Miscellaneous United Kingdom

PAL Aerospace Limited v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2786 (TCC)

Case No: HT-2026-000243

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION

TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date: 29th October 2026

Before :

JONATHAN ACTON DAVIS KC

SITTING AS A DEPUTY JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

PAL AEROSPACE LIMITED Claimant
– and –
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
– and –
DEA AVIATION LIMITED
Defendant
Interested Party

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Rob Williams KC and Jonathan Lewis (instructed by DLA Piper) for the Claimant

Azeem Suterwalla KC and Saara Idelbi (instructed by Burges Salmon LLP) for the Defendant

Anneliese Blackwood (instructed by Dentons) for the Interested Party

Hearing date: 15 October 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

JUDGMENT

Judgment available to the Parties 23rd October 2026

Jonathan Acton Davis KC:

1. At the conclusion of the argument on 15 October 2026, at the request of Counsel for the Claimant, I indicated that the application to lift the automatic suspension would fail and that I would grant the application for an expedited trial in December 2026. I said that I would give my reasons in due course. This judgment contains my reasons for both decisions.

2. The case comes before the Court on the Claimant’s application for expedition dated 16 September 2026 and the Defendant’s application to lift the automatic suspension dated 17 September 2026.

3. All parties, including the Interested Party, filed witness evidence in support of their positions.

4. In this judgment, the Claimant is referred to AS PAL. The Defendant is referred to as the Home Office. The Interested Party is referred to as DEA.

5. This case is subject to a Confidentiality Ring Order made by Constable J on 28th September 2026 as amended by Jefford J on 12th October 2026. The consequence is that the Skeleton Arguments and evidence are heavily redacted. Much of the hearing was held without full access. This judgment will be subject to redactions.

6. The case concerns a public procurement challenge against the award of a contract (“the Contract”) for the Strategic Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance Special Missions Aircraft Management Service (“the Procurement”). The Procurement was run by the Home Office on behalf of the Secretary of State. The system, the subject of the Contract, provides surveillance by air of the crossing of small boats carrying migrants (usually asylum seekers) from mainland Europe to the UK. The information gathered is used by the Border Security Command, HM Coastguard and other partners, to decide on, and act, [Redacted].

7. There were [Redacted]. At the conclusion of the Procurement, the Home Office determined that DEA was the winning bidder. The Should Cost Model indexed-discounted evaluated price, i.e. the estimate of the reasonable and efficient cost of delivering the Contract prepared by the Home Office was [Redacted]. DEA’s Financial Pricing Model provided costings, after being index-discounted, that amounted to an evaluated price of [Redacted]. PAL’s final index-discounted evaluated price was [Redacted].

8. PAL is the incumbent provider of the services. The existing Contract is due to expire on 30 November 2026, [Redacted]. On 17 July 2026, PAL issued proceedings challenging the Home Office’s decision to award the Contract to DEA. Pursuant to Regulation 95 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015, PAL’s claim resulted in an automatic suspension on the Home Office’s ability to enter into the Contract. By its application, which as set out above, was not issued until 17 September 2026, the Home Office applies to lift the automatic suspension.

9. PAL argues that this is a rare case in which a procurement claim concerns a very narrow issue of construction which can realistically be brought to a short trial within a couple of months and during which period, the contracting authority will not suffer disruption to the performance of public services or any significant non-financial harm. The just and convenient course is to maintain the suspension pending an expedited trial.

10. The Home Office argues that the suspension should be lifted because this is an extremely clear case of damages being an adequate remedy for PAL. Conversely, damages would not be an adequate remedy for the Home Office, and if it is necessary to consider the balance of convenience, then that too favours the lifting of the suspension because if the suspension is lifted, the Home Office will be able to enter into the Contract with DEA.

11. Ms Blackwood argued that delay and in particular delay in the implementation of the Contract would have adverse impacts on DEA. Losses suffered by DEA would not be adequately remedied by an award of damages. Her position was supportive of the Home Office.

