Administrative United Kingdom

Carmelo Renold Francis v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: HU/56408/2026

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Nottingham
On 22 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Athwal

Between

CARMELO RENOLD FRANCIS

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Slatter, Counsel, instructed by Solidum Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr Hogg, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 30 April 2026.

Background

2. The appellant is a national of Grenada. He has resided in the United Kingdom since 2001, having arrived at the age of 20, and was granted indefinite leave to remain on 7 September 2006.

3. On 2 December 2025, he was convicted of being knowingly concerned in the evasion of a prohibition or restriction on the importation of a Class A controlled drug. The offence involved 2.14 kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment.

4. Following that conviction, the respondent served notice of her intention to make a deportation order on 17 January 2026. By a decision dated 30 April 2026, the respondent refused the appellant’s human rights claim and made a deportation order.

5. The appellant is a foreign criminal for the purposes of Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. Given the length of the sentence imposed, it is accepted that neither Exception 1 nor Exception 2 can determine the appeal. The central issue is whether the appellant has established very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in the statutory exceptions, such that his deportation would be disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR.

The Hearing

6. The hearing was conducted face to face. It was recorded and that is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

Issues

7. The following matters were agreed between the parties:

(a) The appellant was lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life.

(b) There were no very significant obstacles to his integration in Grenada.

(c) The appellant’s wife is a British citizen and a qualifying partner for the purposes of s.117C(5). It is accepted that their relationship is genuine and subsisting.

(d) The appellant’s child is a British citizen and, at the date of the hearing, was six years old. The child is a qualifying child and it is accepted that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with him.

(e) It is in the child’s best interests to remain in his established home in the United Kingdom with the appellant, his stepmother and his siblings, to maintain contact with his biological mother, and to continue to receive support in relation to his potential neurodivergence.

8. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

(a) Whilst the appellant cannot meet Exception 1, the particular issues for consideration are:

(i) Is the appellant socially and culturally integrated?

(b) Whilst the appellant cannot meet Exception 2, the particular issues are:

(i) Whether the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh on the partner if she remained in the UK without the appellant?

(ii) Whether the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh on the partner if she were to live in Grenada with the appellant?

(i) Whether the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh on the child if he remained in the UK without the appellant?

(ii) Whether the effect of deportation would be unduly harsh on the child if he were to live in Grenada with the appellant?

(c) Are there very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, such as to outweigh the public interest in the appellant’s deportation?

Evidence

9. I heard evidence from the appellant, his wife, his three adult daughters, and the partner of one of his daughters. Each witness adopted their witness statement. I also had regard to the submissions made by the representatives. In reaching my findings, I have considered the oral evidence, the parties’ submissions, and the documentary evidence contained within the MyHMCTS file.

Legal Framework

10. I have applied section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

11. Paragraphs 46 to 50 of HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22 explained very compelling circumstances. It is possible for the Appellant to succeed despite not satisfying Exceptions 1 or 2, or to succeed in a very strong claim that does satisfy Exception 1 or 2.

12. Seriousness of the offence is assessed by reference to the sentence imposed. If there is information showing the sentence was changed for reasons unrelated to seriousness, for example prior offences, personal mitigation or a guilty plea, these should be discounted from the level of sentence when assessing seriousness in the context of section 117C.

Determination of the Issues

Exception 1

13. The appellant cannot satisfy Exception 1. His sentence exceeded four years’ imprisonment and it is accepted that there are no very significant obstacles to his integration in Grenada. It is nevertheless important to consider the other factors. The respondent accepts that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life. Accordingly, the remaining issue relevant to Exception 1 is whether the appellant is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. For the reasons set out below I am satisfied that he is.

14. The respondent submits that the appellant has not established that he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. Reliance is placed on the absence of documentary evidence demonstrating lawful employment after 2008, save for a statement from a claimed employer. The respondent contends that, in light of the appellant’s offending history, it is reasonable to infer that he supported himself through unlawful activity rather than legitimate employment. The respondent further submits that there is little evidence of the appellant’s wider engagement with, or participation in, British society. Whilst the appellant has produced character references and evidence of a joint mortgage with his wife, the respondent argues that this evidence is insufficient, either individually or cumulatively, to demonstrate genuine social and cultural integration. The respondent also relies on the appellant’s drug-related offending, which it is said is inconsistent with the societal norms and values expected of a person who is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.

