Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Q.R. v. D.K.

Official source
Q.R. v. D.K., No. 2464, September Term, 2025. Opinion Filed on October 29, 2026, by
Albright, J.

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER

In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the putative de facto parent’s
maintenance of a residence other than the one in which they lived with the minor does not
preclude putative de facto parent, per se, from establishing that they met the second
prong of the test adopted in Conover v. Conover.

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER

In determining whether one is a de facto parent, the particular living arrangement of the
putative de facto parent and the minor child must be considered.

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT> LIVED TOGETHER

Ultimately, whether or not a putative de facto parent meets Conover’s second prong does
not depend, exclusively, on whether that putative de facto parent maintains another
residence, but on the contours of the household from the child’s point of view.

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT

The “de facto parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto
parent and the child . . . without reference to the parent’s characteristics or the
relationship’s origins.” Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. 561, 574

 (2018). “What matters
. . . is the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child and the child’s
best interests, not the relationship’s title or consanguinity.” 

Id. at 575

.

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT

A putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when petitioning
for access to a minor child: (1) the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and
fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with
the child; (2) the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household; (3) the
petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the
child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s
support, without expectation of financial compensation; and (4) the petitioner has been
in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a
bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature.” Conover v. Conover, 

450 Md. 51, 85

(2016).

CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT

Because “de facto parenthood would interfere with the relationship between legal parents
and their children,” we require putative de facto parents to meet a “narrowly tailored
[test] to avoid infringing upon the parental autonomy of a legal parent.” Conover v.
Conover, 

450 Md. 51, 75

 (2016); Basciano v. Foster, 

256 Md. App. 107

, 144 (2022).

CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT

A “de facto parent” is “a party who claims custody or visitation rights based upon the
party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted child.” Kpetigo v.
Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. 561, 570

 (2018).

CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY > DE FACTO PARENT

De facto parenthood arises when, “with the [legal] parent’s knowledge and consent,”
Kpetigo v. Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. 561, 574

 (2018) and while “labor[ing] alongside [the
legal parent] in their family,” the de facto parent becomes “a psychological parent” to the
child, V.C. v. M.J.B., 

163 N.J. 200, 221

 (2000). In these situations, “the child[] [has] a
strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide
for them. That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional
bonds that develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.” V.C., 

163
N.J. at 221

.

CONSTITUTION > CHILD CUSTODY

Even though a parent’s fundamental right to parent is implicated in a custody case,
parents in such cases do not necessarily enjoy “the full panoply of constitutional due
process protections” afforded criminal defendants.

PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE

The Court “has consistently affirmed denials of motions to continue . . . in the absence of
unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably
mitigated, where untimely requests were made, [and] where procedural rules were
ignored[.]” Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring, Inc., 

418 Md. 231, 242-43

(2011).
PRETRIAL PROCEDURE > CONTINUANCE

It is not an unforeseen circumstance to cause surprise that could not have been reasonably
mitigated when the litigant requests their counsel to withdraw, and their counsel acts on
the request.
Circuit Court for Charles County
Case No. C-08-FM-25-000604
                                                                      REPORTED

                                                            IN THE APPELLATE COURT

                                                                   OF MARYLAND

                                                                       No. 2464

                                                              September Term, 2025
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                                          Q.R.

                                                                           v.

                                                                     D.K.
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                         Leahy,
                                                         Albright,
                                                         Raker, Irma S.
                                                            (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned),
                                                    ______________________________________

                                                              Opinion by Albright, J.
                                                    ______________________________________


                                                           Filed: October 29, 2026

                                                    *Tang, Rosalyn, J. did not participate in the
                                                    Court’s decision to designate this opinion for
                                                    publication pursuant to Md. Rule 8-605.1.


Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.


             2026.10.29
             14:58:44 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
       In Conover v. Conover, 

450 Md. 51

 (2016), the Supreme Court recognized de

facto parenthood and adopted a four-prong test, first established by the Wisconsin

Supreme Court in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 

533 N.W. 2d 419

 (Wisc. 1995), for

determining when a putative de facto parent is in fact a de facto parent. Thus, after

Conover, a putative de facto parent “bears the burden of proving the following when

petitioning for access to a minor child:”

       (1)    the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
              petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
              with the child;
       (2)    the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
       (3)    the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant
              responsibility for the child’s care, education and development,
              including contributing towards the child’s support, without
              expectation of financial compensation; and
       (4)    the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient
              to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
              parental in nature.

Conover, 

450 Md. at 85

.

       In this appeal from the Circuit Court for Charles County, the court concluded that

Appellee D.K.1 is the de facto parent of a child born to Appellant Q.R. through artificial

insemination while the parties were in a romantic relationship. Ms. R. does not dispute

that Ms. K. satisfied the first, third, and fourth prongs of the Conover test.

       Instead, Ms. R. here argues that the circuit court erred in finding that Ms. K. and

the minor lived together in the same household—Conover’s second prong. She contends


       1
          To protect the privacy of the parties and the minor child, we refer to the parties
and adult witnesses by their initials and refer to the minor child by randomly selected
initials. We mean no disrespect in doing so.
that, because this finding was in error, the court abused its discretion in concluding that

Ms. K. is the minor’s de facto parent. Ms. R. points to the fact that Ms. K. maintained

another residence in the District of Columbia and argues that Ms. K.’s doing so negates

the living-together prong per se. We disagree.

       Ms. R. presents two questions for our review,2 which we have rephrased as

follows:

                I. Did the circuit court err when it found Ms. K. and the minor
                   child lived together in the same household and, on that basis,
                   abuse its discretion when it concluded that Ms. K. is a de
                   facto parent to the minor child?
                II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion when it denied Ms.
                    R.’s Motion for Continuance at the custody trial?

We answer both questions in the negative and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

                       FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

                                 Early Relationship and Pregnancy

       Ms. R. and Ms. K. were previously involved in a romantic relationship. The

parties met in 2018 and began dating in 2020. The parties were never engaged or married.




       2
           Ms. R. presented the questions as follows:

           I.    Did the trial court abuse its discretion by determining that Appellee was
                 a de facto parent when she maintained an entirely separate residence
                 and did not live in the same household with the minor child?
       II.       Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s request
                 for a continuance so that Appellant could have counsel present to assist
                 her at an evidentiary hearing involving the determination of de facto
                 parenthood after her prior counsel withdrew from the case two days
                 prior to said hearing?

                                                  2
During their entire relationship, Ms. K. maintained an apartment in the District of

Columbia, and Ms. R. maintained a residence in Maryland.3

       In 2019, Ms. R. prepared to have a child through the process of artificial

insemination by undergoing two surgeries, the first in 2019 and a second in 2020. The

parties shared in the planning of the pregnancy. Specifically, Ms. K. went to doctor’s

appointments with Ms. R., helped to pay for the mobile application used by the fertility

clinic to select the donor, discussed the characteristics of the ideal donor, filtered out

donors that didn’t meet their criteria, listened to the voices of potential donors, and paid

the additional fee to hear the voices of the potential donors. Ms. K. assisted in selecting

the donor. Together they selected a donor of Asian descent because they “didn’t want to

go with a white sperm donor” and Ms. K. didn’t want “a Spanish donor.”

       Ms. R. received her first intrauterine insemination injection in 2021. Ms. K. took

Ms. R. to her insemination appointments, recounting that for one appointment, she had to

“pick up the canister [of sperm,] put it in [her] car[,] and take [the canister and Ms. R.] to

[be] inseminated.” Following the insemination procedure, Ms. R. would “lay in the bed

all day” at Ms. K.’s District of Columbia apartment. In December 2021, after five cycles

of intrauterine insemination injections, Ms. K. received a call from Ms. R. exclaiming,

“we’re pregnant.”




