Tax United Kingdom

Mazher Iqbal v The Commissioners for HMRC

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01503 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10083

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

Decided on the papers

Appeal reference: TC/2025/04489

PROCEDURE – strike out application – appellant bankrupt – whether he has standing – whether to stay the decision on the strike out application – whether the Notice of Appeal was submitted by an authorised representative – whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction following earlier withdrawal – strike out application allowed

Heard on: 19 October 2026

Judgment date: 28 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANNE REDSTON

Between

MAZHER IQBAL

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR

HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

DECISION

Introduction and Summary

1. On 29 January 2021, HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”) issued Mr Iqbal with a Personal Liability Notice (“PLN”) in relation to corporation tax, and on the same day, another PLN relating to VAT. The total amount in issue was £173,928. Statute provides that an appeal against those decisions had to be made by 1 March 2021.

2. In 2023, the Appellant’s then representative filed a Notice of Appeal against the PLNs, and included an application for permission to make a late appeal. The appeal and the related application were withdrawn in February 2024.

3. On 1 October 2025, the Tribunal received a new Notice of Appeal against the PLNs, which similarly included an application for permission to make a late appeal (together, “the Appeal”). By that date, Mr Iqbal had been made bankrupt. His trustee in bankruptcy was Mr Horan of KBL Advisory (“the Trustee”).

4. The Appeal was filed by a Mr Jangeer Hussain, who was identified in the Notice of Appeal as Mr Iqbal’s representative. HMRC applied to the Tribunal to strike out the Appeal.

5. Rule 8(2)(a) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 provides that the Tribunal “must” strike out the proceedings if it does not have jurisdiction in relation to those proceedings.

6. The Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to decide an appeal, or a related application, if (a) it is not made by the appellant or his duly appointed representative and/or (b) there is a statutory bar. In this case:

(1) The Trustee has standing to bring an appeal against the PLNs, and he has not done so. Mr Iqbal does not have standing to bring the Appeal.

(2) Mr Hussain applied to the High Court against the Trustee’s refusal to litigate, but the High Court dismissed the application.

(3) Mr Hussain sought permission to appeal that High Court judgment, and asked the Tribunal to stay its decision on HMRC’s strike out application pending the resolution of the permission to appeal application.

(4) I have decided not to stay my decision on the strike out application because:

(a) even if permission to appeal were given, and even if Mr Iqbal succeeded at the Court of Appeal such that Mr Iqbal has standing, Mr Hussain has not shown that he has been authorised by Mr Iqbal to act as his representative; and

(b) even if that hurdle were also to be surmounted, there is a statutory bar to making a reinstatement application following a withdrawal, as explained at §20ff below, and as a result the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to consider the Appeal.

7. I explain those points more fully in the main body of this decision, see below.

The appellant

8. At the time the Appeal was made, Mr Iqbal was bankrupt. In In the Matter of GP Aviation Group International Limited [2013] EWHC 1447 (Ch), the company was seeking to appeal against a tax assessment. HHJ Pelling QC, sitting as a Judge of the High Court, held that the right of appeal vested in the company’s trustees, and could not be exercised by GP Aviation, because “the only assets out of which the underlying liability can be met have vested in the trustee”, see [31] of the judgment.

9. Judge Pelling went on to hold at [34]:

“I conclude that it is not open to the Applicant to assign the Company's right to appeal the tax assessments to which it has become subject. The decision whether and if so for how long to pursue the appeals is one for the applicant alone, who is entitled to fund the appeal from sums advanced for that purpose by the Respondents but only if and to the extent that he judges that to be in the best interests of the creditors generally balancing on the one hand the benefit to creditors generally of a successful appeal, the merits and likely outcome of any such appeal and the effect on the assets of the Respondents of them funding the appeal having regard to the outstanding misfeasance claim.”

10. In this case the Trustee, initially told Mr Hussain that he had no objection to Mr Iqbal running the litigation at his own cost, but on 2 February 2026, having taken legal advice, the Trustee changed his position and said he did not “support or acquiesce” in the Appeal. The Trustee reconfirmed that position on 8 July 2026.

11. Mr Iqbal challenged at the High Court the Trustee’s conduct in admitting the PLN debt “without investigation”, and the case was heard by Judge Prentis on 30 April 2026. Judge Prentis decided that the Trustee was acting within his reasonable discretion.

12. Mr Iqbal has sought permission to appeal against that decision, and applied to the Tribunal to delay deciding HMRC’s strike out application until the position is final. However, some six months later he has not provided the outcome of that permission application.

13. The current position therefore is that Mr Iqbal does not have standing to make the Appeal. That can only be made by his Trustee, who has made it clear that he does not support the Appeal.

Mr Hussain’s position

14. On 8 July 2026, the Tribunal’s Senior Specialist Caseworker wrote as follows to Mr Iqbal (where “the appellant” refers to Mr Iqbal, and “the T239” refers to the Tribunal’s form for authorising a representative):

“I note that the same email address was provided for the appellant and for the listed representative Mr Jangeer Hussain. It is unclear if the email address belongs to the appellant or Mr Jangeer Hussain. [Neither] the notice of appeal nor the provided T239 bears a wet signature from the appellant, so even if the appellant was not a subject to a bankruptcy order, the validity of the provided authorisation would be into question.”

15. The letter including that passage was sent by post to Mr Iqbal (and not to Mr Hussain, as the Tribunal did not accept that he had been authorised by Mr Iqbal).