15. The appellant submits that he is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. Reliance is placed on the respondent’s acceptance that he has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and that he has held indefinite leave to remain since 2006. The appellant further relies upon his lengthy residence in the United Kingdom, his long-standing marriage, his jointly owned family home and mortgage, his employment history, and the fact that his children and grandchild are British citizens residing in the United Kingdom. The appellant accepts that his serious offending weighs heavily against him and that neither his employment history nor home ownership is, in itself, sufficient to establish social and cultural integration. His case, however, is that when these matters are considered cumulatively, they demonstrate substantial and enduring private and family life ties to the United Kingdom and support a finding that he is socially and culturally integrated.

16. I do not accept the respondent’s submission that the appellant supported himself through unlawful means after 2008. That submission is speculative and is not supported by the evidence before me. I was not referred to any evidence of unlawful conduct on the appellant’s part prior to the index offence in 2019. The PNC only records the index offence.

17. The appellant and his wife were cross-examined about how they supported themselves after 2008. They gave consistent evidence that the appellant had been employed by the local authority as a gravedigger and sustained a back injury in the course of that employment. Their evidence was that the local authority settled his claim before proceedings were issued and paid compensation of approximately £40,000. Following a period of physiotherapy and recovery, the appellant retrained as a builder, established his own business, and worked on a self-employed basis undertaking building and maintenance work. The appellant’s wife explained that business records had been provided to their solicitors but that some documents had subsequently been lost during a house move.

18. That account was supported by other witnesses. During cross-examination, the appellant’s second eldest daughter referred, without prompting, to her father’s business and explained that she and her elder sister assumed responsibility for it following his imprisonment. Her partner also gave detailed evidence regarding the assistance he provided to the business after the appellant’s imprisonment and the responsibilities previously undertaken by the appellant. The witnesses gave consistent accounts of the nature of the business and its operation both before and after the appellant’s imprisonment. Their evidence was not materially undermined in cross-examination. Taken together, I am satisfied that it provides a credible and cogent explanation as to how the appellant supported himself and his family after 2008.

19. In considering whether the appellant was socially and culturally integrated into wider British society, I attach weight to his employment history, including the documentary evidence of employment before his retraining and subsequent self-employment. I also take into account that he has been married since October 2001, has four children and grandchildren in the United Kingdom, and lives with both his wife’s niece and his mother-in-law. The evidence was that the niece, now aged 12, has lived in the family home since she was approximately three years old and that the appellant has played a significant role in her upbringing. I accept the evidence that, within the family home, the appellant shared caring responsibilities for his mother-in-law who has Alzheimer’s disease. I further take account of the evidence of his daughter’s partner, who described the appellant as having welcomed him as a member of the family.

20. I also attach weight to the character references contained within the appellant’s bundle from friends and the daughter’s partners. Those references describe the appellant as a hardworking, supportive and responsible individual who has maintained longstanding and positive relationships within his community.

21. Further, I attach weight to the observations made by the sentencing judge, who recorded that the references provided by the appellant’s family and friends described him as a positive influence, a hardworking and responsible individual, and a devoted family man. Those observations are consistent with the oral evidence before me regarding the appellant’s family life and relationships and the references I have been provided with.

22. Drawing the evidence together, I am satisfied that, prior to the commission of the index offence, the appellant had established and maintained strong family, social and economic ties within the United Kingdom over many years. He had worked, supported his family, cared for members of his extended household, maintained longstanding friendships, and built a settled life here. I therefore find that, prior to the commission of the index offence, the appellant was socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.

23. I next consider whether the appellant remains socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom. In doing so, I have had regard to the principles set out in CI (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 2027, including that criminal offending and imprisonment are relevant considerations as they may weaken or sever previously established social and cultural ties and may reduce a person's opportunities to participate in the life of the community.

24. Having found that the appellant was socially and culturally integrated prior to the commission of the index offence, I have considered whether those integrative links were materially weakened or broken by his offending and subsequent imprisonment. The respondent relies upon the seriousness of the index offence. I have taken that factor fully into account.

25. The sentencing remarks record that the offence was committed in 2019 and that the appellant was not sentenced until December 2025. The appellant's evidence, which was not challenged, was that he remained on bail throughout that period. He denied committing any further offences and the PNC evidence confirms that he has not done so. During that time, he continued to reside with his family, maintained his family life, and worked in the family business with his daughters. I accept his evidence that he assumed responsibility for the care of his youngest child when the child was approximately six months old after the child's biological mother ceased to provide care. I also accept that he continued to play an active role in the upbringing of his wife's niece, and that he continued to share caring responsibilities for his mother-in-law.