       3
          Ms. R. lived in an apartment in Columbia, Maryland, when she and Ms. K. began
their relationship. In 2024, Ms. R. and the minor child moved to their current residence, a
townhome in Waldorf, Maryland.

                                               3
                                    The Birth of Q.D.

       Ms. R. gave birth to Q.D. on August 19, 2022, via cesarian-section. Many family

members, including Ms. R.’s mother and father, traveled to Maryland to be with Ms. R.

for the birth of her son. Under hospital policy, only one person was allowed to

accompany Ms. R. into the operating room. Ms. R. selected Ms. K. to be with her in the

operating room and witness the birth of Q.D. While Ms. R. recovered from giving birth,

Ms. K. stayed with her for “periods of time” in the maternity department, “leav[ing] to go

to work” and returning to the hospital “in the evening.” Ms. K.’s name was not on Q.D.’s

birth certificate. Even so, Q.D. calls her “mama Mǔqīn” (mother in Mandarin).

                                        Family Life

       From his birth, Q.D. lived with Ms. R. Following Q.D.’s birth, Ms. K. ate meals,

cleaned, slept, and left for work from Ms. R.’s Maryland apartment. Ms. K. would depart

from “work at 3:30 p.m.,” go to her District of Columbia apartment “to take care of [her]

cat[,]” drive to the grocery store to purchase items for Ms. R. and Q.D., and return to Ms.

R.’s apartment to “be with [her] and [Q.D.] throughout the night.”

       Q.D. gave Ms. K. Mother’s Day and birthday cards addressed to Mǔqīn in Ms.

R.’s handwriting. Ms. K. listed Q.D. as the “beneficiary for all her assets.”

       Ms. K. slept at Q.D.’s home on most nights from August 2022, when Q.D. was

born, until November 2022 when the romantic relationship “deteriorated.” Moreover, the

parties began to disagree on how to raise Q.D. In March 2023, seven months after Q.D.

was born, the parties were no longer “consistently spend[ing] the night together.”




                                             4
        Despite the change in Ms. R.’s and Ms. K.’s romantic relationship, the parties

continued to co-parent Q.D. Ms. K. continued to contribute to the cost of daycare and

purchase items for Q.D., including clothes, diapers, and food.

                            Pleadings, Motions, and Petitions

        On April 22, 2025, Ms. K., pro se, filed a Complaint for Custody of Q.D., holding

herself out as a de facto parent of Q.D. Three days later, Ms. K., still representing herself,

amended her complaint. She sought joint physical custody and joint legal custody of Q.D.

The Amended Complaint stated that joint custody was in the best interest of Q.D. because

Ms. K. is “a fit and proper person to have joint physical [and joint legal] custody of

[Q.D.]” Ms. K. claimed that she was “in [Q.D.’s] life since birth and cared for him

because he is my son.” In her pleading, Ms. K. asserted that “[Q.D.] knows [her] as one

of his mothers[,]” and that she “can provide a safe and stable environment for [Q.D.]”

Ms. R. was served with the Summons and Amended Complaint for Custody on April 29,

2025.

        On April 29, 2025, the parties cross-filed petitions for protection. Ms. K. and Ms.

R. both consented to the entry of a Final Protective Order (FPO) without admitting the

allegations in the petitions. Under the issued FPOs, the parties were to have no contact

with each other, and Ms. K. was to have no contact with Q.D. The FPOs were made

effective through April 29, 2026.

        On June 2, 2025, Ms. R., represented by counsel, filed a Response to Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer”). Ms. R. alleged that she is the “biological

mother” of Q.D. and that Ms. K. “has no standing to request custody [or] visitation of the


                                              5
minor child [because] she is not a biological parent, nor a de facto parent to the minor

child.” In her Answer, Ms. R. declared, “Plaintiff fails the four-prong test to determine de

facto parentage, as she does not meet any of the four requirements for de facto parentage,

and therefore the ability to seek custody and/or visitation of the minor child.” (Emphasis

added). Specific to the second prong, Ms. R. asserted that

        Plaintiff has not lived in the home of the minor child. The Plaintiff lives in
        Washington DC, and the Defendant and the minor child live, and have lived
        for the duration of the minor child’s life, in Waldorf, Maryland. The Plaintiff
        and Defendant have never cohabitated and shared a residence together.

        The custody trial was initially scheduled for July 21, 2025. Ms. K. requested, and

was granted, a continuance on July 17, 2025, to, inter alia, (1) file a Second Amended

Complaint to clearly state the necessary information showing her entitlement to the relief

being requested, (2) respond to Ms. R.’s Answer because the “nature of the document

reads like a Counter-Complaint[,]” and (3) allow her newly obtained counsel time to

“prepare a proper case for de facto custody.” The trial was continued until September 26,

2025.

        On July 17, 2025, i.e, the day the continuance was granted, Ms. K. filed her

Second Amended Complaint for De Facto Parent Status and Child Custody (“Second

Amended Complaint”). Ms. K. asserted that together the parties decided to and planned

for a baby “by way of genetic donor.” The Second Amended Complaint pled specific

facts to support claims that: “through [Ms. R.’s] words and actions” she “consented to

and fostered the bond that [Ms. K.] shares with the minor child[;]” the parties “existed at

the same time and same place, having a sexual relationship, and raising a child like a



                                              6
family[;]” the “parties worked together to ensure the minor child had what he needed[;]”

Ms. K. made “financial contributions [] without the expectation of reimbursement as []

part of raising a child[;]” and the parties “operated like a couple raising a child together.”

Specific to the disputed second prong of the de facto parenthood test, the Second

Amended Complaint stated, “[t]hat since his birth, the minor child has resided with the

Defendant, and the Plaintiff when she was there.” Ms. K. specifically requested

“recogni[tion of] Plaintiff as a de facto parent to [Q.D.]” and “shared physical and shared

legal custody of [Q.D.]”

       Also on July 17, 2025, Ms. K. filed her Answer to Defendant’s Counter-Complaint

Titled Response to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint for Custody (“Answer to Counter-

Complaint”). Ms. K. denied that she lacked standing to request custody or visitation of

Q.D. She further denied that she did not meet the four-prong de facto parent test.

       Ms. R. filed her Answer to Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint for De Facto

Parent Status and Custody (“Answer to Second Amended Complaint”) on August 15,

2025. While Ms. R. admitted to a romantic relationship with Ms. K., she denied each

statement pertaining to planning the pregnancy, supporting Ms. R. during her pregnancy,

and parenting of Q.D. that Ms. K. asserted. In answer to where Q.D. resided, Ms. R.

admitted that Ms. K. “came to [Ms. R.’s] home in the evenings until [Q.D] was seven (7)

months old.”

       The minor child has always resided with [Ms. R.], as she is his parent. The
       child has never resided with [Ms. K.], as the parties have never lived together.
       Further, [Ms. K.] only came to [Ms. R.]’s home in the evenings until the child
       was seven (7) months old. [Ms. K.] never stayed in [Ms. R.]’s home again
       after March 2023.


                                              7
                         Ms. R. Asks Her Counsel to Withdraw

       On September 9, 2025, Ms. R.’s counsel—on Ms. R.’s request—filed a Motion to

Withdraw as Counsel. In support of the Motion, Ms. R.’s counsel stated:

       1. Defendant has requested that Counsel withdraw from the case, and has
       provided her consent to this withdrawal of counsel by her signature on the
       attached Order of Withdrawal. . . .
       2. Pursuant to Md. R. Civ. P. Cir. Ct. 2-132, this withdrawal will not cause
       undue delay, prejudice or injustice. Defendant is aware that the trial is set on
       the docket for September 26, 2025, and will not be asking for a continuance
       based on the withdrawal of counsel.
       3. Plaintiff[’]s counsel does not oppose the withdrawal as evidenced by their
       signature on the Order of Withdrawal, filed concurrently with the Motion.

