Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Scotty G. Nabors v. Jill A. Nabors

Official source
       Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
           any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
                             MEMORANDUM DECISION
       Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
       binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
            or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.

                                                                                              FILED
                                                                                       Oct 29 2026, 8:52 am

                                                                                            CLERK
                                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                                             and Tax Court



                                           IN THE

           Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                       Scotty G. Nabors,
                                       Appellant-Respondent

                                                  v.

                                         Jill A. Nabors,
                                        Appellee-Petitioner


                                         October 29, 2026
                                   Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          26A-DC-699
                         Appeal from the Bartholomew Circuit Court
                      The Honorable Kelly S. Benjamin, Special Judge
                                      Trial Court Cause No.
                                      03C01-2405-DC-2770


                         Memorandum Decision by Judge Foley
                                Judges Vaidik and Altice concur.



Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026        Page 1 of 17
      Foley, Judge.


[1]   Scotty G. Nabors (“Father”) appeals the trial court’s order modifying custody

      for the child (“Child”) he shares with Jill A. Nabors (“Mother”). He raises

      several issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as:


              I.       Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
                       modified custody to award Mother sole legal custody and
                       primary physical custody; and


              II.      Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it
                       ordered Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s
                       fees.


[2]   We affirm.


      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   In July 2014, while Father and Mother were married, Child was born. The

      marriage between Father and Mother was dissolved by decree, issued in

      December 2024. At that time, the parties were awarded joint legal and shared

      physical custody of Child with “one week on and one week off” parenting time.

      Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 28. At the time of the decree, Father and Mother

      both resided in Bartholomew County.


[4]   On June 23, 2025, Father filed a notice of intent to relocate and a petition to

      modify physical custody based on Father obtaining new employment out of

      state. In his motion, Father stated that he believed that it was in Child’s best



      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 2 of 17
      interest that he be awarded primary physical custody in light of this move. On

      June 26, 2025, Mother filed a counter petition to modify custody and a notice

      of relocation. In her petition, Mother objected to Father’s request of temporary

      or permanent relocation of Child and stated that she intended to move to

      Fairmount, Indiana to be closer to her family. Mother asserted that there had

      been a substantial change in the circumstances of the parties since the

      dissolution decree, which justified modification of custody and that it was in the

      best interest of Child to remain in Indiana with Mother and for Mother to be

      awarded primary physical custody. Over the next few months, several motions

      for contempt were filed by each party. A hearing on all pending matters began

      on November 19, 2025, was bifurcated due to lack of time, and completed on

      February 4, 2026. On February 6, 2025, the trial court conducted an in-camera

      interview with Child.


[5]   In March 2025, Father had been terminated for his employment at Cummins,

      where he had been employed for twenty-six years and earned $350,000 per

      year, plus bonuses, at the time of his termination. Father claimed that Mother

      caused his termination by sending disparaging photos to his employer that

      made it appear that he was drinking at work. Mother contended that Father’s

      drinking caused his termination. Father testified that he used to drink 1.75

      liters of “Jack Daniels” every one to two weeks, but that, at the time of the

      hearing, he no longer drank “that much anymore” because he did not have “all

      of the stress of having to live with [Mother.]” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 46–47. He also

      testified that he never drank while working.


      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 3 of 17
[6]   When he was terminated, Father received a severance package and continued

      to live locally while pursuing new employment. However, he found no

      comparable employment in Indiana and accepted employment at American

      Woodmark Corporation in Virginia. In his new position, he earned

      approximately $280,000 per year with no possible bonuses. He testified that the

      corporation may merge with an Ohio company, and he was not sure what

      would happen with his position.


[7]   Father moved to Virginia in August 2025 and purchased a new home where he

      lived with his new wife at the time of the hearing. The home was located in

      Stephens City, Virginia and had four bedrooms, including a bedroom for Child.

      The area had good schools and extracurricular activities for Child, and the

      neighborhood had children his age.


