Administrative United Kingdom

YE v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/62779/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Manchester

On 30 October 2026

Before

JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL C R COLE

Between

YE

(anonymity direction made)

Appellant

and

the secretary of state for the home department

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms S Khan, Counsel instructed by Burton & Burton

For the Respondent: Mr C Scholes, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity Direction

1. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because in this specific case the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and the ECHR in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.

Introduction

2. The appellant was born in 1994. He is a national of Turkey.

3. The appellant arrived in the UK with his wife on 23 April 2024 and claimed asylum.

4. By decision dated 21 March 2025 the respondent refused the appellant’s Protection Claim and Human Rights Claim.

5. The appellant appeals against the respondent’s decision pursuant to section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002.

Issues

6. At the outset of the hearing, I clarified with the parties the issues to be resolved in this appeal.

7. The respondent does not accept any of the material facts of the appellant’s account and so the credibility of the appellant’s account is the first issue to resolve.

8. If the appellant’s account is accepted, then the respondent asserts that the appellant can access effective protection in Turkey and that he could reasonably relocate to Istanbul, Izmir or Ankara. These are the next issues to resolve.

9. Finally, the respondent does not accept that the appellant’s claim engages the Refugee Convention. The appellant asserts that he comes with the definition of a Particular Social Group (PSG) as he fears persecution as the family member of his wife. This is the other issue for resolution.

10. It was confirmed by Ms Khan that there was no standalone Article 3 (medical) or Article 8 claim being advanced by the appellant.

Documents

11. The respondent provided a bundle of 109 pages with Annexes A to H, including Screening Interview (SI), Asylum Interview Records (AIR1, AIR2 & AIR3), supporting documents, and the Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) dated 21 March 2025. The respondent also provided a Review.

12. The appellant provided an initial bundle of 15 pages which included the appellant’s witness statement, and a country information evidence schedule. The appellant later provided an addendum bundle with supporting letters. The appellant also provided an Appeal Skeleton Argument.

The Hearing

13. At the outset of the hearing, Ms Khan applied for an adjournment. She submitted that the appellant’s wife was a material witness and thus it was in the interests of justice for the case to be postponed so that the appellant’s wife could provide a statement and attend to give oral evidence. Ms Khan explained that the appellant’s representatives had never asked his wife to give evidence. She submitted that the appellant should not be penalised for the failings of his representative.

14. Having considered the guidance in Nwaigwe (adjournment: fairness) [2014] UKUT 00418, I refused the appellant’s adjournment request.

15. The appellant arrived in the UK with his wife and his case revolved around a fear of his wife’s family. It would have been obvious from the outset that the appellant’s wife could provide material evidence. The appellant has been represented by his solicitors throughout the appeal process. It is far too late for the issue of evidence from the wife to be raised for the first time. Any potential witnesses should have been identified much earlier in the process. In my judgment the appellant will not be deprived of his right to a fair hearing by the case proceeding without evidence from his wife. The case thus proceeded.

16. The appellant adopted his witness statement and gave evidence in Turkish.

17. The full details of the evidence and the submissions are contained in the Record of Proceedings which is within the court file. I have taken them into consideration in determining this matter. Consequently, I will not rehearse the evidence and submissions except where it is relevant to my findings.

18. After hearing the evidence and submissions, I reserved my decision.

Findings and Reasons

19. I have considered all the evidence, paying regard to the matters to which I was specifically referred, but only summarised those matters that have been of most assistance to me and which relate to the issues for me to determine.

20. The credibility of the appellant’s account is the first issue for me to determine.

21. Under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 I am obliged to consider certain behaviour as affecting an appellant’s credibility. I accept that the appellant travelled via France. The appellant did not claim asylum in France. The appellant’s account for not claiming asylum in France is not objectively reasonable. He did have the opportunity to claim asylum in a safe country.

22. Thus, this matter does undermine the appellant’s credibility to a limited extent. However, I must still assess the merits of the appellant’s protection claim considering all the evidence and applying the relevant standard of proof, whilst having regard to the appellant’s reduced credibility.