Ms. R. consented to the Motion’s proposed Order, signing it on September 9, 2025, under

a line that said, in bolded capital letters, “Seen and Agreed.” The circuit court granted the

Motion on September 24, 2025, and issued a notice to employ new counsel on the same

day.

       After the circuit court granted counsel’s Motion to Withdraw on September 24,

2025, Ms. R. requested a continuance to obtain new counsel. In her Motion for

Continuance, Ms. R. explained the timing of her filing:

       The Defendant was represented by legal counsel, Tara Steinnard Talley, who
       filed a motion to withdraw on or about [September 9, 2025].
       At the time the Defendant attempted to contact the Court to request a
       continuance, the motion to withdraw had not yet been formally accepted, and
       the Court record still showed the Defendant as being represented by counsel.
       As a result, the Court instructed that any continuance must come from the
       attorney of record, even though the Defendant no longer had the benefit of
       legal representation in practice.
       The withdrawal was handled without proper notice or transition, and the
       Defendant was not adequately informed by former counsel that they would
       be required to represent themselves in the next hearing.


                                              8
Ms. R. “d[id] not feel capable or competent to self represent” because “the best interests

and custody of a minor child” are “serious[] legal issues.” Ms. R. asserted that she “ha[d]

been making diligent efforts to retain new representation but ha[d] not yet been

successful due to the short timeframe and logistical challenges.” “Th[e] request [was]

made in good faith and not for the purpose of delay, but to ensure fairness, due process,

and the competent presentation of the facts in this case.” The Motion for Continuance

justified the request on “legal grounds and equity[,]” stating:

       Courts have consistently held that due process requires that parties be given
       a fair opportunity to secure legal representation, especially in matters
       affecting parental rights.
       Proceeding without counsel in a custody matter may lead to an unjust
       outcome that affects not only the parties, but also the well-being of the child
       involved.
       A brief continuance would not unduly prejudice the opposing party and
       would allow the Defendant the necessary time to retain new legal counsel
       and prepare for a full and fair hearing.

Ms. R.’s Motion for Continuance requested a sixty-day continuance to retain new

counsel.

       The circuit court denied Ms. R.’s Motion as a preliminary matter in the custody

trial on September 26, 2025. Prior to denying the Motion, Ms. R. confirmed to the court

that she had been notified by her prior counsel that a continuance would not be granted

for lack of counsel. The circuit court also ascertained that Ms. R. had one witness (other

than herself) present and ready to testify. And, while the court ruled that it would deny

Ms. R.’s continuance motion, it did indicate, from the outset, that it would delay closing

arguments so that Ms. R. could secure counsel.



                                              9
                                    The Custody Trial

       The custody trial started on September 26, 2025. Ms. K. was represented by

counsel and testified on her own behalf. Ms. K. did not call any witnesses. The court

admitted twenty-one of Ms. K’s exhibits into evidence including photographs, doctor

appointment communications, daycare invoices, greeting cards, purchase receipts, bank

and credit card statements, emails, and 6,852 pages of text messages between the parties.

Ms. R., a pro se litigant during the evidentiary hearing, testified on her own behalf and

called her sister, Ms. B., as a witness. Ms. R. offered one exhibit as evidence, but it was

not admitted by the court. After the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court adjourned,

postponing closing arguments. The circuit court notified Ms. R. that she could obtain

counsel to “argue the law” at closing argument.

       On November 14, 2025, the circuit court heard closing arguments and delivered its

ruling orally on the record. The circuit court first summarized its findings of fact from the

exhibits received into evidence and witness testimony.

       The exhibits[:] there were photographs, the sonogram, holding him at birth,
       [] being the one person chosen to go into the delivery room. [Q.D.] was in
       the hospital crib. There were texts about doctor’s appointments. There were
       happy birthday cards to Ms. [K.] from, quote, [Q.D.] to Mǔqīn[:] thanks for
       being a great mom. There was a card from Ms. [R.] saying, thanks for
       showing care and concern. There was a birthday card in January 25 from
       [Q.D.]. Happy Mother[,] and then there was a happy Mother’s Day, Mǔqīn,
       and the first birthday party photographs. []Ms. [K.] was the contact for [Q.D.]
       at the daycare. Ms. [K.] paid for the daycare. She used days off. There was a
       document, and I know, Ms. [R.], you said it didn’t prove anything, but it
       wasn’t contradicted. But [] it showed days off from work to care for [Q.D.]
       when there was no childcare. Lots of photos of Ms. [K]. with [Q.D.]. In
       August of ‘22, there was a text from Ms. [R.] to Ms. [K.] saying, you’re a
       great mom[,] you’re a great parent. You’re so good for him. I see that you
       love him.


                                             10
       Okay. So, the testimony from my notes. [] They decided to have the child
       together, went to the fertility doctor together, looked at donors, she provided
       money for it, decided on the Chinese donor together, split the cost of hearing
       the donors’ voices, which was an extra cost in order to hear voices . . .
       The Defendant called her to say, we are pregnant. [] Ms. [K.] was put on the
       doctor’s forms as a parent and other matters also, other documents as well.
       She made [Q.D.] the beneficiary for all her assets. That she slept at [Ms. R.’s]
       house until 2022 when the relationship started to get rocky.
       [Ms. R.] denied that [Ms. K.] wanted a child or wanted marriage. [] She
       denies that Ms. [K.] went with her to her appointments. She states she didn’t
       want her involved and eventually broke up with her due to the discord. She
       tried to remain friends, but it was too stressful[,] that they had done all of the
       selection of the donor and all the other things alone. She never intended to
       do it with [Ms. K.], and that she wants sole custody, no visitation for [Ms.
       K]. She chose [Ms. K.] to be in the delivery room because they were still in
       a relationship then. But Ms. [K.] did not consistently spend the night with
       her. And anything she wrote[,] read[,] said or wrote concerning her being a
       mother was when they were still in a relationship. And she denied that Ms.
       [K.] paid for anything. And she stated what existed three years ago was not
       relevant.
       Ms. [R’s] sister testified that she lived with the Defendant since 2018. That
       Ms. [K.] was not on the lease. She had no keys. She did not live there. No
       recollection of[,] of Ms. [K.] buying or paying for anything over the years.
       After [Q.D.] was born, Ms. [K.] came maybe three days a week to spend the
       night. When they moved to Waldorf, she didn’t come as often. And she
       knows all this because she talks to her sister often and checks the Ring
       camera often.

       The circuit court determined, based on the admitted evidence, that Ms. K. met her

burden on the four prongs of Conover v. Conover. The circuit court’s findings of

credibility highlighted that Ms. K. was very credible in contrast to Ms. R. and Ms. B. The

circuit court found that “everything [Ms. K.] said was true[,]” while Ms. R. and Ms. B.

were “tr[ying] so hard to say this never happened . . . [but] it just didn’t ring true.”

       I actually found Ms. K. very, very credible. I think everything she said was
       true. She was very detailed. She was very specific. Very hurt when things
       didn’t go the way they had been going. Acknowledged that the relationship
       went[,] well[,] didn’t[,] went unwell, basically. Acknowledged that things

                                              11
      got different and got tougher, but did not feel that that changed her ability to
      be a parent to [Q.D.]
      ...
      What I thought about Ms. R.’s and her sister’s testimony was that it was
      strained to find none of the above. It was twisted to find none of the above. I
      did not find it credible. . . . [T]hey tried so hard to say this never happened[,]
      it was never my intention[,] I never meant it to be[,] I never expected this to
      be. And it just didn’t ring true to me.

