Administrative United Kingdom

Government of Bermuda v Arvie Oporto

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2801 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2026-LON-002233

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

DIVISIONAL COURT

ON APPEAL FROM WESTMINSTER MAGISTRATES’ COURT

Senior District Judge Goldspring

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 2/11/2026

Before :

LADY JUSTICE ANDREWS

and

MR JUSTICE BOURNE

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Between :

GOVERNMENT OF BERMUDA Claimant/
Appellant
– and –
ARVIE OPORTO Defendant/
Respondent

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Peter Caldwell KC and Waheed Chaudhrey (instructed by CPS Extradition Unit) for the Appellant

David Perry KC and George Hepburne-Scott (instructed by GT Stewart) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 27 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 2nd November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

Lady Justice Andrews and Mr Justice Bourne:

INTRODUCTION

1. Does the United Kingdom have the power to accede to a request by the Government of Bermuda for the extradition of a Filipino crew member working on board a cruise ship sailing under the Bermuda flag, to stand trial in Bermuda on a charge of sexual assault arising from an incident alleged to have taken place on board the vessel whilst it was sailing in international waters between Scotland and Iceland? That is the key issue which arises for our determination on this appeal by the Government of Bermuda against the decision of Senior District Judge Goldspring (“the Judge”) ordering the respondent’s discharge under s.78(6) of the Extradition Act 2003 (“the 2003 Act”). It turns on whether the offence specified in the extradition request is an “extradition offence” (section 78(4)(b) of the 2003 Act).

2. The Judge decided that the offence was not an “extradition offence”. He dismissed all the respondent’s other arguments in support of his application for discharge, and therefore his decision on this issue was determinative of the outcome.

3. The appeal is brought under section 105 of the 2003 Act, with the permission of Chamberlain J. This Court must decide whether the Judge ought to have decided the relevant question differently and, if he had done so, he would not have been required to discharge the respondent.

4. This is the judgment of the Court, to which both members have contributed. We answer both those questions in the affirmative. We have reached that result by a straightforward application of the test under section 137(4) of the 2003 Act. Unfortunately, when considering that test, the Judge fell into error in a number of respects which led him to conclude, erroneously, that the appellant had failed to prove that the statutory requirements were met.

5. There would have been no difficulty in deciding that the respondent could be extradited to Bermuda had the issue arisen prior to the coming into force of the 2003 Act. Section 2(4)(b) of the Extradition Act 1989 (“the 1989 Act”), which defined an “extradition crime”, provided that:

“… conduct in a colony or dependency of a foreign state or of a designated Commonwealth country or a vessel aircraft or hovercraft of a foreign state or of such a country, shall be treated as if it were conduct in the territory of that state or country.” [Emphasis added].

The Extradition (Overseas Territories) Order 2002, SI 2002/1823, which was passed to extend and adapt the provisions of the 1989 Act to designated British Overseas Territories, contained a very similar provision in Schedule 2, section 2, paragraph 4(b).

6. As a matter of public international law, a ship is not treated as part of the sovereign territory of its flag state or country. However, prior to the coming into force of the 2003 Act, by virtue of the aforementioned domestic statutory fiction (which can be traced back to section 25 of the Extradition Act 1870) an offence occurring on a vessel under the Bermuda flag, wherever that vessel might be situated when it was committed (even within the territorial waters of England and Wales), would have been deemed to have been committed in Bermuda. Consequently, provided that the conduct was sufficiently serious, i.e. punishable by a term of at least 12 months’ imprisonment in Bermuda, and also punishable by a term of at least 12 months’ imprisonment had it occurred in the relevant part of the UK (here, England and Wales), it would have been an “extradition crime” within the meaning of the 1989 Act. The court would not have been required to consider whether an English court would have had jurisdiction in exactly corresponding circumstances, i.e. if the offence complained of had taken place on an English ship in the same location.

7. The 2003 Act contains no similar “deeming” provision treating an offence which occurs on board a vessel as if it had occurred within the territory of the state under whose flag she is sailing. No explanation was given for Parliament’s decision to make that change. The 2003 Act was a radical overhaul of the law of extradition, designed to simplify and streamline the extradition process. It may well have been felt that a provision of that nature no longer served any useful purpose, particularly in the light of the breadth of the extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales over certain acts taking place on ships conferred by section 282(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the text of which is reproduced at [24] below. Alternatively, it may have been considered that it was no longer justifiable to maintain a fiction that was so clearly at odds with the rules of customary public international law, and with the way in which the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982 but came into force in November 1994, treats the relationship between a ship and its flag state.

8. Whatever the reasons for the change may have been, the upshot is that a criminal act which takes place on a vessel sailing under the flag of a particular state which happens to be outside the territorial waters of that state at the time, is committed outside the territory. Bermuda is a category 2 territory for the purposes of Part 2 of the 2003 Act. Provided, therefore, that the requirements of section 137(4) of the 2003 Act are satisfied (see [16] below) the subject of the extradition request will have committed an “extradition offence”. Therefore the relevant questions are (i) was the conduct in question subject to the extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction of the requesting party? (ii) if so, would the relevant part of the UK have extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction in corresponding circumstances?

9. In the present case, the Judge was right to find that the conduct on which the charge was based did not occur in a category 2 territory and that section 137(3) was not engaged, but fell into error in concluding that section 137(4) was not satisfied. The respondent’s submissions in the Magistrates’ Court led him into an unnecessary digression into the meaning of “high seas” and an irrelevant comparison between the provisions of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002 and the English Merchant Shipping Act 1995.

