Administrative United Kingdom

SW v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number:PA/82692/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard on the Virtual Region
On 23rd October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL Judge MCQUILLAN

Between

SW

(anonymity direction MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellants: Ms Harris, Counsel.

For the Respondent: Ms Germain, Home Office Presenting officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, who is a citizen of Afghanistan, appeals under the provisions of the Nationality, Immigration, and Asylum Act 2002 against the Respondent’s decision dated 23 July 2025 , to refuse their protection claim made on 31 October 2024. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022 the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (the 2022 Act) applies.

Anonymity Direction

2. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom (‘UK’) under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice.

Background

3. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS. The Appellant is Afghan and aged 26 years old. They arrived in the UK on 30 October 2024 having left Afghanistan on 19 August 2021

4. The Appellant claims to fear persecution if returned to Afghanistan on the basis that they claim to have come to the adverse attention of the Taliban as a result of the Police arresting Taliban members after they had approached him for help. The Appellant fears that the Taliban will kill him as they believe he was spying for the Police.

5. The Respondent accepts the Appellant’s identity and nationality but no other aspect of their claim.

Hearing

Preliminary Issue

6. It was raised by the Appellant that he was concerned that the interpreter appointed had the wrong dialect of Pashtu and he wished to have an interpreter with a dialect the same as his own. The interpreter stated that she spoke both dialects of Pashtu and having taken instructions Ms Harris informed the Tribunal that the Appellant wished to proceed with the hearing as he could not afford an adjournment. I made sure throughout the hearing that the Appellant was satisfied that they could understand the interpreter and that the interpreter was clear she could understand the Appellant. The Appellant was clear that he wished to proceed and I indicated to him and his representative that I would keep the matter under review throughout the hearing. As it happens I was able to conclude the hearing and had no concerns raised with me by anyone as to the accuracy of the interpretation.

Issues in dispute

7. I discussed the issues with the representatives. The Appellant’s skeleton argument (ASA) identified the following matters as in dispute;

8.

(a) Whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution;

ii. Is sufficient state protection available to the Appellant; and

iii. Is relocation a viable option?

Also

(b) If the Appellant does not meet the Convention criteria, alternatively, does he qualify for humanitarian protection, and

(c) Whether his removal would breach the UK’s obligations under Article 8 of Schedule 1 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Ms Harris confirmed that this related to whether there would be very significant obstacles to integration which could also exist if the Appellant had a subjective fear that was unfounded.

9. The Respondent’s review had contended that the question as whether the Appellant fell within Refugee Convention was in dispute. Ms Germain, in her submissions, confirmed the Respondent’s position was that if the Appellant’s claim was accepted then they would fall within the convention but they disputed the account. Ms Harris mirrored that position and I accept the limited concession.

Evidence and submissions

10. The Appellant gave evidence with the assistance of a Pashtu interpreter and was cross examined. Ms Germain and Ms Harris made submissions. I reserved my decision.

Legal Framework

11. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) whether the Appellant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution), and

(b) whether the Appellant does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality as a result of that characteristic.

12. If I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Appellant does have such a characteristic, and fears persecution as a result of that characteristic, I must go on to determine whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:

(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;

(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and

(c) they could not internally relocate.

13. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellant.

Findings

14. In this decision, I have regard to JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 and DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) [2026] UKUT 00413 I am directed by those cases to address each of the questions posed by section 32 of the 2022 Act expressly and sequentially and I do so. I have taken account of everything I have heard, and considered all the documentary evidence I have been referred to by the parties. I have carefully considered all the evidence in the round, in line with the guidance in Ravichandran v SSHD [1996] Imm AR 97 and Karanakaran v SSHD 2000 EWCA Civ.

