Commercial United Kingdom
Moelis & Company UK LLP, DIFC Branch v Emirates Petroleum Company PJSC
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 2756 (Comm)
Claim No: LM-2024-000260
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS
LONDON CIRCUIT COMMERCIAL COURT
Rolls Building
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL
Date: 27/10/2026
Before :
STUART RITCHIE KC (sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
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Between :
| MOELIS & COMPANY UK LLP, DIFC BRANCH | Claimant | |
| – and – | ||
| EMIRATES PETROLEUM COMPANY P.J.S.C. | Defendant |
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– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
Matthew Hardwick KC and Charlotte Eborall (instructed by Simmons & Simmons LLP) for the Claimant
Paul Downes KC (instructed by Clyde & Co LLP) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 16, 17, 18, 22 June 2026
Judgment in draft circulated on 17 October 2026
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JUDGMENT
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.00am on Tuesday 27 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
STUART RITCHIE KC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge :
A. Introduction and summary of conclusions
1. This is the judgment following trial of claims by the Claimant (“Moelis”) for commissions said to be due under an agreement to provide financial advisory services to the Defendant (“Emarat”) a Middle Eastern state company[1].
2. The dispute arises out of the proper interpretation of the terms of a letter of engagement agreed on 11 April 2023, expressed to be effective as of 10 February 2023 (“the Engagement Letter”), which set out the terms of the agreement between the parties.
3. Under the Engagement Letter Moelis were appointed as financial advisor with respect to a Restructuring (as further defined) in relation to the Company’s existing debt financing.
4. That engagement followed a tender process in which Emarat circulated a detailed “Request for Proposals” (“RFP”) which stipulated particular requirements. Moelis provided a detailed response, confirming (or otherwise) which of the stipulated services they could provide if appointed (“the Moelis RFP Response”).
5. The agreement contained in the Engagement Letter was heavily negotiated. The scope and extent of the factual matrix and whether any part of the parties’ exchanges in negotiating the Engagement Letter was admissible, and with what effect, was in issue at trial, and is addressed below.
6. The Engagement Letter provided for monthly retainer payments (of US$110,000 per month). It also provided for commission fees (a “Restructuring Fee”, a “Debt Capital Raise Fee” and an “Equity Capital Raise Fee”) the meaning and application of which are in dispute, which were payable in the event of certain transactions being closed:
i) The Restructuring Fee was 0.25% of the aggregate principal amount of Emarat’s existing debt financing that was restructured subject to a minimum fee of US$3 million.
ii) The Debt Capital Raise fee was 0.9% of the aggregate gross amount of new debt financing.
iii) The Equity Capital Raise Fee was 3% of the aggregate amount of new equity financing.
7. Moelis provided their services until mid-June 2023,when their work was suspended/paused. It was an issue at trial whether this suspension/pause was the result of a separate agreement by the parties, or pursuant to an express option under the Engagement Letter, in favour of Emarat, upon providing written notice, to require Moelis, immediately, to cease providing services for a minimum period of one month (without termination of the agreement) and to call for the recommencement of services on a week’s prior notice.
8. After the suspension/pause, new or extended facility and overdraft agreements were entered into by Emarat with banks in respect of Emarat’s debt. In short:
i) Moelis say that these transactions triggered a combination of Restructuring Fees and Debt Capital Raise fees, alternatively simply Restructuring Fees, and accordingly, they claim a sum of US$10,523 million, alternatively US$3,414,044 million;
ii) Emarat say that these transactions triggered no such fees, on the bases that: (i) the transactions entered into did not fall within the terms stipulated in respect of either the Restructuring or Debt Capital Raise fees, (ii) even if they did, Moelis had not done the work required to trigger the right to receive such success fees, and (iii) in any event, the right to fees had been suspended.
9. The parties had agreed a list of issues for determination. I have addressed that list of issues expressly in Annexe 1, and I have addressed the underlying facts and legal issues in the body of this judgment.
10. The disputed points of interpretation give rise to three central enquiries:
i) Were the transactions which were entered into, and which Moelis claim trigger commissions, qualifying transactions within the terms of the definitions of each of “Restructuring Fee” and/or “Debt Capital Raise Fee”?
ii) If so, what (if anything) did Moelis have to do under the contract to become entitled to any such fee? As I see it, there are three issues which arise:
a) First, were there, as Emarat claim, but Moelis dispute, express or implied terms that each of the services which were canvassed in the RFP and the Moelis RFP Response were terms of the contract?
b) Was there, as Emarat claim, but Moelis dispute, an express or implied term that Moelis would be the, or an, effective cause of the transactions?
c) If so, as Moelis claim, but Emarat dispute, did Moelis comply with any such requirements?
iii) What was the effect of the pause/suspension of the engagement in mid-June 2023 on Moelis’s right to fees?
11. At trial, Moelis was represented by Matthew Hardwick KC (“Mr Hardwick”) and Charlotte Eborall. Emarat was represented by Paul Downes KC (“Mr Downes”). I am grateful to all of them for their clear, able and focused submissions and I commend the quality of Ms Eborall’s submissions in the company of experienced senior silks. I wish to thank them and the solicitors representing both parties for the helpful, efficient and co-operative way in which the trial was prepared and conducted.
12. For the reasons set out below my conclusions are that:
i) The transactions which Emarat entered into fell within the terms of the Restructuring Fee, but not within the terms of the Debt Capital Raise Fee;
ii) The commission payments were part of the consideration for the provision by Moelis of services under the Engagement Letter, as to which:
a) There were no express or implied terms to the effect that each of the services canvassed in the RFP and the Moelis RFP Response were terms of the contract.
b) There was no express or implied term that Moelis would be the, or an, effective cause of the transactions.
c) Moelis performed services in accordance with their obligations under the Engagement Letter and in consideration of the payment of monthly retainer fees and (Restructuring) Transaction Fees. They could not reasonably have provided any further services given the pause to which they were subject.
iii) The suspension of the engagement did not affect Moelis’s rights in respect of such Restructuring fees;
iv) Accordingly, I reject Moelis’s principal claim (based in part on Debt Capital Raise Fees), but their alternative claim (based only on Restructuring Fees) succeeds.
13. The judgment is structured as follows.
| Section and sub-section | Heading | Paragraph numbers |
| A | Introduction and summary of conclusions | 1-12 |
| B | The Facts pre-agreement | 14-41 |
| B1 | The parties | 15-20 |
| B2 | B2. Tender Process: Request for Proposal by Emarat and Response by Moelis | 21-22 |
| B3 | The Request for Proposal (RFP) | 23-26 |
| B4 | The Moelis RFP Response | 27-29 |
| B5 | Negotiation, informal appointment and the start of work | 30-40 |
| C | The Agreement – Engagement Letter signed on 11 April 2023 | 41-42 |
| D | Performance of the Agreement from 11 April 2023 and claims for payment | 43-82 |
| D1 | Provision of advice on strategy and financial model | 44-66 |
| D2 | Pause/suspension of Moelis services and retainer payments | 67-73 |
| D3 | Extension/refinancing of the loans | 74-78 |
| D4 | Claims for payment of commission | 79-82 |
| E | The Witness Evidence | 83-91 |
| F | Legal Principles | 92-149 |
| F1 | Interpretation/construction | 93-95 |
| F2 | Relevance and admissibility of pre-contractual materials | 96-100 |
| F3 | Entire Agreement clauses | 101 |
| F4 | Implied terms | 102 |
| F5 | Effective Cause | 103-146 |
| F6 | Conclusions on case law concerning effective cause | 147-149 |
| G | Analysis of the contractual issues | 150-236 |
| G1 | The parties’ positions in outline | 151 |
| G2 | The Court’s approach to the issues | 152-155 |
| G3 | Object and scope of the retainer | 156-169 |
| G4 | Is the overdraft within the scope of “existing debt facilities”? | 170-174 |
| G5 | Were (commissionable) Transactions concluded? | 175 -197 |
| G6-7 | Services and effective cause | 198-236 |
| H | The effect of the pause/suspension | 237-256 |
| I | Disposal | 257-258 |
| Annexe 1 | List of Issues | |
| Annexe 2 | Emarat Existing Facilities and restructurings |
B. The Facts pre-agreement
14. The following summary is taken from agreed facts and otherwise represents my findings of fact.
B1. The parties
15. Moelis are a branch of Moelis & Company UK LLP, a limited liability partnership incorporated in England and Wales, based in the Dubai International Financial Centre. They provide investment banking and financial advisory services, including on capital structuring and restructuring, and were, in the early part of 2023, regarded as a leading provider of such services in the Gulf.
16. Emarat are a fuel services company incorporated in Dubai, established by Emiri Decree in 1981, and formerly known as the Emirates General Petroleum Corporation. Emarat operate multiple businesses in the Emirates, including retail fuel, gas pipelines and joint ventures. The company has been wholly owned by the Emirates Investment Authority (the “EIA”) since 13 September 2023 and was previously owned by the Ministry of Finance. The EIA was involved both in the decision to appoint Moelis under the Engagement Letter and in the process of restructuring Emarat’s debt.
17. Prior to 2015 Emarat had accumulated losses stemming from subsidies imposed by the government which led their auditors to qualify their accounts. Following 2015 the UAE government eliminated fuel price subsidies which brought Emarat into profit. However, there was a legacy of accumulated losses, reflected in high balance sheet debt which the company wished to reduce.
18. As of 31 December 2021, Emarat’s financial statements disclosed that they had accumulated losses of AED 5.671 billion and a net deficit of AED 2.944 billion with current liabilities exceeding current assets by AED 1.048 billion. Emarat had loans from the Ministry of Finance (aggregate AED 1.25 billion) and the Ministry guaranteed their commercial borrowing. On that basis, Emarat’s accounts were prepared on a going concern basis notwithstanding expressed uncertainties by the auditors.
19. On 30 November 2021 the EIA’s CEO, Mr Al Mansoori, instructed Emarat to appoint a financial advisor to study and assess the restructuring of their bank loans and solutions for reducing the same.
20. From early 2022 Emarat sought to reorganise their debt and balance sheet, and to restructure internally to improve efficiency and profitability. Emarat engaged McKinsey & Company as a strategic advisor, and invited ten investment banks to tender for the mandate to restructure their debt.
B2. Tender Process: Request for Proposal by Emarat and Response by Moelis
21. On 14 March 2022 Emarat sent an initial tender document – entitled Request for Proposal (“Loan Re-Structuring”) to Moelis among other banks. Under “Scope of Work” Emarat stated that they had a loan portfolio of approximately AED 4.75 billion with various banks in the UAE with maturity dates from 2023 to 2026. The loans were secured by Ministry of Finance guarantees. The document indicated that Emarat were planning to appoint a financial advisor to: (i) advise on appropriate and optimal financing strategy to refinance the current liabilities in full or partially; (ii) prepare an analysis of all the funding options available to refinance the existing loans; (iii) support Emarat in terms of presenting various options with their pros/cons to management, board and shareholders of Emarat as and when required; and (iv) carry out a potential market sounding analysis with the potential lenders.
22. Moelis responded on 21 March 2022 with a proposal to act as financial advisor for the purposes of the restructuring in early 2022. That proposal envisaged: (i) evaluation of funding alternatives, (ii) recommendation of an optimal financing strategy, and (iii) engagement with existing and new lenders in relation to the refinancing of the debt package, and proposed a fee structure of 30 basis points of the aggregate amount of debt to be refinanced subject to a minimum fee of US$3million. Moelis met with Emarat, and were in discussion until the restructuring project was temporarily shelved in June 2022 as a result of an instruction by the EIA to postpone it.
B3. The Request for Proposal (RFP)
23. Oussama El Rifai joined Emarat as CFO in August 2022. Emarat generated a new Request for Proposal (namely the RFP – as defined) in broader terms and with an expanded remit to that sent earlier in the year. The RFP was sent to Moelis on 14 October 2022.
24. Moelis worked on their pitch and submitted the Moelis RFP Response on 1 November 2022.
25. Emarat claim that the services requested by Emarat in the RFP (under section 2 – Scope of Work), largely confirmed (they say) by Moelis in their response are contractual terms. It is therefore necessary to deal with these documents in some detail.
26. The Scope of Work section in the RFP provided as follows:
Overview:
2. Scope of Work
Overview
Emirates General Petroleum Corporation "Emarat" seeks to appoint a financial
advisor to provide advice on the Corporate Financial Plan, Capital Structure Balance Sheet and Debt Restructuring. The advisor is expected to perform among other activities that they deem necessary the following:
Assessment of Current State & Development of Financial Model
The advisor is expected to analyse the current Financial Statements and other
financial elements to assess the financial health of Emarat and to develop the
financial model to be used in the exercise as follows:
1. Review the corporate strategy and the 5-year plan to determine the financial
requirements to execute the strategy whether it is short-, medium- or longterm
funding requirements.
2. Review the current financial position of the company and determine the
financial risks and limitations on Emarat and its strategy execution.
3. Assist in the selection of the legal advisor to act on behalf of Emarat.
4. Identify the different classes of assets that Emarat can either revalue in
accordance with the International Financial Reporting Standards "IFRS",
dispose-off or to carved-out [sic].
5. Review the UAE proposed Federal Corporate tax & propose modulations that ensure Emarat to maximize the Deferred Tax Asset that can be created from
the Carried over losses and how the asset can be utilized in the restructuring
exercise.
6. Determine the appropriate operational inputs and key business drivers that
are required for the development of the financial model.
7. Develop a 5-year financial model with the required stress-testing and
sensitivity analysis to the different important inputs to the model.
8. Ensure that the financial model is fully inclusive of the three financial
statements, implied operational, credit and efficiency ratios and of all the
aspects of the credit facilities and any hedging instruments whether related to
tenor, pricing, amortization and other key terms and conditions.
9. Develop and evaluate multiple capital structure scenarios
Identification & Evaluation of Re-structuring Options
In this phase of the project, the consultant is expected to develop the strategic
options available to Emarat as follows:
1. Determine the optimal capital structure for Emarat that support the strategy
execution and enable the company for future growth organically or through
Mergers & Acquisitions.
2. Formulate the different options and scenarios of the Balance Sheet and Debt
re-structuring whether with or without recourse to its Shareholder and Ministry
of Finance.
3. Propose the different Debt capital market instruments, equity or quasi equity
financial products that can be implemented by Emarat to achieve its
proposed capital structure.
4. Determine, evaluate and rank the different sources of Funds options available
to Emarat whether local, regional or global banks or financial institutions and
assess each stakeholder positioning and negotiation power
5. Work with the appointed legal counsel to determine and evaluate the legalities of the different options developed.
6. Develop and agree with Emarat the decisive factors to be used while
evaluating the negotiation outcome of re-structuring options with the different
creditors and lenders and develop the negotiation Strategy or Emarat [sic].
Achieving Financial Closure
In this last phase of the project, the consultant is expected to co-lead to the
financial closure in accordance with the agreed criteria by Emarat as follows:
1. Prepare a detailed information package for prospective lenders consisting of:
a. Information Memorandum
b. Management Presentation inclusive of credit positioning of Emarat
2. Assist in the selection of the legal advisors to act on behalf of the lenders.
3. Prepare & review a detailed term Sheet for the different debt components.
4. Participate in the discussions and negotiations with existing creditors and
lenders existing or potential ones.
5. Coordinate and direct the long form documentation of the deals Coordinate.
B4. The Moelis RFP Response
27. The Moelis RFP Response set out details of their intended personnel, market experience and standing.
28. At pages 17-18, they structured their detailed response by reference to the three stages of the project referenced in the RFP: (1) Assessment of Current State and Financial Model Development; (2) Identification & Evaluation or Restructuring Options/Strategic Alternatives; and (3) Implementation and Closing.
29. At page 18, they specifically addressed the Scope of Work in the RFP and, at page 19, they outlined the Moelis “value-add” in the process. These pages are reproduced below:
B5. Negotiation, informal appointment and the start of work
30. From December 2022, following a meeting at which Moelis were invited to attend Emarat’s head office to discuss their proposal, the parties commenced a lengthy negotiation concerning the terms of engagement leading, ultimately, to the Engagement Letter, agreed on 11 April 2023.
31. Before contractual terms had been agreed, on 8 February 2023, Emarat orally indicated to Moelis that they had secured the engagement as Emarat’s advisor, which prompted a response that day from Mr Ismail (of Moelis) to Mr El Rifai and others at Emarat expressing Moelis’s thanks for being entrusted with “this strategic assignment” and referring to a “kick-off” meeting which was scheduled to take place at Emarat’s headquarters on 10 February 2023. The purpose of that meeting was to introduce the teams and to discuss information which Moelis required. Accordingly, 10 February 2023 was ultimately treated, in the Engagement Letter, as the contractual start date under the engagement, notwithstanding that final terms had not, at that time, been agreed.
32. At that meeting Moelis gave an initial presentation which included an indicative timeline of key activities for what had come to be referred to as “Project Hawk”.
33. That timeline was provisional and conditional, but reflected an awareness on the part of Moelis, by this stage, that a number of the existing facilities were due to expire from May 2023 and there was therefore urgency to the assignment. The timeline envisaged: an urgent process of “onboarding” of Moelis; information sharing and review of materials by Moelis throughout February 2023; development of a capital structure model; assessment of financing alternatives and preparation of materials for discussion with lenders through to mid-March 2023; and thereafter, to the beginning of May 2023, an assessment of alternatives for asset monetisation and various potential execution steps, including engagement with existing lenders, and (dependent upon their reaction), engagement with new lenders.
34. On 17 February 2023 there was a “debt workshop” session attended by senior personnel from Moelis and Emarat, by which date Emarat had shared certain financing information with Moelis. In advance of that session Moelis prepared and circulated to Emarat for discussion at that workshop:
i) A debt facility summary (dated 16 February 2023) which summarised, facility by facility, the amount of the financing available from the identified banks (First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC (“FAB”), Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank PJSC (“ADCB”) and Emirates NBD Bank PJSC (“ENBD”) and a summary of the key terms:
a) A loan facility (AED 750 million) with FAB maturing on 27 May 2023;
b) A loan facility (AED 250 million) with FAB maturing on 4 July 2023;
c) A loan facility (AED 1 billion) with ADCB maturing on 16 July 2023;
d) A loan facility (AED 1.25 billion) with FAB maturing on 31 July 2024;
e) A loan facility (AED 1.5 billion) with FAB maturing on 31 January 2026;
f) An overdraft facility (AED 750 million) with ENBD.
ii) A list of questions under the heading “debt overview and interactions with lenders”. Those questions included (at point 7) an enquiry as to how much of the overdraft facility with ENBD was currently drawn, seeking from Emarat a build-up of drawdowns and repayments.
35. At the meeting on 17 February the parties discussed the facilities, including the overdraft facility. As evidenced by Moelis’s notes of the call, Emarat informed Moelis that the ENBD overdraft facility was on standby for any larger payments which may not be covered from operating cash flow, and that no limits under that facility were, at that time, being utilised.
36. A running theme, throughout February and into March 2023, was that Moelis were struggling to get adequate information from Emarat. Requests were being made on a repeated basis, but were not acted upon in a timely way. This was a frustration, not simply to Moelis, who were hampered in their ability to progress work on a financial model and their advice, but also to senior Emarat personnel. As emerged in cross-examination of Mr El Rifai this may have been, in part, because, in the absence of a signed engagement letter, there was concern on the part of Emarat in sharing details of Emarat’s business plan, and clearance was needed from compliance, which added to the delays. It was also in part because some of the data expected and required by Moelis in connection with Emarat’s business plan required preparation and collation and was not already compiled. Other information which was provided (for example financial projections) was more rudimentary than Moelis had expected – Mr Tabet receiving a report on 6 March 2023 that Moelis and Emarat had had a call “to go through the (very poor) set of projections [Emarat] currently have which was essentially just a set of hardcoded revenue and ebitda numbers. In short, there is no underlying operating financial model within the company and this is an exercise we will need to sit down with them and help them build”. This was consistent with a more general view of Moelis that the data which was being produced by Emarat was mostly not in a form which could be used in their model.
37. By 8 March 2023 this had led to a temporary misunderstanding as to whether Moelis were going to prepare a financial model at all and whether Emarat might be required to approach a Big 4 accountant to do so. Mr Touma responded to Mr Al Ansari at Emarat to clarify that Moelis were, indeed, going to provide such a model, but he needed the Emarat management team to provide the operating assumptions for five years for Moelis to be able to do so.
38. The delays in the provision of information led to cancellation of at least one Steering group session and materially impacted Moelis’s ability to prepare a financial model and to deliver their advice, and thus, the timeline of the project. All of this was reflected in numerous e-mails and steering group materials and was discussed in weekly working team calls. Those delays and their impact were therefore well known to all parties prior to the agreement of the Engagement Letter.
39. Work nevertheless progressed internally at Moelis, in advance of the signing of the Engagement Letter, in connection with key workstreams:
i) Generation of a financial model, a proposed structure for which was shared with Emarat on 10 March 2023 and updated on 15 March 2023.
ii) Strategy materials for discussion with the EIA which went through multiple iterations internally at Moelis over March and April 2023 before being presented formally to the EIA on 24 April 2023 (see below) as a Financing Strategy Report.
40. An amended timeline which accommodated action to be taken by Emarat in advance of the earliest maturing debt facility (the AED 750 million facility with FAB) on 27 May 2023 was circulated by Moelis on 6 April 2023. This document contemplated the completion of Project Hawk by 26 May 2023 with business plan and advice to be delivered in April 2023 and with lender engagement and execution now scheduled for May 2023.
C. The Agreement – the Engagement Letter signed on 11 April 2023
41. The agreement was in the form of an engagement letter, agreed on 11 April 2023 (though wrongly dated 7 April 2022), reciting that the appointment of Moelis was effective as from 10 February 2023. Although in the form of a letter, the terms of the agreement were closely negotiated over a period of weeks, with the involvement of lawyers on both sides.
42. The material provisions were as follows.
“1. We are pleased to confirm that we [Moelis] (“we” or “us”] have , since 10 February 2023 (“the Effective Date”) been appointed by [Emarat], (“the Company” or “you”) as financial advisor with respect to a Restructuring (as defined below) in relation to the Company’s existing debt financing. For the avoidance of doubt, The Company [sic] will retain complete control and discretion over whether and when to proceed with any Restructuring and shall be free at any time not to consummate a Restructuring, in which event no Transaction Fee will become payable”.