10. We would therefore allow this appeal and remit the matter to the Magistrates’ Court with a direction to send the case to the Secretary of State for the Home Department (“the Secretary of State”) pursuant to section 87(3) of the 2003 Act, for a decision whether to order the respondent’s extradition under section 93.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

11. On 13 August 2025 the cruise ship “Queen Anne” (“the ship”), a Bermuda flag vessel, was at sea on an Icelandic cruise, having left the UK from Southampton. The respondent was working on the ship as a cabin steward. A female guest on the cruise made a complaint that evening that the respondent had raped her in her cabin. The ship’s captain, Inga Thorhauge, stated that when staff made her aware of the complaint, at around 7.30pm, the ship was in international waters between Iceland and Scotland.

12. The appellant sought the return of the respondent to stand trial in Bermuda on a charge of sexual assault under section 323 of the Criminal Code of Bermuda (rape is classified as sexual assault under Bermudian law). On 17 August 2025, the respondent was arrested at Southampton docks pursuant to a provisional warrant issued on 16 August 2025. He was produced before Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 18 August 2025, when he was remanded in custody. Pursuant to paragraph 74(11)(a) of the Extradition Act 2003 (Overseas Territories) Order 2016, Bermuda had 45 days starting with the day on which the respondent was arrested, to serve a full request. The full request was served on 24 September 2025.

13. The Extradition Hearing took place on 10 March 2026, and the Judge gave his judgment on 1 May 2026. In the intervening period the respondent applied for, and was granted, conditional bail on 17 April 2026. He remains on bail.

THE RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

14. The 2003 Act deals separately with the process for the extradition of persons to category 1 territories (chiefly, the member states of the EU) and category 2 territories. In the case of a request for extradition to a category 2 territory, section 78 provides that if certain preliminary requirements (which are not in dispute in this case) are satisfied, then the judge at the extradition hearing:

“… must decide whether—

(a) the person appearing or brought before him is the person whose extradition is requested;

(b) the offence specified in the request is an extradition offence;

(c) copies of the documents sent to the judge by the Secretary of State have been served on the person.”

[Emphasis added.]

15. Section 206 of the 2003 Act requires that the question under section 78(4)(b) is to be determined to the criminal standard.

16. An “extradition offence” is defined, for present purposes, by section 137 of the 2003 Act, which provides so far as material:

“137. Extradition offences: person not sentenced for offence

…

(2) The conduct constitutes an extradition offence in relation to the category 2 territory if the conditions in subsection (3), (4) or (5) are satisfied.

(3) The conditions in this subsection are that—

(a) the conduct occurs in the category 2 territory;

(b) the conduct would constitute an offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment if it occurred in that part of the United Kingdom;

(c) the conduct is so punishable under the law of the category 2 territory.

(4) The conditions in this subsection are that—

(a) the conduct occurs outside the category 2 territory;

(b) in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct would constitute an extra-territorial offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment;

(c) the conduct is so punishable under the law of the category 2 territory.”

17. The distinction between sub-sections (3) and (4) of section 137 was considered by the Supreme Court in El-Khouri v United States of America [2025] AC 845 (“El-Khouri”). The USA (a category 2 territory) sought the extradition of Mr El-Khouri for insider trading offences. He contended that the conduct alleged in the request did not constitute an extradition offence because it did not meet the requirement of dual criminality in section 137. The district judge rejected that argument, and sent the case to the Secretary of State to decide whether to extradite him. A Divisional Court dismissed his appeal, but certified a point of law of general public importance arising from the application of section 137(3)(b), and the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal.

18. In the lower courts and again in the Supreme Court, the USA sought to rely on section 137(3), arguing that even though the acts constituting the offence were almost all committed in the UK, their effects were felt in the USA markets, and that was enough to constitute conduct “within the territory” of the USA. Although that analysis was not contested by Mr El-Khouri’s legal representatives, the Supreme Court itself raised with the parties and invited their submissions on the question whether the provision applicable in that case was section 137(4). It also invited argument on the correctness of the view expressed by Lord Hope in his concurring speech in Office of the King’s Prosecutor, Brussels v Cando Armas [2006] 2 AC 1 (“Cando Armas”) that acts done outside the territory of the requesting state would be sufficient to constitute conduct “in” that territory so long as their effects were intentionally felt in that territory.

19. In the Supreme Court, the lead judgment was delivered by Lord Lloyd-Jones and Lord Leggatt JJSC (with whom Lord Reed PSC, Lord Briggs and Lord Stephens JJSC agreed). At [17] they explained that section 137 gives effect to the double criminality rule, which they described as a “central feature of international extradition law.” The rule requires that the conduct which forms the basis of the extradition request should constitute a crime under the law of both the requesting and the requested state. They went on to explain that one purpose of the double criminality rule is to protect the accused from the exercise of an exorbitant foreign jurisdiction. Depending on whether the conduct occurred in or outside the category 2 territory, the wording of the test to be applied to give effect to the double criminality rule differs.

