Tax United Kingdom
HOGAN LOVELLS CADWALADER INTERNATIONAL LLP v THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01502 (TC)
Case Number: TC 10082
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL
TAX CHAMBER
Location: Decided on the papers
Appeal reference: TC/2025/04485
PRIVILEGE – exercise of powers under Information Notice: Resolution of Disputes as to Privileged Communications Regulations 2009
Judgment date: 29 October 2026
Decided by:
JUDGE AMANDA BROWN KC
CHAMBER PRESIDENT
Between
HOGAN LOVELLS CADWALADER INTERNATIONAL LLP
Formerly Hogan Lovells International LLP
Applicant
and
THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Respondents
The Tribunal determined the appeal without a hearing under the provisions of Rule 29 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 the parties having consented to such a determination and upon concluding it was in the interest of justice to do so. The papers before me were as follows:
(1) An application (Application)dated 6 February 2026 originally made by Hogan Lovells International LLP (HLI) pursuant to Regulation 5(5) Information Notice: Resolution of Disputes as to Privileged Communications Regulations 2009 (Regulations) that three specific documents and associated drafts and circulated copies (Disputed Documents)are subject to legal professional privilege and do not therefore need to be disclosed to HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) following the issue of an information notice (Information Notice) pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 2 Schedule 36 Finance Act 2008 (Sch 36).
(2) The first witness statement prepared by Nicholas Mark Atkins (NMA1)which accompanied the Application together with the 342 pages of exhibits.
(3) HMRC’s response to the Application dated 24 April 2026, and accompanying bundle of 329 pages (Response).
(4) HLI’s reply to the Response dated 29 May 2026 (Reply).
(5) The second witness statement prepared by Nicholas Mark Atkins (NMA2) which accompanied the Reply.
(6) HMRC’s further response to the Reply dated 18 June 2026 (Further Response). HLI challenged HMRC’s entitlement to serve the Further Response. I have decided to admit the Further Response. In their Reply HLI served NMA2. HLI contend that I should accept the witness statements as determinative unless they are, by reference to the other evidence available, demonstrably inaccurate. It was in accordance with the overriding objective for HMRC to be given the opportunity to make submissions on NMA2.
(7) Three authorities bundles together running to 952 pages.
(8) Submissions made by both parties on a question put to them by me arising from a concern that the Disputed Documents were co-authored by a lawyer and a non-lawyer.
DECISION
Introduction
1. The Application is made pursuant to the Regulations which give the Tribunal jurisdiction to resolve disputes between HMRC and the recipient of a Sch 36 information notice as to whether documents are privileged and may therefore be withheld by the recipient of such an information notice. HLI claim privilege in respect of three documents (and drafts/circulated copies thereof). The Disputed Documents are described by the parties as the PG Slides, the Corporate Member Executive Summary and the February Paper.
2. The privilege dispute arises in the course of HMRC's enquiries into HLI's partnership tax returns for the tax years 2014/15 to 2023/24. Those enquiries concern the deductibility for tax purposes of payments made by HLI to Hogan Lovells US LLP (HLUS) under arrangements governing the relationship between the two firms following their combination in 2009 contained in the Cooperation Agreement. I understand that HMRC have now closed the enquiry by issue of closure notices for each of the years ended 5 April 2015 – 5 April 2024. The closure notices have been appealed and the appeals have been notified to the Tribunal under reference TC/2026/07011.
3. HLI and HLUS operate as separate legal entities. During the years following signature of the Cooperation Agreement, concerns arose regarding what was described as an "imbalance issue", namely the financial consequences of the arrangements governing partner remuneration and payments between the two firms. That issue gave rise to discussions within the Hogan Lovells organisation during the period 2012 to 2014 concerning possible solutions, including a proposal involving the admission of a corporate entity as a partner of HLI and, ultimately, payments by HLI to HLUS under the Cooperation Agreement.
4. HMRC contends that the Disputed Documents, or at least part of their contents, are not protected by legal advice privilege and should be disclosed. HLI maintains that each document is privileged and has remained confidential. It is that dispute which I must determine.
5. For the reasons set out below, and based on the evidence provided to me in this Application, I make the following determinations in respect of the three documents:
(1) PG Slides – are to be disclosed in a redacted form.
(2) Corporate Member Executive Summary – is privileged.
(3) February Paper – is privileged.
6. In reaching my judgment on this Application, I note that I was provided only with the documents and evidence which the parties considered necessary to determine the Application. Within this judgment I have made findings of fact which pertain to the Application. These findings are definitive only as regards this Application.
Chronology of the dispute
7. HMRC opened an enquiry into HLI's partnership tax return for the 2014/15 tax year on 12 May 2016. During the enquiry HMRC made numerous information requests and issued Sch 36 information notices. HLI disclosed substantial quantities of material but withheld the Disputed Documents on grounds they were protected from disclosure as documents subject to legal advice privilege.
8. The privilege status of two of the Disputed Documents, namely the PG Slides and the February Paper, was first challenged by HMRC in correspondence dated 15 December 2021. HLI subsequently asserted privilege over the Corporate Member Executive Summary in correspondence dated 23 May 2022. Detailed exchanges then followed over a number of years concerning the basis of HLI's privilege claims and HMRC's objections to them.
9. On 7 March 2025 HMRC issued a detailed letter and supporting appendices setting out its substantive challenge to HLI's privilege claims. HMRC challenged the asserted privilege in the Disputed Documents contending that the advice contained within them was given in a commercial rather than legal context. At that time, HMRC also contended that were any privilege to have attached to the PG Slides and the Corporate Member Executive Summary, it was lost because those materials were shared between HLI and HLUS at a time when the firms were adverse parties. As regards the February Paper, HMRC contended both that HLI and HLUS remained adverse parties when versions of the paper were exchanged and that the paper was, in substance, commercial rather than legal in nature. HMRC further contended that privilege in respect of the February Paper had been waived by reason of reliance placed upon it in a witness statement served in the course of the privilege dispute.
10. On 6 February 2026 HLI issued the Application.
11. In their Response, HMRC reformulated aspects of its position, identifying as its primary case that none of the Disputed Documents attracted privilege in the first place. By the Response they no longer advance an absolute rule that communications between adverse parties cannot remain confidential. Rather, and to the extent that the documents were created as privileged, HMRC contend that, in this case, the nature of the relationship between HLI and HLUS and the circumstances of the disclosures mean that no continuing confidentiality can properly be inferred. Accordingly, they maintain that any privilege that may initially have attached was lost when the documents were shared. In the Response, HMRC also maintain alternative arguments concerning loss of confidentiality and severability but no longer contend there to have been collateral waiver through the witness statement.