      The circuit court found that Ms. K. met the first Conover prong, proving that Ms.

R. consented to and fostered the parent-like relationship with Q.D.

      Number one is that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and
      fostered a petitioner’s formation of a parent-like relationship with the child.
      All right. The testimony is different. But here’s my take on it, because I have
      to find the credibility.
      ...
      I believe . . . and she knew so many details about why a Chinese person was
      selected. What about the voices? What about being in the delivery room?
      And, of course, Ms. R. says, well, that’s because we were in a good
      relationship then, but that changed later. . . . But I think that everything that
      Ms. K. testified was true.
      ...
      So, I think that everything that Ms. K. said did, in fact, happen. And I think
      that Ms. R. did, in fact, consent to and foster . . . Ms. K.’s formation of a
      parent-like relationship with the child. And I think she did that while it was
      in her best interest, while it was good for her, while the relationship was
      good, and then after the relationship went sour, just said, I don’t need this
      anymore.

      Finding that Ms. K. met the second Conover prong, the circuit court contemplated

the extent to which Ms. K. and Q.D. must live together in the same household. The court

noted the simplicity of the second prong when the parties are married and the

complication of the requirement in the instant case. The court reasoned as to the second

Conover prong that:


                                             12
       All right. Number two, that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
       same household. The [] Kpetigo case was easy for the court because parties
       lived together for six years. They were married. So, no court in Maryland has
       said it’s got to be at least two years or it’s got to be this or it’s got to be that.
       And every time one of these cases comes out, they evolve. Going all the way
       back to Trox[el], if you wish, but Trox[el] was grandparents and that still
       holds true, that grandparents don’t get de facto parent rights unless they are.
       So, it is a factor to be considered. And I struggled with that because if we
       take that literally and we say, oh, no, they didn’t live together enough, they
       didn’t live together long enough, they didn’t live together frequently enough,
       then we’re done. And I don’t think that’s the way it’s meant to be. . . . So I
       think that, and I may be wrong, and if this case is appealed, I may be reversed,
       but I do not think it’s a hard and fast rule that takes away from the fact that
       these people did at least to some degree live together for some time while
       things were good, and then still continued to co-parent until things got really
       bad.

       The circuit court found that Ms. K. assumed obligations of parenthood by taking

on significant responsibility for the child’s care, education, and development, without the

expectation of reimbursement, thereby establishing the third Conover prong. The circuit

court recounted how Ms. K. purchased household items, contributed to the cost of

daycare, and engaged in feeding, bedtime, and diaper changes, among other things:

       All right. Number three, where the petitioner assumed obligations of
       parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s care,
       education, and development, including contributing towards . . . the child’s
       support. And I think that clearly happened. Payments were made, daycare
       was paid for, groceries were bought, diapers were bought, many things were
       paid for, diapers were changed, bottles were fed to the child, putting the child
       to bed, you know, all of those things were definitely happening. Obviously,
       less and less as Ms. R. started pulling back, and then not at all once Ms. R.
       really pulled back. But I think that there’s no question that Ms. K. did all of
       those things to the extent that she was able to, even as it got less and less,
       including the stalking and hanging around and that kind of stuff that when
       you were still trying to see him.

       Prior to the circuit court making a positive finding on the fourth Conover prong, it

sought clarity from the parties on Q.D.’s age. Upon confirming that Q.D. was


                                                13
approximately two and a half or two and three quarters, the circuit court concluded that

Ms. K. “has been in a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with

the child a [] bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature.” The court summarized:

       He’s old enough to know who’s who. Children that age, [are] old enough to
       understand who feeds him, who changes his diaper, who plays with him, who
       takes him places, who’s at his daycare when they’re doing little events and
       things like that. He’s old enough to . . . know that. And so, . . . I do think that
       there was enough time for . . . a sufficient length of time for there to have
       been established . . . a bonded, dependent relationship, parental in nature. I
       think that did happen.

       After finding that Ms. K. met all four Conover prongs, the court concluded that

Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D. The circuit court again noted the difficulty in

determining to what extent the putative de facto parent must live with the minor child.

Nonetheless, the court found that the burden was met by Ms. K.:

       I do find that there is a de facto parenthood relationship because I think that
       all of these factors are met. And I know that the argument can easily be made
       from a legal standpoint about living together and about how long they lived
       together or didn’t live together, but I don’t think that the way the law is
       developing that it’s meant to create particular cutoff times and especially
       when the other parent is the one cutting off the time.

       Having found that Ms. K. is a de facto parent, the circuit court then moved to the

best interest analysis under the Sanders-Taylor factors.4,5 The court found that it would be


       4
        See Taylor v. Taylor, 

306 Md. 290, 304-11

 (1986); Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs. v. Sanders, 

38 Md. App. 406, 420

(1997).
       5
         The circuit court found: that “there’s no question [Ms. R. and Ms. K. are] both fit
parents[;]” there was “no negative indication” as to the “character and reputation of the
parties[;]” that “Ms. K. is extremely sincere and wants [access]” but “no willingness on
Ms. R.’s part to share custody[;]” that Ms. K. would “maintain the child’s relationship
with the other parent[;]” that Q.D. is not old enough to have a preference regarding


                                               14
in the best interest of Q.D. to maintain a relationship with his de facto parent. To this end,

the circuit court granted Ms. K. visitation with Q.D. and physical and legal custody to

Ms. R. In conformity with its oral findings, the circuit court issued its “Amended Order

of Court” on December 23, 2025.6

       This timely appeal followed. We add additional facts below as necessary.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Under Maryland Rule 8-131(c), this Court reviews “both the law and evidence”

when reviewing actions tried without a jury. B.O. v. S.O., 

252 Md. App. 486

, 501 (2021).

Our Supreme Court distilled “three distinct aspects of review in child custody disputes[.]”

In re Yve S., 

373 Md. 551, 586

 (2003) (citation modified).

       First, when the appellate court scrutinizes factual findings, the clearly erroneous

standard of Rule 8-131(c) applies. 

Id.

 “A trial court’s findings are not clearly erroneous if

there is competent or material evidence in the record to support the court’s conclusion.”

Azizova v. Suleymanov, 

243 Md. App. 340, 372

 (2019) (citation modified). “[We] will

give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the

witnesses.” Md. Rule 8-131.


custody; that the geographic proximity allows for easy access; each party has a stable
home for the child; there are no known financial issues; the parties are employed; the
child’s health is not at issue; Q.D. had a good relationship with both parties; the parties
were separated for “seven months” which is “[not] that long” and “[Q.D.] would
remember” and “certainly get used to reestablishing his relationship with Ms. K.[;]” no
prior abandonment or surrender of custody; and no evidence of “potential disruption of
the child’s social and school life.”
       6
         The order was amended (without substantive changes) because the original order
did not upload properly.

                                              15
       Second, “if it appears that the court erred as to matters of law, further proceedings

in the trial court will ordinarily be required unless the error is determined to be harmless.”

In re Yve S., 

373 Md. at 586

.

       Third, “when the appellate court views the ultimate conclusion[,] . . . the [court’s]

decision should be disturbed only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion.” 

Id.

 There

is an abuse of discretion when:

       no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court, when
       the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles, when the
       court’s ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences
       before the court, when the ruling is violative of fact and logic, or when its
       decision is well removed from any center mark imagined by the reviewing
       court.

Jose v. Jose, 

237 Md. App. 588

, 598–99 (2018) (citation modified).

                                       DISCUSSION

I.     The circuit court did not err when it found that Ms. K. and Q.D. lived
       together in the same household, nor did it abuse its discretion in its ultimate
       conclusion that—having met the four prongs of Conover—Ms. K. is a de facto
       parent to Q.D.

