Administrative United Kingdom

GNN Group Limited v The Pensions Regulator

Official source

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01473 (GRC)

Case Reference: PEN/2026/0050

First-tier Tribunal

(General Regulatory Chamber)

Pensions

Decided without a hearing

Heard on: 16 October 2026

Decision given on: 27 October 2026

Before

JUDGE SIMON BIRD KC

Between

GNN GROUP LImited

Appellant

and

THE PENSIONS REGULATOR

Respondent

Decision: The reference is ALLOWED and the matter is remitted to the Respondent. The fixed penalty notice is revoked and no further directions are required.

REASONS

1. This is the Appellant’s appeal by way of reference in respect of a fixed penalty notice (FPN) with reference 142148702947 issued on 24 February 2026 under section 40 of the Pensions Act 2008 (PA 2008). The Notice was issued because the Respondent was of the opinion that the Appellant had failed to comply with a Compliance Notice (CN) issued under section 35 of the PA 2008 on 29 December 2025 with a deadline date of 9 February 2026.

The Legal Framework

2. The Pensions Act 2008 and the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 impose a number of legal obligations on employers in relation to the automatic enrolment of certain employees into occupational or workplace personal pension schemes. The Respondent has statutory responsibility for securing compliance with these obligations and may exercise certain enforcement powers. Each employer is assigned a staging date from which the timetable for compliance with their obligations is set. An employer must provide certain specified information to the Regulator in a “declaration of compliance” within five months of the staging date. If there is a failure to do this, the Regulator can issue a compliance notice (section 35 of the PA 2008). If there is a failure to comply with this, the Regulator may issue a fixed penalty notice (section 40). Section 43 provides for the Regulator to review notices, including a compliance notice and a fixed penalty notice. The penalty prescribed in the present case is £400.

3. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is derived from section 44 of the PA 2008. Where a person to whom a notice has been issued under section 40 has first made an application for review of the FPN, they may then make a reference to the Tribunal. The role of the Tribunal is to make its own decision on the appropriate action for the Regulator to take, considering all the evidence before it. The Tribunal may confirm, vary or revoke a Fixed Penalty Notice and when it reaches a decision, it must remit the matter to the Regulator with such directions (if any) required to give effect to the decision.

4. The main issue in this appeal is whether the FPN was issued and then received by the Appellant. Section 303 of the Pensions Act 2004, applied by section 144A of the PA 2008 to notices issued under its provisions, provides that:

“…

(2) The notification of document may be given to the person in question –

(a) by delivering it to him;

(b) by leaving it at his proper address, or

(c) by sending it by post to at that address.

….

(6) For the purposes of this section and section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (c.30)(service of documents by post) in its application to this section, the proper address of a person is –

(a) in the case of a body corporate, the address of the registered or principal office of the body,

….”

5. The Appellant is a body corporate and, therefore, section 303(6)(a) of the 2004 Act applies to the instant reference.

6. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978, referred to in section 303(6), provides that:

“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) the, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”.

7. Section 7 therefore provides for a rebuttable presumption that a notice which is contained in a letter which is properly addressed, pre-paid and posted is to be deemed served at the time the letter would be delivered in the ordinary post.

8. The Respondent is also able to rely on a second set of rebuttable presumptions as to the issue and service of notices under the PA 2008 contained in regulation 15 of the Employer’s Duties (Registration and Compliance” Regulations 2010 (the 2010 Regs). Regulation 15 provides:

“(3) The presumptions in paragraph (4) apply where notices to which section 43 applies are issued…..

(4) For the purposes of this regulation, it is presumed that –

(a) where a notice is given a date by the Regulator, it was posted or otherwise sent on that day;

(b) if a notice is posted or otherwise sent to a person’s last known or notified address, it was issued on the day on which that notice was posted or otherwise sent; and

(c) a notice was received by the person to whom it was addressed.”

9. In essence, once the Respondent has discharged the evidential burden of establishing that the relevant notice was issued and properly addressed, if an Appellant claims not to have received the relevant notice, they bear the onus of rebutting the regulation 15(4)(c) presumption that it was received by them. The presumptions have been described as strong statutory presumptions (Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited v The Pensions Regulator PEN 2020 0203).

