Administrative United Kingdom
SU v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/52980/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Hatton Cross
On 21 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Seelhoff
Between
SU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Besso, Counsel instructed by Wilsons Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Gorolay, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 7 January 2025 to refuse his application for asylum originally made on the 24th November 2023.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the case concerns a protection claim and the fact of having raised a claim may cause issues with the Sri Lankan authorities.
Background
3. The Appellant is 17 years old and was just 14 when he arrived in the UK.
4. The Appellant has limited knowledge of his father’s claimed political activities which he says is largely due to his age. The Appellant believes that his father was associated with the LTTE in Sri Lanka. The Appellant says his father was kidnapped and assaulted in 2021 and died from his injuries shortly after he was returned to the family home.
5. The Appellant claims that he was personally taken by unknown men in 2022 when he was 13. As a consequence his mother arranged to send him out of the country. The Appellant was brought to the UK by an agent who left him at the airport. The Appellant claimed asylum when approached by staff at the airport.
6. In the decision the Respondent does not accept that the Appellant’s account was truthful for a number of reasons which are set out in paragraph 10 of the decision.
The Hearing
7. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
8. At the outset of the hearing we discussed the issues in the appeal and started with the question of whether the Appellant was to give evidence. An application had been made two days before the hearing in the following terms;
“We request for the appellant to be excused from providing evidence at the hearing on Wednesday. The Appellant is a vulnerable client given his young age and mental health issues and we have provided extensive medical reports to confirm that the clinical psychologist has recommended that our client is not required to give oral evidence as his anxiety has increased further. Our client has provided 3 detailed witness statements in support of his appeal.”
9. This was granted the day before the hearing by a legal officer who noted as follows;
“The Appellant's representatives, by way of Application, have requested for the Appellant to be excluded from giving evidence at the upcoming hearing due to being a vulnerable Appellant. The requested is granted, and the Appellant's representatives are advised to notify the Judge on the day of the hearing. Legal Officer Read. This decision is made by a Legal Officer in exercise of a specified power granted by the Senior President of Tribunals under rules 3(1) and (2) of the Tribunals Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014. You may within 14 days of the date of this decision apply in writing to the Tribunal for the decision to be considered afresh by a Judge under rule 3(4).”(sic)
10. I noted at the outset of the hearing that the application had been misconceived and that in any event it was not one for a Legal Officer to decide. I said that it was a matter for the Appellant and his representatives as to whether he gave evidence. The issue was as to whether adverse inferences would be drawn from his not giving evidence which would be a matter for me to decide.
11. Ms Gorolay for the Home Office acknowledged the medical evidence but said that the Home Office would ask me to draw adverse inferences from a failure to give evidence given that the Appellant is now nearly 18.
12. I said that I could not make a decision on whether or not I would draw adverse inferences from a failure to give evidence as a preliminary decision as I would in effect need to hear the Respondent’s submissions on the case in full because to do otherwise would impermissibly bind my discretion.
13. I allowed Ms Besso time to take instructions and following further discussions it was agreed that the Appellant would give evidence, with allowances being made for his age and the very specific features of his PTSD. We agreed that questions would be limited, and that they would focus on gaps and key credibility points relied on by the Respondent.
14. In terms of the substantive issues it was agreed that the primary focus was credibility but that risk on return was also relevant as set out in the original decision. It was accepted that if the Appellant was at risk on return there would not be sufficient protection available and internal relocation would not be a viable option.
15. It was agreed that the Appellant should be treated as a vulnerable witness in accordance with Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance
Issues
The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are: Asylum
(i) On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?
(ii) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
(iii) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return for that Convention reason?
Article 8
(iv) Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?
(v) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Evidence
16. The Appellant was the only witness and gave evidence with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter. His foster mother sat with him for reassurance. The Appellant adopted his statements and was cross examined. There was no re examination and I had no questions for him.
17. Ms Gorolay made submissions. I then indicated to Ms Besso that I was not concerned about the Appellant’s credibility and that my primary concern was the Appellant’s risk profile. Ms Besso made submissions and then I reserved my decision.
Legal Framework
18. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
19. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(d) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.
(e) I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
20. I have taken into account the recent decision in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC).
21. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are those set out in Appendix Private Life.
22. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
23. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
24. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
Findings
Issue (i) – On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?