12. In its Reply dated 29 May 2026, HLI noted HMRC’s change of position on the substantive legal questions which had previously been disputed. HLI submit that the remaining dispute is primarily factual in nature and concerns the characterisation of the Disputed Documents and the inferences to be drawn from the contemporaneous documents. To address those issues, HLI rely upon a second witness statement from Mr Atkins. In that statement he asserts that a small number of documents relied upon by HMRC had been disclosed inadvertently and remained privileged notwithstanding their disclosure (Disclosed Documents). Six categories of documents are identified. HLI expressly reserves its position as to their status and asserts that their inadvertent disclosure did not waive privilege either in those documents or more generally.
13. HMRC filed a Further Response dated 18 June 2026. In that document HMRC maintains their position that the Tribunal should determine for itself whether the Disputed Documents are privileged and that the contemporaneous documents remain the most reliable evidence as to their purpose and character. HMRC submit that the second witness statement of Mr Atkins does not materially answer the points raised in the Response and continue to contend that the Tribunal should scrutinise Mr Atkins' analysis, particularly given his lack of direct involvement in the underlying events. HMRC also dispute aspects of the characterisation advanced by Mr Atkins as to the roles performed by Philip Gershuny (PG) and Prentiss Feagles (PF) (as authors of the Disputed Documents) and maintain that the contemporaneous materials were indicative of the documents having been prepared in a broader commercial and managerial context. HMRC further addressed issues arising from documents which HLI assert have been inadvertently disclosed and reserve their position in relation to those matters. HMRC's conclusion remains that each of the Disputed Documents should be disclosed, either in whole or in part.
Regulations
14. Pursuant to the Regulations, where a dispute as to the status of documents meeting the description prescribed in a Sch 36 information notice arises through correspondence, Regulation 5 prescribes a staged procedure for resolution of the dispute. The recipient of the information notice identifies the documents claimed to be privileged, HMRC identifies those it maintains are not privileged, and the disputed documents are then referred to the Tribunal. The Tribunal receives the disputed documents themselves and determines their status.
15. Regulation 8 defines the Tribunal's task. I must determine whether, and to what extent, the documents are privileged and may determine that only part of a document is privileged. I may also direct which parts, if any, are to be disclosed.
16. In Wiseman v HMRC [2022] UKFTT 75 (TC), the Tribunal approached its task under Regulation 8 as an exercise focused on the status of the disputed documents themselves. The Tribunal identified the applicable principles of legal advice privilege, including confidentiality, the requirement that the author be a lawyer acting in a professional legal capacity, the concept of a "relevant legal context", the continuum of communications between lawyer and client, the dominant purpose test where applicable, and the possibility of severance. It then applied those principles to the disputed documents by examining each document in its factual and documentary context.
Legal advice privilege
17. In the form that the Application finally comes to me for determination there is a substantial degree of agreement as to the legal principles which apply in the assessment of whether any particular document is privileged and may, therefore, be withheld. There are, however, some substantive disagreements between the parties.
Agreed position on the relevant principles
18. The parties are agreed that legal advice privilege is a fundamental right which protects confidential communications between a lawyer and the recipient of the advice, where those communications are made for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice.
19. A central factual issue in this Application is whether the relevant individuals were acting as lawyers in the preparation of the Disputed Documents. The parties are essentially agreed that where the author of a relevant document wears two hats i.e. they act as a legal adviser and in some other capacity, there is a factual issue to be determined as to in which capacity the author was acting when they prepared the relevant communication.
20. The parties also agree that when assessing privilege legal advice is not confined to advice on questions of law and may include advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in a relevant legal context, notwithstanding that such advice has commercial consequences or addresses commercial considerations.The parties further agree that the concepts of a 'relevant legal context' and, where applicable, a continuum of communications between lawyer and client may be relevant when determining whether a particular communication is privileged.
21. In relation to confidentiality, the parties proceeded on the common basis that there is no absolute rule that privilege is necessarily lost whenever confidential material is shared with another person, including a person whose interests are not fully aligned with those of the privilege holder. They further accepted that whether privilege is lost is a fact-sensitive question which falls to be determined by reference to all the circumstances surrounding the disclosure. In particular, the parties were agreed that continuing confidentiality may, where appropriate, be inferred from those circumstances and need not depend upon any express statement or agreement that confidentiality is to be maintained.
22. Finally, on severance, the parties are substantially agreed as to the relevant legal principles concerning severance. Both rely on R. (oao Jet2.com) v Civil Aviation Authority [2020] EWCA Civ 35 (Jet2.com) and accept that, where legal and non-legal material can be separated, privilege protects only the privileged material, and the remainder may be disclosed. Equally, both accept that there may be circumstances in which legal and non-legal material are so intermingled that severance is not practically possible and the document falls to be considered as a whole. Whether the Disputed Documents contain intermingled legal and non-legal material or material capable of severance is ultimately a document-specific question which falls to be determined after resolving the legal issues discussed below and considering the documents themselves.
Legal principles needing determination
Secondary communications
23. There is no dispute between the parties that privilege may extend beyond the privileged communication itself and may protect documents which reveal or disclose the substance of privileged advice. There is, however, some difference between them as to the scope of that principle.
24. HMRC contend that the secondary evidence doctrine is a limited one. Relying on Jet2.com and A v B [2020] EWHC 1492 (Ch) (A v B), they submit that privilege only attaches where the later document itself communicates, reproduces or makes identifiable the substance of legal advice. In their submission, it is insufficient that a document was produced against a background in which legal advice had been obtained, that it took such advice into account, or that it reflected thinking influenced by legal advice. Rather, it must be possible to identify, either directly, or by necessary inference, the advice or communication said to be privileged. HMRC therefore maintain that a document will only attract privilege if it itself reveals the substance of legal advice.
25. HLI contends for a broader principle. Relying on Edwardian Group Ltd & Anor v Singh & Ors [2017] EWHC 2805 (Ch) (Edwardian)HLI submit that privilege extends not only to documents which expressly reproduce or summarise legal advice, but also to documents whose disclosure would reveal, disclose or betray the trend, tenor or substance of privileged advice. They submit that the relevant question is whether disclosure would enable the reader to infer the substance or direction of privileged legal advice. HLI therefore reject the proposition that a specific statement of legal advice must be identifiable within the document itself before privilege can attach. HLI acknowledge that A v B is the more recent authority but HLI reference Recovery Partners GP Limited v Rukhadze and others [2021] EWHC 1621 (Comm)(Rukhadze) and University of Dundee v Chakraborty [2023] CSIH 22 at [19] (Dundee) (as referenced in footnote 102 of Thanki & Oppenheimer 4th Edition at paragraph 2.39) as supporting this approach.
Discussion
26. In Jet2.com the Court of Appeal identified at [45] that the preceding authorities established the proposition that privilege covers “not only a document from the lawyer containing the advice … but also any communication … passing on, considering or applying that advice internally”. That was also affirmed in [100(vii)] where the Court expressed the view that a communication that “might realistically disclose legal advice (in the sense of there being a realistic possibility of it disclosing such advice)” would also be privileged.