Relevant Case Law

(i) Evidence of issue of the notice as a matter of fact

10. In J M Kamau Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2025] UKFTT 00435 (GRC) the Chamber President held that in subsequent cases the Pensions Regulator was entitled to rely on the evidence given in that case as to the system it operates for the issuing of notices such as FPNs with no further requirement to produce a witness statement detailing the processes, unless a direction is made to that effect in a given reference. No such direction was given in the current reference. However, the Chamber President added the following caveats:

(a) The ruling was predicated on the evidence given in that case continuing accurately to reflect the processes in place and it continuing to be the case that there have not been any adverse issues with the system that could cause doubt as to the reliability of the information it produces

(b) Where the Pensions Regulator intends to rely upon the evidence given in the Kamau case, this must be clearly identified in the Rule 23 response to the reference;

(c) To discharge the burden of demonstrating that the relevant was issued as a matter of fact, the Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide to the Appellant and the Tribunal screenshots from the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular Appellant; and

(d) Whilst this is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, it is not inevitable and each case will need to be determined on its own facts.

(ii) Rebuttal of the statutory presumption of service

11. In London Borough of Southwark v Akhtar [2017] UKUT 150 (LC) the Tribunal explained the effect of the presumption of receipt in the following terms:

“82. A legal presumption like the one in s.7 has the effect of reversing the burden of proof. Once the landlord has proved that the notice was properly addressed, pre-paid and posted, it has nothing further to do – unless the contrary is proved. If the contrary is provide, then the landlord must, as it were, go the long way round and actually prove service without the help of the presumption and must therefore convince the tribunal on the balance of probabilities that the notice was actually received. But it is only required to do that if the contrary is proved and not if the contrary is merely asserted”.

12. In Keith’s Rubbish Clearance Limited the Tribunal further emphasised that a bare denial or receipt of the relevant notice was insufficient to discharge the presumption of service.

(iii) Service requires no collaboration of reciprocal act from the intended recipient

13. In Kamau, the Chamber President found at [122] that the fact that a notice had not come into the hands of the Appellant was not sufficient to rebut the presumption that the notices were as a matter of law received. There was nothing in section 303 of the PA 2004 or 15(4) of the 2010 Regs which supported a conclusion that service is only effected once there is some collaboration or some reciprocal action on the part of the intended recipient. He added that:

“121. As a matter of practical reality, if this were not the case it is difficult to see how the system could sensibly function. An intended recipient could deliberately choose not to pick up mail on the assumption that some of the mail would be the bearer of bad news. In doing so, they could legitimately rebut the presumption of service”.

The Appellant’s Case

14. The Appellant asks that the FPN should be revoked because it had a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance. It states that it did not receive the CN or the reminder letters and that the breach was not deliberate. It states that the address of its registered office is a shared postal address which is not wholly within the control of the Appellant. It further states that on becoming aware of its obligations, it acted immediately, in the first instance making a number of attempts to seek a review of the FPN.

The Respondent’s Response

15. The Respondent says the Appellant's automatic-enrolment duties started on 6 April 2026 requiring a declaration of compliance by 1 July 2025 with a compliance date of 2 December 2025. However, the declaration of compliance was not served until 16 March 2026.

16. It says it sent the Appellant two reminder letters in August and November 2025 and a warning letter on 10 December 2025 explaining that the Appellant’s non-compliance might result in the imposition of a fine. As there was still no compliance by the Appellant, on 29 December 2025 the CN was issued requiring completion of the declaration of compliance by 9 February 2026. The Appellant did not comply and, on 24 February 2026, the FPN was issued.

17. On 10 March 2026, the Appellant contacted the Respondent by telephone stating that it had not received the any letter from the Respondent other than the FPN. On 11 March 2026 it lodged a review of the FPN noting then and subsequently that its attempts to lodge the request online had failed. The Respondent on review, confirmed the FPN stating that the CN and FPN had been issued correctly to the Appellant’s registered address and that in the absence of any evidence of postal disruption, it was unlikely that only the FPN was received. It stressed that it was ultimately the responsibility of the Appellant to comply with its obligations under the PA 2008 and the 2010 Regulations.

