Administrative United Kingdom

Gant UK Limited v The Environment Agency

Official source

NCN: [2026] UKFTT 01470 (GRC)

Case Reference: FT/EV/2026/0018

First-tier Tribunal

General Regulatory Chamber

Environment

Heard by: Written Representations

Heard on: 30 September 2026

Decision given on: 28October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE SIMON BIRD KC

Between

gant uk limited

Appellant

and

THE ENVIRONMENT AGENCY

Respondent

Decision: The appeal is allowed as to penalty

REASONS

1. By notice of appeal dated 18 February 2026, the Appellant seeks to appeal pursuant to regulation 48(1) of the Energy Savings Opportunity Scheme Regulations 2014 (“the Regulations”) against the Respondent’s imposition of a civil penalty of £39,150 by Notice of Civil Penalty dated 21 January 2026 (“the CPN”) revised by the Respondent in the exercise of it power under Regulation 42(1) of the Regulations on 17 April 2026.

2. The Notice was issued in respect of the Appellant’s failure to carry out an energy audit as required by Chapter 3 of Part 4 of the Regulations by the statutory compliance date of 5 June 2024.

3. The Tribunal’s relevant powers in relation to an appeal to the Tribunal against a Notice of Civil Penalty Notice are contained in Regulation 48(1). An appeal may be made on the grounds that the relevant notice was:

(a) Based on an error of fact;

(b) Wrong in law; or

(c) Unreasonable.

4. In reaching my decision, I have had regard to the agreed bundle comprising 475 pages and the statutory provisions and case law referred to therein. The respective positions of the parties are set out in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, the Respondent’s grounds of opposition to the appeal, the Appellant’s reply, the Respondent’s further response and the Appellants reply to that.

5. There is no dispute between the parties as to statutory provisions relevant to the determination of the appeal. Further, there is no dispute that the Respondent is a relevant undertaking for the purposes of Part 3 Chapter 1 and Schedule 1 of the Regulations and that, as the responsible undertaking for the purposes of Regulation 18, it was responsible for compliance with the Regulations. It was therefore required to carry out an ESOS assessment, including an energy audit and to report on the findings of the assessment prior to the end of the relevant compliance period.

6. This appeal relates to the Phase 3 compliance period which ran from 6 December 2019 to 5 June 2024. The Appellant accepts that it failed to carry out the energy audit within the compliance period in breach of the Regulations. The only factual disputes in this appeal relate to whether the awareness letters, the Compliance Notice and Enforcement Notice were properly served and, if so, whether they came to the knowledge of the Appellant. These factual issues are relevant to the reasonableness of the penalty which the Respondent has sought to impose.

The Issues

7. The following issues fall to be determined by the Tribunal:

(a) Whether the Compliance Notice (“CN”) of 11 September 2024 was “wrong in law” by reason of failing to meet the requirements of Regulation 39(3) of the Regulations;

(b) Whether the awareness letters of 14 December 2023, 29 May 2024 and 26 July 2024, the Compliance Notice dated 11 September 2024 and the Enforcement Notice dated 27 November 2024 were served on the Appellant;

(c) Whether the Appellant was aware of those documents prior to receipt of the Notice of Intent to impose a civil penalty (“the NOI”) originally served on 7 July 2025; and

(d) Whether the Civil Penalty imposed by the revised CPN of £39,150 was unreasonable within the meaning of Regulation 48(1) of the Regulations.

Background

8. The Appellant which is a Private Limited Company with an annual turnover for the year to 31 December 2024 of £64,688,955, first qualified as a relevant undertaking under the Regulations in the Phase 2 Compliance period (6 December 2015 to 5 December 2019). It complied in full with its obligations in relation to Phase 2.

9. The Respondent issued batches of Awareness Letters to the undertakings responsible for compliance with the Regulations in relation to Phase 3 on 14 December 2023, 29 May 2024 and 26 July 2024. The purpose of these letters was to remind responsible undertakings of their need to comply with the Regulations in respect of Phase 3. The letter of 14 December 2023 set out the compliance deadline of 5 June 2024 although this was subsequently extended by the Respondent to 6 August 2024 and this date appeared in the second and third Awareness Letters.

