Miscellaneous United Kingdom

MW Eat Limited & Ors v James Hallam Limited

Official source

Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2673 (BP)

Case No: BL-2025-001165

In the High Court of Justice

Business and Property Division

Business List

Royal Courts of Justice, Rolls Building

Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL

Date: 26 October 2026

Before :

Deputy Master Valentine

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Between :

(1) MW EAT LIMITED
(2) ECHOWALK LIMITED
(3) ECHOWALK INVEST LIMITED
Claimants/
Respondents
– and –
JAMES HALLAM LIMITED Defendant/ Applicant

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

Helen Evans KC and Seohyung Kim (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for the Applicant

Marc Glover and Sami Allan (instructed by Keystone Law Limited) for the Respondents

Hearing date: 9 September 2026

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

JUDGMENT

This judgment was handed down remotely by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives

Deputy Master Valentine:

1. This is a claim for damages resulting from alleged professional negligence, breach of duty and breach of contract brought by the Claimants against the Defendant James Hallam Limited, the First Claimant’s insurance broker and advisor (“D” or the “Broker”). It relates to alleged uninsured losses of up to £8,000,000 suffered by the First Claimant in financial years 2019/20, 2020/21 and 2021/22 said to arise as a result of the lockdown imposed in England on 23 March 2020 during the COVID-19 pandemic.

2. This is my judgment following a one-day hearing of the Defendant’s application of 26 February 2026 to strike out the claim pursuant to CPR 3.4(2)(a) and/or (b), alternatively for summary judgment pursuant to CPR 24.

Parties and Relevant Background

3. The First Claimant, MW Eat Limited (“C1” or “MWE”), is the owner and operator of a number (10 at the relevant time) of restaurants in London. In 2019, its estimated gross profit for a 24 month indemnity period was £40,000,000. The Second and Third Claimants (Echowalk Limited and Echowalk Invest Limited) are group companies and assignees of C1’s claims against D. D is an insurance advisor and broker which rendered such services to C1 in the relevant period of 2019-2022.

4. On 20 September 2019, upon expiration of its previous insurance policy, C1 sought advice and recommendations from the Broker on renewal. If this claim goes to trial there may be an issue as to what D did then, but for the purposes of this hearing I was told D conducted a market exercise and in addition to obtaining renewal terms from Barbican (C1’s then-current insurer), it sought quotations from Allianz, AXA, Zurich, NIG, RSA and Travelers. D says Allianz, NIG, RSA and Travelers declined to quote, AXA quoted £95,000 plus IPT and Zurich £90,000 plus IPT. Barbican's premium for a one-year policy was £80,667.09 including IPT. It also offered an extended policy period, from 20 September 2019 to 31 March 2021, for £123,205.33 including IPT, which was the Broker’s recommendation for renewal.

5. C1 entered into the one year insurance policy with Barbican Protect Limited (the “2019/20 Policy”) arranged by D. The term of the policy was from 20 September 2019-19 September 2020. The policy included Business Interruption "All Risks" cover and various extensions. So far as presently material:

i) There was cover for losses caused by specified diseases manifested at C1's premises or within one mile thereof subject to a maximum indemnity period of three months and a limit of £50,000 in any one period of insurance;

ii) The specified-disease list did not include Covid-19, which had not then emerged, nor coronavirus, nor SARS;

iii) There was additional non-damage denial of access (“NDDA”) cover in respect of closure or sealing off of premises or a right of way by the police or another statutory authority within 1,000 metres;

iv) The NDDA extension was subject to a maximum indemnity period of three months and a limit of £50,000 in any one period of insurance; and

v) The policy also included a separate Norovirus endorsement.

6. It is relevant to D’s case that when the 2019/20 Policy expired, they say the replacement policies entered into by C1 for the next two years had similar limitations in respect of NDDA and disease coverage.

7. I understand it is a common assumption of the parties, though only for the purposes of this hearing, that the 2019/20 Policy did not cover, or not above a £50,000 limit, losses C1 suffered consequent on the COVID-19 pandemic and the government’s response thereto. The Claimants say that the 2019/20 Policy was inadequate to C1’s needs.

