Administrative United Kingdom
FA & Ors v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Numbers: PA77326/2024
PA/77330/2024
PA/77344/2024
PA/61275/2025
PA/61281/2025
PA/61288/2025
PA/61294/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Newport
On 2 November 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE L Salkeld
Between
FA & 6 OTHERS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellants
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr Niaz, Alison Wells Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Duffy, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeals of the Appellants against the decision of the Respondent made on 16 October 2024.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained in MyHMCTS.
4. The first Appellant is a national of Jordan and Sudan. The remaining Appellants are her six children. Their claims depend upon the first Appellant’s account. I refer to the first Appellant as “A”.
5. The Appellants appeal against the Respondent’s decisions refusing their protection claims.
6. The family moved from Sudan to Jordan in August 2021. A claims that members of her husband’s family opposed their marriage because she is a Black Sudanese woman and that her brother-in-law, whom I refer to as “B”, subjected her and the children to threats and violence.
7. A left Jordan with the children in April 2024. They travelled through Egypt before entering the United Kingdom in May 2024, where A claimed asylum.
8. A claims that she and the children would be at risk from B and her husband’s wider family if returned to Jordan. The Respondent does not propose to return the Appellants to Sudan.
The Hearing
9. The hearing took place by video on the Cloud Video Platform. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
Preliminary Issues
10. The Appellants sought permission to rely upon a supplementary appeal bundle of 23 pages, which had been served late. The bundle contained a replacement appeal skeleton argument, A’s witness statement dated 30 October 2026 and photographic evidence. The later replacement skeleton argument and witness statement sought to retract material parts of two earlier witness statements and explain how the disputed evidence came to be included.
11. Mr Niaz applied to rely upon the supplementary appeal bundle, which had been prepared following the recent instruction of the Appellants’ current solicitors. Ms Duffy did not object and was able to address the documents at the hearing. Having considered the application in accordance with the overriding objective, I admitted the bundle.
12. The evidence already before the Tribunal included a letter dated 18 March 2026 from A’s treating Gestalt psychotherapist. It confirmed that A had received individual therapy since January 2025 and recorded symptoms which might be consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. The author was not qualified to make a formal diagnosis.
13. At the outset of the hearing, I raised with Mr Niaz whether A was said to be vulnerable and whether any measures or adjustments were sought. He confirmed that he was not seeking a vulnerability direction or any particular adjustment.
14. I did not identify any difficulty affecting A’s ability to understand the questions or give her evidence and was satisfied that she could participate effectively. Nevertheless, in assessing her evidence, I took account of her limited education, her need for an interpreter, the nature of the evidence and the symptoms recorded in the therapeutic letter.
Agreed and Disputed Issues
15. The Respondent accepts A’s identity and that she is a national of Jordan and Sudan. The Respondent also accepts that:
(a) women fearing gender-based violence in Jordan may constitute a particular social group;
(b) the harm feared by A, if established, would be sufficiently serious to amount to persecution; and
(c) the Appellants will not be returned to Sudan.
16. The issues in dispute are:
(a) whether A’s account is credible;
(b) whether the Appellants would be at real risk on return to Jordan;
(c) whether sufficient protection would be available;
(d) whether the Appellants could safely and reasonably relocate within Jordan; and
(e) whether the Appellants qualify for humanitarian protection or under Article 3 ECHR.
17. Mr Niaz confirmed that no separate claim under Article 8 ECHR was pursued.
Evidence
18. A adopted her witness statement dated 30 October 2026 and was cross-examined by Ms Duffy. She gave evidence through an Arabic interpreter.
19. The interpreter was present in the hearing room while A attended remotely. At times, the interpreter had difficulty hearing A. A was asked to bring her telephone closer to her, after which the interpreter confirmed that he could hear her adequately. I was satisfied that A understood the questions and was able to give her evidence. I heard submissions from both representatives and reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
20. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellants must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests upon them. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, section 32 of the 2022 Act applies.