10. The extended 6 August 2024 compliance period expired without the Appellant complying with the requirement to undertaken an ESOS assessment including energy audit by that date. The Respondent’s states that on 11 September 2024 it issue a Compliance Notice (”CN”) to the Appellant’s registered address by post, with a deadline for response of 25 September 2024. The Appellant denies receiving that CN and contends that it was not served on it. There being no response to the CN, the Respondent states that it issued an Enforcement Notice (“EN”) on 27 November 2024 to the Appellant’s registered office by post.

11. The EN identified inter alia that the Respondent had failed to carry out an ESO assessment, including an energy audit by 6 August 2024 and required this breach of the Regulations to be remedied by 27 February 2025. The EN was not complied with. The Appellant contends that this notice was also not served on it and it had no knowledge of it at the relevant time to enable it to comply.

12. On 7 July 2025, the Respondent issued a Notice of Intent to impose a civil penalty (“NOI”) to the Appellant’s registered office. This was sent by registered post and, on 25 July 2025, the Appellant acknowledged receipt but stated that it had received no previous letters or notices relating to Phase 3 compliance. It also stated that it had appointed a consultant and lead assessor and commenced the set up of its MESOS account in order to remedy the breach of the Regulations.

13. On 30 July 2025 the Appellant provided its full response to the NOI. On 30 July 2025, the Respondent subsequently reissued the NOI to correct a clerical error but the Appellant confirmed that its response to the original version of the NOI should be treated as their response to the revised Notice. In its response, the Appellant repeated that it could find no record of ever having been received the Awareness Letters, the CN or the EN. It stated that its failure to comply with the Regulations in respect of Phase 3 was likely to be due to the change in staff with the responsibilities for ESOS compliance not being passed on to the new Director of Finance.

14. On 14 August 2025 the Appellant confirmed to the Respondent that a Notice of Compliance and an Action Plan had been submitted.

15. On 21 January 2026, the Respondent issued the CPN. This explained that in determining the amount of the civil penalty, the Respondent had applied the stepped penalty approach contained in Annex 2 to its Enforcement and Sanctions Policy. In summary, Step 1 identified that the statutory maximum penalty was £90,000 comprised of two elements which included 80 days worth of the daily penalty rate of £500. Under Step 2 the initial penalty amount was set at £90,000. In Step 3, the Appellant’s culpability was adjudged to fall within the Negligent category and its organisation size as being large given its annual turnover. This led to a penalty starting point of £27000 within a penalty range of £12,600 to £67,500. The Step 4 final penalty amount reflected the Respondent’s assessment of aggravating and mitigating factors. Under the heading “Aggravation” the CPN stated:

“You failed to comply with the Enforcement Notice (EN) deadline 27 February 2026”

16. Under the heading “Mitigation”, the CPN states:

“Swift communication in response to the Notice of Intent

Following receipt of the Notice of Intent, you engaged a Lead Assessor and took

the necessary steps to being your organisation into compliance.

Submission of the Notification of Compliance on 14 August 2025”

17. The CPN then states:

“We consider that the aggravating factors warrant a significant increase from the penalty starting point. However, we have weighed this against the mitigating factors before determining the appropriate penalty.

Taking into account of all these factors we have set the final civil penalty at £51,300”

Was the CPN wrong in law?

18. The Appellant contends that the CPN failed to comply with Regulation 39(3) of the Regulations because it did not accurately explain how the penalty had been calculated. In particular the Appellant argues that

– the CPN described one aggravating factor;

– the Respondent’s Internal Case Summary relied on a different aggravating factor;

– the notice therefore failed properly to explain the reasoning behind the penalty;

– as a result, GANT initially appealed on a mistaken understanding of the

Environment Agency’s reasoning for its penalty level.

19. The Appellant further argues that the statutory requirement is not merely to provide some reasons; the reasons must be intelligible, accurate and sufficient to explain how the penalty was arrived. In support of this argument it relies principally on decisions relating to the discharge of the requirement to provide reasons for administrative decisions, namely R v London Borough of Islington ex p Hinds (1995) 27 HLR 65, Save Britain’s Heritage v Number 1 Poultry Ltd and others [1991] 1 WLR 153, Re Poyser and Mills Arbitration [1964] 2 QB 467 and South Bucks District Council v Porter [2004] 1 WLR 1953. Because the CPN did not accurately describe the Step 4 assessment, the Appellant states that the it was legally defective and should be cancelled.