8. C1 says as a result of the first lockdown imposed in the COVID-19 pandemic, it suffered losses of £8,022,528 being:

i) A £1,049,097 down-turn of profits (after accounting for furlough payments) for the 2019-20 financial year;

ii) A £5,612,641 down-turn of such profits for the 2020-21 financial year; and

iii) A £1,360,790 down-turn of such profits for the 2021-22 financial year (collectively, the “Lockdown Lost Profits”).

9. The claim in the Particulars of Claim is not for the full amount of the Lockdown Lost Profits, but rather for “damages not exceeding the sum of £8,000,000”.

Particulars of Claim

10. The Claimants’ Particulars of Claim (the “PoC”) say that but for the Broker’s alleged breaches (the pleading of which is not in issue before me) C1 (i) would not have entered into the 2019/20 Policy and (ii) would have entered into what they term the “Correct Alternative Product” (I refer to it for brevity as the “CAP”).

11. In those circumstances the Claimants particularise their loss and damage:

i) at §40 as the full amount of their Lockdown Lost Profits “which would have been covered by the Correct Alternative Product, and alternatively such sums as would have been covered by the Correct Alternative Product” and

ii) at §41 “Alternatively loss is claimed on a loss of a chance basis, by reference to the chance that the Correct Alternative Product would have been offered to the 1st Claimant. It is averred that it would have been accepted and entered into the same.”

12. The “Correct Alternative Product” (the CAP) is defined at §35 of the Particulars of Claim as:

“an insurance policy (or policies) which would have provided adequate protection relative to the 1st Claimant’s turnover, in respect of losses caused by diseases such as, but not limited to, SARS, as well as losses caused by general non-damage denial of access to the Restaurants (“the Correct Alternative Product”). Among other things, any financial limit in the Correct Alternative Product would have been per restaurant and not as a total across all the restaurants.”

13. D’s case is that the Claimants’ Particulars of Claim do not adequately set out the causation or loss elements of the cause of action, in particular:

i) the Claimants have not pleaded a coherent “counterfactual.” They say that, had D advised differently, MWE would have purchased a CAP providing “adequate” disease and NDDA cover and indemnifying “all or part” of the £8.02m losses claimed, without particularising what “adequate” or “all or part” means.

ii) the Particulars of Claim do not identify the material terms of that hypothetical CAP, including its limit, premium or maximum indemnity period, identify any insurer offering those terms, or explain how the policy would have covered the losses claimed. For example, MWE claims losses of approximately £8.02 million over what it depicts as three financial years, yet does not plead to the CAP's maximum indemnity period or explain how insurance obtained at the September 2019 renewal would have responded to losses continuing until March 2022.

14. The Claimants’ solicitor Mr Robinson has produced two witness statements that elaborate slightly on the case. Those witness statements include a table of certain features (“NDDOA”, “Diseases”, “Limit Cover”, “Possibility of Composite Policy[1]”, “Indemnity Period” and “Responded? Court case”) of 5 alternative policies that “could have responded to MWE’s COVID BI losses”. It is D’s position that a witness statement cannot save defective pleadings, but that in any event they do not cure the vagueness of the pleading of causation and loss here.

Applicable Legal Principles

15. Under CPR 3.4, the court may strike out a statement of case (or, pursuant to CPR 3.4(1), part thereof):

“if it appears to the court –

(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;

(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court’s process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings;

…”

16. Under CPR 24.3, the court may give summary judgment if:

“(a) it considers that the party has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim, defence or issue; and

(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial.”

17. A “real” prospect is one which is realistic and carries some degree of conviction rather than being merely fanciful: Easyair Ltd v Opal Telecom [2009] EWHC 339 (Ch)at[15].

18. The statement of case must be a “concise” statement of facts relied on, but must also be sufficient to allow the defendant to know what case they need to meet and allow them to move on to collect appropriate witness and (if appropriate) expert evidence, and it plays a crucial role in defining the issues.

