Miscellaneous Mauritius
Supreme Court of Mauritius, 8 May 2026, 2026 MOK 15 – Police v Rajkumar Heerooa
Police v Rajkumar Heerooa
2026 MOK 15
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF MOKA Provisional Cause Number: 328/2026 In the matter of: POLICE v/s RAJKUMAR HEEROOA RULING 1. The applicant stands provisionally charged for the offence of Attempt at Murder, in breach of sections 2 and 45 of the Interpretation General Clauses Act and sections 216, 217 and 222 of the Criminal Code coupled with section 22(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, for having on or about the 07 th of April 2026 at St Pierre, criminally, willfully and of his malice aforethought and with premeditation attempted to kill one Bisnath Heerooa, which said attempt was manifested by a commencement of execution and which had failed in its effect through circumstances independent of the will of the applicant.
2. The applicant, moved before this Court through his counsel, to be admitted to bail.
3. The prosecution objected on the following grounds:
(i) risk of reoffending; (ii) risk of interfering with witnesses; (iii) for his own security; and (iv) risk of absconding
4. At the outset the enquiring officer, PS 5080 Sawordurdhaia (the ‘EO’) averred that on the 07 th of April 2026, at 21.00hrs, the declarant went to open his gate for his daughter to make way for her vehicle and when the declarant came near the said gate through a side door, he saw the applicant standing with a saber in his hand.
According to the EO, the declarant paid no heed to the applicant and slightly opened the gate to allow his daughter to drive away with the car and as he was closing the gate, the applicant approached the declarant and stated in a loud, aggressive tone “likitorma mo pou touye toi zordi”.
5. The EO stated that the applicant instantly assaulted the declarant with the said saber twice. The declarant started running to save his own life, followed by the applicant and at a certain moment, the applicant came in front the declarant and started assaulting him with the same saber anew.
6. The EO further averred that the declarant protected himself with both hands and he was injured. The applicant also tried to assault the declarant’s wife who came on premises at that moment but the declarant held the saber with both hands. Consequently the applicant left the premises with the saber. The declarant was conveyed to Welkin Hospital when after treatment he has been admitted and discharged on the 18 th of April 2026.
7. In relation to the nature of evidence, the EO claimed that they secured a saber with which the applicant hit the declarant.
8. When questioned about the status of the enquiry, the EO confirmed that the enquiry is still ongoing and documents are missing such as MLR, FSL report and a further statement from the applicant and other statements from other witnesses.
9. The EO substantiated the grounds of objection as follows:
Risk of reoffending
9.1 Given that the applicant and the declarant reside in the same yard, if the applicant is released on bail he may reoffend and the applicant is borne on record for three cases of assault 1 .
Risk of absconding
1 Doc X
9.2 Attempt at murder is a serious case and a high penalty is expected, therefore if released on bail the applicant may abscond.
Risk of interfering with witnesses
9.3 Given that it is a recent case there are some statements from witnesses which have not yet been recorded and if released the applicant may interfere with them.
For his own security
9.4 Since that incident, the applicant has made a lot of enemies in his vicinity and in the family, and if the applicant is released on bail, his life will not be easy and people close to the relatives of the victim, may harm the applicant.
10. The EO was duly cross examined during which the following salient features were borne out: 10.1 The applicant partly denied the charge and admitted having assaulted the declarant with a saber; 10.2 The applicant got in an argument with the declarant following which the declarant wanted to assault and in his defence he assaulted the declarant; 10.3 The applicant had to defend himself from the attack of the declarant; 10.4 The applicant and the declarant are brothers who live in the same yard; 10.5 The EO was unable to answer whether the declarant is heavily borne on record and replied that the enquiry is still in progress; 10.6 The EO stated that is possible that the declarant is lying; 10.7 The EO did not confirm whether the applicant was lying in wait and averred that the declarant may have lied when he stated he saw the applicant standing with a saber; 10.8 The declarant’s daughter has made several precautionary measures; 10.9 The present provisional charge was lodged according to instructions of superior officers; 10.10 There is a possibility of case being considered as an assault with premeditation; 10.11 The EO did not answer when asked whether the applicant was provisionally charged with attempt at murder due to pressure from the wife and daughter of the declarant;
10.12 The EO agreed that he is aware that the applicant has other brothers and alternative place of residence; 10.13 There were several persons who gathered on the premises where the alleged incident took place and during the investigation they will have to trace them out to record their statements; 10.14 No witnesses came forward; 10.15 The place where the applicant and victim reside is a junction with several people living nearby; 10.16 The declarant has made enemies in the vicinity and it is a recent case; 10.17 The EO is not aware when main case will be lodged; 10.18 The applicant has strong family ties.
