Tax United Kingdom

K v The Director of Border Revenue

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01490 (TC)

Case Number: TC10071

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

On the papers

Appeal reference: TC/2026/00736

RESTORATION – refusal decision under appeal refers to a spent conviction – Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 – Article 8 ECHR – anonymity application – allowed

Heard on: 23 October 2026

Judgment date: 27 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE MATTHEW DONMALL

Between

K

Appellant

and

THE DIRECTOR OF BORDER REVENUE

Respondent

DECISION

Introduction

1. The Appellant has applied for anonymity (the Anonymity Application) in his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal on further review on 22 January 2026 (the Refusal) to restore items (the Goods) seized at East Midlands airport on 11 December 2023 after the Appellant arrived into the UK from Spain and walked through the ‘Nothing to Declare’ channel.

2. In the Refusal, the Respondent referred to a previous conviction in Germany in 2014 (the Conviction) relating to customs offences resulting in a four-year custodial sentence and relied on this “as evidence that you would have been aware of the fact that the Customs regime across borders exists and the consequences of non-compliance can be severe.” The Appellant in this appeal contends (among other things) that as the Conviction is a spent conviction under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (the ROA), the Refusal was unlawful because the Respondent took it into account.

3. Within the grounds of appeal, the Appellant also made the Anonymity Application. He contends that his name must be anonymised for the purposes of the hearing of his appeal and any subsequent public decision, in order to protect his statutory rights under the ROA and/or Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Unless the anonymity sought is granted, then the public hearing of the appeal and any public decision will disclose publicly the fact of the Appellant’s Conviction in breach of those rights.

4. It should be noted at the outset that the Appellant has not applied for the hearing of the appeal to be in private, but his anonymity. In other words, if any members of the public were to attend the hearing or read the published decision they would not know his name.

5. The Anonymity Application raises two questions, which I address in turn in due course below in sections under the relevant headings:

(1) The first is whether the Tribunal must grant the Appellant anonymity by reason of the provisions of the ROA alone.

(2) The second is whether the Tribunal should do so to protect his Article 8 rights, read against the background of the ROA.

6. First however I address the factual background and some preliminary matters.

Factual background

7. It is not necessary for the purposes of the Anonymity Application to set out the factual background in any detail. As already stated, the appeal concerns the Refusal of the Appellant’s request for the restoration of Goods that were seized at East Midlands airport on 11 December 2023 on the Appellant’s arrival into the UK from Spain. The Appellant had walked through the ‘Nothing to Declare’ channel. The four most valuable items that were seized were three luxury watches and a luxury suitcase and bag. The seizure was pursuant to s.139(1) Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (CEMA) on the basis that the Goods were liable to forfeiture under s.49 of CEMA.

8. The Appellant did not challenge the legality of the seizure in the magistrates’ court and accordingly, the Goods were condemned as forfeit under CEMA.

9. On 25 March 2024 the Appellant wrote to the Respondent requesting restoration of the Goods. An initial refusal of that request was upheld on review and appealed to the Tribunal. Before the hearing of that appeal, the Respondent conceded the appeal and directions were made for the Respondent to undertake a re-review.

10. On 22 January 2026, the Respondent issued the Refusal, being the decision on re-review in which the Respondent again refused to restore the Goods. In that Refusal:

(1) The Review Officer cited their letter of 10 December 2025, in which mention was made of the Conviction and a request was made for the Appellant to provide details thereof:

Secondly, according to PNC records, you have a previous conviction in Germany from 2014 relating to Customs offences, which resulted in a four-year custodial sentence. Please provide details of this conviction. We are also seeking confirmation of this information directly from the German authorities. This is your opportunity to provide the requested information and any additional representations you believe may assist your case.

(2) The Appellant’s response of 17 December 2025 was referred to, and the contention that under the ROA, the Respondent could not request information in respect of the Conviction under the ROA, and any reliance upon it would be unlawful.

(3) Under its “Consideration” section, the Review Officer wrote:

Thirdly, PNC records indicate that you have a prior conviction in Germany from June 2014 for Customs related offences, resulting in a four-year custodial sentence. Despite a request for you to provide the underlying details of this conviction, you have failed to do so. If there were nothing to conceal and it was not relevant at all, it would be reasonable to expect full disclosure without delay. We are now seeking official confirmation of this information directly from the German authorities. As a law enforcement agency, Border Force has the authority to take this information into account when assessing your case. I would limit my consideration of the existence of this matter as evidence that you would have been aware of the fact that the Customs regime across borders exists and the consequences of non-compliance can be severe.

