Administrative United Kingdom
Zeeshan Mian v Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2867 (Admin)
AC-2025-LON-004121
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 6 November 2026
Before :
ROBERT PALMER KC
sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court
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Between :
| ZEESHAN MIAN | Appellant | |
| – and – | ||
| SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY LIMITED | Respondent |
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The Appellant appeared in person
Benjamin Tankel (instructed by Blake Morgan LLP) appeared for the Respondent
Hearing date: 9 July 2026
Further evidence submitted by the Appellant on 15 July 2026
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Approved Judgment
This Judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on 6th November 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and by release to the National Archives.
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ROBERT PALMER KC sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court:
Introduction
1. The Appellant is a solicitor. He appeals under section 49 of the Solicitors Act 1974 against a decision of the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (“the SDT”) dated 15 January 2020. The Respondent to the appeal is the Solicitors Regulation Authority Limited (“the SRA”), to whom the Law Society has delegated responsibility for disciplinary proceedings.
2. The SDT fined the Appellant the sum of £20,000, and imposed conditions of practice upon him for a period of 2 years (commencing on 2 December 2019). It further ordered that he pay the SRA’s costs in the fixed sum of £25,000. This followed its findings that he had acted in breach of Principle 6 of the SRA Principles 2011, failed to achieve Outcome 7.9 of the SRA Code of Conduct 2011 and had acted with manifest incompetence. The Tribunal further found that he had breached Rule 14.5 of the SRA Accounts Rules 2011. The underlying factual basis for these findings had not been contested by the Appellant.
3. On the present appeal, the Appellant submits that the SDT had no jurisdiction to determine the allegations against him or to impose any sanctions upon him. The basis of that submission is the Appellant’s contention that the complaints against him had already been finally determined by the SRA. He suggests that the SRA had closed its investigation after imposing its own conditions upon his practising certificate; further, that having done so, the SRA had no power to refer the relevant matters to the SDT, and that the SDT’s decision was therefore a nullity.
4. The appeal was filed on 27 September 2025, over five and a half years after the 21 day time limit for appealing had elapsed. The Appellant applies for an extension of time. He seeks to justify the length of the extension on the grounds that certain evidence, which was not before the SDT, was disclosed to him between June and August 2025.
5. There are also three further applications before the Court:
i) The Appellant applies for permission to adduce fresh evidence in support of his appeal in part to justify the extension of time.
ii) The Respondent seeks permission to rely on the witness statement of Tina Whitman dated 1 July 2026, in the event that the Appellant is permitted to adduce fresh evidence.
iii) The Appellant does not object to the admission of Ms Whitman’s evidence, but seeks permission to rely on two further witness statements in response, the first dated 6 July 2026 (filed just before the hearing of this matter) and the second dated 12 July 2026 (submitted shortly after the hearing).
6. A further application for the Appellant was made in the form of a Part 18 request for further information. However, by the time of the hearing the SRA had responded to it; the Appellant confirmed that he did not press it further.
7. The Appellant appeared in person before me. Mr Benjamin Tankel of counsel appeared for the Respondent. I am grateful to them both for their written and oral submissions.
The legal framework
(i) Solicitors’ practising certificates and the imposition of conditions on them
8. Part I of the Solicitors Act 1974 (“the 1974 Act”) makes provision in relation to the “Right to Practise as a Solicitor”.
9. Section 1 of the 1974 Act provides that no person shall be qualified to act as a solicitor unless (a) he has been admitted as a solicitor, and (b) his name is on the roll, and (c) he has in force a certificate issued by the Law Society in accordance with the provisions of Part 1 authorising him to practise as a solicitor (referred to as a “practising certificate”).
10. Section 13A provides:
“13A Imposition of conditions while practising certificates are in force.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, the Society may in the case of any solicitor direct that his practising certificate for the time being in force (“his current certificate”) shall have effect subject to such conditions as the Society may think fit.
(2) The power conferred by subsection (1) is exercisable in relation to a solicitor at any time during the period for which the solicitor’s current certificate is in force if–
(a) …
(b) it appears to the Society that the case is of a prescribed description.
(3) “Prescribed” means prescribed by regulations under section 28.”
11. Section 28 provides:
“(1) The Society may make regulations about the following matters, namely–
(a) admission as a solicitor;
(b) the keeping of the roll;
(c) practising certificates; …”
12. The SRA has made various regulations pursuant to section 28. At the material time, the Regulations in force (set out in the then existing SRA Handbook, which was replaced with effect from 25 November 2019) included the SRA Practising Regulations 2011. Regulation 7 provided:
“Regulation 7: Conditions
7.1 The SRA may impose one or more conditions on a practising certificate or on the registration of a European lawyer when granting an application under regulation 3 to 6, or at any time during the practising year, for the following purposes.
(a) The SRA considers the individual concerned unsuitable to undertake certain activities in relation to a legal practice, either at all or save as specified in the condition, and that imposing the condition will, in the public interest, limit, restrict, halt or prevent the involvement of the individual concerned in those activities.
(b) The SRA considers that the individual concerned is putting or is likely to put at risk the interests of clients, third parties or the public by taking certain steps in relation to a legal practice, and that imposing the condition will, in the public interest, limit, restrict, halt or prevent the taking of such steps by the individual concerned.
(c) …”
(ii) Disciplinary action by the SRA
13. Part II of the 1974 Act is concerned with “Professional Practice, Conduct and Discipline of Solicitors and Clerks.”
14. Section 31(1) provides power for the Law Society to “make rules for regulating in respect of any matter the professional practice, conduct, fitness to practise and discipline of solicitors and for empowering the Society to take such action as may be appropriate to enable the Society to ascertain whether or not the provisions of rules made, or of any code or guidance issued, by the Society are being, or have been, complied with.” At the material time, the rules relevant to the present case were contained in the SRA Code of Conduct 2011. They included:
i) Principle 6, which required solicitors to “behave in a way that maintains the trust the public places in you and in the provision of legal services”: and
ii) Outcome 7.9, which required solicitors not to outsource reserved legal activities to a person who is not authorised to conduct such activities.
15. Section 32(1) empowers the Law Society to make accounts rules, including as to the opening and keeping by solicitors of bank accounts for money received, held or dealt with for clients. At the material time, the relevant rules were the SRA Accounts Rules 2011, which provided at rule 14.5 that a solicitor “must not provide banking facilities through a client account. Payments into, and transfers or withdrawals from, a client account must be in respect of instructions relating to an underlying transaction (and the funds arising therefrom) or to a service forming part of your normal regulated activities.”
