Administrative United Kingdom

Michael O’Leary, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board of England and Wales

Official source
MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE
Approved Judgment
R (O’Leary)
v Parole Board

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2773 (Admin)

Case No: AC-2026-LDS-000001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

West Gate
6 Grace Street
Leeds
LS1 2RP

Date: 29/10/2026

Before:

MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between:

The King
on the Application of
MICHAEL O’LEARY
Claimant
– and –
THE PAROLE BOARD OF
ENGLAND AND WALES
– and –
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE
Defendant
Interested
Party

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Carl Buckley (instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors) for the Claimant

The Defendant and Interested Party (instructed by Government Legal Department) did not appear and were not represented

Hearing date: 9 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Approved Judgment

This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on Thursday 29 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.

………………………..

MRS JUSTICE HILL DBE

Mrs Justice Hill:

Introduction

1. By a claim form issued on 6 January 2026 the Claimant, a serving prisoner, seeks judicial review of the Defendant’s decision dated 29 October 2025 not to hold an oral hearing to consider whether he should be released or transferred to open conditions (“the Decision”). The Claimant proceeds with permission granted by His Honour Judge Saffman sitting as a Judge of the High Court in retirement on 28 May 2026.

2. The Defendant filed an Acknowledgment of Service indicating that as a court or tribunal it did not intend to make any submissions. The Interested Party did not file an Acknowledgment of Service but explained in correspondence that he was neutral on the claim. Neither the Defendant nor the Interested Party participated in the hearing.

The legal framework

3. Rule 19 of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended) reads

“19(1) Where a panel is appointed under rule 5(1) to consider the release of a prisoner, the panel must decide on the papers either that—

(a) the prisoner is suitable for release;

(b) the prisoner is unsuitable for release, or

(c) the case should be directed to an oral hearing.

(2) Where a panel has received a request for advice from the Secretary of State concerning whether a prisoner should move to open conditions, the panel must recommend whether—

(a) the prisoner is suitable for a move to open conditions, or

(b) the prisoner is not suitable for a move to open conditions.

(3) Where a panel makes a decision that the case should be directed to an oral hearing under this rule, the panel may at the same time make any directions relating to the oral hearing.

(4) Any decision made under paragraph (1)(a) which is eligible for reconsideration under rule 28 is provisional, and becomes final if no application for reconsideration is received within the period specified by that rule.

(5) Any decision made under paragraph (1)(a) which is not eligible for reconsideration under rule 28 is final.

(6) Any decision made under paragraph (1)(b) is provisional.

(7) Where the Board receives a request for advice with respect to any matter referred to it by the Secretary of State, the Board may advise or make a recommendation to the Secretary of State without an oral hearing.

(8) The decision or advice of the panel must be recorded in writing with reasons for that decision or advice, and the written record provided to the parties within 14 days of that decision or advice”.

4. In assessing whether procedural fairness required an oral hearing, a court must determine for itself whether a fair procedure was followed: R (Osborn) v Parole Board [2013] UKSC 61, [2014] AC 1115 at [65], per Lord Reed, citing Gillies v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2006] UKHL 2; 2006 SC (HL) 71, [2006] 1 WLR 781 at [6]. Regard must be to the principles identified in Osborn and summarised at [2] thereof, thus:

“i) In order to comply with common law standards of procedural fairness, the board should hold an oral hearing before determining an application for release, or for a transfer to open conditions, whenever fairness to the prisoner requires such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake. By doing so the board will also fulfil its duty under section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with article 5(4) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in circumstances where that article is engaged.

ii) It is impossible to define exhaustively the circumstances in which an oral hearing will be necessary, but such circumstances will often include the following:

a) Where facts which appear to the board to be important are in dispute, or where a significant explanation or mitigation is advanced which needs to be heard orally in order fairly to determine its credibility. The board should guard against any tendency to underestimate the importance of issues of fact which may be disputed or open to explanation or mitigation.