20. In response, the Respondent maintains that Regulation 39 does not require a detailed explanation of every aspect of the regulator’s reasoning. Its position is in summary that:

– The CPN identified the amount of the penalty;

– It explained the basic methodology used to calculate it;

– There was no requirement for the Respondent to set out every stage of its internal deliberative process;

– The purpose of the Regulation 39 requirement is to enable the participant to understand the nature of the penalty imposed and the basis upon which it has been determined;

– Regulation 39(3) did not prescribe any particular level of detail regarding aggravating or mitigating factors. Had Parliament intended a CPN to contain a detailed breakdown of the regulator’s assessment of each factor and the weight attributed to it, it could readily have stated so and it did not;

– The difference in wording as between the CPN and the Internal Case Summary Record did not invalidate the CPN.

– The Appellant plainly understood the basis of the decision, as it was able to lodge a detailed appeal; and

– It was relevant that Regulation 48 provides for a full merits appeal and the Tribunal is not confined to reviewing the adequacy of the reasons contained within the CPN itself. Any alleged lack of detail in the CPN therefore caused no material prejudice.

21. The Respondent nevertheless accepts that the notice could have explained the aggravating and mitigating factors more clearly, but argues that lack of detail is not the same as illegality and that the disclosure of the internal Case Summary Record merely provided additional detail. The Respondent relies on the same legal principles as the Appellant, but argues that reasons can be briefly stated and that this is not a case in which the reasoning set out in the CPN gave rise to a substantial doubt as to whether the Respondent had erred in law in issuing the CPN.

Tribunal Findings on the Regulation 39(3) Issue

22. Regulation 39(3) provides so far as is material:

“A penalty notice imposing a financial penalty must specify –

(a) where no daily penalty applied or the total amount of the daily penalty can be determined at the date of service of the notice –

(i) the total amount due,

(ii) where applicable, how it has been calculated, and

(iii) to whom, and the date by which it must be paid”.

23. The issue raised by the Appellant’s ground of appeal is whether the CPN served by the Respondent complied with the requirement contained in Regulation 39(3)(a)(ii).

24. I do not accept the Appellant’s arguments that the difference in wording as between the Respondent’s Internal Case Summary and the CPN is such as to render the CPN erroneous in law. The Internal Case Summary stated that “No prior response had been received to the Enforcement or Compliance Notices”. The CPN identifies as the aggravating factor “You failed to comply with the Enforcement Notice (EN) deadline 27 February 2025”. Compliance with the Enforcement Notice would have been one means of responding to it. Therefore the omission set out in the CPN is embraced by the more broadly expressed concern set out in the Internal Case Summary. Whilst the CPN would have benefitted from being more comprehensive, read as a whole and in context, I do not consider that the particularity of the wording used can be said to justify a finding that the CPN did not adequately tell the Appellant how the penalty had been calculated.

25. The CPN expressly refers to the Respondent’s ESP and sets out the stepped approach showing how the statutory maximum was adjusted as each step was undertaken. Further, it sets out that the aggravating factor of the failure to comply with the EN was the factor which warranted a significant increase above the penalty starting point. The Appellant was, therefore, made aware by the CPN that it was its failure to respond to the EN by taking action to comply with it, which led to the increase above the penalty starting point. Whilst the Appellant assumed that the stated factor was regarded by the Respondent as demonstrating “a history of non-compliance”, I do not consider that it is necessary for a CPN to set out the ESP category of aggravating or mitigating factor which a particular consideration falls into, in order for it to meet the requirements of Regulation 39(3)(a)(ii). What matters to the recipient of a CPN is that there should be sufficient information provided to explain how the penalty has been aggravated and/or mitigated by its conduct so that it can look to see that the ESP has been correctly applied.