11. On 20 February 2026, the Appellant made his appeal, within which the Anonymity Application was made.

The Respondent’s position on the Application

12. The Respondent initially opposed the Anonymity Application in written objections of 15 April 2026. That was on two bases. First because it said that the Refusal did not breach the ROA because the Respondent was placing reliance on the conduct that underlies the Conviction, and not the Conviction itself. Second, because if the Anonymity Application was granted, then that would amount to a summary determination of the substantive appeal. (Neither had force in my view. The first ground of objection concerned the substantive merits of the appeal (upon which I express no view), not the basis for anonymity being sought. As to the second, it does not follow that if the Anonymity Application is granted, that is determining or in any way prejudicial to the Respondent’s position in the substantive appeal. I will return to this below).

13. In view of the Respondent’s written objection, the Tribunal listed the Anonymity Application for a video hearing, which was due to be heard on 23 October 2026. On 20 October 2026, the parties made a joint application to vacate the hearing of the Anonymity Application on the basis that the parties had agreed that the Appellant be anonymised as set out in a signed draft consent order, and to avoid unnecessary costs being incurred by the parties. The text of that draft order is as follows:

UPON the parties agreeing:

(a) that the granting of anonymity to the Appellant is done without prejudice to any and all arguments advanced by the parties in their statements of case as to the issues in the appeal;

(b) that in granting anonymity to the Appellant, the tribunal makes no determination, and neither party makes any admission, as to the validity of any of the parties’ arguments including the Appellant’s arguments about: (i) whether his conviction is spent; (ii) the relevance of that conviction to the matters in dispute in the appeal; (iii) and whether the Respondent was or may be permitted to take account of the conviction and/or the facts underlying the same (and which of those it took into account) and/or whether it was right or wrong to do so; and that all those arguments and issues remain at large,

AND UPON the Appellant agreeing that he will place no reliance on the granting of anonymity within any part of this appeal in support of any argument he advances;

AND UPON the Respondent, on the basis of the agreements set out above, not opposing the granting of anonymity to the Appellant in any reporting or public notification of these proceedings,

AND UPON the Tribunal approving this Order:

BY CONSENT it is hereby agreed:

1. The appellant be granted anonymity in the proceedings, and

2. No determination is made, nor any admission assumed as to the validity of any of the parties’ arguments regarding the Appellant’s conviction, its relevance to the matters in dispute in the Appeal and whether or not the Respondent was or may be permitted to take into account that conviction and/ or the underlying facts and that those arguments and issue remain at large for determination in the substantive appeal.

14. On 21 October 2026, I refused the application to vacate the hearing. This was because an order for anonymity should not be made simply because the parties consent, as the Tribunal must be mindful of the wider public interest of open justice (see e.g. Dettori v HMRC [2024] UKUT 364 (TCC) at [32]). The Tribunal itself must be satisfied that it is appropriate to make such an order. I was in particular concerned that on the one hand, the Anonymity Application appeared to be predicated on the fact that the Appellant has a spent conviction, disclosure of which would breach the ROA and/or breach article 8 ECHR, and on the other, the parties were not agreed on whether the Appellant’s Conviction was spent, as evident in recital (b)(i) of the draft order. I indicated that my view on the need for a hearing might be different if the parties were agreed that the Conviction was spent, and gave the parties liberty to re-apply for vacation, and that such application should seek to address my concerns.

15. On 22 October 2026, the Respondent wrote to clarify its position on whether the Conviction was spent. In particular, it set out the following:

Insofar as the PNC records on which the Respondent relied disclose a conviction resulting in a sentence of 4 years imprisonment imposed on 20th June 2014 the Respondent accepts that the correct analysis of the table in section 5(2) of the ROA 1974 is that the entry in the second row of that table would apply and the sentence, being a custodial sentence of more than 1 and up to, or consisting of, 4 years results in a rehabilitation period, for an adult offender, concluding at the end of the period of 4 years beginning with the day on which the sentence (including any licence period) is completed. Objectively, this would result in the rehabilitation period ending on or about 21st June 2022. To the extent that this is material to the Appellant’s anonymity application, the Respondent is content for the Tribunal to assume this to be the correct position.

