Civil United Kingdom
Vengadeswara Raw Gopalakrishnan v The Home Office
| Judgment Approved by the court for handing down | Gopalakrishnan v The Home Office |
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2856 (KB)
Case No: KB-2025-001621
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 6 November 2026
Before :
MR JUSTICE MANSFIELD
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Between :
| VENGADESWARA RAW GOPALAKRISHNAN | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| THE HOME OFFICE | Defendant |
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The Claimant in Person
Niazi Fetto KC, Julie Anderson and Alex Ivory (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 27-28October 2026 and 6November 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down at 10.30am on 6 November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives and by release to the National Archives.
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THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MANSFIELD
Mr Justice Mansfield:
Introduction
1. The Claimant, a Sri Lankan national, came to this country in 2010. He overstayed after the expiry of a student visa in 2012 and in August 2013 he made an unsuccessful application for asylum. He was kept in immigration detention between September 2013 and February 2014, when he was released on grounds of his health.
2. This claim arises out of that period of detention. It was originally brought, in October 2013, as an application for judicial review challenging the refusal of asylum and the decision to remove the Claimant to Sri Lanka. The claim was amended to add a claim for damages for personal injury.
3. The case has a long procedural history, not least because it was stayed for a lengthy period pending determination of a case which went to the Supreme Court. In 2023 the Claimant was granted indefinite leave to remain and the public law aspects of the claim were compromised by a consent order. The personal injury claim was transferred to this Division and was case managed for a trial which was listed to commence on 19 October 2026, time estimate 10 days.
4. The Claimant’s case was that his treatment in immigration detention caused serious and long-term psychiatric injury, rendering him incapable of work and in need of round-the-clock care. His Schedule of Loss, served in January 2026, claimed over £7 million, though certain heads of loss were unparticularised. Since 2014, it has been said that the Claimant lacks capacity and the proceedings have been conducted on his behalf by a litigation friend, Reena Mathew. She was said to be someone who knew the Claimant from their local church and who provided care to the Claimant on a volunteer basis.
5. During 2026, the Defendant served evidence which materially altered the case. That evidence comprised video surveillance evidence, Ms Mathew’s own Home Office file, and (later) a supplementary report of the Defendant’s psychiatric expert, Professor Maden. The Defendant submits that this new evidence shows that the Claimant does not now suffer from a serious mental health condition, and likely never did. Further, the evidence shows Ms Mathew and the Claimant are in a relationship and have three children, the earliest of whom was born in 2019.
6. The service of this evidence rapidly changed the landscape of the claim. The Defendant applied, successfully, to amend the Defence to plead fundamental dishonesty. Ms Mathew applied, successfully, for her appointment as litigation friend to be terminated on the basis that the Claimant does not now lack capacity. The Claimant’s then solicitors, Duncan Lewis, came off the record; they were replaced, briefly, by another firm, David Benson Solicitors. The Claimant discontinued the claim. At a hearing on 20 August 2026, Lambert J vacated the 10 day trial and, pursuant to CPR PD44 para 12.4(c), directed a trial of the issue of whether the claim was fundamentally dishonest.
7. The issue of fundamental dishonesty now comes before me. For the reasons set out below, I find that this claim is fundamentally dishonest and has been fundamentally dishonest since the personal injury claim was introduced in 2014.
Preliminary matters at the hearing
The Claimant’s attendance in person and interpreting services
8. The Claimant attended the hearing in person. He has had no solicitors since 27 August 2026, when David Benson Solicitors ceased to act. The Claimant has previously been in receipt of Legal Aid, but that is no longer the case.
9. The Claimant’s first language is Tamil. He was assisted at the hearing by an independent interpreter arranged by the Defendant.
The Claimant’s capacity
10. Lambert J directed that the question of capacity be considered at the start of the trial. Having considered the evidence and heard submissions, I gave a ruling that the Claimant had capacity to conduct proceedings and indicated that I would give my reasons in this judgment.
11. On the one hand, the Claimant was represented by a litigation friend from 2014. Various experts have said, over time, that the Claimant lacked capacity, including his expert psychiatrist, Dr Master, earlier this year.
12. On the other hand:
i) Ms Mathew’s appointment as litigation friend was terminated, on her own application, by order of Master Stevens dated 28 July 2026.
ii) Ms Mathew was appointed the litigation friend without order of the court by filing an N235, pursuant to the then applicable CPR PD21 para 2.2(c). No court has ruled that the Claimant lacks capacity. The presumption of capacity under s.1(2) Mental Capacity Act 2005 applies.
iii) In support of the application to terminate the litigation friend’s appointment, witness statements were filed from Ms Mathew (dated 21 July 2026 – “Mathew 3”), Shankhanie Samarakoon, solicitor of David Benson Solicitors (dated 27 July 2026) and the Claimant himself (dated 27 July 2026 – “Gopalakrishnan 2”). All say that the Claimant has capacity. The Claimant himself says that he is able to conduct the proceedings on his own.
iv) Professor Maden has prepared two reports on behalf of the Defendant: “Maden 1”, dated 11 May 2026 and “Maden 2” dated 23 September 2026. His opinion, in Maden 2, is that the Claimant has capacity and probably has always had capacity.
v) Permission was given for the Claimant to file updated medical evidence. He has not done so. Dr Master has refused to provide a further report after Master 3. The Claimant has produced no other medical evidence to gainsay Professor Maden’s opinion as to the Claimant’s capacity.
13. I find that the Claimant has, at the current time, capacity to conduct this litigation.
The evidence
14. Since the claim was transferred to the King’s Bench Division there have been a number of case management orders. The most relevant are those of Lambert J on 5 February 2026, Master Stevens on 28 July 2026 and Lambert J on 20 August 2026. The Claimant was represented by counsel at the hearings when each of these orders was made.
15. The Claimant has not filed or served a witness statement addressing the case on fundamental dishonesty. Master Stevens’ order provided that any such witness statement was to be filed by 17 August 2026. In the recitals to her order dated 20 August 2026, Lambert J recorded that the Claimant did not intend to rely on further evidence in response to the Defendant’s case on fundamental dishonesty.
16. Included in the bundle for this hearing are two earlier witness statements signed by the Claimant. The first is dated 15 January 2014, in support of an application for release from detention. The second, dated 27 July 2026, was filed in support of the application to terminate Ms Mathew’s appointment as litigation friend – I have referred to it above.