19. In Towler v Wills [2010] EWHC 1209 (Comm), Teare J observed at [16]-[19] that:

“The purpose of a pleading or statement of case is to inform the other party what the case is that is being brought against him. It is necessary that the other party understands the case which is being brought against him so that he may plead to it in response, disclose those of his documents which are relevant to that case and prepare witness statements which support his defence. If the case which is brought against him is vague or incoherent he will not, or may not, be able to do any of those things. Time and costs will, or may, be wasted if the defendant seeks to respond to a vague and incoherent case. It is also necessary for the Court to understand the case which is brought so that it may fairly and expeditiously decide the case and in a manner which saves unnecessary expense. For these reasons it is necessary that a party’s pleaded case is a concise and clear statement of the facts on which he relies”.

20. In Pantelli Associates Ltd v Corporate City Developments Number Two Ltd [2010] EWHC 3189 (TCC); [2011] PNLR 12, at [11], Coulson J held that:

“CPR r.16.4(1)(a) requires that a particulars of claim must include “a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies”. Thus, where the particulars of claim contain an allegation of breach of contract and/or negligence, it must be pleaded in such a way as to allow the defendant to know the case that it has to meet. The pleading needs to set out clearly what it is that the defendant failed to do that it should have done, and/or what the defendant did that it should not have done, what would have happened but for those acts or omissions, and the loss that eventuated. Those are “the facts” relied on in support of the allegation, and are required in order that proper witness statements (and if necessary an expert’s report) can be obtained by both sides which address the specific allegations made.”

21. In Charles Russell Speechlys v Beneficial House [2022] Costs L.R. 343 at [50], Cotter J summarised the position as follows:

"It has long been a fundamental rule of litigation that a Claimant's statement of case must include all relevant facts. CPR 16.4.1(a) states that particulars of claim should include a concise statement of the facts relied upon. Relied in this context upon must mean relied upon as establishing and supporting a cause of action." That is because, as Mummery LJ stated in Boake Allen Ltd v HMRC [2006] EWCA Civ 25 at [131]:

"Proper pleading of the material facts is essential for the orderly progress of the case and for its sound determination. The definition of the issues has an impact on such important matters as disclosure of relevant documents and the relevant oral evidence to be adduced at trial."

22. Here D says that this statement of case does not disclose reasonable grounds or is an abuse of the court process as, as drafted, it fails to reveal the case to be met. This, they say, also allows me to conclude that as pleaded the Claimants have no real prospect of success on the claim. The objection is that the Claimants have not pleaded a complete cause of action, that in a claim such as this the counterfactual (what would have happened but for the breach(es)) must be properly pleaded or there is not a sustainable claim that the breach caused the loss.

23. The position was aptly summarised by Master McQuail in Finnan v Charles Russell Speechlys LLP [2023] EWHC 3058 (Ch) at [99]:

"Causation of loss is an essential part of any cause of action that the claimant may have in tort and in its absence there can be no valid claim in tort; a cause of action in the tort of negligence is only complete when damage occurs. If there is no sustainable case on causation of loss there is no reasonable ground for pursuing any claim in contract as it will result in no benefit to the claimant."

24. In Blower v GH Canfield LLP [2025] EWCA Civ 1627, Asplin LJ said, obiter, at [77]-[78]:

“It is said that had Canfields not been negligent, Mrs Blower would not have signed the settlement agreement or would not have settled the claims brought against her by the trustee in bankruptcy for the sums set out in the settlement agreement. There is no express pleading, however, as to what would have happened next. Ms Pope-Williams accepted that CPR rule 16.4(1)(a) provides that particulars of claim must include "a concise statement of the facts on which the claimant relies". She submitted, however, that it was implicit in the pleading at paragraph 48 of the amended particulars of claim, that it would be necessary to deal with what the trustee in bankruptcy would have done had Mrs Blower been separately advised and as a result had not signed the settlement agreement.

It seems to me that that cannot be implied. I agree with the judge that the pleading of causation and loss was insufficient. The amended particulars of claim set out the allegations about what would not have happened but do not state what it is alleged would have happened had the alleged negligence not occurred. It is not pleaded, for example, that the claims would have been settled for a particular sum or that they would have been successfully defended at trial and that Mrs Blower would also have suffered the legal costs which were irrecoverable in doing so. To put it another way, the positive counter-factual is missing. CPR 16.4(1)(a) was not complied with. It is not possible to make up that deficiency by implication, especially where there is no indication of what it is alleged would have happened. It is a mere matter of speculation.”