16. At the material time, section 44D provided as follows:
“44D Disciplinary powers of the Society
(1) This section applies where the Society is satisfied–
(a) that a solicitor or employee of a solicitor has failed to comply with a requirement imposed by or by virtue of this Act or any rules made by the Society, or
(b) that there has been professional misconduct by a solicitor.
(2) The Society may do one or both of the following–
(a) give the person a written rebuke;
(b) direct the person to pay a penalty not exceeding £2,000.”
17. The SRA’s power to take direct disciplinary action against a solicitor is accordingly limited to relatively minor penalties. (Although the maximum financial penalty it may impose has since been increased to £25,000, the upper limit of £2,000 was applicable in the present case.) The disciplinary sanctions available to the SRA do not include the imposition of conditions upon a practising certificate.
18. For any disciplinary offence of a more serious character than would be adequately met by a written penalty or relatively small financial penalty, the SRA must refer the matter to the SDT by making an application under section 47(1). On such an application, the SDT has power under section 47(2) “to make such order as it may think fit”. Section 47(2) expressly provides that any such order may in particular include provision for a solicitor to be struck off the roll, suspended from practice indefinitely or for a specified period, to be required to pay a penalty, and to pay costs. This list is not exhaustive, however.
19. Decisions by the SRA about whether to make a referral to the SDT were at the relevant time made under the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011. Rule 10.1 provides as follows:
“Rule 10: Applications to the Tribunal
10.1 The SRA may make an application to the Tribunal in respect of a regulated person at any time, if the SRA is satisfied that:
(a) there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect that the application will be upheld by the Tribunal;
(b) the allegation to be made against the person under investigation either in itself or in the light of other allegations is sufficiently serious that the Tribunal is likely to order that the person:
(i) be struck off;
(ii) be suspended;
(iii) be subject to an order revoking its recognition;
(iv) pay a penalty exceeding the maximum that can be imposed from time to time by the SRA; or
(v) be subject to any other order that the SRA is not empowered to make; and
(c) it is in the public interest to make the application.”
20. Section 49(1) of the 1974 Act provides that an appeal from the Tribunal shall lie to the High Court. Section 49(4) provides that the High Court shall have power to make such order on such an appeal as it may think fit. Such an appeal proceeds by way of a review, unless the court considers that it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing: CPR 52.21(1); Salsbury v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 1285, [2009] 1 WLR 1286 at [3]). CPR r.52.21(3)(a) provides that the court will allow the appeal where the decision of the lower court was (a) wrong, or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings.
The factual background
21. The following account of the factual background is structured as follows:
i) I begin by summarising the allegations which formed the subject matter of the allegation (and which were ultimately upheld by the SDT) in order to provide the context for what follows.
ii) In order to understand the Appellant’s argument that the SDT had no jurisdiction to determine the SRA’s allegations against him or to impose any penalty in respect of them, it will then be necessary to set out an account of the procedure that the SRA followed leading up to its application to the SDT, including its investigation and some of the detail of the administrative arrangements under which that investigation was conducted. This is largely set out on behalf of the SRA in Ms Whitman’s witness statement based on a review of the investigation files, to which the Appellant has also responded in his witness statement of 6 July 2026.
iii) Finally, in order to understand the Appellant’s case as to why time should be extended by some five and a half years for this appeal to be brought, it will be necessary to explain the nature of the documents that he received for the first time earlier this year, and their claimed significance.
(i) The allegations against the Appellant
22. The Appellant was admitted to the Solicitors’ Roll in 2007, having previously qualified as a solicitor advocate in Pakistan. In January 2008, he established his own firm, Denning Solicitors (“the firm”), of which he was Director.
23. In 2014, he employed an individual, who was anonymised in proceedings before the SDT as “SAH”, to work as a consultant at the firm, apparently accepting his word that he was a qualified barrister. The Appellant allowed SAH to exercise rights of audience before the High Court on two separate occasions in 2014, and on the second occasion expressly confirmed (in response to a specific enquiry from the court) that SAH was his firm’s in-house counsel and was representing his firm’s clients. In fact, SAH had been disbarred in June 2011, following a conviction for fraud two years earlier. The Appellant had failed to carry out identity checks or enquire as to SAH’s authorisation to carry on reserved legal activities with the Bar Standards Board. If he had, he would have known that SAH was no longer permitted to exercise such rights. This formed the basis of the first allegation that was later upheld by the SDT, before whom the Appellant admitted the above facts, accepted a breach of Principle 6 and a failure to meet Outcome 7.6, and accepted also that he acted with manifest incompetence in respect of these matters.
24. The second allegation found proved by the SDT related to an allegation that between October 2014 and March 2015, the Appellant had caused and/or permitted the firm’s client account to be used as a banking facility, in breach of Principle 6 and Rule 14.5 of the SRA Accounts Rules 2011. The relevant facts were admitted by the Appellant: in short summary, he had entered into retainer agreements with “Client E” (as anonymised before the SDT). Client E was a property development company which wished to raise money from investors by way of property bonds. Under the retainer agreements, the firm was to provide certain legal services to Client E in return for 9% of the value of each investor contract concluded. Investors were told to transfer their funds directly to the Appellant’s firm. Investors were told in Client E’s brochure that they could have “added peace of mind” on the grounds that “all clients’ funds are initially transferred to an SRA approved and fully authorised company.” It was emphasised that this “third party escrow agent” held “ring fenced and segregated client accounts”. In fact, upon receipt of each investment, the Appellant’s firm would retain its 9% and, having completed money laundering checks and checked that the investor had been provided with appropriate FCA compliant financial advice, would remit the balance directly to Client E. The Appellant accepted that there was no underlying legal work conducted for each individual transaction, but disputed that the arrangements amounted to the provision of “banking facilities”. The SDT ultimately upheld the SRA’s case that it did: there was no meaningful link between the legal work carried out by the Appellant’s firm and the payments received into the firm from individual investors, and no necessity for the investors’ money to be paid via the firm’s client account.
