Administrative United Kingdom
SN v The Secretary of State for the Home Department
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Number: PA/82044/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Manchester
On 26 October 2026
Before
JUDGE OF THE FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL C R COLE
Between
SN
(anonymity direction made)
Appellant
and
the secretary of state for the home department
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M Arshad, Alexander James Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr F Delacruz, Home Office Presenting Officer
DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity Direction
1. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because in this specific case the importance of facilitating the discharge of the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and the ECHR in the circumstances of this case outweighs the principle of open justice
Introduction
2. The appellant was born in 1996. He is a national of Afghanistan.
3. The appellant arrived in the UK on 1 May 2024 and claimed asylum.
4. By decision dated 21 July 2025 the respondent refused the appellant’s Protection Claim and Human Rights Claim.
5. The appellant appeals against the respondent’s decision pursuant to section 82(1) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002.
Issues
6. At the outset of the hearing, I clarified with the parties the issues to be resolved in this appeal.
7. The respondent does not accept any of the material facts of the appellant’s account.
8. The respondent accepts that “There would not be sufficient protection from persecution in Afghanistan (Section 34 NABA) and you could not relocate within your home country (Section 35 NABA) if the key material facts of your claim were accepted.”
9. Having reviewed the case, Mr Delacruz confirmed that the respondent is now satisfied that the appellant falls within a Particular Social Group (PSG). He submitted that this is consistent with the Country Policy and Information Note: Fear of the Taliban, Afghanistan, February 2026 which recognises as a PSG those who transgress religious, moral, or societal norms, including individuals involved in extramarital relationships, as they are considered to have breached the Taliban’s moral code.
10. Thus, it was agreed that the credibility of the appellant’s account is the sole issue for resolution.
Documents
11. The respondent provided a bundle of 100 pages with Annexes A to C, including Screening Interview (SI), Asylum Interview Records (AIR1 and AIR2), supporting documents, and the Reasons for Refusal Letter (RFRL) dated 21 July 2025. The respondent also provided a Review.
12. The appellant provided a bundle of 15 pages which included the appellant’s witness statement, skeleton argument, and supporting documents.
The Hearing
13. The Appellant adopted his witness statement and gave evidence in Pashto.
14. The full details of the evidence and the submissions are contained in the Record of Proceedings which is within the court file. I have taken them into consideration in determining this matter. Consequently, I will not rehearse the evidence and submissions except where it is relevant to my findings.
15. After hearing the evidence and submissions, I reserved my decision.
Findings and Reasons
16. I have considered all the evidence, paying regard to the matters to which I was specifically referred, but only summarised those matters that have been of most assistance to me and which relate to the issues for me to determine.
17. The credibility of the appellant’s account is the key issue for me to determine.
18. The appellant’s asylum claim was made after the coming into force of sections 30 to 38 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Thus, section 32 applies to the assessment of the relevant factual matters relied upon by the appellant. Those matters fall to be determined on the balance of probabilities. However, the assessment of future risk remains subject to the lower standard of proof. It must be noted that the lower standard of proof still applies to any Humanitarian Protection/Article 3 claim.
19. I have chosen to initially reach my conclusions regarding the credibility of the appellant’s account applying the lower standard of proof. If the appellant cannot prove his case to the lower standard, then he cannot succeed under the Refugee Convention or under Humanitarian Protection/Article 3.
20. Under section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 I am obliged to consider certain behaviour as affecting an appellant’s credibility. I accept that the appellant travelled via France, Italy, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia. The appellant did not claim asylum in any of these countries. The appellant’s account for not claiming asylum in these countries is not objectively reasonable. He did have the opportunity to claim asylum in a safe country.
21. Thus, this matter does undermine the appellant’s credibility to a limited extent. However, I must still assess the merits of the appellant’s protection claim considering all the evidence and applying the relevant standard of proof, whilst having regard to the appellant’s reduced credibility.
22. I have considered the appellant’s evidence with anxious scrutiny, taking account of the lower standard of proof. Nonetheless, for the reasons that follow, I do not find the appellant to be a credible or reliable witness.
23. The appellant claims to have had a relationship with his partner for around two years. They would chat on her doorstep as he walked past her house on the way to play cricket with his friends. Two requests for her hand in marriage were rejected by her family, but he continued his relationship with her. Eventually his partner’s brother saw the appellant with her in their guest house. The appellant ran away and then went to Kabul. He was informed that his partner had been killed by her family who had links to the Taliban.
24. I agree with the respondent that the appellant only provided vague detail about his partner and their relationship. Considering the relationship is said to have lasted for around two years, this is surprising.
25. More problematic is the appellant’s inability to give a consistent timeline as to the material events. I take into account the appellant’s lack of education, the different calendar in Afghanistan and the general lack of importance of dates in Afghanistan. In my judgment these matters do not offer a reasonable explanation for the appellant’s confused chronology and inconsistent dates.
26. The appellant was unable to give any approximate date as to when he first met his partner.
27. The appellant stated that his mother went to his partner’s family on two occasions to ask for her hand in marriage. The appellant’s evidence as to when these requests were made was vague and inconsistent.
28. Initially in AIR1 the appellant stated that the first request was eight months before he left Afghanistan (which was in August/September 2021). He then also said in AIR1 that the second request was in August 2020, which was clearly inconsistent with his earlier answer about the first request.