27. In A v B, the High Court confirmed that privilege may extend to documents which disseminate or communicate previously obtained legal advice. However, the Court rejected the proposition that a document not prepared by a lawyer acting as such becomes privileged merely because it was created against a background in which legal advice had been given. The Court held that, for a secondary document to attract privilege, it must be possible to identify within that document, either directly or by inference, the substance of the privileged advice said to be protected. The Court emphasised that it is necessary to identify how the document in question communicates or discloses that advice and that privilege will not arise merely because the document was influenced by legal advice or prepared with knowledge of it. The document must itself communicate, reveal or disclose the substance of the advice in a manner capable of being identified from its contents. That determination was said to be rooted in the judgment in FSCS v Abbey National Treasury Services [2007] EWHC 2868 (Ch) at [17-18] (FSCS).
28. In FSCS, the Court held that it was necessary to identify how the document said to be privileged disclosed or communicated the substance of legal advice previously given. Subsequently in EdwardianMorgan J considered a wider body of authority and addressed the nature of the inference that may properly be drawn from a document. He concluded that privilege may extend to a document where there is a "definite and reasonable foundation" within the document for inferring the substance of the legal advice, as distinct from material which merely allows the reader to speculate that legal advice may have been obtained and what its content might have been.
29. I experienced some difficulty identifying the relevant Rukhadze judgmentrelied on by HLI. The citation contained in HLI's submissions and reflected in Thanki & Oppenheimer was not available to me using open sources. Nor did the authorities bundle contain the decision to which HLI's submissions referred. Having undertaken further investigation, I located the judgment of Cockerill J upon which reliance was placed and have considered the passages referenced in HLI's submissions. I note that in a paper determination, where the parties rely on authorities without oral elaboration, it is particularly important that the relevant authorities are accurately cited and made available to the Tribunal.
30. Having located the relevant judgment, I note that the passages relied upon do not support the proposition for which HLI cite the case. Rather, at paragraphs [59]-[60], Cockerill J observed that the parties claiming privilege had adopted an "excessively wide view" of the doctrine. In doing so she drew a distinction, reflected in Edwardian and the legal texts, between documents which disclose the substance of legal advice and those which do not.
31. In Dundee the Scottish equivalent to privilege (confidentiality) was considered in the context of a document the first draft of which was prepared as part of an investigation into bullying and harassment and was not therefore prepared subject to privilege of any sort. However, it was amended following legal advice. The final report was disclosed. Privilege was claimed on the earlier draft on the grounds that its disclosure would reveal the legal advice obtained between the drafts. Disclosure of the original draft was ordered by the Employment Tribunal. The Court of Session observed at [17] that under English law on privilege non-legal advice may attract legal advice privilege where that advice is given within the relevant legal context (but not otherwise). The Court noted at [18] that privilege should attach to a document at creation and could not attach subsequently. It went on at [19] (the paragraph referenced in Thanki & Oppenheimer) to note that whilst privilege would extend to material which would “allow the reader to work out what legal advice had been given” (by reference to Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No 6) [2004] UKHL 48) the original report did not fall into that category. Referencing Edwardian, the Court of Session concluded that any comparison between the original and final reports did no more than allow the reader to wonder or speculate whether legal advice had been obtained and its substance; it did not provide a “definite and reasonable foundation … for the suggested inference as to the substance of the legal advice given”.
32. HMRC submit that I should apply the approach adopted in A v B. HLI contend that I should instead follow Edwardian. Having considered the authorities, I do not regard them as establishing fundamentally different principles. Both proceed on the basis that privilege does not extend merely because a document was prepared against a background in which legal advice had been obtained or because the document reflects thinking influenced by such advice. In each case it remains necessary to identify how disclosure of the document would reveal the substance of legal advice previously given. The real difference lies in the degree of connection required between the document and the advice. In A v B emphasis is placed on whether the document identifies, directly or by inference, the substance of the advice. In Edwardian, Morgan J explained the quality of inference required, namely that there must be a definite and reasonable foundation within the document for inferring the substance of the advice, rather than material which merely permits speculation that advice may have been obtained and what that advice might have been.
33. Accordingly, I conclude that a document will not attract legal advice privilege merely because it was influenced by legal advice or was produced in circumstances where legal advice had previously been obtained. Equally, privilege is not confined to documents which expressly repeat or summarise legal advice. A document may attract privilege where its disclosure would provide a definite and reasonable basis for inferring the substance of privileged legal advice previously given. The question is whether disclosure would reveal the advice itself, whether directly or by necessary and reasonable inference. It is not sufficient that disclosure would do no more than suggest that legal advice had been received or allow the reader to speculate as to its content.
Relevance of witness evidence supporting the Application
34. The Application is supported by two witness statements provided by Mr Atkins, HLI’s General Counsel.
35. HLI contend that the statements are central evidence supporting the privilege claims. It is submitted that Mr Atkins’ evidence should be accorded substantial weight in accordance with the principles in West London Pipeline & Storage Ltd v Total UK Ltd [2008] EWHC 1729 (Comm) (WLPS). HLI contend that WLPS establishes that properly formulated witness evidence supporting a privilege claim should generally be accepted unless contradicted by contemporaneous documents or other compelling evidence. They contend that without evidence which contradicts the statement it should prevail. Reliance is also placed on Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006 (ENRC CA), as demonstrating that courts should not readily reject such evidence where it is supported by contemporaneous materials.
36. HMRC submits that only limited weight should be attached to Mr Atkins’ evidence. They emphasise that Mr Atkins was not involved in the imbalance discussions, the creation of the Disputed Documents, or their circulation, and therefore lacks first-hand knowledge of the relevant events. HMRC too relies on WLPS, particularly the proposition that assertions in a witness statement are evidential rather than determinative and must be tested against the evidence as a whole. They also rely on Westminster International BV v Dornoch Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1323 (Dornoch) and Simetra Global Assets Ltd v Ikon Finance Ltd [2019] EWCA Civ 1413 (Simetra), submitting that contemporaneous documents are generally more reliable than retrospective analysis. HMRC therefore argues that the Tribunal should independently assess the contemporaneous evidence and Disputed Documents rather than defer to Mr Atkins’ characterisations and conclusions.
Discussion
37. I start with WLPS, a case concerning the disclosure of accident investigations reports which, it was claimed, had been prepared in contemplation of litigation. The privilege application was supported by an affidavit. At [53] the Court acknowledges that privilege affidavits will usually be sworn by a legal adviser or litigant providing, in the context of legal advice privilege, an analysis of the documents and in the case of litigation privilege the purpose for which they were created. At [86] the Court identifies four propositions concerning challenges to privilege (which I summarise):
(1) Because the burden of proof is on the party claiming privilege, affidavits must be as specific as possible.
(2) An assertion of privilege and/or statement of purpose of a communication is not determinative, such statements are evidence of fact which may require to be independently proven.