17. The Claimant has not filed or served a skeleton argument. Lambert J’s order provided for exchange and filing by 19 October 2026. The Claimant’s position is that as he had no legal representation, he did not know what to say. That was his position at the hearing and in emails to my clerk on Friday 23 October 2026.
18. I explained the procedure and the issues to the Claimant early in the hearing. As he had not filed a witness statement in accordance with Master Stevens’ order he could not give oral evidence without the Court’s permission, pursuant to CPR 32.10. I explained the difference between evidence and submissions, acknowledging that this distinction can be difficult for a litigant in person to understand. He would be entitled to make submissions about the existing evidence, but not to give evidence of new facts, as he had not filed a witness statement.
19. After I had outlined the issues in the case, and Mr Fetto had opened the case, I gave the Claimant the opportunity to explain his position in response to the matters I have to decide. What the Claimant said included matters which amounted to new evidence, and which appeared to me to be inconsistent with the earlier statement filed by the Claimant and other statements filed on his behalf.
20. Following that, Mr Fetto’s position was that the Defendant would not object to the Court giving the Claimant permission to give evidence, notwithstanding the lack of a witness statement, but he would want the opportunity to cross-examine the Claimant. I told the Claimant that I was willing to give him permission to give evidence. I explained that would entail Mr Fetto having the opportunity to ask questions. I gave the Claimant a warning informing him of his privilege against self-incrimination.
21. Whilst it was not for me to explain or advise on the range of matters that could arise from his evidence, the warning was, in my judgment, appropriate given (i) the apparent inconsistencies between what the Claimant said on the first morning of the hearing and his July 2026 witness statement, which had a statement of truth signed by him; (ii) the inconsistencies between his witness statement and earlier witness statements filed on his behalf; and (iii) the nature of the fundamental dishonesty allegation. I told the Claimant that he could consider whether he wished to give evidence until the second day of the hearing and, if it were possible, to seek some advice after court.
22. On the second day of the hearing, I gave the Claimant the opportunity to give evidence. He chose not to do so.
23. I heard evidence from Professor Maden and gave the Claimant the opportunity to ask him questions; he did not do so. I gave him the opportunity to make submissions after Mr Fetto had made submissions. He had very little to say.
24. I have had regard to all the witness statements filed, including those of the Claimant, Ms Mathew and the solicitors instructed on behalf of the Claimant. The Defendant relied on two witness statements of Nicola Griffiths, solicitor, which introduced the evidence of enquiry agents and the documents relied on by the Defendant. It was not necessary to call Ms Griffiths. The Claimant did not suggest that he had any challenge to her evidence, nor the evidence she exhibited. I have had regard to the brief oral submissions made by the Claimant at the hearing.
The Issue
25. The Defendant seeks a finding, pursuant to CPR 44.16(1) that the claim is fundamentally dishonest.
26. The Defendant argues that the claim that the period of immigration detention in 2013 to 2014 caused severe and enduring personal injuries is fundamentally dishonest because:
i) The Claimant consciously fabricated and/or exaggerated those injuries.
ii) The Claimant conspired, for personal gain, with Ms Mathew, falsely to represent himself as seriously injured by reason of his immigration detention.
27. The Defendant argues that this has been a fundamentally dishonest claim from the start. However, the Defendant also argues that even if the Claimant has only been dishonest about his condition since a later date (i.e. if his condition was at first genuine, but he concealed his recovery in later years) that would still amount to fundamental dishonesty in the claim.
The Legal Principles
28. When, as here, a claimant discontinues a claim, he is liable for the defendant’s costs up to the date of service of the notice of discontinuance, unless the court orders otherwise: CPR 38.6.
29. This case, however, is governed by the rules on qualified one way costs shifting (“QOCS”) in CPR Part 44.
i) QOCS applies to proceedings which include a claim for personal injuries: CPR 44.13(1);
ii) Where QOCS applies, orders for costs made against a claimant may be enforced without the permission of the court but only to the extent that the aggregate amount in money terms of such orders does not exceed the aggregate amount in money terms of any orders for, or agreements to pay or settle a claim for, damages, costs and interest made in favour of the claimant: CPR 44.14;
iii) To that general rule there are certain exceptions. One exception is fundamental dishonesty. Orders for costs made against a claimant may be enforced to the full extent of such orders with the permission of the court where the claim is found on the balance of probabilities to be fundamentally dishonest: CPR 44.16(1).
30. An allegation of fundamental dishonesty may remain live notwithstanding the discontinuance of the claim. The court may direct that issues arising out of an allegation that the claim was fundamentally dishonest be determined notwithstanding that the notice of discontinuance has not been set aside: CPR PD 44 para 12.4(c). That was the effect of Lambert J’s order of 20 August 2026.
31. QOCS applies to a claim which includes a claim for personal injuries. Therefore, it applies regardless of whether the claim also includes other claims which are not claims for personal injuries.
32. If a claim for personal injuries is added by amendment, QOCS applies to the proceedings both before and after the amendment: Pathan v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis[2022] EWHC 3244 (KB).
33. The burden is on the party alleging fundamental dishonesty to prove it on the balance of probabilities. There are two questions: Was there dishonesty in the claim? Was the dishonesty fundamental to the claim?
34. The test for dishonesty was set out by Lord Hughes in Ivey v Genting Casinos Limited [2018] AC 391 at paragraph 74:
When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain (subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts. The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.
35. Mr Fetto drew my attention to authorities which show that (a) the mere fact that a claimant has been inconsistent or inaccurate in their evidence does not necessarily mean that they have been dishonest; (b) exaggeration of injuries does not necessarily mean a claimant has been dishonest: in some circumstances, exaggeration may be unconscious, or it may simply be the result of loose speech for effect. Mr Fetto puts his case squarely on the basis that in this case there has been deliberate invention or exaggeration of symptoms.
36. A claimant may advance a dishonest case through a litigation friend. Patel v Arriva Midlands Ltd [2019] EWHC 1216 (QB) is an example upon which Mr Fetto relied. The claimant was found to be dishonest both in his own presentation of the case and in failing to correct false information given by his litigation friend. However, those findings as to the claimant’s dishonesty depended upon the judge’s findings (a) that the claimant was presumed to have capacity; and (b) whilst his true symptoms meant that on a bad day, he may not have been able to contact his solicitors to correct the facts, on a good day he could. Different considerations may apply in a case where the claimant does in fact lack capacity and the dishonest exaggeration of the claim is all on the part of the litigation friend. I do not need to consider the principles that may apply in that situation, as this is not such a case. I have found that the Claimant does have capacity. The Defendant puts its case on the basis that there has been a dishonest conspiracy between the Claimant and his litigation friend.