18. The Respondent relies on the presumptions of service arising under s 303(6)(a) Pensions Act 2004, s 7 Interpretation Act 1978 and regulation 15(4) of the Employers' Duties (Registration and Compliance) Regulations 2010 which it states set a high bar for the Appellant to overcome in terms of evidencing that the notices were not served.

19. Both the CN and FPN were sent to 42 Luton Road, Ellesmere Port CH65 7DP. This was the company’s registered office recorded at Companies House. The Appellant confirmed receipt of the FPN in its telephone call with the Respondent on 10 March 2026.

20. As to the Appellant’s contention that its registered address is a shared address over which the Appellant does not have sole control, the Respondent relied on the decision of the Tribunal in G H Media v The Pensions Regulator PEN/2020/0028 and contended that a reasonable employer would take steps to ensure that its receives its post and that it is not good enough to continue with a situation in which receipt of post is unreliable. It argues that it is the responsibility of the Appellant to ensure adequate arrangements are in place to receive post at its registered address and the fact that post handling is shared does not provide a reasonable excuse for a failure to comply with the CN. There is no evidence provided by the Appellant as to haow the any non-receipt of post as a result of the shared handling has been addressed or managed. Section 86 of the Companies Act 2006 imposes an obligation on the Appellant to ensure that its registered address is appropriate i.e. it is one where a document once delivered will come to the attention of a person acting on behalf of the company.

21. The Respondent further argues that the Appellant has provided no more than a bare assertion of non-receipt which is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of service, relying on Akhter and Keith Rubbish Clearance Ltd v The Pensions Regulator PEN/2020/0203.

22. The Respondent considers it more probable than not that the CN and other correspondence prior to it were received at the Appellant’s registered address and that there may have been a failure to appreciate or act upon it or it may have been wrongly handled. Neither would provide a reasonable excuse for non-compliance. Statute presumes the notice as properly served and received. In the alternative, if the Tribunal considers that more than a bare assertion has been advanced, so that the decision in Freeman applies, the Respondent argues that the Appellant has produced no evidence to prove the presumption has been rebutted.

23. The Respondent argues that Appellant’s grounds do not disclose a reasonable excuse for its non-compliance. It was the responsibility of the Appellant as an employer to be aware of its statutory responsibilities irrespective of any reminder from the Respondent. The level of penalty is prescribed under the 2010 Regulations and there is no discretion to vary it.

24. Therefore, the Respondent argues, the Notices were both issued correctly and the Appellant had no reasonable excuse for its non-compliance.

Findings and Reasons

25. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal squarely raise the issue of whether it had or is deemed to have had knowledge of the CN, the failure to comply with which is the foundation of the FPN. That raises two discrete but related factual issues; was the CN as a matter of fact issued to the Appellant and, if so, is it deemed to have been received as a matter of law. As the Upper Tribunal held in Philip Freeman Mobile Welders Limited v The Pensions Regulator [2022] UKUT 62 (AAC:

“Arguments about whether a notice was in fact issued by post affects whether the presumption about service or receipt applies in the first place, and arguments based on lack of receipt of a notice may also shade into whether it was issued”.

26. There appears to me to be some confusion in the arguments of the Respondent in relation to in what circumstances and how the statutory presumptions operate. In particular, its argument that the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Freeman is applicable only where a Respondent raises more than a bare assertion of non-receipt, is not consistent with the reasoning in that decision. Freeman establishes that before the Regulation 15(4) presumptions may be relied upon, the Respondent must demonstrate that it issued the notice to the Appellant. Further, Akhter establishes that the section 7 presumption may be relied upon only where there is evidence that the relevant notice had in fact been posted to the Appellant.

27. These decisions are reflected in the decision of the Tribunal in Kamau. As the Tribunal in Kamau stated:

“84. General evidence as to the processes operated by The Pensions Regulator cannot, of course, demonstrate of itself that a particular notice was issued and, in my view, given the evidence at the Pension Regulator’s disposal, a bare assertion to this effect is unlikely to meet the burden on it.

