Administrative United Kingdom
SHH v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)
Appeal Number: PA/63394/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Birmingham
On 21 October 2026
Before
FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Elliott
Between
SHH (SOMALIA)
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: No representative and did not attend
For the Respondent: Mrs S. Bhatti, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 26 March 2025.
Anonymity
2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice.
Background
3. The appellant is a Somali national born in 1995. He claims to be a member of the Garre clan, which he describes as a minority clan in Somalia. His asylum claim, made on 26th October 2024 was that he was at risk of persecution on return to Somalia as a member of a minority clan, and also that he was at risk of persecution from Al-Shabab because he says he refused the group’s attempts to recruit him from 2017.
4. The respondent accepted the appellant’s Somali nationality and his membership of the Garre clan. However she rejected his claim to be of adverse interest to Al-Shabab, or that he was at risk of persecution, as opposed to discrimination, on account of his clan membership. The respondent’s refusal letter of 26th March 2025 concludes that the appellant’s account lacked detail and credibility, and was undermined by the appellant remaining in Somalia until 2020 without coming to harm, and was further undermined by his failure to seek asylum in Spain before arriving in the United Kingdom.
5. Following the respondent’s refusal, the appellant advanced a new sur place claim. He informed the Tribunal that he had converted from Islam to Christianity and had been baptised into the Church of Jesus Christ and Latter Day Saints on 11th May 2025. He produced a baptism certificate from a bishop of that church confirming his attendance at a congregation in Leicester.
6. The respondent accepts that the claimed conversion amounts to a ‘new matter’ and has consented to the Tribunal considering it. However the respondent asserts that the genuineness of the conversion remains untested and requires cross-examination. Subsequently the appellant has notified the Tribunal that he no longer considers himself a Christian but now professes to be a atheist.
The Hearing
7. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.
8. The appellant was not represented and did not attend the hearing.
9. At my request my Court Clerk emailed the appellant on the address recorded on CCD and from which the appellant had recently been contacting the Tribunal. I placed the appeal hearing second on my list. However by 1.10pm no response had been received from the appellant.
10. I was satisfied that, pursuant to Rule 26 of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Procedure Rules 2014, a notice of this hearing was properly served on the appellant by email and is shown on CCD. In accordance with Rule 28(a) I am satisfied that reasonable steps have been taken to notify the appellant of the hearing.
11. Pursuant to Rule 28(b), I considered whether it was in the interests of justice to proceed with the hearing and for these reasons I was satisfied that it was:
12. I was satisfied Rule 26 was met and that the appellant was provided with an opportunity to participate fully in the proceedings but chose not to attend and has not provided an explanation for his absence.
13. I noted from the history of the case that the appellant had been in contact with the Tribunal recently and clearly has access to his e-mails and there is no apparent reason why he would not have received the hearing notice or the e-mail sent to him by my Clerk on the morning of the hearing.
14. I have considered the need to avoid delay, so far as it is compatible with the proper consideration of the issues. The appellant has set out his position in his appeal and the limited documentation he has submitted, which I have taken into consideration. He did not apply for an adjournment either in advance of the hearing or on the day. The respondent was present and ready to proceed. Mr Bhatti asked that I should proceed, I agreed to do so, finding it in the interests of justice and fairness to do so, and in accordance with the overriding objective.
Issues
15. Mrs Bhatti agreed that the issue that I must decide in this appeal are:
(a) On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?
(b) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?
(c) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason?
(d) Is it reasonably likely there would not be sufficient protection available?
(e) Is there a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and to which they could reasonably be expected to relocate?
(f) Private Life: Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?
(g) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?
Evidence
16. I had before me a stitched bundle of documents consisting of 164 pages, which included the documents submitted by the appellant and those from the respondent. I confirmed with Mrs Bhatti that she had access to the same bundle. I have considered the contents of all those documents in arriving at my decision below.
17. I heard submissions from Mrs Bhatti as to why I should dismiss the appeal. The appellant being absent, I did not hear submissions from him. However I have taken account of his explanation of his case and of the information he has communicated to the Tribunal on CCD.
Legal Framework
18. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine both the following matters on the balance of probabilities:
(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?
(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?
19. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:
(a) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and
(b) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.
20. I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.
21. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are contained in Appendix Private Life. It is for the appellant to show that he would face very significant obstacles to integration into society if he has to return to Somalia.
22. In so far as he relies on Article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.
23. My approach to assessing credibility comes from KB & AH (credibility-structured approach) Pakistan [2017] UKUT 491 (IAC) where the Upper Tribunal commended consideration of sufficiency of detail, internal consistency, external consistency and plausibility. I consider any documents along with all the evidence in the round. I am also conscious that just because a person has lied about one thing does not mean he has lied about another.