26. I have further considered the effect of the appellant's imprisonment upon those relationships. The evidence of the appellant's wife and daughters was that they have maintained regular contact with him throughout his imprisonment through visits and telephone calls. The appellant's wife stated that she speaks with him daily. I accept that evidence.

27. I also attach weight to the character references contained within the appellant's bundle from friends and family members. Whilst such references must be viewed in the context of the appellant's serious offending, they nonetheless demonstrate that he has maintained longstanding and positive relationships within his community. I similarly note the continuing support shown by family and friends, including those who attended the hearing.

28. Taking the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied that the appellant's offending and subsequent imprisonment have severed the social and cultural ties that he had established over many years in the United Kingdom. Although those matters are relevant and weigh against him, the evidence demonstrates that he has maintained close family relationships and enduring social connections throughout the period between the commission of the offence and the hearing of this appeal. I therefore find that the appellant remains socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom.

Exception 2

Partner – “Go” Scenario

29. I begin with the question of whether it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s wife to relocate to Grenada with him. Mr Hogg accepted that he was unable to rebut the appellant’s submission on this issue. In particular, it was accepted that the appellant’s mother-in-law suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, resides within the family home, and requires ongoing care. It was also accepted that the appellant’s wife is the subject of a guardianship order in respect of her niece, who lives with the family, and that she assists her daughter in caring for her three-year-old granddaughter, who has been diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes.

30. Having considered those matters cumulatively, I am satisfied that the appellant’s wife has substantial and ongoing caring responsibilities in the United Kingdom. Those responsibilities are not limited to a single family member but extend to her mother, niece and granddaughter. In those circumstances, I find that relocation to Grenada is not a realistic option for her. The effect of requiring her to abandon those responsibilities in order to accompany the appellant would be unduly harsh.

Partner – “Stay” Scenario”

31. I have taken into account the respondent’s submission that there is no evidence that the appellant and his partner share a level of dependency beyond that ordinarily to be expected between spouses. The respondent further submits that their relationship could continue through visits and modern means of communication and that, whilst such arrangements are not equivalent to living together, this is an unfortunate consequence of deportation proceedings. The respondent also relies upon the fact that the appellant’s partner and child have continued to reside in the United Kingdom during the appellant’s imprisonment.

32. Having considered the evidence as a whole, I do not accept that submission. The evidence before me established that the relationship is characterised by a degree of practical and emotional interdependence which goes beyond the ordinary incidents of a long-standing marriage. The appellant and his partner have been married for approximately 26 years and, following the grant of indefinite leave to remain in 2006, have enjoyed around 20 years of family life on a settled basis. The evidence demonstrated that they have shared extensive caring responsibilities throughout that period, with the appellant providing care for his partner’s mother and niece and his partner providing care for the appellant’s child.

33. I accept the evidence of the appellant, his partner and the other family witnesses regarding the care needs of the partner’s mother, who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. The consistent evidence was that her condition causes her to refuse to engage with professional carers and to resist receiving personal care from those outside the family. I accept that personal care has largely been provided by the appellant, his partner and the partner of one of their daughters, whom the family believe she associates with her late husband. The evidence before me was that these arrangements have developed out of necessity and trust and cannot readily be replicated through external care provision.

34. I accept that support is available from other family members. However, I am satisfied that such support is neither sufficient nor sustainable in the longer term. The evidence was that, following the appellant’s imprisonment, his partner became financially dependent upon her daughters. I accept the evidence that visits to the appellant in prison have been limited because one daughter has had to increase her working hours to assist the household financially. I also accept that another daughter is in the process of moving home and has responsibility for a newborn child and a young child recently diagnosed with Type 1 diabetes.

35. I further accept the evidence of the daughter’s partner, who works full-time, assists in the family business and provides substantial assistance to the appellant’s partner and her mother outside those commitments. He gave clear evidence regarding the number of hours he works and the support he currently provides. Whilst he expressed a willingness to continue assisting the family, I accept his evidence that the present level of support comes at great personal cost and I am satisfied that it is not sustainable in the long-term.

36. In my judgment, the respondent’s reliance upon the availability of family support does not adequately address the reality of the appellant’s partner’s circumstances. Whilst assistance exists, she remains the person with primary responsibility for two children, one of whom requires additional educational support, and for her elderly mother whose care needs are both significant and demanding. The evidence establishes that the support presently provided by others has been achieved only through considerable personal sacrifice and competing obligations.