b) Where the board cannot otherwise properly or fairly make an independent assessment of risk, or of the means by which it should be managed and addressed. That is likely to be the position in cases where such an assessment may depend upon the view formed by the board (including its members with expertise in psychology or psychiatry) of characteristics of the prisoner which can best be judged by seeing or questioning him in person, or where a psychological assessment produced by the Ministry of Justice is disputed on tenable grounds, or where the board may be materially assisted by hearing evidence, for example from a psychologist or psychiatrist. Cases concerning prisoners who have spent many years in custody are likely to fall into the first of these categories.

c) Where it is maintained on tenable grounds that a face to face encounter with the board, or the questioning of those who have dealt with the prisoner, is necessary in order to enable him or his representatives to put their case effectively or to test the views of those who have dealt with him.

d) Where, in the light of the representations made by or on behalf of the prisoner, it would be unfair for a “paper” decision made by a single member panel of the board to become final without allowing an oral hearing: for example, if the representations raise issues which place in serious question anything in the paper decision which may in practice have a significant impact on the prisoner’s future management in prison or on future reviews.

iii) In order to act fairly, the board should consider whether its independent assessment of risk, and of the means by which it should be managed and addressed, may benefit from the closer examination which an oral hearing can provide.

iv) The board should also bear in mind that the purpose of holding an oral hearing is not only to assist it in its decision-making, but also to reflect the prisoner's legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute.

v) The question whether fairness requires a prisoner to be given an oral hearing is different from the question whether he has a particular likelihood of being released or transferred to open conditions, and cannot be answered by assessing that likelihood.

vi) When dealing with cases concerning recalled prisoners, the board should bear in mind that the prisoner has been deprived of his freedom, albeit conditional. When dealing with cases concerning post-tariff indeterminate sentence prisoners, it should scrutinise ever more anxiously whether the level of risk is unacceptable, the longer the time the prisoner has spent in prison following the expiry of his tariff.

vii) The board must be, and appear to be, independent and impartial. It should not be predisposed to favour the official account of events, or official assessments of risk, over the case advanced by the prisoner.

viii) The board should guard against any temptation to refuse oral hearings as a means of saving time, trouble and expense.

ix) The board’s decision, for the purposes of this guidance, is not confined to its determination of whether or not to recommend the prisoner’s release or transfer to open conditions, but includes any other aspects of its decision (such as comments or advice in relation to the prisoner’s treatment needs or the offending behaviour work which is required) which will in practice have a significant impact on his management in prison or on future reviews.

x) “Paper” decisions made by single member panels of the board are provisional. The right of the prisoner to request an oral hearing is not correctly characterised as a right of appeal. In order to justify the holding of an oral hearing, the prisoner does not have to demonstrate that the paper decision was wrong, or even that it may have been wrong: what he has to persuade the board is that an oral hearing is appropriate.

xi) In applying this guidance, it will be prudent for the board to allow an oral hearing if it is in doubt whether to do so or not”.

5. In R (KP) v Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs and others [2025] EWHC 370 (Admin), Chamberlain J described the two elements of public law rationality thus:

“55. In most contexts, rationality is the standard by which the common law measures the conduct of a public decision-maker where there has been no infringement of a legal right, no misdirection of law and no procedural unfairness. It encompasses both the process of reasoning by which a decision is reached (sometimes referred to as “process rationality”) and the outcome (“outcome rationality”): see e.g. R (Law Society) v Lord Chancellor [2018] EWHC 2094 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR 1649, [98] (Leggatt LJ and Carr J).

56. Process rationality includes the requirement that the decision maker must have regard to all mandatorily relevant considerations and no irrelevant ones, but is not limited to that. In addition, the process of reasoning should contain no logical error or critical gap. This is the type of irrationality Sedley J was describing when he spoke of a decision that “does not add up – in which, in other words, there is an error of reasoning which robs the decision of logic”: R v Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration ex p. Balchin [1998] 1 PLR 1, [13]. In similar vein, Saini J said that the court should ask, “does the conclusion follow from the evidence or is there an unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion?”: R (Wells) v Parole Board [2019] EWHC 2710 (Admin), at [33].