26. The CPN in this case allowed the Appellant to do just this. Whilst it argues that there is a material difference between the wording of the CPN and the Internal Case Summary, I agree with the Respondent that this was a difference more of detail than real substance. The gravamen of the Appellant’s original and amended ground of appeal is not that the aggravating factor should have been categorised under the ESP heading of “Attitude of non-compliant person” as opposed to “History of non-compliance”, but rather that, correctly applying the ESP it was simply wrong to make any reference to a response to or non-compliance with the EN at all. Its essential argument that the penalty is unreasonable is that, on the facts, relying on the Appellant’s response to or failure to comply with the EN as an aggravating factor involved double counting.

27. The wording of the CPN was sufficient to flag this issue up to the Appellant and that is sufficient to meet the objective of the Regulation. In my view, the CPN was adequate to fulfil its statutory purpose and therefore the CPN was not erroneous in law. It was therefore proper, it was sufficiently intelligible to meet the objective of the Regulation and it was adequate in terms of informing the Appellant’s decision to appeal and principal ground of appeal.

Service of the Documents and the Appellant’s awareness of them

28. I will deal with these two issues together.

29. Regulation 51 of the Regulations provides:

“Any determination or notice required to be served on a responsible undertaking, may be served by –

(a) delivering or sending it to, or leaving it at –

(i) the responsible undertaking’s registered office (where applicable),

(ii) the responsible undertaking’s principal place of activity, or

(iii) another address in the United Kingdon specified by the responsible undertaking as its address for service, or

(b) sending it by electronic means to the email address provided by the responsible undertaking pursuant to regulation 29(1)(a) and the second row of Table A in Schedule 3.

30. As the Upper Tribunal held in Elizabeth Arden (UK) Ltd v EA [2024] UKFTT 112 (GRC), Regulation 51 is properly interpreted as meaning that where the Respondent has decided to issue a notice which the relevant provision states must be served on the responsible undertaking, service may be effected by one of the means specified in Regulation 51(a) or (b). For the purposes of this appeal, there is no evidence that the Appellant provided an email address pursuant to Regulation 29 and, therefore, only Regulation 51(a) is relevant.

31. Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 provides that:

“Where an Act authorises or requires any document to be served by post (whether the expression “serve” or the expression “give” or “send” or any other expression is used) then, unless the contrary intention appears, the service is deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting a letter containing the document and, unless the contrary is provided, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post”

32. The Awareness Letters which the Respondent states that it sent to the Appellant were not notices or determinations which were required to be sent to the Appellant under the Regulations. Their purpose was to ensure that the Appellant was alert to the need for it to comply with its obligations under the Regulations and the timescale required for compliance. Neither Regulation 51 nor section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 apply to the service of those letters.

33. Both statutory provisions are relevant to the service of the CN and the EN. Whether the CN was served on the Appellant and the date of that service is relevant to the maximum civil penalty which may be imposed under Regulation 45 and in consequence the penalty starting point under step 3 of the ESP, because the daily civil penalty rate is calculated by reference to the number of days of breach starting with the day after the service of the CN, up to a maximum of 80 working days.

34. As the Upper Tribunal held in the Elizabeth Arden decision, whether the CN and EN were served and came to the notice of the Appellant is also factor which is relevant, although not necessarily decisive, in determining whether the level of civil penalty imposed is reasonable.

35. The Appellant’s case is that the first document actually received by it was the Notice of Intent dated 7 July 2025 (which it received on 14 July 2025). It has has no record of receiving either the CN or EN. In particular as the evidence of the Appellant’s Director of Finance explains, internal investigations found no record of the earlier notices being received either in physical mail, files or email systems. The Director of Finance also states in her witness statement that she had no knowledge of the notices and considers it highly unlikely that they were received by the Appellant.

36. Relying the decision in Elizabeth Arden, the Appellant submits that a copy notice bearing the company's address is not enough to prove service and that it is for the Respondent to provide evidence that the notice was actually posted or sufficient evidence of posting procedures from which posting can be inferred. It argues that it is for the Respondent to prove that the documents were posted before it can rely on deemed service.

37. In this context, the Appellant contends that the evidence provided by the Respondent is not sufficient to prove that the letters and notices were served. In relation to the Awareness Letters the records for the posting of the first batch of letters was incomplete and only general mailing records were produced. In relation to the CN, the Respondent had provided only a generic mailing docket with no evidence linking that to the service of the CN on the Appellant. As to the EN, it questioned the adequacy of the Certificate of Service on the basis that it appeared to be in draft form.