20. At [24] the Supreme Court stated that section 137 distinguishes between conduct which occurred in the category 2 territory and conduct which occurred outside the category 2 territory. The former is dealt with under subsection (3), the latter under subsection (4). Those provisions are mutually exclusive, and each case must be allocated to one or the other, notwithstanding that this can cause problems where crimes are committed across borders with conduct occurring in more than one state. They said this at [59]:

“We think it clear that the underlying scheme is a simple territorial approach to criminal jurisdiction which takes for granted that courts have jurisdiction over acts occurring within the state’s own territory but recognises that they may also in a variety of circumstances exercise jurisdiction in respect of acts occurring outside its territory. The function of subsections (3)(a) and (4)(a) is merely to divide cases into these two categories. In making the allocation there is no need to take any view about the circumstances in which criminal jurisdiction may properly be claimed (whether under rules of common law or otherwise) when some or all of the conduct occurs abroad. That question becomes relevant only if the case falls in the second, extra-territorial category. Nor is there even then any need to develop any general theory of when jurisdiction can properly be exercised in relation to acts done abroad, whether based on a concept of intended effects or otherwise. All that is necessary is to ask whether, on facts transposed in accordance with subsection (4)(b), a UK court would exercise jurisdiction in the particular case. This gives effect to the underlying principle that, in deciding whether to grant extradition, we should accord to other states the jurisdiction which we claim for ourselves but no more.”

[Emphasis added].

21. In an earlier passage at [43] the Supreme Court pointed out that the requirements of section 137(4) are more onerous than those of section 137(3). Under subsection (3), the conduct alleged must simply be an offence in both the requesting territory and the UK. But subsection (4) ensures that in an extra-territorial case – where a requesting territory seeks the return of a person for an offence which was committed outside its territory – the offence is one over which the UK would have extra-territorial jurisdiction if it were committed outside the UK.

22. The Supreme Court ruled that the case before it was governed by subsection (4), not subsection (3). It rejected the views expressed by Lord Hope in Cando Armas on the basis that his reasoning was inconsistent with the mutually exclusive nature of the two subsections of section 137. The question whether conduct had occurred in or outside the category 2 territory was a question of fact, to be answered simply by considering where the acts of the requested person specified in the extradition request were alleged to have physically occurred. The court was not concerned with where any consequences or effects of those acts had occurred or been felt [81].

23. Applying the correct test to the facts of that case, the relevant conduct was held to have occurred outside the USA. Therefore the question to be asked under section 137(4) was whether, if that conduct had been committed outside the UK, it would constitute an extra-territorial offence under the law of the relevant part of the UK. The answer was no, and the appeal was allowed.

24. We will consider how the guidance given in El-Khouri applies to the facts of this particular case later in this judgment. Suffice it to say at this juncture that although there is no discussion of the meaning of the word “territory” anywhere in the judgment, as that was not a matter in issue, it is necessarily implicit in the Supreme Court’s reasoning that the concept of “territory” in section 137 must mean the requesting state’s own sovereign territory, and not some location outside that territory over which the state may exercise jurisdiction.

25. The courts of England and Wales have extra-territorial criminal jurisdiction over certain acts taking place in ships sailing under the flag of the UK (or a relevant part of the UK) by virtue of section 282(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which provides that:

"Any act in relation to property or person done in or at any place (ashore or afloat) outside the United Kingdom by any master or seaman who at the time is employed in a United Kingdom ship, which, if done in any part of the United Kingdom, would be an offence under the law of any part of the United Kingdom, shall –

(a) be an offence under that law, and

(b) be treated for the purposes of jurisdiction and trial, as if it had been done within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England."

26. Section 240 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002, on which the appellant relies, and relied in the lower court, is expressed in very similar terms. It provides as follows:

“240(1) Any act in relation to property or person done in or at any place (ashore or afloat) outside Bermuda by any master or seafarer who at the time is employed in a Bermuda ship, which, if done in Bermuda, would be an offence under the law of Bermuda, shall –

(a) be an offence under that law; and

(b) be treated for the purposes of jurisdiction and trial, as if it had been done within the jurisdiction of the competent court.”

27. In order to understand the Judge’s approach it is also necessary to have regard to s.239 (1) of that Act, the material part of which provides as follows:

“ Where any person is charged with having committed any offence under this Act then –

(a) if he is a British citizen or a British overseas territory citizen possessing Bermudian status and is charged with having committed it-

(i) on board any Bermuda ship on the high seas;

(ii) in any foreign port or harbour; or

(iii) on board any foreign ship to which he does not belong; or

(b) if he is not a British citizen or a British overseas territory citizen possessing such status and is charged with having committed it on board any Bermuda ship on the high seas;

and he is found within the jurisdiction of any court in Bermuda which would have had jurisdiction in relation to the offence if it had been committed on board a Bermuda ship within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction to try the offence, that court shall have jurisdiction to try the offence as if it had been so committed.”

THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE MAGISTRATES’ COURT

28. The appellant’s case was supported by the affidavit of a Bermudian attorney, Seth Levine, sworn on 12 September 2025. That affidavit set out the background and exhibited the documents relevant to the extradition request together with the applicable Bermudian legislation.

29. The charge against the respondent was set out in an Information which stated:

“On the 13th day of August, aboard a Bermuda ship, namely the Queen Anne, while in international waters, you sexually assaulted [the complainant] by touching her vagina with your penis CONTRARY TO SECTION 323 OF THE CRIMINAL CODE”.

30. In paragraph 8 of Mr Levine’s affidavit there was a misquotation of the words of the charge, in this form:

“On the 13th day of August 2025, aboard a Bermuda ship, namely the Queen Anne, when on the high seas, you sexually assaulted [the complainant] by …”

[Emphasis added.]

31. In paragraph 17 of his affidavit Mr Levine explained that under the relevant provisions of the Bermudian Criminal Code a person guilty of sexual assault is liable to imprisonment for up to 20 years on indictment and 5 years on summary conviction.

