciplined for
separate, wrongful conduct.16 On appeal, the Smith Court first reiterated Betancourt’s
holding that narrow certiorari is the proper scope of review for grievance arbitration
awards and that the “severe limits placed on our appellate authority were not self-
imposed” but instead “dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith,
. Applying the narrow certiorari scope of review, the Court first held that the arbitrators did not exceed their powers in ordering the reinstatement of the troopers because the reinstatement “did not mandate that the State Police perform an illegal act” and because the reinstatement “clearly related to the terms and conditions of employment.”
.
The Court next addressed the State Police’s argument that an arbitrator could
“exceed his or her powers … by issuing an order which contravenes public policy.”
(internal quotations omitted). We unequivocally rejected this argument, explaining that
“allow[ing] the courts to interfere with an arbitrator’s award whenever that award could be
deemed to be violative of ‘public policy’—however that nebulous concept may be defined
by a particular appellate court—would greatly expand the scope of review in these
16 Trooper Rodney Smith, after drinking at a bar while off duty, got into an argument with
his ex-girlfriend and jammed his police-issued weapon into her mouth, threatening to kill
her. Trooper Smith pled guilty to five criminal charges stemming from the incident and
was dismissed from the force. After filing a grievance, an arbitrator determined that
Smith’s dismissal was excessive and ordered his reinstatement.
Trooper Robert Johnson was charged with retail theft after stealing $27.58 in
merchandise from a department store. After being notified of his dismissal from the force,
Johnson filed a grievance. The arbitrator concluded that the State Police did not have
just cause to dismiss Trooper Johnson.
[J-70-2025] - 23
matters.”
The Court further explained that adopting such an exception “would undercut the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.”
1253
.
Then-Justice Castille authored a concurring opinion, suggesting that the narrow
certiorari scope of review “be expanded in grievance arbitration cases to include review
of arbitrators’ powers where it appears that an arbitrator’s decision is manifestly,
unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious.”
(Castille, J., concurring). Justice Nigro also concurred, proposing that, based on Trooper Smith’s egregious conduct, the Court expand the narrow certiorari scope of review to examine “whether the arbitration decision is repugnant to public policy or shocks the conscience of the court.”
(Nigro, J., concurring). Lastly, Justice Newman dissented, finding that the arbitrators exceeded the limits of their powers by reinstating troopers who were “guilty of serious crimes.”
(Newman, J., dissenting). Justice Newman reasoned that because police are “responsible for enforcing the laws of this Commonwealth and protecting the safety of the citizens of this Commonwealth, the public policy of binding arbitration must cede to the public policy of insuring that the employees who are bound to carry out these duties are of the highest integrity and character.”
III. Parties’ Arguments
City’s Arguments
The City provides two main reasons why the Court should overrule Betancourt.
First, it argues that the Betancourt Court erred in holding that narrow certiorari applies to
grievance arbitrations because the text of Act 111 is silent on judicial review of grievance
arbitrations. City’s Brief at 28. The City highlights that it was not initially clear that Act
111 permitted grievance arbitrations because the Act does not provide a specific provision
pertaining to such arbitrations. Id. at 30. Although Act 111 states that “[n]o appeal [from
[J-70-2025] - 24
an arbitration award] shall be allowed to any court[,]” id. (citing 43 P.S. § 217.7(a)), the
City maintains that this “clearly applies to interest arbitration only” because “[i]t is
preceded and followed by sections describing the interest arbitration panel’s powers” and
“specifically refers to the ‘determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[.]’” Id.
at 30-31 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.7(a)). The City observes that courts only employ the
narrow certiorari scope of review “as a backdrop where a statute has made clear that it is
precluding review[.]” Id. at 31 (citing Dauphin Deposit v. Myers,
(Pa. 1957)).
However, here, because in the City’s view Act 111 does not prohibit the appeals of
grievance arbitrations, narrow certiorari should not apply.
Second, the City contends that Betancourt misunderstood the history and policy
rationale of Act 111. Id. at 32. Specifically, the City attacks Betancourt’s conclusion that
the “swift resolution of [grievance arbitration] disputes [would] decrease[] the chance that
the workforce would be destabilized by protracted litigation.” Id. at 33 (quoting
Betancourt,
). The City contends that this was not a concern of the General Assembly in passing Act 111, but to the extent it was, the concern was aimed at interest arbitrations which affect the entire workforce.
at 33-34 (citing Pa. State Police v. Pa. Lab. Rels. Bd.,
, 1247 n.6 (Pa. 2002) (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“Good reason
exists to differentiate legislative purposes related to impasses and grievances, since
bargaining impasses implicate a far more immediate and direct potential for
destabilization in the workforce (the seminal concern of Act 111) than does the resolution
of individual grievances.”)).
The City believes that the narrow certiorari scope of review is harmful as it has led
to the wrongful reinstatement of police officers who have betrayed the public trust,
“taint[ing] the entire investigative process” and “failing to protect the public against the
most powerful employees.” City’s Brief at 36. According to the City, “[a] minimally altered
[J-70-2025] - 25
scope of review would restore at least some discretion to the [Police] Commissioner, who
directly understands how derelict officers impact the police mission.” Id. at 41.
Instead of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the City asks the Court to adopt
the J.N.O.V. scope of review set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) of the UAA, or the
essence test, which is the scope of review applied to grievance arbitrations under PERA.
City’s Brief at 43. The City explains that the J.N.O.V. scope of review is specifically
employed for grievance arbitration awards arising out of a public CBA. In such matters,
42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) provides that
a court in reviewing an arbitration award pursuant to this
subchapter shall … modify or correct the award where the
award is contrary to law and is such that had it been a verdict
of a jury the court would have entered a different judgment or
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2). Pursuant to this scope of review, a court should enter judgment
notwithstanding the verdict when “no two reasonable minds could disagree that the
outcome should have been rendered in favor of the movant.” City’s Brief at 43 (quoting
Lockwood v. Pittsburgh,
(Pa. 2000)).
The City alternatively advocates for the essence test, which “considers whether
the issue is within the CBA’s terms and, if so, whether the award ‘can rationally be derived
from the’ CBA.”
(quoting State Sys. of Higher Educ. (Cheyney Univ.) v. State Coll. Univ. Pro. Ass’n,
(Pa. 1999)). The City notes that the essence test is applicable to arbitrations arising under PERA, which, similarly to Act 111, provides that arbitration awards under the Act are final and binding.
at 44 (citing 43 P.S. §
1101.903).
If the Court declines to replace the narrow certiorari scope of review with either the
J.N.O.V. scope of review or the essence test, the City seeks a narrow public policy
exception to the narrow certiorari scope of review. Id. at 49. Although it acknowledges
[J-70-2025] - 26
that the Court declined to add such an exception in Smith, the City explains that three
Justices would have adopted a public policy exception in that case. Id. at 49-50 (citing
Smith,
(Castille, J., concurring);
(Nigro, J., concurring);
1255
(Newman, J., dissenting)). The City also notes that this Court has relied on public policy exceptions in other scenarios.
at 50 (citing Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield,
(Pa. 2004) (OAJC) (finding that based on public policy, an “[i]nsurance [c]ompany is not required to defend or indemnify against damages arising out of its insured’s criminal acts where the voluntary participation of the victim in an illegal heroin-transaction caused her death”); Dinardo v. Kohler,
304 A.3d 1187
, 1205 (Pa. 2023) (rejecting the no-felony-conviction-recovery rule as it conflicts with public policy); Socko v. Mid-Atl. Sys. of CPA, Inc.,
(Pa. 2015) (explaining that the at-will employment doctrine is subject to “judicially-created notions of public policy”); Waychoff v. Waychoff,
(Pa. 1932) (refusing to enforce a contract that is against public policy); McCormick v. Hanover Twp.,
(Pa. 1914) (same)).
The City also highlights that in PERA cases, the Court has adopted a limited public
policy exception aimed at “finding a balance between ‘the sometimes competing goals of
dispute resolution by final and binding arbitration and protection of the public weal.’”
at 52 (quoting Westmoreland,
). The limited public policy exception in
PERA cases consists of the following three-part test:
First, a reviewing court must identify precisely what remedy
the arbitrator imposed. Next, the court must inquire into
whether that remedy implicates a public policy that is well-
defined, dominant, and ascertained by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of
supposed public interests. Finally, the reviewing court must
determine if the arbitrator’s award compels the employer to
violate the implicated policy, given the particular
circumstances and the factual findings of the arbitrator.
[J-70-2025] - 27
(quoting Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Millcreek Twp. Educ. Support Pers. Ass’n,
A.3d 993, 1011
(Pa. 2019)). Based on this Court’s adoption of a limited public policy
exception in PERA cases, the City rejects the Smith Court’s contention that such an
exception would be unworkable in the Act 111 context. Id. at 51.