21. Following the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 413 (IAC), I must first determine, on the balance of probabilities:
(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for a Convention reason (or such a characteristic is attributed to her by an actor of persecution); and
(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution.
22. If those questions are answered in the affirmative, I must then determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that:
(a) the Appellants would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
(b) they would not receive sufficient protection; and
(c) they could not safely and reasonably relocate within their country of origin.
23. Section 32 does not require the Tribunal to determine whether each alleged material fact is established on the balance of probabilities.
24. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellants must not be refugees; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on them.
25. Article 3 ECHR is engaged where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the Appellants would face a real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment on return.
26. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean they have lied about another.
Findings and Reasons
27. I have considered all the evidence before me in the round. I refer only to the evidence necessary to explain my findings.
The successive witness statements
28. A’s written evidence requires careful consideration. The replacement skeleton argument and A’s witness statement dated 30 October 2026 seek to retract material parts of two earlier witness statements on the basis that they were incorrect and did not reflect A’s instructions.
29. The second of those earlier statements was dated 18 June 2026 and was said to make minor corrections to the first. It was unsigned. Notwithstanding its stated purpose, it did not resolve all of the material difficulties in the earlier written evidence.
30. The matters now retracted were not confined to minor errors of wording or chronology. They included an account that A had attended a police station, that the police had failed to assist her and that she had been followed and threatened after leaving the police station. That account was materially different from her evidence at the asylum interview that neither she nor her husband had reported B to the police.
31. The replacement appeal skeleton argument and A’s statement dated 30 October 2026 seek to withdraw those accounts and restore A’s original position that no report was made to the police. A maintained that position in her oral evidence.
32. A explained that she has very limited education, cannot read English and relied upon others to prepare and interpret the earlier statements. It was submitted on her behalf that she had not properly understood or approved their contents. I take those matters into account.
33. A’s account at the asylum interview preceded the witness statements and was clear. It is also consistent with her statement dated 30 October 2026 and her oral evidence. I therefore accept that A’s evidence is that neither she nor her husband made a complaint to the Jordanian police.
34. However, the retracted passages were detailed and concerned matters central to credibility and sufficiency of protection. The first statement was followed by an unsigned statement which purported to correct errors in it but continued to contain material inaccuracies. I have taken account of A’s limited education, her inability to read English, her reliance upon others to prepare and interpret the statements, and her evidence that she did not properly understand or approve their contents. Those matters provide some explanation, but do not fully explain how the detailed and materially different accounts came to be included in successive statements.
35. I do not treat the earlier statements as establishing that the events described in the retracted passages occurred. Nor do I regard the discrepancies as determinative of the appeal. However, the history of the statements means that I approach A’s evidence with appropriate care and consider whether it is consistent with her earlier interviews, oral evidence and the other evidence before me.
A’s account of events in Jordan
36. A’s account has been consistent in some important respects. At screening, she stated that she feared being killed or kidnapped by members of her husband’s family because of her Sudanese origin and because they opposed her marriage.
37. During her substantive asylum interview, A identified B as the person she feared. She said that the problems began after she entered Jordan and that her husband’s family objected because she was Sudanese and they did not want their brother to marry a Sudanese woman. When describing the family’s treatment of the children, she also referred to differences in their skin colour.
38. In her written evidence, A alleged more expressly that the family’s hostility was related both to her Sudanese nationality and her skin colour. She stated that she had been harassed because of her skin colour, that her husband had been criticised for marrying a Black woman and that she had been verbally abused for giving birth to Black children.
39. A also described an incident in January 2023. She said that B entered her home, attempted to throw boiling water at her and injured two of the children. She stated that her husband intervened, following which B produced a knife and threatened to kill her.
40. The essential account that the family objected to A because she was Sudanese, and the January 2023 incident involving boiling water and a knife, were given before the disputed witness statements were prepared. The allegation that the hostility was also related expressly to A’s skin colour was set out more fully in her written evidence.