25. Even more recently in Cohen v Morrison [2026] EWHC 184 (Ch), the Court addressed pleading on causation, in the context of a loss of a chance claim, saying:

“66 The fact that a claim is put on a loss of a chance basis does not absolve the claimant of the responsibility to plead his case on what he would have done, what he says a third party would have done, and what he says the outcome is likely to have been. The fundamental point is that it is for him to plead and prove what his own actions would have been.

67 To take a simple example, if a man involved in a motor accident argues that he was on his way to purchase a lottery ticket, and has therefore lost the chance of winning the lottery, he is not automatically credited with the loss of that chance. He must first prove that he would indeed have bought the ticket, and must plead the facts on which he relies for that conclusion, and only if he does so should his loss of the chance be recognised.”

26. Where a pleading is found to be defective, striking it out is not the only course open to the court, and usually if there is an alternative such as permitting an amendment that cures the defect, that will be preferable. That is not always the case, however, for example where the court concludes that allowing further amendment would be futile or where multiple opportunities to cure the defects have already been refused, see, for example Kim v Park [2011] EWHC 1781 (QB) in which, Tugendhat J said at [40]:

“However, where the court holds that there is a defect in a pleading, it is normal for the court to refrain from striking out that pleading unless the court has given the party concerned an opportunity of putting right the defect, provided that there is reason to believe that he will be in a position to put the defect right.”

and Nichol J at [45] in BrewDog plc v Frank Public Relations Ltd [2020] EWHC 1276 (QB) who said:

“As for the remaining claim in negligent misstatement, I consider that Mr Glen is right that the Claimants have been long been on notice that Reynolds Porter Chamberlain (the Defendant's solicitors) considered that no adequate particulars had been given of the facts and matters which gave rise to a duty of care or as to how any such alleged duty of care was breached and that from the absence of any proposed amendments to the Particulars of Claim I should draw the inference that the Claimants would not be able to draft any, even if given the opportunity to do so.”

DISCUSSION

27. The pleading is not of itself hard to understand. It says that if the Broker had acted with reasonable skill and care (pursuant to its duties in tort and contract) it would have advised C1 to enter into, and C1 would have entered into, the CAP which would have covered “all or part” of the Lockdown Loss, or alternatively that by reason of D’s breach C1 lost the chance to enter into the CAP. The difficulty, and alleged deficiency, is in the specificity with which “the CAP” is described, and the loss it is alleged it would have covered.

28. “The Correct Alternative Product” is used throughout as a defined term as though it referred to a particular policy, but in fact that is not what it refers to – from the Particulars of Claim it should be understood as meaning an insurance policy available at the time of C1’s insurance renewal in 2019 (either generally on the market, or as a bespoke or layered product) that:

i) could have included losses arising from COVID-19 pursuant to disease coverage either because (a) it included contagious illnesses caused by a coronavirus or such as but not limited to SARS among a closed list of “Specified Diseases” for which coverage is provided, (b) it had an “open list” of diseases covered or (c) covered loss on a “notifiable diseases” basis,

ii) had limits which reflected “adequate protection relative to [C1]’s turnover” in respect of losses arising from disease peril and NDDA (no figure is suggested but 2 year gross profit was estimated at £40m, lost profits over a 3 year period at £8m and the actual coverage limit for these types of loss in the 2019/20 Policy of £50,000 is presumably alleged to be too low),

iii) provided that any financial limits (at least on disease peril and NDDA, it is not clear whether this should have been for all financial limits – the PoC say any financial limits “insofar as this was necessary to ensure an adequate overall insured sum”) were on a per restaurant basis, and

iv) had NDDA cover with an indemnity period greater than 3 months.

These are the “Pleaded Minimum Features.”

29. In order to discern these elements of the CAP, it is not enough to look at the definition of the CAP as it appears in the PoC, but requires a broader review of the particulars of breach. Purely from the definition of the CAP in paragraph 35 of the PoC one would conclude that the CAP has (i) coverage of diseases such as but not limited to SARS within the diseases coverage, (ii) “adequate” protection relative to turnover in relation to diseases and NDDA, and (iii) all financial limits to be per restaurant. However, I am satisfied that taken as a whole the PoC do make clear that the CAP would have to meet the Pleaded Minimum Features.

