Miscellaneous United Kingdom
Prescot Management Company Limited & Anor v Zahid Khan
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2855 (BP)
Case No: PT-2026-000602
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY DIVISION
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST
(Underlying proceedings: County Court at Clerkenwell and Shoreditch, Claim No. M04EC634)
Rolls Building
Fetter Lane,
London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 5 November 2026
Before :
MR JUSTICE TWIGGER
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Between :
| (1) PRESCOT MANAGEMENT COMPANY LIMITED (2) DIAMANDIS KARAMAGIAS |
Claimants/ Applicants | |
| – and – | ||
| ZAHID KHAN | Defendant/ Respondent |
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Mr Duncan Kynoch (instructed by Colman Coyle) for the Claimants/ Applicant
Mr Zahid Khan in person
– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Approved Judgment
………………………..
Mr Justice Twigger :
1. On 26 October 2026 I heard the Claimants’ application for an Extended Civil Restraint Order (ECRO). I gave an extempore judgment that afternoon, in which I concluded that it was appropriate to make an ECRO in respect of the Defendant, Mr Khan. Given the time at which I concluded my judgment, I gave directions for written submissions on costs to be filed.
2. This judgment deals with two matters. First, it addresses Mr Khan’s various criticisms of the draft order provided by the Claimants and explains my reasons for making the order in the form in which I have approved it. Secondly, it contains my decision in relation to costs. It is my intention that this judgment will be handed down remotely and be accompanied by the order of 26 October 2026 and an order as to costs. I will not set out the background, which was dealt with in detail in my extempore judgment.
3. I start with Mr Khan’s points relating to the draft order.
4. Mr Khan objects to the description of the Second Claimant in the title to the action as “representative of the First Claimant’s directors, officers, employees and agent”. That wording reflects the order of District Judge Naidoo dated 4 September 2025 and should, in my judgment, be stated in the heading of the action.
5. Mr Khan also objects to the penal notice. The inclusion of a penal notice follows the standard form N19A and is consistent with normal practice. It is important that the ECRO is obeyed and I consider that a penal notice should be included.
6. I understand the First Claimant (“PMCL”) has agreed to the deletion of the former paragraph 1 of the order, which related to the transfer of the claim from the County Court and back again, for the purpose of applying for the ECRO. Although it was an order I was asked to make, and I was prepared to do so, it seems to me not strictly to be necessary in the circumstances, and I am content to follow the parties’ agreement not to include it.
7. I have obtained the Deputy President of the Business and Property Division’s nomination of the Judges to whom application for permission should be made, so they are now named in paragraph 1 of the order.
8. Several points then arise in relation to the defined “Related Matters” included in paragraph 3 of the order.
9. First, Mr Khan objects to the inclusion of matters relating to or involving Flat 147, its ownership, occupation and possession. He says this is a matter between him and Ms Laskar, and not an issue with which PMCL is concerned. I disagree. Mr Khan’s continued assertions that he retains a beneficial interest in the Flat, despite the orders of Recorder Wood and Ritchie J, are the foundation for most of the claims and applications which he has made and on which my decision to make the ECRO is based. Not to include this within the scope of the Related Matters would seriously curtail the effectiveness of the order.
10. For the same reasons, I also reject Mr Khan’s suggestion that the inclusion of the conduct of Ms Laskar in relation to the Flat risks reintroducing the proprietary matters in relation to the Flat. Mr Khan’s persistence in arguing those “proprietary matters” is the reason behind many of the applications certified as totally without merit. I have moved the words relating to Ms Laskar up from sub-paragraph (e) to sub-paragraph (a), however, where they seem to me most logically to fit.
11. Next, Mr Khan has deleted the words “insurance and fire safety” from the matters relating to the Building. In this connection, he has included a lengthy passage later in the order expressly excluding from its scope various kinds of action which might be taken in relation to fire safety and other matters, such as reports to regulators or the fire brigade. As paragraphs 1 and 2 of the order state, its effect is to restrain claims and applications in the High Court, County Court and First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber). It does not have any wider scope. Mr Khan’s additional wording is, therefore, unnecessary. I do, however, consider that insurance and fire safety should be included within the scope of the order. Mr Khan should not be able to side-step the ECRO by making an application concerned with fire safety, but it is important to remember that the order does not prevent Mr Khan from making claims or applications if the Judge from whom permission is sought considers that they have merit.
12. Mr Khan has struck through the words “past and present” in connection with PMCL’s directors. In my judgment, the express inclusion of “past” directors is required because one of Mr Khan’s claims was made against Mr Bolland, a former director. Again, not to include past directors would curtail the effectiveness of the order.