37. For CPR 44.16(1) to apply, the dishonesty in relation to the claim must be fundamental. This requirement was explained in Howlett v Davies[2017] EWCA Civ 1696 at paras 16-17, where Newey LJ cited with approval the following passage from an earlier first instance judgment:
The corollary term to 'fundamental' would be a word with some such meaning as 'incidental' or 'collateral'. Thus, a claimant should not be exposed to costs liability merely because he is shown to have been dishonest as to some collateral matter or perhaps as to some minor, self-contained head of damage. If, on the other hand, the dishonesty went to the root of either the whole of his claim or a substantial part of his claim, then it appears to me that it would be a fundamentally dishonest claim: a claim which depended as to a substantial or important part of itself upon dishonesty
The Claim
38. The claim was initially issued in the Administrative Court on 24 October 2013 together with an application for urgent consideration ahead of the Claimant’s proposed removal to Sri Lanka on 26 October 2013. The claim challenged the Defendant’s decision to set removal directions and the decision to refuse asylum.
39. It is not necessary to set out the lengthy procedural history of the claim, which included, among other things, a six-year stay. I note the following points.
40. A claim for damages for personal injury was raised as long ago as 2014. On 7 November 2014, the Claimant served Amended Grounds of Claim. At paragraph 12, those grounds sought permission to amend to bring a claim for personal injury. Paragraphs 97-100 set out that claim. It was alleged that the Defendant acted in breach of her duty of care to the Claimant during the period of detention. It was alleged that the treatment in detention was injurious to the Claimant’s mental health and the Claimant had suffered severe psychological disruption amounting to a psychiatric injury. The Claimant relied on reports of Dr George dated 2 September 2014 and 5 November 2014.
41. Dr George’s reports were based on examinations on 24 August 2014 and 20 October 2014. Dr George’s took histories from Ms Mathew, described as the Claimant’s voluntary support worker. Dr George was unable to take a history from the Claimant himself on either examination. At the first examination, the Claimant was guided by the arm by Ms Mathew and was in a state of self-neglect. He rocked backwards and forwards during the interview and appeared to suffer from hallucinations. Dr George described him as being in a depressive stupor with slowing of movement and poverty of speech. On the second examination, Dr George recorded that the Claimant’s condition had worsened. He was highly distracted and unable to respond to questions. He constantly muttered to himself. He showed signs of auditory hallucinations. He exhibited child-like self-comforting behaviour which Dr George said was extremely concerning. Dr George recorded a background history from Ms Mathew: the Claimant was unable to manage self-care and unable to leave his home; he was always accompanied by voluntary workers. He was not orientated as to time, place and person and was unable to provide his date of birth or age. Dr George diagnosed the Claimant as suffering from a major depressive disorder, with a severe current episode with psychotic symptoms. He also suffered from PTSD.
42. The Claimant was granted indefinite leave to remain and the public law issues in the claim became academic. By a consent order dated 24 February 2023, the personal injury claim was transferred to this Division.
43. The claim was re-pleaded by Particulars of Claim dated 15 July 2025 and Amended Particulars of Claim dated 22 December 2025. The latter is the current version of the pleaded case.
44. The Claimant claims false imprisonment for the period of his detention, and negligence in respect of his treatment during detention. The claim pleads that the Claimant has suffered pain and injury and sustained loss and damage. The Particulars of Injury are as follows:
The Claimant relies on the reports of Dr Dinshaw Master, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 19th of August 2021… and 11th July 2025…. Doctor Master considers that the Claimant suffered from a Severe Depressive Illness with psychotic symptoms for approximately 9 years following his release from immigration detention. Dr Master further considers that the Claimant continues to suffer from PTSD to the date. The Claimant was incommunicative for a period of approximately 9 years following his release from immigration detention. He continues to lack capacity and is unable to engage in any form of employment. Dr Master recommends that the Claimant remain on his current medication regime and that he be under the care of a consultant psychiatrist. Dr Master opines that the Claimant remains vulnerable to developing depression and to a deterioration in his PTSD symptoms.
45. The Preliminary Schedule of Loss, dated 9 January 2026, pleads that as a result of his detention, the Claimant suffered from a severe depressive illness with psychotic symptoms for a period of 9 years and suffers from ongoing PTSD. These conditions rendered him effectively mute for 9 years, unable to care for himself, to form relationships, study or work. It was said that while there was scope for improvement in his condition, the Claimant remained vulnerable to developing depression in future and his PTSD was ongoing. It was said that he continued to lack capacity.
46. On that basis, general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity were claimed in the sum of £264,090. Loss of earnings was claimed on the basis of a total loss of earning capacity from the time of injury through to retirement. Care costs were claimed on the basis of a need for round the clock care for the rest of the Claimant’s life. The preliminary total claim was put at £7,005,572.26, though that did not include pension loss, deputyship costs, or certain other heads of loss.
47. A Reply was filed on behalf of the Claimant on 9 March 2026. It was pleaded that the Defendant acted in bad faith in pleading, in the Defence, that causation of loss and damage was denied. The Reply went on to deny that the Claimant’s symptoms had alleviated on regularisation of his immigration status. The plea was maintained that the Claimant continued to lack capacity, could never work and required a high degree of care.
Evidence relied on in support of the personal injury claim
Expert psychiatric evidence
48. The pleaded case relies on two reports of Dr Dinshaw Master, consultant psychiatrist, the first dated 19 August 2021 (“Master 1”) and the second dated 11 July 2025 (“Master 2”). In due course the Claimant also relied on a third report of Dr Master, dated 11 May 2026 (“Master 3”).
49. Master 1 was based on an examination on 20 July 2021. Dr Master’s opinion was that the Claimant suffered from a severe depressive illness with psychotic symptoms. It was possible that he continued to suffer from PTSD, but Dr Master could not be sure as the Claimant was unable to engage verbally to report or deny the presence of symptoms.
50. The Claimant attended the appointment with Dr Master with Ms Mathew. Dr Master described that the Claimant was led by the hand by Ms Mathew. He was effectively mute and did not respond to Dr Master’s questioning. Dr Master took the history from Ms Mathew. Ms Mathew gave an account that she had met the Claimant after his release from detention; she was introduced to him through the church. She thought that the Claimant had lived with their Pastor until recently, but for the last seven to eight months (this was an account given in 2021) he had stayed with and been looked after by another couple in Mitcham. She said that he had no or very little meaningful conversation with anyone. He showed no interest in anything and was silent most of the time. She said there may have been a slight degree of improvement over the years.