29. However, he then said later in AIR1 that he had not actually said August 2020 (or in fact any certain date) for the second request. He continued in AIR1 by then stating that the first marriage request was in August 2020 (not eight months before he left Afghanistan as earlier stated in AIR1). He stated that he could not remember when the second request was made.
30. In his witness statement the appellant stated that “the dates I gave were from the top of my head.” He then stated that dates are not important in Afghan culture. I acknowledge that dates may not be as important, but the appellant has failed to provide any sort of consistent approximation even referencing “early Spring or late Spring” as he indicates in his statement.
31. In his oral evidence the appellant was still unable to give any approximate timescales for the two marriage proposals. He stated that the first occasion was around eight months before the incident when he and his partner were caught by her brother. However, he could not remember when it was that they had been caught.
32. The appellant was unable to provide any estimate as to when his mother made the second marriage proposal.
33. In terms of the date that he and his partner were caught by her brother, as detailed above, the appellant could not give any approximate date in his oral evidence. However, initially in AIR1 the appellant provided the precise date of “10 06 2021.” This date is consistent with the SI which indicates that the appellant’s problems began in June 2021. However, later in AIR1 the appellant stated that he could not remember the exact date of this incident.
34. The appellant’s explanation in his statement is that he “was trying to convert the Islamic calendar to the Christian calendar and estimated this date to be 10 June 2021.” The appellant did not provide this explanation in AIR1 and in his oral evidence he merely stated that he did not remember when this incident occurred.
35. The appellant then provided inconsistent evidence about how long he was in Kabul after being caught with his partner. In AIR1 he stated that he stayed in Kabul for a couple of months, then he said the incident was a month before he left Afghanistan, before returning to it being a couple of months in Kabul. The appellant then stated that he did not stay for two months in Kabul.
36. Later in AIR1 the appellant stated that it was July that he left his home and went to Kabul.
37. When he was asked at the hearing how long he had been in Kabul, the appellant answered maybe five to six months. The appellant was asked to confirm this answer was correct, and he said yes, it is correct. When the answers in AIR1 were then put to him, the appellant stated that his answers were approximate and that he was not sure how long he was in Kabul; it could have been three or four or five or six months.
38. I have considered the discrepancies identified above both individually and cumulatively. Whilst any single inconsistency may not necessarily be determinative, I find that the numerous inconsistencies concerning the chronology of the relationship, the marriage proposals, the alleged threats, and the appellant's departure from Afghanistan substantially undermine the reliability of his account. These matters relate to the core of the protection claim rather than peripheral issues.
39. I confirm that I have considered the appellant's explanation that difficulties recalling dates arose from the passage of time and from differences in the use of calendars in Afghanistan. However, the difficulties identified in the evidence extend beyond precise dates. They include an inability to provide a coherent sequence of major events central to his claim. I therefore do not find the explanation adequately accounts for the discrepancies identified.
40. Before reaching a conclusion regarding the credibility of the appellant’s account, I have carefully considered the documents provided by the appellant. I have considered the reliability of these documents holistically alongside all the other evidence.
41. The Jirga letter offers some support to the appellant’s account. The appellant claims that this letter was sent to him by his brother via WhatsApp in February 2026. The WhatsApp communication between the appellant and his brother has not been provided. Also, it has not been explained why it took over four years for the appellant to be sent a copy of the Jirga letter.
42. There is also an arrest warrant letter from the Taliban “General Directorate of Intelligence.” This letter is dated 30 December 2021 and refers to two previous summonses. It is noted that these previous summonses have not been provided.
43. In AIR2 the appellant stated that his brother sent a photo of this Taliban letter to him. Again, the relevant communication between the appellant and his brother has not been provided. It has also not been explained why this letter was sent prior to AIR2 in May 2025, but the Jirga letter was not sent until February 2026.
44. The respondent has provided background information regarding the availability of forged Taliban threat letters. It is necessary to consider this when assessing the reliability of the documents.
45. Overall, I find that the documents are not reliable and so only limited weight can be given to them in the assessment of the appellant’s claim.However, even taking the documentary evidence at its highest, I do not find that it resolves the significant credibility concerns arising from the appellant's oral and written evidence. Having considered all the evidence in the round, I do not find the documents sufficient to establish the reliability of the appellant's account.
46. Finally, I find it notable that the appellant obtained a passport and sought employment in Dubai during the period when he claims to have been engaged in a serious relationship culminating in attempts to secure marriage. Whilst not determinative, this evidence sits uneasily with the appellant's account and provides some further support for my concerns regarding the reliability of his narrative.
47. Drawing all the threads together and considering all the evidence in the round, for all the reasons given above, I find that the appellant has failed to prove that the core of his account is reasonably likely to be true.
48. Therefore, I find that the appellant has failed to prove that he would be at real risk of serious harm on return to Afghanistan.
Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
Order regarding anonymity
Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including his name or address, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
Signed C R Cole Date 27 October 2026
Judge C R Cole
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
TO THE RESPONDENT
FEE AWARD
The appeal has been dismissed and so there can be no fee award.
Signed C R Cole Date 27 October 2026
Judge C R Cole
Judge of the First-tier Tribunal
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