“For the purposes of this agreement:
(a) “Restructuring” means any restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation or amendment of the existing debt financing of the Company including settlement or forgiveness of debt financing, conversion of debt financing instruments into equity, the exchange offer, sale or merger of any of the Company and/or any of its affiliates to/with a third party, any Equity Capital Raise (as defined below), and/or any Debt Capital Raise (as defined below), however implemented; and
(b) “Transaction” means a Restructuring; and
(c) “Transaction Fee” means the Restructuring Fee, the Equity Capital Raise Fee and/or the Debt Capital Raise fee, as applicable.
(d) “Unfunded Commitments” means any funding committed and reserved by an investor in favour of the Company or any of its affiliates and agreed by the Company or any of its affiliates to be used and withdrawn but nevertheless the Company or any of its affiliates does not call for such agreed committed amount at the time the commitment is made.
…..
In performing its services under this Agreement, Moelis is not assuming any responsibility for any decision by the Company or any member of the Group to pursue (or not pursue) any strategy or to take (or not to take) any particular course of action. You should make an independent analysis and decision regarding the financial condition and affairs, assets and liabilities of the Company or any of its affiliates. In addition, any valuation advice which Moelis provides will be given on the understanding that Moelis does not accept responsibility for the accounting or other data and commercial assumptions on which such a valuation is based.
2. As compensation for our services hereunder, the Company agree to pay us as follows:
Retainer Fee:
(a) A retainer fee of US$110,000 per calendar month, commencing on the Effective Date, for each month or rateably for part of a month, payable monthly and payable whether or not any Transaction occurs (“Retainers”). It is agreed by both Parties that any paid Retainer in respect of the first three months from the Effective Date shall be deductible from the Restructuring Fee, once such fee becomes payable. The Company may notify Moelis at any time by email to stop the work on the Transaction and pause the Retainers for a minimum period of 1 month. The Company may subsequently notify Moelis by email with one week’s prior notice to resume the work on the Transaction and the Retainers. For the avoidance of doubt, no work will be carried out by Moelis in respect of this agreement while the Retainers are paused.
Restructuring Fee
(b) A Restructuring fee (the “Restructuring Fee”) of 0.25% of the aggregate principal amount of the existing debt financing of the Company (“Existing Debt Package”) that is restructured as part of the Restructuring, payable upon each closing of a Restructuring of the Existing Debt package, subject to a minimum fee of US$3,000,000 (the “Minimum Fee”) in respect of the Restructuring of the total Existing Debt Package. The Minimum Fee is payable only once on closing of the first Restructuring of the Existing Debt Package and, for the avoidance of doubt, shall not be paid again in the event of any subsequent closings of a Restructuring of the Existing Debt package;
Debt Capital Raise Fee
(c) A new debt capital raise fee (the “Debt Capital Raise fee”) of 0.90% of the aggregate gross amount (including Unfunded Commitments) of any new debt financing or other debt-like financial instruments (including guarantees) that the Company or one of its affiliates raises or issues from the date of this agreement (a “Debt Capital Raise”). The Debt Capital Raise Fee shall be payable upon the closing of any Debt Capital Raise; and
Equity Capital Raise Fee
(d) An equity capital raise fee (the “Equity Capital Raise Fee”) of 3.00% of the aggregate gross amount (including Unfunded Commitments) of any new equity financing or other equity-like financial instruments that the Company or one of its affiliates raises or issues from the date of this agreement (an “Equity Capital Raise”). The Equity Capital Raise Fee shall be payable upon the closing of any Equity Capital Raise.
In addition to any fees payable to us, and whether or not a Transaction is completed, you will reimburse us for all of our out-of-pocket expenses, as they are incurred, in entering into and performing services pursuant to this agreement, including the fees and disbursements of our legal counsel, provided that Moelis shall seek the Company’s consent prior to incurring any such expense. We will provide reasonable supporting documentation relating to such expenses and for the avoidance of doubt all expenses will be billed at actuals. Any such expenses not reimbursed shall be invoiced and payable together with our final fee’s invoice.
….
If, at any time prior to the expiration of 12 months following the termination of this Agreement for any reason with the exception of the Company’s termination prior to entering into a definitive agreement in relation to a Transaction because of Moelis’ material breach of this Agreement, which is not substantially remedied within 10 days from notice from the Company of such material breach, the Company enters into an agreement that subsequently results in the closing and signing of a Transaction that was contemplated during the term of our engagement, then the Company will pay us the relevant Transaction Fee(s) specified above in cash promptly upon the closing of such Transaction (the “Tail”). For the avoidance of doubt, the Tail shall not apply to any Transaction with an investor who approached the Company after termination or expiry of this Agreement and did not receive any marketing or diligence materials that Moelis helped prepare.
….
5. We are an independent contractor with the contractual duties described herein owing solely to the Company. Neither this agreement nor Moelis’ performance hereunder nor any previous or existing relationship between the Company and Moelis will be deemed to create any fiduciary relationship. Since we may be acting on your behalf, the Company and Moelis agree to the indemnity and other provisions set forth in the attached Annex A…..
6. Our engagement hereunder may be terminated at any time, with or without cause, by either you or us upon five (5) days’ written notice thereof. In the event such termination [sic], we will continue to be entitled to (i) any unpaid expenses which we have already incurred prior to termination; and (ii) any unpaid fees which became payable prior to termination, in each case pursuant to the terms of this agreement. Annex A, the last paragraph of section 2 and sections 4 through 9 shall remain in force and effect after the termination of our engagement.
….
8. …..
This agreement sets out the whole agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior agreement (whether oral or written) in relation to the subject matter thereof. It is agreed that (a) no party shall have any claim or remedy in respect of any statement, representation, warranty or undertaking made by or on behalf of the other party or its respective representatives in relation to the subject matter hereof which is not expressly set out in this agreement; (b) any terms or conditions implied by law in any jurisdiction in relation to the subject matter hereof are excluded to the fullest extent permitted by law or, if incapable of exclusion, any right, or remedies in relation to them are irrevocably waived; (c) the only right or remedy of a party in relation to any provision of this agreement shall be for breach of this agreement and (d) except for any liability in respect of a breach of this agreement on the terms set out in this agreement, no party shall owe any duty of care or have any liability in tort or otherwise to the other party (or its respective associated entities) in relation to the subject matter hereof. This agreement may not be amended or otherwise modified or waived except by an instrument in writing signed by both us and the Company. ….
D. Performance of the Agreement from 11 April 2023 and claims for payment
43. A number of actions were taken shortly after the Engagement Letter was signed, in part because of the intrinsic urgency (born of the imminence of maturing dates on the loan facilities) and in part reflecting the reality that, protected by an agreed contract, Moelis were now in a position to share valuable work product with Emarat. This was something which they would have been reluctant to do, for as long as there was a risk of the plug being pulled on the project, had terms ultimately not been agreed.
D1. Provision of advice on strategy and financial model
44. Following further internal work at Moelis on the EIA strategy document, a steering group meeting between Moelis, the EIA and Emarat took place on 18 April 2023. The following day, Moelis were formally invited to present the various restructuring options and supporting analysis to the EIA’s Strategic Assets Committee (the “SAC”) at a meeting scheduled for 2 May 2023, to obtain their views on the way forward. The SAC was an internal governance forum for dealing with the EIA’s strategic assets including Emarat. This was, accordingly, the forum through which the EIA, as Emarat’s incoming shareholder, was to review the capital structure options and give direction as to which option(s) should be developed.
45. On 26 April 2023, in preparation for the 2 May 2023 meeting, Moelis provided the EIA with their then current strategy report (entitled Financing Strategy Report) followed, on 1 May 2023, by a summarised version.
46. The terms of the Executive Summary adequately capture the position. Under “Background” it was noted that: Emarat had a total debt of AED 4.75 billion which was maturing by 2026 (AED 2 billion in 2023, AED 1.25 billion in 2024 with the remaining AED 1.5 billion due in 2026); that debt was guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance which had resulted in Emarat obtaining preferential pricing terms from lenders (EIBOR plus 40-55 bps); the high leverage ratio (Net Debt/EBITDA of 11.2x) and the current debt repayment schedule required the Company to undertake a debt restructuring which was being undertaken with the support of Moelis; the Ministry of Finance had informed the EIA that once the ownership of Emarat was transferred to the EIA, they would discontinue acting as a guarantor for Emarat. This would require the EIA/Emarat to commence the process for changing the guarantor to the EIA or removing the guarantees for Emarat's debt. Moelis and Emarat had developed the five-year business plan and identified options for optimising the capital structure.
47. The summary noted four objectives which the restructuring plan should meet: (i) achieving sustainable leverage; (ii) removal of guarantees; (iii) providing access to growth capital; and (iv) maintaining lender relationships.
48. Against that background and based on Moelis’s advice, as at 2 May 2023 the document outlined seven options:
i) Retain all guarantees;
ii) Remove all guarantees;
iii) Partial guarantees – refinance up to 3.5 x Net Debt/EBITDA on a commercial basis (higher interest rate) and the balance through guaranteed debt (existing rates);
iv) Remove near-term guarantees and inject preferred equity – refinance debt maturing by 2024 (AED 3.25 billion) by taking commercial loans for 3.5 x Net Debt/EBITDA and the balance is injected by the EIA through a preferred equity instrument with a coupon rate (6% estimate).
v) Shareholder loan – refinance up to 3.5 x Net Debt/EBITDA on a commercial basis (higher interest rate) and the balance is injected by the EIA in the form of a shareholder loan.
vi) Preferred equity injection – refinance up to 3.5 x Net Debt/EBITDA on commercial basis (higher interest rate) and the balance is injected by the EIA through a preferred equity investment with a coupon rate (6% estimate).
vii) Asset monetisation and preferred equity injection – Refinance up to 3.5 Net Debt/EBITDA on a commercial basis. Sell non-core assets (land and PP&E) to the EIA for an agreed price (c. AED 1.4 billion) and the EIA injects the balance through a preferred equity instrument with a coupon rate (6% estimate).
49. Of those options, Moelis’s advice was that each of options (iii) – (vii) summarised above could be considered as providing benefits to Emarat and the EIA. What came to be referred to at trial as the “bookend” options – (i) and (ii) – were not, at this stage, considered realistic.
50. On this basis, the next steps were identified as being: (i) to obtain the SAC’s direction as to the options to pursue; (ii) for the Moelis team to prepare the approach and presentation materials for engagement with existing lenders (which included ENBD) and, (if any) new lenders; and (iii) to appoint a legal advisor to finalise a legal review of the chosen option, to prepare a draft of term-sheets for discussion with lenders and to deliver on broad scope.
51. No decision was made by the SAC at the 2 May 2023 meeting. There was to be consideration of the options by the EIA and, additionally, on 16 May 2023, by the Emarat Board of Directors.
52. On 3 May 2023 Moelis sought to arrange a call to discuss the way forward with lenders. In turn, on 4 May 2023, Moelis produced a lender engagement strategy document, which was revised on 8 May 2023. This document set out the maturity timelines, outlined considerations for potential amendment of terms for extension of existing facilities as against simple extensions of the same terms, and proposed immediate engagement with FAB and ADCB. Discussion was to be led by Emarat, with Moelis providing talking points for Emarat during negotiations. The document outlined the possibility of requesting extended maturities and reduction in bank margins by 10-20 basis points.
53. On 6 May 2023 Moelis produced, internally, a further version (version 20) of the Project Finance document presented to the SAC.
54. On 15 May 2023 Moelis provided the Emarat team with a draft version of the operating model (version 80) together with an up-to-date business plan and materials for Board discussion on 16 May 2023.
55. Following further work, a revised presentation was sent to the EIA on 17 May 2023 in advance of the SAC meeting scheduled for 23 May 2023 at which it was to be presented and considered.
56. This revised strategy document reflected feedback from the SAC following the presentation on 2 May 2023 as follows:
i) To refocus analysis of potential financing scenarios on those without cash contribution from the shareholder (i.e. the EIA);
ii) To incorporate return metrics for the business in the analysis of options;
iii) To consider scenarios that assumed an extension of EIA guarantees for c. three years allowing the business time to execute on their business plan and to de-leverage;
iv) Ministry of Finance guarantees to remain in place until the asset transfer is complete;
v) Evaluate financing scenarios against both the Base and Transformation cases (which had been identified with input from McKinsey & Company).
vi) Discuss with in-house and external legal counsel the saleability of Emarat non-core assets for de-leveraging.
57. That feedback resulted in corresponding updates to the Moelis analysis with the benefit of advice from legal counsel, and a consequent streamlining of the initial seven financing scenarios to four in total, based upon a detailed analysis of the Emarat business plan as modelled by Moelis with the benefit of input from McKinsey & Company. The four revised scenarios were as follows:
i) Partial guarantees from 2024 (Option 1);
ii) Partial guarantees from 2026 (Option 2);
iii) Partial guarantees from 2026 with asset sale (Option 3(a)); and
iv) Partial guarantees from 2026 with developed asset sale (Option 3(b)).
58. Moelis identified and analysed assets to be considered for sale together with an interim legal position on saleability. Moelis’s ultimate advice was to adopt either Option 3(a) or 3(b) which were judged by Moelis to be beneficial to Emarat from a leverage and returns perspective. It had been recognised that the short-term elimination of guarantees was not a viable option because of the substantial financing shortfall of AED 1.6 billion which would result.
59. Moelis advised that:
i) An extension of upcoming maturities should be sought until the earlier of 31 December 2023 or the legal finalisation of effective ownership transfer (to the EIA).
ii) This would also (i) allow Emarat and their shareholder to assess and select the way forward on capital structure optimisation plan and (ii) facilitate the ongoing financial audit process.
iii) Emarat could seek to amend pricing for the facilities until extended maturity. However, the notional impact of doing so was likely to be de minimis at that time. It stated that “the ‘ask’ may be best reserved for the broader refinancing exercise”. Their conclusion was that “Emarat has signalled a desire to reduce spreads, but not pressed the issue. To position for the full capital structure optimisation exercise, Emarat can concede current terms and indicate clearly that pricing will be negotiated later”.
60. Having outlined in the presentation the current position on lender engagement, Moelis outlined the immediate, medium- and long-term strategy:
i) Immediate: to seek short-term extensions for upcoming maturities; to update the auditors on the outcome; to finalise the base case business plan and to obtain sign-off from Emarat; the EIA SAC and Emarat management to land on the preferred transaction structure;
ii) The next two months: legal advisor to review and confirm no red flags associated with the chosen structure; to finalise lender presentation for engagement with lenders; the legal advisor to draft term sheets; schedule lender meetings with existing creditors (and potentially new creditors) to present capital structure plan and to solicit initial views and indications of appetite; to share any further information required to facilitate due diligence processes for creditors; if applicable, commence non-core asset sale process – which may include governance, valuation, commercial due diligence and other considerations.
iii) Thereafter, to receive commitment letters and syndication allocations (if applicable); negotiation of long-form documentation with lenders; finalise transfer of Emarat ownership from Ministry of Finance to the EIA; if applicable, finalise implementation of non-core asset transfers.
61. That resulted in advice as to immediate next steps in line with the above advice:
i) Final decision from Emarat/the EIA on preferred capital structure option(s);
ii) Progress/finalise temporary extensions;
iii) Develop lender marketing materials for the comprehensive refinancing exercise;
iv) Finalise legal and any other reviews in relation to asset transfers (if applicable).
EIA/Emarat decision as to strategy and action taken as a result
62. On 26 May 2023 the EIA informed Moelis that approval had been received to proceed with Option 3(a) with Option 2 as a fallback. Accordingly, Option 3(a) became the plan going forwards. So far as it may be relevant, I consider that Moelis’s analysis and advice would have been influential with both the EIA and Emarat, and that they would not have determined upon the course which was approved without Moelis’s analysis and advice. I heard no evidence from the EIA, but, from the material which I saw, it is likely that the EIA would not have been prepared to give guarantees over Emarat’s lending, as incoming owner, without the Moelis analysis and advice. There was an issue raised at trial as to the relationship between guarantees given by the Ministry of Finance (prior to the change in ownership later in 2023) and guarantees to be given by the EIA. I infer that, to the extent that the Ministry of Finance agreed to act as guarantor on Emarat transactions closed after Moelis’s engagement, this would have been in consultation with the EIA as incoming shareholder of Emarat and on the basis of Moelis’s advice.
63. Between 29 May and 6 June 2023 work proceeded, including the holding of meetings, the production of a revised timeline and next steps document and, on 2 June, the provision to Emarat of an updated and final version of the operating model (version 84, which was the last version produced).
64. The operating model appeared, in Emarat’s witness statements, to be the subject of criticism. However, that position moderated during oral evidence. This was a dynamic model, able to run a sensitivity analysis based on different financing alternatives, created in a very detailed Excel Spreadsheet which was the product of comprehensive input from Emarat’s financial records and projected business forecast data and assumptions. It permitted the user to interrogate Emarat’s financial position and to model and test their capital requirements by reference to a wide range of assumptions and criteria. It was used to model Emarat’s requirements, and informed Moelis’s advice to Emarat as to their strategic financing options. Emarat, in due course, and with the express approval of Mr El Rifai, used the model for their own business planning purposes.
65. It was a document which had taken a very substantial amount of time for Moelis to build, populating an Excel template from scratch; Moelis estimated that it had engaged more than 2000 hours of individual input. That figure is not precise, but whilst the true figure does not ultimately matter, as the trial developed, Emarat came to accept that it had been a very time-consuming process to create the document, and that the product was a valuable document.
66. It was, accordingly, a key tool in informing Moelis’s advice to the SAC in May 2023 and thereafter.
D2. Pause/suspension of Moelis services and retainer payments
67. Shortly after the SAC decision, and after Moelis had delivered their follow-up advice and model, on 6 June 2023 Mr Al Ansari sent an e-mail copying various personnel at Moelis and Emarat, stating, amongst other things, “…we need to discuss our plans as we intend to stop the retainer and resume our engagement towards Q4, so we need to align and keep an open communication to resume in Q4”.
68. That was followed up by a formal e-mail on 14 June 2023 from Mr Al Ansari to Mr Ismail at Moelis headed “Temporary Pause of Retainer Agreement”. Given the dispute as to the nature and effect of this pause/suspension, I set out the text of the e-mail in full:
“I hope this email finds you well. I am writing to formally request the temporary suspension of our retainer agreement until further notice effective from Tuesday 13-Jun-2023.
As we continue to navigate through evolving circumstances, we have assessed the existing work [and] determined that a pause in our retainer services would be most appropriate during this period. We appreciate the support and expertise your firm has provided us, and we anticipate resuming our collaboration in Q3-Q4 2023.
In light of this, I kindly request your understanding and cooperation in implementing the following actions:
1. Arranging a biweekly call or a monthly call for updates.
2. Temporarily pause on retainer fees during this period.
3. We will provide you with timely updates regarding the resumption of services or any changes to our engagement.
4.We will provide updates with regards to changes in the facilities.
To facilitate a smooth transition, we kindly ask for your confirmation in writing that you will comply with the pause of our retainer agreement. We value your partnership and appreciate your flexibility in accommodating this temporary suspension.
We look forward to reestablishing our partnership and resuming our retainer agreement in the near future. Should any urgent matters arise that require attention during the pause, we will reach out to discuss the best approach”.
69. On 15 June 2023 Mr Ismail responded as follows on behalf of Moelis:
“We value our partnership and are honored to be advising you on this journey — your input, guidance and leadership throughout this process has been invaluable and very much appreciated. We will be ready to commence the work again in Q3/Q4 and execute the refinancing.
With regards to the pause on the monthly retainer — we completely understand your stance and we agree with it. Please consider this as a confirmation from our side on your proposal below. We assume this has been communicated to the EIA? Otherwise we are happy to do so. Once the circumstances allow, we will kindly request for a written notice from your side instructing us to resume the work so we can re-mobilize the full team and drive Project Hawk to a successful outcome.
As it relates to the regular touchpoints, and in light of the ongoing / upcoming workstreams, we propose the below cadence:
• Replace the two calls structure (management then SteerCo) with only one touchpoint which is SteerCo attended by Emarat, EIA, L&A and Moelis — suggest we keep the Tuesday timeslot as-is given it is already booked in the calendars
• Schedule weekly update calls starting next week until the end of July (except for Eid week — w/o 26 June) to be updated on lender interactions and asset appraisal process
• Switch to bi-weekly (every other week) for the months of August and September until we have more clarity on next steps
If agreed on the above, we will coordinate with Khoula, EIA and L&W on calendarizing this.
Last but not least, and prior to the Eid break, it would be a pleasure to host you for a lunch / dinner next week — can you please let us know a couple of convenient dates & times and who would be attending from your side? Thank you.
70. Although this correspondence envisaged a re-triggering of the engagement and a re-activation of the retainers in Q4, ultimately the engagement remains paused/suspended to date.
71. Accordingly, and without complaint by Moelis, payment of the retainers ceased for the period of the pause/suspension, although some limited work by Moelis, including in conjunction with Emarat, continued for a period. Payment of the retainers was made for the period 10 February 2023 up to the mid-June 2023 pause/suspension.
72. Moelis remained willing and able to provide services under the Engagement Letter, including, so far as may have been required or advised, engagement with lenders, but they were not given the opportunity to do so as a result of the suspension/pause.
73. At the time, there was no material substantive concern or unhappiness expressed at any point by Emarat of Moelis’s performance of their retainer under the Engagement Letter. Emarat ultimately accepted at trial that Moelis had provided services such as to earn their retainer payments, but distinguished this from the services required to earn commission payments. I deal below with whether the conditions for payment of commission have been met. However, in so far as it was suggested in Emarat’s evidence that Moelis failed to provide some service or advice which should have been provided, or provided any service or advice inadequately in the period 10 February to 15 June 2023, I reject that evidence. I consider that no criticism could fairly be levelled at Moelis for their work. Emarat’s expression of appreciation for that work in the e-mail of 15 June 2023 initiating the suspension/pause was, in my judgment, genuine and reflected the views of all concerned at the time. It is notable that, notwithstanding Emarat’s case that all the terms of the RFP were incorporated as terms of the Engagement Letter, there is no allegation in the Defence that Moelis acted in breach of contract.