51. Master 2 was based on an examination on 13 February 2025. Dr Master reported that there had been considerable improvement in the Claimant’s psychiatric condition. He no longer suffered from a depressive illness, but it was likely that he continued to suffer from PTSD. He no longer suffered from psychotic symptoms. His ability to communicate had improved, but he remained impaired in forming new relationships and socialising. Dr Master did not consider that he would be able to engage in any form of employment. He was now able to manage his own personal care but relied on support from his church community. He continued to lack capacity. Dr Master again took a history from Ms Mathew. Dr Master recorded that there was no spontaneous talk from the Claimant, but he did answer questions with brief answers. The Claimant himself said that he never went out on his own. He said he lived with a family in Mitcham but was unable to recall their names.
52. Dr Master records Ms Mathew as saying that the Claimant had lived with a family in Mitcham for the last 20 months, and before that he was living with the Pastor and his family. Given the interview was in February 2025, that would mean Ms Mathew was saying he had moved to the family in Mitcham in around June 2023. As I have noted above, in Master 1 Ms Mathew is recorded as saying that this move had already happened prior to the interview in July 2021. It is unfortunate that Dr Master did not pick up on this inconsistency, which offered a clue as to what, in due course, has been admitted to be a false account of the Claimant’s living arrangements.
53. Master 3 was based on an examination on 20 March 2026. The Claimant attended with Ms Mathew. Again, Dr Master was unable to establish a rapport with the Claimant. There was no spontaneous speech, but the Claimant did answer some questions. Again, Dr Master took a history from Ms Mathew. She said that there may have been a very slight improvement in the Claimant’s condition since Master 2. He had to be prompted for personal care. He never went out unaccompanied. He was still staying with the same family he had moved in with after leaving the Pastor’s home. He did not interact spontaneously with anyone. His level of communication and interaction remained minimal. She could see no prospect that he would be able to live independently.
Presentation on examination by the Defendant’s expert
54. Professor Maden prepared a report on behalf of the Defendant dated 11 May 2026. It was based on an interview with the Claimant on 10 March 2026 in the presence of Ms Mathew. Professor Maden recorded that a conventional interview was impossible. He described that Ms Mathew led the Claimant into the interview room holding his hand as if he were a small child. He said very little in response to questions and nothing spontaneously. His verbal communication was virtually nil, and a history was taken from Ms Mathew. Ms Mathew gave a history of the Claimant’s condition consistent with that given to Dr Master. The Claimant continued to live with the family in Mitcham. He no longer required prompting for basic self-care, but she doubted that he would be able to prepare a meal for himself. There had been a gradual change over 12 years, so that he would now respond to her when she spoke to him. Conversations were limited, and she could not recall him ever initiating a conversation. He continued to be accompanied by others outside but never asked to be taken out and never initiated activities. I will return to Professor Maden’s reports later in this judgment. At this stage, I am concerned to note the case put forward by the Claimant and Ms Mathew: i.e. how they presented to the Defendant’s expert.
Other expert evidence
55. In support of the losses claimed, the Claimant relied on an employment expert’s report (Keith Carter & Associates, dated November 2021) and a care expert’s report (Maggie Sargeant, dated 16 November 2020). In each case, the expert recorded that they were unable to interview the Claimant because he was unable to speak. A history was taken from Ms Mathew.
Witnesses of fact
56. Lambert J’s order of 5 February 2026 gave directions for the exchange of witness statements of fact for trial. Two statements were exchanged in support of the claim: a statement of Ms Mathew dated 24 April 2026 (“Mathew 2”) and a statement of Krishanthi Prathepan, of Duncan Lewis, dated 27 April 2026 (“Prathepan 1”). The Claimant, as described in these statements, was severely debilitated and had been since 2013.
i) Ms Mathew described that in the early years after release from detention, the Claimant lived with the Pastor from his religious community. Ms Mathew provided him with support as a volunteer from the religious community. The Claimant could not be left alone for more than a couple of hours, due to his complete inability to care for himself. He could not perform self-care tasks by himself, such as getting out of bed, eating or personal care. She described the Claimant as in a world of his own, responding only to auditory hallucinations. He did not communicate with her, the Pastor, or others in the community. The Claimant could only go outside when physically supported by Ms Mathew and could only walk a very short distance on his own.
ii) Ms Mathew said that in 2020 she noticed a “slight improvement” in the Claimant’s health and a resultant change in his care needs. However, the Claimant still needed care for ordinary day to day tasks and could not manage his eating and sleeping schedule on his own. The Claimant would only leave the house if someone took him for a walk.
iii) Ms Mathew said she had witnessed a further slight improvement since mid-2023. However, on her account he remained seriously debilitated. In her statement she gives an account that when, in February 2023, she told him that he had been granted indefinite leave to remain he barely reacted and she did not get the impression that he understood the substance.
iv) After being granted indefinite leave to remain the Claimant received universal credit and Ms Mathew opened a bank account for him. The Claimant moved out of the Pastor’s house. Ms Mathew arranged for him to move to live with a family from the church community. That family’s address was said to be 44 Tamworth Lane, Mitcham (“Tamworth Lane”). Even in 2023, on Ms Mathew’s account, the Claimant was severely debilitated. She believed that he had an earlier bank account, but she could not ask him for the details as he would not reply. Mathew 2 says the Claimant still lives at Tamworth Lane with that family.
v) Ms Mathew’s account of the Claimant’s current condition (as of 24 April 2026) includes the following:
a) He does not know how to access online banking or withdraw money, and it is not possible to explain this to him as he struggles to engage in any form of communication;
b) Since moving to Tamworth Lane and obtaining indefinite leave to remain, his conditions have improved “ever so slightly”. He can now respond to questions with one or two word answers. He can perform some basic tasks without prompting, such as brushing his teeth. He needs prompting to wash;
c) Ms Mathew takes him out of the house. She says that if she did not visit, she does not believe the Claimant would ever leave the house and would be confined to his room. He never initiates plans and spends the majority of the day sleeping;
d) Ms Mathew says:
I consider that the claimant still has very high care needs, and requires a lot of day-to-day support. The claimant is unable to prepare his own meals, leave the house alone, attend appointments, manage his finances or arrange any key aspects of his life such as housing, medical care and benefits. The Claimant relies heavily upon me and the family with whom he is living, in order to meet these needs.