FOP’s Arguments
The FOP argues that the history, purpose, and text of Act 111 support the narrow
certiorari scope of review for grievance arbitration awards as interpreted by this Court in
City of Washington and Betancourt. FOP’s Brief at 21-25. The FOP relies on the doctrine
of stare decisis and our specific pronouncement that “[i]n cases resolved upon statutory
interpretation, stare decisis does implicate greater sanctity because the legislature can
prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Id. at 28
(quoting Commonwealth v. Doughty,
(Pa. 2015)). Here, because the General Assembly has not amended Act 111 since Betancourt, the FOP maintains that Betancourt correctly interpreted Act 111.
Moreover, because the narrow certiorari
scope of review has been “repeatedly applied and essentially unchanged” since
Betancourt, the FOP claims that stare decisis further compels the rejection of the City’s
arguments in this case. Id. at 29.
The FOP also contends that the Betancourt Court correctly recognized that Act
111 plainly declares that “policemen and firemen … shall have the right to an adjustment
or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act.’” Id.
at 30 (quoting Betancourt,
(quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1)). Although Betancourt noted that Act 111 did not provide “as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did for interest arbitration,” the FOP explains that the Court based its decision on the purpose and text of Act 111 which was to prevent arbitration awards “from miring down in litigation.” Id. at 32 (quoting Betancourt,
).
[J-70-2025] - 28
Next, the FOP rejects the City’s argument that the Court should apply the J.N.O.V.
scope of review set forth in the UAA because, in the FOP’s view, the UAA does not apply
to Act 111 arbitration awards. Id. at 33. Specifically, the FOP relies on our precedent
holding that the enactment of the UAA did not necessitate a lower scope of review for Act
111 arbitrations. Id. at 33-34 (citing Appeal of Upper Providence,
). The FOP notes that Betancourt similarly rejected the argument that the J.N.O.V. standard applied to Act 111 because it would conflict with the text of Act 111.
at 35 (citing Betancourt,
).
In addition, the FOP rejects the City’s reliance on PERA’s essence test because,
in the FOP’s view, PERA is inapplicable to Act 111 arbitration awards. Id. at 36. Although
PERA generally covers “any individual employed by a public employer,” it specifically
excepts employees covered by Act 111. 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2). The FOP further
distinguishes PERA from Act 111 by noting that PERA has no statutory provision barring
appeals of labor arbitration awards.
Lastly, the FOP rejects the City’s attempt to create a limited public policy exception
to the narrow certiorari scope of review given our decision in Smith which specifically
rejected such an exception. FOP’s Brief at 39-40 (citing Smith,
). Based on the “severe limits” the General Assembly placed on appellate review of arbitration awards under Act 111, the FOP explains that the Court reasoned that a public policy exception “would undercut the legislature’s intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.” Smith,
.
City’s Reply
In its reply, the City responds to the FOP’s invocation of stare decisis, claiming that
because “Betancourt is both clearly wrong and egregiously unworkable, it is not binding.”
City’s Reply Brief at 9 (citing Payne v. Tennessee,
(1991)). The City
[J-70-2025] - 29
also addresses the additional factors we examine when deciding whether to overturn
precedent, “including the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established,
its consistency with other related decisions, ... and reliance on the decision.”
(quoting Commonwealth v. Alexander,
243 A.3d 177
, 196 (Pa. 2020)). As to the quality of Betancourt’s reasoning, the City reiterates its position that the General Assembly did not intend to limit the scope of review for grievance arbitrations in passing Act 111.
Id.
at 9- 10. The City also discounts the FOP’s contention that stare decisis is given more weight in matters of statutory construction, explaining that the Court has been willing to overrule prior cases involving statutory construction.
Id.
at 10 (quoting William Penn Sch. Dist. v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ.,
(Pa. 2017)). Additionally, the City places little value on the fact that the General Assembly has not amended Act 111 since Betancourt.
(quoting Commonwealth v. Small,
238 A.3d 1267
, 1285 (Pa. 2020) (“[The] Court’s
departure from the plain language of a statute should not be viewed categorically as
placing the burden upon the General Assembly to detect our error and to marshal the
resources to correct it.”)).
As to the consequences of Betancourt, the City emphasizes that the narrow
certiorari scope of review has “proven disastrously unworkable, leading to the
reinstatement of police officers who have betrayed the public trust.” Id. at 13. The City
also diminishes the fact that courts have consistently followed Betancourt, because, in
the City’s view, these subsequent decisions have failed to “re-evaluat[e] [Betancourt’s]
wisdom.” Id. at 14. Lastly, regarding the reliance upon Betancourt, the City frames the
reliance interest as being “the right to take actions in reliance upon the narrow scope of
review of Act 111 grievance arbitrations[.]” Id. at 17. According to the City, this reliance
is not protected by stare decisis because “reliance upon a narrow scope of review does
not provide a guide to lawful behavior (and, on the contrary, frequently supports unlawful,
[J-70-2025] - 30
or at least highly inappropriate, behavior).” Id. at 17-18 (emphasis in original). The City
also mentions in passing that “the scope of review is a procedural rule” but fails to develop
an argument as to why this would have an impact on stare decisis. Id. at 17.
Amici17
The City’s Amici collectively highlight that continuing to follow Betancourt is
untenable because unreasonable and egregious arbitration decisions undermine the
public trust, especially when police officers play such an important role in society. The
City’s Amici highlight that sexual harassment is a “harmful and pervasive problem in
Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies” that poses a threat to public safety by
undermining officer and squad effectiveness. Women’s Law Project Amicus Brief at 5,
16-18; Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Amicus Brief at 19-23.
The FOP’s Amici each reiterate that the narrow certiorari scope of review comports
with the text and history of Act 111 and that stare decisis compels the Court to uphold
Betancourt. Amicus Pennsylvania AFL-CIO additionally argues that modifying the scope
of review will undermine contractual provisions agreed to by public employers and unions.
Pennsylvania AFL-CIO’s Amicus Brief at 8-9.
17 The following amici filed briefs in support of the City: 1) Citizens Police Oversight
Commission; 2) Women’s Law Project and the Pennsylvania Coalition Against Domestic
Violence; 3) the Advocacy for Racial and Civil Justice Clinic at the University of
Pennsylvania Carey School of Law, Defender Association of Philadelphia, & American
Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania; 4) the Pennsylvania Chiefs of Police Association;
5) Pennsylvania State Association of Township Supervisors, Pennsylvania Municipal
League, Pennsylvania State Association of Boroughs, and Pennsylvania State
Association of Township Commissioners; and 6) the City of Pittsburgh.
The following amici filed briefs in support of the FOP: 1) the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO;
2) Pennsylvania Lodge, Fraternal Order of Police; and 3) the Pennsylvania Professional
Firefighters Association, and the International Association of Firefighters, Local No. 1.
[J-70-2025] - 31
IV. Analysis
As the City asks us to overturn Betancourt, or alternatively, Smith, we must
address the doctrine of stare decisis. As this presents a pure question of law, our
standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Tincher v. Omega
Flex, Inc.,
(Pa. 2014). Stare decisis “derives from the Latin maxim ‘stare decisis et non quieta movere,’ which means to stand by the thing decided and not disturb the calm.” Alexander, 243 A.3d at 195 (quoting Ramos v. Louisiana,
115
(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part)). It is “preferable for the sake of certainty, … to follow even questionable decisions because stare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.”
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
However, because “precedent is not infallible, … judicial honesty demands
corrective action in appropriate cases.” Tincher,
. To overturn precedent, we “require[] a ‘special justification, over and above the belief that the precedent was wrongly decided.’” Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr. v. Pa. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
309 A.3d
808
, 850 (Pa. 2024) (quoting Alexander, 243 A.3d at 196) (internal citations omitted). In
determining whether there is a special justification to depart from precedent, we analyze
“a number of factors, including the age and lineage of the decisions, as well as ‘the quality
of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other
related decisions, … and reliance on the decision.’” Id. (quoting Alexander, 243 A.3d at
196-97).
Another important consideration informing the analysis is whether the precedent
involves a question of statutory interpretation or constitutional interpretation. As to the
former, stare decisis “implicate[s] greater sanctity because the legislature can
[J-70-2025] - 32
prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Doughty,
A.3d at 955
. Conversely, stare decisis “is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by a constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.” Alexander, 243 A.3d at 177-78 (quoting Agostini v. Felton,
(1997)).