D3. Extension/refinancing of the loans
74. Further to the strategy agreed by the SAC, Emarat extended, amended and refinanced their existing debt financing to avoid the loans maturing and repayment being required.
75. In the case of the FAB AED 750 million facility which was due to mature on 27 May 2023:
i) On 18 May 2023 Mr Al Ansari communicated to Moelis terms on which FAB were prepared to extend/refinance the existing loan, which included a reduction in the interest rate to 0.28% (28 basis points).
ii) On 22 May 2023 Mr Al Ansari sought advice from Moelis as to whether to negotiate 1-month EIBOR rate + 30 basis points or 3-month EIBOR + 28 basis points. Moelis came back (through Mr Mazourine, who had undertaken substantial work on the model) that evening illustrating the respective options by graph showing the latest forecast curves, advising that the 3-month option (required by the bank) was reasonable.
iii) Following the pause/suspension of the retainer, on 21 June 2023 FAB and Emarat agreed a formal extension (to 31 May 2024, subject to service by FAB of an exercise notice permitting a further extension) of the existing facility, on amended terms.
iv) On 30 May 2024 FAB and Emarat agreed a formal amendment agreement further extending the term.
76. In the case of the ADCB facility (AED 1 billion maturing on 16 July 2023):
i) Following signature of the Engagement Letter on 11 April 2023, Emarat shared with Moelis indicative heads of terms which ADCB had provided to Emarat (which, in turn, it had circulated to the EIA) on 21 March 2023.
ii) On 25 April 2023 Mr Al Ansari sought advice from Mr Tabet on what to do with ADCB. There was debate, internally, at Moelis, as to the correct approach. The view was that a short-term extension of upcoming maturities was necessary “to buy some time for the lenders to do their diligence around the targeted structure” on which Moelis were expecting guidance from the SAC the following week (this being a reference to the upcoming 2 May SAC meeting). Mr Tabet questioned whether a 2-month extension was more appropriate. Moelis went back to Mr Al Ansari advising that “We don’t think a decision should be communicated (either way) to them around whether we will be extending the facility. However, we can suggest that we are currently reviewing the capital structure as part of a broader transformation exercise and that they can expect to be contacted in the coming weeks to discuss this further”.
iii) Mr Al Ansari e-mailed Mr Ismail at Moelis setting out indicative terms from ADCB, noting that “they have agreed to 2.5 billion with 30 [basis points].” ADCB’s stance was incorporated into Moelis’s materials in relation to lender engagement.
iv) The arrangements incorporated terms which were considered by ADCB in an e-mail to Emarat of 26 June 2023 to be “major changes to the original agreed terms”. Those arrangements were finalised after the pause/suspension came into effect. Initially, agreement was reached separately (including for tax reasons) as to loans of AED 1 billion and AED 1.5 billion. A formal amendment and restatement deed of 22 September 2023 set out the terms of the AED 2.5 billion facility ultimately agreed. Mr Al Ansari reported internally within Emarat that “the entire agreement that we worked on with [ADCB] is structured in a way to ensure maintaining 30 bps for a 2.5bn exposure and meeting the requirements set by the financial standards of moving the loan from short term to long term to remove the going concern”.[2]By doing this, our current assets will be higher than our current liabilities hence satisfying the requirement to remove the going concern given we have a positive equity position”. This followed his explanation on 8 August 2023 that the additional AED 1.5 billion would replace the two FAB loans.[3]
v) Further amendments were entered into on 14 June 2024 and subsequently on 25 September 2025.
77. As to ENBD:
i) On 17 April 2023 Mr Al Ansari provided to Moelis an indicative term sheet for a loan of AED 1 billion from ENBD.
ii) Following exchanges between ENBD and Emarat over the summer of 2023 as to the term and rates of the loan, on 21 November 2023 Emarat entered into an AED 1.5 billion facility with ENBD for an initial term of 6 months with a maximum period of 24 months (three subsequent 6-month rollovers). It appears that this structure was agreed to enable the Bank to quote more competitive rates in connection with short-term loans. The overdraft facility was amended at the same time. This amounted, in commercial terms, to a refinancing of the FAB loan of AED 1.5 billion which was to mature on 31 January 2026.
iii) The overdraft facility was further amended by amendment and restatement letter of 27 May 2025 as part of a wider restated suite of credit facilities between Emarat and ENBD.
78. Appended to this Judgment at Annex 2 is a summary of the key terms of Emarat’s credit facilities from time to time prepared by Counsel for Moelis, to which Emarat made no challenge.
D4. Claims for payment of commission
79. On 16 November 2023 Moelis issued an invoice for the payment of the US$3million minimum fee, less three months of retainers (as contemplated by the Engagement Letter in circumstances where the minimum fee was due) plus VAT at 5%.
80. On 23 July 2024 Moelis issued an invoice for the payment of a Debt Capital Raise fee in the sum of US$3,675,970 (plus VAT at 5%) in respect of the ADCB AED1.5 billion facility (i.e. the part of the AED2.5 billion facility which did not represent an extension of the existing AED 1 billion facility) and, on 10 April 2026, a further Debt Capital Raise fee in the same sum in respect of the ENBD AED1.5 billion facility.
81. Those invoices were not paid, nor was any further sum beyond the retainer payments for the period 10 February to mid-June 2023. At trial, in submission and in evidence, there was considerable focus on the respective parties’ approaches to the issue of the initial invoice (on the part of Moelis) and to the question of payment of it (on the part of Emarat). Emarat sought to highlight evidence which, they said, evidenced a lack of conviction on the part of Moelis that the invoice was due or that commission was payable. Moelis sought to highlight evidence which they said, evidenced, from an early stage, Emarat’s preparedness to pay commission, which they suggested, reflected an understanding on the part of Emarat that commission was payable.
82. I do not consider that it is either helpful or relevant to analyse this material in detail or to make findings on it. Generally, I accept that there was some evidence which supported both of those respective positions. However, the evidence, taken as a whole, does no more than reflect the fact that the issues may not be clear-cut. Even from the perspective of each party, the other’s position was, by no means, unequivocal. Thus, the evidence is not helpful. Emarat submitted that material which was said to show that the parties did not think that “routine rollovers” would generate Transaction Fees was admissible “if it’s a shared expectation based on things that crossed the line”. However, in the absence of a plea of estoppel or rectification, the parties’ subjective thoughts and expressed stances whether before or after the event are not admissible or relevant in determining the proper interpretation and application of the commission terms under the Engagement Letter.
E. The witness evidence
83. Each party called two witnesses: on the part of Moelis, Mr Rami Touma, the Managing Director and Head of Middle East and North Africa, was the lead witness for Moelis. He had personal dealings in connection with the Emarat contract with Mr Oussama El Rifai who is and was the Chief Financial Officer of Emarat, and who was the lead witness for the Defendant. Those witnesses dealt principally with the background to and the negotiation of the Engagement Letter and were the main witnesses at trial.
84. Mr Cyril Tabet, a managing director of Moelis, was responsible for preparing the financial model and reviewing the outputs and communicating Moelis’s recommendations to Emarat and the EIA and he gave evidence on this. Mr Rashid Al Ansari was the Vice President of corporate finance at Emarat, and gave evidence on the process leading to signature of the Engagement Letter and Moelis’s performance of the contract.
85. All the witnesses were experienced commercial men of conspicuous intelligence. No suggestion was advanced by either party that the witnesses were other than honest.
86. As to the reliability of the evidence, this is not the first litigation concerned with contractual interpretation in which the boundaries between admissible evidence about factual matrix and performance of the agreement blurred into inadmissible evidence about pre-contract negotiations and argument; argument in which, I have no doubt, the witnesses believed. However, in general, the evidence of both lead witnesses betrayed sufficient commitment to their client’s respective cases – which may be understandable for senior management witnesses who were involved in the events which have given rise to the dispute which forms the proceedings – that, insofar as it is relevant to the issues which I need to determine, I approach it with a degree of caution.
87. Mr Touma was a passionate witness who struggled at times to distinguish evidence from argument and was reluctant to provide a factual response without qualifying his answer by reference to his/Moelis’s position, lest the response should be misinterpreted as a concession. He clearly now feels that Emarat have withheld payment which (he believes) they ought to have made. At the heart of this controversy, as it emerged in cross-examination, was whether he had expressly told the Emarat personnel that commission fees (including the Moelis US$3 million minimum fee) would apply in the event of “a roll-over” of loan facilities (i.e. extension in the same amount on the same or varied terms), something which he was adamant he had told Emarat personnel expressly and repeatedly. I formed the view that he would probably not have said those exact words. There is no indication in the written materials that the term “roll-over” was used at all, and there is no direct reference in any written communication consistent with such point having been made by Mr Touma. There is, for example, no such reference in correspondence following meetings where the terms of the Engagement Letter were discussed, or in internal correspondence (or correspondence to Emarat) concerning the decision to issue the invoice in 2023 and in reaction to Emarat’s failure to pay, where one might expect to see reference to it. Rather, I consider it more likely that Mr Touma would have made very clear to Emarat’s personnel that, in the event of any restructure of existing debt financing (which he would likely have explained in all-encompassing terms as being a very broad concept), the minimum fee would be payable. Roll-over (in the sense it was used by Emarat at trial) being, in Mr Touma’s mind, squarely within such concept, his position now is that he expressed this.
88. Mr El Rifai was a thoughtful and articulate witness who was prepared to make certain appropriate concessions where the question or evidence dictated them. However, he clearly feels aggrieved that a claim is being pursued against Emarat for commission in respect of what he perceives as run of the mill transactions retaining state guarantees which were, accordingly, transactions which Emarat could well execute (as, ultimately, they largely did) on their own. Informed by this, he had clear messages which he wished to convey through his evidence, and on which he was reluctant to give ground in cross-examination. His evidence was defensive concerning state guarantees, and he maintained that Moelis: (i) failed to advise on certain categories of asset sale (referred to in the RFP), and (ii) failed and refused to deal with Emarat’s lenders. I consider that the latter criticism, in particular, was unfair and unreasonable and found no support from his or, more widely, Emarat’s reactions at the time. No-one on the Emarat/EIA side asked for further options for asset sales. As regards Moelis’s dealings with lenders:
i) Moelis could not be expected to deal with banks before there was even a contract in place (i.e. pre-11 April 2023).
ii) In the period between 11 April 2023 and the mid-June 2023 suspension/pause, Moelis did assist Emarat, where asked, in connection with advice on engagement with lenders, and had produced and updated a lender engagement strategy document. Their advice at the time, which was never doubted or queried by Emarat, was that it would be better, when negotiating new terms, for Emarat to deal with banks with whom they were familiar, rather than Moelis, so as to avoid the risk of spooking the banks as to the potential reasons for Moelis’s engagement.
iii) Following the suspension/pause it was not open to Moelis to act for Emarat in dealings with banks, Emarat having paused their retainer, even though certain advice was still given.
89. I found Mr Tabet’s evidence as to the creation and operation of the model credible and there was ultimately no substantial challenge to it. He gave evidence which I found persuasive, though it was criticised by Mr Downes, to the effect that Moelis’s work had caused the EIA to be prepared to enter into future guarantees on Emarat lending.
90. There was a marked shift between Mr Al Ansari’s written and oral evidence. His witness statement was stridently critical of Moelis’s performance of their services under the Engagement Letter, both as regards the financial model produced (alleging that it was of no value) and their advice. I consider that those criticisms were unfair and unreasonable and had no support objectively, including from what he said or did at the time. To his credit, he corrected the “no value” evidence in his evidence in chief at trial, albeit not fulsomely, and his oral evidence under cross-examination, in the course of which he made a number of other concessions, acknowledging work carried out by Moelis and its value, was generally reliable.
91. More generally, and with certain exceptions referred to in the context of the contractual analysis below, I do not consider the oral evidence to be of great assistance in resolving the issues between the parties. Where the evidence is admissible (as regards the admissible factual matrix and the performance by Moelis of the retainer), as a result of the process of cross-examination, many of the divergences which had been apparent between the witness statement evidence and the impression which I might have formed from reading the documents alone, had diminished. Otherwise, evidence as to the negotiations leading to the agreement, the parties’ understanding of the terms of the agreement and the parties’ attitudes to payment (see above) were very largely inadmissible.
F. Legal principles
F1. Interpretation/construction
92. There was no dispute as to the core principles to be applied in interpreting the Engagement Letter. They have been authoritatively established and explained in a number of House of Lords and Supreme Court decisions: Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896; Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd (Chartbrook Ltd and anor, Pt 20 defendants) [2009] UKHL 38; Re Sigma Finance Corpn [2009]UKSC 2; Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank [2011] UKSC 50; Arnold v Britton [2015]UKSC 36; Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017]UKSC 24.
93. The core principles were synthesised by Popplewell J (as he then was) in The Ocean Neptune [2018] EWHC 163 (Comm) at [8] – a passage frequently cited since, and were recently summarised by Lord Burrows in Providence Building Services Ltd v Hexagon Housing Association Limited [2026] UKSC 1 at [21]-[23].
“21. The modern approach in English law to contractual interpretation is to ascertain the meaning of the words used by applying an objective and contextual approach. As was said by Lord Hoffmann in his seminal speech in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 ("ICS") , at p 912, the aim of contractual interpretation is to ascertain "the meaning which [the contract] would convey to a reasonable person having all the [relevant] background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract." His Lordship also explained that business (or commercial) common sense may be relevant. In contrast, declarations of the subjective intentions of the parties and, for reasons of practical policy, previous negotiations cannot be used in determining what the contractual language means.
22. In Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619, the Supreme Court clarified that the words used by the parties are of primary importance so that one must be careful to avoid placing too much weight on business common sense (or purpose) at the expense of the words used; and one must be astute not to rewrite the contract so as to protect one of the parties from having entered into a bad bargain.
23. In Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24; [2017] AC 1173, Lord Hodge, with whom the other Supreme Court Justices agreed, pointed out, at para 12, that contractual interpretation "involves an iterative process by which each suggested interpretation is checked against the provisions of the contract and its commercial consequences are investigated…".
94. Further to that summary of the core principles, the following further material propositions are established by that case law:
i) Textualism and contextualism are not conflicting paradigms in a battle for exclusive occupation of the field of contractual interpretation: Wood per Lord Hodge at [13];
ii) The court must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to the objective meaning of the language used: Providence per Lord Burrows at [4]; The Ocean Neptune per Popplewell J at [8];
iii) It does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each: The Ocean Neptune per Popplewell J at [8].
iv) Where a word or expression is expressly defined by the contract the court will give effect to the agreed definition in preference to the conventional meaning of the word or expression: see Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts, 8th Ed at 5.91 and case law referenced in support.
F2. Relevance and admissibility of pre-contractual materials.
95. Emphasis was placed, in opening, in evidence, and (albeit to a lesser degree) in closing on pre-contractual materials, including communications containing and evidencing pre-contractual negotiations.
96. The relevant law is authoritatively stated at Lewison, Chapter 3, Section 17 – “Background” in terms drawn, in particular from Lord Hoffmann’s speech in ICS v West Bromwich at 912H:
“In construing any written agreement the court is entitled to look at evidence of the objective factual background known to the parties or reasonably available to them at or before the date of the contract. This principle applies even if the contract appears to be unambiguous. There is no conceptual limit to background. It can include anything relevant which would have affected the way in which the document would have been understood by a reasonable person. However, this does not entitle the court to look at evidence of the parties’ subjective intentions; nor to ascribe to the words of the contract a meaning that they cannot legitimately bear”.
97. Thus, pre-contractual negotiations are, with limited exceptions, inadmissible as an aid to contractual interpretation. The general approach in this regard is also accurately set out at Lewison, Chapter 3, Section 9:
“Evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is not generally admissible to interpret the concluded written agreement. But evidence of pre-contractual negotiations is admissible to establish that a fact was known to both parties; to decide (in a consumer contract) whether a term has been individually negotiated; to determine which party put forward a particular term; and to elucidate the general object of the contract. Evidence that parties negotiated on the basis of an agreed meaning is only admissible in support of a claim of estoppel or rectification”.
98. Both parties, in opening and in evidence, and Emarat in closing, relied on pre-contractual negotiations, placing reliance (with varying degrees of ambition) on the exception to the general rule as to the inadmissibility of pre-contractual negotiations so as to elucidate the “general object” (alternatively expressed as the “genesis and aim”) of the contract. The basis for and extent of that exception was considered, and the law reviewed and explained, by Leggatt LJ (as he then was) in Merthyr (South Wales) Limited v Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council [2019] EWCA Civ 526 at [52] – [55]:
52. It is established law that, as stated by Lord Wilberforce in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381, 1384-5, previous documents may be looked at to show the surrounding circumstances and, by that means, to explain the commercial or business object of a contract. No doubt was cast on that principle in the Chartbrookcase and the passage from the judgment of Lord Wilberforce which includes this proposition was cited with approval in Arnold v Britton [2015] UKSC 36; [2015] AC 1619 , para 15, and Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] UKSC 24; [2017] AC 1173, para 10. …..
53. The phrase "genesis and aim of the transaction" is a composite phrase taken by Lord Wilberforce from the judgment of Cardozo J in Utica City National Bank v Gunn, 222 NY 204 (1918), a decision of the New York Court of Appeals, which Lord Wilberforce described as following "precisely the English line" and as a judgment which "combines classicism with intelligent realism": see Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381, 1384F. The approach followed by Cardozo J was, by considering the circumstances which led to the execution of the contract, to identify the purpose of the transaction and to construe the language used in the light of that purpose. Cardozo J concluded (at 208):
"To take the primary or strict meaning is to make the whole transaction futile. To take the secondary or loose meaning, is to give it efficacy and purpose. In such a situation, the genesis and aim of the transaction may rightly guide our choice."
54. Lord Wilberforce clearly saw no conflict between this approach and the rule, reaffirmed in Prenn v Simmonds, that evidence of negotiations, or of the parties' intentions, ought not to be received. (It is equally clear that Lord Blackburn had seen no such conflict, as Lord Hope observed in the Chartbrookcase at para 4.) What is not permissible, as the decision of the House of Lords in the Chartbrookcase confirms, is to seek to rely on evidence of what was said during the course of pre-contractual negotiations for the purpose of drawing inferences about what the contract should be understood to mean. It is also clear from the Chartbrookcase that it is not only statements reflecting one party's intentions or aspirations which are excluded for this purpose but also communications which are capable of showing that the parties reached a consensus on a particular point or used words in an agreed sense. The exclusion of such evidence was justified in the Chartbrookcase, not on the ground that it will always or necessarily be irrelevant, but because of the costs and other practical disadvantages that would result from relaxing the rule and because the "safety devices" of rectification and estoppel will generally prevent the exclusionary rule from causing injustice.
55. I would accept that there may be borderline cases in which the line between referring to previous communications to identify the "genesis and aim of the transaction" and relying on such evidence to show what the parties intended a particular provision in a contract to mean may be hard to draw. The present case, however, is not one of them. In my view, it very well illustrates this distinction”.
99. What is not permitted is to admit evidence of the parties’ negotiations to show the genesis and aim of including a particular provision in a contract. The genesis and aim of a particular provision may be sufficiently important to qualify as part of the genesis and aim of the whole transaction. If so, it will be admissible pursuant to Prenn v Simmonds; if not, it is contrary to Prenn v Simmonds to allow it to be admitted: see per Leggatt LJ at [50].
F3. Entire Agreement clauses
100. The Engagement Letter contains an entire agreement clause. The purpose of such a clause is to achieve contractual certainty and to nullify prior collateral agreements: see MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd v Rock Advertising Ltd [2018] UKSC 24; [2019] AC 119 per Lord Sumption at [14], who approved the following statement of the law by Lightman J in Inntrepreneur Pub Co (GL) v East Crown Ltd [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 611 at [7]:
“The purpose of an entire agreement clause is to preclude a party to a written agreement from threshing through the undergrowth and finding in the course of negotiations some (chance) remark or statement (often long forgotten or difficult to recall or explain) on which to found a claim such as the present to the existence of a collateral warranty. The entire agreement clause obviates the occasion for any such search and the peril to the contracting parties posed by the need which may arise in its absence to conduct such a search. For such a clause constitutes a binding agreement between the parties that the full contractual terms are to be found in the document containing the clause and not elsewhere, and that accordingly any promises or assurances made in the course of the negotiations (which in the absence of such a clause might have effect as a collateral warranty) shall have no contractual force, save in so far as they are reflected and given effect in that document. The operation of the clause is not to render evidence of the collateral warranty inadmissible in evidence as is suggested in Chitty on Contracts, 28th ed (1999), vol 1, para 12-102: it is to denude what would otherwise constitute a collateral warranty of legal effect.”
F4. Implied terms
101. There was no dispute as to the test for implication of terms in a commercial contract. The leading authority is Marks and Spencer plc v BNP Paribas Securities Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd [2015] UKSC 72, [2016] AC 742. The relevant principles were helpfully distilled from that and other leading authorities by Carr LJ (as she then was) in Yoo Design Services Ltd v Iliv Realty PTE Ltd [2021] EWCA Civ 560, at [51]:
" In summary, the relevant principles can be drawn together as follows:
i) A term will not be implied unless, on an objective assessment of the terms of the contract, it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract and/or on the basis of the obviousness test;
ii) The business efficacy and the obviousness tests are alternative tests. However, it will be a rare (or unusual) case where one, but not the other, is satisfied;
iii) The business efficacy test will only be satisfied if, without the term, the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence. Its application involves a value judgment;
iv) The obviousness test will only be met when the implied term is so obvious that it goes without saying. It needs to be obvious not only that a term is to be implied, but precisely what that term (which must be capable of clear expression) is. It is vital to formulate the question to be posed by the officious bystander with the utmost care;
v) A term will not be implied if it is inconsistent with an express term of the contract;
vi) The implication of a term is not critically dependent on proof of an actual intention of the parties. If one is approaching the question by reference to what the parties would have agreed, one is not strictly concerned with the hypothetical answer of the actual parties, but with that of notional reasonable people in the position of the parties at the time;
vii) The question is to be assessed at the time that the contract was made: it is wrong to approach the question with the benefit of hindsight in the light of the particular issue that has in fact arisen. Nor is it enough to show that, had the parties foreseen the eventuality which in fact occurred, they would have wished to make provision for it, unless it can also be shown either that there was only one contractual solution or that one of several possible solutions would without doubt have been preferred;
viii) The equity of a suggested implied term is an essential but not sufficient pre-condition for inclusion. A term should not be implied into a detailed commercial contract merely because it appears fair or merely because the court considers the parties would have agreed it if it had been suggested to them. The test is one of necessity, not reasonableness. That is a stringent test."