Photographs and other supporting evidence
41. A relies upon photographs said to show injuries sustained by the children. In oral evidence, she said that her husband had sent her the photograph showing an injury to one child’s back and that she had taken the remaining photographs herself.
42. The photographs show marks or scarring. They are undated and are not supported by medical evidence. They do not establish when, where or how the injuries were sustained, or who was responsible for them.
43. Mr Niaz submitted that the photographs were consistent with A’s account. I accept that they provide some support for her evidence that members of the family sustained injuries. However, I attach limited weight to them as evidence that B caused those injuries in the circumstances alleged.
44. A also relied upon threats allegedly made after she left Jordan. At her substantive asylum interview, she said that B had threatened to follow her to Egypt and to report to the Jordanian embassy that she had kidnapped the children.
45. In oral evidence, A said that, while the family was living in Home Office accommodation in the United Kingdom, B sent a message to one of the children’s telephones stating that he would find her even if she were “under the ground”.
46. No copy or record of that message was produced. A explained that it had been received on her son’s telephone and that she did not know that it should be retained or provided as evidence. She said that she had mentioned the threat to a healthcare professional.
47. I take A’s explanation into account. However, the alleged message is relied upon as evidence of B’s continuing intention and ability to trace her outside Jordan. In the absence of the message or any other record of it, this part of her account is unsupported.
48. There is no legal requirement for an Appellant’s account to be corroborated. However, where supporting evidence could reasonably be expected to be available, the failure to produce it, in the absence of an adequate explanation, may be taken into account when assessing the evidence as a whole, see TK (Burundi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 40.
49. A remains in contact with her husband and was able to ask him to provide one of the photographs. His evidence could have addressed matters of which he was said to have direct knowledge, including the alleged violence and threats, his intervention during the incident in January 2023, the pressure exerted by his family and the threats allegedly made after A left Jordan.
50. A said that she did not know that a statement from her husband was required. I take account of that explanation. A had legal representation at various stages of her claim, although there may have been changes or interruptions in that representation. Her current solicitors reviewed the case and prepared further evidence before the hearing. No explanation was provided as to why a statement or other evidence could not have been obtained from her husband at that stage.
51. I do not treat the absence of evidence from A’s husband as determinative. I do, however, take it into account when assessing A’s evidence on matters which her husband could have addressed from his own knowledge.
Further oral evidence
52. In oral evidence, A stated that B had been imprisoned on two or three occasions, was involved in drugs and had once fled from the police and stayed at her accommodation. She could not recall the dates of those events and was uncertain whether the occasion on which he fled from the police occurred approximately one year after she moved to Jordan.
53. Those matters were not clearly set out in A’s earlier evidence. Mr Niaz submitted that they arose in response to questions asked in cross-examination and did not alter the core of her account. I accept that a witness cannot be expected to provide every detail at the earliest opportunity and do not find that the additional evidence was necessarily an attempt to embellish the claim.
54. However, B’s alleged criminality, imprisonment and ability to evade the police were material to the assessment of his conduct, influence and the availability of state protection. The late emergence of those matters, together with A’s inability to provide any clear chronology or detail, affects the weight I attach to that part of her evidence.
55. A said that the problems with B began when she first lived with her husband’s family. She and her husband left the family home after approximately 10 or 11 days and obtained separate accommodation.
56. A stated that B did not live in their household. He lived elsewhere within the same large province and travelled to their home by car. She alleged that he came to the property three or four times each week, depending upon his mood.
57. A and the children nevertheless remained in Jordan until April 2024. The children attended school there.
58. Ms Duffy submitted that A’s failure to move beyond the same province undermined her account that B posed a serious and continuing threat. A explained that she and her husband did not know Jordan well and did not know how to obtain accommodation elsewhere.
59. I do not find that explanation persuasive. A and her husband had obtained separate accommodation after leaving the family home. They lived independently for a substantial period and arranged for the children to attend school.
60. A later travelled with the six children from Jordan to Egypt and then from Egypt to the United Kingdom. I recognise that international travel undertaken with assistance is not directly comparable to establishing a home elsewhere in Jordan. It nevertheless demonstrates that A was capable of taking substantial practical steps when she considered it necessary to protect the children.