(ii) The SRA’s investigation
25. In November 2014, the SRA received a report regarding the Appellant’s firm regarding its involvement with SAH. The SRA opened an investigation under reference CDT/1126506-2014 (“the 2014 investigation”). It was assigned to a regulatory supervisor, Harbinder Purewal, who then had conduct of the investigation. On 23 February 2015, the SRA informed the Appellant that it had received a report about his firm employing a disqualified barrister.
26. In April 2015, a second report was made to the SRA concerning the firm, this time relating to its involvement with the investment scheme operated by Client E. The SRA opened a second investigation under reference CDT/1137974-2015 (“the 2015 investigation”). It was also assigned to Mr Purewal.
27. Mr Purewal commissioned a forensic investigation into the firm, in respect of both the 2014 and 2015 investigations. Forensic investigations are conducted by a specialist team within the SRA, having been commissioned by the supervision team.
28. On 7 September 2015, an SRA Forensic Investigation Officer, Lesley Horton, visited the firm to interview the Appellant and another director about its accounting processes and the investigations relating to SAH and Client E.
29. On 5 October 2015, Ms Horton produced a Forensic Investigation Report, which dealt with each of the two allegations. The Forensic Investigation Report is designed to be a factual report, whose function is not in itself to reach any conclusions as to whether there have been any disciplinary breaches or whether any action should be taken. Having completed the report, Ms Horton closed the forensic investigation, and responsibility for the investigation was passed back to Mr Purewal. Thus, still on 5 October 2015, Ms Horton emailed Mr Purewal in the following terms: “I have now completed and issued my report into Denning Solicitors. The report and attachments will be shortly uploaded onto Doxis for you to review. My file is now closed.” The following day, an administration officer acting on behalf of the Defendant’s forensic investigations team wrote to Ms Horton and Mr Purewal confirming that “The above investigation has now been closed and the report and appendices have been uploaded to Doxis.”
30. On 15 December 2015, the SRA informed the Appellant, by what was known as an explanation with warning (“EWW”) letter, that it was starting a formal investigation into the firm. It sent the Appellant a copy of the Forensic Investigation Report.
31. On 18 December 2015, Mr Purewal completed a “Closure Validation Form” for the 2015 investigation. Ms Whitman explains that this was an administrative step which reflected the fact that the matters which had been subject to the 2015 investigation (the Client E investigation) had been linked with and considered as part of the 2014 investigation (the SAH investigation). The SRA has explained that this was not an unusual (administrative) step for it to take where more than one matter was being investigated: it avoided unnecessary duplication. The form did not suggest that “no further action” would be taken in respect of the 2015 investigation (despite that being one of the boxes that was available to be ticked). To the contrary, this followed the issue of the EWW letter to the Appellant beginning the formal investigation.
32. On 10 February 2016, the SRA conducted a review of the investigation. It was considered that the Appellant posed a risk to the regulated community, clients and the public and that he had failed to provide adequate assurances to the SRA. A case note was prepared which identified the next steps as including:
i) “Impose immediate P[ractising] C[ertificate] conditions owing to concerns on current and future risk, and need for immediate control”;
ii) “Start process of D[isciplinary] P[roceeding]s for all of the breaches identified in F[orensic] I[investigation] report”; and
iii) a possible intervention into Denning if the Appellant failed to comply with P[ractising] C[ertificate] conditions, and “ask for referral to SDT at same time in Intervention Casenote.”
33. In March 2016, the SRA received another report relating to the Appellant’s firm. The SRA opened a third investigation under reference CDT/1162174-2016 (“the 2016 investigation”). The concern related to the sale of a particular property. A different regulatory supervisor, Simon Griffiths, had conduct of this investigation.
34. On 7 April 2016, the SRA informed the Appellant that it was considering imposing conditions on his practising certificate as a result of the 2014 and 2015 investigations.
35. On 20 May 2016, the SRA emailed a letter to the Appellant confirming that it was recommending the imposition of conditions on his practising certificate. The letter was accompanied by a detailed report, chronology and bundle of documents. The report was directed to an SRA adjudicator, who was asked to consider whether to impose conditions on the Appellant’s 2015/2016 Practising Certificate. The report referred to the 2014 and 2015 investigations’ findings, and set out the risks that such conditions were intended to manage, the proposed conditions and the reasons for them. The letter sought the Appellant’s views in response to the report by 6 June 2016.
36. On 23 June 2016, Queen’s Counsel instructed by the Appellant wrote to the SRA requesting confirmation that “the proposed PC conditions represented the extent of the intended action” against the Appellant. The SRA responded on 27 June 2016, stating that in light of the issues raised within the forensic investigation report, a decision as to proportionate disciplinary action was under consideration. On 22 July 2016, the Appellant (through his QC) submitted representations against the imposition of conditions. It was submitted that it was premature to consider the imposition of such conditions, given that it was understood that the SRA was giving consideration to “conduct issues”: those issues should be resolved first.
37. On 5 September 2016, the Appellant was notified that an SRA adjudicator had imposed conditions on his practising certificate. A copy of the adjudicator’s decision dated 2 September 2016 was provided. It clearly related to the matters which had been the subject of the 2014 and 2015 investigations. The Appellant was informed of his right of appeal to an Adjudication Panel or to the High Court.
38. On 3 October 2016, the Appellant appealed to an Adjudication Panel against the imposition of conditions on his practising certificate. On 2 November 2016, the decision to impose conditions on the Appellant’s practising certificate was considered by the panel. The panel upheld the conditions and imposed a further one. It did so on the basis of the risks which were apparent from the matters which had been the subject of both the 2014 and the 2015 investigations. The panel noted that the conditions were intended to address immediate risks and were not part of the disciplinary process. It observed that the imposition of conditions was dealt with separately and could not be delayed while the Appellant was facing disciplinary action for his conduct whilst at the firm. A copy of this decision was provided to the Appellant on 10 November 2016.
39. Meanwhile, on 13 October 2016, the SRA intervened in the firm following a further forensic investigation being triggered by a new report to the SRA concerning it which had been made on 16 September 2016. Mr Griffiths was involved in the preparation and coordination of this intervention, as it formed part of the 2016 investigation for which he was responsible.
40. On 10 November 2016, Mr Purewal completed another Closure Validation Form, this time in respect of the 2014 investigation. It records that Mr Purewal had engaged with Mr Griffiths and that the matter was linked to the matter of the intervention. The SRA’s evidence was that this was likely intended to indicate that the matters that Mr Purewal had been investigating were now to be combined with the 2016 investigation being progressed by Mr Griffiths. This was disputed by the Appellant; I will return to this below. In any event, Mr Purewal ticked the box labelled “Upheld at Adjudication” but none of those indicating that no further action would be taken. (Nor was the box marked “referred to the SDT” ticked, as no such decision had been made at this stage.)