F5. Effective cause
102. There was dispute as to the proper approach to the issue of “effective cause”. Emarat’s case is that, whether on the proper construction of the Engagement Letter, or by reason of terms implied into it, it was a requirement of the contract, so far as the right to commission was concerned, that Moelis were the or an effective cause of the Transactions giving rise to such right.
103. Emarat deploy, as the starting point for that case, the statement of the law set out in Bowstead on Agency [26th Ed.] at Article 57 which provides as follows:
“Subject to any special terms or other indications in the contract of agency, where the remuneration of an agent is a commission on a transaction to be brought about, the agent is not entitled to such commission unless the services performed were the effective cause of the transaction.”
104. Emarat rely, further, on the explanation of principle in Chitty on Contracts [36th Ed.] at 22-167, as follows:
“It is traditional to say that, subject to clear indications to the contrary, where the agency contract provides that an agent earns remuneration upon bringing about a certain transaction, the agent is not entitled to such remuneration without being the effective cause of the transaction being brought about. This is often said to result from the implication of a term: but the rules for such implication are not generous and an appropriate result must frequently be obtained by interpretation of the contract: any principle is certainly subject to contrary indications, especially outside the context of consumers and estate agents. On this point there is a substantial body of case law, resulting from the use of words such as “find” or “introduce” a purchaser. Thus in Millar v Radfordthe plaintiff was retained by the defendant to find a purchaser of the defendant’s property or, if that was not possible, a tenant. A tenant was found and the plaintiff was paid his commission. Over a year later the tenant bought the property from the defendants. The plaintiff claimed commission although he had not been in any way concerned with the sale. The Court of Appeal held that he was not entitled to commission, since he had not brought about a sale and was not the effective cause of it taking place. An agent need not, however, be the immediate cause of the transaction, provided that there is sufficient connection between the agent’s act and the ultimate transaction. Thus, an auctioneer was instructed to sell the island of Herm by auction or otherwise, but the island failed to reach the reserve price at the auction. A potential buyer then asked the auctioneer for the name of the owner and, upon receiving it, purchased the island directly from him. It was held that the auctioneer was entitled to his commission.If the transaction which results in a sale is different from that which the agent was engaged to bring about, it will be a matter of construction whether the parties intended remuneration to be payable in the changed circumstances. If the agent was the effective cause of the ultimate transaction the court may make the necessary implication or may imply a new contract from the fact that the agent continued to act at the principal’s request towards completion of the new transaction. But if the ultimate transaction was of a wholly different nature from that contemplated or worked towards, the agent may not be entitled to remuneration.
105. Emarat submit, contrary to suggestions made at one stage by Moelis, that the “effective cause” requirement is not limited to consumer estate agent cases. They say that case law outside the estate agency field establishes a well-established default rule (see the authorities cited in paragraph 45(c) of their written opening submissions) and point to leading texts in the field of insurance (Butler & Merkin Re-insurance Law at D-0243 – D0243/1) and carriage of goods (Goods in Transit 5th Ed at 23-005) in support.
106. Emarat submit, harnessing the Bowstead reference to “a transaction to be brought about”, that the Article 57 rule is engaged where the obligation of the agent is a “procurement type” obligation, as opposed to an “advisory type” obligation, and they seek to characterise Moelis’s contractual role accordingly.
107. It is clear from the Bowstead and Chitty summaries above, that the law in this area, and its application, are not hard-edged. I was referred to many authorities. Both parties recognised that many of the older cases do not much assist in identifying or explaining principle, and I have therefore left them out of account in the review of the law below. I have concentrated on those authorities to which I was referred which either establish or explain a point of principle/general approach, or which the parties have commended as being of assistance by analogy given the circumstantial parallels.
108. In Luxor (Eastbourne) Limited v Cooper [1941] AC 108, Viscount Simon stated the position as follows at pp. 119-121:
“There is, I think, considerable difficulty, and no little danger, in trying to formulate general propositions on such a subject [the rights and obligations of house agents and their clients concerning commission remuneration], for contracts with commission agents do not follow a single pattern and the primary necessity in each instance is to ascertain with precision what are the express terms of the particular contract under discussion, and then to consider whether these express terms necessitate the addition, by implication, of other terms. There are some classes of contract in which an implied term is introduced by the requirements of a statute (for example, under the Sale of Goods Act or the Marine Insurance Act); there are other contracts where an implied term is introduced by the force of established custom (for example, the necessity of a month's notice in the case of hiring a domestic servant); but in contracts made with commission agents there is no justification for introducing an implied term unless it is necessary to do so for the purpose of giving to the contract the business effect which both parties to it intended it should have”.
He went on to analyse three obvious classes of case where an agent may be occupied in endeavouring to dispose of property of a principal.
109. In Foxtons Limited v Pelkey Bicknell & Another [2008] EWCA Civ 419, a leading analysis and application of the principles applicable to estate agency cases, the Court of Appeal had to determine whether Mrs Bicknell was required to pay commission to Foxtons on the sale of her residential property because of the introduction by Foxtons of the buyer (Mrs Low) at a time where Foxtons were appointed sole agent. The key clause was the sole agency clause which provided that:
“you will be liable to pay remuneration to us, in addition to any other costs or charges agreed, if at any time unconditional contracts are exchanged:- with a purchaser introduced by us during the period of our sole agency or with whom we have had negotiations about the property during that period; or with a purchaser introduced by or offering via another agent during that period.”
110. At [20] Neuberger LJ (as he then was) drew the relevant strands from the authorities in the field as follows:[4]
i) The term in [Bowstead] Article 57 is very readily implied, especially in a consumer context, unless the provisions of the particular contract or the facts of the particular case negative it;
ii) The main reason for implying the effective cause term is to minimise the risk of a seller having to pay two commissions;
iii) It is not entirely clear whether the test is “an effective cause” or “the effective cause”;
iv) Whether an agent was the effective cause is a question whose resolution turns very much on the facts of the particular case;
v) While two commissions are to be avoided, there will be cases where the terms of the relevant contracts and the facts compel such a result;
vi) Where the term is implied, the burden is on the agent seeking the commission to establish that he was the effective cause.
111. Neuberger LJ resolved the dispute as to whether commission was due to Foxtons through a process of interpretation of the words “purchaser introduced by us”, resolving that Foxtons had to show that they introduced the purchaser to the purchase, and not merely to the property [36]. There was no question of implying an “effective cause” requirement into the agreement [37], although he acknowledged that his preferred interpretation was, in most cases, likely to produce an outcome similar to that arrived at if such a term were implied [34].
112. A similar approach was adopted in Nahum v Royal Holloway and Bedford New College [1999] EMLR 252, in which the Defendant college’s representative engaged Mr Nahum to sell three valuable paintings from its collection – and, so, a case about an agent disposing of a principal’s property but outside the field of consumer estate agency.
113. The Court of Appeal had to determine, on the terms of the oral contract between the parties, what Mr Nahum was obliged to do to earn his commission. There was held to be an express term of the contract that Mr Nahum would receive commission if he introduced a purchaser who entered into a contract of purchase. The debate, on appeal, was whether there should be an implied term that Mr Nahum should be “the” or “an” effective cause of such purchase. Waller LJ expressed doubt “whether, in truth, the debate is about the implication of a term, as compared to seeking to construe the word “introduce” [p. 259].
114. Waller LJ summarised the legal position at p. 261:
“First, subject to there being no express words of a contract requiring a different interpretation the word introduction of a buyer carries with it a causative element, indeed an effective causative element, in the words of Nourse LJ (in Wood v Dantata [1987] 2 EGLR 23 at 25) in the “bringing in of the purchaser to that transaction”;….. Second, I have used the indefinite article above. I doubt whether it makes any difference whether it is “an” or “the” effective cause except possibly where there are two agents with agreements that they are entitled to commission if they introduce a purchaser. Third, what Mr. Nahum was obliged to establish in relation to the Constable was that it was his actions that really brought about the relation of buyer and seller between the College and the buyer”.
115. He went on to find that test satisfied on the facts, upholding the judgment below, though doubting [at p.264] that there existed the distinction drawn by the Judge between Mr Nahum being the introducer and Mr Nahum being the effective cause.
116. The requirement to focus on the express words of the contract which carry with them a required causative link between the agent’s act and the commissionable event is illustrated in the following two recent first instance decisions.
117. In Burgess v Kempson [2023] EWHC 2216 (Ch) the Court had to determine whether a Defendant landowner was required to pay commission to the Claimant who had given advice with a view to increasing the value of that land for the purposes of sale, pursuant to an informal oral agreement.
118. The Claimant agreed to work for the Defendant with a view to improving the terms on offer to the Defendant, in return for 15% of any improvement in terms that he was a cause of securing above the price of £250,000 per acre contemplated at the time of the agreement [96] and [132]. “If no improvement was achieved, or if it was achieved independently of the Claimant’s work, he was to receive nothing”.
119. The Judge’s reasoning on the question of causation is at [98] to [106]. He had to resolve: (i) whether there was any requirement, as alleged by the Defendant, that the Claimant’s work should bring about the improved terms; and (ii) whether the Claimant needed to be an or the effective cause of the improvement in terms or the increase in the value of the land.
120. In finding that, on its true interpretation, the contract required the Claimant to be a/the cause of the improved terms the Judge was influenced by: (i) the way in which the question of cause was addressed in the agreement – payment “in return for” improved terms which linked the right to payment to the improved terms; and (ii) the purpose for which the Claimant was engaged, namely the specific aim to improve the terms. This was not a case of a general advisory role, unlike EMFC (see further below), where EMFC’s services were to assist and support, not deliver a result. In the Burgess case, the increase in value of the land was not simply an aim of the contract, it was its raison d’etre.
121. On the facts the claim failed, as the subsequent offer for the land had nothing to do with the Claimant.
122. In Alphier Capital Two LLP v Blyvoor Gold Capital (Pty) Ltd [2026] EWHC 244 (Ch) the Court had to determine whether the Claimant was owed commission for finance which it helped the Defendant to secure from an entity called Orion to develop a South African mine.
123. Under its retainer, the Claimant was required to provide various stipulated advice and assistance and (importantly) “to help place the Investments with Orion”: see per Richards J at [74], [96] and [103]-[104]. In consideration of the Claimant carrying out all those services the Defendant was to pay commission fees to the Claimant.
124. The Defendant had submitted that the Claimant’s engagement provided, either on the proper construction of its express terms, or by the implication of a term, that the Claimant had to be “the effective cause” of any receipt of investment funds for a success fee to be payable. The Claimant argued the contrary by reference to the judgments in EMFC and Rothschild (below),emphasising that the contractual arrangements (which extended to a tripartite agreement to which Claimant, Defendant and a further third party agent were all parties) made no mention of the requirement that the Claimant should be an “effective cause”.
125. The Judge held that the Claimant’s obligations were not limited to advice (Rothschild), or loan execution support services (EMFC). By the tripartite agreement both the third party agent and the Claimant were engaged to “jointly pursue the funding ….from Orion”. Further, “[the Claimant] was under a contractual obligation to “help place the Investments [with Orion]. Whether or not the contract used the phrase “effective cause” the requirement for [the Claimant]’s own individual actions to have a real-world effect on securing the funding from Orion comes from a combination of those provisions, considered against the background consisting of the factual matrix” [106].
126. The Judge reasoned (at [109]) that the obligation to help place the Investments with Orion could be understood as a species of “effective cause” requirement, because it asks whether the Claimant’s actions contributed to an outcome. However, that was not necessarily the same as the “effective cause” requirement dealt with in Bowstead Article 57. Since the parties had expressly used the concept of “helping”, that was the test which the Judge applied.
127. Having determined the scope of the required causation between the Claimant’s activity and commissionable event as a matter of interpretation of the express terms, it followed that there was no scope for the implication of any effective cause requirement [112] – [115].
128. On the facts the Claimant had performed all the required services, and so its claim succeeded.
129. I now turn to the case law to which I was referred considering commission arrangements with financial advisors (acknowledging the wide and varying roles which can be performed by such advisors and the wide variation in the types of contracts and terms under which they may be engaged).
130. In EMFC Loan Syndication LLP v The Resort Group plc [2021] EWCA Civ 844 [2022] 1 WLR 717 the Court of Appeal had to consider the issue of “effective cause” in the context of the engagement by the Defendant (“D”) of the Claimant (“EMFC”) to provide services for the purposes of raising long-term financing for D in the form of specific loan facilities. Following the arrangement of loan facilities, EMFC claimed an entitlement to commission. D defended the claim: (i) on the basis of alleged repudiation by EMFC and (ii) claiming that the contract contained an implied term that EMFC was only entitled to commission if it was an effective cause of the loan facilities, which, D said, they were not.
131. Under the contract EMFC was appointed to “assist in the execution of the Facilities”. Itwas to be working in conjunction with D’s debt advisor, Investec Bank plc, and was to carry out tasks typical in a mandate of that type (as evidenced by a typical scope of work for loan execution support services) to be agreed with Investec. EMFC’s remuneration included commission fees which became due on the date of signing of each and any Facilities documents. The agreement provided that, on termination, there would be a graduated payment of the commission fee within the first year following termination of the contract (100% in the first six months and 50% in the second six months) if a relevant transaction were to be consummated.
132. Carr LJ (as she then was) addressed the law relating to an agent’s entitlement to commission at paragraph 60 and following, citing Bowstead Article 57, the summary of principle in Neuberger LJ’s judgment in Foxtons (above) and Viscount Simon LC in Luxor (above).
133. She noted that the authorities stress that there are commission contracts to which the principle enunciated in Article 57 may not apply, particularly outside the residential estate agency context. “The general principle in article 57 is therefore always subject to any special terms or indications in the Contract (as article 57 says on its face). Ultimately, everything will turn on the particular circumstances and terms of each contract by reference to the application of normal contractual principles of construction and relating to the implication of terms”.
134. At paragraphs 69 and following Carr LJ gave eight reasons for rejecting the approach of the first instance Judge, who had found that, in order to avoid commercial unreality, the effective cause term was to be read into the contract as a matter of interpretation, alternatively that such term fell to be implied. The Court of Appeal found that this was a case where the general principle in Article 57 of Bowstead was not engaged. I summarise below those reasons of potential relevance, by analogy, in the present case:
a. First, the contract, which contained an entire agreement clause, contained no express effective cause requirement, when it could have done if this was what the parties had intended;
b. Secondly, EMFC’s contractual role was to assist in the execution of the facilities. The indicative scope of work was to assist and support, and not to deliver the Facilities themselves. References to the “loan execution services” offered by EMFC did not take the scope of EMFC’s appointment outside the provision of support services, “albeit that those services always had ultimate execution of the Facilities by [D] as their aim”. This was not a typical “introducer” agreement, let alone comparable to an estate agency contract. “EMFC was not engaged to bring about execution or to execute…. the opening words of clause 6 [indicate] that EMFC was to be paid for delivery of its services. The completion fee [i.e. the commission fee] was tied to the delivery of services and not completion.” (emphasis added)
c. Thirdly, it was clearly understood that EMFC was contractually obliged to work “in conjunction with Investec”. The “two commission” trap for estate agents did not apply here so as to require implication of an effective cause term to save D from paying two commissions.
…….
d. Fifthly, the termination provisions were inconsistent with the existence of an effective cause requirement providing, (as they did) for a purely mechanical payment exercise by reference to the timing of any Facilities executed within 12 months of termination of the Contract.
….
e. Seventhly, difficulties of proof can be relevant in considering whether the parties would have intended a clause to exist (citing Rothschilds [2014] EWHC 2165 (Comm) at [23])and would potentially have been in that case.
f. Finally, there were obvious differences between the residential consumer cases where an effective cause requirement had been established by implication (on which the Judge had relied) and the facts of the EMFC case: EMFC was not a sole agent; EMFC was not engaged to introduce a lender; the rationale for implication of effective cause requirement – to avoid two commissions – did not exist, as exposure to a double commission was accepted.
135. The Rothschild case referred to in EMFC (Edmond De Rothschild Securities (UK) Limited v Exillon Energy plc [2014] EWHC 2165 (Comm)was a decision of Males J (as he then was), granting summary judgment to Rothschild bank in a claim for commission arising under a contract for corporate advisory services. Males J rejected Exillon’s argument that payment of a “success fee” was conditional upon proof by the bank that its activities were the effective cause of the “success” in question being achieved.
136. Exillon had a disruptive shareholder (Worldview) and engaged Rothschild to assist it, both at a forthcoming EGM and generally. Its role was to “advise Exillon in its response to the proposed shareholder requisition” andto develop and implement a strategy to persuade Worldview to agree to withdraw from activism against Exillon. Rothschild was to be paid a retainer for its services together with a success fee if resolution to the issues was achieved, defined by reference to the occurrence of five designated events, including if Worldview reduced its shareholding in the company to below 5%.
137. Males J accepted Rothschild’s submissions that the five listed events defined when the “resolution to the issues… has been achieved” so that, in such events, the success fee was to be payable without further enquiry. On the facts, a stipulated event (the relevant reduction in shareholding) had been achieved. The use of the passive voice “resolution has been achieved” did not require that Rothschild should have achieved this by its efforts. There was therefore no need, and no scope, to imply an effective cause requirement. The contract was to provide strategic and financial advice. It did not contemplate, as a typical agency contract would, that Rothschild would introduce or seek to introduce counterparties who would enter into contracts with Exillon. Thus, there were indications in the contract which counted against the application of the general principle in Bowstead Article 57. Rothschild’s construction did not provide for a windfall, nor was it contrary to business sense. There was a real risk that, if an effective cause term were to be implied, a valid claim would fail for want of proof (the issue picked up by Carr LJ in EMFC).
138. A similar approach had been taken by Eady J in Seymour Pierce Limited v Grandtop International Holdings Ltd [2010] EWHC 676 on a summary judgment application by the Claimant, who was engaged as financial adviser in relation to the Defendant’s acquisition of Birmingham City Football Club.
139. Under the terms of the contract Seymour Pierce were to provide defined advisory, process management, assistance and co-ordination, drafting and liaison services.
140. A non-refundable up-front fee of £300,000 was payable to Seymour Pierce, by Grandtop. Further, “[c]onditional upon the Offer being declared unconditional as to acceptances and in consideration of our providing the Services, the Company shall pay to Seymour Pierce an additional Success Fee of £2,200,000. In the event that the agreement was terminated by Grandtop and an Offer for the Club was declared or became unconditional as the result of any offer made by or in association with Grandtop within a period of 12 months after the effective date of termination, the contract provided that Grandtop was to pay to Seymour Pierce the Success Fee in full. Seymour Pierce claimed that such an event had occurred within the stipulated 12-month period following termination and, accordingly, claimed its fee.
141. The Court rejected Grandtop’s defence that Seymour Pierce were not “the or an effective cause of the success of” the ultimate transaction and dismissed, as irrelevant, cases about “effective cause”. The question was to interpret the contractual provisions. The right to a success fee following termination was clear and unambiguous and permitted the payment of the fee where Seymour Pierce had not been “the or an effective cause” of a late acquisition. To qualify that right by implying a term requiring Seymour Pierce to be “the effective cause” was not a matter of business efficacy.
142. Mr Hardwick also placed reliance on the decision of the Hong Kong Court of Appeal in Eminent Investments (Asia Pacific) Ltd v Dio Corporation [2020] HKCFA 38 dismissing an appeal in a claim by a financial advisor for a success fee in respect of a fundraising transaction entered into by its client after termination of the advisory agreement.
143. A “tail gunner” clause in that agreement provided for the payment of a commission fee to the Claimant if within a period of two years of termination the Company completed a transaction including and not limited to a secondary listing or fund raising with any third parties or received funds from a financing source introduced by the Claimant.
144. The dispute between the parties was whether, in this context, “introduction” was to be interpreted as being “introduction to the party” or “introduction to the transaction”. The Court of Final Appeal held that introduction meant, in context, “introduction to the transaction” and not “introduction to the investor” and the Claimant had not made the necessary introduction.
145. As to the implication of an effective cause term (which had commended itself to the Judge at first instance, in the alternative to interpreting the express terms as requiring Eminent to be the effective cause), following a review of English, Hong Kong, New York and New Jersey law, Lord Collins and Mr Justice Ribeiro advanced the following position (at paragraph 89), as representing English law:
“Outside the sphere of estate agents, where (especially in the residential consumer context) there is a common understanding of the agent’s duties and the consequences of the absence of a presumption or an implied term, there is little to be said for a presumption and nothing to be said for an implied term. All will depend on the construction of the term in question in the context of the agreement as a whole and the purpose of the transaction.”
146. This echoed their remarks earlier in the judgment at paragraph 71-72 when they emphasised, by reference to the facts of that case, that there was no special approach to the construction of contractual terms governing post-termination payments to financial advisers. It was inappropriate to regard Article 57 as stating a substantial legal rule as to the existence of either a presumption or an implied term in favour of an “effective cause” requirement.