(3) At an interlocutory stage affidavits are difficult to go behind and will therefore be conclusive unless the statements made in them can, by reference to the other available evidence, be demonstrated to be incorrect.
(4) Where, on the evidence before it a Court considers that the requirements for privilege are not satisfied it has options open to it including requiring further evidence.
38. ENRC CA accepts that in the context of an application to withhold documents from disclosure in civil proceedings evidence as to the purpose for which documents were created should not be disregarded even where the evidence was strictly hearsay. Dornoch similarly confirms that witness evidence as to the purpose for which documents are created is neither conclusive nor irrelevant; such evidence forms part of the evidential picture from which the status of documents is to be determined. That evidential picture will necessarily include the contemporaneous, but non-privileged (and therefore disclosed) documents (see Simetra).
39. In my view the authorities to which I was referred by both parties provide only limited assistance on the specific issues arising in this Application. Most were concerned with litigation privilege and the circumstances in which documents were created rather than the status of a small number of identified documents available for inspection by the Tribunal. Nevertheless, taken together, the authorities establish that the Tribunal must determine whether privilege exists by carrying out an evaluation of all of the evidence available. Witness evidence forms part of that evidential picture but is not determinative of the issue.
40. I accept that witness evidence may be of considerable assistance in placing disputed documents within their proper factual and organisational context. That is particularly so where, as here, the issues require an understanding of governance arrangements, reporting structures, the roles performed by particular individuals and the wider course of communications of which the Disputed Documents formed part. Such matters are not always apparent from the face of the documents themselves. Equally, whether a particular document attracts legal advice privilege is ultimately a matter for the Tribunal. The views of a witness as to whether a document constitutes legal advice, forms part of a privileged continuum of communications or otherwise attracts privilege are not conclusions which I am bound to accept. Those are matters which I must determine for myself having regard to all of the evidence before me.
41. I therefore approach Mr Atkins' evidence by distinguishing between his evidence concerning the factual and organisational background to the imbalance issue and his opinions as to the proper characterisation of the Disputed Documents. The former is capable of providing relevant context, albeit subject to the limitation that Mr Atkins was not directly involved in many of the underlying events. The latter carries more limited weight because it is for me to determine the privilege status of the Disputed Documents. I have accordingly taken account of Mr Atkins' evidence concerning the governance arrangements within the Hogan Lovells organisation, the roles performed by the individuals involved and the communication history within which the Disputed Documents came into existence. However, I have formed my own view as to whether the requirements for legal advice privilege are satisfied, doing so by reference to the Disputed Documents themselves and the contemporaneous materials available to me.
Direction and supervision
42. During my consideration of the issues in this appeal, I identified a matter which concerned me as to the authorship of the Disputed Documents; in particular I was concerned that they had been prepared with the direct involvement of both a lawyer and a non-lawyer. On 4 September 2026 I directed the parties to provide submissions on the following issue:
Where a document over which legal advice privilege is claimed was prepared or presented jointly by a lawyer and a non-lawyer, what principles determine whether legal advice privilege attaches to the document where the evidence does not establish:
(1) their respective contributions to its preparation or presentation; or
(2) whether, and if so to what extent, the non-lawyer acted under the direction and supervision of the lawyer?
43. HLI’s response was that the question did not need answering because HMRC do not dispute that the Disputed Documents had been authored by identified lawyers. HLI contend that the dispute centred instead on whether the Disputed Documents had been authored by a lawyer qua lawyer, such that they were communications between lawyer and client with the dominant purpose of seeking or giving legal advice or alternatively constituted secondary communications of such legal advice. HLI further contend that the principle of direction and supervision which prompted my directions was wholly inapposite because it was limited in application to a situation in which the communication in question was not from the lawyer at all but from, for example, legal secretaries, trainees or paralegals acting on the lawyer’s behalf, which was not the factual situation in this Application.
44. In their submissions, HMRC also contend that the principle of direction and supervision is principally concerned with communications made by a non-lawyer, in which context the critical question is whether the non-lawyer was acting as agent for, or as a conduit of, the lawyer. HMRC therefore state that the principle “does not alter the analysis in the present case”. HMRC maintain their position that the non-lawyer contribution demonstrates that the documents were not produced by the lawyers in their capacity as lawyers for the dominant purpose of providing legal advice. In essence they also contend that the non-lawyer contribution, if severable, should be disclosed.
Discussion
45. I am not entirely satisfied that the position adopted by the parties as to the scope and general application of the principle requiring direction and supervision in the context of privilege is correct in light of the Supreme Court judgment in Prudential plc v Special Commission of Income Tax [2013] UKSC 1. I briefly questioned whether, in light of HMRC v Bluecrest Capital Management (UK) LLP [2025] EWCA Civ 23, and given my disquiet on the issue, it was open to me to accept what appeared to be an agreed matter of law between the parties. However, on balance, I have decided that it is unnecessary to determine the scope of the principle. The parties have both indicated that it is not material to the Application. Relevant email correspondence demonstrating the nature and extent of Richard Olver’s (RO) contribution has been disclosed to HMRC who have then framed their challenge to privilege. I have determined whether each of the Disputed Documents is privileged in that context.
Factual issues to be determined
46. I now turn to the factual issues that I must determine for the purposes of this Application. The parties are generally agreed that I must determine:
(1) Whether the imbalance issue and, in particular, the extent to which the contemporaneous communications occurred within a relevant legal, tax, regulatory and governance context.
(2) The circumstances in which the Disputed Documents were circulated and considered, including whether their circulation occurred on a basis that preserved confidentiality.
47. Having determined the applicable legal principles and reviewed the evidence, I must then determine, so far as relevant, in relation to each of the Disputed Documents:
(1) Whether the document or any part of it was prepared or presented by the lawyer in question acting as a lawyer.
(2) Whether the dominant purpose of the document or any part of it was the provision of legal advice and/or whether the document itself constitutes, records, communicates or reveals legal advice.
(3) Whether confidentiality attaching to the document was preserved.
(4) As appropriate if any parts of the document do not satisfy steps (2) or (3) those parts are capable of severance.
Evidence
48. Having determined those legal principles, I turn to the evidence.
Evidence of Mr Atkins
The authors of the Disputed Documents and their roles
49. Mr Atkins is a partner of HLI and its General Counsel. In both witness statements he explains that his evidence is derived from his own involvement in the HMRC enquiry, his review of contemporaneous materials, the Disputed Documents and associated correspondence, and discussions with relevant individuals, including PF. He also describes his knowledge of the governance arrangements of HLI and HLUS and the roles occupied by those involved in the matters under consideration.