A. Betancourt and narrow certiorari scope of review
i. Age and lineage of Betancourt
When analyzing the age and lineage of a decision, we note that “[c]ases with a
long lineage tend to have multiple precedents to overcome, making it challenging to
overrule one decision without disrupting an entire area of law.” Allegheny Reprod. Health
Ctr., 309 A.3d at 887. In addition, we “are generally more hesitant to overturn
longstanding decisions involving questions of statutory interpretation, reasoning that the
longer the decision has been on the books, the longer the legislature had to step in if they
felt something needed to be corrected.” Id.
Betancourt was decided in 1995, and this Court has repeatedly followed its holding
in Act 111 grievance arbitration cases ever since. See N. Berks, 230 A.3d at 1027; City
of Pittsburgh, 224 A.3d at 713; City of Phila. v. Fraternal Ord. of Police Lodge No. 5
(Breary),
(Pa. 2009); Town of McCandless v. McCandless Police Officers Ass’n,
(Pa. 2006); Smith,
. Given this Court’s
frequent and consistent application of Betancourt and the narrow certiorari scope of
review, it would be a significant departure to now reverse course and hold that Betancourt
was wrong ab initio.
Moreover, as described, Betancourt based its holding in large part on cases that
preceded it. See City of Washington,
(holding that narrow certiorari is
the proper scope of review of arbitration awards rendered pursuant to Act 111, without
[J-70-2025] - 33
distinguishing between grievance arbitrations and interest arbitrations); Chirico,
at 474
(determining that “the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within
the framework of Act 111 is arbitration[,]” even though Act 111 does not set forth a specific
procedure for the arbitration of grievances). Betancourt was not decided in a vacuum,
and it did not break new ground in clarifying that the narrow certiorari scope of review
applies to grievance arbitrations in the same manner as interest arbitrations. If we were
to overturn Betancourt, it would not only disrupt the long lineage of cases decided
subsequently but also call into question the cases preceding Betancourt.
We also emphasize that the General Assembly has not amended the pertinent
language of Section 7 of Act 111, which precludes the appeals of grievance arbitration
awards, in the thirty years following Betancourt. We recently rejected a similar call to
overturn precedent involving a matter of statutory interpretation where the General
Assembly did not amend the statute at issue following our initial decision in 1999. See
Yoder v. McCarthy Constr., Inc.,
345 A.3d 668
(Pa. 2025). In Yoder, the appellant requested that this Court overturn Fonner v. Shandon, Inc.,
(Pa. 1999), which reiterated that Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act provides a general contractor with statutory employer immunity from common law negligence claims. We noted that “[n]otwithstanding jurists’ qualms with Fonner’s result and explicit calls that the General Assembly act, that policy-making branch has enacted no change to suggest that our decades-old interpretation of the Act is contrary to its intent.” Yoder, 345 A.3d at 683. We again emphasized that stare decisis “implicate[s] greater sanctity” in matters of statutory interpretation “because the legislature can prospectively amend the statute if it disagrees with a court’s interpretation.” Id. (quoting Doughty,
).
[J-70-2025] - 34
Here, the General Assembly has similarly failed to act following Betancourt.18
While this alone is not dispositive, it is a significant hurdle to overcome when claiming a
special justification to depart from precedent. See Allegheny Reprod. Health Ctr., 309
A.3d at 887. Unlike amendments to the Constitution—which require two layers of
legislative approval in consecutive sessions and a vote by the people before becoming
effective—statutes may be amended in the normal course of the General Assembly’s
business as the legislative branch of government. Given that there are fewer
impediments for correcting alleged errors of statutory interpretation, we reason that the
General Assembly’s failure to act following our decision in Betancourt supports the notion
that the Court’s initial interpretation was correct. While the City is correct that the burden
of correcting departures from the plain language of a statute should not be placed on the
legislature, as we later discuss, we conclude that Betancourt did not so depart.
Accordingly, the age and lineage factor weighs in favor of following Betancourt and stare
decisis.
ii. Quality of Betancourt’s reasoning
To overcome stare decisis, it is not enough to demonstrate that the decision was
wrongly decided or that the reasoning of the decision was flawed. Rather, one must show
18 The General Assembly enacted a law in 1996—one year after Betancourt was
decided—which allows for the collective bargaining between school administrators
employed by school districts in first class cities and their public employers. See Act of
April 9, 1929, P.L. 177, added by Act of July 11, 1996, P.L. 619, as amended, 71 P.S. §
371 (“Section 371”). Section 371 is virtually identical to Act 111 in that it provides
administrators with “the right to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or
disputes in accordance with the terms of this [S]ection[,]” 71 P.S. § 371(a), sets forth an
identical procedure and timeline to Act 111 for composing a board of arbitration, id. §
371(e), and includes the familiar language that “[n]o appeal shall be allowed to any court”
in reference to the determination of the board of arbitration. Id. § 371(h). The
Commonwealth Court has concluded that, like Act 111, the appropriate scope of review
for arbitration awards under Section 371 is narrow certiorari. Commonwealth Ass’n of
Sch. Adm’rs ex rel. Axelrod v. Bd. of Educ.,
(Pa. Commw. 1999).
[J-70-2025] - 35
that the reasoning of the decision was “egregiously wrong” or “patently flawed.” Id. at 883
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As a preliminary matter, the Betancourt
Court explained that in City of Washington, the Court held that narrow certiorari applied
to review of Act 111 arbitration awards, and the Court did not limit its holding to apply only
to interest arbitrations. Betancourt,
n.3 (citing City of Washington,
A.2d at 440
). The Betancourt Court also observed that “this Court plainly declared in Chirico … that it was Act 111 that authorized grievance arbitration” and that “grievance[s] must be arbitrated in accordance with Act 111.” Betancourt,
(citing Chirico,
) (“[T]he only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the
framework of Act 111 is arbitration.”)). Arguably, the general holding in City of
Washington that narrow certiorari applies to the review of Act 111 arbitration awards,
coupled with the specific holding in Chirico that “the only method for settling grievance
disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration[,]” would have constituted
a sufficient legal basis to conclude that narrow certiorari applies to the review of grievance
arbitration awards.
Nonetheless, the Court continued its analysis, highlighting that because Act 111
“plainly declare[s] that ‘policemen or firemen … shall have the right to an adjustment or
settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the terms of this act[,]’” the
General Assembly “expressed the unqualified intent that issues relating to grievance
resolution be covered under Act 111.”
at 88 (quoting 43 P.S. § 217.1). Despite this
overarching statement of intent, the Court recognized that it was “obscured by the
legislature’s failure to provide as detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did
for interest arbitration.” Id. Given the perceived ambiguity in Act 111, the Court
“review[ed] the history behind Act 111” in order “[t]o determine whether the legislature
[J-70-2025] - 36
intended that grievance arbitration awards have a different scope of review from interest
arbitration awards[.]” Id.
The Court’s preliminary analysis was not egregiously wrong nor patently flawed. It
relied on past precedent for the threshold determination that grievance arbitration awards
were controlled by Act 111 and then examined the language of Act 111 to ascertain
whether the General Assembly intended to prohibit appeals of such awards. After finding
no clear answer in the text of Act 111, the Court reasonably looked at the history of Act
111 to determine the intent of the legislature. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(c)(7) (“When the
words of a statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be
ascertained by considering, among other matters … [t]he contemporaneous legislative
history.”).
The City argues that “Act 111 is silent on the scope of review of grievance
arbitrations[,]” and contends that “Betancourt over-relied upon the fact that Act 111
mentioned the word ‘grievances’ once.” City’s Brief at 29-30. However, this argument
ignores the Court’s holding in Chirico that “the only method for settling grievance disputes
allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.” Chirico,
. Aside
from a passing reference to Chirico in its reply brief,19 the City does not offer any
meaningful discussion of the case, let alone challenge the Betancourt Court’s reliance on
it for the threshold determination that grievance arbitrations are governed by Act 111.
While the City here does not dispute that Act 111 authorizes the arbitration of
grievances, it argues that Section 7’s prohibition of appeals applies only to interest
arbitrations given that the prohibition references determinations by the board of arbitration
set forth in Section 4 of the Act, which it maintains does not apply to grievance arbitrations.
19 See City’s Reply Brief at 6 n.1 (attempting to distinguish Chirico only by noting that it
“did not concern the scope of appellate review of an arbitration appeal, but rather
addressed whether the court of common pleas had jurisdiction in the first place”).