When I first met the claimant, he could not speak at all, other than to himself due to the auditory hallucinations which he was experiencing. I have witnessed a very slow improvement over time, as I cannot say that there has been any major improvement, particularly since the Claimant still cannot communicate normally or engage in conversations.
57. Mathew 2 is consistent with Ms Mathew’s 5 November 2014 witness statement (“Mathew 1”) in which she described the Claimant as unable to care for himself. He very rarely responded when spoken to.
58. Ms Mathew, throughout her evidence, describes herself as someone who provides care as a volunteer to another member of her church community. She met the Claimant after his release from detention and began to care for him, as she has done ever since, visiting him first while he lived with the Pastor and then when he lived with a family at Tamworth Lane.
The Defendant’s new evidence of fundamental dishonesty
59. Between 12 May 2026 and 2 June 2026, the Defendant instructed enquiry agents to observe and film the Claimant in public. I have watched the video footage. In each of these videos, the Claimant can be seen in public carrying out normal activities. Moreover, he is seen with three children and Ms Mathew, behaving as any family might when out and about. Over the course of the surveillance footage, he can be seen doing the following:
i) Taking children to school;
ii) Driving a car with Ms Mathew and three children as passengers;
iii) Scrolling on a mobile phone;
iv) Interacting with others at a trampolining venue and a restaurant;
v) Walking in public on his own, including going to a pharmacy;
vi) Walking to a gym and undertaking an hour-long gym session.
60. Online searches by the enquiry agents also show the Claimant as participating in a competition at a go-karting centre on 19 April 2025.
61. The Defendant has obtained Ms Mathew’s Home Office file. In that file, Ms Mathew describes the Claimant as her spouse and the father of her children. The file contains the birth certificates of two children, born on 28 October 2019 and 1 June 2021. The Claimant is stated to be the father of both. On both certificates his occupation is given as delivery driver.
The response on behalf of the Claimant
62. It was the service of this new evidence that led to the application to terminate Ms Mathew’s appointment as litigation friend and, in due course, to the discontinuance of the claim. In support of the application to terminate the appointment as litigation friend, statements were filed from the Claimant and Ms Mathew (Gopalakrishnan 2 and Mathew 3 – as referred to above under the heading of “The Claimant’s capacity”).
63. These statements paint a very different picture to Mathew 1 and Mathew 2, and to the accounts given to the various experts.
64. The Claimant and Ms Mathew both say that they met in 2012, before the Claimant’s period of detention. They met again in 2014 and began a relationship and started living together in 2015. They have three children together, born on 28 October 2019, 1 June 2021 and 19 August 2025.
65. Both say that the Claimant was severely mentally distressed following his period of detention and that Ms Mathew provided support. Ms Mathew says that the Claimant was unable to perform basic tasks and did not even recognise what needed to be done.
66. Ms Mathew says that the Claimant improved gradually in or around 2018. She says that after the birth of their first son, in 2019, his outlook improved and that he later began to do his own activities.
67. Ms Mathew says that she did not mention her relationship with the Claimant to the Claimant’s solicitors as she was not allowed to have another person living in her accommodation, and she feared that her immigration status might be affected. She says she did not properly understand that these matters should be disclosed and did not intend to mislead the Court.
68. In Gopalakrishnan 2, the Claimant maintains a position that he suffered severe symptoms between 2014 and 2018 and was battling with depression. He says he struggled to cope with daily life and “was not functioning as I normally would”. He says that by around 2018 his mental health began to improve and he gradually became better able to manage his day to day activities. He does not go into any detail of his improvement but says that his circumstances have changed since the earlier period when he needed significant support, and he is now able to conduct proceedings on his own.
69. Both Ms Mathew and Mr Gopalakrishnan avoid giving an account of Mr Gopalakrishnan’s current capabilities. Ms Mathew’s account of improvement after 2018 is put in general terms, without engaging in any detail as to the Claimant’s capabilities. She says that after the birth of the first child in 2019 he did not require the same level of care and later began to do his own activities. The Claimant gives no clear account of his improvement after 2018 and identifies no other time when he says his condition improved in a material way.
70. As I have indicated, early in the hearing I asked the Claimant to outline his position in response to the application. He spoke through the interpreter. His voice was quiet but fluent. After a short time, he began to cry or at least appeared to; but he continued to speak. He gave the following account in these submissions. He said that from 2014 to 2018 he was not feeling well mentally and someone had to take him to appointments and meetings. He said that around Covid time his mental health was a bit better, but he went into the dark again when Covid came. He was getting better little by little. Ms Mathew did everything for him. He said that his intimate relationship with Ms Mathew began when she was caring for him. He has only recently felt that he has been able to do certain things. He was still taking tablets for his mental health and was still trying to come out of a darker life. He tries not to show his children his pain and mental health problems. He gets anxious with professionals, especially when he goes to appointments. Sometimes he wonders what the point of living is but thinks about his children. Sometimes he feels he is going back to the old days. He did not mean to hide anything, but seeing professionals made him very anxious.
71. Some of this account is not contained within Gopalakrishnan 2. His account of his improvement and deterioration around the time of Covid is absent from that statement and is, in my view, inconsistent with the overall impression given in that statement.
72. At the stage of the hearing when Mr Fetto took me to Gopalakrishnan 2, the Claimant wanted to clarify something, and I allowed him to speak at that stage. He said he did meet Ms Mathew in 2012, but between 2013 and 2018 he had no contact with her. He said he met her again in 2018. He only found out then that she had been the person helping him. He said that from 2014 he does not remember her in his life. He said, to clarify, until 2018 he did not know who was looking after him or in his life. He said he did not remember 2014 to 2018.
73. That account is plainly at odds with both Gopalakrishnan 2 and Mathew 3, both of which say the Claimant and Ms Mathew began a relationship and began living together in early 2015. It is inconceivable that they did so at a time that the Claimant was so incapacitated that he did not even know, for a further three years, that Ms Mathew was involved in his life. In any event, the Claimant gives no such explanation in his witness statement.
74. As I have explained above, the Claimant chose not to give this account, or any account, on oath. Ms Mathew did not attend the hearing and did not give evidence.
Professor Maden’s evidence
75. I have already dealt with how the Claimant and Ms Mathew presented to Professor Maden when interviewed on 10 March 2026. At that time, Professor Maden did not have the surveillance footage. Nor did he know that the Claimant and Ms Mathew were in a relationship and had three children together; nor that there was evidence that the Claimant worked as a delivery driver.