38. The Appellant emphasised that that service and knowledge of the notices are two separate issues and, even if the Tribunal is satisfied that the documents were served and received, the fact that the Appellant had no knowledge of them was relevant to the reasonableness of the level of civil penalty.

39. In response, the Respondent contends that each of the Awareness Letters, the CN and the EN were sent to the Appellant’s registered office and it relied on the evidence of posting which was provided in the form of mailing records, the witness statements of its mailing contractor and its Senior Technical Officer and a Certificate of Service relating to the service of the EN. For the CN and EN it is sufficient that they were sent to the Appellant’s registered office and provided that it has complied with the methods of service, both notices should be treated in law as having been given and received relying on Sun Alliance London Assurance Vo Ltd v Hayman [1975] 1 WKR 177. The Respondent further argues, relying on UKI (Kingsway) v Westminster City Council [2018] UKSC 67 and R (Alam) v SSHD [2020] EWCA Civ 1527 that the relevant legal test is whether the notices were properly sent and received at the correct address, not whether they were actually opened or seen by the recipient and that organisations cannot avoid regulatory responsibility by failing to process mail delivered to their registered office.

Findings on the Service issue

40. In relation to the Awareness Letters, I find it is more likely than not that the first Awareness Letter was posted to the Appellant’s registered office and that, under common law it is presumed to have been received by the recipient (Khan v D’Aubigny [2025] EWCA Civ 11). The evidence of the Appellant’s Senior Technical Officer as to the procedures employed in processing and sending those letters including the sourcing of addresses for proposed recipients and the use of mail merge to add the relevant address to the letter to be sent, together with the evidence that the mailing list shows that the first Awareness Letter was sent on 15 December 2023 are sufficient to engage the presumption that the letter was sent and presumed received.

41. Likewise, the evidence as to standard procedure of the Appellant’s mailing contractor and the posting record which it has provided in relation to the Third Awareness Letter satisfy me that it is more likely than not that the letter was sent to the registered office of the Appellant.

42. In relation to the Second Awareness letter, there was clearly an issue with the posting of this batch with 23 communications out of 7,191 not sent to Royal Mail for posting. Whilst this is only 0.3% of the batch, I note that the Respondent’s Senior Technical Officer accepts that it is not able to identify which companies were affected and that he cannot be certain that the Appellant was not one of the 0.3%. Whilst it can be said that mathematically it is more likely than not that the Appellant was sent the Awareness Letter, given that there is evidence that some letters were not sent and it is not possible to ascertain which were the affected companies, I have concluded that I should disregard the Second Awareness.

43. In relation to the CN, I am satisfied from the evidence of process and sending by post of the Notice, that it is more likely than not that it was sent and presumed received at the Appellant’s registered office. Allowing three days for delivery, the effect of section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 is that it is presumed to have been received on 14 September 2024.

44. As to the EN, I am satisfied that the Certificate of Service and its attachment shows that it is more likely than not that the EN was posted and served in accordance with Regulation 51 of the Regulations and that it should be deemed to have been received at the Appellant’s registered office on 30 November 2024 allowing three days for delivery.

45. This case differs on the facts in the Elizabeth Arden case, in that the Respondent has produced both evidence of posting of all of the relevant documents (save the Second Awareness letter) and also of the procedures involved in issuing those documents which shows that they all used the correct address of the Appellant’s registered office and were posted. The Respondent has not sought to rely as it did in the Elizabeth Arden case solely on the date and address set out in the relevant documents.

46. I note that the Appellant’s Chief Financial Officer states that it had robust and reliable processes in place to ensure that any statutory or legal notices from regulatory bodies were immediately flagged and directed to her attention. I have no reason to doubt that she had no awareness of any of the Awareness Letters, the CN or the EN. However, whilst she states that in the light of the result of the Appellant’s investigations and the processes in place she considers that it is highly unlikely that the CN and EN were received by GANT, I am not satisfied that the Appellant’s evidence taken as whole is sufficient to rebut the presumption that the documents were received at its registered office.