[J-70-2025] - 37
at 30-31 (citing 43 P.S. §§ 217.4(b), 217.7(a)). Consistent with the City’s argument,
Section 7’s prohibition on appeals makes clear that “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be
allowed to any court.”20 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (emphasis added). The word “therefrom”
means “from that or it.” Therefrom, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/therefrom (last visited Dec. 11, 2025). Based on the preceding
sentences of Section 7, it is apparent that “therefrom” refers to “[t]he determination of the
majority of the board of arbitration[.]” 43 P.S. § 217.7(a). It is equally apparent that “[t]he
determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[,]” id., refers to the board of
arbitration outlined in Section 4(b). See 43 P.S. § 217.4(b) (“The board of arbitration shall
be composed of three persons, one appointed by the public employer, one appointed by
the body of policemen or firemen involved, and a third member to be agreed upon by the
public employer and such policemen or firemen.”). Thus, upon reading Section 7 and
Section 4(b) together, it becomes clear that Section 7’s prohibition on appeals applies to
arbitration awards rendered by a tripartite board of arbitration set forth in Section 4(b).
The Betancourt Court bound itself to the reasoning of its prior decision in Moon.
The Moon Court explained that Section 4 “clearly relate[s] to a contract negotiation
impasse and not to an alleged grievance” and held that “there is no clear intent that can
be derived from the language of the Act to suggest that the procedure set forth in [S]ection
4 must be followed [in grievance arbitrations].” Moon,
. The unexamined
20 To reiterate, Section 7(a) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration
thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute
and shall be binding upon the public employer and the
policemen or firemen involved. Such determination shall be
in writing and a copy thereof shall be forwarded to both parties
to the dispute. No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any
court.
43 P.S. § 217.7(a).
[J-70-2025] - 38
holding in Moon that the procedures outlined in Section 4 of Act 111 do not apply to
grievance arbitrations deserves attention. In Chirico—decided two years prior to Moon—
this Court similarly concluded that the procedures outlined in Section 4 pertain to interest
arbitrations. Chirico,
. However, the Chirico Court reasoned that “it is clearly inadequate to recognize a right ‘to a settlement of grievances or disputes[,]’ while failing to provide any method for the implementation of those rights.”
(quoting 43 P.S.
§ 217.1). Explaining that “[t]his obvious vacuum must not be countenanced” to permit
grievances to be resolved by courts in a manner contrary to Act 111, the Chirico Court
held that “the only method for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework
of Act 111 is arbitration.” Id. at 475. As Section 4 is the only section of Act 111 that
outlines the method of arbitration, Moon’s holding that Section 4 does not apply to
grievance arbitrations is difficult to reconcile with Chirico’s holding that “the only method
for settling grievance disputes allowable within the framework of Act 111 is arbitration.”
Id.
Neither Moon nor Chirico called attention to the structure of Section 4, which
contains two separate subsections, (a) and (b).21 While Section 4(a) clearly outlines the
21 For reference, Section 4 provides, in its entirety:
(a) If in any case of a dispute between a public employer and
its policemen or firemen employes the collective bargaining
process reaches an impasse and stalemate, or if the
appropriate lawmaking body does not approve the agreement
reached by collective bargaining, with the result that said
employers and employes are unable to effect a settlement,
then either party to the dispute, after written notice to the other
party containing specifications of the issue or issues in
dispute, may request the appointment of a board of
arbitration.
For purposes of this [S]ection, an impasse or stalemate shall
be deemed to occur in the collective bargaining process if the
parties do not reach a settlement of the issue or issues in
(continued…)
[J-70-2025] - 39
dispute by way of a written agreement within thirty days after
collective bargaining proceedings have been initiated.
In the case of disputes involving political subdivisions of the
Commonwealth, the agreement shall be deemed not
approved within the meaning of this [S]ection if it is not
approved by the appropriate lawmaking body within one
month after the agreement is reached by way of collective
bargaining.
In the case of disputes involving the Commonwealth, the
agreement shall be deemed not approved within the meaning
of this [S]ection if it is not approved by the Legislature within
six months after the agreement is reached by way of collective
bargaining.
(b) The board of arbitration shall be composed of three
persons, one appointed by the public employer, one
appointed by the body of policemen or firemen involved, and
a third member to be agreed upon by the public employer and
such policemen or firemen. The members of the board
representing the public employer and the policemen or
firemen shall be named within five days from the date of the
request for the appointment of such board. If, after a period of
ten days from the date of the appointment of the two
arbitrators appointed by the public employer and by the
policemen or firemen, the third arbitrator has not been
selected by them, then either arbitrator may request the
American Arbitration Association, or its successor in function,
to furnish a list of three members of said association who are
residents of Pennsylvania from which the third arbitrator shall
be selected. The arbitrator appointed by the public employer
shall eliminate one name from the list within five days after
publication of the list, following which the arbitrator appointed
by the policemen or firemen shall eliminate one name from
the list within five days thereafter. The individual whose name
remains on the list shall be the third arbitrator and shall act as
chairman of the board of arbitration. The board of arbitration
thus established shall commence the arbitration proceedings
within ten days after the third arbitrator is selected and shall
make its determination within thirty days after the appointment
of the third arbitrator.
43 P.S. § 217.4.
[J-70-2025] - 40
specific events which shall constitute an impasse or stalemate in collective bargaining
negotiations sufficient to trigger interest arbitration, Section 4(b) is limited to defining the
composition of the board of arbitration, the timeframe and procedure for appointing the
arbitrators, and the timeframe for commencing the arbitration after the arbitrators are
selected. See 43 P.S. § 217.4(a)-(b). Section 4(b) makes no specific mention of
impasses or stalemates. Instead, Section 4(b) sets forth generally applicable arbitration
requirements that could apply to any grievance or dispute. Given that arbitration is the
only method for resolution of disagreements between public employers and public
employees under Act 111, it would have been reasonable to interpret Section 4(b) to
apply to any arbitration conducted pursuant to the statute. In departing from this method
for grievance resolution, the Moon Court reasoned that “there is nothing unique about a
tripartite arbitration panel[,]” Moon,
, without reckoning with the fact that
the legislature preferred a tripartite arbitration panel. The General Assembly treated
dispute and grievance resolutions similarly: “policemen or firemen … shall have the right
to an adjustment or settlement of their grievances or disputes in accordance with the
terms of this act.” 43 P.S. § 217.1. Based on Section 1’s clear statement of intent that
grievances shall be resolved in accordance with the Act, and the generally applicable
arbitration procedures in Section 4(b), the Moon Court could have looked to the entirety
of Act 111, including the arbitration procedures in Section 4(b), to conclude that the
procedures in Section 4(b) were applicable to grievance arbitrations.22
Betancourt relied upon Moon’s procedural distinction between interest and
grievance arbitration. Betancourt,
n.10. Indeed, the Court’s primary 22 The parties do not question Moon. Pursuant to the CBA, the instant grievance was decided by a single arbitrator, see supra note 3. We observe that in another recent case a grievance was decided by a tripartite board of arbitration. See City of Pittsburgh v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, Fort Pitt Lodge No. 1,
344 A.3d 429
, 434 (Pa. Commw. 2025).
[J-70-2025] - 41
reason for finding an ambiguity in Act 111 was “the legislature’s failure to provide as
detailed a mechanism for grievance arbitration as it did for interest arbitration.” Id. at 88.
Given this perceived failure of express intention, Betancourt broadly sought to ascertain
“whether the legislature intended that grievance arbitration awards have a different scope
of review from interest arbitration awards[.]” Id. at 89 (emphasis in original). In analyzing
this question, the Court did not engage with Section 7’s specific language prohibiting
appeals from a “determination of the majority of the board of arbitration[.]” 43 P.S. §
217.7(a). Thus, if there is a failure of Betancourt, it emanates from Moon and its failure
to account for the fact that Section 4(b) was not necessarily limited to interest arbitrations.
If Moon had concluded that the method for arbitration detailed in Section 4(b) applied to
both interest and grievance arbitrations, there would be no disconnect between Section
4(b) and Section 7’s prohibition of appeals “therefrom.” Id.
However, even if this was an interpretive error, it is not an error that impacts the
correctness of Betancourt’s holding because under either analysis, the narrow certiorari
scope of review applies to grievance arbitration decisions. Betancourt, and Chirico before
it, correctly discerned the comprehensive intention of the legislature by concluding that it
“eschewed judicial interference in grievance arbitration” and “that the objective of Act 111
‘would be completely frustrated if we were to impose, by judicial fiat, a layer of court
intervention.’” Betancourt,
(quoting Chirico,
). That this
conclusion is correct is supported by recognizing that grievance arbitrations resolve
differences of opinion over the application and interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements, the formation of which are indisputably authorized by Act 111 and that any
impasses in their negotiations are subject to non-appealable arbitration decisions. If
negotiation of the contract is subject to non-appealable arbitration, then enforcement
through grievance arbitration should be afforded the same protection.