[8]   In the fall of 2025, Mother had relocated to Fairmount, Indiana, with her new

      husband who she had married in February 2025. Mother stated she had moved

      to be closer to her family. Her home in Fairmount was located on three acres

      that contained two homes and a barn. Child had his own room and loved his

      eight cats and two dogs and all of the acreage at the home. Due to the move,

      Mother enrolled Child in a new school, Park Elementary, without Father’s

      consent. Child liked his new school more than his old school and had made

      several new friends since enrolling at Park Elementary. He was also still able to

      spend time monthly with a good friend from Columbus. In his first semester at

      Park Elementary, Child had received all As and one B-. Although Father



      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 4 of 17
       believed that Child’s grades were slipping in the new school, Mother stated that

       his grades had not been affected by the move. At the time of the hearing,

       Mother was working at IU Health in Muncie as a clinical medical assistant

       making a gross weekly income of $825 per week.


[9]    Toward the end of summer 2025, when both parties were making arrangements

       to relocate, both Father and Mother failed to constructively communicate,

       which caused Father to miss some parenting time. On one occasion, in

       September 2025, Father used derogatory and offensive language toward Mother

       in a text exchange regarding an exchange of Child for parenting time. There

       was testimony that both Mother and Father acted poorly toward each other,

       sometimes in front of Child and that their relationship was contentious and

       hostile.


[10]   In May 2025, Father removed Child from school without notifying Mother or

       the school. Instead, he took Child with him out of town, and Child spent the

       day with his wife’s adult son while Father went to Churchill Downs. Because

       Father did not notify the school of Child’s absence, the school contacted

       Mother, and when she tried to text Father multiple times, he failed to answer.

       Only after Mother contacted the police for a welfare check, did Father

       communicate to the school later that afternoon that Child would be absent. At

       the hearing, Father testified that he did not “realize you had to call the school

       on those things” and admitted it was his fault that the school was not notified.

       Id. at 138.



       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 5 of 17
[11]   On March 6, 2026, the trial court issued its order on the parties’ competing

       petitions. The trial court found that each parent’s relocation was made in good

       faith and for legitimate reasons, those being an employment opportunity for

       Father and being closer to family for Mother. As a result of the parties’

       relocations, they lived approximately eight hours apart by car and about one

       hour and forty-five minutes away by plane, and the trial court found that the

       “equal week-on/week-off parenting time [was] not possible and constitute[d] a

       substantial change of circumstances” since the dissolution decree. Appellant’s

       App. Vol. II p. 19. The trial court awarded Mother sole legal custody and

       primary custody of Child subject to Father’s parenting time as set out in the

       order. The trial court based its custody determination on the following factors:


               1. The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the
               parents, and other individuals who are significantly involved.


                        a. [Child] has a close bond with both parents.


                        b. [Child] has a good relationship with Father’s current
                        spouse . . . as well as Mother’s husband . . . .


                        c. [Child] has a close relationship with his Columbus, IN
                        friend and gets to see him at least one time per month at
                        Mother’s home. This is beneficial and important to
                        [Child].


               2. The child’s adjustment to home, school, and community.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 6 of 17
                 a. [Child] enjoys, and has adjusted well, to his Mother’s
                 home in Fairmount, Indiana. [Child] loves the outdoors
                 with three acres, taking care of his cats and dogs, and
                 enjoys playing soccer.


                 b. [Child] was removed from Columbus schools due to the
                 relocation of each parent. [Child] enjoys Park Elementary
                 School in Grant County, Indiana, where he has attended
                 since August 2025. [Child] likes it better than the
                 Columbus schools and he has adjusted well, earning
                 straight A’s and one B- at the end of the first semester.
                 [Child] likes the teachers, the smaller school size, and has
                 made good friends at the school.


                 c. Father has moved to a community with good schools
                 and activities available for [Child], but the Court finds no
                 reason to uproot [Child] from his current school and
                 friends. It is also uncertain whether Father would be
                 required to move if his current employer merges with a[n]
                 Ohio company, or if Father would be offered a position
                 earning more money elsewhere.