50. In Mr Atkins’ evidence, PG is described as a long-standing tax partner in HLI's corporate tax team who had previously served as Head of International Tax. Mr Atkins states that, although PG had not been involved in negotiating the Cooperation Agreement, he was called upon to provide advice in relation to the firm's UK tax affairs and was specifically appointed by David Harris (DH) in May 2012 to act as tax adviser to HLI in connection with the imbalance issue (DH was, at the time, Co-CEO of Hogan Lovells (HL)). Mr Atkins states that the imbalance issue was one of the matters in respect of which HLI and HLUS required separate advice because the interests of the two LLPs had diverged. He describes PG as advising HLI on that issue and preparing work products for those representing HLI's interests. It is confirmed that PG held no executive position within HLI's governance structure and no managerial, negotiating or decision-making role in relation to the issues under consideration. In his second witness statement Mr Atkins reiterates that understanding and states that PG's involvement related to advice given within his area of tax expertise.
51. The statements record PF as a partner in HLUS, admitted as a lawyer in the United States and specialising in corporate and transactional tax matters. Mr Atkins provides a detailed account of PF's positions within HLUS and the wider Hogan Lovells organisation. He states that PF advised senior leadership of HLUS on legal, tax, financial and structural matters, played a central role in the negotiation and implementation of the Cooperation Agreement and was subsequently regarded as an authority on the legal, tax and governance structure of the combined organisations.
52. Mr Atkins states that PF occupied several roles simultaneously. Between 2010 and 2014 he served as Co-Head of Finance alongside RO (RO was UK based)and was responsible for managing the internal finance and tax functions. During the same period, he also advised the Co-CEOs, International Management Committee (IMC) and HL Board on matters concerning the Cooperation Agreement and broader issues affecting cooperation between the two LLPs. Mr Atkins distinguishes between those managerial and advisory roles and states that this distinction informed HLI's approach when asserting privilege.
53. Mr Atkins further explains that, although external tax advisers were consulted on aspects of the issues under consideration, neither HLI nor HLUS instructed external lawyers in connection with the matters giving rise to the Disputed Documents. His evidence is that the relevant legal advice was instead provided internally, principally through PG and PF, whose expertise in tax, partnership structures, the Cooperation Agreement and the governance arrangements of the two LLPs was relied upon by those addressing the imbalance issue.
The nature and purpose of the Disputed Documents
54. The statement places the creation of the Disputed Documents in the context of the "imbalance issue". Mr Atkins explains that, following the combination of HLI and HLUS, concerns emerged regarding the relationship between partner remuneration arrangements and the profits generated by the respective LLPs. He states that, from 2012 onwards, senior representatives of HLI and HLUS considered a range of possible responses to that issue and that discussions became increasingly contentious during 2013.
55. Mr Atkins' evidence is that the Disputed Documents formed part of a sequence of communications concerning the imbalance issue extending from 2012 through to implementation of the agreement reached on 18 February 2014. He describes the PG Slides, Corporate Member Executive Summary and February Paper as having arisen at different stages of that process and as part of the continuing consideration of options, proposals and implementation measures relating to the imbalance issue.
56. In relation to the PG Slides, Mr Atkins confirms the agreed position that they were prepared by PG in late 2013. He describes them as identifying issues arising from the imbalance issue and setting out possible options for addressing it. According to Mr Atkins, the slides were prepared when discussions between HLI and HLUS had become increasingly contentious and were intended to assist consideration of the matters then under discussion. In his second witness statement he states that the slides were prepared in the context of briefing senior individuals who were expected to assume leadership responsibilities and ensuring that they understood the issues then under consideration.
57. Mr Atkins states that the Corporate Member Executive Summary was prepared by PF in early February 2014. He explains that one of the options then being considered was a proposal under which HLUS, or a subsidiary of HLUS, would become a corporate partner of HLI. He describes the proposal as one that required consideration of partnership structures, the governance arrangements established by the Cooperation Agreement and tax consequences in multiple jurisdictions. In his second witness statement he describes the document as an executive summary prepared in connection with the consideration of that proposal by the relevant governance bodies.
58. Mr Atkins states that the February Paper was prepared by PF following a meeting held on 18 February 2014. According to Mr Atkins, discussions at that meeting resulted in agreement not to pursue the corporate member proposal as a near-term solution and agreement that payments should be made under the Cooperation Agreement. He describes the February Paper as a document produced afterwards to address implementation of that agreed approach, including governance, structural and tax considerations. He states that it was intended for consideration by the HL Board and IMC.
Circulation and use of the Disputed Documents
59. Mr Atkins’ evidence describes the governance arrangements operating between HLI and HLUS. He explains that each LLP had its own board and management committee while the combined organisations also had the Board and IMC. He states that, depending on the issue under consideration, different combinations of those bodies and their members acted as recipients of advice.
60. Mr Atkins' evidence is that the identity of the relevant client group changed over time. He states that, in ordinary circumstances, legal advice concerning the affairs of the combined organisations was provided to a common client comprising the IMC and the Board (and their constituent members). However, during the period in which the interests of HLI and HLUS had diverged in relation to the imbalance issue, advice was, at times, directed separately to the governance structures of HLI and HLUS respectively. He further states that following the meeting of 18 February 2014, and the agreement then reached in principle as to the way forward, those involved were once again working towards a common objective and advice thereafter proceeded on that basis.
61. As regards circulation of the Disputed Documents, Mr Atkins states that the imbalance issue was regarded as a sensitive matter with implications for the relationship between the two LLPs and the operation of the combined organisations. He states that documents addressing those matters were shared within a limited group of individuals and circulated on a need-to-know basis. According to his evidence, those individuals included representatives of HLI, HLUS, the IMC and the Board who were involved in considering and addressing the issues arising from the imbalance. He further states that confidentiality was understood by those involved to arise from the nature and sensitivity of the issues under consideration and did not depend upon any express confidentiality designation.
62. Mr Atkins states that circulation of both the Corporate Member Executive Summary and the February Paper formed part of the process by which options were considered, proposals developed and matters were presented to the relevant governance bodies. In relation to the Corporate Member Executive Summary, he refers to exchanges involving comment and revision before consideration by the intended audience. In relation to the February Paper, he describes drafts being prepared and circulated in the period following the meeting of 18 February 2014 and before discussion by the HL Board and IMC.
HMRC’s challenges to the factual context as described by Mr Atkins
63. HMRC's principal challenge to the witness statements is directed to the weight which should be attached to Mr Atkins' evidence and, in particular, to his evidence concerning the purpose, character and privileged status of the Disputed Documents. For the reasons already given, I do not consider Mr Atkins' opinions on those matters to bear weight and have formed my own view by reference to the documents themselves and the contemporaneous material. It is therefore unnecessary for me to address in detail those aspects of HMRC's challenge. I confine myself to the respects in which HMRC contend that the witness statements provide an incomplete account of the surrounding factual context, the communication chains within which the Disputed Documents arose, and the circumstances in which they were circulated.