11. The applicant under oath testified that he will abide by any bail conditions if released on bail.
12. The applicant was duly cross examined and stated his intent was only to defend himself and that there was no witness to the alleged offence at the material time.
13. The witness for the applicant, one Mr. Vijay Gopee, the brother-in-law of the applicant stated under oath that he will take responsibility of the applicant to reside at his place and that the distance between his place of residence and that of the applicant is of 1km. Mr. Vijay Gopee further stated under oath that he undertakes to have the applicant abide by his bail conditions.
14. I have duly considered the present application, the objections thereto coupled with the submissions on behalf of the applicant, hereby the present ruling. The prosecution did not offer any submissions.
15. I have taken into account the constitutional right to liberty of the applicant as enshrined in section 5(3) of the Constitution and section 4(1) of the Bail Act which provides that the aim behind the conditional release of an offender is to ensure that a suspect (a) appears for his trial in the event that he is eventually prosecuted; (b) does not harm the society whilst being at large if he or she is the author of the alleged offence; and (c) does not in any way interfere with the course of justice. The object of bail is neither punitive nor preventive.
16. I have also taken note of the rationale of bail law which has been established throughout authoritative case law , to the effect that the “[…] rationale of the law of bail at pre-trial stage is accordingly, that a person should normally be released on bail if the imposition of the conditions reduces the risks… to such an extent that they become negligible having regard to the weight with which the presumption of innocence should carry in the balance”.
17. Accordingly, a balancing exercise has to be made, by considering all the evidence on record, between (a) the need to safeguard the necessary freedom of liberty of a suspect when viewed in the context of the presumption of innocence, thus favouring the release of the applicant on bail; and (b) on the other hand the need to ensure that the society as well as the administration of justice are necessarily protected against serious risks which may materialise if the detainee is the alleged offender, therefore favouring the refusal of bail.
18. It is apposite to note that the principles underlying the provisions of the Bail Act 1999 and the Constitution bear similar provisions to the following international, regional and comparative law instruments that are not legally binding on Mauritius, notably the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, article 5(3) of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 7(5) of the American Convention on Human Rights which all guarantee the presumption of innocence.
19. Therefore, similarly, the provisions of the Bail Act can be described as being a procedural right which “entrenches the effect of the presumption of innocence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal trial process and safeguards the liberty of accused persons”.
20. Now, bearing in mind that under our Constitution, “[…] liberty is the rule and
2 Maloupe v the DM of Grand Port ipo DPP [2000 SCJ 223, MR 264] 3 R v Antic [2017] 1 S.C.R 509 at paragraph 1; R v Hall[2002] 3 S.C.R 309 at paragraph 13; R v Oland [2017] 1 S.C.R 250 at paragraph 34
detention is the exception”, 4 I shall assess the evidence of the EO pertaining to each ground to determine whether the imposition of conditions can reduce the risks to a minimum level.
21. However, first and foremost, it is important to note that with respect to the nature of evidence as described by the EO, the Court finds that there is direct evidence but not sufficient to amount as concrete evidence against the applicant, which I find as being reasonable ground for the continued detention of the applicant. The EO has stated that they have the saber and that the applicant has admitted to having assaulted the declarant but did so only in his defence. The EO has further averred under oath that the declarant has possibly lied and the circumstances in which the alleged offence has occurred are still unclear.
22. True it is that the aforementioned evidence does satisfy the legal test for reasonable grounds for suspicion which a police officer must satisfy before they can stop and detain an individual 5 , however, I am of the opinion that they do not amount to concrete and direct evidence that will justify the continued detention of the applicant in the present matter.
23. Having said so, I shall now address the risk of reoffending.
24. It has been established that the denial of bail for reasons of likelihood of reoffending has been described as “[…]a sufficiently narrow circumstance because bail is denied only for those with a “substantial likelihood” of committing an offence, and only where this likelihood endangers public safety. The circumstance is narrowed further by the requirement that the detention be not simply convenient, but necessary for public safety”
25. Therefore, in dealing with the risk of re-offending, it is important to recall section 4(1)(a)(iii) of the Bail Act which lays down, amongst other grounds, that bail may be
4 Chrishna Ramgati v The Honourable Ag District Magistrate of the Bail and Remand Court & anor [2022 SCJ 373] 5 Note 402, Halsbury’s Laws of England/Police and Investigatory Powers (Volume 84 (2019), paras 1–394; Volume 84A (2019), paras 395–831)/8. Arrest, Detention, Entry, Search and Seizure/(2) Stop and Search/402. Reasonable grounds for suspicion.