41. Meanwhile, throughout the year 2016, the Appellant had been seeking to transfer from practice as a solicitor to the Bar. On 17 February 2016, the Appellant had applied for admission to the Bar as a solicitor. His application was accompanied by a letter of good standing issued on 23 November 2015 (which post-dated the forensic investigation but pre-dated the EWW letter). On 15 April 2016, the Bar Standards Board approved the Appellant’s application to transfer to the Bar. On 4 May 2016, the Appellant signed a declaration in support of an application to be admitted to Lincoln’s Inn, stating that there were no pending disciplinary proceedings against him and that he was not aware of any matter which might call into question his fitness to be a practising barrister. On 23 May 2016, the Appellant was admitted as a student member of Lincoln’s Inn. He also ceased to be a director of the firm that month. On 31 October 2016, the Appellant allowed his practising certificate as a solicitor to expire without being renewed. On 24 November 2016, the Appellant was called to the Bar by Lincoln’s Inn. In 2017 he initially practised as an employed barrister and then registered as a “third six” pupil. A second certificate of good standing was issued to him by the SRA in 2017.
42. In late 2017, Mr Griffiths handed over conduct of the 2016 investigation to Ruth King, a different regulatory supervisor.
43. On 18 September 2017, the Appellant applied to the SRA to be removed from the roll of solicitors. On 11 January 2018, the SRA considered the application. The authorised officer noted in the draft decision that there was still an open complaint against the Appellant, and it was both necessary and proportionate for him to remain on the roll while the complaint was considered. The details of the matter set out as requiring further investigation related to the allegations concerning the sale of the property which had been the subject of the 2016 investigation. The draft decision did not refer to the matters which had originally been the subject of the 2014 and 2015 investigations. It stated that the Appellant needed to remain on the roll to ensure that his obligation to respond to and co-operate with the investigation was maintained; granting the application would prevent the SRA from taking any disciplinary action that might be considered appropriate at the end of the investigation. A further application for removal from the roll could be made when the investigation and any subsequent disciplinary action, if applicable, was concluded.
44. The draft decision was sent to the Appellant for his response on 11 January 2018. In response to sight of the draft, the Appellant immediately withdrew his application for removal from the roll. The SRA confirmed its withdrawal on 17 January 2018.
45. On 12 March 2018, an internal SRA memorandum was prepared which asked the Disciplinary Proceedings Team to consider whether it was appropriate to authorise disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant. The memorandum referred to matters which arose from each of the 2014, 2015 and 2016 investigations (under the reference number for the 2016 investigation), consistently with the matters all being managed and considered together.
46. On 27 March 2018, on the basis of the internal memorandum, the SRA’s Authorised Officer decided to refer the Appellant to the SDT. On 3 April 2018, the Appellant was advised that his conduct was being referred to the SDT in respect of the matters previously dealt with under the 2016 investigation reference. (As set out above, these matters embrace the earlier 2014 and 2015 investigations.)
47. On 4 April 2018, Ms King handed the Appellant’s case over to the SRA’s Legal and Enforcement team. The 2016 investigation file was closed; on transfer to the Legal and Enforcement team, the case was assigned reference TRI/1225347-2018.
48. For a period of over a year from July 2018, the Appellant engaged in a substantial amount of correspondence with the SRA, in which the Appellant had protested against the taking of further action by way of referring these matters to the SDT. He has set out the detail of that correspondence in a very full witness statement. The essence of his complaint was that he had been punished enough already, in that he had had conditions imposed on his practising certificate. He argued that the 2014 and 2015 investigations had been concluded with the taking of such action, and that it was wrong in principle to seek to revive these matters at this stage. He made a number of requests for disclosure (to which I return below).
49. On 29 May 2019, the SRA served a detailed statement setting out the allegations against the Appellant and the facts and matters supporting the application and each of the allegations, as required by Rule 5 of the Solicitors (Disciplinary Proceedings) Rules 2007. It was accompanied by a 295 page bundle of documents, including the documentary evidence relied upon. By this stage, the matters relied upon by the SRA had been reduced only to the matters concerning SAH and Client E.
50. On 26 September 2019, the Appellant filed his “Answer” in response to the Rule 5 Statement. It included a preliminary submission that the SDT either did not have jurisdiction or should refrain from exercising jurisdiction to deal with the matter. He submitted that the SRA was seeking to “punish [him] for the second time for the same mistakes”: the SRA had “penalised [him] for same allegations and imposed stringent and disproportionate conditions on his Practise Certificate. The matter had been finally concluded at the point when the Adjudication Panel decline [his] appeal against the imposition of these conditions. The [SRA], despite repeated invitations, could not produce a single document that would support [its] position that [the Appellant] had, during investigation or at the time of imposing decision, been notified that the conditions were imposed as an interim measure (as it is now argued by the [SRA] to justifying the Tribunal’s proceedings)” (sic). He stated that he had been given the unambiguous impression that the conditions were imposed on the conclusion of the investigation and the same were to be published in order to protect the public. It was now sought to put him in jeopardy for a second time in respect of the same facts. This was particularly important when he had notified the SRA and provided supporting evidence establishing that the sanctions by way of conditions on his practice certificate had had disproportionate effects on his professional and personal reputation.
51. On 29 and 30 October 2019, and on a third day on 2 December 2019, the SDT heard the Appellant’s case.
52. On 15 January 2020, the SDT produced its written determination. It was served the following day. The SDT referred to the Appellant’s preliminary submission on jurisdiction at paragraph 4 of its judgment, as follows:
“In his Answer [the Appellant] had submitted that the Tribunal did not have jurisdiction to hear this matter or alternatively it should elect not to hear it. This contention was not pursued by [the Appellant] at the hearing and the Tribunal was not invited to address this potential issue.”