F6. Conclusion on the case law concerning “effective cause”
147. Mr Downes submitted that the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in Eminent was wrong to have gone so far in its observations about the limits of any presumption or implied term as to “effective cause”. That decision is not binding on me (though deserving of respect given the eminence of the judges) and it is unnecessary for me to determine the question in this case. I draw the following points material to the present case from the review of the case law to which I was referred and in light of the submissions made by both parties:
i) The default proposition in Bowstead (Article 57) is stated to be limited to (i) agents (ii) who have “brought about” a transaction.
ii) Advisors may not be agents at all, and, if their role is limited to the provision of advice and support, that role would not, typically, be regarded as one to “bring about” a transaction.
iii) The paradigm example in case law of such “bringing about” of transactions is selling agents who introduce purchasers.
iv) “Introduction” carries with it an effective causative element, and thus, interpreting the express term “introduction” may well, depending on the precise wording of the contract, arrive at a construction of the contract whereby “introduction” expresses the notion of “effective cause”.
v) The willingness of Courts to find indications to counter the Article 57 presumption indicates that, in so far as it exists outside the field of estate agents, it is readily rebutted. Thus, the Court must interpret the express terms of the contract to determine whether, and to what extent, they require a causal link between the agent’s acts and the commissionable transaction.
vi) Even where courts have found some procurement-type obligation on the part of a service provider, it is the express terms which dictate the nature and level of the procurement and, accordingly, of any causal link required between the service and the commissionable transaction (see e.g. Burgess and Alphier above).
vii) It does not follow that a procurement-type obligation automatically leads to a requirement that the service-provider be the effective cause of the commissionable transaction. The key question will always be “what was the service-provider required to do to earn its commission?”.
viii) The scope for the implication of an implied term is likely to be very limited indeed. If a causation requirement is established through the express terms, it is those terms (including provision as to the extent or standard of causation required) which will govern the right to commission. If not, I was shown no modern example of the implication of an effective cause requirement in a commercial contract for the provisions of services, to fill a causation void left by the express terms.
148. I therefore accept Emarat’s characterisation of the case law, to the effect that, when assessing what is required of a claimant to earn commission payable upon a defined event, one can discern a distinction between contracts for services which are advisory and those where procurement of a defined result is involved.
149. However, while incidental enquiries as to the characterisation of obligations, and whether they are properly to be characterised as “procurement” or “assistance” obligations, may be helpful in rationalising the result of decided cases, such characterisation cannot predominate over an analysis and evaluation of the express terms. Less still can such characterisation pre-determine the existence or not of an “effective cause” requirement as a condition of the right to receive commission.
G. Analysis of the contractual issues.
150. As I stated in the introduction, there are a large number of disputes between the parties as to the proper interpretation of the Engagement Letter, in particular the commission provisions and whether (a) commissionable transactions had occurred; and (b) what part Moelis were required to play in the bringing about of those transactions.
G1. The parties’ positions in outline
151. I summarise, at the outset of this section, the essential contest between the parties, and will address more detailed arguments in the context of the analysis and discussion of the issues which follow.
i) First, there is a fundamental dispute between the parties as to the scope of the Engagement Letter and what transactions give rise, in principle, to what fees:
a) Moelis say that where an existing facility between Emarat and Bank A is extended in the same amount, that gives rise to a Restructuring Fee (so, on the facts, the FAB AED 750 million loan, the ADCB AED 1 billion loan and the ENBD overdraft facility of AED 750 million). Where an increase in the level of the facility is negotiated, the extent of the increase attracts a Debt Capital Raise Fee as this is “new debt” (so, say Moelis, the increase in the September 2023 ADCB of AED 1.5 billion and the new 2023 ENBD facility of AED 1.5 billion).
b) Moelis say that this is the case even where the overall total amount of debt financing remains the same (i.e. AED 4.75 billion + overdraft facility of AED 750 million).
c) Emarat say this approach is wrong: the contract sets up a mutually exclusive fees regime, in which fees payable for transactions concerned with restructuring existing debt are separate and distinct from fees payable for transactions raising new debt, (i.e. new debt raised such as to increase the level of Emarat’s overall debt facilities above its pre-contract level).
d) In non-technical terms, Emarat say that moving the same level of debt around banks in different and varied amounts does not mean that this is “new” debt, even if, necessarily in such a reorganisation, one or more banks (viewed individually) end up extending a “new” or increased credit facility. I deal below with this issue first, because it raises a fundamental question as to the purpose of the contract and the commission regime as a whole.
ii) Second, the parties disagree as to whether “existing debt financing” extends to the ENBD overdraft facility (and thus, whether transactions in relation to that facility are potentially commissionable):
a) Moelis say that an overdraft facility is, looking at the text of the agreement, within the meaning of “debt financing” and that the intended inclusion of the ENBD overdraft facility can be seen from the factual matrix. They point to exchanges between the parties which, they claim, show that the parties were treating the overdraft facility as being within “existing debt financing” and as part of the restructuring project under the Engagement Letter.
b) Emarat say that the overdraft facility was not within the scope of “existing debt financing”, and point to the fact that, at all material times prior to the date of the contract, it remained undrawn and thus the actual level of indebtedness was zero.
iii) Third, as to whether Moelis have established that commissionable transactions took place (leaving aside the part required to be played by Moelis), the parties disagree as to whether the transactions which took place between Emarat and each of FAB, ADCB and ENBD fell within the definitions of “Restructuring” or “Transaction Fees”. If not, there would be no commission payable, irrespective of questions as to what part was required of Moelis to bring about such transactions:
a) Moelis say that the language of the agreement is clear. There have been transactions which fall within the terms of “Restructuring” as defined in the Engagement Letter.
b) Moelis say, further, that it was always understood and agreed that they were providing their services on the basis that if there was any “Restructuring” their minimum fee was US$3 million. They say that this fee has, accordingly, been triggered. They say that the fees are payable upon the first transactions by which the existing debt financing (“Existing Debt Package”) is restructured.
c) Emarat say that the defined transactions were subject to a materiality threshold, which they say was not crossed as the transactions were, in substance, roll-overs of existing facility agreements, such that the transactions do not fall within the scope of the Engagement Letter. Moelis dispute that there was any such materiality threshold and say that, even if there was, it was crossed.
d) In any event Emarat say that the transactions in respect of which Moelis are claiming commission were not within the contemplated commissionable transactions of the parties, objectively ascertained. Emarat say that Moelis were engaged to provide services on a debt restructure project which was known to both parties as Project Hawk. At the date on which the Engagement Letter was signed it was contemplated that the restructure would be complete by May 2023 (i.e. in the short term). It was not contemplated that, in the event of an interim set of transactions pending a later final refinancing/restructure a fee would be paid for the interim transactions.
iv) Fourth, turning to the part required to be played by Moelis in the transactions, the parties disagree about what services Moelis were required to perform under the Engagement Letter:
a) Moelis say that the agreement provides for no express causal requirement between their services and the transactions giving rise to commission. Commission was part of the consideration for the provision, generally, by Moelis of services under the Engagement Letter.
b) Emarat say that the terms of the RFP were express terms of the Engagement Letter, upon the proper construction of the otherwise undefined term “services” required of Moelis under the Engagement Letter. In the alternative, they say that such obligations were implied terms. They say that, properly characterised, these terms demonstrate that Moelis had a procurement-type obligation in respect of the commissionable transactions.
c) Moelis dispute all of this. They rely on: (i) the absence of any such terms being expressed by the parties; (ii) the entire agreement clause which they say precludes such terms; (iii) the fact that there was, clearly, no agreement to provide certain of the required services, and (iv) that the formulation of the terms themselves, even if the general subject matter was agreeable in principle, was never agreed. Moelis say that none of the tests for implied terms gets off the ground.
v) Fifth, and flowing from the dispute about services, Emarat contend, and Moelis dispute, that there was a requirement that Moelis should be the (or an) effective cause of any (otherwise commissionable) transactions.
a) Emarat say that this conclusion flows from the proper interpretation of the agreement (premised on the requests in the RFP constituting terms of the Engagement Letter). They rely principally upon principles of interpretation to arrive at this result, but, in the alternative, rely on implied terms.
b) Moelis dispute the premise (namely the alleged terms of the agreement upon which Emarat seeks to erect the effective cause requirement), and in any event dispute that such a requirement arises, whether through interpretation or implication. In this regard, the parties disagree as to the characterisation of the agreement under the Engagement Letter.
c) Emarat deny that Moelis were an effective cause of any Transactions. Moelis say that they do not need to be, but have performed all services which they could reasonably have performed prior to the June 2023 pause (see below) and have done all that they were required to do to earn the Transaction fees.
vi) Sixth and finally, the parties disagree as to the effect of the “pause/suspension” of the engagement in June 2023.
a) Emarat say that the agreement to suspend the engagement was a self-standing agreement which went beyond the contractual right to “pause” the agreement, and that the effect of such suspension was to suspend all rights to all remuneration (including commissions) under the Engagement Letter.
b) Moelis say that: (i) they had never understood Emarat to contend that the suspension was anything other than an exercise of the contractual right, by Emarat, to pause their performance of the agreement and payment of the monthly retainers; (ii) in any event, the right to receive commissions (as distinct from retainer payments) was not suspended.
G2. The Court’s Approach to the issues
152. There is no dispute that this contract was closely negotiated over many weeks. This was with the benefit of legal input on both sides. Further, it was a professional services contract negotiated between experienced and able commercial people.
153. In such circumstances, one would expect the principal focus in ascertaining the meaning of the agreement to be on the words used by the parties.
154. For that reason, I address the disputed issues of interpretation starting with the language of the text itself and have considered the impact of the factual matrix and an iterative testing of the commercialities of the arguments, so far as those issues arise, against the contractual text.
155. Given the number of disputes between the parties, for ease of reference I have sought to bring and address the various disputes between the parties under different headings. However, the issues, as set out in those headings, do not arise in sequence, and I have taken account of the analysis of each set of issues when addressing the other sets of issues and reaching my ultimate conclusions.
G3: Object and scope of the retainer:which transactions give rise to which fees.
156. Dealing first with the object and scope of the agreement, and, at a structural level, what transactions were intended to give rise to what fees, one starts with the terms of the appointment. Moelis’s appointment is as financial advisor (not expressly defined further) with respect to a Restructuring (defined) in relation to Emarat’s existing debt financing (not defined).
157. Textually, “Restructuring”, as a defined term, embraces three separate concepts: it is defined to mean:
i) Any restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation or amendment of the existing debt financing of [Emarat], including settlement of forgiveness of debt financing, conversion of debt financing instruments into equity, the exchange, offer, sale or merger of any of [Emarat] and/or any of [their] affiliates to/with a third party;
ii) Any Equity Capital Raise (as defined) and/or
iii) Any Debt Capital Raise (as defined)
In each case, however implemented.
158. I consider, as Emarat submit, that the language of the text points to three separate, and mutually exclusive concepts: (i) restructure of existing debt financing, (ii) Debt Capital Raise and (iii) Equity Capital Raise. Although, looking at the text of clause 1(a), it would be logically and linguistically possible for Debt Capital Raise and Equity Capital Raise to be included within the concept of restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation or amendment of existing debt financing, in contextI do not consider that either of those latter concepts can properly be read as being governed by the word “including” so as to bring such concepts within the defined meaning of any “restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation or amendment of the existing debt financing”.
159. Two features of the Engagement Letter lead clearly to that view:
i) The first is the grammatical structure of clause 1(a), by which “Restructuring” means “any” [restructuring etc… of the existing debt financing, including…] “any” [Debt Capital Raise …] and “any” [Equity Capital Raise”]. The use of “any” is as a determiner of three separate concepts.
ii) The second is the subsequent definitions of “Transaction”, “Transaction Fee” and the contractual structure of those fees themselves which correspond to those three separate concepts of (i) restructure of existing debt financing, (ii) raising of new debt, and (iii) raising of new equity.
160. In defining “Transaction” as a “Restructuring” and then providing that “Transaction Fee” means the “Restructuring Fee”, the “Equity Capital Raise Fee” and/or the “Debt Capital Raise Fee” as applicable, a distinction is drawn in the fee provisions in clause 2 between the Transactions/Restructuring that attract each of those fees:
i) The Restructuring Fee of 0.25% is payable only in respect of the restructure of the “aggregate principal amount of the existing debt financing (“Existing Debt Package”)” – and is subject to a minimum fee (which I return to below).
ii) Whereas, the Debt Capital Raise Fee is the defined term for “a new debt capital raise fee of 0.9% of the aggregate gross amount… of any new debt financing or other debt-like financial instruments….”; and the Equity Capital Raise Fee is the defined term for an “equity capital raise fee of 3% of the aggregate gross amount … of any new equity financing or other equity-like financial instruments….”
161. Therefore, as with the use of “any” in clause 1(a) to determine and distinguish three separate concepts, that same distinction is followed through in the fee structure in clause 2, with the fee payable for restructure of the existing debt financing, separate and exclusive from the fee payable for new debt financing and separate and exclusive again from the fee for new equity financing.
162. As Emarat submit, that structure suggests that a transaction which falls within one category is not intended to fall within any other. That, in turn, is consistent with separate and distinct 0.9% and 3% commissions being payable in respect of the raising of new debt and new equity, respectively. How, asks Mr Downes can a definition of restructure etc… of existing debt financing accommodate “new” equity, pursuant to a debt/equity swap so as to give rise to a Restructuring fee but (if the logic of Mr Hardwick’s argument is right), also engage a New Equity fee. Mr Downes submits that the same logic must apply to “new” debt and submits that the three regimes are mutually exclusive.
163. If the agreement is read as a whole, I agree with Emarat that there are three separate, mutually exclusive, commission regimes:
i) A regime governing existing debt facilities, which is intended to embrace a wide variety of transactions by which that debt is restructured/reorganised/renegotiated/amended, even extending to debt equity swap or wider corporate restructure. The wide words used indicate that transactions whereby Emarat reduce the level of a pre-existing AED 1 billion facility with Bank A to AED 0.5 billion and increase a pre-existing facility with Bank B from AED 1 billion to AED 1.5 billion such that the overall level of debt facility remains constant would constitute transactions triggering the Restructure Fee, even if there is, in one sense, “new” debt with Bank B. The outcome would be the same if, instead of extending an AED 2 billion facility with Bank A Emarat entered into a new facility with Bank B for AED 2 billion and paid off their loan with Bank A in full.
ii) A regime governing the introduction of new debt, which is intended to mean new debt which is new and additional to the level of debt comprising the Existing Debt Package, in other words, debt which has the effect of increasing Emarat’s overall debt facilities above the pre-contract level.
iii) A regime governing the introduction of new equity, which is intended to mean the introduction of capital by way of new equity which, as with “new debt” has the effect of increasing Emarat’s capital over and above the pre-contract level. On this basis, such concept excludes new equity which arises from a debt-equity swap (which would not have that effect).
164. The separate (and in my judgment mutually exclusive) treatment of those three categories of fees is further reflected in (i) the deductibility of the retainer fees in respect of the first three months of the engagement from the Restructuring Fee, but not from the Debt Capital Raise Fee or from the Equity Capital Raise Fee, and (ii) the fact that the Restructuring Fee is subject to a minimum fee of US$3 million, thus indicating the intention that the “core” work of the project is directed to the restructure of the existing debt financing. And so, the Retainer Fees are deductible from that core commission fee (but not from the commissions payable on any additional finance raised) and there is a minimum fee of US$3 million to restructure existing debt, (but no such minimum fee to raise additional debt or equity).
165. Thus, the concept of “Restructuring” as defined in clause 1(a) goes beyond restructuring, refinancing, reorganising and amending existing debt financing and also extends to new and additional financing, whether by way of debt or equity.
166. Subject to the impact of the factual matrix I also agree with Emarat’s submission that (in non-technical terms) moving the same level of debt around the same banks in different proportions or even moving the same level of debt around different banks does not engage the concept of new “Debt Capital Raise” or the associated commission fee.
167. I consider that the above conclusions are supported and reinforced by reference to the factual matrix:
i) First, in the consistent approach of Moelis’s own fee structure in the Moelis RFP Response, which identifies three separate fee categories responsive to each of existing debt, new debt and new equity.
ii) Secondly, the development in the genesis and aim of the contract. In the March 2022 RFP, its scope was strictly limited to services in restructuring an identified debt package of AED 4.75 billion. Moelis’s fee proposal was equally limited to a restructure fee. That RFP was shelved. The October 2022 RFP was much broader in scope, was no longer tied to a defined debt figure of AED 4.75 billion, and required Moelis to consider capital structure and adequacy more widely, thus introducing the prospect of raising finance by way of debt or equity to a level above the existing level of debt financing. In response, Moelis introduced a fee proposal correspondingly calibrated – see (i) above. To my mind, this confirms (if confirmation were required) that the scope of the Engagement Letter, and thus the purpose of the agreement, extended to services in relation to new (in the sense of additional) finance by way of debt and equity, and provided for commissions accordingly. In discussion, Mr Hardwick was initially resistant to the suggestion that the first RFP (and Moelis’s initial response) were admissible as part of the factual matrix. I understood his principal objection to be that reference to a shelved RFP or its response may not be helpful, but I understood him to accept that admissibility might depend upon the purpose for which reference was being made. In my view it is legitimate to have regard to the first RFP to understand the development of the genesis and aim of the agreement and the commissionable work to be undertaken under it.
iii) There is a further point which emerges from the development in the genesis of the agreement through the RFP and Moelis’s responses prior to any process of negotiation. If it were necessary, (which I do not consider it is, given the clear text of the contract) it would assist the understanding of the objective observer to know that Moelis, in their own response to the first RFP, represented that a refinancing of existing debt with a new lender would come within the restructuring fee for existing debt, with no suggestion that this activity would give rise to a separate or additional fee beyond the (at that time 0.3%) proposed Restructuring fee.
iv) Mr Downes submitted that it would also be open to the Court to admit for the purpose of exploring the object/genesis and aim of the agreement Moelis’s statement in correspondence of 19 January 2023 that the new debt raise fee would arise if Moelis were asked to raise new (i.e. additional) debt. Moelis submit, firmly, that this material is excluded as it formed part of the pre-contract negotiations. I consider that this material is not clearly admissible, as it is arguably directed at the aim of a particular provision and not the agreement as a whole. If so, this would offend the principle outlined in paragraph 50 of Merthyr Tydfil [see section F2 above]. Given my conclusions above, it is not necessary to court controversy by relying on it.
168. Looking at the business/commercial rationality of the competing arguments, I consider that if the clause were to be interpreted in line with Moelis’s contrary argument a number of uncommercial consequences would flow:
i) First, the risk of double fees. I asked Mr Hardwick what would happen if, on his approach, the restructure were to take place with an initial amendment of the existing facility, but, later in time, a refinance of the same indebtedness with a new lender. He confirmed that Moelis’s case was that a Restructure Fee would arise in connection with the initial extension transaction and that a Debt Capital Raise Fee would arise in connection with the later refinancing of the same sum through a new lender. Presumably Moelis’s position would be the same (that a new fee would become payable) for each occasion on which a loan was refinanced through a new lender. That would not, however, be so, if, instead of re-financing with new lenders, there were further extensions of the already extended facility – Moelis say that this transaction would fall within the concept of a Restructuring Fee and they accept that you cannot get that fee twice.
ii) Secondly, one can test the position by reference to a hypothetical variation of the current facts. Assume that, in negotiating with FAB, ADCB and ENBD Banks in May 2023, ENBD Bank provided an indicative term sheet showing willingness to refinance the entirety of Emarat’s debt financing at a margin of e.g. 25 bps. Emarat therefore decide to refinance the entirety of their existing debt and undrawn overdraft through a AED 4.75 billion facility + AED 750 million amended overdraft with ENBD. That would, on Moelis’s case, give rise to a fee of 0.9% on the entirety of the AED 4.75 billion loan facility and a fee of 0.25% on the overdraft facility. Assume that, at the last moment, FAB and ADCB were prepared to match that marginal rate of 25 bps, leading Emarat simply to extend all their existing facilities in the same amount with the existing banks. That decision would reduce their commission, at a stroke, to 0.25% of AED 4.75 billion. There is no rational explanation for the disparity in fee treatment which would not arise under Emarat’s interpretation – an adventitious disparity which would only promote a risk of conflict on the part of Moelis – their own interest being favoured if Emarat refinanced existing levels of debt with new lenders, rather than if it extended existing facilities. That risk of conflict is avoided through Emarat’s interpretation which results in payment of the same fee whatever the restructuring solution adopted in respect of the existing debt financing.
iii) Mr Downes also points to the uncommerciality of paying a rate of 0.9% in respect of the renegotiation/extension of an existing lending facility n circumstances where the annual marginal lending rates were, at the time of the Engagement Letter c. 30 bps and where the commission fee (even if a one-off fee) may well exceed the total bank fees payable over a two or three year term. That uncommerciality would be exacerbated in a hypothetical world of repeated transactions discussed in (ii) above: contrast the applicable fee position as between two extensions of a pre-existing loan with the same bank (maximum fee 1 x 0.25% of the loan value) and two subsequent refinancings of the loan with new lenders each time (2 x 0.9% of the loan value).
iv) Whereas, the commercial logic of a 0.9% rate for debt finance introduced over and above the pre-existing level of AED 4.75 billion + overdraft base is much greater. It is in return for the achievement of additional financing, which, logically, will be more difficult to secure and which affords the company greater working capital, rather than an arrangement which gives the company the same financing, only differently structured/organised.
v) Finally, Mr Hardwick’s interpretation renders the various contractual alternatives by which a Restructure of existing debt financing may take place, largely empty. On his analysis every transaction which is not an amendment of the existing facility (through extension with or without varied terms) will be new debt within the meaning of “New Capital Debt Raise”, on the basis that any “new” facility amounts to new debt. He was unable to give examples of “restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation” of existing debt financing – other than amendments to extend an existing facility[5], which would fall within Moelis’s proposed interpretation of Debt Capital Raise, despite the apparent intention of the clause that it should be broad in its application.