        3. Communication between parents:


                 a. Mother and Father have shown a consistent and
                 unhealthy hostility toward one another, that has at times,
                 been observed by [Child].


                 b. The ability to contact and communicate with each other
                 in a respectful manner, other than through Our Family
                 Wizard, has proven to be futile and contrary to the best
                 interests of [Child].




Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 7 of 17
                         c. With distance now a factor, in addition to the lack of
                         respectful communication between Mother and Father,
                         joint legal custody is no longer in the best interest of
                         [Child].


       Id. at 19–20. The trial court also ordered Father to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees

       in the amount of $4,000 due to a disparity in the parties’ income. Father now

       appeals. 1


       Discussion and Decision

       I.       Custody Modification
[12]   Initially, we note that Father has chosen to proceed pro se. A litigant is not

       given special consideration by virtue of his or her pro se status. Kelley v. State,

       

166 N.E.3d 936

, 937 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “It is well settled that pro se litigants

       are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. This means that pro

       se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be

       prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri,

       

58 N.E.3d 980

, 983–84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted).


[13]   We review custody determinations for an abuse of discretion. McDaniel v.

       McDaniel, 

150 N.E.3d 282

, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “There is a




       1
        Since filing his notice of appeal, Father has filed numerous documents with this court, including a “Verified
       Motion to Supplement the Record Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 32” filed on August 12, 2026, and a
       “Verified Emergency Motion for Immediate Interlocutory Stay of Enforcement Pending Disposition
       Pursuant to Appellate Rule 39” filed on September 29, 2026. In an order issued in conjunction with this
       decision, we deny all of Father’s pending motions.



       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026                   Page 8 of 17
       well-established preference in Indiana for granting significant latitude and

       deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” 

Id.

 (citing Steele-Giri v.

       Steele, 

51 N.E.3d 119, 124

 (Ind. 2016)). Appellate courts “are in a poor position

       to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who

       saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as

       it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of

       the evidence[.]” Kirk v. Kirk, 

770 N.E.2d 304, 307

 (Ind. 2002). Therefore, on

       appeal we will not “reweigh the evidence nor reassess witness credibility, and

       the evidence should be viewed most favorably to the judgment.” Best v. Best,

       

941 N.E.2d 499, 502

 (Ind. 2011). We will reverse the trial court’s custody

       determination only if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the

       facts and circumstances or the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.”

       McDaniel, 150 N.E.3d at 288 (quoting In re Paternity of C.S., 

964 N.E.2d 879,

883

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). “[I]t is not enough that the evidence

       might support some other conclusion, but it must positively require the

       conclusion contended for by appellant before there is a basis for reversal.” Kirk,

       

770 N.E.2d at 307

 (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 

204 N.E.2d 850, 852

 (Ind.

       1965)).


[14]   Here, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions, which are required

       under Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8.2. Accordingly, we apply a two-tiered

       review and will “affirm when the evidence supports the findings, and when the

       findings support the judgment.” Aulakh v. Aulakh, 

273 N.E.3d 431

, 441 (Ind.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 9 of 17
       Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. We do not “set aside the findings or judgment

       unless [they are] clearly erroneous,” and we must give “due regard ... to the

       opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” Wysocki

       v. Johnson, 

18 N.E.3d 600, 603

 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).

       “Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only when they have no factual support

       in the record[,]” and “a judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong

       legal standard to properly found facts.” Aulakh, 273 N.E.3d at 441–42. We

       review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo. Gittings v. Deal, 

109 N.E.3d

963, 970

 (Ind. 2018).