64. HMRC contend that the statement does not fully reflect the contemporaneous documents which demonstrate that both before and after the creation of the Disputed Documents there were extensive communications concerning the imbalance issue involving senior personnel from HLI and HLUS, including discussions concerning possible commercial solutions, governance arrangements, compensation issues, tax consequences and implementation options. HMRC contend that those communications provide important context when considering the creation and subsequent circulation of the Disputed Documents. They also contend that the contemporaneous materials show that drafts of the Corporate Member Executive Summary and the February Paper were circulated amongst a number of individuals drawn from HLI and HLUS for comment and revision before being presented to the relevant governance bodies. HMRC place particular reliance upon those exchanges as evidence of the process by which the documents circulated thereby lost the necessary confidentiality to be protected as privileged.
65. HMRC also dispute aspects of the chronology advanced by Mr Atkins. In particular, whilst accepting that the meeting of 18 February 2014 was an important event in the development of the imbalance issue, HMRC contend that the contemporaneous documents demonstrate that substantive issues remained under discussion thereafter. HMRC therefore submit that the communications and circulation of documents after that date must be assessed in the light of the continuing exchanges recorded in the contemporaneous documents.
66. Finally, HMRC submit that certain contemporaneous documents to which Mr Atkins refers do not expressly provide relevant evidence concerning the circumstances in which the Disputed Documents were circulated and considered. HMRC rely on those materials as part of the overall factual context and submit that the Tribunal should take them into account when assessing the significance of the communication chains, draft exchanges and distribution of the Disputed Documents.
The contemporaneous documents
67. In section B of HMRC’s Response they narrate the contemporaneous documents on which they rely. In the main, HLI’s Reply and NMA2 do not challenge the accuracy of HMRC’s summary of the documents. The dispute centres on the inferences to be drawn from those documents.
68. As noted in paragraph 11 above, HLI contend that the Disclosed Documents were inadvertently disclosed despite being privileged. HLI have expressly stated that they do not seek to remove them from the record. However, at least implicitly, it is contended that I should not rely on such documents to determine the status of the Disputed Documents. In my review of the papers and when determining the relevant legal context/continuum of correspondence, I have not ignored the Disclosed Documents but neither have I placed particular weight on them. It is plain from my review that I have not been provided with every document and so necessarily only have a partial context. That context is supplemented by the NMA 1 and 2. I have formed my view of the circumstances in which the Disputed Documents came into existence in a general way from everything with which I have been provided.
69. Internal communications show that the imbalance issue was being discussed by September 2011. During 2012 RO obtained advice from Deloitte regarding the tax consequences of the imbalance for HLI partners. That advice was discussed with PF and others. In July 2012 RO and PG produced a memorandum for DH outlining the imbalance issue and possible means of addressing it (this is one of the documents that HLI contend was inadvertently disclosed despite being privileged). A version of that memorandum was subsequently shared with PF. In December 2012 PF circulated a document entitled “Memo to Board re Cooperation Agreement Payment” within a group which included RO, PG and Chris Rees (CR) (Global Finance Director based in the UK).
70. The documents also show that discussions continued during 2013 regarding possible ways of addressing the imbalance. One proposal under consideration was the admission of a corporate entity associated with HLUS as a partner in HLI. Email exchanges between members of the HLI and HLUS teams during March 2013 and again between October and November 2013 record discussion of that proposal together with its possible tax and regulatory consequences.
71. On 21 November 2013 PG forwarded an existing email chain to DH, copying RO and Nicholas Cheffings (NC) (Chair of HL). In that email PG identified a number of issues which, in his view, required resolution in relation to the imbalance issue and referred to the possibility of a meeting being arranged to discuss them.
72. An exchange followed on 26 November 2013 between DH and PG, copied to RO and PF. The correspondence referred to a proposed meeting, the possible involvement of David Hudd (Deputy CEO-elect of HL, from HLI), and the preparation of a short paper or briefing in advance of further discussions.
73. The documents indicate that the PG Slides were prepared during November/December 2013. A version was provided to RO on 13 December 2013. RO made amendments to the document. On 17 December 2013 RO circulated versions of the presentation to NC and to Steve Immelt (SI)(CEO-elect of HL, from HLUS). The correspondence records that proposed amendments had been made to the slides and that a version of the presentation was intended to be used for a call with SI later that day.
74. In parallel, further discussions continued concerning the imbalance and possible solutions. Correspondence on 15 and 16 December 2013 records discussion regarding a proposal to seek further advice from Deloitte and PwC. The emails refer to the continuing consideration of both legal and broader issues arising from the imbalance.
75. On 24 January 2014, Deloitte produced a note addressing possible alternatives for resolving the imbalance. The note described itself as a discussion document intended to assist consideration of available options and included discussion of the corporate member proposal and its potential tax consequences. On 4 February 2014 PwC produced a separate analysis which also referred to a corporate or “valve” partner structure. Deloitte subsequently produced a more detailed discussion paper on 10 February 2014 examining the corporate member proposal in greater depth.
76. In early February 2014, drafts were circulated of the Corporate Member Executive Summary. On 4 February 2014 PF sent a draft Executive Summary to RO. During the following days revised drafts passed between them. The exchanges record comments on both the content of the proposal and the manner in which it should be presented to decision-makers. Further external advice from Deloitte and PwC had been received by the time later drafts were circulated.
77. On 18 February 2014 PG circulated a summary of an “all hands” meeting. The summary referred to concerns expressed about aspects of the corporate member proposal, including governance, regulatory and reputational considerations. DH responded on 19 February 2014 expressing concerns of his own. Documents from 20 February 2014 record a further exchange between PG and PF concerning matters discussed at that meeting. On 22 February 2014 CR sent an email stating that the corporate valve proposal had been abandoned.
78. On 22 February 2014 PF circulated an initial draft of the February Paper to RO for review and comment. Drafts were revised and exchanged over the following days. The emails show comments and suggested amendments being provided by RO, DH, Warren Gorrell (WG) (HL Co-CEO) and NC. The correspondence records a number of areas where views differed and indicates that the document remained work in progress while discussions continued.
79. The final stages of that process are recorded in exchanges dated 26 and 27 February 2014. Drafts continued to be amended, and discussions took place concerning presentation of the issues to the IMC and HL Board. Following a meeting held on 28 February 2014, a version of the February Paper was circulated to the HL Board and IMC. The covering email stated that the document was being sent on behalf of NC, DH, WG, RO and PF and was intended to provide the recipients with the benefit of their collective consideration of the issues discussed.
Assessment of the issue/findings of fact
General issues
Whether the imbalance issue was being treated by those involved principally as a legal/tax issue, a commercial issue, or both
80. HLI submits that the imbalance issue was being considered within a complex legal, tax and governance framework created by the Cooperation Agreement and the combined structure of HLI and HLUS. It argues that the issue extended well beyond a purely commercial question of whether a payment should be made. HLI accepts that many of the contemporaneous documents refer to commercial considerations and consequences. However, it contends that legal advice is often given in a commercial context and frequently addresses the commercial implications of legal issues. It therefore submits that references within the documents to "commercial" matters, financial consequences or business considerations do not demonstrate that the work being undertaken was non-legal in character. Rather, the legal and commercial aspects were intertwined, with legal and tax advice informing decisions that ultimately required commercial judgment by the relevant decision-makers.