169. Moelis’s interpretation of “Debt Capital Raise” focuses on the definition of clause 2(c) in isolation (on which basis it makes linguistic sense) and not in context (on which basis it gives rise to real difficulties). Whereas, on Emarat’s analysis, there is a coherent and logical hierarchy to the fee structure:
i) The Retainer payments are made in respect of professional advisory services provided pursuant to the Retainer, and are payable monthly unless there is a pause requested by Emarat (see analysis below);
ii) There are then (success) fees payable in the event of defined Transactions. These are not fees upon which Moelis could rely as certain remuneration if they performed services under the agreement. The contract provides that Emarat “will have discretion over whether and when to proceed with any Restructuring and shall be free at any time not to consummate a Restructuring, in which event no Transaction fee is payable”. Admittedly, on the facts of the present case, it was almost certain that a Restructuring of some sort would take place: the first FAB loan was to mature in May 2023 and, as Mr Touma stated in evidence, and as would have been appreciated by any reasonable observer at the time of contracting, having engaged Moelis to advise, Emarat were not simply going to pay up or default. However, it was unclear what sort of Restructuring would be effected – whether a simple Restructuring, giving rise to a Restructuring Fee or (less likely) a raising of new debt or equity engaging the higher fees.
iii) There is a relatively low percentage “success” fee payable (0.25%) in the event of a restructuring of the existing debt, subject to a minimum fee of US$3 million. There are substantially higher success fees (0.9%) in the event of transactions raising new, additional, debt for Emarat and jackpot (3%) success fees in the event of transactions raising new equity for Emarat, subject to no such minimum.
iv) In referring to “success” fees in this context, I refer to the feature that the fees are in each case triggered by a concluded (i.e. successful) Transaction. Emarat sought to suggest, by reference to correspondence preceding the Engagement Letter that the parties’ (liberal) references to “success” fees, demonstrated a shared understanding of the parties that this meant success of Moelis (strictly, success attributable to the work of Moelis). I disagree. So far as such references are admissible, they are not probative. I consider that success refers to the success (i.e. conclusion) of the Transaction which triggers the Transaction Fee. The term is neutral as regards the required causal input of Moelis in bringing the Transaction about, which I deal with below in section G 5-6 below.
G4: Is the overdraft within the scope of “existing debt facilities”?
170. Looking, again, at the words of the Engagement Letter, the appointment is “as financial advisor with respect to a Restructuring (as defined below) in relation to the Company’s existing debt financing”.
171. There are two textual points:
i) First, the language of “existing debt financing” is not a defined term. The term is, itself, defined (in the context of Restructuring) as the “Existing Debt Package”. Mr Downes submits that they mean the same thing. I agree.
ii) Debt financing, as a concept, would naturally extend to an overdraft facility, which is a form of debt financing, whether the overdraft facility is drawn down or remains undrawn.
iii) Emarat argues that existing debt financing/Existing Debt Package refers to the level of Emarat’s debt at the date of the agreement, and says that Mr El Rifai’s evidence that the level of Emarat’s debt was AED 4.75 billion was never challenged.
iv) However, the agreement does not use the term “existing debt”; nor does it refer to AED 4.75 billion. In the context of the agreement as a whole, the term “existing debt financing”/“Existing Debt Package” is to be interpreted in light of the meaning of “Restructuring” and in light of the object of the agreement as disclosed by that term. As analysed above the object of the agreement extended beyond the mere refinancing of the existing AED 4.75 billion debt (as initially contemplated under the First RFP) to the potential for additional services in connection with further capital requirements (new debt, new equity).
172. Looking at the factual matrix (and, in my view, consistent with the textual analysis):
i) In advance of 16 February 2023 Emarat had supplied Moelis with details of the overdraft facility;
ii) As summarised in section B5 above Moelis had prepared a debt finance summary for discussion at a meeting with Emarat on 17 February 2023, in advance of which meeting questions about the overdraft facility were specifically raised of Emarat, and then addressed by Emarat at the meeting.
iii) At no time did Emarat indicate that the overdraft facility was not in scope as part of the debt facilities or that it fell outside the scope of Moelis’s services; nor did Mr Al Rifai when cross-examined on the debt finance summary.
These features support an interpretation that such facility fell within the scope of “existing debt financing” and thus, within the scope of “Existing Debt Package”.
173. Finally, considering the commercial consequences of the competing arguments, given the scope of the Engagement Letter Moelis would be bound to consider the availability of the overdraft facility when considering Emarat’s capital requirements as against their current financing arrangements, in considering whether Emarat required further finance to service their operational requirements. The ENBD facility would therefore fall within the scope of Moelis’s services, but would be excluded on Emarat’s case from the commissionable consequences of a “Restructuring” of that same facility.
174. On balance, I therefore prefer Moelis’s argument and consider that the ENBD overdraft Facility fell within the terms of existing debt financing and within the definition of Existing Debt Package for the purposes of the definition of “Restructuring”.
G5: Were (commissionable) Transactions concluded?
175. Thus, the Court must determine whether Transactions were concluded and, if so, which, if any fee, is triggered and payable.
176. On their primary case, Moelis say that certain existing debt was amended, giving rise to Restructuring Fees, and new loans were entered into with certain banks which give rise to Debt Capital Raise Fees.
177. I reject Moelis’s case that Debt Capital Raise Fees were triggered and became payable for the reasons analysed in section G3 above. I accept Emarat’s case that, having regard to the underlying loan documents and the transactions which were effected, the transactions for which Debt Capital Raise Fees are claimed were transactions by which Emarat’s existing debt financing was amended or refinanced. I do not understand Moelis to dispute that the effect of the transactions was not to introduce new debt into Emarat. In my judgment the Debt Capital Raise fees would only arise for new debt introduced into Emarat once the level exceeded AED 4.75 billion. There is no evidence of that.
178. For the reasons analysed above, I consider, accepting Moelis’s alternative case, that the transactions qualify for commission, if at all, as Restructuring Fees.
179. Moelis say that it is clear that the pleaded transactions amount to “Restructuring” and thus (subject to issues of causation which I consider below) relevant Transactions were concluded and Restructuring Fees are payable.
180. In this context Emarat raises three arguments to the contrary:
i) There was an implied term of the Engagement Letter that the transactions were material. Emarat says that they were not material, and the parties cannot be taken to have intended that commission should be payable in such circumstances.
ii) The transactions which were closed were not within the contemplation of the parties under the Engagement Letter and in particular in the fee structure of Clause 2, which was intended to bite on substantive restructuring transactions and not interim transactions pending substantive restructuring.
iii) The above submissions are supported by the definition of Restructuring Fee which limits the right to transactions amounting to a “restructuring” (lower case “r”), omitting reference to, for example, “amendment”.
Was there a requirement for transaction to be material?
181. Mr Downes submits that there must be a materiality threshold to any transaction to trigger a fee and here the transactions were in substance just a continuation of the status quo (in my words not his) or “roll-overs” of debt (in his words) and they are therefore not qualifying Transactions. The real fire of his submission was directed to the “amendment” part of the definition of Restructuring, but it was relied upon generally.
182. Up to a point I accept the starting point for the submission. However, that point does not go nearly far enough for Mr Downes’ argument to succeed. I consider that the general principle “de minimis non curat lex” would, in this context, apply, as in many other contexts. Application of the doctrine would avoid, in circumstances, for example, a correction of a term of the agreement or of a typographical error as triggering (on the basis of “amendment”) a minimum US$3 million fee. Mr Hardwick says that no such qualification is required, because there must be an amendment “of the existing lending” and such a hypothetical trivial amendment would not, in any event, constitute a qualifying Transaction or qualify for a fee. That may be so. I still regard the doctrine as being potentially applicable. However, questions as to whether the doctrine might ever be engaged do not warrant extending this judgment, because the transactions in question do not get close to engaging any possible application of the doctrine. Each transaction individually and the package collectively represented transactions of precisely the type contemplated by the definition of Restructuring, so far as it applied to the existing debt financing, including new temporal terms as to loans and new terms as to interest, as submitted by Moelis and not seriously challenged by Emarat – see the summary in Annexe 2.
183. Beyond a “de minimis” qualification, I do not consider that any materiality threshold is to be implied into the agreement. The terms of clauses 1 and 2 of the Engagement Letter were central to the parties’ contractual bargain. It was for the parties to draft the protection which they respectively sought. The threshold for implication of terms is high, and I do not consider that the tests are made out. Providing a materiality threshold would give rise to significant dispute as to where such line should be drawn (as witnessed in this trial) and would be far from an obvious implication. The agreement is coherent and works without such implication.
184. In any event, were such a term to be implied, I consider that such transactions would be “material”. Looking simply at the FAB extension in May 2023, this provided for new and substantially modified interest terms and a substantially extended maturity period. These were each key terms of the loan. In circumstances in which “amendment” is part of the definition of “Restructuring”, and where Emarat accept that the FAB extension amounted to an amendment, it is plain, in my view, that such a transaction was material and (subject to the arguments below) fell within the definition of Restructuring.
Transactions not within the contemplation of the parties
185. Mr Downes accepted in closing arguments that a roll-over would be an “amendment” to the existing debt. But, he says, it does not amount to a Restructuring, because such roll-overs were not within the contemplation of the parties as part of Project Hawk which, by 11 April 2023, was the parties’ name for the restructuring project.
186. Mr Downes submitted that the Court should ask itself, “What was the Restructuring (capital R) that the parties contemplated under that project?” He submits that it was not an amendment to existing debt. He developed that submission in two ways: orally in closing submissions he says that what the parties had in mind by the date of the Engagement Letter was a project, and that project was outlined in the timeline put in place at the outset of the informal engagement on about 10 February 2023. That timeline envisaged a close of refinancing of maturing tranches with the project ending in mid-May 2023, before any of the facilities came up for renewal. What was envisaged was a “substantive” refinancing of the existing debt, not a question of intermittent, routine, rollovers. Even in early April 2023 timelines were being produced which indicated completion of financing by the end of May 2023.
187. Emarat therefore say that the imminent expiry of some of the existing facilities meant that either (i) Project Hawk had to be completed before loans matured in 2023 or (ii) extensions of the existing facilities would be needed to buy time for the Project Hawk restructuring to take place later. Either way, Emarat’s argument is that the parties did not envisage a simple extension (referred to at trial as a roll-over, even though there was no contractual right to extend) – either because they never envisaged needing a roll-over (see the pre-agreement timeline documents) or because they would not be ready to undertake the main restructuring or refinancing exercise by the 2023 loan maturity dates and thus would need roll-overs as a holding position pending the real restructure. Either way it is the real restructure which triggers the fee.
188. Mr Downes supports this submission further by what he says is the fallacy of Moelis’s approach whereby, on the facts of the present case, a Restructuring fee would become payable on (for example) the FAB extension in 2023, but not on a subsequent “amendment to an amendment” and not on the substantive restructuring down the line (all parties acknowledging that the total Restructuring Fee is payable only once – it is not payable twice on any part of the existing debt financing). Mr Downes says that this is not a probable understanding of the position, because it would provide no incentive on the part of Moelis to continue working on the project. They could just say “Well, thank you very much. We’ll take this and you take your chance in a couple of years’ time”.
189. Mr Downes further relies upon the wording of clause 1, namely that “the Company will retain complete control and discretion over whether and when to proceed with any Restructuring and shall be free at any time not to consummate a Restructuring, in which event no Transaction Fee will become payable”. He says that this must be intended to be a genuine clause and to contemplate that no (as opposed to some) Restructuring would take place. Given that it was near inevitable that some transactions would be necessary to avoid the cliff-edge of the 2023 loan maturities, if Moelis’s case were correct and the 2023 transactions (the subject of the claim) fell within the definition of “Restructuring” it would undermine the contractual words which contemplate that no Restructuring may take place.
190. Finally, Mr Downes argues that Clause 2(b), in providing for a fee of 0.25% “of the aggregate principal amount of the existing debt financing of the Company…. that is ‘restructured’”, does not deploy the term “Restructured” (capital R) so as to incorporate and cross-refer to the definition of “Restructure” (capital R) in clause 1(a) which, in the context of the existing Debt Package, extends to restructure, reorganise, renegotiate, amend; rather it refers to “restructured” (lower case r). Emarat argues that it cannot be said that the transactions which took place amounted to a “restructure” on any plain English meaning of that word. Mr Downes deployed this argument in support of other submissions as well.
191. Mr Downes’ principal submission is therefore that where, in the event, the restructuring is to be undertaken in phases, with the substantive restructuring in the final phase, it is the substantive restructuring which triggers the fee and not the (as he would put it) interim restructuring.
192. I accept that, in circumstances in which there are two or more phases to a restructuring project, and where each phase includes a transaction which falls within the terms of “Restructuring”, given that commission cannot be payable twice, the agreement requires to be interpreted to ascertain whether it is the first, or some other or subsequent transaction which is intended to trigger the right to commission.
193. Contrary to Emarat’s submissions, I consider that the first qualifying transactions which fell within the definition of Restructuring trigger the Restructuring Fee:
i) For the reasons developed further in section G 6-7 below, this contract was not structured so as to provide commission for procurement or achievement of an objective by Moelis. Commissions were payable where triggering Transactions were closed, in consideration of the provision of services (generally) by Moelis. There was no specific service which Moelis was obliged to undertake to earn commission.
ii) Linguistically, the bifurcation which Emarat seek to draw between “non-substantive” and “substantive” transactions, the former which fall outside the definition and the latter which are included, is not borne out by the language used, which draws no such distinctions. There is no language to support non-payment of commission on the first transactions which would otherwise fall within the definition of “Restructuring”.
iii) Emarat relies, as part of the factual matrix, upon the fact that the parties would have appreciated at the time of contracting, that 93% of the total fee payable in the event that the entire existing debt financing[6] were restructured. The document by reference to which Mr Downes makes that point is, in my view inadmissible, but the fact itself is, I consider, admissible because it is no more than a foreseeable commercial consequence of performing the terms of the contract. The parties would no doubt have considered such commercial consequences before contracting.
iv) The Minimum Fee of US$3 million was a key part of the contract under the Engagement Letter. It was a consistent feature of the Moelis RFP Responses. Any objective observer at the date of the contract would have been in no doubt that such a fee was to be regarded as a central part of Moelis’s remuneration under the contract.
v) Any interpretation of the Engagement Letter which puts in doubt the payment of that fee where a Restructuring exercise was in fact carried out would run contrary to that premise.
vi) In line with that premise, the minimum fee was payable in full on the first Restructuring. That reflects the pre-eminent importance to Moelis (as known to Emarat) of the minimum fee in agreeing to accept the engagement. The fact that it was only payable if a Restructuring was carried out reflects acknowledgment of some risk, but a very limited risk where, on the facts as objectively ascertainable, it was almost inevitable that there would be a Restructuring.
vii) To defer the right to that minimum fee until the final phase of a Restructure would run contrary to the pre-eminent importance of the US$3 million fee by injecting inherent uncertainty into the operation of an otherwise clear-cut scheme.
viii) First, a restructure may (as in this case) take place over many years. What may be intended when the decisions on a project first crystallise may be subject to change, putting in doubt what the “substantive” Restructuring is. It may be that an intended “substantive” Restructuring is abandoned over time. The present case illustrates this. It appears that there have still not been, as at the date of trial, the (on Emarat’s terminology) “substantive” Restructuring transactions which were contemplated in May 2023. I was shown no evidence, and no submission was made about this. If Emarat were right, it would follow that notwithstanding that the pleaded 2023 transactions otherwise qualify as “Restructuring” transactions, no commission is payable to date, and may never become payable.
ix) Second, in this respect, the Engagement Letter is not structured to give effect to Emarat’s interpretation. It provides no protection to Moelis if commission might only be payable upon the “substantive” (i.e. final) restructuring transaction in any medium or long-term restructuring exercise. The contract under the Engagement Letter is terminable on short notice at any time and the “tail” provision only provides for commission to be paid on defined transactions agreed within a year of termination. So, any phased restructure contemplated to take place over the long-term would enable Emarat to terminate and avoid payment of commission because there would be no triggering agreement within a 12-month period of termination.
x) Finally, I do not accept Emarat’s “disincentive” argument – that if the commissions are all paid on “interim” transactions, there is no incentive to continue work under the contract on the “substantive” transactions. Under the Engagement Letter the work was front-loaded, each of the model and advice being very labour-intensive. The commissions are to be seen as part of the consideration for that work. In this regard, it was Emarat’s case that the monthly retainer payments would cover that cost. If so (which I doubt), but in any event, I consider that the monthly retainers alone would provide worthwhile remuneration to Moelis to continue to provide services under the contract, to assist with execution of the final phases, so far as required. In any event, given that it is common ground that the minimum fee was payable on the first Restructuring transaction (whether, adopting Emarat’s characterisation, it was interim or substantive) irrespective of the amount of debt restructured by that transaction, any risk of disincentivisation to see the project through would potentially arise, in any event, following that first transaction.
194. I do not accept that the words of Clause 1 which make payment of commission for a Restructuring conditional on Emarat’s decision to proceed with any such transaction are undermined by the above interpretation. Those words are directed to individual prospective Restructuring transactions, which would include transactions for new debt and equity as well as prospective (and potentially competing) transactions by which Emarat may or may not restructure existing debt, and would apply even though, generally, the debt had to be restructured.
“Restructure” versus “restructure”
195. I do not have sympathy with Mr Downes’ argument distinguishing between the capitalised “R” of “Restructuring” in clause 1 and the lower case “r” in the definition in paragraph 2(a). It seems plain to me that the definitions of fee in clause 2 are intended to work together with the definitions in clauses 1(a)-(d).
196. If Mr Downes were right, a transaction which amounted to, say, an amendment but not a (lower case r) restructure of the existing debt package, as provided for in clause 1(a), would give rise to no fee at all. That does not reflect the structure of the Engagement Letter or the objectively ascertained intention of the parties. I consider that the word “restructured” in clause 2(b) is intended to capture, by way of shorthand, the various meanings of Restructure, so far as that term is addressing existing debt financing. That is clear both contextually, from the agreement as a whole, as well as textually, given that the term “restructured” appears in the context of the words “as part of the Restructuring” and there is further reference to “Restructuring of the total Existing Debt Package” in clause 2(b).
Conclusion
197. Accordingly, in conclusion, while I accept that, in some cases, one might expect commission to be earned at the conclusion of a commissionable transaction (or set of transactions) when it may be said that an agent or service provider “earns their commission”, this will always depend upon the interpretation of the terms of the contract, and, in my judgment, this is not the case under the Engagement Letter.
G 6 and 7: Services and effective cause
198. I turn to the analysis of Emarat’s case that the right to commission payments was subject to a causation requirement, noting that what is pleaded is not that there was a requirement that Moelis were the effective cause, but that the transactions should be attributable to the work of Moelis. Given that no argument was directed to the meaning of “attributable”, I proceed on the basis that Emarat’s case is that, in this context, “attributable to the work of Moelis” is intended to mean that Moelis were the/an “effective cause” of the transactions. This was the concept which was the focus of the parties’ submissions.
199. Emarat’s case on causation is built upon (i) establishing that the stated requirements of the RFP were terms of the agreement under the Engagement Letter (whether expressly or impliedly); and (ii) establishing that the Engagement Letter, so interpreted, or on the basis of such implication, required (as a matter of interpretation or implication) that Moelis should be the/an effective cause of any commissionable Transaction.
200. It is the terms of the RFP which Emarat say supply the “procurement-type” obligation on the part of Moelis which gives rise to the effective cause interpretation/implication. Emarat say that, without resort to the factual matrix, the contractual use of the word “services” has no meaning and the Court should strive to give it meaning. Emarat say that in circumstances in which Moelis were being opaque in not setting out what the services were, Moelis can have no complaint if the Court looks to the factual matrix to work out what services were contractually required.
201. In this regard, Emarat’s case is that, once the full terms of the contract are established, it can be seen that Moelis was retained not merely to advise (although Mr Downes accepts that this was plainly part of their role) but to bring about the transactions themselves.
202. In opening, Emarat relied upon the following features:
i) When Moelis presented to Emarat and pitched for the appointment they stated in clear terms that they would fulfil the brief that was stipulated in the RFP. Given that the services were not defined in the Engagement Letter, the reasonable reader would assume that this was a reference to what Moelis said they would do when pitching for the work. Thus, these services are the contractual services, whether as a matter of construction or implication.
ii) The RFP stipulated that Moelis’s services included “Achieving Financial Closure”.
iii) Moelis’s own pitch for the appointment emphasised their ability to procure delivery of the restructuring, referring to “unmatched execution capabilities; >$100bn value creation to date”: “Only IFA to oversee preparation and execution”; “premier integrated M&A IPO and Capital Markets execution Capabilities”; “Securing access to markets and technology”; “Attracting FDI (Foreign Direct Investment): “Moelis’s scope of work… will be split into three phases… Implementation and Closing Phase: implementing and executing the BoD-approved way forward”; “Identify/approach lender base”; “We have access and strong relationships with relevant stakeholders, banking and investor communities”.
203. In closing, Mr Downes highlighted various features of Moelis’s March 2022 presentation, including references similar to those in paragraph 202(iii) above, in support of a submission that Moelis were not saying “we’ll come and play on your team” (as adviser) but, rather “we’ll deliver the result” (as procurer). He also pointed to Mr Tabet’s evidence that Moelis’s role was to “come up with a range of restructuring options for Emarat” [Tabet 1/7]and his apparent acceptance that it was part of Moelis’s role to identify new lenders [Tabet 1/37]. Emarat’s case is that their characterisation of Moelis’s role is reinforced by the repeated pre-contractual description of the Transaction Fees as “Success Fees”.
204. Moelis say that this analysis is wrong, as summarised in section G1 above. Their case is that this was a general advisory retainer; the requirements of the RFP were not terms of the contract. They say that the contract adequately makes clear the nature and field of the advisory services, through (i) their expressed relationship to the Restructuring of existing debt financing and (ii) the sphere of commissionable transactions. They say that there was no requirement that Moelis should be an effective cause of the (commissionable) Transactions and every reason why that would not be a practicable term, because of the uncertainties of being able to establish fulfilment of any such a requirement where Emarat were making the ultimate decisions, acting in consultation with the EIA and where other advisors were also engaged (lawyers and McKinsey & Company).
RFP requirements as terms of the contract
205. I address, first, the question whether the requirements of the RFP were terms of the contract, before specifically addressing the issue of an effective cause requirement.
