Civil United Kingdom

High Court (King’s Bench Division), 23 October 2026, n° [2026] EWHC 2793 (KB)

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2793 (KB)

Case No: KB-2025-0002427

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING'S BENCH DIVISION

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 23 October 2026

Before :

BRUCE CARR KC

(Sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

HATTONS OF LONDON LIMITED Claimant
– and –
THE KNIGHTSBRIDGE COLLECTION LIMITED
ANDREW PICKERILL
ALEXANDER JEFFERY
DANIEL FARMER
WILLIAM SHORE
NICK HARVEY
BENJAMIN BRADSHAW
First Defendant
Second Defendant
Third Defendant
Fourth Defendant
Sixth Defendant
Seventh Defendant
Eighth Defendant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Mr Daniel Northall KC (instructed by Herrington Carmichael LLP) for the Claimant

The Second, Third, Fourth and Seventh Defendants were not represented

The Sixth and Eighth Defendants did not appear and were not represented

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgement – Costs and Consequential Orders

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties' representatives by email and release to The National Archives at 10.30am on 23 October 2026.

Bruce Carr KC :

Introduction

1. Pursuant to paragraph 113 of my Judgment handed down on 19 June 2026 (“the June 2026 Judgment”), the parties have provided written submissions on the issue of costs and the form of the Order that should follow from that Judgment. The Claimant’s submissions were provided on 3 July 2026. The Defendants (with the exception of the First and Fifth Defendants) provided their responses on various dates during the course of July 2026. References below to “the Defendants” should be read as meaning the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Defendants.

2. The Claimant provided reply submissions on 31 July 2026. After that date, the Second Defendant sent in a further submission on 2 August 2026 in which he sought permission to raise a new factual matter relating to the potential sale of his house. The Claimant responded to that point on 4 August 2026 objecting to any further evidence being submitted and suggesting that in any event, a formal statement (and permission to adduce it) was not necessary as it was open to the Second Defendant simply to write to the Court. For reasons that will become apparent, I have not found it necessary to come to any conclusion on the application set out in the Second Defendant’s 2 August 2026 email.

Costs issues

3. The Claimant’s position is that not only should costs follow the event, but that it should be entitled to recover its costs on an indemnity basis. In support of that submission, the Claimant suggests that, based on the findings in the June 2026 Judgment, this is a case which can properly be described as being “out of the norm”. The Claimant points to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Excelsior Commercial and Industrial Holdings [2002] EWCA Civ 879 as further developed in Esure Services Limited v Quarcoo [2009] EWCA Civ 595. In particular, the Claimant relied on the judgment of Waller LJ at paragraph 25 in Esure as follows:

“The Recorder seems to have construed the word “norm” as indicating that if the situation facing the court was one that quite often occurred that would mean that the situation was within the norm. In my view the word “norm” was not intended to reflect whether what occurred was something that happened often so that in one sense it might be seen as “normal” but was intended to reflect something outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings. To bring a dishonest claim and to support a claim by dishonesty cannot be said to be the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings.”

4. The Claimant suggests that this was indeed a claim that was defended by the Defendants in a manner that was dishonest and that this dishonesty was maintained throughout the proceedings. In support of this, it points to various findings set out in the June 2026 Judgment which are indicative of dishonesty, including the destruction or attempted destruction of evidence on the First Defendant’s Zoho account (for which the Eighth Defendant was responsible), the use of pseudonyms by most of the Defendants on the “Cliq” messaging platform and the “sham grievance” that was pursued, again by most of the Defendants in an attempt to justify their departure from employment with the Claimant. The Claimant contends that it has had to prove at trial a case which the Defendants must have known was unanswerable.

5. Whilst the Defendants have each provided separate written submissions in response to the Claimant’s application for costs on an indemnity basis, there is a substantial degree of overlap in what they seek to argue. For that reason, I do not propose to deal with each Defendants’ response in turn but rather will address their arguments collectively and thematically.

6. A number of the Defendants point to their limited financial means as being something that should be taken into account in considering whether to order costs on an indemnity basis and/or whether an order should be made for payment on account and if so, as what level. As to these points, whilst it may well be that the Claimant will face some difficulty in trying to enforce any order as to costs, I do not consider that the financial circumstances of the Defendants are something to which I should have regard in considering such issues. Given that conclusion, it does not seem to me that I should address the issue of the sale or potential sale of the Second Defendant’s house. In particular, I reach no conclusion on the assertion by the Claimant that the Second Defendant is taking steps to avoid having to pay costs and/or damages to it.

7. The next point taken by the Defendants is that the Claimant did not succeed in all of its arguments before me. Whilst it is factually correct that the Claimant was unsuccessful in some of the points that it sought to argue, I do not think that these provide a basis for suggesting that it should not get all of its costs and/or should not do so on an indemnity basis. I accept that Claimant’s assertion set out in its reply to the Defendants’ costs submissions that it is not a requirement of an order for costs that it has not succeeded on every point – see Fox v Foundation Piling Limited [2011] EWCA Civ 790. In addition, as the Claimant notes, none of the matters on which it did not succeed caused additional costs to be incurred.