61. The family’s continued residence within the same province made it unsurprising that B and other members of the family knew where they lived. It does not establish that B had the ability to trace the Appellants throughout Jordan.
62. A also said that her husband left Jordan approximately two and a half months before the hearing following an argument with B, during which her husband threatened to reveal what had happened to A. She said that the wider family or tribe became involved.
Overall assessment of the evidence
63. I have considered A’s evidence in the round. I have taken account of the consistency in the central aspects of the account given at screening and during the substantive asylum interview, together with the difficulties arising from the successive witness statements. I have also made appropriate allowance for A’s limited education, her inability to read English and her reliance upon others to prepare and interpret her statements.
64. I accept that members of A’s husband’s family were hostile towards her because she is a Black Sudanese woman and because they disapproved of the marriage. I also accept that B repeatedly attended the family home, shouted and interfered with their belongings, and on one occasion injured A’s daughter’s arm. Those matters formed part of the account given during the substantive asylum interview.
65. I further accept that there was a serious confrontation in January 2023 during which B attempted to throw boiling water at A, two of the children were injured, and B produced a knife and threatened to kill her.
66. I do not accept the additional allegations developed in the written evidence concerning threats to poison the children, the removal of the children from school, restrictions preventing A and the children from leaving the home, or B’s asserted influence over the police. Those matters were not part of the central account given during the asylum interviews and, having regard to the difficulties arising from the successive witness statements, have not been established even to the lower standard.
67. A also alleged that B continued to threaten her after she left Jordan, including through a message sent to her son’s telephone after they arrived in the United Kingdom. For the reasons already given, I attach limited weight to that account. The alleged message was not produced and there was no evidence from A’s husband, despite his direct knowledge of some of the alleged threats. I am not satisfied that A has established that B continued actively to pursue her following her departure from Jordan.
68. I therefore accept that A and the children experienced hostility, threats and mistreatment from B while living in Jordan. Whether those past events establish a present risk on return, and whether B would have the means to locate the Appellants elsewhere in Jordan, are matters I address below.
Determination of the Issues
Question 1: Does A have a characteristic which could cause her to fear persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, or is such a characteristic attributed to her by an actor of persecution?
69. A is a woman and a Black Sudanese national. Those are characteristics which she cannot or should not be required to change.
70. The Respondent accepts that women fearing gender-based violence in Jordan may constitute a particular social group. I have also accepted that the hostility of A’s husband’s family arose, at least in part, because she is a Black Sudanese woman.
71. I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that A has characteristics which could cause her to fear persecution for reasons of race and membership of a particular social group. I answer the first question affirmatively.
Question 2: Does A in fact fear such persecution?
72. A has consistently maintained that she fears B and members of her husband’s family. Her departure from Jordan with the children and her subsequent conduct are consistent with that expressed fear.
73. Notwithstanding the aspects of her account which I have not accepted, I am satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that A genuinely fears persecution by B and members of her husband’s family. I answer the second question affirmatively.
Question 3: Is there a reasonable likelihood that the Appellants would be persecuted for a Refugee Convention reason?
74. I have accepted that B repeatedly attended the family home, behaved aggressively, interfered with their belongings, caused injuries to the children and threatened A. I have also accepted that there was a serious incident in January 2023 involving boiling water and a knife. Those matters must be considered cumulatively and in the context of the hostility shown towards A because she is a Black Sudanese woman.
75. A remained in Jordan until April 2024. Her evidence was that B continued to attend the family home and behave aggressively after the incident in January 2023. I have accepted that his conduct was not confined to a single event.
76. There is no statement or other evidence from A’s husband concerning the circumstances in which he left Jordan. For the reasons already given, I take that absence into account. Nevertheless, A’s evidence concerning his departure is consistent with the existence of a continuing and serious dispute within the family.
