Administrative United Kingdom
KC v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/62119/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Columbus House
On 02 November 2026
Before
first-tier tribunal JUDGE Webb
Between
KC
(Anonymity ORDER made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Hasan (Solicitor)
For the Respondent: Ms J Harrison (Presenting Officer)
DECISION AND REASONS
NOTICE OF DECISION
1. The appeal is dismissed on asylum grounds.
2. The appeal is dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
3. The appeal is dismissed on human rights grounds.
REASONS
4. The appellant, a citizen of Nepal, has appealed on protection and human rights grounds against the respondent’s decision dated 02 February 2025 refusing their application for leave to remain dated 17 October 2024.
ANONYMITY ORDER
5. I have decided to make an anonymity order because the importance of discharging the obligations of the United Kingdom under the refugee and human rights conventions outweighs the principle of open justice. This case raises issues about the appellant’s potential risk on return to their country of nationality and it is appropriate that the appellant’s identity be protected until the final outcome of this appeal.
BACKGROUND
6. The background to this appeal is set out in the information contained on MyHMCTS.
7. The appellant asserts a right to remain on protection grounds. He claims to fear the government because of his support for the “save the nation, nationality, religion, culture and citizen saving party”.
HEARING
Format
8. The hearing was held by video. There were no issues with any of the participants being able to see or hear each other and I was satisfied that the format enabled a fair hearing.
Issues in dispute
9. This is a case to which the provisions of the Nationality, Asylum and Borders Act 2022 apply and as a result the dual standard of proof applies to the issues I am required to decide under the Refugee Convention.
10. The parties agreed that the issues for me to decide are as follows:
Matters to be decided on the balance of probabilities
(a) Does the appellant have a characteristic that could cause them to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention?
(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution?
Matters to be decided on the lower standard
(c) Would the appellant be persecuted for that convention reason?
(d) In the alternative would the appellant qualify for humanitarian protection?
(e) Does the decision breach the appellant’s rights under Article 3 ECHR.
11. The respondent has identified the appellant’s lies in his visa application made in 2015 as engaging section 8 of the 2004 Act.
12. The respondent has conceded that there is no protection or internal relocation option if his account is accepted.
13. Mr Hasan confirmed the appellant was not pursuing any Article 3 medical grounds. He also confirmed that he did not have instructions to withdraw the Article 8 private life claim but conceded that it was based on the same facts as the protection claim so that if the protection appeal failed, the Article 8 appeal would also fall to be dismissed.
Evidence and submissions
14. The appellant gave evidence and followed the proceedings with the assistance of a Nepali interpreter. Neither he nor the interpreter indicated any difficulty in understanding each other.
15. The appellant gave evidence; he confirmed his witness statement and was cross-examined by Ms Harrison.
16. After I heard evidence, Ms Harrison and Mr Hasan both made submissions.
17. I recorded the oral evidence and submissions in my record of proceedings and have taken it all into account, along with the documentary evidence downloaded from MyHMCTS.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
18. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion).
19. The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made after 28 June 2022, following s32 of the 2022 Act, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100, as amended by DS (NBAB s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC), I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Whether the appellant has a characteristic that could cause them to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention.
(b) Whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
20. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason,
(d) There would not be sufficient protection available, and
(e) The appellant could not internally relocate.
21. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds an appellant must show a real risk of serious harm at the date of the hearing. The burden of proof rests on an appellant. The standard of proof is a reasonable degree of likelihood, which can also be expressed as a reasonable chance or a serious possibility.
22. In relation to Article 3 the appellant must establish that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of them being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
23. In relation to Article 8, the question is whether the refusal breaches the appellant’s right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR. That right is qualified. The appellant must establish on the balance of probabilities the factual circumstances on which they rely, and that Article 8 (1) is engaged. If it is, then I have to decide whether the interference with the appellant’s right is justified under Article 8 (2).
24. If the appellant meets the requirements of the immigration rules the interference is not proportionate, TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109.
25. Under Appendix Private life to the immigration rules the requirements to be met by an adult applicant who has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years at the date of application are that “there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK.”
26. The concept of “integration” for the purposes of Appendix Private Life requires a broad evaluative assessment. The question is whether the appellant will be enough of an insider to understand how life in the society in the country of return is carried on and if they have capacity to participate in it. This includes whether the appellant will have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted, to function on a day-to-day basis and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual's private or family life.
27. If an appellant does not meet the immigration rules, the public interest is normally in refusing leave to enter or remain. The exception is where refusal results in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or a family member such that refusal is not proportionate. I take into account the factors set out in s.117B Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and balance the public interest considerations against the factors relied upon by the appellant.
28. Where an appellant has provided documents, it will be for them to show they can be relied upon and they will be considered along with all the other evidence, Tanveer Ahmed [2002] UKIAT 00439.
FINDINGS
Facts in dispute
29. I have not set out every point or piece of evidence, only those that are most important to my decision. In making my findings I have considered all the evidence that I was given.