25. To determine this issue I must first determine whether the Appellant’s account is credible.
26. I have assessed his credibility bearing in mind the relevant guidance for vulnerable and child witnesses.
27. It was brave of the Appellant to give evidence but I consider that he did so in a compelling and frank manner. There was no exaggeration and he was clear about what he did and did not know about his claimed experiences and about what his parents had done in the past. The Appellant tried to answer each question to the best of his ability and his evidence provided context and clarity in respect of what was set out in the detailed statements.
28. I turn to the specific credibility challenges raised in the decision. Although the decision makes reference to having taken account of the Appellant’s age, in my assessment that is not consistently reflected in the approach to the issues set out in paragraph 10 of the decision.
29. There is no paragraph 10 (a) in the decision letter. 10 (b) of the decision asserts that in paragraph 6 of his mother’s second statement she had said that the Appellant’s father was not an LTTE member, had not recent involvement with them and that accordingly his profile was not such as would plausibly have attracted the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities. This does not accurately reflect the mother’s evidence. The Appellant’s mother said in her written statement that she had had no idea her husband had been involved in the LTTE in the past. Her evidence was that she only found out about her husband’s activities after her husband had been returned badly beaten after being kidnapped. Her evidence was that on the way to hospital in a rickshaw he told her that he had helped the LTTE in the past and was under investigation for this. The Appellant’s father died from his injuries the following day.
30. Neither the Appellant nor his mother claim to have any real knowledge of what his father did or did not do for the LTTE. Given that the father had concealed his activities from his wife up until he was in effect dying from his injuries it seems entirely unrealistic to proceed on the basis that what he said about the limits of his activities was true, or that he was able to give his wife an accurate or complete account of his risk profile in the conversations before he died.
31. Paragraph 10 (c) of the decision says that it is not credible that the Appellant has not been able to give more detail about his father’s LTTE activities, particularly given that he could have asked his mother for more information. This is flawed for the same reason as the reasoning in 10 (b). The Appellant’s father concealed his activities until he was dying of his injuries. It is entirely unrealistic to believe that the Appellant’s mother could have obtained further information about the father’s activities in the context of the events described.
32. Paragraph 10 (d) again makes the point that the Appellant has failed to demonstrate that his father has a significant role in “post conflict separatism”. This is a fair comment but again must be seen in the context that the activities were concealed from the Appellant, his mother and sister. This does not in my view go to credibility but may go to the level of risk the Appellant might face on return.
33. Paragraph 10 (e) takes the point that the Appellant only knows about what has happened from his mother and that his father did not experience problems before. The Appellant has been entirely open about the first point. The second point is less valid. It would be more correct to say that the Appellant and his mother do not know about any problems his father may have had in the past as any LTTE activities and involvement were kept secret from them.
34. Paragraph 10 (f) notes that the Appellant has given different dates as to when his father was taken (25th or 26th December 2021) but the decision itself acknowledges that this is a minor point.
35. Paragraph 10 (g) takes the point that if the Appellant were of interest to the authorities then he would not have been able to leave Sri Lanka through the airport on his own passport. This is a bad point as it has been established since GJ and others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 00319 (IAC) that officials at the airports are very susceptible to bribery even where individuals are wanted by the authorities as set out in paragraph 275 of that decision.
36. Paragraph 10 (h) says it is not consistent that people who visited the Appellant’s home searching for him threatened his mother and told her not to report this to the police if they were from the authorities. The Appellant cannot be expected to explain this, although even if the people were from the intelligence services, telling her to not bother contacting the police could be a simple intimidation tactic. I do not consider that this point damages the Appellant’s credibility.
37. At paragraph 10 (i) it is suggested that the authorities would be more interested in the Appellant’s mother, sister and uncle all of whom are adults. The Appellant cannot be expected to explain this. It is also said that it is inconsistent that the authorities would be looking for him if they know he left the country. This ignores the use of an agent to leave the country and assumes that no bribes were paid in the passport issuing process.
38. At paragraph 10 (j) the decision says the lack of problems prior to the Appellant’s father’s death, and the lack of problems whilst the Appellant hid in Colombo is indicative that the authorities had no interest in the Appellant. As noted above, the Appellant does not know whether or not his family had no problems prior to his father’s death. The Appellant’s father’s murder, if it happened, would be a strong indicator of interest in him. The point about the lack of problems during the time the Appellant spent in Colombo is that the Appellant was in hiding.