206. Turning specifically to the argument that “Services” is to be construed to mean the scope of works identified in the RFP, there has been a shift in Emarat’s case over time:
i) In their pleaded Defence (including as amended), their case was that all the numbered requirements of the RFP were contractual services. Those terms were identified in schedule 2 to the Defence which replicated the twenty items set out under three categories that appeared in the RFP.
ii) The pleaded case was that those terms (the implication being all of them) had to be performed as a condition of the right to receive commission on a Transaction.
iii) In Emarat’s opening, the effective cause requirement was also said to flow, in part, from the terms of the Moelis RFP Response, such that it would now be relevant to look, additionally, at what Moelis were offering, and not merely what Emarat were requiring by their RFP. Emarat affirmed their pleaded case that the requisite performance on the part of Moelis to earn a fee was incomplete because not all the (RFP) services had been provided – [28] of Emarat’s Opening.
iv) Moelis pointed out in opening and in cross-examination that three of the services required under the RFP (items 4-6 of phase 2 of the RFP) could not, on any view, be terms of the Engagement Letter, because Moelis had at all times made clear that they could not provide such services; see also the terms of the Engagement Letter excluding legal, tax, insolvency, accounting or other specialist advice from the scope of the Engagement Letter. As a result, Mr Downes realistically conceded, during trial, that, to the extent that Moelis had made clear that it could not provide services (see items 4-6 of Phase 2 of the RFP) these items were not contractual terms.
v) Emarat also conceded, in closing, that Moelis would not be required to provide all the (seventeen remaining) services set out in the RFP in order to earn a Transaction fee. That concession was also realistic. It is difficult to see how such a requirement could have arisen through a process of either interpretation or implication.
vi) In closing, as stated above, Emarat placed additional reliance on the terms of Moelis’s own pitch in response to the March 2022 RFP to support their “procurement” as opposed to “team player” characterisation of Moelis’s obligations (as summarised above), in turn to support an “effective cause” requirement, which they maintained.
207. Mr Hardwick submits that such shifting sand, of itself, sounds warning bells where the Court is being invited to determine unexpressed, but allegedly certain, terms of an agreement.
208. The Engagement Letter was negotiated over many weeks, each side having access to lawyers. It is to be inferred that it was a deliberate decision not to define “services”. Mr Downes was critical of Moelis’s (candid) evidence that they did not want to tie their hands as to the services which they had to perform, because of what might turn up “under the hood” once the retainer was underway. There was nothing underhand or lacking in transparency in this. It was for each party to negotiate in their own interest. The ultimate result is a contract for advisory services which have not been defined.
209. While there may be a superficial attraction in inviting the Court, via a process of construction, to interpret what is meant by the term “services”, so as to “read in” to the contract multiple specific incidents of the required services, Emarat’s argument faces insuperable difficulties in my judgment:
i) First, the Court must be astute not to introduce, as express terms into the agreement, any statements, warranties or representations which the parties can be taken deliberately not to have adopted, and which, independently, could not validly stand as contractual terms, given the terms of the entire agreement clause. I accept that (at least formally) Emarat are not seeking to establish independent collateral terms. Rather, they are seeking to interpret the existing term “services”.
ii) Second, however, and following on from (i), in substance, the exercise which Emarat invite the Court to undertake is to add an express contractual scope of work to a contract which did not otherwise include one. In my view it is not realistic to describe the attempted introduction of twenty (or even seventeen) additional service provision terms as an exercise in interpreting a general and undefined services obligation. As Mr Hardwick submits, the interpolation of terms in a sophisticated, carefully negotiated contract is always ambitious. In substance, Emarat are inviting the Court to supplement and thus re-write (through a process of constructing rather than construing) the parties’ bargain. This is impermissible – see Lewison at 1.24. It is not for the court, in the guise of interpretation, to substitute for the bargain which the parties did make a different bargain which in its view they would have made if they had been better advised or had had better regard for their own interests.
iii) Third, as above, three of the terms sought to be introduced are inconsistent with the Moelis RFP Response and correspondence (where Moelis had made clear that they could not deliver those particular services) and the terms of the Engagement Letter. Mr Downes disavowed reliance on those three requirements.
iv) Fourth, while it is apparent that there was a level of pre-contract consensus as to the subject matter of the requests in the RFP, as Mr Hardwick submits, Moelis did not consistently address each of the requests in turn in the Moelis RFP Response. In answering the RFP document with their own responsive pitch, Moelis did not “accept” the precise terms of Emarat’s document as drafted. The reasonable party in Moelis’s position would not have reason to suppose that they would assume contractual obligations as a result, particularly in light of: (i) the fact that these exchanges pre-dated any pre-contractual negotiation and (ii) the entire agreement clause included within the Engagement Letter.
v) Fifth, the Moelis RFP Response and its content form no part of Emarat’s pleaded case as to the content of any express or implied term which is limited to the terms of the RFP. It is, in any event, clear that a substantial part of that Moelis offer, for example in connection with introduction of their industry contacts, would only be engaged if Emarat wished to explore relationships with new lenders or investors. It was not automatic or inevitable that this would happen (and in the event it did not).
vi) I can therefore accept, as did Moelis, that there was a meeting of the parties’ minds in a general sense as to what services were likely to be required under any ensuing contract, by reference to the RFP. Moelis accepted at trial that, by reference to the factual matrix, services under the Engagement Letter would fall under the three headings adopted by both Emarat and Moelis in the RFP and the Moelis RFP Response. The issue is whether the parties are to be taken to have intended that the requirements of the RFP should operate as contractual terms. That is a very different enquiry. Even if the Court were otherwise satisfied (which I am not) that it should undertake the exercise of interpretation which Emarat invites, it is not clear in precisely what terms the service requirements could be taken to have been agreed (see by analogy the requirement that the formulation of any implied term is clear and certain). Quite apart from the uncertainty as to formulation of the particular service, would the parties, objectively, for example, have intended that any scope of services should be qualified by wording such as “so far as may be agreed/advised/appropriate” or “subject to agreement to the contrary”? It seems to me inherently improbable that parties in the position of Emarat and Moelis could be taken to have agreed that any scope of work was to define absolute, unqualified obligations on the part of the advisor. Mr Touma’s evidence as to why Moelis did not include such a scope of services is in line with what one might naturally expect, that the precise services to be provided would depend on what the engagement threw up, once Moelis had got “under the hood”. Indeed, Emarat’s abandonment of their case at trial that all of the RFP services had to be performed implicitly recognises that some qualification is appropriate, but no case has been advanced as to how that might be reflected in the express terms to be read into the Engagement Letter by way of interpretation.
210. Accordingly, I reject Emarat’s case that “services” under the Engagement Letter should be interpreted to mean the requirements set out in the RFP as expressed in Schedule 2 of the Amended Defence, even with the three excluded services excised from that list.
RFP requirements as implied terms
211. Mr Downes advanced an alternative case that the RFP requirements should be implied into the Engagement Letter.
212. I consider that if it is not open to interpret Services to mean the items listed in the RFP (as I have found above) then, in the present circumstances, I agree with Moelis that it is not realistically possible to seek to imply such terms into the Engagement Letter, having regard to the high threshold established in the case lawdigested in section F4 above.
213. Principally, this is for the reasons that Mr Hardwick submits, namely that the nature and field of services is adequately described, and the agreement is capable of working coherently without such terms.
214. Whatever arguments might be made in support of implied terms, there can be no warrant for the implication, wholesale, of all twenty (or seventeen) requirements of the RFP, on either grounds of business efficacy or obviousness. The objection to implication arises both generally, as to the substance of the terms and, specifically, as to their formulation, for the reasons explained in connection with express terms above.
215. I therefore conclude that the Services Term is not established.
Effective cause
216. Emarat say that the effective cause requirement arises from the express terms of the Engagement Letter. In opening this was put as follows:
i) Moelis’s obligations extended beyond mere advisory work. They had a procurement obligation, in that it was part of their role to present advantageous options to Emarat and therefore secure a meaningful benefit for it.
ii) The Transaction Fees were expressly linked to the provision of this service.
iii) The Transaction Fees were viewed by both sides as “success fees” which itself implies a causal link between the advantageous changes sought and the work that Moelis was required to do.
217. In closing, the procurement was put even more positively, by reference to the Moelis response to the March 2022 RFP and the (October 2022) Moelis RFP Response, extending to the way in Moelis described their experience, leadership of process, and their credentials for execution and closing of transactions.
218. In the alternative, it is said that the above features give rise to an implied term which fulfils the obviousness requirement.
219. Emarat face two major hurdles:
i) The first is that the express terms of the contract are positively inconsistent with such a requirement;
ii) The second is that, even if, contrary to my conclusions above, the RFP terms were found to be incorporated, I do not consider that they give rise to an effective cause requirement, whether as a matter of interpretation or implication and I deal with this below.
220. Looking first purely at the text of the Engagement Letter, apart from the “tail” provision, dealing with the situation post-termination, there is no language which imposes any condition on the payment by Emarat of commission, save for occurrence of the “Transaction” itself, which I have addressed above. Even taking account of the “tail provision”, there is no express obligation which connotes procurement of an identified objective. Moelis place reliance on the tail provision as undermining Emarat’s suggested interpretation.
221. Further, there are a number of references which contradict either a procurement or any causation condition:
i) First, as Mr Hardwick submits, the general and unspecific language of the appointment itself in clause 1 suggests a general retainer. It does not suggest a defined event objective which Moelis is to procure. It states, in general and wide terms, Moelis’s appointment as “financial advisor” “with respect to” a “Restructuring” “in relation to” the Company’s existing debt financing.
ii) As analysed above, it is clear from the language of clauses 1(a) to (d) that a wide range of transactions were contemplated under the Engagement Letter as potentially arising (contrast e.g. many of the cases cited in this field where the transaction or task was clearly defined, in terms of sale of property, getting rid of a troublesome shareholder, getting investment over the line etc).
iii) The further terms of the Engagement Letter are consistent with an essentially advisory retainer, and do not lend positive support to Emarat’s case as to an effective cause requirement owed by virtue of an agency relationship. Clause 1 indicates that all decisions on transactions will be for Emarat to make. Clause 4 prohibits disclosure or publication of Moelis’s “advice”. Clause 5 provides that Moelis is an independent contractor with contractual duties described herein owed to Emarat. As Ms. Eborall submitted, the term recognises that Moelis “may be acting on your behalf”. It does not accept that they willbe so acting.
iv) The terms as to remuneration (retainers and fee commissions) were expressed to be payable “for our services hereunder”. Properly interpreted, that is a reference to the services provided pursuant to the Engagement Letter.[7] There is a direct analogy here with the relevant contractual term in EMFC, which Carr LJ found to count against a causation requirement at [71]: “The completion fee [i.e. the commission fee] was tied to the delivery of services and not completion.” (emphasis added)” – see [164] above.
v) The Restructuring Fee arises upon debt financing “that is restructured” – referred to in the passive voice (compare the decision in Rothschild per Males J analysed in F5 above) and is payable on closing of a Restructuring. There is no express reference to any act of Moelis which is required to trigger such a fee, nor express provision for any required causal link between any service and the outcome.
vi) The Debt Capital Raise Fee and Equity Capital Raise Fee are triggered by new financing “that [Emarat] or one of its affiliates raisesor issues from time to time”. Again, there is no reference to a required act of Moelis in relation to that raise.
vii) The tail provision provides for no effective cause requirement. The limit of any condition to the right to commission in the event of a post-termination Transaction is that the Transaction must have been “contemplated” during the term of the agreement. It is common ground that this means contemplated “in fact” (i.e. in the performance of the agreement), and not contemplated “in law” (i.e. under the terms of the agreement). Mr Downes submitted that this was a sui generis provision, and explained its rationale as being to avoid Emarat taking advantage of a Moelis solution, holding back on a transaction and terminating in the meantime, so as to avoid payment of commission. However, there is no express requirement that such a transaction was the result of a solution proposed by Moelis, or even that it was contemplated as a result of work undertaken by Moelis. Even if that requirement were to be read into the clause, properly interpretated, this establishes a low threshold and would be satisfied once Moelis had given advice about possible transactions. Only in the case of an approach by an investor to Emarat was an enhanced causation requirement stipulated, namely that they had received marketing or diligence materials “that Moelis helped prepare.” Even in that event, Moelis are not required to have introduced the investor or even (solely) to have prepared any diligence or marketing materials. I accept that the clause covers the scenario where Emarat may wish to exploit a Moelis solution without paying commission, but the required causal link between Moelis’s services and the ultimately commissionable transaction is very limited.
222. Moelis place substantial store by the words which qualify “Restructuring” in clause 1(a) of the Engagement Letter, namely “however implemented”. Moelis say that this provides a complete answer to Emarat’s effective cause case, because they say this provision makes clear that it does not matter “who [i.e. by whom] and how the event is implemented”. I am sympathetic to the general nature of Moelis’s submission, that the text of the Engagement Letter is hostile to an effective cause interpretation, but I do not consider that this particular (“however implemented”) wording administers a knock-out blow to the effective cause case, as claimed. In my view, the use of “however” in this context connotes that it is the substance of the transaction which matters over the form of its implementation. The words used are neutral as to who is responsible for implementation. As is suggested by the formulation of Moelis’s own submission (cited above) the concept of “by whomsoever” is distinct from “however”.
Do the terms of the RFP support a procurement/effective cause requirement?
223. If I am wrong in my approach to the services term above, and if the provisions of the RFP terms are terms of the contract, such that the services term is found to be established, I still would not consider that the effective cause requirement is made out. For completeness, my view would be the same if one were simply to have regard to the RFP as part of the factual matrix in seeking to interpret the provisions of Clause 2 of the Engagement Letter (and therefore without such RFP requirements being terms of the contract).
224. The short answer lies in Emarat’s own formulation of the “procurement” obligation in [216] above. That summary of Moelis’s role does not describe a relevant procurement of the commissionable Transactions such as to give rise to an effective cause requirement. It describes acts as advisor. The fact that Moelis were to “secure meaningful benefit” to Emarat by presenting “advantageous options” does not connote a causal link between Moelis’s acts and the Transactions which can properly be described as amounting to the requirement that Moelis was the (or an) “effective cause” of such transactions.
225. Looking at the detail of the RFP, the requests describe advice and assistance. Cumulatively they call for Moelis to work with Emarat as part of their team. They do not describe a procurement obligation where Moelis are required to achieve an objective. They do not, for example, require introduction of a lender or the bringing about of a Transaction. Emarat submitted that the “RFP stipulates that the RFP services included “Achieving Financial Closure”. However, that reference is to the wording of a heading. The component requests by Emarat of Moelis under that heading are in respect of advice and assistance in respect of achieving financial closure (execution). Thus, the RFP set out requests which have some analogy to the support services which were insufficient to generate an equivalent causal requirement in EMFC, albeit that those services had ultimate execution of Facilities as their aim. EMFC were not engaged to bring about execution or to execute (see per Carr LJ at paras 70-71).
226. Emarat seek to rely on Moelis’s own statements as to their capabilities, both in March 2022 and October 2022. That goes further than the pleaded case on this issue as well as on the services issue. I consider that the “procurement” versus “team player” submission was not consistently rooted in any stable, pleaded, contractual or evidential source.
227. Standing back, one can test Emarat’s submission as to the existence of an effective cause requirement in the context of a hypothetical scenario where Emarat’s debt financing comprises five separate loan facilities expiring at three-month intervals. Assume that each debt required refinancing and that (for the sake of this hypothesis) the product of each such refinancing was a transaction for a loan in the same sum but (all) with one different bank, otherwise known to Emarat. Assume further that: (i) Moelis had raised such refinancing transactions as one possible solution in advice delivered to the Emarat Board; and (ii) that all transactions amounted to a restructure so as, in principle, to come within the terms of a Restructuring Fee under clause 2(a). It would be commercially very surprising if newly negotiated facilities 1-4, all of which closed during the currency of the contract, although contemplated during its currency, gave rise to no commission (because, on Emarat’s case, Moelis did not procure their execution, and was not the effective cause of such transactions) but facility 5, which closed after termination of the agreement, gave rise to a fee because the refinancing was a transaction which had been contemplated during the currency of the agreement.
Conclusion on express term as to effective cause
228. Thus, I consider that the terms of the RFP do not import a requirement that Moelis should be the (or an) effective cause of the Transactions:
i) I do not consider it fatal, or even necessarily damaging to Emarat’s argument that the words “effective cause” are not used in the contract, whether or not the parties could have said so, if they had intended this. I accept Mr Downes’ submission that there are many reported cases in which such a requirement has been established where these words were not used.
ii) Emarat’s difficulty is that both the express terms of the Engagement Letter and the terms of the RFP are inconsistent with such a causal requirement. There is no express support for such a causal requirement in the Engagement Letter (in the absence of the alleged Services Term or generally). The express terms as to remuneration tie the Transaction Fees to the provision of services generally and not to Moelis’s role in completion, and the requests set out in the RFP do not describe a procurement obligation such as to correlate to a requirement that Moelis should be the (or an) effective cause of the Transactions (in line with EMFC, Rothschild, Seymour Pierce and to be distinguished from Burgess and Alphier.)
iii) There is no dispute in this case that Moelis’s performance of services under the retainer earned them payment (duly paid) of the monthly Retainer Fees. The dispute was whether they had done enough to earn commissions. Emarat say not (see paragraph 21 of the Defence). In my judgment the same performance of services by Moelis was required to earn retainer payments as to earn commissions on Transactions. Whether commissions became payable was dependent upon the conclusion of Transactions by Emarat, not on the further performance of additional, unexpressed, causally potent acts on the part of Moelis.
Implied term as to effective cause
229. Emarat submitted that, even if there is no express effective cause requirement, such a requirement should be implied into the Engagement Letter.
230. Mr Downes made his submissions in closing by reference to three distinct scenarios in the estate agency field:
i) Scenario 1: “If you sell my house, I will pay you a commission”. This is said to be a straightforward example (drawn from Windle v Brierly [1952] 1 All ER 398). The sale transaction is the trigger for commission. The words “if you sell my house” import the necessary causal link. Thus, there is an effective cause requirement by interpretation.
ii) Scenario 2: “I retain you to sell my house”. “I will pay you if my house sells.” This was said to be more problematic, but to result in the same conclusion (again via a process of interpretation) because (a) it would be inherently improbable to pay someone a commission calculated against the value of a substantial asset with no link to the services provided – otherwise, in essence, submitted Emarat, this would be a wager and (b) it would be inherently probable that the parties intended the commission to be an incentive to sell the house.
iii) Scenario 3: the express words are simply “I will pay you a commission if my house sells” with no mention of services. Mr Downes submitted that the analysis would be fact-sensitive, but in such a scenario, depending on the factual matrix and the expectations of the parties, an effective cause term might be implied.
231. In submitting that the present case was to be treated under scenario 3, and that such a term was to be implied, Mr Downes relied on the following points:
i) The inherent probability that the substantial Transaction fees would be linked to the services provided – I interpret this as intended to mean “specifically linked”.
ii) Moelis had won the retainer on the basis of claims to be able to execute and close transactions. This could not be said to be a purely advisory retainer.
iii) The use of the word “success” in relation to the fee in antecedent documents.
iv) The fact that 93% of the maximum fees will be payable for closing the first part of a transaction (i.e. payment of the minimum US$3 million fee) – otherwise where is the incentive on Moelis?
v) The level of the monthly retainer fee of US$110,000 which was to cover Moelis’s base level costs with the Transaction Fees. Mr Downes put it as follows: “We know that we can pay everybody’s wages on that, keep the lights on and then if it all comes off, kerching, 3 million.”
vi) Out of pocket expenses were recovered in line with the contract.
232. Fundamentally, the answer to Emarat’s case on implied terms lies in my analysis of the express term which Emarat contended for. This is not an informal oral agreement, but a sophisticated written agreement by professionals drafted by lawyers. The implied term sought would, in my judgment, and for the reasons previously analysed, be:
i) Inconsistent with the express terms of the agreement;
ii) Incompatible with the terms of the RFP, whether they were terms of the Engagement Letter or merely part of the factual matrix;
iii) In any event, neither necessary nor obvious and would not pass the test for implication set out in section F4 above.
233. I have already addressed the issues of characterisation, commercial rationale and interpretation raised in points (i) to (iv) of Mr Downes’ argument earlier in the judgment. Point (v) is speculation. It may or may not be supported by Moelis’s commercial rationale. However, there is no evidence of the actual costs in question and no such material formed part of the factual matrix. Even if the premise of the purpose and calculation of the monthly retainers were correct (and Mr Downes’ calculation was simplistic because the notional hourly rate breakdown does not take account of other workstreams progressing alongside the model), it does not lead to the appropriateness or implication of an effective cause term based on necessity or obviousness. Objectively, part of the calculation of the fee model is likely to have turned on the perceived likelihood of there being a Restructuring so as to trigger a minimum fee. In my judgment that fee was not a speculative “nice to have”, but something which Moelis would, on the basis of the contract interpreted against the admissible factual matrix, have expected, in the ordinary course of things, to receive.
234. The absence of support in case law for the implication of an effective cause term in a case such as this, and powerful dicta doubting their availability, only fortifies the conclusion which I reach on application of ordinary contractual principles. Accordingly, I reject the implied term as to attributability/effective cause for which Emarat contend.
Were Moelis’s services the effective cause?
235. As to whether the services provided by Moelis were the/an effective cause of the transactions, although Emarat accept that there were some communications between Emarat and Moelis about the FAB extension they contend that they came nowhere near establishing that Moelis were the effective cause of the extension. Moelis were not involved with the post-suspension transactions and cannot be said to have provided any services that led to their coming about.
236. Moelis do not claim that they were necessarily the or an effective cause of the transactions in respect of which they claim commission. They claim, and I agree, that they provided their services as required pursuant to the Engagement Letter; and they provided all the services which they were reasonably able to provide before the retainer (and accordingly their ability to provide services) was paused in June 2023. I deal further with this in connection with Pause/Suspension of the retainer below. As explained earlier in the judgment I find, if it is necessary (which on the basis of my conclusions it is not) that Emarat would not have entered into any of the transactions in respect of which commission is claimed without having had Moelis’s advice and their financial model.
H. The effect of the pause/suspension
237. Emarat has a further argument, namely that all terms conferring an entitlement to remuneration, including commission fees, were suspended on or about 15 June 2023. That issue is reflected in issue 6 of the List of Issues.
238. Mr Downes contends that the effect of the suspension was beyond what was envisaged by the contractual option to invoke a “pause” provided in clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter. He submits that there was a separate self-standing suspension agreement, and that the effect of such an agreement is broader than the effect of a pause under Clause 2(a). He maintains, in any event, that the contractual pause under clause 2(a) gave rise to the same suspension of rights.
239. There are two questions which arise:
i) Was there an agreement to “suspend” the retainer including all rights to remuneration, which was independent of the contractual right to “pause” in clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter?
ii) Whether, under an independent suspension agreement or under a clause 2(a) pause, Transaction Fees, as distinct from retainer payments, were to be suspended.