[J-70-2025] - 42
Given the ambiguity in Act 111, we address the City’s argument that Section 4
should be read in its entirety to apply only to interest arbitrations and thus, Section 7’s
prohibition on appeals from an award of a tripartite board of arbitration also only applies
to interest arbitrations. However, this construction does not account for Section 1’s
directive that both grievances and disputes be resolved pursuant to the Act. Even if we
assume for the sake of stare decisis analysis that the City’s incomplete interpretation is
reasonable, any disagreement with Betancourt is based on a different interpretation of an
ambiguity in Act 111. Such a disagreement does not make that historical precedent
egregiously wrong so as to support overruling it.
As to the history of Act 111, the City argues that the Betancourt Court conflated
the legitimate policy reasons for preventing protracted appellate litigation stemming from
interest arbitrations as having the same relevance in the grievance arbitration context.
City’s Brief at 33-34. The City explains that while it makes sense to prohibit appeals of
interest arbitrations to avoid scenarios where entire departments are out of work for
extended periods of time, the same logic does not apply to grievances involving only one
or few employees.
(citing Pa. State Police,
n.6 (Saylor, J.,
dissenting) (“Good reason exists to differentiate legislative purposes related to impasses
and grievances, since bargaining impasses implicate a far more immediate and direct
potential for destabilization in the workforce (the seminal concern of Act 111) than does
the resolution of individual grievances.”)). While impasses certainly have a greater
potential for destabilization, it was not unreasonable to recognize the potential
reverberations of prolonged individual grievances on the workforce.
In sum, the City essentially repeats the same arguments raised by the State Police
in Betancourt. We explained in Yoder that when seeking to overturn precedent, the
appellant “must do more than proclaim [the precedent] is wrong to prevail now. In other
[J-70-2025] - 43
words, it is not enough for [an appellant] to rehash the appellant’s arguments from [the
case sought to be overturned].” Yoder, 345 A.3d at 681. Ultimately, although the
Betancourt Court could have reached a different result based on the text of Act 111, or
could have reached the same result based on a different analysis, we reiterate that the
Court’s reasoning in reaching its holding was not egregiously wrong nor patently flawed.
In light of existing precedent, the Court, after detecting an ambiguity in the text of Act 111,
reasonably relied on the history of the Act to resolve the ambiguity. See 1 Pa.C.S. §
1921(c)(7).
iii. Workability of narrow certiorari scope of review
The City contends that the scope of review is unworkable in the sense that it leads
to the “reinstatement of officers who have betrayed the public trust.” City’s Brief at 24.
Here, the City conflates controversial outcomes of grievance arbitrations with the
workability of the narrow certiorari scope of review itself. Precluding judicial review of
grievance arbitration awards—whether the awards are correct or outrageously wrong—is
exactly what the General Assembly intended, as interpreted by Betancourt. The fact that
questionable grievance arbitration awards are subject to the narrow certiorari scope of
review is not proof that the scope of review is unworkable. The City does not claim that
any of the four areas of inquiry set forth in the narrow certiorari scope of review are unable
to be applied by courts reviewing grievance arbitration awards. Instead, the City’s
workability argument is based on its disagreement with the outcome of narrow certiorari
review as applied to controversial arbitration decisions. While we might also find some
outcomes distasteful, correcting course by allowing more robust judicial review is a matter
for the General Assembly. See Yoder, 345 A.3d at 684 (“[W]e again direct Yoder and
other proponents of changes to the Act to appropriate policy-making branch—the General
Assembly.”).
[J-70-2025] - 44
iv. Betancourt’s consistency with other related decisions
As discussed with respect to our discussion of the quality of reasoning factor,
Betancourt relied on precedent from this Court to reach its conclusion that the narrow
certiorari scope of review applies to grievance arbitration awards. See supra p. 36. This
Court has consistently applied Betancourt’s holding in Act 111 grievance arbitration
cases. See supra p. 33. The City diminishes these subsequent cases because, while
the Court has followed Betancourt, the Court has not “re-evaluat[ed] its wisdom.” City’s
Reply Brief at 14. The City’s argument only strengthens the support for stare decisis as
this Court’s consistent following of Betancourt demonstrates that this issue has long been
settled. The City’s justification for overturning Betancourt would flip stare decisis on its
head because the entire point of the doctrine is to respect precedent that has been
decided. If we revisit precedent simply to “re-evaluate its wisdom[,]” id., stare decisis
would be meaningless.
The City also claims that the holding from Betancourt “is inconsistent when
compared to other government workers [under PERA,]” which was enacted in 1970.
City’s Reply Brief at 16. However, this argument ignores that the General Assembly
specifically intended for police officers and firefighters to be excluded from PERA. See
43 P.S. § 1101.301(2) (“‘Public employe’ or ‘employe’ … shall not include … those
employees covered under the act of June 24, 1968 (Act No. 111)[.]”). Indeed, the
exclusion of Act 111 employees from PERA’s scope indicates a clear legislative intent to
establish different procedures for other public employees. This Court does not have the
authority to rewrite Act 111’s prohibition on appeals, nor does this Court have the authority
to substitute its own policy judgment in place of the General Assembly’s.
[J-70-2025] - 45
v. Reliance on Betancourt
“[W]here there has been substantial public or private reliance on precedent—and
where overruling a decision would ‘dislodge settled rights and expectations or require and
extensive legislative response[,]’ stare decisis has added force.” Allegheny Reprod.
Health Ctr., 309 A.3d at 888 (quoting Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Railways Comm’n,
202
(1991)). The FOP, as the party seeking to uphold Betancourt, makes no developed
reliance argument. Rather, in one sentence, the FOP argues that Betancourt “has been
standing law relied upon by police and firefighters for decades.” FOP’s Brief at 33. Given
the FOP’s lack of a developed argument, we do not address this factor.
Based on our foregoing discussion of the stare decisis factors, we conclude that
the City has not established a special justification to depart from Betancourt. Accordingly,
we reaffirm Betancourt and reiterate that the proper scope of review for grievance
arbitration awards under Act 111 is narrow certiorari.23
B. Smith and the limited public policy exception
Alternatively, the City argues that we should adopt a limited public policy exception
to the narrow certiorari scope of review. The City faces the same stare decisis hurdle in
advocating for this limited exception given our decision in Smith where we specifically
rejected the same argument, explaining:
Broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to include a
provision which would allow the courts to interfere with an
arbitrator’s award whenever that award could be deemed to
be violative of “public policy”—however that nebulous concept
may be defined by a particular appellate court—would greatly
expand the scope of review in these matters. If we were to
adopt the State Police’s recommendation to include this ill-
23 Given that we reject the City’s call to overturn Betancourt, we have no reason to
analyze the City’s arguments in support of adopting either the J.N.O.V. scope of review
set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 7302(d)(2) of the UAA, or the essence test applied to review of
arbitration awards arising under PERA. See City’s Brief at 43-48.
[J-70-2025] - 46
defined term within the narrow certiorari scope of review, we
would markedly increase the judiciary’s role in Act 111
arbitration awards. This would undercut the legislature’s
intent of preventing protracted litigation in this arena.
Smith,
.
The City does not separately address the stare decisis factors to support its
alternative argument to overturn Smith. See City’s Brief at 49-52. Rather, it merely
“note[s] that the Smith Majority itself was narrow, with three Justices reasoning that an
arbitrator should be reversed if he violated public policy.”
at 49-50 (citing Smith,
A.2d at 1253
(Castille, J., concurring);
(Nigro, J., concurring);
(Newman, J., dissenting). A narrow majority is certainly not a special justification to overturn precedent, as many of our decisions are based on narrow majorities. Moreover, the Smith Court grounded its decision to reject the limited public policy exception based on Betancourt and the rationale that the “severe limits placed on our appellate authority were not self-imposed” but instead “dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith,
.
Thus, the Court concluded that “[i]f we were to broaden the narrow certiorari scope of
review to the extent propounded by the State Police, we would not be interpreting Act 111
but rather would be rewriting it.” Id. at 594.
The City does not advance any compelling reason to revisit Smith. The City claims
that because the Court has adopted a limited public policy for arbitrations arising under
PERA, “the Smith Majority’s concern that the public policy test would be vague and ill-
defined has not proven correct.” City’s Brief at 51. As noted previously, see supra p. 45,
the City’s reliance on precedent interpreting PERA is misplaced because PERA explicitly
excludes “employees covered under [Act 111].” 43 P.S. § 1101.301(2). If we were to
adopt a limited public policy exception based on our precedent involving PERA, we would
rewrite the legislatively created distinction between Act 111 and PERA. Since PERA’s
inception in 1970, this Court has always employed the essence test as the scope of review
[J-70-2025] - 47
for grievance arbitrations arising under PERA. Westmoreland,
-63 (citing
Cmty. Coll. of Beaver Cnty., 375 A.2d at 1275). While we have since adopted a limited
public policy exception to the essence test, it is clear that the exception only applies to
PERA arbitrations.24 Id. at 865 (explaining that “like our adoption of the federal essence
test for purposes of PERA, we conclude that the federal public policy exception is
appropriately applied to arbitrator’s awards arising under PERA as well”).