23. I have carefully considered the appellant’s account as provided across the SI, AIRs, witness statement and oral evidence. In my judgment the appellant has provided sufficiently consistent and detailed evidence regarding the core facts of his account. I find that the majority of the appellant’s account can be accepted to the civil standard of proof.

24. I find that the appellant and his wife embarked on a relationship having met at the café of a hospital in Istanbul. I accept that the wife’s family were very traditional having arranged marriages for the wife’s older sisters. It was for this reason that the appellant and his wife conducted their relationship in secret, only meeting twice in person and mainly conducting the relationship over the telephone.

25. I accept that the appellant wished to marry his wife and so his family approached her family to request her hand in marriage. This marriage proposal was rejected. I accept that the appellant’s wife was then beaten by male members of her family who disapproved of the relationship. The appellant’s wife was then engaged to a cousin at the behest of her father.

26. I find that the appellant’s wife was allowed to stay with an elder sister, who was sympathetic to her plight. The appellant was then able to collect his wife from her sister’s home, and the couple ran away to the appellant’s family’s home village.

27. I find that the appellant and his wife then sought the protection of the authorities. The police at the larger police station offered support and the couple were able to obtain a protection order on 4 March 2021. This protection order was made to protect them from the wife’s family and was valid for 30 days.

28. The appellant and his wife then married on 21 April 2021. The couple remained living in the appellant’s family home until they fled Turkey at the end of September 2022.

29. As stated above, these facts I find to be proven to the civil standard of proof. However, there are issues regarding the time the appellant and his wife spent in Turkey after they eloped and prior to them leaving the country and regarding the ability of the wife’s family to locate and harm the couple that I have serious reservations about.

30. The appellant claims that his wife’s family come from a powerful tribe and that they have connections with the authorities. In particular the appellant claims that his wife’s brother works for the Turkish security services (MIT) and so could locate the couple and harm them anywhere in Turkey. This evidence does not sit easily with the appellant’s account of events in Turkey after he and his wife eloped.

31. The appellant confirmed that he was living in his family home village in 2021 when he and his wife eloped. He also confirmed that he and his wife moved into his family home after he had collected her from her sister’s home.

32. The couple then lived in the appellant’s family home for some 18 months without being discovered by the wife’s family, despite the claims to their power and influence.

33. The appellant claims that he and his wife were living in a separate part of the family home where they could not be discovered. The appellant claims that he and his wife did not leave the home during this period.

34. The appellant claims that his wife’s family and their tribe raided the village with weapons looking for the appellant and his wife. It is stated that they searched everywhere but were unable to find the appellant and his wife. I do not accept that this is reasonably likely to be true. I do not find that it is reasonably likely that armed men with power and influence would not be able to find the appellant and his wife when they were in his family home.

35. The appellant and his wife were able to leave the home to go to both the local military station (who refused to help) and then to a larger police station to seek protection. They were able to obtain a protection order from the court. I find that this is indicative of the willingness of the state to offer help and of the couple’s ability to safely leave the house.

36. The appellant states that they went back to court to seek an extension of the protection order. This suggests that the couple were again able to leave the house.

37. The appellant claims that the court refused to issue a further protection order. The country information referred to by Ms Khan supports the appellant’s account in this regard to the limited duration of many protection orders. However, I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that the reason for the extension had anything to do with the appellant’s political sympathies as the appellant had the same political affiliation when he first applied for a protection order which was granted.

38. It is not possible to definitively discern why the court refused to extend the protection order. However, I do not accept that it is reasonably likely that the refusal was due to the appellant's political opinions.

39. I note that, after the expiry of the protection order, the appellant and his wife got married. In his oral evidence the appellant claimed that there was no wedding ceremony and that the village Mukhtar merely came to the appellant’s home to get the papers signed. I do not accept that this is reasonably likely to be true.

40. I do not find that it is reasonably likely that the International Family Book would have been issued to the appellant and his wife confirming their marriage without a formal procedure being undertaken. The translation of the International Family Book states that the photographs of the couple were stamped by the Marriage Registrar. There is also detailed a stamp and signature from “Abdulkerem Ecer” who elsewhere is referred to as the village Mukhtar. The translation states that the ceremony was carried out by the village Mukhtar.