30. The question is whether the PoC’s Pleaded Minimum Features sufficiently describe the counterfactual in a way that allows D to understand and respond to the claim. I conclude they do not, for the following reasons.

31. It is not clear from the PoC whether in order to be a CAP, a hypothetical policy must be as good as or better than the 2019/20 Policy in other ways (e.g. with the same level of property damage or business interruption “all risks” coverage, similar levels of excess or other features). Similarly, the PoC do not set out any range of premium that C1 would have been willing to pay, notwithstanding the Claimants’ case that C1 would have entered the CAP. They do, however, concede that any increase in premium would be deducted from the damages due, so it is clear that the CAP would not necessarily have to be at or below the price of the 2019/20 Policy (or the other policies that the Broker did identify for C1 in 2019).

32. Moreover, the PoC do not allow the reader to infer the minimum indemnity period(s) or relevant indemnity limits of the CAP. The Pleaded Minimum Features say that at least for NDDA coverage, there would have been an indemnity period of more than 3 months, but as the particulars of special damage include damage over 3 financial years, D could not be confident whether a policy with, say, a 6 month indemnity period would qualify as a CAP on the Claimants’ case. The PoC are also clear that the minimum indemnity limit for disease and/or NDDA coverage would have to be more than £50,000 total, and “adequate” in relation to turnover (though damage is claimed by reference to lost profit, not lost turnover), but that is insufficient to allow D to understand what financial limit is asserted to be adequate.

33. I am also unable to tell from the PoC what loss it is claimed would have been avoided by entry into the CAP. The PoC claim (i) the whole of the Lockdown Loss on the basis that it “would have been covered by the Correct Alternative Product,” (ii) “alternatively such sums as would have been covered” and (iii) alternatively, damages on a loss of chance basis.

34. Because the Claimants have not nailed their colours to the mast in respect of what indemnity limit (per site and overall) and what indemnity period the disease and NDDA coverage would have had, and what premium the CAP would have had, it seems to me that the PoC do not explain the basis on which it can be said C1’s entire Lockdown Loss would have been covered. I am in addition at a loss as to what part of their £8m total lost profit would have been prima facie claimable under the CAP for the same reasons. D is therefore left in the position of having to determine for itself the amount of the claim.

35. That lack of definition matters because it leaves D, in effect, being asked to meet an allegation that a policy meeting a range of vaguely defined characteristics existed, could have been negotiated, or could have been assembled through some combination of available products. That exercise requires D to supply some crucial missing content of the Claimants' own counterfactual case.

36. In my judgment, that is insufficient. A claimant must plead the material features of the alleged counterfactual with sufficient precision to enable the defendant to know what he must refute, prepare evidence and formulate a defence. These Particulars of Claim do not presently achieve that. The fact that D cannot discern the true size of the claim from the PoC also makes it difficult to evaluate the claim for the purposes of settlement.

37. D’s objections went further than this and raised a further difficulty in that, as no particular specific policy is pleaded, it is not in a position to make arguments as to whether, even if a prima facie claim under the CAP for the Lockdown Loss or a specified part of it existed, it would in fact have been covered by the language of the policy. Cockerill J in Oaxaca Limited t/a Wahaca v QIC Europe Limited [2024] EWHC 394 (Comm) at [4] acknowledged that in cases related to coverage of COVID-related losses, of which there have been a series, “It is an area where the devil is in the detail.” D says they cannot be expected to answer the claim that the CAP would have actually covered (some of) C1’s losses without knowing the insurer and the language of the policy C1 claims it should have been offered.

38. I think there is force in this submission, but only up to a point. If no specific policy language is pleaded, D is entitled to put the Claimants to proof that a policy with the relevant characteristics would have been responsive to the Lockdown Loss in their case. I cannot see how the Claimants could ultimately prove their case that a specific loss would have been covered without proving that the language of the policy they should have been offered (and would have bought) would have responded to the loss in question. This necessarily involves an examination of the language of the policy and potentially other matters such as those relating to the claims history of the particular insurer. However, it appears to me that this is primarily a matter of proof, and not of pleading.