81. HMRC submits that the contemporaneous documents show that the imbalance issue was principally being treated as a commercial and managerial problem rather than as an exercise in obtaining or providing legal advice. It relies in particular on communications in which participants described the relevant questions as commercial decisions, discussed how much should be paid to HLUS, explored options for addressing the imbalance, and considered reputational, governance and practical consequences. HMRC points to repeated references within the contemporaneous record to commercial objectives, negotiations, policy choices and competing views among those involved. In HMRC's view, the contemporaneous documents show that legal and tax considerations formed part of the background to the discussions but that the principal focus was identifying commercially acceptable solutions to the imbalance issue and recommending a course of action to the relevant governance bodies.
Discussion
82. In 2009, pursuant to the Cooperation Agreement, HLI and HLUS agreed to cooperate. The early contemporaneous documents evidence that the arrangement was underpinned by a commercial expectation that the profitability of both LLPs would be enhanced through referrals and collaborative working. The Cooperation Agreement anticipated the possibility of annual imbalances between the firms but, as is apparent from the difficulties which gave rise to the Disputed Documents, the Cooperation Agreement did not contemplate a situation in which the imbalance persistently operated in one direction over an extended period. The trading pattern which subsequently emerged exposed shortcomings in the contractual arrangements and gave rise to significant tax consequences for the LLPs and their members together with potential governance and regulatory concerns.
83. The tensions generated by the imbalance issue had the potential to seriously affect the continuing relationship between HLI and HLUS. Identifying a solution was therefore an imperative for the two LLPs and the operating infrastructure established under the Cooperation Agreement. That required each LLP, whilst continuing to seek to work collaboratively in support of the wider HL brand, to understand both the consequences of allowing the imbalance to continue and the implications of any proposed solution. The documents demonstrate that a number of possible approaches were considered. None represented a perfect outcome for both LLPs, and each potential solution carried differing contractual, tax, regulatory, governance and financial consequences.
84. Against that background, I consider that the relevant legal context was the need to address the consequences of a sustained one way imbalance and to identify means by which that imbalance might be addressed whilst minimising unintended tax, regulatory and governance consequences. It was within that legal context that advice was sought, received and discussed concerning the imbalance issue.
85. In my view, the imbalance issue was simultaneously a contractual, tax, regulatory, governance and commercial problem. The contractual, tax, regulatory and governance aspects of the problem represented matters of pure law, the commercial problem formed a part of the wider context in which the legal aspects arose. I am satisfied that none of the aspects can realistically be separated from the others. The fact that many participants described particular issues or potential solutions as "commercial" does not demonstrate that the contractual, tax, regulatory or governance dimensions were incidental. As the parties accept, legal advice is not confined to advice on questions of law but may extend to advice as to what may prudently and sensibly be done within a relevant legal context, notwithstanding that such advice addresses commercial considerations or has commercial consequences.
Finding of fact
86. I am satisfied that the imbalance issue provided a relevant legal context within which privileged legal advice could be sought and given, and that communications concerning the identification, evaluation and implementation of possible solutions were capable of forming part of a continuum of legal advice. That conclusion does not determine the status of any particular document. Each document must still be shown to constitute, record, convey or reveal advice falling within the relevant legal context.
Whether circulation of the Disputed Documents occurred on a basis that preserved confidentiality
87. HLI submits that circulation of the Disputed Documents occurred in circumstances which preserved confidentiality and therefore did not result in any loss of privilege. It contends that the imbalance issue concerned a highly sensitive internal dispute with significant implications for the future operation of the combined businesses and was discussed only within a limited group of individuals on a need-to-know basis. HLI accepts that documents and advice were shared between representatives of HLI and HLUS but argues that such sharing occurred for the purpose of enabling the leadership of both LLPs to identify a lawful and workable solution to the issues arising under the Cooperation Agreement. It submits that confidentiality does not depend upon a formal written policy and that, given the nature of the issues under consideration, all participants would have understood that the communications were confidential. It was not therefore necessary to mark the documents as confidential or subject to privilege. HLI contends that as confidentiality may not be lost notwithstanding disclosure to another party where the circumstances demonstrate an expectation that the material will remain confidential as against the wider world, the disclosure between HLI and HLUS did not cause the Disputed Documents to lose privilege.
88. HMRC contends that HLI has not established that the Disputed Documents were shared on a basis which preserved confidentiality. HMRC argue that the surrounding circumstances do not support the inference that confidentiality was maintained. They place particular reliance on the fact that the documents were exchanged between representatives of HLI and HLUS when the two LLPs were considering matters affecting their respective financial interests. They submit that HLI has produced no documentary evidence demonstrating any policy, understanding or limitation governing onward disclosure of the documents. HMRC further argues that the mere fact that circulation was confined to a relatively small number of individuals is insufficient to establish continuing confidentiality. In HMRC's submission, if HLI and HLUS were willing to share documents said to contain legal advice concerning matters that affected their respective interests, that tends to undermine rather than support an inference that the documents continued to be treated as confidential. HMRC therefore contends that, even if privilege initially attached, confidentiality was lost when the documents were circulated.
Discussion
89. Having considered all of the surrounding circumstances, I am satisfied that HLI has established that any confidentiality attaching to the Disputed Documents was preserved notwithstanding their circulation within the various bodies of the HL organisation. I reach that conclusion for several reasons. First, the contemporaneous documents demonstrate that the imbalance issue was regarded as sensitive and significant to the future operation of the relationship between HLI and HLUS. Secondly, circulation of material relating to that issue was restricted to a relatively small group of individuals occupying leadership, governance, advisory or implementation roles in relation to the matters under consideration. Thirdly, the documents were circulated for the limited purpose of understanding, evaluating and implementing potential solutions to the imbalance issue. Finally, whilst HLI and HLUS did not always have aligned interests in relation to the consequences of the imbalance, the contemporaneous material demonstrates a continuing effort to identify a solution capable of addressing the associated tax, regulatory, governance and commercial consequences. In those circumstances, I consider it appropriate to infer that the recipients of the Disputed Documents all and each understood that they were being provided to them for that limited purpose and on a basis that preserved their confidentiality as against those not involved in the process. The absence of an express confidentiality agreement, confidentiality marking or documented policy does not materially detract from that conclusion.
Finding of fact
90. I am satisfied that to the extent that the Disputed Documents were created as privileged documents such privilege was not lost through the circulation that occurred.
Disputed Documents
91. I have carefully considered each of the Disputed Documents
PG Slides
92. According to HLI, the PG Slides were prepared by PG in his capacity as legal adviser on tax to senior members of HLI. HLI's case is that the slides were prepared at the request of DH, that they were intended to provide legal advice to the HLI board concerning options for dealing with the imbalance issue, and that circulation of the slides was intentionally restricted because of the sensitivity and strategic importance of the subject matter. HLI also relies on the slides as an example of a work product prepared by PG to assist those representing HLI during the negotiations.