76. Even in the absence of that evidence, based on the Claimant’s presentation and on detailed review of the medical records, Professor Maden expressed significant doubt as to the genuineness of the Claimant’s symptoms.
i) He said that pre-detention, the Claimant was probably suffering from a mild or moderate depressive episode;
ii) During detention, the Claimant complained of pseudo-hallucinations and other inconsistently reported mental health symptoms as well as exaggerated physical complaints that strongly suggested malingering. Professor Maden did not believe that he ever had true psychotic symptoms. There was nothing to suggest his mental capacity was ever impaired;
iii) Post-detention, Professor Maden said that the progression of symptoms after release was surprising. He said that the Claimant’s presentation to him was inconsistent with a depressive disorder but was consistent with a dissociative disorder with exaggeration or malingering. A proper psychiatric assessment was impossible because of the Claimant’s inability or unwillingness to communicate beyond a very basic level. Professor Maden did not believe that there was any aspect of the Claimant’s presentation in the community (i.e. after his release from detention) that could not be explained by malingering or fabrication, but it was a matter for the court to decide the contribution of these factors.
77. Professor Maden prepared a supplementary report after seeing the surveillance footage and additional disclosure. He said the following:
In light of the new evidence, I would now say only that it is possible that the Claimant in June 2013 was suffering from a mild or moderate depressive episode (Category 6A70.1 in ICD11). The facts are too uncertain to allow an expert to say more. (para 20).
Within detention, I am now more confident in saying that there was manipulative behaviour and fabrication of symptoms. I do not believe he ever suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or from a psychotic or severe mental illness. (para 24).
I no longer believe that in June 2014 the Claimant lost mental capacity and nor do I believe that he has ever suffered from a dissociative disorder. This was a case of malingering. I set out in my first report the ICD11 definition of category QC30 as the “feigning, intentional production or significant exaggeration of physical or psychological symptoms, or intentional misattribution of genuine symptoms to an unrelated event or series of events when this is specifically motivated by external incentives or rewards such as escaping duty or work; mitigating punishment; obtaining medications or drugs; or receiving unmerited recompense such as disability compensation or personal injury damages award”. (para 25).
If it is assumed that the Claimant suffered from a mild or moderate depressive episode in June 2013 and/or that he has a personality disorder with pronounced dissocial traits, neither would have affected his state of knowledge or belief as to the genuineness or lack thereof of his represented symptoms to treating clinicians, medico-legal experts, solicitors and the Defendant/its staff. (para 28).
78. Professor Maden gave helpful oral evidence, expanding on some matters in response to questions from Mr Fetto and answering my questions. He explained his concern as to inconsistent presentation by the Claimant over time (based on his analysis of the medical records) and as to the importance of the fact that it was not possible to take a history from the Claimant. He gave a cogent explanation of why he differed from the earlier experts, who, he said, had not properly analysed the medical records. In any event, the surveillance evidence and the true life history of the Claimant were crucial, and if the other experts had seen the evidence he had now seen they would have reached different conclusions.
79. He said that the Claimant’s presentation was not consistent with any straightforward diagnosis such as depression. The Claimant’s presentation on examination was bizarre and, as the Professor put it, just not how people with mental illness present. Either the explanation was a dissociative condition or fabrication. Having seen the surveillance evidence and additional disclosure, he was convinced there was no dissociative disorder and the explanation was malingering.
80. Professor Maden said that the Claimant’s life situation – i.e. he has a partner and three children – is wholly inconsistent with the Claimant’s presentation to him, or to the earlier experts. He said there was no explanation for the difference between his presentation in March 2026 and his behaviour in the video surveillance in late May and early June 2026. There was very little prospect of the difference in behaviour being due to improvement in the Claimant’s condition. Further, all of the prior experts had given a very gloomy prognosis inconsistent with such recovery.
81. Professor Maden reiterated his opinion that the Claimant has never lacked capacity. He was highly suspicious of the fact that the Claimant’s presented and reported condition deteriorated after release from detention, rather than improving.
The Claimant’s disclosure
82. The Defendant relies both on (i) what the Claimant’s disclosure shows and (ii) inferences from deficiencies in the Claimant’s disclosure.
83. The parties were ordered to give standard disclosure by 6 March 2026 (order of Lambert J 5 February 2026). In purported compliance with that order, Ms Mathew served a list of documents saying that she did not have access to any of the Claimant’s documents. The Defendant objected and requested a range of documents in letters dated 23 March 2026 and 22 May 2026. Duncan Lewis replied on 29 May 2026. They disclosed certain documents and explained the absence of certain others.
i) A tenancy agreement for Tamworth Lane was disclosed, showing Ms Mathew to be the Claimant’s landlord. This fact was unexplained; the evidence up until that time said that the Claimant lived at Tamworth Lane with a family who were members of the church community;
ii) Bank statements were disclosed for a Monzo account in the Claimant’s name, dating from May 2023. It was said that, to Duncan Lewis’ knowledge, the Claimant did not have any additional bank accounts;
iii) In response to a request for a copy of the Claimant’s driving licence and motor insurance documents, it was said that he did not possess a driving licence and had not been in possession of one since his release from immigration detention;
iv) The letter explained that they were unable to ask the Claimant about other documents and were unable to obtain further details from the Claimant, because he lacked capacity.
84. I note that the date of this letter, 29 May 2026, is only three days before the Claimant was filmed driving a car in which Ms Mathew and his three children were passengers and taking them to a trampolining centre and a restaurant.
85. At some point, statements from two further bank accounts in the Claimant’s name were disclosed: from Lloyds and Halifax. These too only went back to 2023.
86. Mr Fetto showed me certain entries in the bank statements.
i) There were entries which corroborated matters shown in the surveillance footage. There is an entry for the trampolining centre for the correct date, and a direct debit for the same gym as shown in the surveillance footage.
ii) The entries indicate a longer pattern of the behaviour shown in the surveillance footage. There is a monthly direct debit payment to a gym (albeit the particular gym changes) back as far as September 2024.
iii) There are many entries for things such as petrol, public transport, supermarket shopping. The locations of the transactions span various parts of London and the southeast of England. That pattern of spending can be seen across the whole date range of the statements, back to 2023.
87. Mr Fetto asks me to infer that these entries show that the Claimant was making card payments, and the fact of those card payments shows someone who was engaged in the normal activities of daily life.