57. Outcome rationality, on the other hand, is concerned with whether – even where the process of reasoning leading to the challenged decision is not materially flawed – the outcome is “so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it” (Associated Wednesbury Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, 233-4) or, in simpler and less question-begging terms, outside the “range of reasonable decisions open to a decision-maker” (Boddington v British Transport Police [1999] 2 AC 143, 175).

The factual background

6. In 2017 the Claimant was sentenced to a discretionary life sentence, with a minimum term or tariff of 6 years and 132 days, following his convictions for attempted rape, assault by penetration and false imprisonment. On or around 19 October 2023 the Claimant’s tariff expired.

7. On 23 July 2024 the Defendant held an oral hearing, at the end of which no recommendation was made for the Claimant’s release or transfer to open conditions.

8. On 29 September 2025, the Claimant’s solicitors made representations seeking an oral hearing. These representations would be subject to an initial paper review, at the Member Case Assessment (“MCA”) stage. The representations included the following:

“Mr O’Leary seeks progression at this review and seeks to challenge the risk assessments put forward by professionals. For example, at page 131 of the dossier the COM [Community Offender Manager] states:

“Mr O’Leary does appear to have a good working relationship with his male keyworker, Luke Dareschani, and it is apparent through records, that Mr O’Leary behaves more aggressively to female staff. This is linked to clear misogynistic attitudes which is evident in his sexual offending and domestically abusive behaviour towards previous intimate partners, evidenced throughout his safeguarding record Mr O’Leary appears to have no quarms (sic) in subjecting women to sexual, emotional, psychological, financial and physical abuse in order to gain a wanted outcome. In my assessment, Mr O’Leary has no understanding of the impact of this behaviour on the victims.”

These comments are challenged vehemently by Mr O’Leary who disagrees with the suggestion that he continues to hold misogynistic attitudes and disputes that he is readily willing to be more aggressive towards female staff. Despite this comment, and incident which took place over 13 months ago, there is no other reference within the dossier or POM [Prisoner Offender Manager] report that Mr O’Leary has persistently demonstrated these attitudes over the last review period. Mr O’Leary has been able to engage in the M&E work with his POM productively. Comments such as the above can go directly to the risk of serious harm assessment, and ultimately could impact the outcome of this review. Mr O’Leary challenges these assertions and it is only fair to him that an oral hearing is direct[ed] to allow for cross examination on those points, and for Mr O’Leary to put forward his views and /explanation in relation to such concerns.

The MCA member will note that Mr O’Leary is maintaining his innocence around the index offence. He is entitled to do so and this should not be a barrier to his progression or application for release or progression to open conditions. It has been noted within the dossier that Mr O’Leary continues to struggle to access aspects of his sentence plan and as such finds himself at yet again an impasse in terms of progress. It is said that Mr O’Leary is on the waiting list for Building Choices however he was on the Kaizen waiting list for a number of years and was not placed on the programme. There is no guarantee that Mr O’Leary will be placed on Building Choices any time soon. Irrespective of this, Mr O’Leary seeks to argue that his risks can be safely managed in either open conditions or upon release, without the need to complete work.

Mr O’Leary challenges the risk assessments advanced by professionals and seeks an oral hearing in order to effectively challenge those views and risk assessments by his legal representative. Such challenging of evidence can only be conducted at an oral hearing and cannot be fairly achieve[d] on the papers alone…

Mr O’Leary has a legitimate interest in being able to participate in the decision making and provide useful information and evidence to a Parole Board Panel who will be undertaking a risk assessment of his case. In our submission, Mr O’Leary would be able to offer the Parole Board direct evidence, particularly around the index offence, how Mr O’Leary would seek to manage himself in the community or open conditions, and discuss his future motivations to comply. In our submission, the Parole Board can only fairly make a determination as to whether or not Mr O’Leary can be safely managed in open conditions or upon release after hearing such evidence from Mr O’Leary and upon doing so, they would be able to make their own assessment as to likelihood of future compliance and consider whether or not the risk can in fact be managed under a proposed risk management plan”.