[15]   Father argues that the trial court abused its discretion 2 when it awarded Mother

       sole legal custody and primary physical custody of Child. He contends that the

       trial court disproportionately weighed his actions against those of Mother,

       specifically that it focused on his inappropriate text messages to Mother on one

       occasion and on the time he failed to call the school when he took Child out of

       town. Father also asserts that it was abuse of discretion for the trial court to not

       put in place a structured schedule for communications between Child and

       Father when Child was not in his custody, which Father claims is necessary



       2
        We note that Father’s brief contained a case cited for the standard of review for custody modification
       determinations that does not exist. See Appellant’s Br. p. 8 (Betclean v. Anstavel, 

123 N.E.3d 22, 28

 (Ind. Ct.
       App. 2019)). Although Mother identified this nonexistent citation, Father provides no explanation for it in
       his reply brief. Citations to fictitious, AI-generated authority is a growing problem nationwide, and we
       admonish Father for citing a fictitious case in his brief. We caution both attorneys and pro se litigants against
       using AI to conduct legal research without independently verifying the citations generated. Judges must be
       able to rely on the authenticity of the authorities cited by the parties to make just decisions.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026                    Page 10 of 17
       because of Mother’s interference with his ability to communicate with Child.

       Father further argues that the trial court abused its discretion in its custody

       determination because evidence was presented that Mother’s new husband has

       a prior battery conviction, which constituted a safety hazard for Child.


[16]   Indiana Code section 31-17-2-21 provides that a trial court “may not modify a

       child custody order unless: (1) the modification is in the best interests of the

       child; and (2) there is a substantial change in one (1) or more of the factors that

       the court may consider under [Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8] . . . .” I.C. § 31-

       17-2-21(a). Indiana Code section 31-17-2-8 provides that the trial court is to

       consider all relevant factors, including:


               (1) The age and sex of the child.


               (2) The wishes of the child’s parent or parents.


               (3) The wishes of the child, with more consideration given to the
               child’s wishes if the child is at least fourteen (14) years of age.


               (4) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with:


                        (A) the child’s parent or parents;


                        (B) the child’s sibling; and


                        (C) any other person who may significantly affect the
                        child’s best interests.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 11 of 17
               (5) The child’s adjustment to the child’s:


                        (A) home;


                        (B) school; and


                        (C) community.


               (6) The mental and physical health of all individuals involved.


               (7) Evidence of a pattern of domestic or family violence by either
               parent.


               (8) Evidence that the child has been cared for by a de facto
               custodian . . . .


[17]   In its order, the trial court concluded that both parents’ relocations were made

       in good faith and for legitimate reasons and that such relocations constituted a

       substantial change in circumstances since the decree. The trial court also

       examined the factors listed above, specifically giving weight to the interaction

       and interrelationship of Child with Father and Mother and other important

       individuals in Child’s life, such as the parents’ new spouses and Child’s close

       friend from Columbus. The trial court also gave weight to Child’s positive

       adjustment to Mother’s home in Fairmount, his new school, and community,

       and the fact that moving Child to Virginia with Father would uproot Child

       from his current school and friends. The trial court also considered the

       unhealthy hostility between Father and Mother and their inability to



       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 12 of 17
       communicate respectfully. Based on all of this, the trial court concluded that

       joint legal custody was no longer in the best interests of Child, awarding

       Mother sole legal custody, and that it was in the best interests of Child for

       Mother to have primary physical custody. We conclude that there was ample

       evidence in the record to support a determination that there was a substantial

       change in the circumstances and that a custody modification was in Child’s best

       interests.


[18]   Father does not assert that the evidence presented at the hearing did not support

       the trial court’s findings or that the findings made by the trial court did not

       support the trial court’s conclusions. Instead, he argues that the trial court

       disproportionately assessed the fitness of each parent, focusing more on

       Father’s negative actions and minimizing actions by Mother and an alleged

       safety hazard posed by Mother’s new husband. We grant latitude and

       deference to our trial judges in family law matters, Steele-Giri, 

51 N.E.3d at 124

,

       and here, the trial court was able to observe the witnesses and scrutinize their

       testimony and then make a determination on what evidence it deemed to be

       pertinent and credible. The trial court was within its authority to do so, and we

       do not second guess the trial court’s determinations. Father’s arguments are

       simply a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and reassess the

       credibility of the witnesses, which we do not do on appeal. 

Id.