37. Nor do I consider that modern means of communication or occasional visits would materially mitigate the consequences of the appellant’s deportation for his partner. The central issue is not simply the continuation of their emotional relationship but the loss of the appellant’s day-to-day practical assistance, caring role and emotional support in circumstances where those functions are integral to the management of the household and the care of multiple dependants.

38. Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the consequences of the appellant’s deportation for his partner would go well beyond the ordinary disruption and distress inherent in deportation. The loss of a spouse with whom she has shared a marriage of 26 years, extensive caring responsibilities and substantial mutual support would leave her bearing an unsustainable burden. Taking the evidence cumulatively, I am satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s partner to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant.

Child’s Best Interests

39. As agreed by the parties, it is in the child’s best interests to remain in his established family unit in the United Kingdom with the appellant, his stepmother and his siblings, to maintain his relationship with his biological mother, and to continue receiving support for his educational needs. I treat those best interests as a primary consideration, albeit not a paramount one.

Child – “Go” Scenario”

40. Mr Hogg accepted that he was unable to rebut the appellant’s submission that it would be unduly harsh for the child to relocate to Grenada with the appellant. In particular, he accepted that such a move would result in the child’s separation from his stepmother, siblings, and biological mother, who he has monthly contact with. This would disrupt the support and stability presently available to him, including support relevant to his educational needs and potential neurodivergent needs. I note that the respondent’s review did not engage with the cumulative effect of these factors. Accordingly, I am satisfied that it would be unduly harsh for the child to accompany the appellant to Grenada.

Child – “Stay” Scenario”

41. I have considered the respondent’s submissions regarding the reports concerning the child. The respondent argues that limited weight should be attached to the social worker’s report because the author did not sufficiently consider alternative sources of support available to the family and proceeds on the basis that the child would effectively “lose” his father, whereas contact could continue through visits and modern means of communication. The respondent further relies upon the fact that the child has continued to live in the United Kingdom during the appellant’s imprisonment. In relation to the educational and cognitive assessment prepared by Dr Greenaway in July 2026, the respondent submits that the assessment identifies no significant cognitive impairment, records findings that are largely within age expectations, reaches no diagnosis of dyslexia, ADHD or autism, and is inconclusive as to the cause of the child’s educational difficulties. It is argued that the report adds little to the appellant’s case because any educational support identified does not require the appellant’s physical presence.

42. I do not accept the respondent’s characterisation of the evidence. Whilst it is correct that Dr Greenaway did not diagnose dyslexia, ADHD, autism or any other neurodevelopmental condition, that is not the substance of the evidence upon which the appellant relies. The report must be read as a whole.

43. The assessment records that the child’s cognitive functioning falls broadly within the Low Average to Average range and does not fully explain the extent of his classroom difficulties. Importantly, however, the report identifies a number of concerns extending beyond cognitive ability. Standardised questionnaires completed by those involved in his care indicate social and emotional vulnerabilities, signs of anxiety both at home and at school, attentional difficulties, possible neurodivergent traits, sensory differences and concerns regarding social communication. The report expressly records that these factors may affect his engagement with learning and educational progress and that the child is too young to be diagnosed.

44. The report further notes that the child requires significant support within the classroom and recommends amongst other things, monitoring of his emotional wellbeing, pastoral support and close collaboration between home and school. The report also recommends continued monitoring of attentional and social communication difficulties and consideration of diagnostic assessment should concerns persist.

45. I attach little weight to the respondent’s criticism that the questionnaires relied upon by Dr Greenaway were completed by family members and school staff and are therefore subjective. The assessment was commissioned by the child’s school to investigate concerns regarding his educational progress and was not obtained to support the appellant’s appeal. Moreover, the observations of parents and teachers are a necessary and important means of understanding a child’s functioning across different environments. An assessor’s observations are necessarily limited to the assessment setting and cannot replicate the insights available from those who observe the child on a daily basis. In my judgment, Dr Greenaway was entitled to place weight on those sources of information, and I do likewise.

46. I accept that the report is cautious in its conclusions and does not provide a diagnosis. Equally, however, it does not dismiss the concerns identified. Rather, it highlights continuing vulnerabilities which require monitoring and support. I therefore attach weight to the report as evidence of the child’s present needs, notwithstanding the absence of a formal diagnosis.