53. The SDT found the allegations proved to the extent set out above at paragraphs 23 to 24. In considering the appropriate sanction to impose, it took into account in mitigation the personal and financial impact that the proceedings and underlying events had already had. It considered that the appropriate sanction was a £20,000 fine (with a further costs award of £25,000). The SDT further considered that given the nature of the misconduct, which included breaches of the SRA Accounts Rules 2011, and the relative lack of insight and awareness displayed by the Appellant with regards to prioritising and effecting appropriate financial stewardship of third party funds, it was appropriate to impose fixed term restrictions on his future practice. (It is clear that this included consideration of the lack of insight and awareness that the Appellant was continuing to display at the time of the SDT proceedings, by now some years after the original conduct had occurred.) This was in order to protect the public against the risk of similar future failings. The Tribunal considered that a two year duration was proportionate and constituted a period during which the risks to the public would be mitigated whilst the Appellant had the opportunity to develop further insight and experience before the expiration of the restrictions. The Tribunal imposed conditions that for a period of two years the Respondent may not:
i) practise as a sole practitioner or sole manager or sole owner of an authorised or recognised body;
ii) be a partner or member of a Limited Liability Partnership, Legal Disciplinary Practice or Alternative Business Structure or other authorised or recognised body
iii) be a Compliance Officer for Legal Practice or a Compliance Officer for Finance and Administration;
iv) hold client money; or
v) be a signatory on any client account.
54. The 21 day time limit to appeal under CPR 52.12(2)(b) expired on 6 February 2020.
55. Subsequently, on 16 June 2022, the Appellant was disbarred by a Disciplinary Tribunal of the Council of the Inns of Court on 12 charges of professional misconduct, essentially for having failed to disclose the regulatory proceedings against him before his Call to the Bar and admission to Lincoln’s Inn. On 24 May 2023, Thornton J dismissed his appeal against disbarment: her judgment is reported at [2023] EWHC 1249 (Admin). This development led the SRA, on 26 August 2025, to refer further allegations against the Appellant concerning his failure to declare his regulatory history as a solicitor when applying to be admitted to the Bar. I was told by the parties that that complaint was to be heard before the SDT on 27 to 30 July 2026 (after the hearing of the present matter). It is now a matter of public record that on 2 September 2026 the SDT ordered that the Appellant be struck off the roll of solicitors. However, the Appellant’s appeal against that decision remains pending before the High Court. This development has formed no part of my consideration of the present appeal.
(iii) Further disclosure to the Appellant
56. Since 2018, the Appellant had made a number of disclosure and subject access requests to obtain documents relating to the investigations against him. Ms Whitman explained in her witness statement that the SRA had received six data subject access requests from the Appellant dated 4 September 2018, 3 January 2019, 13 November 2019, 7 February 2025, 16 May 2025 and 22 May 2025. Correspondence shows that as early as July 2018, the Appellant was contending that the 2014 and 2015 investigations had been closed before the reference to the SDT had been made, and that it was an abuse of process to continue to take action in respect of those matters by making the reference.
57. Between June and August 2025, the SRA disclosed a substantial amount of documents to the Appellant.
i) On 23 June 2025, the SRA disclosed a redacted copy of the file for the 2014 investigation to the Appellant.
ii) On 4 August 2025, the SRA disclosed the following (amongst other matters) to the Appellant:
a) the complete file for the 2015 investigation;
b) all correspondence passing between the SRA and the Appellant on the 2016 investigation file; and
c) the Closure Validation Form completed on 10 November 2016.
iii) On 18 August 2025, the SRA disclosed a copy of the memorandum dated 12 March 2018 prepared as part of the 2016 investigation.
58. On 1 September 2025, the Appellant wrote (what was said to be) a Judicial Review Pre-action Protocol letter before claim to the SRA. Over nearly 30 pages (including two appendices), he set out his case that the SDT had had no jurisdiction to consider the case against him. A response was provided on 15 September 2025.
59. On 27 October 2025, the Appellant filed the present appeal. (There had been a number of earlier attempts to file such an appeal up to a month earlier, the Appellant stated, but they had been rejected by the Court.)
Submissions
60. The Appellant’s case is founded upon the premise that the 2014 and 2015 investigations were “closed” when the forensic investigating officer had submitted her report, and/or when Mr Purewal filled out the Closure Validation Forms in respect of the originally numbered investigation files: only the 2016 investigation (which concerned a complaint which was not ultimately referred to the SDT) continued thereafter. The 2014 and 2015 investigations had concluded upon the decision to impose conditions on his practising certificate (and if they were not, there is nothing to evidence as much, and he was not told of any continuing investigation at the time). The decisions of the Adjudicator and the Adjudication Panel had been final, and the SRA could not go behind those decisions except by way of appeal. Despite that, the proceedings purportedly referred to the SDT on 12 March 2018 under the 2016 investigation’s reference number had unlawfully concerned the already concluded matters which had arisen under the 2014 and 2015 investigations. It had not had any power to make such a referral, as the SRA had been prevented from doing so by the principles of res judicata, cause of action estoppel and/or issue estoppel: those matters could not be relitigated, and it was an abuse of process to have sought to do so. Further, by reason of the closure of the investigations, he was no longer a “person under investigation” within the meaning of rule 10.1(b) of the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011. Unless the SRA could show that he continued to be investigated under the reference numbers associated with the 2014 and 2015 investigations, the referral was void.
61. The Appellant further submits that in the absence of a lawful referral, the SDT had had no jurisdiction to consider the matters which had been the subject of the 2014 and 2015 investigations. Although he had squarely raised this matter in his Answer, the SDT had not provided him with any opportunity to argue this matter, but had proceeded to the substance of the matter and arrived at the judgment now under appeal.
62. It was only upon the provision of the SRA’s disclosure, which it had refused to provide over a period of 7 years, that it was confirmed that the 2014 and 2015 investigations had been concluded prior to the referral to the SDT. Permission was sought to adduce this fresh evidence on the basis that it met the requirements in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489. Further, an extension of time to bring the appeal should be granted, given that the SRA had failed to provide this disclosure at an earlier stage, applying the approach set out by Lang J in Taylor v SRA [2019] EWHC 201 (Admin) at [6]-[9].
63. The Appellant further submitted that the proceedings should have been struck out by the SDT for delay, contrary to the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. The SDT should have considered this point regardless of whether the Appellant had raised it before them.
64. On behalf or the SRA, Mr Tankel submits that time should not be extended to bring the appeal, and the Appellant should not be granted permission to adduce fresh evidence that was not before the SDT. The appeal should in any event be dismissed.