32. At paragraph 19 of his affidavit Mr Levine further stated:

“THAT now produced and shown to me and marked "SLL/4" for identification is a true copy of section 240 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002. This section establishes the jurisdiction of Bermuda's courts, in certain circumstances, to try crimes committed outside Bermuda by seafarers of Bermuda ships. For these purposes, a seafarer 'means any person who is employed or engaged or works in any capacity on board a ship’ (section 2 of the same Act) …”.

Exhibit SLL/4 to the affidavit in fact included sections 238-241 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002.

33. On an unspecified date, the Crown Prosecution Service made a request for further information from the Bermudian authorities, asking:

“The evidence of the ship’s captain is that: “About 7.30pm on 13th August 2025 the boat was in international waters between Iceland and Scotland”. Was the ship, as a matter of Bermudian law, on the high seas?”

34. In a further affidavit sworn on 13 February 2026, Mr Levine referred to what he believed to be relevant provisions of UNCLOS, including the definition of “High Seas” in Article 86 of that Treaty:

“[. . .] all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.”

35. In its original Opening Note dated 8 December 2025, the appellant relied on section 137(3) of the 2003 Act, asserting that the ship constituted part of the territory of Bermuda for the purposes of that subsection. However, in an amended Opening Note and in its skeleton argument, it relied primarily on section 137(4), whilst inviting the court to consider section 137(3) as an alternative. Its reliance on section 137(4) was expressly based on the existence of dual extra-territorial jurisdiction under section 282 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and section 240 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002.

36. In their skeleton argument on behalf of the respondent for that hearing, his counsel made the following submissions:

“18. The primary difficulty confronting the Government is that, under the 2003 Act, identical conduct committed by foreign nationals on a foreign vessel whilst on the high seas no longer falls within either section 137(3) or (4). This is because the deeming provision that was included in the predecessor legislation to the 2003 Act has been omitted from the Act. For conduct to be excluded and not fall neatly into either category of extradition offence is not a novel proposition: see, for example, the decision of the Supreme Court in El-Khouri at [43] and R (Al Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556, [95] and [105].”

[Emphasis added].

37. Having then referred to case law which dealt with the deeming provisions in the previous legislation, the skeleton argument continued with a passage including the following extracts:

“27. Quite apart from the absence of a specific provision to cater for the position of conduct that takes place on vessels, there is another difficulty that lies in the way of extradition. The Bermuda law makes reference to the ‘high seas’. This concept has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used and in order to understand the differences it is necessary to start with the criminal jurisdiction of the Admiralty, now exercised by the ordinary criminal courts, and which still extends over things done aboard any British ship or boat …

28. For the purposes of the Admiralty jurisdiction ‘the high seas’ included ‘all oceans, seas, bays, channels, rivers, creeks and waters…where great ships could go, with the exception only of such oceans etc as are within the body of some country’ …

… The Admiralty jurisdiction’s approach to the meaning of ‘high seas’ is to be contrasted with the meaning of that concept as a matter of international law. Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), the high seas are defined as all parts of the sea not included in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), the territorial sea, the internal waters of a state or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic state.

29. In the case of the United Kingdom, there is a partial EEZ and a 200-mile fishery zone, which covers significant portions of the North Sea and North Atlantic. There are also EEZ and territorial limits claimed by other states. These areas would not be regarded as the high seas as a matter of international law (even though they might fall, depending upon the circumstances, within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty) …

30. On the basis of analysis set out above it is respectfully submitted that the position in Mr Oporto’s case is as follows:

(i) The requirements of section 78(4)(b) cannot be satisfied. This is because it is conduct alleged to have taken place in a vessel and there is no provision of the 2003 Act which treats it as if it were conduct outside the requesting state and which would constitute an extraterritorial offence.

(ii) There is in any event a lack of correspondence between the relevant provisions of the English Merchant Shipping Act 1995 and the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002.

(iii)Section 239 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002 applies only to offences committed on the high seas (and the charge against Mr Oporto alleges as much). The term ‘high seas’ has different meanings depending on the context in which it is used.

(iv)The international law concept of the high seas is limited in scope and there is no evidence that the conduct in this case did in fact occur in the high seas as opposed to within the EEZ (claimed by the United Kingdon or another sovereign state), or the United Kingdom’s fishery zone (or a zone claimed by another sovereign state).”

[Emphasis added].

38. Those submissions unfortunately led to some confusion, for three principal reasons, quite apart from the legal inaccuracies in the passages we have highlighted in paragraphs 18 and 30(i), which we will address later, and the factual inaccuracy in paragraph 30(iii), which no doubt derived from the misquotation of the charge in Mr Levine’s affidavit. First, they did not clearly assist the Judge in his task of addressing subsections (3) and (4) of section 137 separately, but tended to elide the separate considerations of where the offence took place and whether the dual criminality test was satisfied. Secondly, they introduced an irrelevant issue about whether the alleged conduct took place on the “high seas”. That issue could only have arisen, if at all, if the appellant had been relying on section 239 of the Bermudian statute, but it did not arise under, and those words do not appear in, section 240 on which the appellant was in fact relying. Thirdly, the reference to “correspondence between the relevant provisions” of English and Bermudian law tended to misstate the nature of the factual comparison which must be undertaken under section 137(4).

39. The Judge took the section 137(4) argument first and therefore considered whether both Bermuda and England and Wales would have extra-territorial jurisdiction over the alleged offence. He carried out the “corresponding circumstances” exercise under that subsection, asking himself whether the UK would have had criminal jurisdiction if the conduct had occurred on a UK-registered ship at sea. The appellant’s case in that regard was based on section 282 of the 1995 Act.