Credibility

15. The Respondents in their Refusal letter, Review and at the hearing raised issues about the credibility of the Appellant’s account. I consider that, in this case, the credibility of past events are relevant to the questions that the 2022 Act requires me to answer, including whether a convention right exists and the Appellant has a subjective fear. In assessing the credibility I note that DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) confirms that section 32 of the 2022 Act has not changed the approach I should take to assessing evidence. It does not require that each alleged fact must be proved on the balance of probabilities, nor that evidence of such an alleged fact must be ignored unless the alleged fact is proved on the balance of probabilities. All that section 32(2) requires is that, having taken account of all of the relevant evidence as approved in Karanakaran, and having given to each item of that evidence the weight I consider appropriate, I then determine on the balance of probabilities whether the asylum seeker either has a relevant characteristic or has a relevant characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution and that they do, in fact, fear persecution by reason of that characteristic.

16. The main issues in respect of the Appellant’s credibility were as follows;

(a) Ms Germain questioned the credibility of the claim that the Taliban were still looking for the Appellant 4 years after the incident. She noted that they had only called to the Appellant’s home once and did not call at all to his Uncle’s where he was for a month. She submitted that the Appellant’s evidence was that the Taliban were still looking for him but he had never received any direct threats and any further threats were passed on through Imam. In addition she questioned why the summons the Appellant had produced was 4 years old. Ms Harris submitted that the Appellant had been asked for documentation and his father had gone to the Imam to seek documentation. It was this approach that prompted the summons some years after the incident.

(b) It is not clear why the Taliban did not look for the Appellant at his Uncle’s house in Jalalabad after they took control of the city and why there was just one contact with the family home. The Appellant stated that his parents had gone to Jalalabad and had received no further contact from the Taliban. It is also not clear how the Appellant’s father obtained the summons produced to the Tribunal. Whilst Ms Harris may be correct in suggesting that the query prompted the production of the summons there was no evidence of this from the Appellant’s father and no evidence of how the summons was sent to the Appellant, he says by WhatsApp. It is also of note that the Appellant said the Taliban knew by this time that he had left Afghanistan. The limited interest in the Appellant at the time of the incident, the lack of interest since and the lack of evidence around the summons all combine to damage the Appellant’s credibility in respect of this aspects of his account.

(c) When asked at Question 59 of his Asylum interview how he knew what had happened at the shop as he was not there he stated that his father was also ‘in the shop with me’. In the next answer he states his father was ‘standing there’ with the Taliban when he, the Appellant, got the taxi. At the hearing the Appellant’s evidence was different. He stated that his father was not in the shop with him and there were only children and customers there. He stated that when he came back to the shop he saw a crowd of people and he phoned his father who was elsewhere, perhaps at the mosque. His father told him to go to his Uncles and his father then went to the shop after the Police had arrived. He spoke to his father on his phone later that day when he got to his Uncle’s and his father was checking that he had made there safely. Despite Mr Harris’ submission that this did not change the core of the account and was not wholly inconsistent I consider this to be significant.

(d) The Appellant had never said before that his father was not present and in fact in his answers I am satisfied that he was clearly stating that his father was with him in the shop before he left to get the taxi and therefore before the Police arrived. In his witness statement the Appellant makes no reference to his father being present at all or speaking to him by phone when he returned, stating simply that he, the Appellant, was very scared when he saw the Police at the shop and went to his Uncle’s house. Then when closely questioned at the hearing by Ms Germain about who was in the shop he stated that his father was not there and that he called him and it was only then that his father went to the shop. It is possible that the Appellant could have failed to mention his call to his father in his witness statement although it would be strange not to. It is not, however, a mere omission to say, as I have clearly found, in one account that his father was present prior to the incident and in another state that he was not present and give evidence, for the first time, that he the Appellant called his father and this was why what prompted his father to attend the scene.

(e) This is a significant difference and suggests an uncertainty on the part of the Appellant about what he had said both in his interview and in his Witness statement. That in turns creates substantial doubts about the credibility of the account of the key incident that was, the Appellant says, the catalyst for his leaving his home and ultimately Afghanistan.