6 R v Morales [1992] 3 S.C.R 711
refused to an applicant if the Court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that, if released the applicant is likely to commit an offence other than an offence punishable only by a fine not exceeding Rs 1,000.
26. As such, the danger of a serious offence being committed by the applicant whilst on bail should be a plausible one. I have taken into account the principles enunciated in the authoritative jurisprudence which laid down that the nature of the offence and the expected sentence in case of conviction are relevant considerations when assessing the seriousness of the risk that the detainee may re-offend. It has also been established that “[…] the extent to which the offences which the applicant is suspected to have committed are lucrative should also be considered as the temptation, in case the applicant is guilty, that he may wish to make as much money as possible whilst on bail, is likely to be greater”
27. Applying the principles highlighted above to the facts, it is undeniable that the applicant resides in the same yard as his brother the declarant and the possibility of the applicant being eventually tried before a higher court other than a District Court and being visited by a heavy custodial sentence is not to be excluded at this stage with regards to the present provisional charge.
28. Hence the risk of reoffending would have been plausible if Mr Vijay Gopee did not undertake to take responsibility of the applicant at his house which is 1km away from the residence of the declarant and his family. Moreover, the EO has also averred in cross examination that there is a possibility of the main charge being that of assault with premeditation and not attempt at murder.
29. I note that the applicant is borne on record for only one case of assault as the other cases have already been spent. 8 However, no evidence has been adduced on behalf of the prosecution to show the connection between the previous conviction of the applicant and the present provisional charge.
30. Accordingly, I am of the view that there is no concluding element to prove that
7 Ibid 8 Doc X
should the applicant be granted bail he would commit another similar offence. Hence, the risk of reoffending has not been substantiated.
31. In assessing the risk of absconding, other factors are relevant including the weakness or absence of family, community, professional or occupational ties and financial commitments 9 . I have taken note that the applicant has no history of being in breach of any bail conditions.
32. The evidence shows that the applicant has a fixed place of abode, has strong family ties as confirmed by the EO and the applicant under oath. There is no evidence of any dual passport by either the applicant or any members of the family and no evidence that the applicant owns any movable or immovable properties. More importantly, there is no evidence that applicant has resisted his arrest or tried to escape custody and instead has fully cooperated throughout the enquiry.
33. Having said so, I am of view that there is no evidence which particularly indicates that there is a serious risk of absconding which cannot be rendered negligible by the imposition of conditions.
34. I shall now address the risk of interfering with witnesses.
35. I shall refer to the following extract which I find pertinent namely in Deelchand v Director of Public Prosecutions & Ors 10 which provides that where there is a risk of interference with witnesses, namely:
“ (a) the defendant has allegedly threatened the witnesses; (b) the defendant has allegedly made admissions that he intends to do so;
(c) the witnesses have a close relationship with the defendant, for example in cases of domestic violence or incest;
(d) the witnesses are especially vulnerable, for example where they live near the
9 ibid 10 [2005 SCJ 215] where reference was made to Neil Corre in his extract from the book “ Bail In Criminal Proceedings” [1990]
defendant or are children or elderly people;
(e) it is believed that the defendant knows the location of inculpatory documentary evidence which he may destroy, or has hidden stolen property or the proceeds of crime;
(f) it is believed the defendant will intimidate or bribe jurors;
(g) other suspects are still at large and may be warned by the defendant”
36. In the present case, it has been made clear by the EO, that there are no other suspects and the witnesses are known and have been identified by the police. It is now that the EO is going to investigate to determine whether any witnesses were present at the time of the alleged offence and to record their statements. At the moment, no witnesses came forward save and except the daughter and wife of the declarant.
37. As matters stand, there is no evidence which shows that the applicant has been in contact with any of the witnesses identified by the police. There is evidence of a any close relationship between the applicant and the witnesses but again in view of the testimony of Mr Vijay Gopee I am of the opinion that bail conditions may be imposed to minimise the risk of interference with witnesses.
38. I also take note of the principle that provides that “[…] It would be preposterous to hold the view that in each and every application for bail it would suffice that an enquiry officer should express his fear that the applicant would interfere with one or more witnesses for the accused to be denied bail on that ground. To satisfy the court that there is a serious risk of interference with a witness, satisfactory reasons, and appropriate evidence in connection thereof where appropriate, should be given to establish the probability of interference with that witness by the Applicant.” 11 (emphasis added).