9. On 10 October 2025, the MCA member issued a provisional paper decision, declining to hold an oral hearing and again making no recommendations for transfer or for release. At the outset, the decision explained the position in respect of the oral hearing issue as follows:

“Before considering this matter on the papers, the panel took into consideration the principles set out in the case of Osborn, Booth and Reilly [2013] UKSC 61 concerning oral hearings. The panel has not found any reasons to direct a hearing”.

10. Under the heading “Reasons”, the decision said the following:

2.6. Mr O’Leary’s legal representatives request an oral hearing. They submit that Mr O’Leary challenges comments in the dossier (page 131), and the risk assessments. They also argue that he has been unable to access programmes. They submit that “he was on the Kaizen waiting list for a number of years and was not placed on the programme”. They submit that there “is no guarantee that Mr O’Leary will be placed on Building Choices any time soon. Irrespective of this, Mr O’Leary seeks to argue that his risks can be safely managed in either open conditions or upon release, without the need to complete work”.

2.7. They argue that fair and independent risk assessment in a case such as this cannot be fairly conducted on the papers alone and an oral hearing should be directed. The panel does not agree with this. An oral hearing took place in July 2024 where the panel completed a thorough risk assessment and concluded that Mr O’Leary had core risk reduction work outstanding.

2.8. The current panel has completed its own thorough assessment of risk and has reached the same conclusion. The panel concludes that the further work is necessary to address those risk factors and that this needs to be undertaken within a custodial setting as it is clear that internal protective factors have not yet substantially developed enough to affect the necessary controls required to prevent further offending.

2.9. The panel believes that it is vital that he develops the necessary controls and coping strategies to ensure that the risk management plan is sufficiently robust to manage the risk in the future” [emphasis added].

11. On 23 October 2025 the Claimant exercised his right to apply for an oral hearing under Rule 20(1) of the Rules. The representations included the following:

“The very nature upon which the negative decision was reached…prohibits Mr O’Leary from being able to take part in proceedings which have a significant impact on his continued incarceration. This goes against the overarching principle of fairness to the prisoner; the MCA member in this case has favoured the views of professionals and the last Panel and clearly considered there to be no prospects of progression prior to Building Choices being completed.

The MCA decision wholly accepts the decision of the last Panel and throughout their decision makes reference to it. This is indicative of the current MCA not conducting their own risk assessment and merely adopt[ing] a previous Panel’s without thought or application to the case presently or the submissions which were made. Whilst [the] Panel claims to have conducted a ‘thorough assessment’ (para 2.7 negative MCA decision 10/10/25) it can’t possibly have done when there was information omitted from the dossier. There was a post programme report from the Motivation and Engagement programme which was completed; this has not been directed for disclosure or submitted for the purpose of the current risk assessment. This is important information and evidence of progress since the last review. A full enquiry was not completed by the current MCA member and therefore it cannot be said that a thorough assessment did in fact take place…

There is no mention of fairness to the prisoner at all in the MCA decision letter and the only time ‘fairness’ is mentioned is in the standard paragraphs at the end of the decision in the information sheet. The Panel have very clearly failed to consider the overarching principle of fairness which evidence improper application of the law rendering the decision procedurally unfair and irrational.

Regardless of the MCA member’s views in adopting the previous Panel’s decision, the refusal of an oral hearing in a case such as this prevents Mr O’Leary from legitimately taking part in his Parole process and also prevents him from being able to offer [useful] and important evidence to the Parole Board regarding progress made over the review period.”