12. The Invitation to Tender includes Volume 3 of the Contract Terms, including Joint and Order Schedules. Schedule 20 contained the specification. Under the heading “Operational Context” at paragraphs 12 to 16 of Schedule 20, the Home Office drew a distinction between “manned” and “unmanned” solutions.

13. It is common ground that PAL and DEA’s tenders relied [Redacted]. It appears that PAL had lost out to DEA on the basis of its price which was approximately [Redacted] of PAL’s price. Through correspondence with the Home Office, it became apparent that the price discrepancy arose because DEA was permitted to submit an allegedly non-compliant bid which should have been excluded by the Home Office on the basis of its requirements. It is said that the claim is concerned with that single issue which is a short point concerning the interpretation of the tender documents. It is said that that process of adjudication turns essentially on the interpretation of a small number of provisions of the tender documents, and confirming a limited number of basic facts about DEA’s tender which are not believed to be in dispute.

The Applications.

14. A reader of PAL’s Skeleton Argument might have gained the impression that the authors considered that the expedition application should be decided first. Mr Suterwalla KC disagreed with that approach. In argument, Mr Williams KC agreed that the primary issue was the application to lift the automatic suspension.

15. The questions for the Court when determining an application to lift the automatic suspension in a Procurement challenge case are as follows:

(i) Is there a serious issue to be tried?

(ii) If so, would damages be an adequate remedy for the Claimant if the suspension were lifted and they succeeded at trial, or is it just, in all the circumstances, that the Claimant should be confined to a remedy of damages?

(iii) If not, would damages be an adequate remedy for the Defendant if the suspension remained in place and it succeeded at trial?

(iv) Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of damages for either of the parties, which course of action is likely to carry the least risk of injustice if it transpires that it was wrong; that is, where does the balance of convenience lie? See generally Camelot UK Lotteries Ltd v Gambling Commission [2022] EWHC 1664 (TCC).

16. Addressing the balance of convenience stage, O’Farrell J said at [126]:

“The balance of convenience test requires the Court to consider all the circumstances of the case to determine which course of action is likely to carry the least risk of injustice to either party if it is subsequently established to be wrong. When determining where the balance of convenience lies:

(i) the Court should consider how long the suspension might have to be kept in force if an expedited trial could be ordered;

(ii) the Court may have regard to the public interest;

(iii) the Court should consider the interests of the successful bidder, alongside the interests of the other party;

(iv) if the factors relevant to the balance of convenience do not point in favour of one side or the other, then the prudent course will usually be to preserve the status quo (or perhaps more accurately the status quo ante), that is to say to lift the suspension and allow the contract to be entered into.”

17. Additionally, in National Commercial Bank Jamaica Limited v Olint Corporation Limited [2009]1 WLR 1405, Lord Hoffmann said:

“In practice, however, it is often hard to tell whether either damages or the cross-undertaking will be an adequate remedy and the Court has to engage in trying to predict whether granting or withholding an injunction is more or less likely to cause irremediable prejudice (and to what extent) if it turns out that the injunction should not have been granted or withheld, as the case may be. The basic principle is the Court should take whichever course seems likely to cause the least irremediable prejudice to one party or another.”

18. It is common ground that there is a serious issue to be tried. I do not therefore need to consider that aspect.

Adequacy of Damages for PAL

19. PAL argues that there are four separate reasons why it would not be just in all the circumstances for it to be confined to a remedy in damages, in the event that the suspension is lifted and the claim is successful at trial.

(i) The difficulties of assessment of damages

20. [Redacted]. The Court will require detailed and cogent evidence as to the effect of the loss of the Contract.

21. The evidence in support is provided in Mr Turner’s Second Witness Statement, confirmed by [Redacted].

22. [Redacted].

23. [Redacted].

24. [Redacted].

25. [Redacted].