13. Mr Khan’s next point relates to PMCL’s inclusion within the Related Matters of “the use in any proceedings of judgments of the Family Court in proceedings between” Mr Khan and Ms Laskar. His suggested wording expressly refers to three particular judgments, and I agree that is appropriate. HHJ Bugg gave permission to PMCL to use those three judgments for the limited purposes of the harassment claim. It is applications about the use of those three judgments which relate to these proceedings and which should, therefore, be covered by the ECRO. There may be other judgments of the Family Court which have no relevance to the issues which have led to the ECRO and there is no evidential basis for thinking that any applications could be made about them in connection with any proceedings involving PMCL. Consequently, I consider PMCL’s draft extends too far. I have amended paragraph 3(e) of the order accordingly. I do not, however, consider that Mr Khan’s additional “for the avoidance of doubt” wording is necessary.
14. The next set of issues relates to the express exclusions from the order contained in paragraph 4. The ECRO does not have the effect of staying currently existing claims and applications and I consider that it is potentially helpful to refer to known applications which are ongoing, to avoid any future argument about them, as PMCL has done. I consider, however, that PMCL’s suggested wording could lead to confusion, because it might be argued to imply that existing applications which are not mentioned are somehow affected by the order. On the other hand, Mr Khan’s suggested wording is too expansive. For example, appeals against future orders made on existing applications are intended to be caught by the ECRO. I have insufficient knowledge of the Bristol appeal and the renewal application for permission to appeal in relation to Districk Judge Willink’s order to be able to include them. I have amended the wording to take the above points into account.
15. Paragraph 3.2(3) of CPR Practice Direction 3C makes clear that Mr Khan is able to appeal the ECRO in the normal way, so this does not need to be expressly stated. PMCL’s agreement that Mr Khan can apply for directions within the harassment proceedings (except for a variation of the interim injunction) seems to me to be a separate exclusion from the ECRO, and I have amended the wording accordingly.
16. The wording relating to applications for permission follows the standard form N19A and does not, in my view, require amendment.
17. In relation to service, I have adopted Mr Khan’s suggestion of service to a single email address. If he is content with that, I see no reason to serve by other methods. I do, however, consider it helpful to state expressly that service shall be deemed effected on the second business day after sending, to remove the scope for any argument. It is not for the court to say whether Mr Khan’s consent to electronic service extends only to this order. The scope of his agreement with PMCL is a matter between them.
18. I have amended the paragraphs dealing with written submissions in relation to costs to reflect my direction by email that Mr Khan could file his submissions by 2 November 2026. Since I have now received and reviewed the parties’ written submissions, I will set out my decisions on costs below.
19. The Claimants were the successful party and, in accordance with the general rule, are entitled to an order that Mr Khan should pay their costs. There is no basis to depart from the general rule in this case.
20. The Claimants seek their costs on the indemnity basis. Costs are ordered on the indemnity basis where the conduct of the parties, or the circumstances of the case, or both, are such as to take the situation “out of the norm” in a way which justifies an order for indemnity costs. The expression “out of the norm” refers to something outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings.
21. I am satisfied that an order should be made on the indemnity basis in the circumstances of this case. This is based on my overall assessment of Mr Khan’s conduct, but factors which have weighed heavily are the following:
i) It was clear that Mr Khan had sought to make it as difficult as he could for the Claimants to serve the papers relevant to the application on him. He returned unread the bundles which were taped to his door, for reasons which made no sense to me. He relied on the injunction obtained against him as a reason for saying that he was unable to collect his post. He made service by email impossible, asking instead to be sent a link to CE-file.
ii) Mr Khan had applied for an adjournment of the hearing to Master Pester, who refused that application. Mr Khan then sought to appeal Master Pester’s order and made a further application for an adjournment to me at the beginning of the hearing.
iii) Mr Khan sought the adjournment from me on the basis that he had not had time to prepare, because he had only received the papers when they were handed to him at a different hearing the previous week. When the adjournment was refused, however, it became clear that he had detailed notes for his submissions already prepared.
iv) Mr Khan produced new evidence at the hearing, including a witness statement of Ms Baig, which had not been provided to the Claimants in advance.
v) Mr Khan said at the hearing that the other directors of PMCL were unaware of the ECRO application. There was no evidence in support of that submission and it appeared to me unlikely to be correct. It is illustrative of Mr Khan’s propensity to think up arguments without notice, making it difficult for the Claimants to anticipate every point.
22. Mr Khan submits that the fact of an ECRO being made is not enough to justify an order for costs on the indemnity basis without more. Even assuming (without deciding) that he is right about that, the above matters are examples of Mr Khan’s conduct of the application for the ECRO. They are, in my judgment, well outside the ordinary and reasonable conduct of proceedings by themselves. They will inevitably have caused the Claimants’ costs to increase. They are “out of the norm” and justify an order for costs on the indemnity basis.