12. In the Decision dated 29 October 2025, the Defendant’s Duty Member declined to hold an oral hearing, saying the following:

“[Mr O’Leary’s] case was considered on the papers by an MCA panel on 10/10/2025. That panel considered the dossier, including legal representations from Carringtons Solicitors dated 29/09/2025 requesting an oral hearing and concluded that one was not required. It did not consider Mr O’Leary to meet the test for release or the criteria for open conditions. Following the provisional decision letter being issued, further legal representations were received from Carringtons Solicitors dated 23/10/2025 requesting an oral hearing, essentially, in the interests of fairness and so that Mr O’Leary could participate in his review. As a consequence, the dossier containing 259 numbered pages has been provided to a Duty Member to consider.

Having considered the provisional MCA Decision and the legal representations, the Duty Member did not find that an oral hearing is needed to properly make an assessment of risk or so that Mr O’Leary can put his views across effectively. The Duty Member did not consider the legal representations to make a material difference to the position, taking the MCA panel’s paper decision into account. An oral hearing is not, therefore, directed” [emphasis added].

The Claimant’s grounds

13. The Claimant’s grounds contended that the Decision was: (1) unreasonable/irrational; (2) in breach of the principle of procedural fairness and therefore unlawful; and/or (3) in violation of the Claimant’s rights under Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”).

14. As his case involves consideration of his right to liberty, the Claimant relied on the principle that “in cases involving fundamental rights, the reviewing court is required to consider the rationality of the original decision with ‘the most anxious scrutiny’”: Browne v The Parole Board of England and Wales [2018] EWCA Civ 2024 at [54], per Coulson LJ, and the authorities cited therein.

15. Mr Buckley, counsel for the Claimant, accepted that Ground (3) was parasitic on Grounds (1) and (2) and would only succeed if either or both of those grounds succeeded.

Submissions and analysis

Grounds 1 and 2

16. Grounds 1 and 2 overlap and I have considered them together. The submissions can be distilled into the following themes.

(i): Factual disputes

17. Mr Buckley placed significant reliance on the fact that the Claimant’s representations to the Defendant had identified a series of important factual disputes in his case. In essence, these were that (i) he took issue with certain factual elements of the information contained within the dossier; (ii) he sought to argue that risk could be managed without the need to complete the work that had been identified; and (iii) he had highlighted that certain work had been completed but a post-programme report addressing this work had not been provided.

18. The Decision did not address this issue. The Duty Member simply indicated that they did not consider the further representations that had been made justified departing from the MCA decision to the effect that “an oral hearing [was not] needed to properly make an assessment of risk or so that Mr O’Leary can put his views across effectively”: [12] above. No explanation was given for why the factual disputes identified in the preceding paragraph could be fairly addressed on the papers. This was material, because the factual disputes bore directly on the central question of risk which the Defendant had to address. In particular, as the Claimant’s representations had highlighted, important evidence of the Claimant’s progress since the 2024 oral hearing, namely the post programme report from the Motivation and Engagement programme, had not been provided: [11] above.

19. Even if it was appropriate for the Duty Member to have regard to the MCA decision (as to which, see further at [36]-[37] below), that was similarly brief: the MCA decision stated that the current panel had completed its own thorough assessment of risk and reached the same conclusion as had been reached after the July 2024 oral hearing: [10] above. Again, this did not engage with the factual disputes that had been highlighted, in particular the evidence of work done since July 2024 which had not been evidenced, which the Claimant contended meant that an oral hearing was required.

20. In my judgment Mr Buckley was right to focus on this issue, because it exposed the following flaws in the Duty Member’s decision.

21. First, the Duty Member’s reasons did not enable the Claimant to “understand why the matter was decided as it was” and what conclusions were reached on the “principal important controversial issues”, such that the quality of the reasoning fell short of the standards established by South Bucks Council v Porter (No.2) [2004] UKHL 33 at [36].

22. Second, the Duty Member’s lack of engagement with the factual disputes underpinning the risk assessment amounted to a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. This was because the existence of “facts which appear to the board to be important are in dispute” had been specifically identified in Osborn at [2] i) a) as a relevant consideration in cases of this kind.