85. To discharge the burden of demonstrating that a OPN, FPN or EPN was issued in any given appeal, The Pensions Regulator can be expected to provide the appellant and Tribunal with screenshots of the relevant tabs from its IT system relating to the particular appellant before the Tribunal, as it has done in this appeal. Those screenshots, assuming they confirm the issuing of the notice in question to the proper address, taken together with the general evidence as to the IT processes operated by the Pensions Regulator is likely to be sufficient for the Pensions Regulator to satisfy the burden placed upon it, but that is not inevitable, as each case will need to be determined on its own facts”

28. I agree with the content of those passages. In this appeal, despite the need to discharge the burden of showing that the CN had been issued as a matter of fact, the Respondent has not produced the relevant and necessary screenshot evidence which accords with the Tribunal’s decision in Kamau. The presumptions are not therefore engaged and it is necessary for the Respondent to prove by evidence that the CN was as a matter of fact, received by the Appellant. However, the Respondent produces no evidence that the CN was received. Instead, it invites the Tribunal to draw an inference that it was received because the FPN notice was received by the Appellant and because it asserts that it sent a series of correspondence to the Respondent and, by implication, it is unlikely that this was not received.

29. There are two problems with this reasoning. Firstly, in the absence of any evidence that the correspondence was issued to the Appellant, the Respondent’s submissions amount to nothing more than bare assertion. Secondly, the mere fact that one notice was received by the Appellant is not a sufficient evidential basis for the Tribunal to conclude that the other correspondence and the CN were issued by the Respondent. It was necessarily issued at a later date than the correspondence and the CN and its receipt tells one nothing about the process of issuing and what happened to the other documents.

30. Unless and until the initial evidential burden in relation to issuing is discharged, the Respondent’s contention that it issued and posted the relevant notice are no more than bare assertion which stands against the Appellant’s bare assertion. In such circumstances, there is no proper evidential basis for concluding that either party’s contention is more likely than the other’s. I should add that I do not consider it a reasonable stance for the Respondent to take, that the Appellant should explain why it has not received a CN which the Respondent has failed to show it did, as a matter of fact, issue and post. That would be to create a presumption of issuing, which is not the position under either statute or common law.

31. Whilst I accept that the Appellant did not in its grounds of appeal expressly raise the issue of whether or not the CN and other correspondence had in fact been issued by the Respondent, its claims not to have knowledge of their existence should have alerted the Respondent to the need to provide the Tribunal with evidence that in this case and as a matter of fact, its processes operated in the manner detailed in the evidence of Ms Doherty in the Kamau case in relation to the issue of the CN. In particular, it was incumbent on the Respondent to provide the screenshot evidence that the CN was in fact issued to the Appellant.

32. In short, there is no evidence before the Tribunal on which it would be proper to conclude that the CN was issued as a matter of fact. Whilst the evidence shows that the FPN was issued and served, that cannot give rise to the inference that so too was the CN. To be satisfied that the Respondent is entitled to rely on the statutory presumptions as to service and receipt it needs case specific evidence as to the issue and posting of the relevant statutory notice as is clear from the Freeman and Akhter decisions.

33. I have given consideration as to whether I should adjourn the determination of this appeal to provide the Respondent to provide the screenshot evidence if its possesses it, but having regard to the overriding objective set out in Rule 2 of the Tribunal Rules, I have concluded that it would not be fair and just to do so. The Respondent has been provided with the clearest possible guidance in the Kamau decision of the evidence which it needs to produce in cases where an Appellant claims not to have received one or more relevant statutory notice. The need for such evidence in this appeal should have been obvious to it and, despite the Case Management Directions providing the opportunity to send additional evidence to the Tribunal, no screenshot evidence was provided. To delay determining the appeal to allow such evidence to be provided would not be proportionate having regard to the issues involved.

34. I therefore conclude that the Respondent has failed to provide any evidence that the CN was issued and posted to the Appellant as a matter of fact. In those circumstances, the FPN which alleges a failure to comply with a CN issued to the Appellant, has no lawful basis and further, the Appellant has a reasonable excuse for its failure to comply with the CN. I therefore direct that the FPN be revoked.

Signed Judge Simon Bird KC Date: 16 October 2026


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