       A.     Legal Framework

       We begin our analysis by summarizing parental rights and their expansion to third

parties under the doctrine of de facto parenthood. We then turn to the disputed second

Conover prong and relevant decisions from other jurisdictions that address the “living

together” prong of the de facto parent test. Finally, we review the circuit court’s findings

on whether Ms. K. satisfied the second Conover prong and consider the circuit court’s

ultimate conclusion that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D.




                                             16
              1.     Fundamental Rights of Parents

       The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right of a parent to

“establish a home and bring up children” in 1923. Meyer v. Nebraska, 

262 U.S. 390, 399


(1923). The Court recognized this right as “perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty

interests recognized by this Court.” Troxel v. Granville, 

530 U.S. 57, 65

 (2000). Protected

by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution, the liberty interest encompasses the “care, custody, and control of their

children,” Troxel, 

530 U.S. at 65

, and recognizes a “cognizable and substantial” interest

in retaining custody of their children, Stanley v. Illinois, 

405 U.S. 645, 652

 (1972).

       In Maryland, “a parent’s liberty interest in raising a child [is] a fundamental one

that cannot be taken away unless clearly justified.” In re Yve S., 

373 Md. at 566

. The right

to rear one’s children is “essential,” and the right is included among a parent’s “basic

civil rights.” Wagner v. Wagner, 

109 Md. App. 1, 37

 (1996) (citation modified). “The

proper starting point for legal analysis when the State involves itself in family relations is

the fundamental constitutional rights of a parent.” In re Yve S., 

373 Md. at 565

.

       However, the rights of parents are not absolute because “the best interest[s] of the

children is the paramount fact” when deciding questions of custody. A.A. v. Ab.D., 

246

Md. App. 418, 441

 (2020) (quoting Kartman v. Kartman, 

163 Md. 19, 22

 (1932)). In

determinations of custody, the court seeks to balance the child’s “indefeasible right to

have their best interests fully considered” against liberty interests of the parent. Basciano

v. Foster, 

256 Md. App. 107

, 131 (2022) (citation modified).




                                              17
       To this end, we “recognize a rebuttable presumption that the child’s best interests

will best be served by custody in a biological parent, over a third-party.” Karen P. v.

Christopher J.B., 

163 Md. App. 250, 265

 (2005) (citation modified). Regarding third-

party petitioners,

       [w]here the dispute is between a fit parent and a private third party, both
       parties do not begin on equal footing in respect to rights to care, custody, and
       control of the children. The parent is asserting a fundamental constitutional
       right. The third party is not. A private third party has no fundamental
       constitutional right to raise the children of others.

E.N. v. T.R., 

474 Md. 346, 371

 (2021) (citation modified). A third-party seeking custody

of a child must rebut the presumption in the biological parent by a preponderance of the

evidence. Shurupoff v. Vockroth, 

372 Md. 639, 662

 (2003).

       Until recently, a third-party petitioning to obtain custody of a child from her

natural parents had to demonstrate parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances.

McDermott v. Dougherty, 

385 Md. 320, 325

 (2005). Today, however, we recognize “a

narrow class of third parties who have a special relationship with a child” where a

showing of parental unfitness or exceptional circumstances is not required. Kpetigo v.

Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. 561, 570

 (2018); Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 133. The narrow

class of third parties is de facto parents. Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. at 570

.

       De facto parenthood does not hinge on the child’s legal parent being absent.

Instead,

       rebutting the presumption of custody in the biological parent, is not
       dependent on its development during the absence of the biological parent. A
       relationship resulting in bonding and psychological dependence upon a
       person without biological connection can develop during an ongoing
       biological parent/child relationship. Particularly is this true when the


                                             18
       relationship is developed in the context of a family unit and is fostered,
       facilitated and, for most of the child’s life, encouraged by the biological
       parent.

Conover, 450 Md. at 76–77 (2016) (quoting Monroe v. Monroe, 

329 Md. 758, 775


(1993)) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, because “de facto parenthood would interfere

with the relationship between legal parents and their children,” we require putative de

facto parents to meet a “narrowly tailored [test] to avoid infringing upon the parental

autonomy of a legal parent.” Conover, 

450 Md. at 75

; Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 144.

              2.     De Facto Parenthood

       A “de facto parent” is “a party who claims custody or visitation rights based upon

the party’s relationship, in fact, with a non-biological, non-adopted child.”7 Kpetigo, 

238

Md. App. at 570

 (citation modified). A putative de facto parent must demonstrate the

following to obtain de facto status:

       (1)    that the biological or adoptive parent consented to, and fostered, the
              petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship
              with the child;8
       (2)    that the petitioner and the child lived together in the same household;
       (3)    that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking
              significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and



       7
         “Other jurisdictions have also referred to this status as a ‘psychological parent,’
an ‘equitable parent,’ a ‘de facto custodian,’ or being in loco parentis.” Kpetigo, 

238 Md.
App. at 570

 n.3. The Maryland Supreme Court defined “‘psychological parents’ as ‘third
parties who have, in effect become parents’” or who have, “essentially, like de facto
parents, . . . assumed a parental role.” 

Id.

 (citation modified).
       8
         Where there are two existing legal parents, both parents must be shown to have
consented to a third party’s formation of a parent-like relationship with a child or, in the
alternative, that one or both parents are unfit or exceptional circumstances exist before
establishing de facto parenthood. E.N. v. T.R., 

474 Md. at 395

.

                                             19
                   development, including contributing towards the child’s support,
                   without expectation of financial compensation; and
        (4)        that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of time
                   sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent
                   relationship parental in nature.

Conover, 

450 Md. at 74

 (emphasis added) (citing In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.

2d at 435–36). In Conover, our Supreme Court made “explicit that de facto parents are

distinct from other third parties.” 

Id. at 85

. Thus, a de facto parent has “standing to

contest custody or visitation and need not show parental unfitness or exceptional

circumstances before a trial court can apply a best interest of the child analysis.” 

Id.

 In so

doing, the Court adopted the Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s H.S.H.-K. de facto parent

test. 

Id. at 74

.

        The adoption of the H.S.H.-K four-part test was grounded in setting a “high bar for

establishing de facto parent status,” and in the “knowing participation” of the legal

parent. Conover, 

450 Md. at 74

. Importantly, the factors ensure that the proceedings are

properly “focus[ed] on the child” and are intended to “protect[] a child’s best interest by

preserving the child’s relationship with an adult who has been like a parent.” In re

Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W. 2d at 436. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated:

        [w]hen a non-traditional adult relationship is dissolving, the child is as likely
        to become a victim of turmoil and adult hostility as is a child subject to the
        dissolution of a marriage. Such a child needs and deserves the protection of
        the courts as much as a child of a dissolving traditional relationship.

Id. at 421.

        Once the status of de facto parent is established, it “counterbalances (or

supersedes) [the legal parent’s] otherwise preemptive right to determine whether and to



                                                20
what extent another adult is involved in his child’s life, and turns the court’s focus to the

best interests of the child.” Id. Stated differently, “a de facto parent is accorded the same

constitutional rights as a biological or adoptive parent, and with that, the presumption that

the child’s best interests are to be with that parent.” Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 144.

       “A putative de facto parent transcends third party status when the party can

establish, first and foremost, ‘that the biological or adoptive parent consented to and

fostered the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the

child.’” Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. at 573

 (quoting Conover, 

450 Md. at 74

). The Conover

Court “highlighted that the first factor of the H.S.H.-K. test—the consent prong—is

‘critical because it makes the biological or adoptive parent a participant in the creation of

the psychological parent’s relationship with the child.’” Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 145

(quoting Conover, 

450 Md. at 75

). Indeed, “de facto parenthood ‘cannot be achieved

without knowing participation by the biological parent.’” 