8. The Defendants also seek to argue that they as individuals were not responsible for all of the conduct which was the subject of criticism in the June 2026 Judgment. They therefore suggest that the right way to deal with costs, is by making individual costs orders to reflect the extent to their responsibility for the particular torts or breaches of contract which are identified in that Judgment. I disagree – as is clear from the June 2026 Judgment, the Defendants have engaged in what in the criminal courts would be described as a “joint enterprise”. They have conspired together to unlawfully gain access to the Claimant’s data and then to use that data in order to try to establish a new business venture using the vehicle of the First Defendant. In the light of the findings that I have already made, I do not see any basis on which the court should try to ascribe particular levels of responsibility to particular Defendants in circumstances in which it is clear that they were “all in it together”. In short, the Defendants are jointly and severally liable for costs.

9. A number of the Defendants point to the undertakings that they gave to the Claimant when first contacted by the Claimant’s solicitors. Undertakings were offered in early July 2025 following a letter from the Claimant’s solicitors dated 20 June 2025. However, as recorded in paragraph 38 of the June 2026 Judgment, those undertakings were on the basis that there had in fact been no misuse of the Claimant’s client data or confidential information. They also (with the exception of the Eighth Defendant who had long since left his employment with the Claimant) relied on the false narrative set out in the Grievance that they had submitted as well as falsely asserting that their presence at the First Defendant’s premises had been solely for the purpose of discussing that grievance. Not only were the July 20025 undertakings narrower than those that had been sought by the Claimant but they also fell well short of the relief that was subsequently ordered by Mr Glasson KC at the hearing which then took place on 17 July 2025. Thereafter of course, as again recorded in the June 2026 Judgment, the Defendants continued to behave in a dishonest way, designed to try to disguise their unlawful activities and/or the extent of them. I do not think that the July undertakings provide any basis for a different approach to costs than is otherwise appropriate in this case.

10. The same is true of the points made by the Defendants relating to their attempts to resolve the litigation via ADR or financial offers of settlement. All of these efforts, such as they were, fell well short of anything like a proper acceptance, whether in terms of liability or remedy, of the case that the Claimant had brought against them and in my view, again provides no basis of any mitigation in terms of post-trial orders for costs. The Claimant was, in my view, fully entitled to reject the offers of ADT or financial settlement which the Defendants had put forward in the course of the litigation.

11. In short, having reviewed all of the submissions provided by the Defendants, I am driven to conclude as follows:

a. The Claimant is entitled to an order for costs against all Defendants to the full extent of its costs. This does not of course mean that it can recover the full sum against each of them. The Defendants are jointly and severally liable in respect of such sum as may be determined as a result of a detailed assessment – enforcement of that order will be a matter for the Claimant and it will of course proceed on the basis that, as with any award of damages, it is not entitled to any form of double recovery;

b. The order for costs should be on an indemnity basis. The June 2026 Judgment sets out in detail exactly why this case is “out of the norm” but in short, the Claimant has established liability in the face of persistent dishonesty by each and every one of the Defendants.

12. There is then the issue of payment on account. The Claimant is clearly entitled to such a payment under CPR 44.2(8) unless there is good reason for not doing so. Any financial problems faced by the Defendants do not it seems to me, amount to a good reason for not making such an order, even if the Claimant then faces difficulty in enforcing my Order. In addition, the Defendants have suggested that no order for payment on account should be made until after the determination of the Claimant’s damages claim. I disagree – the Claimant has succeeded in establishing liability and has had to spend a significant amount in legal costs in doing so. It is entitled to an award of costs now and, consequently, are entitled to a reasonable sum on account and pending detailed assessment. The Defendants urge me to exercise caution in assessing the amount to be ordered on account. On this point, I agree with them. The Claimant seeks a payment of £357,204.51, representing 70% of the costs that it claims. In the particular circumstances of this case, I take the view that this is a little on the high side and therefore, without prejudice of course to any detailed assessment that may take place, order that the sum of £275,000 be paid on account by the Defendants.

Remedy Hearing

13. Although the issue of equitable relief was addressed in the June 2026 Judgment, there of course remains the issue of damages. It is already clear from the evidence that I have heard in this case, that the Claimant has suffered significant losses as a consequence of the Defendants’ misuse of its confidential information and diversion of its customers. I accept, as submitted by the Claimant, that the court will be assisted by expert accountancy evidence and I give permission to the Claimant to instruct and rely on a report from its proposed accountancy expert, Matthew Haddon of Menzies. I also agree with the Claimant that it makes sense for the Claimant first to provide its Schedule of Loss (which will presumably draw on the conclusions reached by Mr Haddon) and for the Defendants to then submit their own Counter Schedule. Whether they do so on an individual or collective basis is a matter I leave to them but it seems to me that permission to instruct their own expert should be limited to one accountant only. If for any reason, it proves unworkable to proceed on the basis of a single expert appointed on behalf of all of the Defendants, they can make such application to the Court as might be appropriate for varied directions to deal with that situation (there being liberty to apply as set out in the Order that I have made).

14. In terms of separately addressing liability and equitable relief based on the June 2026 Judgment, I will make an Order in the terms sought by the Claimant and set out in the draft provided to the Court on 3 July 2026.


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