47. Whilst the Appellant has explained the standard process for the handling of physical post at its registered office, both by the external building management and the Appellant’s front-of-house team, I have no evidence as to the effectiveness of those arrangements, particularly the sorting and separation of the post by the external building management so that it reached the correct tenant of the building, which is also the Appellant’s registered office. I note that, whilst recorded or tracked deliveries are logged, this does not apply to unrecorded or standard post. Without evidence that this process operated effectively and without error over the relevant period, simply providing a general description of how the process worked is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of service in relation to any of the documents.

48. Whilst therefore I accept that the Appellant remained unaware of the Awareness Letters, the CN and the EN until after the service of the NOI, I find that they were served and received at the Appellant’s registered office. There are two consequences which flow from this. Firstly, the daily penalty accrued as from 15 September 2024 and the CPN appropriately included the cumulative daily penalty. Secondly, the absence of knowledge of the documents is a factor which should be taken into account, when considering mitigation of the penalty in accordance with the Upper Tribunal’s decision in Elizabeth Arden.

Was the Level of Penalty Unreasonable?

49. Regulation 48(1) of the Regulations provides that an appeal to the Tribunal against a Penalty Notice may be made on the grounds that it was:

(a) Based on an error of fact;

(b) Wrong in law, or

(c) Unreasonable.

50. On an appeal against a penalty notice, the role of the Tribunal is not to place itself in the position of the Respondent and to ask itself what penalty it would have decided to impose, but rather to consider whether the penalty was erroneous either because of a factual or legal error or because it was unreasonable. Unreasonable in this context bears its ordinary meaning i.e. one which having regard to the circumstances is unfair, unsound or excessive. Appropriate deference should be shown to the judgment of the Respondent as the statutory regulator under the ESOS scheme (Marlborough Sterling Investment Group Ltd v EA [2023] UKFTT 681 (GRC) and Safeguard World International Holdings Ltd EA [2024] UKFTT 34 (GRC).

51. In Marshall Oill LLP v EA [2023] UKFTT 948 (GRC) the Tribunal held that the ESP, provided that it is correctly followed, provides a sound and therefore reasonable basis for determining the appropriate civil penalty in a given case. I note that the Appellant does not dispute this finding and I see no reason to reach a different conclusion in this case. I should add that the ESP has clearly been informed by the principles of contained in section 21(1) of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, which the Respondent is required to have regard to when exercising its function to issue a CPN and also respects the six principles set out in the Regulator’s Code which any general enforcement policy of the Respondent must comply with. The ESP, when correctly followed, also ensures that the Respondent complies with its duty under s108 of the Deregulation Act 2005 and its relevant obligations set out in the Growth Duty Statutory Guidance.

52. The ESP sets out the Respondent’s enforcement and sanctions policy. Section A of Annex 2 explains the steps the Respondent will take to decide whether to impose a civil penalty or to work out the final penalty amount in relation to climate change schemes including ESOS. The steps are based on those in the Definitive Guide for the Sentencing of Environmental Offences published by the Sentencing Council in 2014. Within the steps the Respondent assesses:

– that nature of the breach

– culpability

– the size of the organisation

– financial gain

– any history of non-compliance

– the attitude of the non-complaint person

– personal circumstances

53. Under the ESP four steps are carried out within which the Respondent can apply its discretion and decide whether to waive the civil penalty, reduce it or extend the time for payment. Those four steps are:

Step 1: check or determine the statutory maximum penalty for the breach
Step 2: decide whether to waive the penalty or set the initial amount by assessing the nature of the breach and other enforcement positions
Step 3: if the Respondent decides to impose a civil penalty, work out the penalty starting point and penalty range based on culpability and the size of the organisation
Step 4: set the final penalty amount by assessing aggravating and mitigating factors and adjust the starting point as appropriate.

54. Section D of Annex 2 to the ESP explains how the Respondent will initially assess each ESOS breach and its normal “nature of breach” assessment and the other enforcement positions specific to the scheme. The nature of the breach assessment is the seriousness of the breach based on the impact it has on the integrity of the scheme. That means the trust in, transparency, reliability and effectiveness of the scheme. The ESP notes that this “may” include the length of time a person has been required to comply with the law.

55. The Appellant accepts the Environment Agency’s calculation at Steps 1–3 of the ESP’s stepped approach in relation to its breach:

Statutory maximum: £90,000.