Id.

 at 146 (citing E.N., 

474 Md.

at 398

 (quoting Conover, 

450 Md. at 74

)).

       Notably, “[n]ot just any relationship will work: the putative de facto parent and

the child must have lived together in the same household, with the de facto parent taking

on real parenting responsibilities over a sustained period of time.” 

Id.

 (emphasis added).

Maryland has yet to examine the second Conover prong; however, courts in other

jurisdictions have, to which we now turn.

       Maryland is one of several sister states that has adopted the H.S.H.-K. test to

determine de facto parenthood. Appellate courts in two of these states, South Carolina

and New Jersey, have considered whether the second prong prevents (or does not


                                              21
prevent) a putative de facto parent from maintaining another residence. The Supreme

Court of South Carolina concluded that the second prong was met even though the child,

legal parent, and putative de facto parent never resided together under the same roof.

Middleton v. Johnson, 

369 S.C. 585, 598

 (Ct. App. 2006). In Middleton, the child spent

half of their time at the legal parent’s residence and half of their time at the putative de

facto parent’s residence. 

Id. at 633

. The child considered each residence to be “home.” 

Id.


The Supreme Court held that the “joint custody arrangement” qualified under H.S.H.-K’s

second prong. 

Id. at 598

.

       Similarly, the Superior Court of New Jersey concluded that the maintenance of

separate residences did not preclude a putative de facto parent from meeting H.S.H.-K.’s

second prong provided that the de facto parent and the legal parent presented themselves

to the world as a family unit. A.F. v. D.L.P, 

339 N.J. Super. 312, 316, 312

 (2001).

Although the New Jersey Superior Court there concluded that the third-party was not a de

facto parent, it did not do so because the parties maintained separate residences. Instead,

the court held that “it [was] not the maintenance of two homes per se that negate[d] the

living-together prong, but the way the parties presented themselves to the world that

warrant[ed] the conclusion that they did not live together with the child.” 

Id. at 324

.

       B.     Ms. R.’s Appellate Contentions

       Ms. R. argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in finding that Ms. K. is a

de facto parent to Q.D. Focusing on the second Conover prong, “living together in the

same household,” Ms. R. asserts that because Ms. K. maintained a separate residence, she

did not meet this prong. Ms. R. adds that the circuit court’s finding that Ms. K. lived with


                                              22
Q.D. “to some degree . . . for some time . . . and then still continued to co-parent until

things got really bad” does not satisfy the second prong of the Conover test because it

does not include a definite finding that the parties lived together.

       Asserting that Maryland caselaw requires that the putative de facto parent and

minor child have “shared the same single household . . . for a significant period of

consecutive time, without dividing their time at their entirely separate household” to meet

the second Conover prong, Ms. R. argues that Ms. K. does not meet this prong because

she only stayed overnight irregularly for two and a half months. She adds that because

Maryland’s courts have not yet held that a putative de facto parent may maintain a second

residence while holding themselves out as a de facto parent, that situation does not meet

Conover’s second prong.

       C.     Analysis

       We see no error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s finding that Ms. K. met

Conover’s second prong or in its conclusion that Ms. K. is Q.D.’s de facto parent. De

facto parenthood arises when, “with the [legal] parent’s knowledge and consent,”

Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. at 574

, and while “labor[ing] alongside [the legal parent] in their

family,” the de facto parent becomes “a psychological parent” to the child, V.C. v. M.J.B.,

163 N.J. 200, 221

 (2000) (citing cases). In these situations, “the child[] [has] a strong

interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who love and provide for them.

That interest, for constitutional as well as social purposes, lies in the emotional bonds that

develop between family members as a result of shared daily life.” V.C., 

163 N.J. at 221

.




                                              23
       A putative de facto parent who maintains another residence is not necessarily

precluded from meeting H.S.H.-K’s second prong. A.F., 

339 N.J. Super. at 324

. In A.F. v.

D.L.P., a legal parent and one claiming to be a de facto parent maintained separate legal

residences, spending “many nights together at one house or the other.” 

Id. at 316

. The

parties were involved in an intimate, romantic relationship from August 1990 through

June 1995. 

Id. at 315

. However, the defendant “hid the romantic aspect of their

relationship from her family and friends, maintaining the appearance of a close, platonic

friendship.” 

Id. at 316

. The defendant traveled to China to adopt a child in May 1995, and

the petitioner was “one of several” people at the airport to greet the adoptive mother and

child upon their arrival home. 

Id. at 323

.

       In finding the petitioner did not meet the “living together” prong, the court

observed that petitioner kept the relationship secret and was “one of several close and

interested friends who [greeted the child at the airport] and offered help and support to

the new, single mother[.]” 

Id.

 Although the New Jersey Superior Court concluded that the

third-party was not a de facto parent, its decision was not a consequence of the parties’

maintaining separate residences:

       We are aware that married couples raising children in so-called “traditional”
       families often have to live apart for periods of the week or year, as when one
       of the parents travels extensively on business, or takes a job in another city.
       The critical distinction from the facts before us is that in those situations, the
       parties continue to hold themselves out to the world as a family unit; they do
       not secrete their relationship. It is not the maintenance of two homes per se
       that negates the living-together prong, but the way the parties presented
       themselves to the world that warrants the conclusion that they did not live
       together with the child as a family, and that plaintiff cannot prove otherwise
       to satisfy the second prong.



                                              24

Id. at 324

 (omitting footnote).

       Nor is a putative de facto parent precluded from meeting H.S.H.-K’s second prong

by the fact that they spend some nights in another residence, away from the minor.

Middleton, 

369 S.C. at 598

. In Middleton, a legal parent and one claiming to be a de facto

parent maintained separate legal residences, allowing the child to spend half their time at

the legal parent’s residence and the other half at the putative de facto parent’s residence.

Id. at 633

. The child considered each residence to be “home.” 

Id.

 In concluding that Mr.

Middleton had met H.S.H.-K’s second prong, the Supreme Court held that the parties’

“sort of joint custody arrangement” qualified:

       As for the second prong, which considers whether the psychological parent
       and child have lived together, it further protects the legal parent by restricting
       the class of third-parties seeking parental rights. Normally, the child, legal
       parent, and psychological parent have at one point, all resided together under
       the same roof. However, we can conceive of a situation, as in this case, where
       the legal parent and the psychological parent operated under a sort of joint
       custody agreement where the child spends half the time at the legal parent’s
       house. The other half of the time is spent at the psychological parent’s house,
       which the child also considers home. This type of arrangement also suffices
       to meet the second part of the test.

Id. at 598

.

       Here, when viewed with an eye toward measuring whether Ms. K. was a

psychological parent to Q.D., Ms. K.’s presence in Q.D.’s household, even if not an

everyday or every night presence, met H.S.H.-K.’s (and Conover’s) second prong.

Specifically, from Q.D.’s birth in August 2022 through March 2023, Ms. K. slept at Ms.

R.’s apartment on most nights. The three of them, Ms. R., Ms. K., and Q.D. slept in the

same bed. Ms. K. would commute to work from the apartment and return after work to



                                              25
“be with [Q.D.] throughout the night.” Prior to her return, Ms. K. would stop at her

District of Columbia apartment to care for her cat and the grocery store to purchase items

for Q.D.’s household. Moreover, Ms. K. had clothes and toiletries at Ms. R.’s apartment.

While in Q.D.’s household, Ms. K. regularly ate meals, cleaned, and engaged in activities

with Q.D. After March 2023, the parties “did not consistently spend the nights together”

but remained in a co-parenting relationship.