(f) The Respondent raised other issues at the hearing and in their Reasons For Refusal Letter which were of less significance and I give little weight to any confusion between the Police and the Taliban in the various accounts, accepting Ms Harris’ submissions that after the takeover the Police and the Taliban were as one. Similarly I give little regard to the fact that the Appellant applied and was refused Asylum in France due to a lack of evidence. I have no information about the process for claiming asylum or the French system for assessing evidence and I give this little significance either under section 8 of the 2004 Act or otherwise.

Conclusions of the Appellant’s credibility.

17. The Appellant’s account of the reason he fears persecution if returned is, on one level, quite simple; He was asked to assist the Taliban and when he was away getting them a taxi they were arrested and they blamed him for alerting the Police. It is the story’s simplicity that makes the details so important. Had the account covered a series of encounters over a prolonged periods of time variations or inconsistencies would have less importance. This is why the quite stark and significant inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence, from his interview to his witness statement to his oral evidence, about his father’s presence and how and when they spoke about the incident is of importance. Having regard to the other evidence, including the country evidence I was referred to about the Taliban and how they have interacted with the civilian population prior to and since their takeover, the documentary evidence produced and the submissions I heard about that evidence, I find, in the round, the Appellant’s credibility and that of his account to be damaged to the extent that I find his account lacks credibility.

The 2022 Act

18. Adopting the approach of the Upper Tribunal I now turn to the specific provisions of section 32 of the 2022 Act.

Section 32(2)(a): Convention Ground.

19. Under s32(2)(a) I am firstly required to determine, on the balance of probabilities:

(a) whether the asylum seeker has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (or has such a characteristic attributed to them by an actor of persecution)

20. I have carefully considered the evidence in this case and have found the Appellant’s account to lack credibility in important aspects. The convention reason that would have applied here – an imputed political opinion attributed to the Appellant by the Taliban on the basis of their suspicions of him – require me to accept that he has given a credible account. I have not done so and therefore applying the balance of probability I do not find that he has a characteristic that could cause him to fear persecution.

Section 32(2) (b); Subjective Fear

21. Section 32(2)(b) requires the decision-maker to also determine, on the balance of probabilities.

(b) whether the asylum seeker does in fact fear such persecution in their country of nationality (or in a case where they do not have a nationality, the country of their former habitual residence) as a result of that characteristic.

22. For the same reasons as I have given above and my conclusion that the Appellant’s account lacks credibility I find on balance that he does not have a subjective fear of persecution on return for the characteristic claimed. Ms Harris suggested that he could have a subjective but unfounded fear for the purpose of this creating very significant obstacles which would establish a breach of his Article 8 rights. For the reasons I have given I have found his account lack credibility and his claimed fear for a convention reason similarly lacks credibility. If he has a different fear of return he gave no evidence of it. As I mention later there was some brief reference to a fear based on his westernisation but for the reasons I give when assessing risk this does not change my answer the question posed here.

23. This is determinative of the Asylum claim but as approved by the Upper Tribunal in JCK (Botswana) I take a ‘belt and braces’ approach and address the other aspects of section 32 namely whether, applying the lower standard of proof, there is a reasonable likelihood that:

(a) the Appellant would be persecuted for a Convention reason on return;

(b) that there would be insufficient protection; and

(c) they could not internally relocate.

24. The Upper Tribunal characterised the first of these questions as an evaluation of objective risk.

Section 32(4)(a); risk of persecution

25. To answer this question I must ask myself whether there is a reasonable likelihood that if the Appellant were returned to Afghanistan :

(a) they would be persecuted as a result of the characteristic mentioned in subsection (2)(a)

26. The burden is on the Appellant to show to the lower standard that there is a real risk of persecution on return. It is well established that this ‘standard of proof’ could more accurately be described as an assessment of risk and that even with a risk as low as 10% an Appellant could succeed[1].