[19]   As to Father’s assertion that the trial court abused its discretion because it did

       not “implement a rigid, self-executing long-distance schedule [for telephone



       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 13 of 17
       communications and digital access] that leaves zero operational discretion to

       Mother,” Appellant’s Br. pp. 9–10, he does not cite to any law, statute, or rule

       that requires such a requirement. He cites to Indiana Parenting Time Guideline

       I(A)(3), but it simply states that, “Both parents shall have reasonable phone

       access to their child. Telephone communication with the child by either parent

       to the residence where the child is located shall be conducted at reasonable

       hours, shall be of reasonable duration, and at reasonable intervals, without

       interference from the other parent.” In its order, the trial court ordered that,

       “[e]ach parent shall facilitate reasonable phone and video contact between

       [Child] and the other parent.” Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 22. We conclude that

       the trial court’s order complied with the parenting time guideline and was not

       an abuse of discretion.


[20]   Ultimately, when it comes to child custody, “[o]n appeal it is not enough that

       the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively

       require the conclusion contended for by [the] appellant before there is a basis

       for reversal.” Kirk, 

770 N.E.2d at 307

 (first alteration in original) (quoting

       Brickley, 210 N.E.2d at 852). Despite Father’s arguments to the contrary, we

       conclude that the trial court’s custody decision has sufficient evidentiary

       support. We are therefore unpersuaded that the trial court abused its discretion

       in its determination to modify both legal and physical custody in favor of

       Mother.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 14 of 17
       II.     Attorney’s Fees
[21]   Father asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to

       pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees. “A determination regarding

       attorney[’s] fees in proceedings to modify a child support award is within the

       sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of a

       clear abuse of that discretion.” Milcherska v. Hoerstman, 

56 N.E.3d 634, 642


       (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).


[22]   Indiana Code section 31-17-7-1 applies in all post-dissolution cases. Under that

       statute, trial courts have the discretionary power to “periodically . . . order a

       party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining

       or defending” the action, “and for attorney’s fees and mediation services[.]”

       I.C. § 31-17-7-1(a). “To award attorney’s fees under [the statute], the trial court

       ‘must consider the parties’ resources, their economic condition, their ability to

       engage in gainful employment and earn adequate income, and any other factors

       bearing on the reasonableness of the award.’” Reel v. Reel, 

231 N.E.3d 915

, 926

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Montgomery v. Montgomery, 

59 N.E.3d 343, 354


       (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied).


[23]   Here, the trial court concluded that, “[d]ue to the disparity in income,” Father

       shall pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $4,000.

       Appellee’s App. Vol. II p. 23. Father argues that the trial court’s order

       constituted “economic distortion” because it failed to take into account certain

       wealth transfers that Mother received in the decree and rental income Mother


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 15 of 17
       was forgoing because she allowed a friend to stay rent free in a rental unit

       Mother owned. Appellant’s Br. p. 11. The evidence did establish a stark

       disparity in the income of the parties. Father earned approximately $5,384 per

       week, while Mother earned around $825 per week. Although Father points to

       wealth transfers that Mother received in the dissolution decree, he does not

       direct us to evidence in the record that establishes that these wealth transfers

       were liquid or able to be accessed by Mother at the time of the hearing. And, as

       to the rental income, there was no evidence as to what the rental rate would be

       and how it would affect the disparity in the income between the parties.

       Because the evidence presented supported the trial court’s finding of a disparity

       in income between Father and Mother, we conclude that the trial court did not

       abuse its discretion in ordering Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s

       fees.


       Conclusion
[24]   The trial court did not abuse its discretion in its custody determination, nor was

       it an abuse of discretion to order Father to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s

       fees.


[25]   Affirmed.


       Vaidik, J., and Altice, J., concur.




       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 16 of 17
APPELLANT PRO SE
Scotty G. Nabors
Stephens City, Virginia


ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Morgan L. Wieneke
Greg S. Morin
Montgomery, Elsner & Pardieck, LLP
Seymour, Indiana




Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-DC-699 | October 29, 2026   Page 17 of 17

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