26. The second argument relied upon by PAL is [Redacted].

27. On the basis of Mr Turner’s evidence, it is said that [Redacted].

28. [Redacted].

29. The third argument is based on the difficulties of assessment of damages on the alternative case argued by PAL that the relevant requirements in the Invitation to Tender were lacking in transparency. In that case, the Court would have to consider the counterfactual of how PAL would have bid had it been clear that a solution of the type proposed by DEA was in fact permitted. It is said that it is impossible to know the answer to that question.

30. There is a line of authority to the effect that complexities and difficulties raised by the necessity of seeking to conduct a complex counterfactual analysis mean that damages may not be an adequate or fair remedy: see Letting International Limited v Newham LBC [2007] EWCA Civ 1522, Edenred (UK Group) Limited v HM Treasury & others [2014] EWHC 3555 (QB) and Medequip Assisted Technology Limited v Kensington & Chelsea [2022] EWHC 3293.

31. The last reason relied upon by the Claimant is the assertion that there is a risk that there may be no damages at all. I can deal with that argument shortly. The Home Office does not plead that the breaches are not sufficiently serious to justify an award of damages.

32. In response, Mr Suterwalla KC reminds me that where damages would be an adequate remedy for the Claimant, the normal outcome should be that the suspension is lifted: OpenView Security Solutions Limited v Merton [2015] EWHC 2694 (TCC) at paragraph 70. The burden of proof is on the dissatisfied tenderer.

33. Mr Suterwalla KC relies upon [Redacted]. The Judge distilled the following principles:

“(1) [Redacted].

(2) [Redacted].

(3) [Redacted].

(4) [Redacted].

34. The fact that the assessment of damages after trial will not be straightforward and that there will be difficulty in such an assessment does not necessarily mean that damages will not be an adequate remedy for a claimant: Medequip (supra) at paragraph 40, as explained by O’Farrell J in Bombardier Transportation v London Underground Limited [2018] EWHC 2926 (TCC) at paragraph 58.

35. Mr Suterwalla KC relies also upon the guidance given by Stuart-Smith J in Alstom Transport Limited v London Underground [2017] EWHC 1521, with particular reference to claims that [Redacted]:

“(1) [Redacted].

(2) [Redacted].

(3) [Redacted].

36. At paragraphs 33-44 of its Skeleton Argument, the Home Office criticises the evidence adduced by PAL on the adequacy or otherwise of damages, saying in broad terms that the evidence is unclear. At paragraph 39, the Home Office emphasises (and this point loomed large in argument) that PAL’s case that damages are an inadequate remedy almost entirely rests on [Redacted].

37. At this stage, the Court need only be satisfied that there is a realistic risk that damages are not an adequate remedy for PAL: One Medicare (t/a One Primary Care LLP) v NHS Northamptonshire Integrated Care Board [2025] EWHC 623 (TCC).

38. In my judgment, it is important to emphasise that the case argued by PAL depends [Redacted] on the effect [Redacted] of losing the Procurement, [Redacted] on [Redacted], PAL. Mr Williams’ argument and Mr Turner’s evidence concern matters from the perspective of PAL [Redacted]. However, the argument depends on the impact on PAL, [Redacted].

39. I have summarised above Mr Turner’s evidence. I agree with Mr Williams KC that there is no real answer to it. That is sufficient for me to determine this issue in favour of PAL.

40. I am satisfied that there is a real risk that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the Claimant if the suspension were lifted and it succeeded at trial. I do not believe it to be just in all the circumstances that PAL should be confined to a remedy of damages.

Would damages be an adequate remedy for the Home Office?

41. There is a line of authority, including Medequip Assisted Technology Limited v Kensington & Chelsea [2022] EWHC 3293, One Medicare (t/a) One Primary Care LLP v Northamptonshire [2025] EWHC 623, and Teleperformance Contact Limited v The Home Office [2023] EWHC 2481, to the effect that it is a relevant fact that a public body has determined that services should be provided, or should be provided in a particular way. If that body is not able to provide the services in the form and on the terms it wishes, that is a loss which cannot be adequately compensated in damages.