77. I have not accepted the additional allegation that B continued actively to pursue A after she left Jordan. Nor am I satisfied that he has the influence or means to locate the Appellants throughout the country. However, those matters are principally relevant to whether sufficient protection or safe internal relocation would be available. They do not remove the risk from B in the area in which the Appellants previously lived and where B and the wider family know them.
78. Having considered the accepted incidents cumulatively, I am satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that B would again threaten or harm A and the children if they returned to their former home area. Given the nature, repetition and escalation of the accepted conduct, I am satisfied that the harm feared reaches the necessary level of seriousness.
79. I have accepted that the hostility towards A was connected, at least in part, to her race and her position as a Black Sudanese woman within her husband’s family. I am therefore satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood that A would be persecuted for a Refugee Convention reason in her former home area.
80. The children have also been subjected to B’s conduct and would return in A’s care. I am satisfied that the risk to them arises from their relationship to A and the same family hostility. The third question is therefore answered affirmatively in respect of all the Appellants.
Question 4: Would sufficient protection be available to the Appellants?
81. A did not report B to the Jordanian police. She explained that reporting him was regarded as her husband’s responsibility and that he was placed under pressure by his parents and the wider family or tribe not to report his brother because of the effect upon their reputation.
82. In assessing that explanation, I have taken account of A’s very limited education, her lack of experience in dealing with the Jordanian authorities and her position within her husband’s family. Those circumstances, together with the family and tribal pressure described by her, may have made it difficult for her to report B independently. I do not draw an adverse inference from her failure to do so.
83. The country evidence provides contextual support for that explanation. The US Department of State’s 2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Jordan, dated 22 April 2024, records that many so-called honour crimes, especially in non-urban areas, go unreported because of social taboos, fear of additional violence and perceptions of inadequate outcomes in the formal justice system. The London School of Economics report, Tribes and Tribalism in a Neoliberal Jordan, dated 16 July 2018, records the continuing use of tribal truces and settlements in disputes between families, sometimes in place of civil proceedings.
84. The BTI 2024 Country Report: Jordan, published by the Bertelsmann Stiftung on 19 March 2024, records concerns about corruption and the use of wasta, or personal connections, to obtain favours or advantages. However, that general country evidence does not establish that B personally has influence over the police, courts or other state authorities.
85. The Respondent relied upon the existence of a functioning police force and the Protection against Domestic Violence Law No. 15 of 2017. Those matters are referred to in the Respondent’s review. The existence of legislation and formal protective machinery is relevant but is not, by itself, determinative of whether protection would be effective in practice.
86. In accordance with Horvath v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37; [2001] 1 AC 489, I must consider whether Jordan has a system of domestic protection and machinery for the detection, prosecution and punishment of the harm feared, and whether the authorities have the ability and readiness to operate that machinery. Protection need not eliminate every risk or guarantee the Appellants’ safety.
87. I have considered the concerns identified in the country evidence. However, that evidence does not establish that the Jordanian authorities are generally unwilling or unable to protect women and children from serious criminal violence. Nor does it establish that B has influence over the police, courts or other state authorities.
88. If A’s evidence concerning B’s previous arrests and imprisonment is accurate, it indicates that the authorities have previously been willing and able to take action against him. In any event, her account does not establish that he is beyond their reach.
89. The pressure placed upon A’s husband by his family may explain why no complaint was made. However, the family’s unwillingness to report B does not establish that the authorities would have refused or been unable to assist A had their protection been sought.
90. A’s assertion that B had “links” was general. She was unable to identify their nature or extent.
91. Having considered the country evidence together with A’s individual circumstances, I am satisfied that Jordan operates a system of protection which is reasonably effective in practice and which the Appellants could reasonably access.
92. I have considered whether A’s limited education, lack of experience in dealing with the authorities and position within her husband’s family would prevent her from accessing protection in practice. Those matters may make it more difficult for her to seek assistance. However, the evidence does not establish that she would be unable to approach the police, particularly if living away from the family and tribal pressures which previously discouraged her from doing so.