39. The review adds further credibility challenges. At paragraph 7 it says it is not plausible that the Appellant’s father would have been released after one day if he was suspected of supporting the LTTE. This ignores that on the account the Appellant’s father had been beaten to the point of dying within a matter of hours of his release, and was not released so much as he was left to die.
40. The review makes the point that the Appellant’s mother and sister continue to reside in Sri Lanka in apparent safety. This goes to risk, but I also note that this also indicates that the evidence has not been exaggerated as there has been no attempt to close this “gap” in the Appellant’s case. I also note that often men are seen as being the more likely to be politically active or militant which could be a factor.
41. Paragraph 9 of the review repeats the point made in 10 (c) of the decision and again ignores the fact that activities were concealed from the Appellant’s mother. The Appellant also explained that discussing these issues upsets his mother so he has not asked.
42. Paragraph 10 of the review again notes that the Appellant spent nearly a year hiding in Colombo without incident. This does not necessarily go to the truth of the account. Paragraph 11 criticises the Appellant’s inability to explain the arrangements for his journey to the UK. This ignores that the Appellant was just 14 at the time, on his first journey out of Sri Lanka and under the control of an agent.
43. Paragraph 12 of the review invites the tribunal to be cautious in its approach to statements form the Appellant’s mother as;
“there is no information as to who prepared the statement or how it was received, and in the absence of supporting evidence, it is afforded limited evidential weight”
44. I accept that the statement has to be approached in accordance with Tanveer Ahmed principles and considered in light of my findings in respect of the Appellant’s credibility.
45. In submissions Ms Gorolay noted that the only evidence that the Appellant has that his father was involved in the LTTE is that his mother told him so. As I noted at that stage he also has, if I accept his account, the fact that his father was killed and died from his injuries which is powerful evidence that someone wanted to do him harm and only one explanation has been put forward as to why that might be.
46. Ms Gorolay noted that the death certificate said that the Appellant’s father died from a brain bleed whereas the Appellant originally said it was a heart attack. The Appellant’s mother’s statement says that she lied to the Appellant at the time to protect him from all the details of what happened to his father. This is a reasonable explanation.
47. Ms Gorolay says that further evidence of the hospital admission could have been obtained by the Appellant’s mother. This if a fair observation but not one made in the decision or the review and so the Appellant has not had an opportunity to address this.
48. Ms Gorolay noted that the Appellant was personally targeted after a school trip to a Tamil event and that nothing specifically about the incident should cause the Appellant to think this was linked to his father’s activities. The Appellant has been frank about this and even in his earliest statements said;
“I don’t know if they were the same men who attacked my father.”
49. Ms Gorolay last submitted that it was not credible that the Appellant’s mother would have taken the family back to their home town after a stay in Colombo. I consider that the Appellant has given an account of his mother evaluating the risk and deciding it was safe to go back, bearing in mind that the Appellant had at that stage been threatened and not harmed and that the threats were connected to him not attending the Tamil event his school had taken him to.
50. I have taken into account the medical evidence. This is primarily a pair of reports from the psychologist Dr Sarah Heke. Before me Ms Gorolay said that the reports were not challenged although she did still rely on the review. Dr Heke diagnosed the Appellant with PTSD relating to his father coming home badly injured and his own brief abduction. The review does comment on the report but primarily in the context of noting that it does not disclose matters that could not be addressed by treatment in Sri Lanka. I proceed on the basis that a diagnosis of PTSD is indicative of past trauma and treat this as offering some support to the account.
51. Finally I note that the actions of the Appellant’s mother in sending a child to a country where they have no family for his safety is a drastic one and not one which would be taken without good reason. The Appellant was just 14 on his arrival.
52. I also take into account the Respondent’s COIS documents on Sri Lanka and the guidance cases of GJ and KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC) and what is said in those decisions about the government of Sri Lanka generally and their attitudes to post conflict separatism. I note that the COIS Country Policy and Information Note Sri Lanka: Tamil separatism August 2025 states;
“Tamils continue to face discrimination in employment, education, and access to justice. Surveillance and monitoring of Tamils, especially those politically active or involved in commemorative events, remain prevalent. Heavy military presence in Tamil-majority areas contributes to a climate of distrust and self-censorship.