42. That is expanded upon at paragraph 53 – 58 of the Home Office’s Skeleton Argument. In argument, Ms Idelbi further emphasised through references to the Cranston Inquiry and Report the dangers to human life of what have become known as small boat crossings. Whilst recognising the importance of such matters, it is difficult to see any causative link between a procurement challenge and such crossings which might lead to an award of damages.

43. Mr Kitching’s evidence on behalf of the Home Office is expressed in general terms. For example, he says in his First Statement that the suspension prevents the Home Office “from realising operational, financial and public value benefits which cannot be recreated or adequately compensated after the event” (paragraph 8).

44. Broadly, there is insufficient evidence for me to conclude that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the Home Office, particularly where a speedy trial in December can take place. [Redacted]

45. The Home Office also argued that an expedited trial would cause them practical difficulties. That was primarily argued as justification for lifting the suspension.

46. As I said at the hearing, the pressures on the Home Office are well-known. The Court is sympathetic. However, much of the work on this case will be done by outside lawyers. That is not to say that there will be no disruption to and inconvenience for the ordinary work of Home Office staff, but that is an inevitable consequence of the procurement challenge.

Adequacy of damages for DEA

47. DEA’s evidence describes difficulties in recruiting staff and the impact on DEA’s [Redacted] if the Contract is delayed into 2027. Both points are met if a trial takes place in December. Broadly, DEA’s interests are met by a speedy resolution of this challenge to the Procurement.

The balance of convenience

48. As explained by O’Farrell J in Camelot UK Lotteries v Gambling Commission (Supra):

“The balance of convenience test requires the Court to consider all the circumstances of the case to determine which course of action is likely to carry the least risk of injustice to either party if it is subsequently established to be wrong. When determining where the balance of convenience lies:

(i) the Court should consider how long the suspension might have to be kept in force if an expedited trial could be ordered …

(ii) the Court may have regard to the public interest …

(iii) the Court should consider the interests of the successful bidder, alongside the interests of the other parties …

(iv) If the factors relevant to the balance of convenience do not point in favour of one side or the other, then the prudent course would usually be to preserve the status quo (or, perhaps more accurately, the status quo ante) that is to say to lift the suspension and allow the contract to be entered into.”

49. Most of the Home Office’s submissions on this issue concern what they describe as the impracticability of the arrangements for an expedited trial.

50. I disagree that the proposals made by PAL are unworkable. Since the hearing of this matter directions have been made leading to a trial beginning on 7 December 2026.

51. Broadly, therefore, I accept that the balance of convenience favours the maintenance of the suspension pending the determination of the claim at an expedited trial. That course avoids the risk that the public purse will have to pay twice, once to the appointed service provider, and once in damages. Moreover, it avoids the risk of PAL being confined to its remedy in damages which I have already decided is an insufficient remedy.

Expedited trial

52. In W L Gore & Associates GmbH v Geox SpA [2008] EWCA Civ 622, Lord Neuberger identified four factors which the Court should take into account when considering an application for expedition:

“(i) whether a good reason for expedition has been shown;

(ii) whether expedition would interfere with the due administration of justice;

(iii) whether expedition would cause prejudice to the other party to the application; and

(iv) whether there are any other special factors operating in favour or against expedition.”

53. As set out above, Mr Suterwalla KC accepted that an expedited trial should take place if the decision of the Court was that the suspension should not be suspended.

54. In those circumstances, whilst I record that I have considered the factors identified by Lord Neuberger, it is unnecessary for me to set out that consideration in this judgment.

55. For those reasons, the decision was as indicated:

(i) The application to lift the automatic suspension must be refused; and

(ii) There be an Order for an expedited trial. Directions have now been made for that expedited trial.

56. I am grateful to all Counsel for their help.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

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