23. The Duty Member also gave no explanation for why they had apparently concluded that, notwithstanding the factual disputes, the Defendant could nevertheless “properly or fairly make an independent assessment of risk, or of the means by which it should be managed and addressed”. The sort of issues the Claimant was raising were, at least arguably, best assessed by the Board “seeing or questioning him in person”. Osborn at [2] i) b) was therefore also engaged.

24. Third, for these reasons the Duty Member’s approach revealed a “logical error or critical gap” and an “unexplained evidential gap or leap in reasoning which fails to justify the conclusion”, of the kind identified in the cases cited in KP at [56] (see [5] above).

25. I therefore accept Mr Buckley’s overarching contention that this failure rendered the Decision irrational under Ground 1 and a breach of the common law standards of procedural fairness under Ground 2.

(ii): Further Osborn factors in favour of an oral hearing

26. Mr Buckley submitted that an oral hearing was also necessary to ensure that (i) the Claimant and other witnesses who had “dealt with” the Claimant such as his COM could be questioned and their views “tested”; (ii) he could put his case that he should be released or progressively move into open conditions, effectively; and (iii) the Defendant could be fully informed about what was required going forward for the Claimant and the level of risk and its manageability or otherwise. These matters, he submitted, engaged Osborn at [2] i) c), such that a “face to face” hearing was required.

27. He alsocontended that the refusal to hold an oral hearing had prevented the Claimant from exercising his “legitimate interest in being able to participate in a decision with important implications for him, where he has something useful to contribute”, as referenced in Osborn at [2] iv).

28. I accept these submissions. In light of the factual disputes described above, the further factors identified in Osborn at [2] i) c) and [2] iv) as pointing towards an oral hearing being necessary to ensure procedural fairness also applied. This further aspect of Ground 2 therefore succeeds.

(iii): The Claimant’s post-tariff status

29. Mr Buckley also drew support from R (Somers) v The Parole Board [2023] EWHC 1160 (Admin), where Foster J held as follows:

“55. The Supreme Court in Osborn indicated for a range of prisoners that in cases of doubt a hearing should be afforded…The reasoning in Osborn which adverts particularly to the position of the post-tariff lifer, is tantamount to articulating a presumption in favour of a hearing in such cases. Put otherwise, a good reason for not holding a hearing should be present when a refusal is made in the case of a post-tariff lifer, for whom the issues of insight, behaviour and risk (at least) are central to progress, and are almost certainly best examined and understood in the open forum of an oral hearing. The obligation to consider the prisoner’s position falls upon the Board, it is not dependent upon the prisoner, and it does, as the court in Osborn recognised, engage Article 5(4).” [emphasis added]”.

30. As [24], [25] and [46] of her judgment make clear, Foster J’s finding of a presumption in favour of an oral hearing in the case of post-tariff prisoners was derived from Lord Reed’s observations in Osborn to this effect:

“70. Courts have recognised what Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers described as “the feelings of resentment that will be aroused if a party to legal proceedings is placed in a position where it is impossible for him to influence the result” Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF (No 3) [2009] UKHL 28; [2010] 2 AC 269, para 63). In the present context, research has established the importance attached by prisoners to a process of risk assessment which provides for their contribution to the process (see Attrill and Liell, “Offenders’ Views on Risk Assessment”, in Who to Release? Parole, Fairness and Criminal Justice (2007), ed Padfield)…

112. Bearing in mind however that the continued detention of a post-tariff prisoner must be justified by his continuing dangerousness as independently assessed by the board, and taking account of the importance of what is at stake, it will in most cases be necessary as a matter of fairness [under Article 5(4)] that he should have an opportunity to appear in person before the board. That is consistent with the common law, as explained earlier”.

31. In my judgment, Mr Buckley was right that this aspect of the Claimant’s case provided another important factor that pointed towards fairness requiring an oral hearing. While the presumption described in Somers might be rebuttable in certain cases, the Duty Member had not applied their mind to the presumption or given appropriate reasons for rebutting it, so as to make out the “good reason” for not holding a hearing required by Somers at [55]. Ground 2 also succeeds on this basis.