For similar reasons, we reject the City’s reliance on this Court’s recognition of
public policy in other contexts to support its argument that we should adopt a limited public
policy exception here. See supra p. 27. None of the cases relied upon by the City arise
under Act 111, nor did our invocation of public policy in those circumstances conflict with
a legislatively enacted statute. Pursuant to stare decisis, we have no basis to look beyond
Smith and its clear rejection of a limited public policy exception in Act 111 cases.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the City has failed to establish a special justification to
overturn our decisions in Betancourt and Smith. Thus, we adhere to stare decisis and
affirm the judgment of the Commonwealth Court. Since we reaffirm Betancourt and the
24 We acknowledge the City’s and the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion’s argument
that under the limited public policy exception applicable to PERA, we have recognized
that an arbitrator’s award of reinstatement with back pay “violate[d] a well-defined and
dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace, a public policy which
is grounded in both the federal and state law against sex discrimination in employment,
including Title VII, the regulations of the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission],
and this Commonwealth’s own [Pennsylvania Human Relations Act].” Phila. Hous. Auth.
v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps.,
(Pa. 2012). Our decision in the instant case does not in any way alter our determination that the Commonwealth has a well-defined and dominant public policy against sexual harassment in the workplace. However, given this Court’s interpretation of Act 111 in Betancourt and Smith, we are constrained by stare decisis to conclude that this public policy cannot expand the “severe limits placed on our appellate authority … dictated by the legislature[.]” Smith,
. It is for the General Assembly to address any public policy
inconsistencies.
[J-70-2025] - 48
application of the narrow certiorari scope of review, the General Assembly again has the
opportunity and prerogative to correct course if our decision is not consistent with its
intent.
Justices Dougherty, Wecht, Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.
Chief Justice Todd files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
[J-70-2025] - 49
Opinion concurring in part
[J-70-2025] [MO:Donohue, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, : No. 59 EAP 2024
:
Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court entered
: January 8, 2024, at No. 39 CD 2023,
v. : affirming the Order of the Court of
: Common Pleas of Philadelphia
: County, Civil Division, entered on
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE, LODGE : December 13, 2022, at No. 2544.
NO. 5, :
: ARGUED: September 11, 2025
Appellee :
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
CHIEF JUSTICE TODD DECIDED: October 29, 2026
Police officers hold a unique and exalted position in our Commonwealth. The lives
of the members of our communities are entrusted to police officers who maintain public
order; ensure our safety; prevent, detect, and combat crime; enforce the laws; and
provide social services, such as rendering aid in emergencies. See Petro v. Kennedy
Township Board of Commissioners,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1980). Officers
place their lives on the line every day to protect the citizens of Pennsylvania, and we are
indebted to them for their service.
However, because police officers hold positions of trust, and occupy such a special
and elevated role, they also carry with them special obligations and expectations. They
are vested with significant authority and discretionary powers, distinct from other public
employees, requiring a high degree of judgment. They are charged with the execution of
warrants and the apprehension of suspected criminals, and, to facilitate those
responsibilities, they have search, seizure, and arrest powers, including, in certain
circumstances, without a warrant. Indeed, while carrying out these duties a police officer
is empowered to resort to lawful, and in some cases lethal, force.
Related thereto, the public’s reliance upon, and perception of, police officer
integrity is integral to the protection and safety of our communities. Because of the need
to protect members of the community, as well as the safety of other officers, it is essential
to foster trust and confidence among officers, with other law enforcement agencies, and
with our citizens. Such trust and confidence is closely tied to public perceptions, and the
citizenry must trust police departments and police officers. When that trust is breached,
individuals are less likely to report crime and to cooperate in investigations, negatively
impacting the community, and ultimately hampering the ability of the police department
to carry out its functions. Simply stated, the public expectation is clear: “The public,
including fellow law enforcement agents, expect that police officers will not violate the
laws they are charged with enforcing.” United States v. Foreman,
(9th Cir.1990). Thus, “[t]he government has a substantial interest in retaining public trust in the police department and in removing police officers allegedly implicated in criminal activity who might betray that trust or who may pose a threat to the health, safety and welfare of the public.” City of Philadelphia v. Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5,
A.2d 779, 785
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
Accordingly, in light of their foundational role in our society, the significant authority
and discretionary powers in which they are invested, the public’s reliance upon police
officer integrity, as well as public expectations, “police officers are held to a higher
standard of conduct than other citizens, including other public employes” due to the
“compelling state interest in the maintenance of a high degree of public respect for police
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 2
officers.” Faust v. Police Civil Service Commission of Borough of State College,
765, 768
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1975).
Given the unique stature of police officers in Pennsylvania, I join in the majority’s
reaffirmance of the application of the narrow certiorari standard of judicial review of Act
111 grievance arbitration awards as determined in Pennsylvania State Police v.
Pennsylvania State Troopers’ Association (Betancourt),
(Pa. 1995).1
However, given police officers’ unique authority and responsibilities, as well as the
public’s expectations of law enforcement officers, unlike the majority, I would adopt a
limited public policy exception to narrow certiorari review. My reasoning follows.
The General Assembly’s intent in granting collective bargaining rights to police
(and fire personnel) is essential to understanding my position, so I briefly recount the
history of public sector labor relations. The late 1800s and early 1900s were a time of
great labor unrest. These tumultuous times were, in part, a result of individual employees
lacking full freedom of association and liberty of contract, as well as an inequality of
bargaining power, which substantially and adversely affected the welfare of the
Commonwealth and the country. Such adverse impacts included widespread strikes,
employer lockouts, and violence, all deemed inimical to the public safety and weal.
In response, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 and two
years later, in 1937, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted the Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Act (“PLRA”). Through the PLRA, the legislature granted private sector
employees in Pennsylvania the statutory right, inter alia, “to self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
1 Fire fighters also enjoy collective bargaining rights pursuant to Act 111, and, given their
similar and essential role in our Commonwealth, significant authority and discretionary
powers, and the public’s reliance upon their integrity, my reasoning applies equally to
these necessary public servants.
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 3
choosing,” and mandated bargaining between an employer and a union over wages,
hours, and other conditions of employment. 43 P.S. § 211.5; see Borough of Ellwood
City v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,
(Pa. 2010). However,
these pieces of legislation only applied to those working in the private sector.2
Historically, collective bargaining rights for those employed in the public sector was
seen as contrary to the public welfare and not permitted. Philadelphia Housing Authority
v. PLRB,
(Pa. 1985). Accordingly, public sector unionization lagged far behind its private sector counterpart. Indeed, public employees, including police officers, enjoyed no collective bargaining rights during the first half of the 20th Century. Betancourt,
. Thus, while the 1930s brought a change for private sector labor relations, labor unrest in the public sector continued and attempts at collective bargaining rights for these employees were met with fierce resistance in Pennsylvania and across the country.3 4 2 Section 3 of the PLRA excludes from the definition of employers, “the United States or the Commonwealth, or any political subdivision thereof, or any municipal authority . . . .” 43 P.S. § 211.3(c). 3 Perhaps the most famous example of the quelling of public sector organizing attempts was then-Massachusetts Governor, later-President, Calvin Coolidge’s suppression of a 1919 Boston police strike, undermining subsequent efforts at unionizing police officers, as well as other public employees. The 1919 strike resulted in “the complete destruction of the policemen's trade union movement,” with municipal officials throughout the country opposing unionization and collective bargaining for police officers. William A. Herbert, Public Sector Labor Law and History: The Politics of Ancient History?,
28 Hofstra Lab. &
Emp. L.J. 335
, 352 (2011). 4 Ten years after passing the PLRA, the General Assembly enacted the Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, § 1 et seq., in an attempt to quell increased concerns over disruptive work stoppages in the public sector. Township of Moon v. Police Officers of the Township of Moon,
(Pa. 1985). While this legislation granted employees the right to resolve grievances through negotiations, there was no provision for collective bargaining as to terms and conditions of employment and striking was prohibited. Thus, the Act of 1947 failed to achieve labor stability in the public sector, ultimately leading to the belief in the late 1960s, that the right to collectively bargain should be granted to public employees.
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 4
Due to the persistence of labor unrest among public employees, the belief that
collective bargaining should have no application in the public sector slowly lost support.