16. The Respondent emphasised that its core concern was that its arguments on the substantive appeal are not in any way compromised by the decision on the Anonymity Application. I address this further below.

17. In the light of this further correspondence from the Respondent, I vacated the hearing. I therefore proceed to determine the Anonymity Application on the basis of the papers before me, which now include the draft consent order and the Respondent’s email of 22 October 2026. Notwithstanding the Respondent’s agreement to the anonymisation of the Appellant in this appeal, I need to be satisfied myself that it is appropriate to make such an order.

18. For the reasons set out below, I conclude that I am so satisfied. This decision is accordingly itself anonymised.

The Status of the Appellant’s Conviction under the ROA

19. Section 1(1) ROA provides that if an individual has been convicted of any offence or offences and did not have imposed on him a sentence that is excluded from rehabilitation under the ROA, then after the end of the rehabilitation period, he shall be treated as “a rehabilitated person” and that conviction for those purposes shall be “treated as spent”. Section 1(4) includes convictions by a court outside England, Wales and Scotland. Section 5 sets out the relevant rehabilitation period. For custodial sentences of more than 1 year and up to, or consisting of, 4 years, the rehabilitation period is “the end of the period of 4 years beginning with the day on which the sentence (including any licence period) is completed”. (I note that the provisions of the ROA differ in England and Wales from those applicable in Scotland. It is to those in England and Wales that I refer, and as at the present date, given the question before me is the Appellant’s rights at present, relevant to whether he should have anonymity.)

20. The Respondent has accepted for the purposes of this Anonymity Application that the rehabilitation period in respect of the Conviction has ended and the Conviction is therefore spent. Given the facts asserted by the Respondent in the Refusal, namely a custodial sentence of four years and date of conviction on 20 June 2014, this is a sensible concession: were the four year sentence to have been completed in June 2018, then the Conviction would have become spent in June 2022. It is now October 2026, and for the purposes of the Anonymity Application, the relevant question is whether the Conviction is spent now. I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that it is and proceed on that basis.

21. However, because the Respondent was clear in the draft consent order and the email of 22 October 2026 that its neutral position on anonymity was premised on the granting of anonymity not in any way compromising the resolution of the substantive appeal, I should briefly address this concern. This is because the finding that the Conviction is now spent does sit somewhat in tension with the Respondent’s formal position on that point in its statement of case.

22. The Respondent’s statement of case, served on 22 April 2026, sets out its contentions in the appeal. The Respondent’s primary case [34-41] on the substantive dispute about the legality of the reference to the Conviction is that the Respondent did not seek to rely on the Conviction itself, but rather the underlying conduct. It relies for this distinction upon Hussain v London Borough of Waltham Forest [2020] EWCA Civ 1539. Its alternative case [42-54] is that if there had been some reliance on the Conviction, then that was nevertheless lawful, and “it makes an application under section 7(3)” of the ROA for the admission of the Conviction into evidence, to support the Refusal.

23. Nothing in this decision on the Anonymity Application materially prejudices the Respondent or in any way prejudges the resolution of the Substantive Dispute on those two issues. The fact that the Appellant has a Conviction which is now spent is immaterial to the primary argument (which is that the Respondent was not relying on the Conviction at all) and to the alternative argument (which is itself premised on the Conviction being spent as it seeks permission to rely on it under section 7(3) ROA).

24. Nonetheless I acknowledge that at [32-33], as preliminary point, the Respondent makes no admission as to whether the Conviction “is spent or not”, on the basis that the Appellant has not given the Respondent details about the Conviction. To that extent, there is on the face of it a tension between the Respondent being prepared to accept, for the purposes of the Anonymity Application, that the Conviction is spent, and the Respondent saying that in no way can that prejudice any of its arguments in the substantive appeal, a (minor) aspect of which is this non-admission. In my judgment, in addressing the Anonymity Application I have to determine whether the Conviction is spent, as that is a predicate fact to the basis on which anonymity is said to be justified. Any impact on the Respondent’s pleaded position in respect of the same ‘preliminary point’ in its statement of case is therefore unavoidable. However, that is not material to the Respondent’s main arguments therein.

Issue 1. Does the Appellant have a right to anonymity under ROA

The provisions of the ROA

25. The title of the ROA is:

An Act to rehabilitate offenders who have not been reconvicted of any serious offence for periods of years, to penalise the unauthorised disclosure of their previous convictions, to amend the law of defamation, and for purposes connected therewith.