40. The Judge said at [33] of his judgment that the Supreme Court in El-Khouri at [43]: “acknowledged that the absence of a deeming provision in the 2003 Act means that certain conduct which fell within the predecessor legislation may no longer do so”, and that “the same point was noted by the House of Lords in R (Al Fawwaz) v Governor of Brixton Prison [2002] 1 AC 556 at [95] and [105] in connection with the legislative history”. That appears to be an acceptance of the submissions made in paragraph 18 of the respondent’s skeleton argument, reproduced above, albeit not an entirely accurate representation of them. Paragraph 18 appeared to postulate that there is a scenario in which conduct is neither committed within the jurisdiction nor outside it, whereas as El Khouri makes clear, if it was not committed in the territory, it must necessarily have been committed outside it.

41. Paragraph 43 of the judgment in El-Khouri makes no reference to the presence or absence of any deeming provision in the 2003 Act, and indeed the judgment as a whole contains no such discussion. Nor do the cited paragraphs of Al Fawwaz. As we have already pointed out at [21], all that the Supreme Court said in paragraph 43 was that where section 137(4) is applicable, because the requesting state is seeking to exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction, the requirement under subsection 4(b) is more onerous than the requirement under subsection 3(b). That ensures that UK standards concerning extra-territorial jurisdiction are applied.

42. The Judge went on to decide that in the absence of a deeming provision in the 2003 Act, equivalent conduct in “corresponding circumstances” would not constitute an extra-territorial offence subject to English jurisdiction under section 282 because of “a material lack of correspondence between the English provision and the Bermudian equivalent” (paragraph 37). Here again, some confusion is apparent. Although the Bermudian provision relied on by the appellant was section 240, the Judge did not address that section. Instead he considered section 239, which had been introduced by the respondent’s counsel and was completely irrelevant to the questions he had to decide.

43. Accepting the respondent’s submissions, the Judge ruled that the words “on the high seas” in section 239 bear the meaning ascribed to them under international law, as confirmed by Bermuda's adherence to UNCLOS. Having considered the evidence relied on by the appellant, he found there to be a possibility that, at the time of the alleged offence, the ship was not “on the high seas” but was, instead, in an EEZ which he described as a maritime zone created by UNCLOS extending up to 200 nautical miles from a coastal state’s baseline, and within which the coastal state enjoys exclusive rights for economic purposes – such as fishing, energy production, and resource exploitation – but does not exercise territorial sovereignty. Where conduct occurs within the UK’s EEZ, he ruled, it is not treated as having occurred within the territory of the UK for ordinary criminal or extradition purposes. That is true, but again, entirely irrelevant. For the purposes of s.282(1) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, the impugned conduct can occur in “any place outside the United Kingdom”.

44. The Judge concluded:

“43. I am therefore satisfied that in fact the Bermudian provision does not extend to acts committed within the EEZ of the United Kingdom or another state, within territorial waters, or within any other zone falling short of the high seas as defined in Article 86 of UNCLOS.

44. Section 282 of the English Act, by contrast, operates via the Admiralty jurisdiction, which has its own broader conception of the high seas encompassing waters where great ships may go, including certain rivers and bays well within the territory of another state: The Mecca [1895] P 95; R v Anderson (1868) XI Cox CC 198.

45. This is not an abstract distinction. The Requested Person submits, and I accept as foreshadowed above, that there is no evidence in the materials before me that the conduct occurred on the high seas as defined under international law.

46. The captain's evidence that the vessel was in international waters between Iceland and Scotland, without specific coordinate evidence establishing exactly where at the material time does not establish that it was on the high seas in the UNCLOS sense.

47. The North Atlantic between Iceland and Scotland encompasses significant portions of the EEZ of the United Kingdom and potentially Iceland, neither of which constitutes the high seas under Article 86 of UNCLOS.

48. No navigational or positional data, no chart evidence, and no expert evidence on the precise location of the vessel as of 13th August 2025 has been placed before the court.

49. In those circumstances, I cannot be satisfied to the criminal standard that the conduct occurred on the high seas as required by section 239 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002.

50. Section 137(4)(c) requires that the conduct be so punishable under the law of the category 2 territory: that condition cannot be fulfilled if Bermudian extra-territorial jurisdiction does not extend to the location at which the conduct is alleged to have occurred.”

45. There then followed an alternative line of reasoning:

“51. Even leaving the geographical difficulty to one side, I am not satisfied that there is the necessary correspondence between section 282 of the English Act and section 239 of the Bermudian Act.

52. Section 282 treats the conduct as if committed within the Admiralty jurisdiction of England, producing a fiction of English domestic territorial jurisdiction. Section 239 of the Bermudian Act creates jurisdiction where the defendant is found within Bermuda's ordinary jurisdiction. The two provisions are not coextensive in legal effect.”

46. The Judge then went on to consider whether the requesting territory could instead rely on section 137(3) on the basis that the ship fell to be treated as Bermudian territory. In support of its section 137(3) argument, the appellant relied again on section 240 of the Bermuda Merchant Shipping Act 2002, this time conflating the concepts of territory and jurisdiction to contend that the ship was to be treated as the territory of Bermuda for these purposes.

47. The appellant further relied on Bye v Sint Maarten [2025] EWHC 183 (Admin), where Kerr J considered the meaning of the words in section 93(4) of the 2003 Act. This provides that where a request is made for extradition to a category 2 territory, the Secretary of State, if the relevant conditions are met, must order that the requested person be “extradited to the territory to which his extradition is requested.” The issue in that case was whether this provision only permitted the person’s removal to the geographical territory of the state or country requesting their extradition. It mattered because the requesting authority of St Maarten, which is one of the four self-governing countries forming the Kingdom of the Netherlands, intended that the requested person be removed to the Netherlands and detained there prior to his trial in Aruba (not St Maarten). The requested person claimed that the proceedings were an abuse of process because the requesting authority in fact intended to extradite him to the Netherlands, and not to St Maarten.