65. Mr Tankel submits that from as early as April 2018, when the SRA had notified the Appellant of the decision to refer matters to the SDT, the Appellant had contended that those matters had already been adjudicated upon and brought to an end via the imposition of practising conditions, with the matters then closed. For a period of over a year afterwards, he had disputed the SRA’s explanation that the imposition of conditions had not represented the end of the case, but had been imposed to manage the risk he presented pending any decision on disciplinary proceedings. He had filed a response to the application in September 2019 to that effect; he had neither sought a stay of the application proceedings as an abuse of process nor sought permission to apply for judicial review of the decision to refer the case to the SDT on the grounds that it was unlawful. Instead, he had positively engaged with the application after making a decision (as explained in a witness statement dated 29 November 2019) not to confront the SRA but to “accept everything”, and had “prioritised to agree on everything that was produced on behalf of the SRA without making material objections on statements and procedural failures by the SRA…” This had led the Appellant to agree a “Statement of Agreed Facts and Outcome” with the SRA on the eve of the hearing, in which he had admitted most of the allegations and agreed to pay a fine. In line with this, he had abandoned his jurisdiction defence before the SDT, having deliberately decided not to pursue it. The SDT’s decision had accurately reflected this. If, contrary to this, both the SRA and the SDT had misunderstood the position and the Appellant had in reality sought to maintain his jurisdiction defence, then he could and should have appealed within 21 days of the judgment, as required under the CPR. The appeal was now 5½ years out of time. Even after receiving further disclosure in June and August 2025, he still waited months before bringing the appeal.
66. Mr Tankel submits that the new evidence is inadmissible in any event. The Ladd v Marshall test is not met. The vast majority of the evidence now relied upon was available to the Appellant at the time of the appeal before the SDT (being correspondence between the Appellant and the SRA). The only truly new material that the Appellant did not have available to him at the time of the SDT appeal would not have had any important influence on the result of the case. That material consisted only of:
i) the internal emails of 5 and 6 October 2015 recording the closure of the forensic investigators’ file following the completion of the forensic investigation;
ii) internal emails concerning the draft EWW letter of November 2015;
iii) the closure validation form of 18 December 2015 (and accompanying caseworker file closure actions);
iv) the case note of 10 February 2016 recording that the SRA had decided to impose immediate practising certificate conditions and start the process of disciplinary proceedings for all of the breaches identified in the forensic investigation report, and accompanying file note;
v) the closure validation form of 10 November 2016; and
vi) the internal SRA memorandum dated 12 March 2018 which asked the Disciplinary Proceedings Team to consider whether it was appropriate to authorise disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant.
67. Moreover, the appeal should be dismissed in any event. The Appellant was wrong in law to suggest that the imposition of practising conditions was even capable of concluding disciplinary action. Nor was it correct on the facts that the SRA had sought to conclude the matter by way of the imposition of such practising conditions. The closure of specific files during the course of the Respondent’s investigations into the Appellant’s conduct did not mean that the investigation as a whole was being closed and did not mean that a decision had been taken to cease the investigation without further action. No question of cause of action or issue estoppel could arise in any event, given that the SRA was exercising its regulatory functions: it was not adjudicating as between the competing cases of two parties (as would an Ombudsman).
68. The Appellant’s arguments concerning delay and breach of Article 6 ECHR is also far too late. It could and should have been advanced within 21 days of the SDT’s determination if it was to be relied upon at all.
Discussion
69. In my judgment, there is no proper basis upon which to extend time by 5½ years to allow the Appellant to bring the appeal.
70. The Appellant accepts that the test to be applied is that set out by Lang J in Taylor v SRA [2019] EWHC 201 (Admin) at [6]-[10], as follows:
“[6] … There is no statutory time limit in the Solicitors Act 1974 for the filing of an Appellant's Notice, and so the time limits in the Civil Procedure Rules apply, including the power to grant an extension of time. Therefore, the principle in R (Adesina) v Nursing and Midwifery Council [2013] EWCA Civ 818, where the statute imposed an absolute time limit which in exceptional circumstances could be read down so as to be compatible with Article 6, is not applicable here.
[7] By CPR rule 52.12(2)(b), an Appellant's Notice must be filed within 21 days after the date of the decision. This is subject to CPR PD 52D paragraph 3.3A, which provides that, where a statement of reasons for the decision is given later than notice of the decision, time runs from the date on which the statement of reasons is sent to the Appellant.
[8] Under CPR rule 3.1(2)(a) the court may grant an extension of time. ….
[9] An application to appeal out of time is to be equated with an application for relief from sanctions, and the court will apply what have become known as the Mitchell/Denton principles (see Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906; [2014] 1 WLR 3926 at [24]). The court will apply CPR 3.9, which states that the court will consider all the circumstances of the case so as to enable it to deal justly with the application, including a need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to enforce compliance with rules, Practice Directions and orders.
[10] In applying the Mitchell/Denton principles, the first stage is to identify and assess the seriousness and significance of the failure to comply. The second stage is to consider why the default occurred. The third stage is to evaluate all the circumstances of the case so as to enable the court to deal justly with the application, including the first and second factors.”
71. There can be no doubt that a delay in filing an Appellant’s Notice of over 5½ years beyond the 21 day deadline under the CPR is both serious and significant. There would have to be very compelling reasons to justify such an extension. Here there are none. As Mr Tankel points out, the argument that the Appellant wishes to pursue on appeal is one which he raised in his written Answer to the SRA’s case before the Tribunal. He gave the Tribunal to understand that he did not wish to pursue it, which they so recorded in their determination. The Appellant’s decision not to pursue such an argument is consistent with his agreeing a statement of facts and proposed penalty with the SRA before the hearing before the SDT (albeit that the SDT did not then wholly accept that agreed position): this was a clear acceptance of the SRA’s jurisdiction to impose such a penalty. Even if that were wrong, and the Appellant somehow intended to maintain his argument that there was no jurisdiction for the SRA to pursue any disciplinary proceedings against him or for the SDT to determine the reference to them, then the Appellant would have been aware from the moment that the SDT handed down its determination that it had failed to deal with this (fundamental) point. Despite that, the Appellant did not appeal. There is no good reason for his failure to have done so.
72. The more recent disclosure of the investigation files and associated internal documents does not alter that position. No application for specific disclosure was advanced before the SDT. Nor did the Appellant continue to pursue such disclosure after the SDT’s determination: between 2021 and 2025 he made no efforts to pursue it. The disclosure was made in June and August 2025 following requests which appear to have been generated by the second set of SRA disciplinary proceedings against him (concerning his failure to disclose the previous proceedings upon his call to the Bar and admission to Lincoln’s Inn).