93. Accordingly, I find that sufficient protection would be available to the Appellants.
Question 5: Could the Appellants safely and reasonably relocate within Jordan?
94. In any event, I have considered whether the Appellants could safely and reasonably relocate to another part of Jordan. The Respondent identified Amman, Irbid and Russeifa as possible places of relocation. The refusal decision and Respondent’s review relied upon country information stating that Jordanian nationals generally enjoy freedom of domestic movement and international travel.
95. B continued to locate the family after they left the family home because A and her husband obtained accommodation within the same province in which B and the wider family lived. Their whereabouts were known to the family. That does not establish that B could locate the Appellants elsewhere in Jordan.
96. A asserted that B was well known and had “links”, but she was unable to identify their nature or extent. The evidence does not establish that he has influence or connections extending throughout Jordan, or that he could discover an address which was not disclosed to members of A’s husband’s family. I am therefore satisfied that relocation outside the Appellants’ former home area would remove the risk from B.
97. I have considered whether relocation would be reasonable in A’s individual circumstances. She has very limited formal education, no employment history and would return with responsibility for six children. Her husband is now said to be in Egypt, and A has not identified any relatives of her own upon whom she could rely in Jordan.
98. I have also taken account of the therapeutic evidence. It confirms that A has received therapy and records symptoms which might be consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder. However, the author was not qualified to make a formal diagnosis. The letter does not assess A’s ability to function independently or care for the children or identify any treatment which would be unavailable in Jordan.
99. The country material produced by the parties contains no detailed evidence concerning the availability or cost of accommodation, employment or financial support for a woman in A’s circumstances in Amman, Irbid or Russeifa. I do not therefore assume that securing accommodation and meeting the needs of six children would be straightforward.
100. Equally, no objective evidence was produced to establish that A, as a Jordanian national, would be unable to obtain accommodation, enrol the children in school or access ordinary public services in one of the proposed places of relocation.
101. I accept that A would face practical difficulties in securing accommodation and meeting the needs of a large family in a new location. However, she is a Jordanian national, speaks Arabic and has previously lived in Jordan with the children. She and her husband obtained accommodation away from the family home, and the children attended school.
102. There was little evidence concerning her husband’s present circumstances or resources. I cannot assume that he would provide substantial support. However, A remains in contact with him and the evidence does not establish that he would be unable to provide any assistance.
103. I have treated the children’s best interests as a primary consideration. Their best interests are served by remaining together with A, who is their primary carer. They have previously lived and attended school in Jordan. No particular medical, developmental or educational needs have been identified which could not be met there.
104. I take account of the fact that their father is presently said to be in Egypt and that I have accepted hostility from members of the paternal family. Those matters are relevant to the practical difficulties of relocation. However, the children would remain together with A and would not be required to return to the former family home or area.
105. The children have lived in the United Kingdom since May 2024 and are attending school. Their return would inevitably involve disruption. However, they would return together as a family unit to a country in which they have previously lived.
106. Considering the circumstances cumulatively, I am satisfied that the Appellants could safely and reasonably relocate outside their former home area. Although relocation would present practical difficulties, it would not be unduly harsh.
Humanitarian Protection and Article 3 ECHR
107. I have accepted that the Appellants would face a real risk from B in their former home area. However, sufficient state protection would be available to them. In any event, they could safely and reasonably relocate to another part of Jordan.
108. It follows that the Appellants have not established substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of serious harm or treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR on return to Jordan.
109. The Appellants do not qualify for humanitarian protection and their removal to Jordan would not breach Article 3 ECHR.
Article 8 ECHR
110. No separate Article 8 ECHR claim was pursued and I therefore make no determination on that ground.
Notice of Decision
111. The appeals are dismissed on Refugee Convention grounds.
112. The appeals are dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
113. The appeals are dismissed on human rights grounds.
ANONYMITY ORDER
114. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the Appellants and any identified member of their family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
115. I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 3 November 2026
L Salkeld
First-tier Tribunal Judge L Salkeld
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