88. It is possible that the card payments could be explained by somebody else using the Claimant’s bank account and bank card. If that were so, it would shed no light on the Claimant’s activities or abilities. However, I do not accept that is what happened. I find that the Claimant himself has been responsible for these payments.
i) There has been no explanation offered for the card payments. The Claimant has not said that the payments were made by others. He has not said, where motoring costs have been incurred, that others made the journey, or that he was not the driver on the journey;
ii) Some of the payments – the gym direct debit and the trampoline park – clearly relate to activities the Claimant himself undertook;
iii) The pattern of spending is entirely consistent with the behaviour of the Claimant in the surveillance footage where he can be seen going about normal daily activities;
iv) As is clear from the medical evidence, the surveillance evidence and the witness statements filed in July 2026, the Claimant now has capacity and is capable of shopping, driving and carrying out normal day to day activities. There is no reason to think that his current position does not extend back, at least, as far as 2023. There is no explanation offered by the Claimant that for part of the period of the statements he was not using his bank card himself, but that later he was;
89. I therefore find that these statements show the Claimant’s own use of his bank accounts, and they show a person who was capable, over the whole period of the statements from 2023, of travelling, shopping and carrying out normal day to day activities.
90. Mr Fetto argues that the absence of bank statements for the period prior to 2023 is suspicious. The Claimant is likely to have had bank accounts at an earlier time. The failure to disclose them suggests that the Claimant has wished to conceal earlier financial records which would show a longer track record of normal day to day activities.
91. I accept that submission. I do find that the Claimant has sought to conceal a longer pattern of behaviour that would be shown by his earlier bank records. I say that for the following reasons:
i) The Claimant came to the UK on a student visa and was here as a student for nearly three years prior to detention. It would be unlikely that he functioned without a bank account;
ii) It is unlikely that the Claimant survived without a bank account from 2014 to 2023. That situation may have been plausible if indeed the Claimant had been incapacitated and had been constantly cared for by others. But it is now clear that is not the case. Ms Mathew and the Claimant had been living together since 2015 and have three children. Since 2019 at least, Ms Mathew has stated the Claimant’s occupation to be as a delivery driver. He is unlikely to have been able to function either as a delivery driver or as a father of a family without a bank account;
iii) Duncan Lewis’ explanation for the absence of documents is that they could not ask the Claimant for more documents because he lacked capacity. That answer is clearly based on a false account given to the solicitors by the Claimant. It is plain that in May 2026 the Claimant did have capacity and could have searched for documents and given instructions;
iv) No other explanation has been given by or on behalf of the Claimant.
92. In the absence of any explanation from the Claimant, I do infer that the Claimant has deliberately withheld documents, in the form of bank statements, through fear of what they would show. I infer that they would show:
i) A pattern of normal activities being undertaken by the Claimant over many years;
ii) Expenditure, such as petrol, showing that he has been driving for many years. That would be consistent with the “delivery driver” entries on the birth certificates of the Claimant’s children in 2019 and 2021.
Discussion and conclusions
93. From this recital of the evidence, and from the findings I have made, the following is clear:
i) Mathew 3 and Gopalakrishnan 2 show that the Claimant and Ms Mathew have lied about their relationship status. They have concealed from the Defendant, and from all the medical experts, the fact that they have been living together in a relationship since 2015 and have had three children since 2019;
ii) The Claimant is capable, in 2026, of carrying out normal day to day activities such as driving, looking after his children, using a mobile phone and going to the gym. There is no evidence or explanation from the Claimant to suggest to the contrary;
iii) I have found that the Claimant’s bank statements show that he was carrying out normal activities such as going to the gym from September 2024 and driving and shopping over the period from 2023, when the disclosed bank statements start. I have found that the Claimant has withheld bank statements from earlier years which would have shown the same pattern of behaviour;
iv) On his own case, the Claimant appears to accept that he was well enough to carry out normal activities by 2018, or around the time of Covid (as he said in submissions), although his exact account of his recovery is unclear.
94. The Claimant’s family circumstances, his actions as recorded in his bank statements and the surveillance evidence show a level of functioning which is wholly inconsistent with the case put forward in the pleadings and correspondence in 2026; in the presentation by Ms Mathew and the Claimant to both Dr Master and Professor Maden in 2026; and in Mathew 2. In my judgment, the inconsistency is obvious, but it is confirmed by Professor Maden in his evidence, which I accept.
95. The Claimant could have chosen to file a witness statement to explain the evidence. He could have filed evidence to explain how the surveillance footage and bank statements were consistent with his ongoing medical condition as presented to both parties’ experts. He chose not to do so. There is no explanation for the inconsistencies between his presentation to the experts and his condition as shown by the new evidence.
96. The difference between the presentation to experts in March 2026 and the surveillance footage in May and June 2026 cannot be explained by improvement in the Claimant’s condition in the period between March and May.
i) The Claimant did not offer that explanation for the difference between his behaviour in interview with the experts and his behaviour in the surveillance footage;
ii) Professor Maden thought it a very unlikely possibility that there could have been such an improvement. He thought fabrication to be the likely explanation;
iii) The bank records show that the Claimant had been functioning normally at the time of the expert examinations.
97. The Claimant says that he found meetings with experts to be very difficult. That cannot be the explanation for his presentation in meetings with experts. Ms Mathew gave an account of the Claimant’s lack of capability day to day that was consistent with the way that he presented in interview. She did not say in any of the assessments that the Claimant’s presentation in the assessment was worse than his normal presentation.
98. I have considered whether the false account given can be said to be the responsibility of Ms Mathew, not the Claimant. It is she who has given the false history to the experts. However, on each occasion Ms Mathew gave an account to the experts the Claimant was present. He obviously knew what she was saying. He was present and had a Tamil interpreter on each occasion. It would at any time have been open to him to correct the record. He did not do so. Instead, he feigned symptoms in a manner consistent with the account that Ms Mathew gave. Indeed, I find that he feigned a lack of ability to communicate in order to avoid having to answer questions from the experts, thereby to avoid being “found out” if he said something unguarded or unhelpful. I find that Ms Mathew and the Claimant acted together. The Claimant knowingly participated in the false accounts given to the experts.
99. I conclude that when examined in 2026 by Dr Master and Professor Maden the Claimant and Ms Mathew deliberately exaggerated the Claimant’s symptoms and the Claimant deliberately feigned behaviour in order to deceive the experts.
100. When the Amended Particulars of Claim, Schedule of Loss and Reply were pleaded, they were based upon a false picture as to the Claimant’s symptoms and prognosis. The Claimant knew that picture to be false. Further, Duncan Lewis’ correspondence about disclosure in May 2026 shows that they believed the Claimant to lack capacity at that time, so that they could not ask him about documents. That was based on a false representation of the position by the Claimant to Duncan Lewis.