24. Section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004 means that behaviour designed or likely to conceal information, mislead, obstruct or delay consideration of a claim, and claims made after a negative decision has been made or after there was an opportunity to make a claim in a safe country are damaging to credibility.
Facts
25. The burden rests on the appellant to establish the facts upon which he relies, and in accordance with Section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, the appellant must demonstrate that his factual claim must be established on the balance of probabilities.
26. As the appellant did not attend the hearing, he did not adopt the contents of his explanation contained in his appeal reasons on CCD, he has not provided a signed witness statement, did not give oral evidence and was not available for cross-examination. The challenge that the respondent has raised to the appellant’s credibility has therefore remained substantially unanswered.
27. Although I have considered all the documentary evidence with care, the absence of the appellant limits the weight that I can attach to his assertions, where they are disputed.
Credibility
28. I have also had regard to section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. The appellant's evidence is that he travelled through Spain before entering the United Kingdom and did not seek international protection there. His explanation was that he believed the United Kingdom to be safer. Whilst I have taken that explanation into account, I find that his failure to claim asylum in Spain is conduct falling within section 8 and is capable of damaging his credibility. I have taken that matter into account as one factor in my overall assessment of the appellant's credibility. My findings do not depend upon section 8 alone but upon my assessment of the evidence as a whole.
Interest from Al-Shabab
29. The appellant claims that Al-Shabab tried to recruit him and that he received threats from them between 2017 and 2019. He claims that he refused to be recruited and that he is, therefore, at risk of being killed by them.
30. The appellant claims that the threats from Al-Shabab were made by 2019 at the latest and had been made intermittently from 2017. Despite this, the appellant remained in Somalia until around August 2020. There is no evidence before me that Al-Shabab tried to seek him out, tried to locate him, harmed him, or took any meaningful steps to act upon the threats he claims they made.
31. The respondent’s submission was that, if Al-Shabab had genuinely wanted to recruit or target the appellant, they had ample opportunity to do so between 2017 and the appellant leaving Somalia in 2020. I find that a persuasive argument.
32. I also note that there is no evidence before me that Al-Shabab have taken any interest in the appellant following his departure from Somalia, nor any evidence that they have been making enquiries about his whereabouts, or that they have approached the appellant’s family members at any time since 2020. Further, given the appellant’s account is that Al-Shabab did not approach him in person, and their only contact with him was by telephone, it is not clear how the appellant would be identifiable by Al-Shabab members.
33. The respondent’s concerns about the appellant’s credibility have not been tested in oral evidence and cross-examination. Having considered the evidence before me in the round, I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the appellant was threatened by Al-Shabab or that he was of adverse interest to them.
34. Even taking the appellant's account at its highest, the threats described were apparently limited to telephone contact between 2017 and 2019. There is no evidence of any attempt to locate him in person or since 2019, no evidence that his family were approached, and no evidence of any continuing adverse interest during the period he remained in Somalia until 2020. I am satisfied that the evidence, at its highest, tends strongly against the existence of any continuing interest in the appellant by Al-Shabab and does not establish a present risk on return.
Clan membership
35. I accept, as does the respondent, that the appellant is a member of the Garre clan.
36. However, beyond describing what amounts to having experienced discrimination in Somalia in the job market, the appellant has not identified actions against him or his clan that establishes that he was subjected to past persecution or a real risk of future persecution arising from his membership of the clan. Whilst discrimination and disadvantage may be experienced by his and other minority clans in Somalia, the evidence before me does not establish treatment that reaches the threshold of persecution or serious harm.
37. Whilst minority clan members may experience social and economic disadvantage, the country guidance I refer to below does not establish that minority clan members in Mogadishu face persecution merely because of their clan membership. Nor does it establish that minority clan membership alone renders relocation unreasonable. The evidence before me does not demonstrate that the appellant would be without family support, clan support, accommodation, remittances or access to employment. I therefore do not accept that his membership of the Garre clan gives rise to a real risk of persecution or serious harm.
Conversion to Christianity
38. The appellant has advanced a claim that he has converted from Islam to Christianity. I am not satisfied on the balance of probabilities that he is, or ever was, a genuine Christian convert.
39. Although the appellant has provided some documentary evidence to support this aspect of his claim, the respondent does not accept that in itself, that evidences a genuine conversion. The appellant did not attend the hearing to explain his reasons for his conversion, his religious journey, belief and understand of Christianity or the circumstances of his conversion. Thus the respondent’s concerns regarding the genuineness of the claimed conversion have not been tested.
40. In any event, I note that on 5th October 2026 the appellant e-mailed the Tribunal and stated that his conversion had caused tensions and arguments between him and his parents and that he has since come to realise that ne does not believe in either Islam or Christianity and that he now identifies as an atheist.