41. I find that the evidence does not support the appellant’s claim for there to have been some clandestine marriage where the Mukhtar merely came to the home and got the couple to sign papers. I find that the documentary evidence is inconsistent with the appellant's account of an entirely informal process and suggests that formal marriage procedures were undertaken.

42. In response to questions from Ms Khan about whether he needed to register his address with the Turkish authorities, the appellant claimed that he did not inform the authorities where he was living. However, this claim does not make sense when earlier in oral evidence the appellant confirmed to me that he was living in his home village before he eloped with his wife and so before the problems began.

43. Thus, I do not find it reasonably likely that the appellant’s home address was not registered with the Turkish authorities.

44. I also note that the appellant’s wife has provided a copy of her Turkish identity card which has her married name rather than her maiden name. This indicates that the appellant’s wife renewed her identity card after her marriage to the appellant which demonstrates the couple’s willingness to engage with the authorities at a time they claimed to be in hiding.

45. I have considered the two letters of support provided. The first supports the claim that the appellant’s wife’s brother worked for MIT and the family have strong connections within the state. However, even if this is true, there is no explanation as to how the wife’s family failed to locate the couple in the appellant’s family home over a period of around 18 months.

46. The second details how the author and other villagers “witnessed” the appellant and his wife refusing to go outside. It is not clear how refusing to leave the house can be “witnessed”. Also, the author describes them being “locked in their homes for days, even weeks.” This is inconsistent with the appellant’s claim of being hidden in the home for almost a year and a half.

47. When considering the evidence in the round, I find that these letters offer little support to the appellant’s account.

48. There is also the voicemail which it is claimed was sent by the appellant’s wife’s father to the village Mukhtar. It is stated that this was sent after the wife’s father received the protection order. This voicemail is consistent with the appellant’s account of threats from his wife’s father. However, it is not clear how the appellant obtained this message.

49. There is also a letter from the village Mukhtar (“Serhat Ecer”). This Mukhtar has a different first name to the Mukhtar who undertook the marriage. However, the letter is dated 2 August 2024, and the marriage was 21 April 2021; it is possible that the Mukhtar changed between those dates (although I note that both Mukhtars share the same family name as the appellant).

50. The Mukhtar states that the appellant’s wife’s father and brothers came to the village armed with guns looking for the appellant and his wife. Again, it is not clear how they were unable to find the appellant and his wife if they are as powerful as claimed. The Mukhtar then refers to the wife’s father “constantly” ringing him to ask whether he has heard anything (presumably regarding the whereabouts of the appellant and his wife).

51. I note that there is no reference to the provision of a voicemail to the appellant, but this may be because it was the previous Mukhtar who gave the appellant the voicemail.

52. Overall, even if the appellant’s wife’s family did react strongly initially (i.e., attending the village with guns), the fact is that they did not find the appellant and his wife and then it seems the search for the appellant and his wife amounted to calling the Mukhtar for updates. I do not find this evidence supportive of the appellant’s claims regarding the power and influence of his wife’s family.

53. Drawing all the threads together and considering all the evidence holistically, I make the following findings of fact.

54. I find that the appellant’s wife comes from a strict, traditional family that refused to allow her to marry the appellant and instead wanted to marry her to a cousin. The appellant’s wife was beaten and abused by her male family members.

55. I find that the appellant arranged to collect his wife from her sister’s house and that the couple eloped. They lived in the appellant’s family home in his home village where he had lived prior to eloping with his wife.

56. I find that the appellant’s wife’s father and brothers came to the appellant’s home village looking for the couple. The father and brothers were armed. They failed to find the couple.

57. I find that the appellant and his wife were able to obtain a protection order from the court that was valid for only 30 days. This order was not extended despite requests for an extension.

58. I find that, on receipt of the protection order, the appellant’s wife’s father made threats of serious violence against the appellant which were conveyed via telephone to the village Mukhtar.

59. I find that, after coming to the village and leaving the threatening voicemail with the Mukhtar, the appellant’s wife’s father’s attempts to locate the appellant and his wife amounted to calling the Mukhtar for updates.