73. Moreover, the documents now relied upon by the Appellant (assuming them to be admissible for this purpose) do not establish even an arguable case that the initial referral of disciplinary proceedings to the SDT in 2018 was unlawful and that time should be extended for the Appellant to bring this appeal. There are four principal reasons why not.
74. First, the Appellant’s case is premised upon a misunderstanding of the statutory scheme. There can be no doubt that in imposing conditions upon his practising certificate, the SRA was acting in pursuance of its powers under section 13A(1) of the 1974 Act and regulation 7.1 of the SRA Practising Regulations 2011. Conditions imposed by the SRA under section 13A are regulatory in nature, not disciplinary. Their purpose is not punitive. They are “intended to ensure that a solicitor who has run into trouble in a professional capacity is subject to a degree of oversight in the conduct of his professional life at least until he has demonstrated over a period that he is not in need of any such supervision to protect the public”: see Solicitor (No 12 of 2008) sub nom. Brandon v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 967 at [31], citing Camacho v Law Society [2004] EWHC 1675at [15]. Regulatory conditions are imposed where they are necessary in the interests of the public and the reputation of the profession, and must be reasonable and proportionate: Brandon at [32], per Sir Anthony Clarke MR.
75. A similar argument to the contrary as was relied upon by the Appellant in the present case was also advanced in Awan v Law Society [2003] EWCA Civ 1969, but was rejected. Lord Phillips MR (with whom May and Carnwath LJJ agreed) said at [25] (with italicised text that I have interposed by way of explanation of the context) as follows:
“[Counsel for the Appellant] has described these decisions [to impose practising conditions] as convictions and contended that the imposition of conditions on Mr Awan's certificate were punishments, so that it was an abuse of process for the SDT to impose any further remedy in respect of misconduct. These submissions are misconceived. They confuse the regulatory role of the OSS [the Office for the Supervision of Solicitors, predecessor to the SRA]with the disciplinary role of the SDT. Where serious charges are pending before the SDT, it is common for the OSS to impose restrictions on a solicitor's practising certificate for the protection of the public and the reputation of the profession pending the SDT hearing. It is, it seems to me, plainly not merely proper but essential that in appropriate cases they should do so. The imposition of such conditions is not a punishment and in no way pre-judges the result of the hearing before the SDT.”
76. So too in the present case: it is entirely clear that the SRA was exercising its powers under Part I of the 1974 Act to safeguard the public when it imposed practising conditions on the Appellant. This was incapable of affecting its power under Part II of the Act (section 47(1) in particular) and rule 10.1 of the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011 to refer the matter to the SDT for disciplinary action.
77. Second, the Appellant’s argument constructed on the disclosed evidence is entirely without foundation. It is premised upon the suggestion that there was – as a matter of fact – a deliberate decision to “close” the 2014 and 2015 investigations into his actions. This is incorrect. It relies upon the Appellant’s misinterpretation of the new documents upon which he relies, and an excessive degree of formalism in his analysis of their significance. In particular, he is wrong to place so much emphasis on his forensic analysis of the various administrative file numbers under which each matter was being dealt. The fact that certain files were closed at certain times simply did not have the significance for which he contends. The SRA’s powers to exercise its statutory functions as it saw fit were not limited by whether any one particular numbered file had been “closed” within its administrative filing system. Specifically:
i) The internal emails of 5 and 6 October 2015 in relation to the forensic investigation simply reflect the fact that that stage of the investigation had been completed, and the forensic investigation report was now being passed to the regulatory supervisor who had commissioned it. The fact that the forensic investigators closed their own file meant nothing other than that. It certainly did not have the consequence that the investigation itself was closed.
ii) The closure validation form of 18 December 2015 (and accompanying caseworker file closure actions) simply reflected the fact that the 2014 and 2015 investigations were being joined under a single reference number. The SRA’s evidence to that effect is supported by the fact that the Forensic Investigation Report had addressed both matters together, and had then been sent to the Appellant under cover of the EWW letter as part of a single formal investigation. There is no indication anywhere in the documents that the SRA had decided not to proceed further with any aspect of the investigation. To the contrary, the EWW letter showed that the formal stage of the investigation was just beginning.
iii) The case note of 10 February 2016 recorded that the SRA had decided both to impose immediate practising certificate conditions and to start the process of disciplinary proceedings for all of the breaches identified in the forensic investigation report. This was flatly inconsistent with the Appellant’s suggestion that a decision had been made not to initiate disciplinary action.
iv) As to the closure validation form of 10 November 2016, the Appellant disputed the SRA’s evidence that this was likely generated because the 2014 and 2015 investigations were being consolidated with the 2016 investigation, for which Mr Griffiths had responsibility. The Appellant’s witness statement of 12 July 2026, filed after the hearing to respond to this suggestion, exhibited extensive correspondence concerning Mr Griffiths’ 2016 investigation into the matter of the property sale. The Appellant was concerned to establish that neither Mr Griffiths nor his ultimate successor Ruth King stated in that correspondence that they had taken over responsibility for the 2014 and 2015 investigations, or that those investigations were ongoing. There is indeed little or no indication on file that Mr Griffiths took any further action to investigate the earlier matters; however, that is of no obvious significance: those matters remained pending. What is apparent is that once the investigation into the property sale matters first raised under the 2016 investigation had been completed, the three matters were taken forward for consideration as to whether disciplinary action should be authorised on a consolidated basis. The SRA’s reading of this file note is entirely consistent with that, and I accept it. Moreover, there is no indication that anybody had purported to take a decision that no further disciplinary action would be taken.
v) The internal SRA memorandum dated 12 March 2018 duly asked the Disciplinary Proceedings Team to consider whether it was appropriate to authorise disciplinary proceedings against the Appellant in respect of the matters which had first been raised under the 2014 and 2015 investigations. It is true that this was some considerable time after the events in question, and that it would have been highly desirable for the SRA to have reached this stage far earlier. However, on the evidence it appears clear that such consideration was delayed by the need to finish investigating the property sale matters raised under the 2016 investigation, and to take further action on the basis of an aggregated view of the seriousness of that which had emerged from each of the investigations.