48. In rejecting those submissions, Kerr J applied a purposive interpretation to the phrase “extradited to the territory” in section 93(4). He said at [75] that the concept of a territory is undeniably geographical, but the act of extraditing a person is a legal act which describes more than physical transport of the person to a location. He therefore accepted the submission that the words “extradited to the territory” meant delivering the requested person into the hands of agents of the requesting territory. The decision in El-Khouri was handed down shortly after the decision in Bye, but we were told that the Supreme Court refused permission to appeal in Bye.

49. Transposing that analysis to section 137, the appellant submitted to the Judge that for the purposes of considering whether the conduct occurred in or outside the “territory” of the requesting Category 2 territory, “territory” meant somewhere where the state concerned enjoyed legal jurisdiction, such that its own law is applicable to the case against the requested person. Since Bermuda enjoyed such jurisdiction over its flag vessels, the only remaining question was whether the conduct alleged, if it occurred in England and Wales, would constitute an offence being punishable (in both jurisdictions) with imprisonment of at least 12 months, which it plainly would.

50. The Judge rejected that argument, and ruled that the question was resolved the other way by the Supreme Court’s decision in El-Khouri. He said:

“55. I decline to find that the conduct occurred in the category 2 territory for the purposes of section 137(3). The Supreme Court in El-Khouri resolved this question. At [64] the Court stated that the question of territory is answered by reference to the physical location of the acts: the court is concerned, and concerned only, with where the person's acts specified in the extradition request were physically done. That is an unambiguous rejection of any juridical or notional approach to the location of the conduct.

56. The decision in Bye v Sint Maarten was handed down only days before El-Khouri and, to the extent it adopts a juridical interpretation of territory inconsistent with the Supreme Court's later and authoritative statement of principle, it cannot survive El Khouri.

57. An analysis of legislative history confirms the position. As the Requested person submits and I accept, for over a century, the extradition statutes addressed this situation by including a deeming provision equating vessels to the territory of their flag state. Those provisions were expressly omitted from the 2003 Act.

58. In the absence of such a provision, conduct on a vessel cannot, on the authority of El-Khouri, be treated as conduct within the territory of the flag state simply by reason of that state's assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction over its vessels.

59. Accordingly, jurisdiction under section 137(3) is not founded. The conduct did not physically occur within the territory of Bermuda. The vessel Queen Anne was at sea. The fact that Bermuda asserts jurisdiction over its registered vessels does not make those vessels part of Bermuda's territory in the geographic sense required by section 137(3) as interpreted by El-Khouri.”

51. Accordingly the Judge refused to send the case to the Secretary of State, and instead ordered the respondent’s discharge.

The submissions on appeal

52. Counsel on both sides made succinct and focused submissions for which we are grateful. For the appellant, Peter Caldwell KC placed primary reliance on section 137(4) and addressed section 137(3) only as an alternative. He submitted that the Judge erred by not sufficiently separating out the issues arising under the distinct subsections and by dealing with issues, such as the meaning of “high seas”, which in fact it was unnecessary to decide.

53. Taking section 137(3) first, he reminded us that in Bye, Kerr J favoured a juridical rather than geographical interpretation of the word “territory” as a purposive construction that would accomplish the aims of the statutory regime. Mr Caldwell also pointed out that under previous statutory extradition regimes, there was support for the view that “territory” could be understood in a juridical rather than a geographical sense even without consideration of the deeming provisions in the previous legislation.

54. In R v Governor of Brixton Prison ex parte Minervini [1959] 1 QB 155, Norway sought the extradition of an Italian seaman accused of a murder on board a Norwegian ship at sea. Extradition was sought under an 1873 Extradition Treaty between Norway and the UK which referred to a person being accused of a “crime committed in the territory of” the requesting party. Interpreting that provision, Lord Parker CJ accepted that section 25 of the Extradition Act 1870, which deemed a vessel of a state “to be within the jurisdiction of and to be part of such foreign state”, could not enlarge the meaning of the Treaty, though it was a valid aid to construction of the Treaty because the contracting parties would have had it in mind. He said at page 162:

“This Treaty is not treating ‘territory’ in its strict sense, but in a sense which is equivalent to jurisdiction, and it is only in that way that one can make sense of the Treaty. Indeed, it is to be observed that in many of these treaties reference is made not to territory but to jurisdiction, and, in my view, in this Treaty ‘territory’ is equivalent to jurisdiction.”

55. Mr Caldwell therefore submitted that when Parliament adopted the new formulation of “territory” in the Extradition Act 2003, where previous Extradition Acts had referred instead to a “foreign state”, the view may have been taken that a deeming provision was no longer needed, because “territory” in fact included a place over which the relevant state or country had jurisdiction. Accordingly, Mr Caldwell submitted that this Court should review the meaning of “territory” in the present context and should not adopt the view taken by the Judge that the decision in Bye could not survive El-Khouri.

56. Nevertheless, Mr Caldwell’s primary reliance was on section 137(4). In that regard he submitted that the Judge erred by considering Bermudian extra-territorial jurisdiction under section 239 of the 2002 Act instead of section 240, thereby having regard to the irrelevant phrase “high seas” and the irrelevant question of whether an EEZ is part of the “high seas”. Even if section 239 had been relevant, Mr Caldwell submitted that the Judge went astray in considering whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that the ship was on the high seas. All he would have needed to decide with regard to that section was whether the respondent was charged with the relevant offence, not whether the prosecution at trial would succeed in proving all the elements of it.