27. For the reasons I have given above I have found the account the Appellant has given not to be credible. It follows that, even to the lower standard there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted for the convention reason relied on as, absent the account that I have found to lack credibility, no substantial reason for a risk of persecution was put forward by the Appellant. At one point the ASA mentioned the risk of persecution from being westernised. This matter featured in a single sentence of the Appellant’s witness statement and did not feature in oral evidence or in Ms Harris’ submissions nor was it raised as an issue in dispute in this Appeal. For completeness’ sake and in the absence of evidence to the contrary I accept Ms Germain’s submission that the Appellant has not provided evidence to support the brief suggestion that westernisation may put the Appellant at real risk of persecution.

Section 32(4)(b): protection

(b) they would not be protected as mentioned in section 34.

28. Section 34 states

Article 1(A)(2): protection from persecution

(1)For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention, protection from persecution can be provided by—

(a)the State, or

(b)any party or organisation, including any international organisation, controlling the State or a substantial part of the territory of the State.

(2)An asylum seeker is to be taken to be able to avail themselves of protection from persecution if—

(a)the State, party or organisation mentioned in subsection (1) takes reasonable steps to prevent the persecution by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution, and

(b)the asylum seeker is able to access the protection.

Section 32(5): internal relocation

(5) The determination under subsection (4) must also include a consideration of the matter mentioned in section 35 (internal relocation).

29. These matters can be dealt with together. I have not accepted the Appellant’s account to be a credible one and therefore I do not consider that there would be any need for the Appellant to seek protection or to relocate.

Humanitarian protection

30. I have found at paragraphs 26 and 27 that there is not a reasonable degree of likelihood that the Appellant would be persecuted if returned. For the same reasons and applying the same standard of proof I find that the Appellant has not shown substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if returned. Their Humanitarian Protection claim fails also.

Human Rights

31. Ms Harris suggested that the basis for any article 8 claim would be the very significant obstacles the Appellant would face including the subjective fear of persecution he held, even if unfounded. I have found that he does not hold such a fear for a convention reason and no other substantive reason was advanced. No other very significant obstacles were advanced to me and I find no basis for finding that the Appellant’s returned would be a breach of his Article 8 rights.

Notice Of Decision

The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.

Anonymity Direction

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or addressed, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To The Respondent

Fee Award

I have dismissed the appeal and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signed CA McQuillan Date: 2 November 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge C McQuillan

Notes

[1] MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216 paragraphs 51-52, Singh LJ.

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our immigration lawyer in Paris.


Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).

Neighbouring decisions

Preliminary case review

Send your documents. Receive an analysis.

Send us the documents in your case. Hassan KOHEN reviews them personally and sends you a first written analysis of your situation within 24 working hours.

  • Written analysis by the lawyer, €80 incl. VAT
  • Personal reply within 24 working hours
  • 100% confidential, legal professional privilege guaranteed
  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
80 €incl. VAT

Preliminary review of your case. Review of your documents and a first written analysis by Hassan KOHEN within 24 working hours. Payment is made online after this form is submitted.

  • Up to 1 GB of documents in total, folders and sub-folders accepted
  • Secure payment, no card details stored
  • Terms and fee agreement

Click or drag your files here
All formats accepted (PDF, Word, images, etc.)

Sending...

Payment constitutes a request for immediate performance of your analysis. Your data is used solely to process your request.
Terms · Privacy policy.

IA juridique gratuite

Une question de droit ? Demandez à Judith.

Judith cherche dans les codes, la Constitution, la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et les décisions des juges, puis vous montre les textes et les passages d’arrêts qui pourraient répondre à votre question, avec leur source officielle. Gratuite, sans compte, elle ne rédige rien à votre place. Découvrir Judith, l’IA juridique gratuite du cabinet.

Trois recherches par jour, sans compte. Votre question est enregistrée et relue par le cabinet pour améliorer l’outil : n’y mettez ni nom ni information sensible.