78. Third, the Appellant is wrong in any event to contend that the closure of an administrative file would have the consequence – as a matter of law – that the SRA would be unable later to refer the matter to the SDT for disciplinary action if it considered it appropriate to do so.
79. There were two strands to the Appellant’s argument in this respect. The first strand was that he would no longer be a “person under investigation” within the meaning of rule 10.1 of the SRA Disciplinary Procedure Rules 2011, with the result that no application to the SDT could be made. This argument is misconceived:
i) Section 47 of the 1974 Act makes clear that the jurisdiction of the SDT applies to a “solicitor”. The Appellant was undoubtedly a solicitor at all material times.
ii) Rule 10.1 of the 2011 Rules provided that the SRA may make an application to the SDT in respect of a “regulated person” at any time. A “regulated person” was defined to include a solicitor.
iii) One of the matters of which the SRA was required to be satisfied before making an application to the SDT was, under rule 10.1(b), that “the allegation to be made against the person under investigation either in itself or in the light of other allegations is sufficiently serious” that the SDT is likely to make one of the orders that the SDT is empowered to make (but which the SRA is not). “Person under investigation” was defined as a “person subject to a discipline investigation”. “Discipline investigation” was in turn defined as an investigation by the SRA to determine whether a person should be subject to an SRA finding, a disciplinary decision, or an application to the SDT under rule 10.
iv) The Appellant was at all material times a “person under investigation”. Even if active steps were no longer being taken to investigate the matters originally opened under the 2014 and 2015 investigations, those matters were still relevant to the aggregated decision-making exercise which followed the completion of the 2016 investigation: the test in rule 10.1(b) itself requires consideration of the seriousness of an allegation both in itself and in the light of other allegations. The fact that the various investigations had all been rolled up under a single file reference remains of no legal significance for the reasons I have given above – but if it had any at all, it would tend to support the conclusion that the SRA was taking an aggregated view of the seriousness of each of the allegations on a cumulative basis. In any event, the decision as to whether there should be an SRA finding, a disciplinary decision or an application to the SDT had remained pending as at 12 March 2018, and the Appellant therefore remained subject to a “discipline investigation” within the meaning of the 2011 Rules.
80. The second strand of the Appellant’s argument in this respect was his reliance on a cause of action or issue estoppel preventing the SRA from referring matters to the SDT which it had already dealt with by imposing practising conditions. The Appellant relies upon the decision of the Court of Appeal in Clark v In Focus Asset Management and Tax Solutions Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 118, in which Arden LJ (with whom Black and Davis LJJ agreed) held that the doctrine of cause of action estoppel applied to the binding final decision of the Financial Ombudsman Service, so as to prevent the complainant from accepting an award but then going on to relitigate the matter in court.
81. This argument fails on multiple levels.
i) First, it wrongly assumes that the relevant matters had been finally dealt with and were to be treated as closed. As I have already explained, this was wrong both as a matter of fact and as a matter of law.
ii) Second, as Mr Tankel correctly submits, the present case is not one where there was an acceptance of a decision in relation to a dispute between two parties whereby a cause of action advanced by one party is the subject of a dispute resolution process. The SRA was engaging in no such act of adjudication; it was instead exercising a regulatory function in accordance with the statutory scheme. There is nothing in that statutory scheme which prevents the SRA from making a referral to the SDT where it has imposed practising conditions.
82. Fourthly, as to the delay arguments (whether taken on their own terms or on the basis of Article 6 ECHR), there is nothing in the disclosed documents which was necessary to enable the Appellant to advance such an argument. The Appellant could have advanced any such argument immediately upon the handing down of the SDT’s determination (assuming it was to be contended that the SDT should have considered such an argument for itself but had failed to do so). There is no basis to extend time now to allow the Appellant to make such an argument now.
83. The Appellant did not pursue other strands of his written grounds of appeal at the oral hearing. He was right not to do so: his broad submissions that the decision to make the referral to the SDT was an abuse of process by reason of being (variously) a form of malicious prosecution, or in support of a collateral purpose, were unsupportable.
84. In conclusion, and evaluating all the relevant factors together, including the seriousness of the delay, the lack of good reason for it, and the need to deal justly with the application, including the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost and to enforce compliance with rules, Practice Directions and orders, there is no basis for me to extend time to bring this appeal. Moreover, even if I were otherwise persuaded to extend time, I would dismiss the appeal on its merits. The referral to the SDT was lawfully made, and the SDT had had full jurisdiction to determine the matter before it and to make such orders as it saw fit. Notably, the Appellant takes no separate point on this appeal as to the appropriateness or proportionality of the orders in fact made by the SDT following the findings it had made against him.
85. Whilst I have admitted the evidence relied upon by both parties to the extent necessary to consider the Appellant’s application to extend time to appeal, that application is refused.
Postscript
86. Following circulation to the parties of a draft of this judgment, I received extensive submissions from the Appellant seeking, amongst other things, the deferral of the handing down of this judgment, the opportunity to submit further evidence including the transcript of the cross-examination of a witness in the later SRA proceedings heard in July 2026, and a re-opening of my factual conclusions.
87. I reject this application. This is not an appropriate use of the opportunity provided by circulation of a draft judgment to the parties. The sole purpose of the provision of a draft judgment is to enable the parties to make suggestions for the correction of errors, prepare submissions on consequential matters and prepare themselves for the publication of the judgment. It is not intended to provide an opportunity to any party (and in particular the unsuccessful party) to reopen or reargue the case, or to repeat submissions made at the hearing, or to deploy fresh ones save in exceptional circumstances (which are not present here): R (Binyam Mohamed) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2010] EWCA Civ 158; [2011] QB 218 at [5].
88. Some of the Appellant’s submissions in this context showed a misunderstanding of the terms of the draft judgment. I have taken the opportunity to clarify some of these points in the approved judgment in order to better aid understanding (in accordance with Binyam Mohamed at [4]). Beyond that, the sole appropriate venue for any further arguments with my conclusions that the Appellant may seek to raise is on appeal, should permission be granted.
89. I also received an application from the Appellant for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal. However, any further appeal would be a “second appeal” within the meaning of section 55(1) of the Access to Justice Act 1999, CPR rule 52.7(1) and PD52A paragraph 4.7. As the Appellant himself points out in that application, the consequence is that only the Court of Appeal may grant permission to appeal. Any application is accordingly to be made to that Court.
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