Culpability: Negligent.

Organisation size: Large.

Starting point: £27,000.

Penalty range: £12,600–£67,500.

56. The Appellant however challenges the Respondent’s approach at Step 4 where the aggravating and mitigating factors fall to be assessed.

57. Firstly, the Appellant argues that the Respondent was wrong to take into account and to give weight to the only aggravating factor relied upon, namely the absence of any engagement or response to the Compliance Notice and Enforcement Notice. The Appellant argues that it was wrong to treat this as an aggravating factor because it had not, as a matter of fact had knowledge of those notices and therefore, it could not respond to notices it was unaware of. In consequence, any failure in its internal systems had already been reflected in the "negligent" culpability assessment at Step 3 of the ESP’s stepped approach and should not be counted again at Step 4. Treating non-response as an aggravating therefore amounted to double counting. Once its lack of knowledge was taken into account, the Appellant contends that the alleged aggravating factor falls away entirely.

58. The Appellant further argues that despite there being only one aggravating factor and several mitigating factors, the Respondent nonetheless increased the penalty starting point very significantly above the penalty starting point of £27,000. It argues that a properly weighted balancing exercise should have reduced the penalty below the starting point. The Appellant submits that the Environment Agency failed to give sufficient weight to several mitigating factors, including the absence of any financial gain from the breach, a clean compliance history in the previous ESOS phase and its immediate engagement once the issue came to its attention with the rapid completion of the audit process within approximately one month. The Appellant argues that these matters demonstrate a positive attitude to compliance and should have resulted in a much lower penalty.

59. The result of the Respondent’s approach, the Appellant claims, is that the result is punitive rather than proportionate which does not accord with the principles of the ESP, the Regulator’s Code and the Growth Duty.

60. In response, the Respondent notes that it had reduced the level of the civil penalty albeit not accepting that this reflected an acceptance that the original penalty was unreasonable.

61. The Respondent argues that it followed the penalty-setting methodology in Annex 2 of its Enforcement and Sanctions Policy exactly as intended. The failure to undertake an ESOS energy audit is a serious breach that undermines the integrity of the scheme. The ESP states that for a non-new entrant the starting position will normally be the statutory maximum penalty. The Appellant has accepted the ESP Step 1–3 calculations, including classification as a large organisation with negligent culpability and a £27,000 starting point.

62. The Respondent rejects the suggestion that the reliance on the claimed aggravating factor was unreasonable. The Appellant did not engage with the regulator until after the Notice of Intent and there was no response either to the CN or EN. No steps were taken towards compliance until July 2025. The lack of engagement persisted despite the Awareness Letters, guidance and newsletters. The Respondent argues that this behaviour justified increasing the penalty above the starting point because it demonstrated a poor compliance attitude and required substantial regulatory effort to bring the company into compliance.

63. The Respondent rejects the Appellant’s contention that its approach has involved double counting. The “Negligent” culpability concerned GANT’s failure to have proper systems in place to ensure ESOS compliance. The aggravating factor concerned a separate matter, namely the lack of response to regulatory intervention after enforcement action had begun. These, it argued, were distinct considerations and therefore there is no double counting.

Finding on Penalty

64. I am satisfied that both the original penalty of £51,500 and the revised penalty of £39,150 are the product of an incorrect application of the ESP’s stepped approach having regard to the facts of this case and that, in consequence they are unreasonable for the purposes of Regulation 48 of the Regulations. Even allowing for appropriate deference to the Respondent’s decisions, I have concluded that the penalty should be set aside in favour of a reduced penalty.

65. The error in the Respondent’s approach is that it has treated as an aggravating factor a failure to respond to two notices which, as a matter of fact, the Appellant remained unaware until it received the NOI. It remained unaware of those notices because, I have found, it is more likely than not that the procedures it had in place for ensuring it complied with its ESOS obligations were inadequate. Not only did the Appellant fail to ensure that its ESO compliance processes were adequate to cope with a change in the person responsible for ensuring compliance, it also failed to ensure that its postal receipt procedures were adequate to ensure that statutory notices served other than by registered mail came to its notice.