41. I find that this further shift in his claim raises obvious questions regarding the reliability and genuineness of his claimed conversion to Christianity. The appellant was not present at the hearing to provide any explanation for his further change in religious beliefs, or lack of them.
42. Given that background, I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant genuinely converted to Christianity.
Atheism
43. I am also not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the appellant is an atheist. The appellant’s claim of his realisation of his atheism has not been tested in oral evidence. Beyond his e-mail of 5th October 2026 he has provided no detailed explanation for his claimed lack of religious belief, the impact on his daily life or the consequences that would follow for him if he returned to Somalia.
44. Given the appellant’s previous claim to be a Christian convert, and the lack of direct oral evidence from the appellant, I find that he has failed to establish on the balance of probabilities, that he genuinely holds atheist beliefs.
Risk on return to Somalia
45. In light of my findings above, I do not accept that the appellant has established the factual basis of his claim to have been of adverse interest to Al-Shabab, his claimed to have converted to Christianity or his more recent claim to have become an atheist. I therefore find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that he possesses any characteristic that would place him at risk on return to Somalia.
46. Even if I am wrong about some aspects of the factual findings, I am satisfied that the appellant could reasonably be expected to relocate to Mogadishu. I have had regard to the country guidance in OA (Somalia) CG (2022) UKUT 33 (IAC) and MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC).
47. That country guidance indicates that Al-Shabab retains the capability to conduct attacks in Mogadishu, but that the city is under the control of the Somali authorities and ordinary civilians are not exposed to a general risk of serious harm merely by reason of their presence there. The security situation is therefore materially different from areas under Al-Shabab control.
48. The guidance also identifies categories of people who may face an enhanced risk from Al-Shabab. These include, officials or employees of the Somali state; members of the security forces; those associated with government institutions; perceived government supporters and clan elders and community leaders opposed to Al-Shabab; journalists or activists; persons against whom Al-Shabab has a specific continuing interest.
49. Having rejected the appellant’s factual claim, I accept the respondent’s submission that the appellant does not fall into a recognised risk category, and there is no evidence before me that he would face persecution or treatment contrary to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. There is no evidence that the appellant has ever worked for the state or security services or has any connection with the Somali government. I find therefore that the appellant does not possess a profile that would place his at particular risk in Mogadishu.
50. The appellant is an adult male of working age. There is no evidence before me that he suffers from any significant physical or mental health conditions. There is no evidence before me that he is incapable of employment or supporting himself. I accept that life in Mogadishu may be difficult, that the economic conditions in Somalia are challenging and a returnee may face hardship. However, hardship alone does not mean that relocation is unreasonable.
51. It is accepted that the appellant is a Somali and is a member of the Garre clan. There is no evidence before me that the appellant would be unable to access clan support or support from his family. The appellant appears to have remained in contact with his family in Somalia. Although he says that they have a strained relationship due to his conversion, I have rejected the account of his conversion to Christianity and to atheism. Accordingly I am not satisfied that the appellant would be returning as a person who would be deprived of family, clan or social support.
52. Further, even if I were wrong, and the appellant had genuinely converted to Christianity or genuinely adopted atheist beliefs, there is insufficient evidence before me to establish that this would prevent him accessing accommodation, employment, family support or clan support in Mogadishu. The appellant has not attended to explain how he would live on return, whether he would seek openly to manifest such beliefs, or why internal relocation would not remain available to him.
53. Considering the evidence as a whole, I find that the appellant would be able to relocate to Mogadishu, obtaining accommodation and employment and re-establishing himself there. Whilst the process, may be challenging, I am not satisfied it would be unduly harsh or that it would expose home to conditions contrary to Article 3 ECHR.
54. For the same reasons, as the appellant is a citizen of Somalia with the right to work and familiarity with the life, language and culture of the country, I find no evidence that he would face very significant obstacles to integration into society in Somalia.
Determination of the Issues
55. Applying section 32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022, I find that the appellant has failed to establish on the balance of probabilities the essential factual matters upon which his claim depends. Proceeding on the basis of the facts that I have found, I am not satisfied that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant would face persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, serious harm for the purposes of humanitarian protection, or treatment contrary to Articles 2 or 3 ECHR if returned to Somalia. In any event, I find that internal relocation to Mogadishu is both available and reasonable.
56. The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Notice of Decision
57. The appeal on asylum ground is dismissed.
58. The appeal on humanitarian protection grounds is dismissed
59. The appeal on human rights grounds is dismissed.
ANONYMITY ORDER
60. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including his name or their address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
To the Respondent – Fee Award
No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.
Signature
Signed Date 4th November 2026
D.J.R. Elliott
First-tier Tribunal Judge Elliott
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