39. Therefore, it is clearly not a case where there are suspects at large who may be
11 Deelchand v DPP, n10
warned by the applicant. In view of the aforementioned, I find that the reasons advanced by the EO to substantiate the risk of interfering with witnesses, are not satisfactory and no appropriate evidence in connection thereof has been provided to establish the probability of interference with any witness by the applicant.
40. In relation to the ground of objection pertaining to the security of the applicant I shall refer to the case of Deelchand v DPP (supra) where the case of IA France 12 was cited and provides as follows “[…] the protection of the defendant is capable of being relevant and sufficient reason for pre-trial detention, within the spirit of Article 5 of the Conventions with the following caveat: “however this can only be so in exceptional circumstances having to do with the nature of the offences concerned, the conditions in which they were committed and the context in which they took place”.
41. I have not been satisfied with the evidence of the EO that there is a risk to the security of the applicant which could materialize. In fact, the EO relies on the fact the case is a recent one and the applicant made enemies in the vicinity but no evidence of any hostility towards the applicant has been adduced. Further there is evidence that the applicant will not reside in the vicinity. I am therefore not satisfied that there is a serious risk to his security.
42. Having considered all the evidence on record and the principles underlying the rationale of bail, I have carried out the required balancing exercise. The prosecution has offered no submissions. The question which remains is to whether this Court, on the basis of all the assessment made starting from the nature of the evidence, the stage at which the enquiry has reached up to the evidence with regards to the grounds of objection, maintain the detention of the applicant? The answer is in the inasmuch as the prosecution has failed to give reasons as to why and in what manner those risks cannot be minimised by any bail conditions.
43. All of the aforesaid factors must be gauged against the applicant’s constitutional right to personal liberty 13 inasmuch as “[…] liberty is the rule, and detention is the
12 [1998] ECHR 89 13 Seewoochurn K M v The Commissioner of Police & Ors (2019 SCJ 189)
exception”
44. It has been made clear in several authorities from the Supreme Court that the seriousness of the offence cannot by itself be a ground of refusing bail 15 and the pronouncements were upheld by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
which held that due consideration has to be given to the right of liberty and the presumption of innocence, as enshrined in our Constitution which substantially follows the European Convention of Human Rights.
45. This being said, considering:
(a) the facts of the case at hand;
(b) the reasons put forward by the prosecution which do not support the grounds of objection denying bail to the applicant;
(c) the presumption of innocence in favour of the applicant and the constitutional right to liberty of the applicant;
and in light of all of the above assessment, I believe that the risks under the grounds of objection can be reduced by the imposition of conditions such that they become negligible. In the circumstances, I order the applicant to be released on bail provided that:
(a) The applicant provides a surety in the amount of Rs 100,000 to be to be furnished by cheque;
(b) The applicant enters into a recognisance in the amount of Rs 500,000 in his own name;
(c) The applicant shall reside at a fixed and permanent place of residence indicated by him, the address of which he shall communicate to the police. The applicant shall not move to another place of abode without the prior consent of the Court;
14 Crishna Ramgati, n3 15 Labonne v DPP & Ors [2005 SCJ 38]; Deelchand v DPP and ors [2005 SCJ 215] 16 Hurnam v The State [2004 PRV 4]
(d) The applicant shall report to the nearest police station, once daily between 06.30 hours and 20.00 hours;
(e) The applicant shall inform the police of his daily movements each time he reports at the police;
(f) The applicant shall: (i) be permanently equipped with a mobile phone and a landline phone, the numbers of which he shall communicate in advance to one or more enquiring officers designated for that purpose;
(ii) ensure that the mobile phone as well as the landline phone are in good working condition and open for communication at all times;
(iii) ensure that the mobile and landline numbers are solely and exclusively for the present monitoring purposes to enable any enquiring officers at any time to ascertain his movements and location and if necessary to direct him to be in attendance at any indicated spot.
(g) The applicant shall remain inside his residential place between 21.00hours and 05.00hours;
(h) The applicant shall endeavour not to be in communication with any suspects and/or potential suspects, witnesses and/or any potential witnesses, and/or any person other than the authorities in connection with the present case, either in person or by means of any technology such as phone, email, WhatsApp, messenger, Facebook, twitter or any other social media platform and/or app and/or service;
(i) The applicant shall not cause any intimidation or harm to the declarant and his family;
(j) The applicant shall not leave the country, whether by sea or by air, without the Court’s permission; and
(k) The applicant shall surrender his passport, if he has one, to the Passport and Immigration Office.
[ Delivered by: Bibi Azna BHOLAH (Ms), District Magistrate] [ Delivered on: 08 May 2026]
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