16. On 10 August 2026, Mr Hussain emailed the Tribunal a pdf headed “Authority and appointment of lay representative”, which stated that Mr Hussain was authorised to act for Mr Iqbal. However, there was no “wet” signature; instead Mr Iqbal’s name was simply typed on the bottom of the pdf.

17. The pdf begins by saying:

“I am unable to read or write in any language and cannot use a computer or any electronic device….I communicate in spoken Punjabi (Pothwari) only and rely entirely on my friend and translator, Jangeer Hussain, for all written and electronic communications.”

18. I reject that statement as not credible. Mr Iqbal ran a business in Derby called Balti International Ltd for several years. Companies House gives the nature of that company’s business as “restaurant” or “café”. I do not accept that Mr Iqbal is unable to read or write in any language, or that he is unable to sign his name on a letter of authority.

19. It follows that, even if Mr Iqbal were to have standing, the Appeal was not made either by him or by an authorised representative on his behalf.

The statutory bar

20. The letter from the Tribunal issued on 8 July 2026 also said:

“If the appellant overcomes the barrier of the authorisation, then he must demonstrate that this is a new appeal against a different issue. The appeal against the PLN notices was lodged with the Tribunal back in 2023 under TC/2023/08979 and our records show that it was properly notified to the parties and subsequently withdrawn by the appellant’s representative.”

21. Even if Mr Iqbal were to surmount the authorisation issues set out above, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to determine the Appeal because this is precluded by TMA s 54 in relation to the corporation tax, and by VATA s 85 in relation to the VAT.

22. As those provisions are in nearly identical terms, I have only set out the former, which is reads (my emphasis):

“(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, where a person gives notice of appeal and, before the appeal is determined by the tribunal, the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown and the appellant come to an agreement, whether in writing or otherwise, that the assessment or decision under appeal should be treated as upheld without variation, or as varied in a particular manner or as discharged or cancelled, the like consequences shall ensue for all purposes as would have ensued if, at the time when the agreement was come to, the tribunal had determined the appeal and had upheld the assessment or decision without variation, had varied it in that manner or had discharged or cancelled it, as the case may be.

(2) Subsection (1) of this section shall not apply where, within thirty days from the date when the agreement was come to, the appellant gives notice in writing to the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown that he desires to repudiate or resile from the agreement.

(3) …

(4) Where

(a) a person who has given a notice of appeal notifies the inspector or other proper officer of the Crown, whether orally or in writing, that he desires not to proceed with the appeal; and

(b) thirty days have elapsedsince the giving of the notification without the inspector or other proper officer giving to the appellant notice in writing indicating that he is unwilling that the appeal should be treated as withdrawn,

the preceding provisions of this section shall have effect as if, at the date of the appellant's notification, the appellant and the inspector or other proper officer had come to an agreement, orally or in writing, as the case may be, that the assessment ordecision under appeal should be upheld without variation.”

23. Section 54(4) therefore provides that where a taxpayer appeals to the Tribunal and then withdraws that Tribunal appeal, and 30 days have elapsed since the withdrawal, the parties are treated as coming to an agreement that settles the appeal. The consequences of that agreement are the same as if it had been decided by the Tribunal in favour of HMRC.

24. In relation to the similar VAT provision, Judge Sarah Falk (as she then was) held in OWD v HMRC [2018] UKFTT 06675 (TC) at para [32] that:

“Section 85 is quite clear in its terms. If an appellant, or someone on its behalf, notifies HMRC that it desires not to proceed with an appeal and there is no objection from HMRC under s 85(4)(b), then the parties are deemed to have agreed that the appeal is upheld, with the same consequences as if the Tribunal had determined it.”

25. Although Rule 17 of the Tribunal Rules gives the Tribunal power to reinstate an appeal, that Rule begins by saying, at paragraph (1), that it is “[s]ubject to any provision in an enactment relating to withdrawal or settlement of particular proceedings”. Where an appellant has withdrawn its appeal, TMA s 54 and VATA s 85 prevent the Tribunal exercising its power under Rule 17, unless a reinstatement application is made within the 30 days specified in those provisions.

26. In this case, Mr Iqbal filed a Notice of Appeal in 2023, and subsequently withdrew that appeal. I acknowledge that the Notice of Appeal contained both the substantive appeal and an application for permission to make a late appeal, and the withdrawal happened before the permission application was determined. However, the statutory provisions cannot reasonably be read as applying differently in such a case.

Conclusion and appeal rights

27. For the above reasons, I strike out the Appeal.

28. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Rules. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to "Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)" which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

29. Any permission to appeal application made under the above provisions by Mr Iqbal will not be considered by the Tribunal unless it is accompanied by a decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside the High Court judgment of Judge Prentis such that Mr Iqbal has standing to seek permission to appeal.

30. Any permission to appeal application made by Mr Hussain on behalf of Mr Iqbal will not be considered by the Tribunal unless is accompanied by:

(1) a judgment of the Court of Appeal in his favour as set out above; and

(2) a statement that a letter of authority has been:

(a) signed by Mr Iqbal in the presence of a UK qualified solicitor or barrister who is in practice as such; and

(b) certified in writing by that solicitor or barrister as having been so made.

31. That signed authority must be separately forwarded to the Tribunal by the solicitor or barrister, with the words “PTA application” and the reference number of this appeal in the header line of the email.

Release date:

28 October 2026


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.