101. The claim advanced in 2026 is a false one, and one that the Claimant knew to be false. However, the same can be said of earlier stages of the claim.
102. The notion that the Claimant and Ms Mathew were in a relationship and had a child together is wholly at odds with the level of symptoms the Claimant is described as having in Mathew 2, and wholly at odds with the accounts being given to the experts. By the time of Master 1, in 2021, the Claimant and Ms Mathew already had two children. Even the Claimant, in Gopalakrishnan 2, does not appear to suggest that he suffered significant symptoms after 2018. Yet the Claimant presented in 2021 to Dr Master as needing to be led by the hand and to all intents and purposes mute. He presented in the same way to Maggie Sargeant in 2020 and Keith Carter & Associates in 2021, all for the purposes of obtaining evidence to support a large claim for damages.
103. Further, I find that this personal injury claim has been fundamentally dishonest from the moment it was introduced in 2014. The Claimant and Ms Mathew maintain that despite the later concealment of the true position he was in fact severely suffering in the period 2014 to 2018. I do not accept that:
i) I found Professor Maden’s evidence to be compelling: his opinion is that this has been a case of malingering throughout. I accept his evidence;
ii) Given their egregious dishonesty in the later period, I simply do not accept their evidence in relation to the earlier period, unless it is corroborated by reliable evidence from elsewhere. There is no such reliable evidence;
iii) There is no reason to think that the earlier expert reports were not the product of the same deception as the later reports. It is clear that since 2015, the Claimant and Ms Mathew have deceived all medical professionals about the nature of their relationship. There is no more reason to rely on the earlier medical reports than on the later reports. Although Dr George’s reports pre-date the 2015 relationship, the Claimant and Ms Mathew’s deception has been so extensive that the history given to Dr George by them cannot be relied on;
iv) The Claimant has shown himself willing to lie, and to maintain a lie, for gain. He had reasons to lie in the earlier phases of the claim.
104. Both Mathew 3 and Gopalakrishnan 2 state that there was no intention to mislead. I reject that.
i) Ms Mathew says that she did not understand that these matters needed to be disclosed. It would self-evidently be important for the expert psychiatrists to have a true understanding of the Claimant’s domestic arrangements, both in terms of his ability to undertake activities and in terms of the support around him. It is not simply a matter of failure to disclose; Ms Mathew has actively given a false account of her own and the Claimant’s domestic situations. As recently as April 2026, in Mathew 2, Ms Mathew presented herself as a carer who visited the Claimant at the home of the family he lived with. She said in terms that she could provide care to the Claimant as she did not have any dependants such as children. It is plain that these statements in Mathew 2 are lies;
ii) In Gopalakrishnan 2, the Claimant says that he did not intend to mislead and did not seek to obtain money by deception from the Defendant. I have considered his explanation that he acted from fear and poor mental health. I do not accept that this explains or excuses the deliberate presentation of symptoms which he knew to be false;
iii) The Claimant goes on to say that if he showed that his mental health had improved and he was capable of doing things on his own, he would be detained again. That explanation, taken at face value, shows dishonesty: the Claimant is saying that in order to avoid a particular result (being taken back into detention) he deliberately concealed the true position as to his recovery. His statement implicitly accepts that he knew that he was presenting a false position; and expressly states that he did so to achieve an outcome that was beneficial to him. That, on any view, is dishonest;
iv) Further, I do not accept that this explanation can be taken at face value. The false impression has been maintained until this year, some 12 years after the Claimant’s release from detention. He has been represented by lawyers who would have been able to advise him as to the risk, or lack of risk, of him being detained again. The claim for damages has been persisted in since 2014, and in particular has been persisted in after settlement of the public law issues and the transfer to this Division. The Claimant could simply have abandoned the claim. He did not. He persisted in the fabrication. I have no doubt that he did so in order to obtain money from the Home Office.
105. It is clear to me that the Claimant’s exaggeration of his symptoms has been deliberate, calculated and for the purposes of gain from these proceedings. By the standards of ordinary decent people, the Claimant’s conduct in bringing and pursuing a claim for damages based fabricated or exaggerated symptoms was dishonest.
106. The dishonesty has been fundamental to the claim. The false account of the Claimant’s medical symptoms underpinned the claim for general damages, career-long loss of earnings and lifelong care. It similarly underpinned the unparticularised claims for loss of pension and deputyship costs. The dishonesty went to the root of the claim. I do not say that the public law element of the claim was dishonest, nor the claim for false imprisonment. I was not asked to consider the merits of those claims and make no findings about them. It is not necessary to do so. The personal injury claim is plainly a significant part of the claim throughout and accounts for the large sum of damages claimed. The Claimant’s dishonesty is fundamental to the claim as a whole.
Conclusion
107. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that the claim is fundamentally dishonest. The Claimant has deliberately fabricated or grossly exaggerated his symptoms, in collaboration with Ms Mathew, for the purposes of pursuing a claim for damages put at over £7 million. The sums claimed were based on a fabrication and were without basis. It would be sufficient for a finding of fundamental dishonesty that the Claimant had been dishonest in the presentation of the claim in 2025 and 2026. However, I find that the claim has been dishonest since it was first raised, in 2014.
108. As the Claimant has discontinued his claim, he is liable to pay the Defendant’s costs of the whole claim up to the date of service of the notice of discontinuance, pursuant to CPR 38.6. I grant permission, pursuant to CPR 44.16(1), for the Defendant to enforce that costs order to the full extent. Any application for costs after the date of notice of discontinuance can be made at the hearing for hand down of this judgment.
109. I end this judgment with the following observations.
110. The story of the complete destruction of the Claimant’s life as an independent adult would be tragic, and the story of Ms Mathew’s devoted care for him would be inspiring, if any of it were true. As is now clear from the evidence, the story is a fabrication.
111. On the basis of that fabrication, and with the benefit of Legal Aid, the Claimant has engaged huge resources in terms of lawyers, medical experts, care experts and employment experts in pursuit of millions of pounds in damages. He has put the Defendant to much work, at taxpayer expense, in defending the claim. Significant judicial and administrative resources have been taken up over many years, both in this Court and in the Administrative Court. Those resources are stretched, and any misuse of them is to the significant detriment of other court users. The waste of public resources caused by the Claimant’s dishonesty over many years is scandalous.
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