47. I also accept the evidence that the child has been adversely affected by his father’s continuing absence. The evidence before me was that the appellant previously played a significant role in the child’s daily life by providing routine, reassurance, practical care and support with his education. I accept the oral evidence that, for much of the appellant’s imprisonment, the child was told that his father was working in Grenada rather than serving a custodial sentence. The evidence was that, during this period, contact was limited to telephone and video calls. I further accept the evidence that the appellant’s partner recently informed the child of the true position because his behaviour had deteriorated, he was struggling with his father's absence and had regressed to incontinence. I accept the evidence that visits to the appellant in prison have had a positive effect upon the child’s emotional wellbeing and behaviour and have assisted in managing those difficulties.

48. Whilst communication can continue through telephone and video contact, I accept that such contact cannot replicate the benefits of daily parental involvement, particularly for a child of his age who is experiencing educational, emotional and attentional difficulties.

49. Nor am I persuaded by the respondent’s submission that alternative support sufficiently addresses the child’s needs. Whilst family members are willing to assist, I have already found that the appellant’s partner carries extensive caring responsibilities for her niece and her mother. I have further found that the support provided by other family members is constrained by their own significant commitments and is not sustainable at its present level in the longer term. I am satisfied that the evidence relied on by the appellant establishes that the appellant’s partner would be unable to provide the level of educational and emotional support that the child requires, whilst continuing to discharge those other responsibilities.

50. Taking the evidence cumulatively, I find that the child is a young child with identified emotional vulnerabilities, anxiety concerns, attentional difficulties and possible neurodivergent characteristics requiring monitoring and support. He has limited contact with his biological mother and has been cared for by the appellant and his partner since he was approximately six months old. I accept the unchallenged evidence that the partner has no legally recognised parental status in respect of the child, whilst the biological mother has retained parental responsibility and receives the child-related state benefits. I also note that Mr Hoggs accepted that the partner was a credible and reliable witness. I therefore accept her evidence on these matters.

51. I am satisfied that the child’s circumstances are already characterised by a degree of uncertainty arising from the nature of his relationship with his biological mother and his reliance upon the appellant and his partner as his primary carers. In those circumstances, the appellant’s removal would create a further source of instability in the child’s life. I have already accepted that the appellant plays a significant role in providing routine, reassurance, practical care and educational support. I further accept that the child requires a high level of assistance within the educational setting and continues to experience difficulties despite intervention.

52. Whilst the child would remain in the care of the appellant’s partner, the evidence establishes that she is already carrying substantial responsibilities for her niece and her mother. For the reasons I have given, the support available from other family members is limited and cannot be regarded as a sustainable substitute for the appellant’s contribution. The loss of the appellant’s day-to-day presence and support would therefore have consequences extending beyond those ordinarily associated with the separation of a child from a parent through deportation.

53. Drawing these matters together, I am satisfied that the cumulative effect of the child’s emotional vulnerabilities, his educational and developmental needs, his limited relationship with his biological mother, his dependence upon the appellant as a primary parental figure, and the instability that would inevitably arise from the appellant’s removal elevates the impact beyond the level of harshness ordinarily expected in deportation cases. I therefore find that it would be more than unduly harsh for the child to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant.

Very Compelling Circumstances over and above Exception 1 and 2

54. I find that the appellant has established both a private life and a family life in the United Kingdom. His deportation would interfere with his rights under Article 8 ECHR and with the rights of his family members. The decision is in accordance with the law and pursues the legitimate aim of the prevention of disorder and crime and the maintenance of effective immigration control. The issue is whether the decision is proportionate.

55. In considering whether there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2, I remind myself that section 117C(6) does not require the application of a rigid formula. I have adopted a balance-sheet approach, weighing the public interest in deportation against the particular circumstances of this appellant and his family. I have been careful not to double count factors which overlap.

56. The following matters strengthen the public interest in deportation:

(a) The appellant was convicted of knowingly being concerned in the evasion of a prohibition or restriction on the importation of a Class A controlled drug and was sentenced to 54 months' imprisonment. The offence involved approximately 2.14 kilograms of cocaine.

(b) I have considered the sentencing remarks in full. The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant was a positive influence, a hard-working and responsible individual and a devoted family man. The judge also accepted the substantial mitigation advanced on the appellant's behalf, including his lack of previous convictions, positive character references and extensive family responsibilities. He noted that the appellant made a “stupid decision…that will come to ruin your life as you built it.” Nevertheless, the sentencing judge emphasised the seriousness of the offending. The offence involved participation in a conspiracy to import a substantial quantity of cocaine. The judge found that the appellant knowingly provided assistance essential to the commission of the offence and acted for financial gain. Although the judge ultimately concluded that the appellant's role was properly characterised as a lesser role rather than a significant role, it remained an indispensable role without which the enterprise could not have succeeded.