As a result, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the General Assembly enacted sweeping
reforms. In 1968, the General Assembly passed Act 111, which granted police officers
and fire fighters collective bargaining rights: “The law relating to police and fire personnel,
whose services are so vital to an ordered society . . . was created to strike a more perfect
balance between the need of the Commonwealth to insure public safety and the rights of
the worker.” Betancourt,
. As our Court stated in Township of Moon, “the General Assembly was committed to the view that the right to collective bargaining over terms and conditions of employment was critical to the restoration and maintenance of harmony in the public employment sector.” Township of Moon,
. Two
years later, in 1970, the legislature enacted the Public Employe Relations Act (“PERA”),
granting collective bargaining rights to other public employees. The public policy
underlying PERA was similar to that of Act 111, “to promote orderly and constructive
relationships between all public employers and their employes subject, however, to the
paramount rights of the citizens of this Commonwealth to keep inviolate the guarantees
for their health, safety and welfare.” 43 P.S. § 1101.101. Thus, it was the General
Assembly’s intent, through these labor laws, to balance public health, safety, and welfare
with workers’ rights as well as promote harmony in public sector labor relations.
One aspect of collective bargaining is the resolution of grievances, including those
disputes that arise out of contract interpretation. Arbitration is the “highly valued and
greatly favored” means of resolving labor disputes--in both the public and private sector.
State System of Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College Professional
Association (PSEA-NEA),
(Pa. 1999). As with federal labor policy, the
basis for Pennsylvania's strong policy in favor of arbitration is that it is considered to be
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 5
“a prime force in the policy of reducing industrial strife,” partly because it has the attributes
of being less formal, less expensive, and faster than traditional dispute resolution in the
courts.
Indeed, both Act 111 and PERA contain provisions that clearly envision an
arbitration award as final and binding.5
Notwithstanding the labor policy in favoring the final and binding arbitration of
disputes, and the statutory language expressly supporting such finality, our Court has
nevertheless determined that the judiciary has the authority to review labor arbitration
awards. See City of Washington v. Police Department of the City of Washington,
A.2d 437
(Pa. 1969) (allowing for judicial review of Act 111 arbitration awards pursuant to then-Supreme Court Rules R. 68 1/2); Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA),
1267, 1271
(Pa. 1977) (determining judicial review of PERA arbitration award permissible
under Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 2101).
Police officers deserve procedural protections against arbitrary employment
actions, nevertheless, it is generally accepted that these protections should not be so
cumbersome as to unreasonably impair the ability of police supervisors to control their
departments or promote reform. Stephen Rushin, Police Arbitration,
74 Vand. L. Rev.
1023
, 1073-74 (2021). Thus, in my view, the challenge in this appeal is determining the 5 See 43 P.S. § 217.7(a) (“The determination of the majority of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final on the issue or issues in dispute and shall be binding upon the public employer and the policemen or firemen involved. . . . No appeal therefrom shall be allowed to any court.”); 43 P.S. § 1101.903 (“Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. . . . The procedure to be adopted . . . [and] the final step shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator . . . .”); Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7 Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA/NEA,
(Pa. 2007) (stating that “labor
disputes arising under a collective bargaining agreement be resolved by final and binding
arbitration”).
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 6
extent of judicial review of arbitration awards to effectuate the General Assembly’s intent
to balance the interests of essential public employees with the public health, safety, and
welfare.
Our Court’s experience regarding the review of arbitration awards under PERA is
highly instructive. Judicial review of an appeal from a PERA arbitration award is governed
by the deferential “essence test.” Under the essence test, the reviewing court first
determines if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement. If the issue is embraced by the agreement, and, thus, appropriately before
the arbitrator, the arbitrator's award will be upheld if the arbitrator's interpretation can
rationally be derived from the collective bargaining agreement; a court will vacate an
arbitrator's award only where the award “indisputably and genuinely is without foundation
in, or fails to logically flow from, the collective bargaining agreement.” Cheyney
University,
.
Nevertheless, in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #
our Court determined that the essence test was subject to a narrow public policy exception.
- 66. Specifically, initial judicial review was to be conducted under the essence test. If the arbitration award satisfied essence test review, our Court explained that a court could nevertheless further consider whether the award violated public policy. Our Court narrowly defined the public policy to be applied as one which was well-defined, dominant and ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.
Act 111’s narrow certiorari standard is stricter than application of the essence test.
That is to say, an arbitration award may be judicially vacated under the essence test
where such award would be upheld under narrow certiorari. Indeed, under narrow
certiorari, a court is limited to reviewing only questions concerning: (1) the jurisdiction of
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 7
the arbitrators; (2) the regularity of the proceedings; (3) an excess of the arbitrator's
powers; and (4) deprivation of constitutional rights. Betancourt,
. This
makes some sense, as most employees covered by PERA have a limited right to strike,
however, under Act 111, due to the essential nature of their services, police officers and
fire fighters are denied the right to strike. Thus, under narrow certiorari review, an
arbitrator’s award under Act 111 is insulated from judicial vacatur in the extreme. The
circumscribed instances in which an arbitrator’s award may be rejected under narrow
certiorari raises one of the questions at issue in this appeal ─ the propriety of a public
policy exception to narrow certiorari review, akin to our Court’s recognition of a public
policy exception to the essence test under PERA.
Over 25 years ago, we rejected the possibility of a public policy exception to narrow
certiorari review in Pennsylvania State Police v. Pennsylvania State Troopers’
Association (Smith),
(Pa. 1999). I believe the reasoning undergirding our
decision in Smith was flawed when decided, and that its reasoning has become outdated
in light of subsequent decisions by our Court. Thus, I do not believe that Smith should
constitute a bar to our reconsideration of the adoption of a public policy exception to
narrow certiorari.
In Smith, a state trooper, while off duty, became intoxicated and got into an
argument with an ex-girlfriend. The argument was highlighted by the state trooper
jamming his loaded, police-issued weapon into his ex-girlfriend's mouth and threatening
to kill her. The state trooper was arrested later that day for driving under the influence,
simple assault, and making terroristic threats, charges to which he subsequently plead
guilty. The Pennsylvania State Police then terminated the officer's employment.
The trooper grieved his termination, and while an arbitrator determined that Smith
had committed the acts in question, the penalty of discharge was too excessive, primarily
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 8
finding that the trooper’s conduct was less egregious than actions of other troopers who
received less discipline in similar circumstances. He also relied on the fact that Smith
had an exemplary record over a 13-year career and had been under stress as a result of
working at the Pittsburgh crash site of a commercial passenger plane in the fall of 1994.
The State Police challenged the arbitrator's award, arguing, inter alia, that the decision
was contrary to public policy and, thus, that the arbitrator exceeded his powers under
narrow certiorari review. The Smith Court rejected that argument.
First, the Court found that adopting the State Police’s position would impermissibly
broaden the narrow certiorari scope of review. The Court concluded that “public policy”
was a “nebulous concept” and that broadening the narrow certiorari scope of review to
include such a basis for review would “greatly expand the scope of review in these
matters” and “markedly increase the judiciary's role in Act 111 arbitration awards.”
1252-53
. Second, our Court warned that, if adopted, a public policy exception would “not be interpreting Act 111 but rather would be rewriting it.”
.
In my view, our decision in Smith should not prevent our Court from adopting a
public policy exception to narrow certiorari review. The doctrine of stare decisis mandates
courts generally follow established precedent to ensure predictability, consistency, and
stability in legal principles, fostering reliance on judicial decisions. However, adherence
is not absolute; courts may deviate when prior rulings were wrong when decided, prove
unworkable, or become outdated by changing circumstances or societal developments.
There are several factors to consider in deciding whether to overrule a past decision,
including the age and lineage of the decision, as well as “‘the quality of [its] reasoning,
the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other related decisions, . . .
and reliance on the decision.’” Commonwealth v. Alexander,
243 A.3d 177
, 196 (Pa. 2020) (quoting Knick v. Township of Scott, Pennsylvania,
(2019)).
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 9
Indeed, our Court is not “bound to follow precedent when it cannot bear scrutiny, either
on its own terms or in light of subsequent developments.” William Penn School District
v. Pennsylvania Department of Education,
(Pa. 2017). As our Court has oft stated, stare decisis does not lock our decisions in stone, but, rather, is a “legal concept which responds to the demands of justice, and, thus, permits the orderly growth process of the law to flourish.” Allegheny Reproductive Health Center v. Pennsylvania Department of Human Services,
309 A.3d 808
, 850 (Pa. 2024).