57. In corresponding circumstances, Mr Caldwell submitted, the English court would plainly have jurisdiction under section 282 of the 1995 Act. Therefore the appellant had satisfied the requirements of section 78(4)(b) by way of section 137(4).

58. For the respondent, David Perry KC acknowledged that there is a lack of clarity in the Judge’s judgment and a blurring of the distinction between subsections (3) and (4) of section 137, and he candidly accepted that this may have been a reflection of the way in which some of the arguments were put by the respondent below.

59. Mr Perry invited us to uphold the Judge’s rejection of the section 137(3) route on the basis that when passing the 2003 Act, Parliament decided to dispense with the fiction of a deeming provision pretending that the conduct had occurred within the territory of the requesting state, choosing instead to focus on the specifics of what happened on board a ship and on the extra-territorial jurisdiction which might or might not apply in the two countries. That would be consistent with the legislative aim of protecting against requesting states exercising an exorbitant foreign jurisdiction in extradition proceedings (an aim discussed in Al-Fawwaz by Lord Millett at [95] and [105]), by requiring a rigorous “mirror image” exercise to determine the issue of dual criminality in each case. That approach, he submitted, was not inconsistent with Bye, which was concerned with a very different question.

60. Turning to section 137(4), Mr Perry accepted that the appellant relies on section 240, not section 239, and therefore that nothing turns on the definition of “high seas”. The focus on that definition, dating from the way in which the charge was originally summarised by Mr Levine and the request for further information, had unfortunately introduced some confusion below. When it was put to him that section 240 plainly applied to the conduct alleged in the request, Mr Perry did not demur.

DISCUSSION

61. We begin by considering the question which the Supreme Court in El-Khouri made clear is a binary one: did the alleged conduct occur in the territory of Bermuda or outside it? The charge says it occurred on a Bermuda ship which was sailing in international waters. The ship is not part of Bermudian territory in any sense, and even the previous deeming provision did not treat it as such. Instead it deemed the conduct to have occurred somewhere else, in the territory of the flag state. Logically, that means the conduct in fact occurred outside the territory of the flag state. It is unrealistic to suppose that Parliament expressly adopted a legal fiction in order to reflect what would be the state of the law without it.

62. El-Khouri does not decide the section 137(3) issue in this case. The issue in that case was whether that subsection would apply if the consequences of the conduct complained of were felt within the jurisdiction of the requesting state, even if the conduct itself occurred wholly or mainly outside it. Nevertheless, the decision and the reasoning in the judgment is consistent with the interpretation of the 2003 Act generally as focusing on real events rather than legal fictions.

63. In the earlier Extradition Acts, Parliament decided to mandate the use of a legal fiction by way of the deeming provisions, and in the 2003 Act it did not. There is no provision of English law which requires the ship to be treated as a floating portion of Bermudian territory, and we have therefore concluded that it should not be so treated. Whilst the Judge was wrong to say that El-Khouri decided that conduct on a vessel cannot be treated as conduct within the territory of the flag state simply by reason of that state's assertion of extra-territorial jurisdiction over its vessels, he was right to find that that proposition was consistent with the approach adopted in El-Khouri, and we agree that it correctly represents the law.

64. Section 137 simply requires the Court to begin by asking itself whether the conduct took place inside or outside Bermudian territory. If the answer is outside, then the bar for extradition is set slightly higher under subsection (4), requiring Bermuda to establish to the criminal standard both that it has extra-territorial jurisdiction, and that England and Wales would have extra-territorial jurisdiction in corresponding circumstances. That higher bar is consistent with the legislative aim of avoiding the exercise of an exorbitant foreign jurisdiction. This approach also makes the section much easier to apply, requiring a straightforward factual inquiry about where the conduct occurred, without any legal argument about whether it may be deemed to have occurred in some different place.

65. In this case the reality is that the ship, though subject to Bermudian extra-territorial jurisdiction for some purposes, was outside Bermudian territory at the relevant time, and therefore the relevant provision was section 137(4), not section 137(3).

66. We are not dissuaded from that conclusion by the observations of Lord Parker CJ in Minervini (above). Lord Parker may have been right that the 1873 Extradition Treaty treated territory and jurisdiction as equivalent concepts but, more than 150 years later, we see no sign that Parliament so treated them in this part of the 2003 Act from which, as we have said, the historic deeming provisions were omitted.

67. Nor do we accept that the judgment in Bye leads to a different conclusion. Although both Bye and the present case are concerned with the word “territory” in the 2003 Act, it is being used in different contexts and for very different purposes. If a “juridical interpretation” is appropriate to determine a question about the mechanics of surrender of a requested person, it does not follow that the same interpretation should determine where the alleged conduct of the requested person should be treated as having taken place.

68. Accordingly we do not need to decide, and in our judgment the Judge did not need to decide, whether there is any inconsistency between Bye and the decision of the Supreme Court in El-Khouri. We simply observe that the two cases were concerned with very different questions and neither was concerned with the precise question before us.

69. We therefore agree with the Judge’s rejection of section 137(3) as a way of satisfying section 78(4)(b) in this case, though for somewhat different reasons.