93. HMRC disputes that characterisation. HMRC relies on contemporaneous communications suggesting that the proposed briefing was intended to present an alternative perspective to that of PF, that PG had described the underlying issue as a commercial, transactional or deal issue rather than a technical tax issue, and that the briefing was intended to be developed in conjunction with others involved in the discussions. HMRC therefore contends that the slides reflected participation by PG in the wider negotiations concerning the imbalance issue rather than the provision of legal advice alone.
Determination
94. Having reviewed the PG Slides I answer the questions identified in paragraph 47 as follows:
(1) On the basis of the chronological narrative provided by Mr Atkins and as demonstrated in the documents I have reviewed from HMRC’s Section B and my own review of the PG Slides I am satisfied that they were prepared by PG acting as a lawyer.
(2) I am also substantively satisfied that the PG Slides were created for the dominant purpose of providing/obtaining legal advice within the relevant legal context. Nevertheless, there are limited parts within the PG Slides that convey the factual circumstances in which the imbalance issue arose and which reflect information already disclosed to HMRC (excluding the Disputed Documents).
(3) For the reasons stated at paragraphs 89 and 90 above confidentiality in the PG Slides was not broken and privilege is maintained.
(4) I am satisfied that certain limited factual material in the PG Slides can be severed. I have redacted the legal advice from the PG Slides and, subject to subparagraph (5) below I direct that the redacted copy be disclosed to HMRC. On receipt, HMRC will note that the unredacted information does not convey any new commercial/factual information not otherwise disclosed in the documents already disclosed.
(5) To preserve HLI’s position pending any appeal, the redacted copy of the PG Slides need not to be disclosed to HMRC before expiry of the time limit for seeking permission to appeal this decision. If an application for permission to appeal is made within that period, disclosure shall be stayed until the application, and any renewed application have been finally determined.
Corporate Member Executive Summary
95. HLI submits that PF was acting as a lawyer when this document was created. HLI relies on the evidence of Mr Atkins regarding his role within the Hogan Lovells organisation and submits that PF was exercising his professional legal expertise. HLI contend that although PF held certain managerial responsibilities, the Corporate Member Executive Summary was created in his capacity as a legal adviser on matters concerning the Cooperation Agreement, governance arrangements and associated tax issues.
96. HMRC submit that the contemporaneous documents demonstrate that PF was involved in the imbalance issue as part of a broader commercial, transactional and governance exercise. They contend that PF's involvement reflected his wider finance responsibilities. HMRC therefore submit that the mere fact that PF was legally qualified and may have provided legal advice in relation to aspects of the imbalance issue, does not establish that his involvement in the matters culminating in the Disputed Documents was legal rather than commercial in nature.
Determination
97. Having reviewed the Corporate Member Executive Summary I answer the questions identified in paragraph 47 as follows:
(1) On the basis of the chronological narrative provided by Mr Atkins and as demonstrated in the documents I have reviewed from HMRC’s Section B and my own review of the Corporate Member Executive Summary I am satisfied that it was prepared by PF acting as a lawyer.
(2) I am also satisfied that the Corporate Member Executive Summary was created for the dominant purpose of providing/obtaining legal advice within the relevant legal context.
(3) For the reasons stated at paragraphs 89 and 90 above confidentiality in the Corporate Member Executive Summary was not broken and privilege is maintained.
(4) To the extent that wider commercial matters are discussed in the Corporate Member Executive Summary they are not severable from the legal advice provided. I nevertheless observe that there is no new factual/commercial information within the document that is not conveyed in other documents which have been disclosed to them.
(5) HLI have disclosed email chains sent by RO concerning the Corporate Member Executive Summary. Having reviewed the tracked changes in the drafts with which I was provided, and to the extent that any amendments proposed by RO survive, I do not consider the amendments severable.
February Paper
98. HLI submits that the February Paper was prepared by PF acting as legal adviser to the HL Board and IMC following the agreement reached on 18 February 2014. Its case is that the document addressed the legal, tax, governance and structural implications of implementing that agreement and either constituted legal advice or communicated legal advice previously received by HLI and HLUS. HLI further contends that the review and amendment of drafts by senior individuals reflected the ordinary process of refining and approving legal advice for presentation to the Board and IMC and did not alter its privileged character.
99. HMRC disputes that characterisation. It contends that the drafting history demonstrates that the February Paper was intended to record and present a collective position reached through discussions between representatives of HLI and HLUS rather than legal advice provided by PF. HMRC relies on the circulation of drafts for comment, the incorporation of amendments proposed by non-lawyers, references to matters being "above my pay grade", and the final description of the paper as reflecting the parties' "collective thinking". HMRC therefore submits that the document reflected commercial, financial, governance and policy considerations rather than legal advice and that any privileged material contained within it is capable of severance.
Determination
100. Having reviewed the February Paper, I answer the questions identified in paragraph 47 as follows:
(1) On the basis of the chronological narrative provided by Mr Atkins and as demonstrated in the documents I have reviewed from HMRC’s Section B and my own review of the February Paper I am satisfied that it was prepared by PF acting as a lawyer.
(2) I am also satisfied that the February Paper was created for the dominant purpose of providing/obtaining legal advice within the relevant legal context and/or conveys such legal advice previously provided. Whilst I accept that it records the collective position reached at the point at which it was created the document provides a comprehensive analysis of the imbalance issue, the legal, tax, governance and structural considerations arising from it, the options available to address it and the consequences associated with those options. It then identifies the actions, approvals and governance decisions required from HLI, HLUS, the IMC and the Board in order to implement a solution. The content and structure are, in my view, far more consistent with a document prepared for the purpose of communicating and evaluating legal advice within the relevant legal context than with a document whose dominant purpose was merely to record a commercial agreement between the parties.
(3) For the reasons stated at paragraphs 89 and 90 above confidentiality in the February Paper was not broken and privilege is maintained.
(4) To the limited extent that wider commercial matters are discussed in the February Paper they are not severable from the legal advice provided. I nevertheless observe that there is no new factual/commercial information within the document that is not conveyed in other documents which have been disclosed to them.
(5) HLI have disclosed email chains sent by RO concerning the February Paper. Having reviewed the tracked changes in the drafts with which I was provided, and to the extent that any amendments proposed by RO survive, I do not consider the amendments severable.
Disposition
101. For the reasons stated I determine:
(1) The PG Slides should be disclosed subject to the redactions I have made.
(2) The Corporate Member Executive Summary (and the relevant drafts of it) are privileged and need not be disclosed.
(3) The February Paper (and the relevant drafts of it) are privileged and need not be disclosed.
Right to apply for permission to appeal
102. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.
Release date:
29 October 2026
If you are facing a similar issue in France, you may contact our tax lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).