In my assessment of these factors, Smith fails to withstand scrutiny. First, the
quality and soundness of the Smith Court’s reasoning was lacking when rendered, and
fails to withstand the test of time. In an analysis spanning barely two paragraphs, the
Court rejected the adoption of a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review for two
reasons. First, the Court reasoned that “public policy” was a “nebulous concept” which
“may be defined by a particular appellate court,” and adopting it would “greatly expand
the scope of review in these matters” and “markedly increase the judiciary's role in Act
111 arbitration awards.” Id. at 1252-53.
However, the Smith Court’s characterization of public policy considerations as
“nebulous” and capable of differing judicial definitions is belied by prior and subsequent
decisions of our Court. Indeed, our Court has made clear that it is quite capable of
defining vague terms. See William Penn School District,
(“Courts give
meaning routinely to all manner of amorphous constitutional concepts, including those
that lie at the intersection of legislative prerogative and judicial review. And they do so
while still leaving room for future development by whatever government body or
mechanism the law fairly prescribes.”).
As to notions of public policy, our Court has routinely employed the concept of
policy to thwart injustice and protect the public weal. See, e.g., Socko v. Mid-Atlantic
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 10
Systems of CPA, Inc.,
(Pa. 2015) (finding at-will doctrine subject to exceptions including “judicially-created notions of public policy.”); Minnesota v. Greenfield,
(Pa. 2004) (precluding recovery of damages pursuant to an insurance contract on public policy basis); Waychoff v. Waychoff,
(Pa. 1932) (rejecting agreement for layperson to receive portion of an attorney’s fees for procuring litigation as contrary to public policy); McCormick v. Hanover Township,
195, 197
(Pa. 1914) (determining employment contract with township for unconscionable
amount contravened public policy). Thus, the quality of the Smith Court’s reasoning in
this regard was faulty from its inception.
Even more importantly, Smith’s reasoning has become outdated in light of our
subsequent 2007 decision in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit # 7, wherein we embraced
a narrow public policy exception under PERA. In that decision, there was no suggestion
that the concept of public policy was too vague, ill-defined, or subject to differing court
interpretations, or that it would improperly increase the role of the judiciary in reviewing
arbitration awards under PERA. Thus, in my view, the Smith Court’s first stated basis for
rejecting a public policy exception was flawed at the time, and has become unsustainable
in light of our subsequent express adoption of a public policy exception under PERA.
Simply stated, perpetuating Smith’s reasoning does not account for changes in labor
relations and prevents “the orderly growth process of the law to flourish.” Allegheny
Reproductive Health Center, 309 A.3d at 850.
Related thereto, the Smith Court feared that a public policy exception would
expand the scope of review and increase the judiciary's role in Act 111 arbitration awards.
Of course, any exception to narrow certiorari review would expand the judiciary’s role.
However, the same can be said of the public policy exception to the essence test, and,
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 11
yet, the Court’s experience under that standard has not led to protracted litigation or
undue judicial intervention, due to the limited nature of public policy review.
The second rationale in Smith for rejecting a public policy exception under Act 111
was equally flawed. The Court contended that, if a public policy exception were adopted,
the Court would “not be interpreting Act 111 but rather would be rewriting it.” Smith,
A.2d at 1253
.
This reasoning failed to appreciate the nature of a public policy exception, which
is judicially created, and, thus, ipso facto, not an interpretation, or a rewriting, of a statute.
Moreover, such statement is somewhat disingenuous coming on the heels of our Court’s
finding authority to review of Act 111 arbitration awards where Act 111 not only did not
speak of such review, but specifically eschewed any judicial intervention. 43 P.S. §
217.7(a) (stating that regarding an arbitration award, “[n]o appeal therefrom shall be
allowed to any court.”). Of course, as noted above, our Court has found judicial review
of arbitration awards under Act 111 to be proper, without “rewriting it,” as would the
adoption of a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review.
Further, this flaw in the Smith Court’s reasoning becomes obvious in (again)
considering our Court’s subsequent decision to allow for a public policy exception to the
essence test under PERA. Our Court in Westmoreland Intermediate Unit expressed no
hesitation in embracing a narrow public policy exception due to “rewriting” PERA, which
by its terms called for “final” and “binding” arbitration. 43 P.S. § 1101.903 Again, the
Smith Court’s stated reasons for rejecting a public policy exception to narrow certiorari is
not longer valid in light of subsequent developments in the law.
Our decision in Smith is a quarter century old; its reasoning was dubious when
written and cannot withstand the subsequent developments and passage to time in this
area of the law. Accordingly, Smith should be overruled, and at least not constitute a bar
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 12
to adopting a public policy exception to narrow certiorari review in this case. Estate of
Fridenberg v. Commonwealth,
(Pa. 2011) (“When precedent is
examined in the light of modern reality and it is evident that the reason for the precedent
no longer exists, the abandonment of the precedent is not a destruction of stare decisis,
but rather a fulfillment of its proper function.”).6
With Smith placed aside, I believe we can and should address whether a public
policy exception to narrow certiorari should be adopted under Act 111. And, in my view,
we should do so.
First, as noted above, the intent of the General Assembly in enacting both Act 111
and PERA was to balance the rights of workers with the protection of public health, safety,
and welfare. The recognition of a limited public policy exception would be consistent with
that balance and constitute a reasonable accommodation of the sometimes competing
goals of dispute resolution by final and binding arbitration and the protection of the public
weal. Simply stated, I do not believe that our Court should countenance an arbitration
award that contravenes our Commonwealth’s public policy.
In my view, such an exception is especially necessary considering law
enforcement’s essential role in our Commonwealth. Due to police officers holding
positions of trust in our communities, the significant authority and powers which police
officers possess, our citizenry’s reliance upon police officer integrity, as well as essential
public expectations and trust in our police, and the negative ramifications when that trust
6 The majority primarily rejects a public policy exception to narrow certiorari on the basis
that Smith is binding precedent. For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully disagree.
The majority also rejects any analogy to the adoption of a public policy exception under
PERA, as PERA excludes employees covered by Act 111 and the public policy exception
only applies to PERA arbitrations. This is true as far as it goes; however, it does not
account for whether a judicially adopted public policy exception would be appropriate for
the employees covered by Act 111 in light of the changes in the law and our Court’s
willingness to adopt a public policy exception under a similar labor statute.
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 13
is breached, I believe it entirely appropriate to hold police officers to a higher standard of
conduct than other citizens, including other public employees. Accordingly, I find it
eminently reasonable to allow for a limited exception to narrow certiorari review to
consider whether an arbitrator’s award violates our Commonwealth’s public policy.
We adopted a public policy exception under PERA 20 years ago to ensure that our
Court does not enforce an arbitration award that contravenes public policy. That
recognition of such an exception has not resulted in protracted litigation, labor unrest, or
undermined the goals of PERA. I conclude that adopting a limited public policy exception
to narrow certiorari review is even more appropriate here. Indeed, the need for such a
public policy inquiry is made manifest by the circumstances in this appeal involving an
arbitrator’s reinstatement of a police lieutenant who sent sexually explicit texts and a
pornographic bestiality video involving a dog and a women to female subordinates and
then pressured one of the officers to lie to and not to cooperate with internal investigators.
Moreover, it has been almost 60 years since the enactment of Act 111. The
relationship between police officers and their employers that was once characterized by
chaos and violence is now largely characterized by harmony and peace. It is a mature
labor relationship. I do not believe that the adoption of a limited public policy exception
to narrow certiorari review would upset this status; it has not done so in the last 20 years
under PERA.
Additionally, our Commonwealth would not be an outlier in this regard, as
numerous other states courts have recognized a narrow public policy exception regarding
judicial review of arbitration awards involving police officers. See, e.g., State v. Public
Safety Employees Association,
(Alaska 2011); Town of South Winsor v. South Winsor Police Union Local 1480,
(Conn. 2001); City of Boston v. Boston Police Patrolmen’s Association,
(Mass. 2017);
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 14
Police Officers Association of Michigan v. County of Manistee,
(Mich. App. 2002); City of Richfield v. Law Enforcement Services, Inc.,
40-41
(Minn. 2019) (assuming but not deciding existence of a public policy exception); City of Livingston v. Montana Public Employees Association,
(Mont.
2014).
For these reasons, I would adopt a public policy exception to narrow certiorari
review under Act 111. Under this exception, a court would not enforce a grievance
arbitration award that contravenes public policy, if such public policy is well-defined,
dominant, and ascertainable by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from
general considerations of supposed public interests. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit,
. Accordingly, given that I would adopt this exception, I would remand
this matter to the Commonwealth Court for consideration of whether the arbitrator's award
is violative of the public policy of the Commonwealth.
[J-70-2025] [MO: Donohue, J.] - 15
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