The Sri Lankan government continues to proscribe several Tamil diaspora groups, including the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE). People affiliated with or perceived to support this, or other proscribed groups may be subject to surveillance, particularly if they engage in public demonstrations or online activism”
53. Considering all the evidence in the round I find that the account is truthful. To be clear that means I accept that the Appellant’s father was abducted and killed and that he attributed it to activities with the LTTE that he had long concealed from his family.
54. I accept that the Appellant was himself accosted after attending a Tamil event through school. Although the Appellant has no direct evidence that this is linked to his father, I consider that it was reasonable to infer that there may have been a link.
55. I accept that the family went into hiding in Colombo and that after they returned home people came looking for the Appellant. Again there is no direct evidence this was linked to the father’s activities but I accept that it was a reasonable inference and that the Appellant was sent into hiding in Colombo and then on to the UK for his safety.
56. In terms of the motivation for the targeting I find that given what the Appellant’s father said the motive for targeting him was likely his claimed work for the LTTE as recently as 2021 which would be seen as promoting Tamil Separatism. I also accept that the Appellant was targeted after attending a Tamil event albeit as part of a school trip which suggests that his Tamil identity was a material consideration.
57. Accordingly I find on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant and his family would be suspected of being politically opposed to the government of Sri Lanka and involved in recent separatist activity. I find the Appellant therefore has a qualifying characteristic with reference to the Refugee Convention.
Issue (ii) – On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
58. It follows from my findings above that I do accept that the Appellant has a genuine fear of return. The Appellant’s father was killed which is about as extreme an action as could be taken by the authorities. Having seen such extreme harm it is probable that the Appellant would fear return for the same reason.
Issue (iii) – Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return for that Convention reason?
59. The Respondent’s policy document confirms that some former LTTE supporters continue to be targeted in Sria Lanka;
“3.5.7 Arrests in Sri Lanka for allegedly reviving the LTTE have occurred in recent years but on a small scale. Most sources consulted by the Netherlands MoFA in 2023 and 2024 suggest these arrests reflect not a real fear of LTTE resurgence, but rather government overreaction to pro-Tamil expressions or efforts to justify continued military presence in the north and east by portraying the LTTE as an ongoing threat”
60. This is the context the Appellant will face on return.
61. It is also important to note that the Appellant does not hold a passport and will therefore need to secure a travel document to return. That means that he will need to be interviewed at the Sri Lankan High Commission to secure a travel document and on return at the airport in Sri Lanka. As of today the Appellant is still a child which means that this will be more traumatic. The Appellant cannot be expected to lie to the authorities and so he would be expected to disclose that his father was killed on suspicion of post conflict involvement with the LTTE. The death of the Appellant’s father is relatively unusual in the context of events over the last five years in Sri Lanka so this may attract additional attention.
62. There is no way to know how the Appellant’s own departure from Sri Lanka will be viewed. Assuming that the people who came to the family shop and home looking for him may have an official government connection there must be a risk that they are still looking for him. This may mean that he is perceived as having been involved in or have information about post conflict separatism, or that he may be on a stop list having disappeared from the country as set out in 7 (a) and (d) of the headnote to GJ.
63. In my assessment in the Appellant’s case this must amount to a real risk of detention pending further enquiries on return as set out in KK and RS. It is common ground that such detention would amount to persecution.
Issue (iv) – Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?
64. This was not argued as a stand alone point before me although reliance was placed on the arguments set out in the skeleton argument. Were the Appellant not at risk on return he would be returning to the care of his mother with whom he remains in daily contact in Sri Lanka. No evidence has been served to say that suitable treatment would not be available on return in respect of his mental health. But for the facts of the asylum claim this case would not succeed on this basis.
Issue (v) -Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
65. This can be dealt with summarily as well. But for the facts of the protection claim, the Appellant’s best interests would be in being cared for by his mother. Suitable treatment would be available in Sri Lanka and he has been resident in the UK for a relatively short period of time. I would not have allowed the appeal on article 8 grounds independent of the facts of the asylum claim.
Determination of the Issues
66. On my findings, and in light of the Respondent’s concessions, the Appellant meets the requirements for recognition as a Refugee.
Notice of Decision
67. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds
ANONYMITY ORDER
68. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant, is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed A.Seelhoff Date 2nd November 2026
First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff
Our immigration lawyer in Paris assists clients in matters of this kind.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).