60. I find that the appellant has failed to prove that it is reasonably likely that he and his wife lived hidden in a separate part of his family home never going out for some 18 months. I find that the evidence does not support this claim.

61. I find that the appellant has failed to prove that it is reasonably likely that the appellant’s wife’s family have such power and connections that they could find the couple anywhere in Turkey. This is evidenced by the failure of the wife’s family to find the couple when they lived in the appellant’s family home for 18 months.

62. Even if the appellant’s wife’s brother works for MIT, I do not find that it is reasonably likely that he would be willing and able to use his employment to track the appellant and his wife. Again, this is evidenced by the failure for the couple to be found during the 18 months living with the appellant’s family.

63. In conclusion, I find that the appellant and his wife would be at real risk of serious harm from the appellant’s wife’s family if they were located by them or if they came into contact with them.

64. However, I find that it is not reasonably likely that the appellant’s wife’s family would be able to locate the appellant and his wife if they relocated to another part of Turkey. Given my findings that the appellant has failed to establish that the wife's family possess the claimed ability to trace the couple throughout Turkey, it is not reasonably likely they would be located in a large city such as Istanbul or Ankara.

65. Furthermore, I find that it would be reasonable for the appellant and his wife to relocate elsewhere in Turkey. I note the appellant’s wife’s health issues, but there is no basis to conclude that she would not be able to obtain necessary support and treatment in Turkey. She would have the support of her husband. In my judgment, internal relocation would be reasonable.

66. I also find that the appellant has failed to prove that it is reasonably likely that the Turkish authorities would not offer them effective protection if required. The couple were able to obtain the support of the police to assist in the court issuing a protection order. That assistance was provided notwithstanding the wife’s family's alleged influence and connections.

67. I note the country information highlighted by Ms Khan which refers to some difficulties with obtaining protection in Turkey due to certain prevailing attitudes towards issues deemed as family matters. I note that orders are often issued for only short periods and that enforcement is weak. However, the appellant and his wife were able to obtain protection from the police and the court at the time when the threat from the wife’s family was most visible and most immediate.

68. I find that, despite the shortcomings of the system of protection of people such as the appellant and his wife, the authorities in Turkey are willing and able to offer sufficient protection. I find that effective protection to the relevant standard can be accessed by the appellant and his wife if required. The test is not whether protection is guaranteed or wholly effective but whether there exists a system of protection which operates to a reasonable level. I find that such a system exists.

69. I have considered the country evidence that honour-based violence may occur months or years after relocation and concealment. However, the material issue in this appeal is not whether the wife's family retain hostility towards the appellant and his wife. I accept that they do. The issue is whether the family would be able to locate them elsewhere in Turkey. For the reasons already given, including the inability of the family to locate the couple during approximately 18 months living in the appellant's home area, I do not find it reasonably likely that they would be able to do so.

70. Therefore, I find that the appellant has failed to prove that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Turkey as it would be safe and reasonable for he and his wife to relocate and there is a system that would offer them effective protection if required.

71. Considering my findings, it is not necessary for me to reach a conclusion as to whether the appellant’s claim engages the Refugee Convention.

72. I accept that, as per SSHD (Respondent) v. K (FC) (Appellant) Fornah (FC) (Appellant) v. SSHD (Respondent) [2006] UKHL 46, family can, in principle, constitute a PSG within the Refugee Convention. The appellant is married to his wife and thus is part of her family.

73. The more contentious issue is the causal nexus. The appellant would need to demonstrate that one of the reasons that his wife’s family would cause him serious harm is because he is a member of her family (i.e., her husband). It is certainly arguable that the wife's family seek to harm the appellant because they regard him as having become part of her family through marriage and because his continuing place within that family is viewed as an ongoing source of dishonour.

74. Had it been necessary to decide the issue, I would have found that the appellant was a member of a PSG. However, given my findings on risk, that issue is not material to the outcome of the appeal.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Order regarding anonymity

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant and his wife are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Signed C R Cole Date 3 November 2026

Judge C R Cole

Judge of the First-tier Tribunal

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

The appeal has been dismissed and so there can be no fee award.

Signed C R Cole Date 3 November 2026

Judge C R Cole

Judge of the First-tier Tribunal

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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