30. In undertaking my assessment of all the evidence, I have in mind the structured approach set out in KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 00491 (IAC).
31. In assessing credibility, I remind myself that an individual may tell lies about some aspects of their case but may be telling the truth about others.
32. Section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 requires that I take certain matters as potentially damaging to the appellant’s credibility. The respondent relies on the appellant’s lies in his visa application made in 2015.
33. The appellant’s evidence has been quite clear: that when he completed his visa application form in 2015 he had no intention of returning to Nepal. He accepts that he made false statements on his visa application.
34. It is of particular note that the appellant says that his fear arose in 2024 after his father’s home in Nepal was raided. The appellant did not need to lie on the visa application to escape a fear of harm in Nepal in 2015. I find that the appellant did so and had an intention to remain in the UK at that time is a significant factor that undermines the credibility of his account.
Whether the appellant has a characteristic that engages the Refugee Convention?
35. This is assessed on the balance of probabilities.
36. The respondent does not accept that the appellant has a political profile that is adverse to the Nepalese Government.
37. The appellant says that his house was raided because he has publicly supported the party by posting on Facebook.
38. The appellant has not provided any evidence of his social media accounts to show that he has publicly posted information. The appellant’s explanation given in cross-examination was that he had already provided this to the respondent after his main interview and because of that he had not provided it to those who now represent him.
39. I remind myself that corroboration is not required, but that where evidence can be reasonably expected but not provided it may be damaging to the credibility of a witness: ST [2004] UKIAT 00119, TK (Burundi) [2009] EWCA Civ 40.
40. There are no social media posts contained in the respondent’s bundle. While I do not discount the possibility that this is an administrative error on behalf of the respondent, I note that the appellant is legally represented and social media activity is a key aspect in his account. I find that if such evidence were available, it would have been reasonable for that to be produced by the appellant even if it had been provided to the respondent previously. I find that its absence without a reasonable explanation is a significant factor that undermines the credibility of the appellant’s account to have publicly supported the party.
41. The appellant’s account is that he has supported the party in the UK and has been to two meetings. At his interview he confirmed that he would provide further evidence of his attendance at these meetings. When the lack of evidence about these meetings was put to the appellant during cross-examination, he said that he did not know what sort of evidence he could provide. I find that, given the appellant had said at his interview he would be able to provide evidence it is reasonable to expect it to have been produced and he has not provided an explanation for its absence. This is another factor that undermines his account of supporting the party and having a political profile.
42. The appellant has given a generally consistent account of his support of the party and the raid on his house. This is a factor that weighs in favour of the appellant’s credibility.
43. However, I find that his account of becoming a supporter of the party, his reasons for doing so, and his account of allowing friends to use his empty room in Nepal for political activity lack sufficient detail. I find that this lack of detail is a factor that undermines the appellant’s credibility.
44. Taking the findings above, there are significant factors that undermine the credibility of the appellant’s account. I find the appellant has not shown, even to the lower standard, that he is a supporter of the party or that he has posted his support openly on Facebook.
45. I find the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he has a characteristic that would engage the refugee convention.
Whether the appellant does in fact fear persecution
46. This is assessed on the balance of probabilities.
47. I have rejected the appellant’s account of his political activity. The appellant has not provided any other reasons why he would fear return to Nepal. I find the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that he has a subjective fear of harm if he were to return to Nepal.
Risk on return, internal relocation, and sufficiency of protection
48. These are assessed on the lower standard of proof.
49. In light of my findings above, I find the appellant has not shown, to the lower standard, that he would be at risk of treatment amounting to persecution on return to Nepal.
50. In light of that finding, I need not consider internal relocation or sufficiency of protection.
Humanitarian protection and Article 3 ECHR
51. Taking the findings above, I conclude the appellant has not shown, to the lower standard of proof, that there is a real risk he would be subjected to serious harm on return to Nepal.
52. For those same reasons I also find that there is no real risk of him being subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on return.
Article 8 ECHR
53. In light of Mr Hasan’s concession that this ground would stand and fall with the appellant’s protection claim, I find the appellant has not shown on the balance of probabilities that there would be very significant obstacles to his reintegration in Nepal, or that the decision would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences.
Application of the law to the facts
54. For the reasons set out above I find the appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason.
55. For the reason set out above, I find that the appellant does not qualify for humanitarian protection.
56. For the reasons stated above I also find there is no risk the appellant would suffer treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
57. For the reasons stated above I find the decision does not unlawfully interfere with the appellant’s rights protected by Article 8 ECHR.
ANONYMITY ORDER
Pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, until this appeal is finally determined or the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
If there is an onward appeal or challenge, an application to amend or vary the anonymity order must be made to the Upper Tribunal or court concerned.
TO THE RESPONDENT – FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.
N Webb
First-tier Tribunal Judge Webb
06 November 2026
For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).