23. The Claimants invite me to summarily assess the costs. They have filed an N260 containing a breakdown of a total sum sought of £49,076.45. Mr Khan submits that the N260 is insufficiently particularised to permit summary assessment now, so there should be further directions and either summary assessment at a later date, or detailed assessment. I do not consider postponement of an award of costs to be appropriate or cost-effective. The assessment is best carried out by me at this time, whilst the matter is fresh in my mind. I will consider Mr Khan’s submissions concerning the particularisation of the sums sought when dealing with the summary assessment.
24. Costs must be reasonably incurred and reasonable in amount. An assessment of costs on the indemnity basis requires the court to resolve any doubt as to reasonableness in favour of the receiving party. There is no requirement to consider proportionality.
25. Counsel’s fee is £10,000. Based on my experience, that is well within the range of reasonable fees for a hearing lasting a day with a complex background. The order being sought was serious and required careful preparation by counsel. I do not consider it necessary to require a fee note or further particularisation.
26. My recollection is that the hearing lasted all day, from 10.30 am until after 5.00 pm. Seven hours attendance for the partner and Grade D fee earner appears reasonable, therefore.
27. Mr Khan challenges the fees charged by Mr Champ on the basis that he has been charged at Grade A rates but is CILEX qualified and on the basis that the rate in question is higher than the London 3 Guideline Hourly Rates. There is nothing in the first point. Legal executives with over 8 years’ experience fall within the Grade A bracket. Moreover, Mr Champ’s witness statements were in evidence, from which it is clear that, not only does he have day-to-day control of the matter, he is an experienced and competent litigator. The hourly rate charged (£375) is indeed higher than the London 3 guideline, although it does not appear to me especially high for a case of this type, given the complex history. I will come back to this.
28. Mr Khan points out that the figure of £10,312.50 claimed at Grade A rate for attendances is not particularised for dates or purposes. That is true, but it is a feature of the summary assessment procedure that a relatively broad brush is applied. I do not consider it proportionate to require further particularisation. Nor do I consider the three hours claimed for each of attendance on opponents and attendance on others to be unreasonable in the context of this application.
29. So far as work on documents is concerned, Mr Khan highlights the risk of overlap between work relevant to the ECRO and work in relation to which the costs have already been allowed in other contexts. There were necessarily several bundles in this case, reflecting the different applications and claims Mr Khan had been party to, in different courts and tribunals. I am not surprised by the amount of time spent preparing bundles (which seems to me relatively modest), nor the time spent updating them as developments occurred. The overall sum claimed for work on documents is around £13,000, which seems to me perfectly reasonable, given the volume of material. That sum includes the drafting of Mr Champ’s witness statements and working on the skeleton argument. I have no reason to believe that Mr Champ has double counted any work.
30. I do not consider it proportionate to require any further breakdown of the sum of £2,699.54 claimed for “travel, sustenance and numerous transcript fees.” That said, the sum claimed does appear on the high side, given that Colman Coyle are based in London.
31. In relation to VAT, there appears to be no dispute that PMCL is not VAT-registered and is therefore entitled to recover VAT. I have no reason to believe that Mr Karamagias is VAT-registered. It appears to me, based on the figures, that VAT has been charged on all sums apart from court fees and the travel, sustenance and transcript fees (£37,930 x 20% = £7,586). That appears reasonable and I do not, therefore, consider it proportionate to require particularisation of who incurred what item and for whom VAT is irrecoverable.
32. Mr Khan then invites me to step back and look at the reasonableness of the costs overall (proportionality being irrelevant to an assessment on the indemnity basis). The total sum of £49,076.45 does not appear to me especially high for an application of this importance and length. Nevertheless, I think it likely that, on detailed assessment, deductions would be made, most importantly in relation to the Grade A hourly rate, which feeds into the calculation of many of the sums claimed. If I insert the London 3 guideline rate of £319 per hour into the excel spreadsheet version of the N260 I have been sent, the total sum reduces to £44,466.53. That is around 90% of the total sum claimed. It seems to me that this is perhaps a little higher than might generally be expected to be recovered on detailed assessment on the indemnity basis. Moreover, as I have said, the travel, sustenance and transcript fees figure seems a little high.
33. Taking these matters into account, and applying a broad-brush approach, I assess the costs at £42,000, including VAT.
34. Mr Khan asks for 180 days to pay (alternatively 90 days, or 42 days). Those periods are all far too long. I appreciate that Mr Khan says he is on Universal Credit and has no income. That is not a good reason for postponing the date on which the Claimants are entitled to be paid. The normal order is 14 days. The most I am prepared to allow is 28 days, i.e. by 3 December 2026.
Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).