39. D had in argument suggested to the contrary that the claim for loss of profits (as opposed to loss of a chance) should be struck out because this claim, in truth, can only be formulated on a loss of chance basis due to the uncertainty about whether a putative policy would have been offered and on what terms, relying on Norman Hay Plc. v Marsh Ltd [2025] PNLR. In that case, the claimant business had settled a particular claim without agreeing it was liable in respect of that claim, and did not plead that it was liable for the claim, which was a relevant factor to whether coverage would have responded to the loss involved. I do not read Norman Hay as establishing that a claim of this kind must necessarily be advanced only on a loss of a chance basis. I do not think that case rules out pleading a claim that a policy with the pleaded relevant characteristics would have responded to a specific loss, though of course it may be a more challenging matter to prove it. In this case, in my view, the Claimants have not yet fully pleaded the counterfactual of what the CAP would have prima facie covered, but if they can specify what the relevant characteristics of the CAP are then they are in a position to plead that such a policy would have covered a specified amount of their lost profits. Whether a policy with those characteristics would in fact have covered the relevant losses is a matter to be established by evidence and determined at trial, as the court said in Norman Hay at [36] “How the claim against the putative insurer should be assessed will be a matter for trial.” That uncertainty does not in my judgment prevent the claim for specific lost profits being properly pleaded.

40. Even if I am wrong in that, in this case the claim is not limited to a claim that with the right policy, £X of loss would have been covered. In addition, there is a claim that the Claimants lost a chance to obtain a policy that would cover the loss (or, possibly, failed to obtain a policy that had a chance of covering the loss, or both). For that claim, it does not strike me as necessary to specify the insurer and language of the potentially lost policy(ies) at this stage. It should be enough to clarify the material features of the policy(ies) that should have been offered and would have been accepted. The likelihood and value of the chance allegedly lost may involve a review of language of particular policies, but there may be other ways of evidencing those matters, and in any event I do not consider this level of detail is required to plead the counterfactual for this loss of a chance claim.

41. D also relies on the fact that, even after the onset of the pandemic and with the benefit of knowledge of the losses allegedly suffered, C1 is said to have purchased insurance which did not contain the type or extent of disease and NDDA cover which it now contends it would have purchased in September 2019. D submits that this undermines the Claimants’ counterfactual case. In my judgment, however, that is a matter of evidence rather than pleading. It may ultimately bear upon whether C1 would in fact have accepted and purchased the CAP had it been available, but it is not an issue which can properly be determined on this application.

42. The difficulty for the Claimants lies not in the absence of a named insurer or complete policy wording, rather the deficiency lies in the failure to identify with sufficient precision the positive counterfactual on which the claims for causation and loss depend. In order to enable D to evaluate and respond to the claim, and prepare its responsive evidence (including expert evidence) it is entitled to know in addition to the Pleaded Minimum Features whether the CAP would have replicated the 2019/20 Policy in its key features, what indemnity limit (per restaurant and overall) and what indemnity period would have been adequate in respect of both disease and NDDA coverage, what premium would have been acceptable for such a policy, and what loss, if less than the full Lockdown Loss, is alleged would be recoverable under the CAP. The amended pleading should also make clear whether that loss is advanced on a direct indemnity basis, a loss-of-a-chance basis, or both.

43. D argues that the Claimants have had their chance to clarify their case in this way, having been invited to do so multiple times by D, and I should infer from the fact they have declined to do so that they cannot do so, and strike out the claim. I will not do so, nor do I consider at this stage that an unless order is warranted. The claim is otherwise clear, concise and well organised, and the witness statements demonstrate the Claimants have sought expert advice that should allow them to correct the deficiencies I have identified. They should be given an opportunity to amend their PoC to do so.

44. In those circumstances I decline at this stage to strike out the claim finally or grant summary judgment. Instead, I will direct that the Claimants serve amended Particulars of Claim remedying the defects identified in this judgment within 28 days.

45. That is my judgment.

Notes

[1] In this context, this was intended to mean that there was a possibility of indemnity limits being per-restaurant.

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