(c) The offence concerned a Class A controlled drug. There is a strong public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals who participate in the importation of such drugs, both to deter offending and to express society's revulsion at conduct of this nature.

(d) Parliament has determined that the deportation of foreign criminals sentenced to four years' imprisonment or more is in the public interest save where very compelling circumstances are established. I attach very substantial weight to that public interest.

57. On the appellant's side of the balance are the following matters.

(a) The best interests of the child are a primary consideration. I have found that it is in the child's best interests to remain in the United Kingdom within the family unit he has known throughout his life and to continue receiving support for his identified educational and emotional vulnerabilities. I have further found that it would be unduly harsh both for the child to relocate to Grenada and for him to remain in the United Kingdom without the appellant. I attach very significant weight to those findings.

(b) I also attach weight to the fact that the child's circumstances are unusual. The appellant's partner has cared for him since infancy but has no legally recognised parental status. The child's biological mother retains parental responsibility notwithstanding her limited involvement in his day-to-day upbringing. I accept that the appellant and his partner have provided the child with stability throughout his life and that the appellant's removal would introduce a further source of uncertainty into circumstances which are already complex.

(c) I have found that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant's partner either to accompany him to Grenada or to remain in the United Kingdom without him. The evidence establishes a relationship of some 26 years' duration characterised by extensive mutual support and shared caring responsibilities. The appellant's partner bears primary responsibility for the care of her mother, and her niece.

(d) I have taken into account the impact upon the partner’s mother. Her needs are unusually acute because of her refusal to engage with professional carers and the resulting dependence upon a very small number of trusted family members.

(e) I have also taken into account the position of the partner's niece. I accept that she has lived within the family household since approximately the age of three, is now aged twelve, and has been raised by the appellant and his partner pursuant to a guardianship arrangement. The evidence established that the appellant has played an important parental role in her upbringing.

(f) I also take into account that the family has only managed during the appellant's imprisonment through extensive support from the adult daughters and their families. The evidence establishes ongoing financial difficulties, including mortgage arrears, and a dependence upon assistance from the daughters. I accept that prison visits have assisted in managing the child's deteriorating behaviour and emotional wellbeing. The fact that the family has struggled through a period of imprisonment does not demonstrate an ability to absorb the permanent consequences of deportation. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates the strain already being experienced by family members attempting to compensate for the appellant's absence. I attach very significant weight to this.

(g) I have found that the appellant has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of his life and remains socially and culturally integrated here. He arrived in 2001 at approximately 20 years of age and was granted indefinite leave to remain in 2006. I accept that he has spent the entirety of his adult life in the United Kingdom, established a family here, worked here, raised children here and developed strong social and family ties. I attach significant weight to those matters.

(h) I have considered the appellant's conduct before and after the offence. This was his first and only conviction. Whilst little weight can generally be attached to the fact that a person has not committed further offences, I take into account that he remained in the community for a lengthy period between the commission of the offence in 2019 and his sentencing in December 2025 without committing further offences. I further take into account the sentencing judge's observations regarding his positive character and the numerous character references before me.

(i) I also take into account, albeit with less weight, the appellant's guilty plea which attracted credit in the criminal proceedings.

58. Weighing all these matters together, I am satisfied that this is one of the relatively rare cases in which the cumulative circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the very strong public interest in deportation.

59. Whilst I recognise that findings of undue harshness do not themselves satisfy the requirements of section 117C(6), I find that this is a materially stronger case than one in which Exception 2 is only narrowly established. The cumulative effect of the child's vulnerabilities and dependence upon the appellant, the partner's extensive caring responsibilities, the unusual circumstances surrounding the care of her mother, the lack of sustainable alternative support, the appellant's lengthy lawful residence and integration in the United Kingdom, and the family's exceptional reliance upon the role he performs, together amount to circumstances which are very compelling and which go well beyond those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

60. Accordingly, I find that the public interest in the appellant's deportation is outweighed by those very compelling circumstances and that the respondent's decision would constitute a disproportionate interference with the appellant's and his family's rights under Article 8 ECHR. The appeal is therefore allowed on human rights grounds.

Notice of Decision

The Human Rights appeal is allowed.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

As I have allowed the appeal and because a fee has been paid or is payable, I have considered making a fee award and have decided not to make one because further evidence was required to clarify the issue.

Signature

Signed Date 27 October 2026

H.Athwal

First-tier Tribunal Judge Athwal

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