       Moreover, Ms. K. and Ms. R. “h[e]ld themselves out to the world as a family

unit[.]” See A.F., 339 N.J. Super at 324. Ms. R. did not keep her relationship with Ms. K.

secret. Ms. K. was the one person allowed to be with her in the operating room, leaving

Ms. R.’s mother, father, sister, and “family from all over” outside of the delivery room.

After Q.D.’s birth, Ms. B.’s testimony that Ms. K. spent “maybe three [nights] a week” at

the apartment shared by the sisters demonstrates that their sleeping arrangement was not

secret. Moreover, Ms. K. was the designated “parent” at the daycare and doctor’s office,

not “one of several close and interested friends who offered help and support to the new,

single mother[.]” See A.F., 339 N.J. Super at 324. Ms. K. took off days from work to care

for Q.D., and in instances of needing to leave work, she told her boss she needed to leave

to care for Q.D. The record fully supports the fact that Ms. K. held herself out as a parent

to Q.D. and that Ms. R. encouraged and supported Ms. K. in this role.

       And their living arrangement, vis-à-vis where and with whom the minor would

live, was one that the parties consented to, even after the parties’ own romantic

relationship ended. See Middleton, 

369 S.C. at 598

 (recognizing that the parties’

agreement as to where a minor will live is pertinent to assessing whether a putative de


                                               26
facto parent meets the H.S.H.-K.’s second prong). Here, from his birth, Q.D. lived with

Ms. R., and Ms. K. was integrated into the household by maintaining a regular routine

and commuting to the household established for Q.D.9 While at the apartment, Ms. K.

washed dishes, including the components used by Ms. R. when pumping breast milk,

changed Q.D.’s diapers, fed Q.D. bottles, and put the child to bed. The three of them, Ms.

R., Ms. K., and Q.D. would sleep in the same bed together each night. Ms. K. had clothes

and toiletries in the household. She paid for household food, baby diapers, half of the

daycare expenses, half of the expense of his first birthday party, and swimming classes.

In addition, Ms. K. paid for household expenses outside of Q.D.’s care including, air duct

cleaning for the home and tires for Ms. R.’s car. Ms. K. continued to support the

household after the romantic relationship ended through continuing to pay for a portion

of the daycare fees and purchasing food, diapers, wipes, and clothing for Q.D.

       Ms. R.’s argument that putative de facto parents who maintain other residences

cannot meet H.S.H.-K’s (and Conover’s) second prong is unpersuasive. To be sure, no

Maryland case affirmatively holds that the maintenance of another residence is


       9
         Ms. K. filed her Complaint and First Amended Complaint using the standardized
“Complaint for Custody” Form. The form asks petitioner to provide the places and
locations where the child has lived in the last five years and with whom. On both forms,
Ms. K. provided Ms. R.’s name and address. At oral argument, and in her submitted brief,
Ms. R. contends that these entries on Ms. K’s original and amended complaints are
dispositive of the second Conover prong. This contention was not raised or decided
below, however. Accordingly, we decline to address it. Md. Rule 8-131(a) (“Ordinarily,
an appellate court will not decide any other issue unless it plainly appears by the record to
have been raised in or decided by the trial court, but the Court may decide such an issue
if necessary or desirable to guide the trial court or to avoid the expense and delay of
another appeal.”).

                                             27
acceptable for the second prong. But no post-Conover case has squarely (or tangentially)

addressed, one way or the other, how the maintenance of another residence might (or

might not) affect the second prong. In other words, the issue has yet to come up in

Maryland’s appellate opinions.10

       In E.N. v. T.R., there was no dispute that the minor children lived with their

biological father and the putative de facto parent for several years prior to the biological

mother filing to obtain sole legal and physical custody of her children. 

474 Md. at 351

.

The dispositive prong in E.N. was the first Conover prong where the Supreme Court of

Maryland held that where two legal parents exist, both parents must consent to and foster

the parent-like relationship. 

Id.


       In Kpetigo, the second prong was not examined because the parties stipulated that

the child “resided full time” with the biological father and stepmother between 2009 and

2015. 

238 Md. App. at 565

. On appeal, the biological father challenged whether use of

the Conover test was proper because the parties were not in a same-sex relationship. 

Id. at

574

. We held that “nothing in Conover suggest[ed] that de facto parenthood is available

only to same-sex couples.” 

Id.

 (explaining that the Conover de facto parenthood test

measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent and the child—a




       10
         We addressed whether de facto parents are entitled to attorney’s fees in David A.
v. Karen S., 

242 Md. App. 1

 (2019). There, the circuit court found that “Ms. Karen S. is,
and has been[,] the de facto parent of Child[;]” therefore, the Conover prongs were not
considered on appeal. 

Id. at 28

 (citation modified). We held that as a de facto parent, she
“ha[d] the status of a parent and is eligible to receive an award of attorney’s fees and
costs under § 12-103(a)(1) [of Maryland’s Family Law Article].” Id.

                                             28
relationship formed with the biological parent’s knowledge and consent—without

reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s origins.”).

       In B.O. v. S.O., Basciano v. Foster, and Caldwell v. Sutton, the second Conover

prong was not disputed because the minor children lived with the third party for multiple

years in the absence of the legal parent. Instead, each case turned on whether the legal

parent’s consent to have a parent-like relationship with the child was voluntary. Compare

Basciano, 256 Md. App. at 154 (holding that consent was not established when a child

was placed in the care of petitioner under a safety plan implemented by the Maryland

Department of Human Services), and B.O., 252 Md. App. at 498 (holding that the first

Conover prong was not satisfied when the child was placed with the third party after

being “removed from [the legal parent’s custody] due to child neglect and domestic

violence”), with Caldwell v. Sutton, 

256 Md. App. 230

, 277 (2022) (holding that the first

Conover prong is met when, for a period of eight years, grandmother “fulfilled the role of

Child’s mother,” after the child’s only legal parent voluntarily left the child with

grandmother prior to turning herself into the police and consented to grandmother’s sole

legal and physical custody of the child “even if she subsequently stated that she did not

intend to consent to Grandmother having de facto parent status”).

       Ultimately, whether or not a putative de facto parent is a child’s psychological

parent does not depend, exclusively, on whether that putative de facto parent maintains

another home, but on the contours of the household from the child’s point of view. The

“de facto parenthood test measures the relationship between the putative de facto parent

and the child . . . without reference to the parent’s characteristics or the relationship’s


                                              29
origins.” Kpetigo, 

238 Md. App. at 574

. “What matters . . . is the relationship between the

putative de facto parent and the child and the child’s best interests, not the relationship’s

title or consanguinity.” 

Id. at 575

.

         Here, there is no dispute that Ms. R. “consented to, and fostered, [Ms. K.’s]

formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with [Q.D.]; that Ms. K.

“assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for the child’s

care education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support,

without expectation of financial compensation”; and that Ms. K. “has been in a parental

role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent

relationship parental in nature.” Moreover, there is no dispute that—for the first seven

months of Q.D.’s life—Ms. K. regularly stayed with Ms. R., commuting to and from

work from the Maryland apartment and engaging in household activities for the benefit of

Q.D. Ms. K. contributed financially to the household and was held out as a “parent” at

Q.D.’s doctor and daycare.

         Considering the particular living arrangement presented here, we find no error or

abuse of discretion in the court’s conclusion that Ms. K. and Q.D. lived together in the

same household. Nor do we see error or abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s ultimate

conclusion that Ms. K. is a de facto parent to Q.D. The circuit court’s factual findings

were well-supported by the evidence. We hold that Ms. K.’s maintenance of another

residence did not preclude her, per se, from establishing that she met Conover’s second

prong.




                                              30
II.    The circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Ms. R.’s Motion
       for Continuance to obtain new counsel.