(iv): The alleged outcome focus

32. In R (on the application of McKilligan) v The Parole Board of England and Wales [2024] EWHC 336 (Admin) at [37], HHJ Belcher, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, had identified the error of “focusing on the potential outcome of an oral hearing”, which “fails to specifically address the relevant issues set out in Osborn”. At [38], she found that the decision in that case evidenced such an error, because it was “focused on the outcome and in doing so has failed to address the central fundamental question outlined in Osborn, namely whether fairness called for an oral hearing, and has failed to consider which elements of the Claimant’s case might or might not call for an oral hearing, by reference to the guidance given in Osborn”.

33. In R (on the application of Clarke) v Parole Board for England and Wales [2025] EWHC 190 (Admin), Fordham J also considered the suitability of a focus on outcome in decisions of this kind. He described the concept of determining whether fairness required an oral hearing based on whether the prisoner could identify a realistic prospect of their succeeding after the hearing by obtaining the “outcome” of a release-direction as the “Outcome-Utility approach”; and observed that this approach had been rejected in Osborn as unduly narrow and wrong: [10]-[12].

34. In my judgment the MCA decision evidences a flaw of this kind: it states that an oral hearing is not considered necessary because the current panel had completed its own thorough assessment “of risk” and had reached the same conclusion as that reached at the previous oral hearing: [10] above. The MCA decision was therefore focussing on what the outcome of any oral hearing might be, in terms of the ultimate assessment of risk, rather than whether fairness required an oral hearing in the first place.

35. The Decision adopts the MCA decision in full: [12] above. It therefore appears to be vitiated by the same flaw. This focus on outcome was another reason why the Decision was procedurally unfair under Ground 2.

(v): The test to be applied to MCA Members’ decisions on oral hearings

36. Under Ground 1, Mr Buckley also argued that the Duty Member had applied the wrong test to the Claimant’s submissions dated 23 October 2025. By dismissing his submissions on the basis that they did not contain any new information and therefore made no material difference to the earlier decision by the MCA Member declining an oral hearing, the Duty Member made it clear that they had approached his submissions as if they were acting as an appellate jurisdiction. Rather, counsel argued, the Duty Member should have considered the application afresh and simply applied the Osborn test.

37. In light of my conclusions in the Claimant’s favour on the other aspects of Grounds 1 and 2, it is not necessary for me to resolve this issue. Further, it is a procedural point which plainly has the potential to impact the Parole Board processes more widely. It is therefore one that would better be determined after the Court has had the benefit of full argument from the Defendant and/or the Secretary of State, which was not the case here: see [2] above.

Conclusion

38. Pulling these threads together, applying the anxious scrutiny required, and assessing afresh what fairness required, the Decision was vitiated by process irrationality and procedurally unfair for the reasons given at [17]-[35] above.

Ground 3

39. Article 5(4) of the ECHR provides that:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

40. The applicability of Article 5(4) in Parole Board cases was considered by Lord Reed in Osborn at [2](i): see [4] above. There, he acknowledged that the Board should hold an oral hearing before determining an application for release, or for a transfer to open conditions, whenever fairness to the prisoner requires such a hearing in the light of the facts of the case and the importance of what is at stake; and that by doing so the Board would also comply with its duty under Article 5(4).

41. On the facts of Osborn Lord Reed held that because the Board had failed in its duty of procedural fairness to the appellants at common law, it followed that it also failed to act compatibly with Article 5(4): [113].

42. For the same reasons, it follows that the Claimant’s claim also succeeds on Ground 3.

Conclusion

43. Accordingly, for all these reasons, the Claimant’s claim for judicial review is allowed on all grounds. I quash the Defendant’s 29 October 2025 decision and order that the Claimant’s parole review is referred back to the original decision-maker, with a direction that an oral hearing is listed in accordance with the Defendant’s expedited procedure.

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Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.