Was there an agreement to suspend independent of the contractual right to pause?
240. The issue of suspension/pause was first engaged on the pleaded case by Moelis in their Particulars of Claim, which, at [5], pleaded as follows:
“by e-mail … dated 14 June 2023, Emarat formally requested the temporary suspension of the engagement, effective from 13 June 2023 until further notice…. This temporary suspension paused Emarat’s obligation to pay the Retainer Fees during the period of the suspension (pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of the Engagement Letter). However, the suspension did not pause or extinguish Emarat’s obligation to pay any other fees due and payable under the terms of the Engagement Letter, including any Restructuring Fees or Debt Capital Raise Fees”.
241. Emarat admit and aver that plea by [16] of their Amended Defence, thus admitting and averring the pause of Emarat’s obligation to pay Retainer Fees pursuant to paragraph 2(a) of the Engagement Letter. Paragraph 16 continues:
“As a result and by agreement (“the Suspension Agreement”) the parties agreed that the Defendant would not provide any services under the Engagement Letter until they resumed by way of a further agreement. As a result and on its true construction (alternatively by way of implication) the Suspension Agreement provided thatthere would be no further consideration payable for services after 15th June 2023”.
242. Emarat further assert (at [17]) that it was an implied term of the Suspension agreement that the Restructuring and Debt Capital Raise Fees would only be payable if the Restructuring or Debt Capital Raise were attributable to Moelis’s services provided before the Suspension Agreement. Emarat accept that this implication arises on the grounds of the prevention principle and/or obviousness, to avoid a scenario where Moelis do the work but are precluded from being paid a Transaction Fee because Emarat have paused/suspended the retainer.
243. I do not accept Emarat’s arguments, whether as a matter of pleading or substance. I consider from the context of the written communications in June 2023 and from the actions of Emarat and reactions of Moelis at the time, as reflected in their witness evidence, that, objectively, the request to suspend the engagement was, and would objectively have been understood, as an instruction to pause made under clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter.
244. Nothing in the correspondence from Emarat to Moelis did anything to put Moelis on notice that the proposed suspension/pause was an arrangement other than as contemplated under clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter, and it would not have been understood otherwise. The “agreement” reached by the parties in correspondence amounted to no more, in my judgment, than Moelis’s confirmation of Emarat’s invocation of their right to pause work under the Engagement Letter. Suspension and pause were, in this context, to be regarded interchangeably, as, indeed, those terms were in Mr Al Ansari’s first witness statement at [5.7]-[5.8] and [9.1]-[9.2].
245. I accordingly reject Emarat’s submission that the alleged Suspension Agreement gave rise to a “stronger cessation” of obligations than would have occurred under the clause 2(a) pause. Whether or not the right to be paid Transaction Fees survived the introduction of the pause is to be answered by reference to the interpretation of the Engagement Letter and not by reference to the interpretation of an alleged separate Suspension Agreement.
246. It follows that there is no independent analysis or process of interpretation or implication to be undertaken in relation to the “suspension agreement”. So, the correspondence which Mr Downes invited me to consider in interpreting the Suspension Agreement, as part of what he submitted was the factual matrix to that agreement, but which he accepted would be inadmissible in interpreting the Engagement Letter (because it post-dated it) is inadmissible as an aid to construction. The task is to interpret the effect of the pause on the right to Transaction Fees in clauses 2b – 2d.
Does the right to Transaction Fees survive the suspension/pause?
247. As to whether the right to receive fees survived a pause, I consider that there are a number of features of the agreement which lead to the conclusion that the parties are to be taken, objectively, to have intended that such a right survived the contractual pause.
i) The structure of the agreement under the Engagement Letter, in particular that the right to pause is to be found within a paragraph dealing expressly with the right to Retainer Fees.
ii) The clear commercial rationale for such a clause (confirmed by Moelis in evidence), to the effect that there may be periods of an engagement where there is little for Moelis to do or where they can render little additional value. That is reflected in express words making clear that the request to stop work entails a pause on payment of the regular, monthly Retainer Fees.
iii) By contrast, that same rationale does not extend to a pause on the right to receive one-off Transaction Fees, and in particular the stipulated minimum fee of US$3 million. There is no corresponding express wording, whether in that paragraph or in any of paragraphs (b) to (d) stating that the pause under clause 2(a) has the effect that the right to receive Transaction fees is equally suspended;
iv) Realistically, (and given the minimum US$3 million fee in clause 2(b)) it was the Transaction Fees and not the Retainer Fees which would have been understood, objectively, to represent the major part of the remuneration available under the agreement. It would, thus, be a commercially very surprising result (and one for which one would expect clear drafting) for the parties to have intended objectively to put in Emarat’s hands, unilaterally, the power to deprive Moelis of the right to receive fees. The pause clause permits Emarat (as has happened) to decide whether the pause should end up being a permanent state of affairs, given that there is no obligation to terminate the pause and to revive the contract.
v) It is clear (and would have been objectively clear to the parties prior to the Engagement Letter being signed, from the work being done in the period between 10 February 2023 and 11 April 2023) that the work under the appointment to act as financial advisor was significantly front-loaded. Objectively, the pause clause is likely to be invoked (as here) where Emarat has received value from Moelis (e.g. as in this case, a model and recommendations) and does not need further advice.
vi) Emarat, pre-empting the obvious objection in (iv), seek to meet it through their acceptance of an implied term that if the work already done by Moelis means that the transaction is attributable to Moelis then the fee is payable. However, that does not wholly address the objection or its inherent unfairness. If, contrary to my conclusions above, Moelis were not to have done sufficient work to earn the fee by the date of the pause, not only would the pause prevent payment of a fee due and owing, but it would prevent Moelis from earning their fee in the first place.
248. Moelis say that if there is a term that their fees are contingent upon the provision of services then the Court must also imply the correlative term that Emarat could not prevent Moelis from performing those services, and, so, barring the right to fees. They rely upon the commentary from Lewison at 6.127 and cases cited therein in support of the principle often referred to as the “prevention principle”.
249. However, I do not consider that the prevention principle can readily apply in this context. It is a necessary element of the operation of that principle – which is itself often regarded as an incident of the principle that the contract should not be construed in a way that allows the contract-breaker to take advantage of his own breach – that there has been a breach of contract. In the present context the “prevention” arises through the invocation of an express contractual term. Thus, the prevention principle would not be an answer to Emarat’s principal case on this issue, if their interpretation as to the effect of the pause were otherwise right.
250. Emarat’s interpretation can be cross-checked against what would have happened if, instead, Emarat had terminated the agreement in June 2023 rather than pausing it. In that event, the transactions which took place in 2023 (which were contemplated by the parties during the engagement) would have generated Restructuring Fees for Moelis. I consider that it would be uncommercial and irrational if Emarat can, instead, put the retainer on pause for over three years and deny payment to Moelis of the major part of their anticipated remuneration under the Engagement Letter, including the stipulated minimum fee, and meanwhile undertake transactions by which Emarat’s debt is restructured using Moelis’s model and informed by Moelis’s advice.
251. Taking these considerations together, I do not consider that Emarat’s interpretation can be correct. Emarat’s construction requires the further implication of a term (even on their own interpretation) to save it from being objectionable. Their interpretation still permits Emarat to invoke the pause indefinitely (as they have done), to avoid (on their case) rights to commission accruing, and so as to avoid paying commission under the “tail” on termination.
252. Accordingly, I prefer Moelis’s interpretation – a request to cease work paused the retainer payments and not the rights in respect of Transaction Fees. Those rights were unaffected by the “pause”.
253. On the facts of the case, the right to receive payment in respect of the amendment of the FAB facility had crystallised, as a renewed facility had been agreed in May 2023, and the pause could not be used to withhold it.
254. As regards the balance of the debt facilities:
i) Moelis had provided their services, and had given their advice and the Emarat Board had approved a strategy informed by advice from Moelis.
ii) I consider that, to the extent that transactions generating fees over and above the US$3 million minimum fee were triggered following the suspension, Moelis had done all that they were required to do under the agreement, namely, to provide services up to June 2023, and to remain willing to provide services again if the retainer was revived.
255. The pause has remained in place from June 2023 to date. In that period existing debt has been restructured within the meaning of clause 2(b) (starting from July 2023) and the pause was imposed in circumstances where there was no further work expected from Moelis which would be of immediate benefit to Emarat.
256. Accordingly, Emarat’s invocation of the pause/suspension under clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter does not affect Moelis’s right to Transaction Fees.
I. Disposal
257. For the reasons explained above, Moelis’s claim succeeds to the extent indicated in [12] aboveand in my answers to the list of issues as set out in Annexe 1.
258. I invite Counsel to draw up an order giving effect to those conclusions.
Annexe 1 – The List of Issues
In relation to the Engagement Letter and its terms:
1. What was the effect of the Engagement Letter? When the Engagement Letter was signed, was there an expectation that Emarat’s exposure to Government debt could be reduced and replaced by other financial instruments or assets sales and the like? (Def/5, Reply/5).
Were the objectives of the engagement to: (i) identify a plan to deleverage Emarat’s balance sheet; (ii) ensure that Emarat had adequate access to capital to deliver on growth and transformation initiatives; (iii) remove guarantees issued by the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Finance (“the MoF”); and (iv) maintain existing relationships with Emarat’s banking partners?
Is it the case that although Emarat had the benefit of guarantees issued by the MoF to certain of Emarat’s creditors, Emarat did not (at the time) have any exposure to debt issued directly by the United Arab Emirates government? (ADef/5, AReply/5).
It is common ground on the pleaded case that there were objectives in the form of (i) to (iv) stated above. That did not mean that Moelis’s engagement required it to deliver those objectives or that any fee remuneration was subject to achievement of those objectives.
There was no “expectation”, if that term is being used in the context of a contractual expectation (objectively ascertained from the terms of the contract) thatEmarat’s exposure to Government debt could be reduced and replaced by other financial instruments or assets sales and the like.
The question of Emarat’s exposure to debt issued directly by the United Arab Emirates government was not the subject of substantial evidence or argument at trial. It did not appear to be in dispute, nor is the question critical to the issues which, on the arguments advanced at trial, the Court has to determine.
2. Was it an express, alternatively, an implied term of the Engagement Letter that the Restructuring Fee, the Debt Capital Raise Fee and the Equity Capital Raise Fee were success fees, namely that they became due as a result of the said restructuring, debt capital raise or equity capital raise [fee sic] being procured as a result of the services Moelis DIFC provided under the Engagement Letter? (ADef/8, Reply/8).
No.
It was neither an express nor an implied term of the Engagement Letter that the defined fees became due as a result of the identified triggering events being procured as a result of the services Moelis provided.
If there was such a term, it was, nevertheless satisfied – see below.
3. Was it an express, alternatively, implied term of the Engagement Letter that fees would be paid to it only upon provision of the services set out in the RFP? (ADef/12, AReply/12).
No.
The fees were (along with the Retainers) payable “as compensation for” and therefore, in consideration of, services being provided by Moelis under the Engagement Letter.
It was not an express or implied term of the Engagement Letter that fees would only be paid upon provision of the services set out in the RFP if it is thereby suggested that all such services had to be provided.
Emarat did not advance or maintain this case in closing submissions. Emarat expressly accepted that not all services set out in the RFP had to be provided, but submitted that Moelis had to be the effective cause of the transactions.
It was not, in any event, a term of the Engagement Letter that services as set out in the RFP were to be provided.
3A. Was it a requirement for there to be a “Restructuring” within the meaning of the Engagement Letter, for the same to be “material” (ADef/38A-38D, AReply.32A.2-32A.3).
A de minimis change, if otherwise within the definition of Restructuring, within the scope of the “de minimis non curat lex” principle would not give rise to a Transaction and would not, accordingly, trigger a fee, as defined. Otherwise, there was no express or implied “materiality” threshold pursuant to the Engagement Letter.
In relation to the services provided:
4. What services did Moelis DIFC agree to perform pursuant to the Engagement Letter in consideration for the fees set out therein? In particular, did Moelis DIFC agree to perform the services set out in the RFP? (ADef/10-11, AReply/10).
They agreed to perform services [consistent with their appointment] as financial advisor with respect to the Restructuring (defined in clause 1(a)) in relation to Emarat’s existing debt financing.
There was no express, or implied, agreement to perform the services set out in the RFP.
5. What advice and/or services did Moelis DIFC in fact provide? (APOC/7, ADef/19-22 and Sch 1, AReply/18-22).
They provided services in connection with assessing Emarat’s current financial state, development and delivery of a financial model, setting out a strategic financing plan and recommending a capital structure plan, and they gave further advice about lender engagement and addressed specific questions on the proper approach to negotiations on future lending.
In relation to the suspension:
6. Was the effect of the temporary suspension of the engagement (effective from 13 or 15 June 2023) that no Restructuring Fees or Debt Capital Raise Fees would be payable after that date? (APOC/5, ADef/16, AReply/15).
No.
The effect of the temporary suspension, was, as stated expressly in clause 2(a) of the Engagement Letter, that Retainer Fee payments would be paused during the suspension. The Engagement Letter did not provide, and its effect was not, that no fees (as provided for in paragraphs 2(b) – (d)) would be payable. Such fees would be payable if the transactions the subject of the fees were concluded.
In relation to the fees claimed in respect of “Restructuring”:
7. Was the FAB Extension a “Restructuring” under the terms of the Engagement Letter? (APOC/9.1, ADef/29-30, AReply/27-28).
Yes
8. Did Emarat increase the size of its facility with ADCB from AED 1,000 million to AED 2,500 million (completed in September 2023)? (APOC/8.2, ADef/33).
Yes
Alternatively, did Emarat simply move AED 1,500 million from FAB to ADCB without increasing Emarat’s Existing Debt Package? (ADef/33-34, AReply/30.1-30.2).
Legally, there was no novation. There was discharge of one set of obligations and entry into a new set of obligations. In terms of commercial effect, the increase in the value of loans from ADCB was neutral in terms of the overall level of the Debt Package.
It is not determinative of the relevant contractual issues to characterise the transactions by reference to either of the “alternatives” posited. They are not, in context, alternative propositions. The transaction fell within the terms of clause 2(b), but not 2(c) of the Engagement Letter, because it amounted to a Restructuring (and a restructuring – lower case “r”) of Emarat’s Existing Debt Package within the meaning of clause 2(b). The fee structure in clause 2 set up mutually exclusive fees. Thus, although the increase of the facility amounted to “new debt” in the sense that the bank agreed to lend a greater sum than it had lent before, the transaction fell within the terms of clause 2(b) and was not new debt as contemplated by clause 2(c), i.e. new debt in the sense of debt, when taken together with other facilities, in excess of the level of the Existing Debt Package.
9. Was the ADCB Raise a “Restructuring”, in particular, a “Debt Capital Raise” under the terms of the Engagement Letter? (APOC/9.2, ADef/35-36, Reply/30.3 and 31).
Yes, it was a Restructuring within the terms of clause 1(a).
No, it did not amount to a Debt Capital Raise Transaction giving rise to a Debt Capital Raise Fee within clause 2(c).
Alternatively, was the ADCB Raise (the ADCB 1,500m Facility) a “Restructuring” giving rise only to a “RestructuringFee”? (APOC/9.3, ADef/38E).
Yes, the ADCB raise was a Restructuring which gave rise (only) to a Restructuring Fee.
See 8 (second question) above.
10. In respect of either the FAB Extension and/or the ADCB Raise (and subject to issues 1 and 2), did Moelis DIFC provide services to entitle it to a Restructuring Fee and/or Debt Capital Raise fee? (ADef/37, AReply/32).
The Restructuring Fee was not dependent upon the provision of particular services.
In any event the services which Moelis provided were such as to entitle them to a Restructuring Fee, but not a Debt Capital Raise Fee.
10A. Was the ADCB 1,000m Extension a “Restructuring” under the terms of the Engagement Letter such as to trigger a “Restructuring Fee”? (APOC/9.4, ADef/38B, 38E).
Yes
10B. Was the ENBD 1,500m Facility a “Debt Capital Raise” under the terms of the Engagement Letter such as to trigger a “Debt Capital Raise Fee”?
No – see the reasoning in 8 above.
Alternatively, was the ENBD 1,500m Facility a “Restructuring” giving rise to a “Restructuring Fee”? (APOC/9.5-9.6, ADef/38E-F).
Yes, see the reasoning in 8 above
10C. Was the ENBD Overdraft Amendment a “Restructuring” giving rise to a “Restructuring Fee”?
(APOC/9.7, ADef/38D-E).
Yes
10D. Were the services provided by Moelis DIFC the effective cause of the FAB Extension, the ADCB Debt Raise, the ADCB 1000m Extension, the ENBD 1,500m Facility, or the ENBD Overdraft Amendment?
There was a causal link between the services provided and the transactions in question. Emarat and the EIA would not have proceeded without advice from Moelis. Moelis fulfilled their contractual services and carried out such services pursuant to the Engagement Letter as it was reasonably able to prior to the suspension/pause coming into effect.
[ISSUES 11 AND 12 WERE DELETED BY AMENDMENT BEFORE TRIAL ]
In relation to the sums and other relief claimed:
13. In respect of the FAB Extension, is Moelis DIFC entitled to US$2,670,000 (plus VAT) (being, $3 million in respect of the FAB Extension, less the first three months of retainer fees paid by Emarat of US$330,000)? (APOC/13.1, ADef/45, AReply/38).
14. In respect of the ADCB Capital Raise, is Moelis DIFC entitled to US$3,675,970 (plus VAT) (being, 0.9% of AED 1,500 million (the amount of new debt capital advanced by ADCB)? (POC/13.2, Def/45, Reply/38). Alternatively, is Moelis DIFC entitled to a “Restructuring Fee” in respect of the ADCB Capital Raise? (APOC/9.3, ADef/38E).
14A. In respect of the ADCB 1,000m Extension, the ENBD 1,500m Facility, and the ENBD Overdraft Amendment, to what fees is Moelis DIFC entitled? (APOC/13.4,16.1, ADef/45).
13. Yes
14-14A. Moelis is entitled to a Restructuring Fee in respect of all the transactions listed above, less US$330,000 dollars being the sum payable for three months of Retainer Fee payments, which is deductible from the sum otherwise due. It is not entitled to a Debt Capital Raise Fee in respect of any transaction.
Annexe 2 – Emarat – Summary table of Existing Facilities & Restructurings
| Fac. | Bank | AED | Date Agreed | Maturity | Pricing | Document | Ref |
| 1 | FAB | 750m | 22.4.18 | 27.5.23 | 1m EIBOR+55bps | TLA2 2 “TLA” = “Term Loan Agreement”. (22.4.18) | {F1/7/23-44} |
| 2 | FAB | 250m | 1.6.22 | 4.7.23 | 1m EIBOR+40bps | TLA (1.6.22) | {F1/16/164-187} |
| 3 | ADCB | 1bn | 15.7. 22 | 16.7.23 | 1m EIBOR+45 bps | TLA (15.7.22) | {F1/19/207-266} |
| 4 | FAB | 1.25bn | 14.7.19 | 31.7.24 | 1m EIBOR+40bps | TLA (14.7.19) | {F1/10/47-69} |
| 5 | FAB | 1.5bn | 21.1.21 | 31.1.26 | 1m EIBOR+52bps | TLA (21.1.21) | {F1/11/70-93} |
| TOTAL: 4.75bn | |||||||
| 6 | ENBD | 750m O/D | 5.5.21 | n/a | EIBOR/LIBOR+62.5bps | FAL3 3 “FAL” = “Facility Amendment Agreement”. (19.1.22) | {F1/12/94-103} |
| Restructurings | |||||||
| Fac. | Bank | AED | Date Agreed | New Maturity | New Pricing | Document | Ref |
| 7 | FAB | 750m | 21.6.23 | 31.5.24 | 3m EIBOR+28 bps | AA4 4 “AA” = “Amendment Agreement”. (21.6.23) | {F2/384/1244-1250} {F2/353/1137} |
| 8 | ADCB | 1bn | 28.9.23 | 24 months from 14.7.235 5 Definition of “Final Termination Date” at (a) {F2/384/1337} | 3m EIBOR66 See too {F2/424/1487}. +0.30%7 7 Increasing to 0.60% for second year {F2/411/1339} subject to Clause 2.2(a) right to seek to negotiate a new margin under the Margin Review Option {F2/411/1344}. | ARD8 8 “ARD” = “Amendment and Restatement Deed”. (28.9.23) | {F2/411/1323-1389} |
| 9 | ADCB | 1.5bn | 28.9. 23 | 24 months from 28.9.239 9 Definition of “Final Termination Date” at (b) {F2/384/1337} | 3m EIBOR+0.30%10 10 See footnote 7. | ARD (28.9.23) | {F2/411/1323-1389} |
| 10 | ENBD | 1.5bn | 21.11. 23 | 6 months + 3 x 6mnth rollovers | 3m EIBOR+0.30%11 11 See {F2/431/1503} under heading “Clause 3.8 Loan Facility – Short Term Loan” | FAL (21.11.23) | {F2/431/1500-1510} |
| 11 | ENBD | 750m O/D | 21.11.23 | n/a | 1m EIBOR+0.60% | FAL (21.11.23) FAL (27.5.25) |
{F2/431/1503} |
Notes
[1] I refer to each of the parties in the plural.
[2] Presumably, the auditors’ concern as to whether Emarat was a going concern.
[3] In the sums of (i) AED 250 million expiring on 4 July 2023 and (ii) AED 1.25 billion expiring on 31 July 2024.
[4] As conveniently summarised by Carr LJ in EMFC Loan Syndication LLP v The Resort Group plc[2022] 1 WLR 717 at [61]
[5] I accept that the concepts of restructuring, renegotiation, reorganisation and amendment are not mutually exclusive and would, in their likely application, overlap.
[6] This calculation excludes the impact of including the overdraft facility, but the essence of the point remains.
[7] See by analogy and reaching a similar conclusion per Rix J in BHP Petroleum Ltd v British Steel plc (QBD) unrep 5 July 1999.
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Official sources: view the source page
Open Justice Licence (The National Archives).