       A.     Legal Framework

       Maryland Rule 2-508 provides, that “[o]n motion of any party or on its own

initiative, the court may continue or postpone a trial or other proceeding as justice may

require.” Md. Rule 2-508(a). A decision to grant or deny a motion to postpone a hearing

is within the discretion of the court. Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 

394 Md. 654, 669

 (2006).

Thus, “[a]bsent an abuse of that discretion[,] we historically have not disturbed the

decision to deny a motion for continuance.” 

Id.

 This is true “even where the ground for

the requested continuance is the withdrawal of movant’s counsel from the proceedings.”

Fontana v. Walker, 

249 Md. 459, 463

 (1968).

       The Supreme Court of Maryland has made clear that only in “exceptional

situations” will a denial of a motion to postpone constitute reversible error. Plank v.

Summers, 

205 Md. 598, 605

 (1954). The Court “has consistently affirmed denials of

motions to continue . . . in the absence of unforeseen circumstances to cause surprise that

could not have been reasonably mitigated, where untimely requests were made, [and]

where procedural rules were ignored[.]” Neustadter v. Holy Cross Hosp. of Silver Spring,

Inc., 

418 Md. 231, 242-43

 (2011).

       The Supreme Court has never “found it to be an exceptional situation, when the

denial has had the effect of leaving the moving party without the benefit of counsel.”

Fontana, 

249 Md. at 463

 (affirming denial of a continuance when counsel withdrew from

the case the day before the hearing). A party who is notified of their attorney’s intent to



                                             31
withdraw and fails to secure substitute counsel in a timely manner is not entitled to a

continuance. See e.g., Das v. Das, 

133 Md. App. 1, 26

 (2000) (finding that the husband’s

claim of lack of notice was not credible given the attorney’s letter and a court notice

advising him to obtain alternative counsel that were issued sixty days before trial); Serio

v. Baystate Properties, LLC, 

209 Md. App. 545

, 556–57 (2013) (affirming that a litigant

is not entitled to a continuance where the litigant was aware of the trial date and the

attorney’s intent to withdraw but delayed seeking new counsel until shortly before trial).

       B.     Ms. R.’s Appellate Contentions

       Ms. R. argues that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her Motion for

Continuance. She argues that: (1) withdrawal of her attorney a “mere two days before

trial in a case involving de facto parenthood issues” was an “exceptional situation where

justice required” the continuance; (2) “the assistance [of counsel] was critical given that

the de facto parenthood [matter] relate[d] to the best interests of the minor child” and

“Ms. R.’s fundamental right to parent the minor child under the Fourteenth Amendment;”

and (3) it is “unjust” given a similar continuance was granted to Ms. K. on July 17, 2025,

for the previously-scheduled July 21, 2025 hearing. Ms. R. emphasizes that her

fundamental right to raise the minor child” is “superior to any third party’s request for

custody”—increasing the criticality of the assistance of counsel.

       C.     Analysis

       Ms. R.’s first argument, i.e., that the withdrawal of her counsel a “mere two days

before trial,” is unsupported by the record. Ms. R. requested that her counsel withdraw,

and counsel moved to do so on September 9, 2025. At the time, Ms. R. indicated to the


                                             32
court that she consented to her counsel’s withdrawal. Thereafter, Ms. R. did not object to

her counsel’s motion. Under these circumstances, counsel’s withdrawal was not the

surprise that Ms. R. suggests.

       Moreover, the circuit court could not have acted on counsel’s withdrawal motion

earlier than it did. Under Maryland Rules 2-132(b) and 2-311(b), “unless the motion [to

withdraw] is granted in open court, the court may not order the appearance stricken”

“within 15 days after [service of] the motion[.]” Md. Rules 2-132 and 2-311. Here, the

Motion was served on September 9, 2025. The earliest date the circuit court could have

acted on the motion was September 24, 2025, the day it ruled on the motion.

       Ms. R. next argues that the assistance of counsel was critical because it related to

the best interests of Q.D., which was of “transcendent importance” in this custody case,

and to Ms. R.’s “fundamental right to parent” Q.D. under the Fourteenth Amendment.

These arguments are not persuasive. Even though a parent’s fundamental right to parent

is implicated in a custody case, parents in such cases do not necessarily enjoy “the full

panoply of constitutional due process protections” afforded criminal defendants.

Touzeau, 

394 Md. at 676

. The Supreme Court of Maryland explained:

       We have said that the right to parent is fundamental even in custody disputes.
       The fundamental nature of the right to parent, however, does not necessarily
       implicate the range of due process protections statutorily afforded to parents
       in Child In Need of Assistance (“CINA”) proceedings and involuntary
       termination of parental rights proceedings. Even in the two latter situations,
       we heretofore have declined to require the full panoply of constitutional due
       process protections to litigants, as afforded to defendants in criminal cases.

Id. at 676

 (citation modified).




                                             33
       Ms. Touzeau, as a pro se litigant in a custody modification, requested a

continuance asserting that, “she had a right to be represented by counsel because the

proceedings implicated the right to parent, a right [the Supreme Court of Maryland had

already] recognized to be fundamental.” 

Id.

 The Supreme Court disagreed, pointing out

that even in termination of parental rights cases, and child in need of assistance cases,

wherein the right to counsel is mandated by statute, a litigant is not entitled to the “the

full panoply” of due process protections as is afforded a criminal defendant. 

Id.


       We do not doubt that this case was of critical importance to the parties and their

minor child. Nonetheless, Ms. R. provides no authority for why today’s result should

differ from Touzeau. Here, as in Touzeau, the custody trial was not a CINA or a

termination of parental rights proceeding. In other words, Ms. K. was not asking that

Q.D. be found in need of assistance or that Ms. R.’s parental rights be terminated, nor

could Ms. K. have done so.11 Given this posture, Ms. R. has not demonstrated that she

was entitled to counsel.12



       11
          See 

Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-809

(a) (CINA petition to be filed by
local department); 

Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law § 5-313

(b) (guardianship petition, as
antecedent to adoption through local department, to be filed by “individual who would be
subject to guardianship or a local department”).

       12
         Nor was the circuit court’s denial of Ms. R.’s continuance motion as sweeping
as Ms. R. suggests. At the outset of the custody trial, it was apparent that Ms. R. had one
witness (other than herself) present and prepared to testify. The circuit court then
indicated that it would receive evidence and, in order that Ms. R. have an opportunity to
secure counsel, continue the matter for the purpose of closing arguments. By October 8,
2025, counsel had entered their appearance on behalf of Ms. R. but did not ask to re-open
the evidentiary portion of the trial. Counsel did appear on behalf of Ms. R. for closing
argument.

                                              34
       Finally, we see no merit in Ms. R.’s contention that the court should have granted

her a continuance because Ms. K. had been granted a continuance two months earlier.

Typically, continuance motions are evaluated based on the circumstances of the moving

party. Reaser v. Reaser, 

62 Md. App. 643, 650

 (1985) (finding that the denial of a

continuance was arbitrary because the trial provided “no reason for the denial”); In Re

McNeil, 

21 Md. App. 484, 500

 (1974) (concluding that the case must be reversed because

of the arbitrary refusal to grant a continuance to permit the mother to be present). Ms. R.

has offered no authority to the contrary. But even if the circuit court should have given

more weight to Ms. K.’s having been granted a continuance, the situation presented by

Ms. R. was not the equivalent of Ms. K.’s. When Ms. K. was granted a continuance, she

had already retained counsel; by contrast, when Ms. R. requested a continuance, she had

just discharged her counsel and did not have a replacement. On the record before us,

therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s denial of Ms. R.’s

continuance motion.

                                           JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
                                           FOR CHARLES COUNTY AFFIRMED;
                                           COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.




                                             35

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