66. However, these failings are the constituent elements of the negligence which is identified by the EA at Step 3 of the ESP’s stepped approach. At Step 4 when considering the “Attitude of the non-compliant person” what is relevant is how the recipient of an NOI who has had knowledge of the breach and/or any notices served, has responded to the Respondent’s actions. If that person, has not responded in a positive way to a CN or EN by taking steps to remedy the breach, that is a factor which may aggravate the relevant penalty. However, where the recipient of an NOI is unaware that a CN or EN has been served through negligence or otherwise, to avoid double counting, it is not appropriate to treat that as showing a poor attitude in response to those notices which is capable of aggravating the starting penalty. The failure to respond is the product of the negligence which is already accounted for at Step 3.

67. Step 3 of the ESP is the step which is intended to equate at a general level to the level of harm caused to the ESOS scheme by the relevant breach. Step 3 takes no account of any difference in the length of time taken by responsible undertakings to remedy their breaches within any of the Culpability categories. Step 3 assumes that consequence of negligent non-compliance is equally harmful to the ESO scheme irrespective of the degree of negligence and irrespective of the period of non-compliance. Under the stepped approach although the ESP states that the length of time a person has been required to comply “may” be taken into account in the nature of the breach assessment, as is clear from Annex D 2.3, the policy in respect of a failure to undertake an energy audit, is that normally the statutory maximum will be used as the initial penalty amount. No account is therefore taken in Steps 1-3 of the length of time a responsible undertaking has been in breach.

68. However, in assessing what is a reasonable penalty, the length of the period of non-compliance which the culpability has resulted in must a relevant factor at Step 4. The appropriate way to deal with it, in accordance with the Step 4 methodology and in accordance with the transparency principle given that it is not expressly referred to in the ESP’s Step 4, is to treat it as a factor which reduces the weight accorded to the mitigation of ultimate compliance by the responsible undertaking. As to how much the weight of that as a mitigation factor should be reduced, will turn on the particular facts of the case.

69. In this case, the Appellant was required to comply by 5 June 2024 (extended by the Respondent to 6 August 2024) and it was not until 14 August 2025 that the Notice of Compliance was served by the Appellant on the Respondent. That is a very prolonged period of non-compliance and the fact that the Appellant was not aware of the Respondent’s attempts to ensure and enforce compliance provides some, but little mitigation, as the statutory requirement to undertake an ESOS assessment is not contingent on their being any notice from the Respondent of the need to do so. The Appellant should have ensured that on the change in its relevant personnel, the requirement to comply with the Regulations was not overlooked as in fact happened.

70. In these circumstances, I do not consider that it was unreasonable for the Respondent to give little weight to the Appellant’s ultimate compliance with the Regulations as a mitigating factor.

71. Taking all of these considerations into account, my conclusion is that it was not reasonable on the facts for the Respondent to conclude that there was an aggravating factor which justified raising the level of penalty above the penalty starting point of £27,000. Some credit should have been given for the Appellant’s good history of compliance with the ESOS scheme and some credit should have been given for the very quick response to being the Respondent into compliance once it appreciated its failings, albeit as I have said, this should have been reduced by the fact that it took effectively a year for the Appellant to wake up to its obligations. I am not convinced that the Appellant’s absence of the knowledge of the notices should have been treated as providing any additional material mitigation on the facts here, as the CPN relates to the failure to undertake an energy audit rather than the breach of a notice and the Respondent was under no obligation to remind the Appellant of its obligations. Further, the assessed culpability was “negligent” and not “deliberate” and, therefore, allowance had already been made for the Appellant’s absence of knowledge of its responsibilities in setting the penalty.

72. I therefore conclude that the reasonable penalty in this case is £24,000. That is reasonable and proportionate having regard to the Appellant’s actual culpability in this case and takes appropriate account of the mitigation.

73. As a result of my conclusion, I allow the appeal in part and direct that the civil penalty notice be affirmed but modified by deleting reference to any aggravating factors under the heading “Aggravation” and adding to the content under the heading “Mitigation” the following:

“Absence of financial gain and previous history of good compliance”

74. I also direct that the amount of the final civil penalty should be amended to £24,000 with the payment details within the notice amended to require payment on 15 January 2027.

Signed Judge Simon Bird KC Date: 15 October 2026

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