70. However, contrary to the submissions made on behalf of the respondent to the Judge, it does not follow that because there is no deeming provision, the conduct falls outside section 137(4). The suggestion in paragraph 30(i) of the respondent’s skeleton argument below that the requirements of section 78(4)(b) could not be satisfied because the conduct was alleged to have taken place in a vessel and there is no provision of the 2003 Act which treats it as if it were conduct outside the requesting state and which would constitute an extraterritorial offence, simply makes no sense. There was no need for the 2003 Act to contain an express provision of that nature. The default position, in the absence of a provision deeming the conduct to have taken place in the territory, is that it took place outside the territory if that is where the ship was located at the time. That is recognized in the respondent’s skeleton argument on appeal, which sensibly concedes at paragraph 31 that the absence of a “deeming provision” does not, in and of itself, exclude the analysis from subsection (4).

71. The provision which gives Bermuda extra-territorial jurisdiction over what happened on the vessel is not in the 2003 Act, but in domestic legislation of the requesting state, as one might expect, namely, s.240 of the Bermudian Act. It is plain that the Bermudian courts do have extra-territorial jurisdiction by virtue of section 240(1)(a) of the 2002 Act, because the alleged sexual assault was an “act in relation to … [a] person done in or at any place (ashore or afloat) outside Bermuda by any … seafarer … employed in a Bermuda ship …”. The evidence makes it clear that the alleged conduct is punishable in Bermuda by a sentence of at least 12 months’ imprisonment.

72. The Judge simply did not apply section 240 at this stage of the analysis and, in that regard, fell into error. It is very unfortunate that the picture was blurred by reference to section 239, giving rise to the unnecessary and irrelevant debate about whether the ship was on the high seas at the time of the conduct. By the time of the appeal, the respondent accepted that sections 239 and 240 of the Bermudian Merchant Shipping Act 2002 were not interchangeable. Mr Perry did not contend that the limitation in section 239 (the reference to the ship being on the high seas) was to be imported into section 240.

73. Turning to the exercise of transposing the case into an English context, to see whether the dual criminality requirement is satisfied, it is equally clear that in corresponding circumstances – meaning the same alleged conduct being committed by a seaman on board an English-registered ship in international waters – the equivalent conduct would “constitute an extra-territorial offence under the law of the relevant part of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment or another form of detention for a term of 12 months or a greater punishment” as section 137(4) requires. Given that the maximum sentence for rape is life imprisonment, that is the inescapable conclusion from a straightforward application of section 282 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.

74. Mr Perry KC was unable to show us any reason why the extra-territoriality/dual criminality test is not satisfied by either section 240 of the Bermudian Act or section 282 of the 1995 Act. There is no material difference between the two provisions which could have that effect.

75. Although Mr Perry wisely did not seek to pursue the argument orally, the effect of section 282(1)(b) is not to deprive the English court of extra-territorial jurisdiction by treating the act complained of as if it had been done within Admiralty jurisdiction, and thus deeming it to be an intra-territorial offence, as is suggested in paragraph 33 of the respondent’s appeal skeleton argument, which appears to be based on the Judge’s reasoning at paragraph 52 of his judgment. Rather the effect is to confer extra-territorial jurisdiction upon it by treating the offence, for the purposes of jurisdiction and trial, in the same way as if it had been committed when the ship was within English or Scottish territorial waters. The respondent’s (and the Judge’s) suggested interpretation of section 282 would obviously deprive it of its intended effect. The Bermudian statute uses the same device.

76. It follows that the Judge’s decision was wrong. Once it was appreciated that the relevant Bermudian provision was section 240 and not section 239, the finding of a “material lack of correspondence” with the English section 282 was untenable. What was required by section 137(4) was not a comparison of the two countries’ legal provisions, but simply an answer to the question of whether both countries would have extra-territorial jurisdiction and sufficient sentencing powers in “corresponding circumstances”. The answer to that question is plainly yes.

77. For completeness, we must add that section 239 of the Bermudian statute is not concerned with this situation at all. True it is that it addresses the scenario where someone who is not a British citizen or a British overseas territory citizen possessing such status, is charged with having committed an offence on board any Bermuda ship on the high seas. However in order for that section to apply, that person must be “found within the jurisdiction of any court in Bermuda which would have had jurisdiction in relation to the offence if it had been committed on board a Bermuda ship within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction to try the offence.” The phrase we have highlighted must mean that, for whatever reason, when the question of jurisdiction to try the case is considered, the person is physically present within the jurisdiction of the Bermudian court.

78. It therefore appears clear that section 239 is inapt to cover a situation where the person concerned is in England. It may cover the situation which would have arisen, for example, if a Bermuda flag ship put into port in Bermuda and a passenger who, like the respondent, is a national of the Philippines, was then arrested at that port and charged with a serious criminal offence which allegedly took place while the vessel was on the high seas. Any argument about whether in order to rely on section 239 it would be necessary to prove at that stage that the vessel was on the high seas at the time when the offence occurred, or whether the location of the vessel would be treated as a constituent element of the charge to be proved at trial, would have to be addressed to the Bermudian court seeking to exercise the jurisdiction to try that person in Bermuda.

CONCLUSION

79. For all of these reasons, we conclude that the Judge should have found that the offence specified in the request is an extradition offence under section 78(4)(b) of the 2003 Act. The appeal will therefore be allowed.

80. Under section 106(6) of the 2003 Act we (a) quash the order discharging the respondent, (b) remit the case to the Judge and (c) direct that the Judge proceed as he would have been required to do if he had decided the relevant question in accordance with this judgment at the extradition hearing, namely, send the case to the Secretary of State pursuant to section 87(3) of the 2003 Act, for a decision whether to order the respondent’s extradition under section 93.

If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our criminal law attorney in Paris.


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