26. Section 4 is headed “Effect of rehabilitation”. It provides:

(1) Subject to sections 7 and 8 below, a person who has become a rehabilitated person for the purposes of this Act in respect of a conviction shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction; and, notwithstanding the provisions of any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, but subject as aforesaid—

(a) no evidence shall be admissible in any proceedings before a judicial authority exercising its jurisdiction or functions in England and Wales to prove that any such person has committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for any offence which was the subject of a spent conviction; and

(b) a person shall not, in any such proceedings, be asked, and, if asked, shall not be required to answer, any question relating to his past which cannot be answered without acknowledging or referring to a spent conviction or spent convictions or any circumstances ancillary thereto.

(2) Subject to the provisions of any order made under subsection (4) below, where a question seeking information with respect to a person's previous convictions, offences, conduct or circumstances is put to him or to any other person otherwise than in proceedings before a judicial authority—

(a) the question shall be treated as not relating to spent convictions or to any circumstances ancillary to spent convictions, and the answer thereto may be framed accordingly; and

(b) the person questioned shall not be subjected to any liability or otherwise prejudiced in law by reason of any failure to acknowledge or disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction in his answer to the question.

(3) Subject to the provisions of any order made under subsection (4) below,—

(a) any obligation imposed on any person by any rule of law or by the provisions of any agreement or arrangement to disclose any matters to any other person shall not extend to requiring him to disclose a spent conviction or any circumstances ancillary to a spent conviction (whether the conviction is his own or another's); and

(b) a conviction which has become spent or any circumstances ancillary thereto, or any failure to disclose a spent conviction or any such circumstances, shall not be a proper ground for dismissing or excluding a person from any office, profession, occupation or employment, or for prejudicing him in any way in any occupation or employment.

(4) The Secretary of State may by order—

(a) make such provision as seems to him appropriate for excluding or modifying the application of either or both of paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2) above in relation to questions put in such circumstances as may be specified in the order;

(b) provide for such exceptions from the provisions of subsection (3) above as seem to him appropriate, in such cases or classes of case, and in relation to convictions of such a description, as may be specified in the order.

(5) For the purposes of this section and section 7 below any of the following are circumstances ancillary to a conviction, that is to say—

(a) the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction;

(b) the conduct constituting that offence or those offences; and

(c) any process or proceedings preliminary to that conviction, any sentence imposed in respect of that conviction, any proceedings (whether by way of appeal or otherwise) for reviewing that conviction or any such sentence, and anything done in pursuance of or undergone in compliance with any such sentence.

(6) For the purposes of this section and section 7 below “proceedings before a judicial authority” includes, in addition to proceedings before any of the ordinary courts of law, proceedings before any tribunal, body or person having power—

(a) by virtue of any enactment, law, custom or practice;

(b) under the rules governing any association, institution, profession, occupation or employment; or

(c) under any provision of an agreement providing for arbitration with respect to questions arising thereunder;

to determine any question affecting the rights, privileges, obligations or liabilities of any person, or to receive evidence affecting the determination of any such question.

27. Section 7 sets out limitations. These include:

(1) Under s.7(2)(f), s.4(1) does not prevent the admission or requirement of any evidence of the conviction in any proceedings in which the person (whether a party or witness) consents to it.

(2) Section 7(3) gives courts (and the Tribunal in this case) power to admit or require evidence relating to a person’s prior convictions if cannot otherwise be done (emphasis added):

If at any stage in any proceedings before a judicial authority in England and Wales (not being proceedings to which, by virtue of any of paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (2) above[1] or of any order for the time being in force under subsection (4) below, section 4(1) above has no application, or proceedings to which section 8 below applies) the authority is satisfied, in the light of any considerations which appear to it to be relevant (including any evidence which has been or may thereafter be put before it), that justice cannot be done in the case except by admitting or requiring evidence relating to a person's spent convictions or to circumstances ancillary thereto, that authority may admit or, as the case may be, require the evidence in question notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1) of section 4 above, and may determine any issue to which the evidence relates in disregard, so far as necessary, of those provisions.

28. Section 8 makes provision in respect of defamation actions, including:

(1) This section applies to any action for libel or slander begun after the commencement of this Act by a rehabilitated person and founded upon the publication of any matter imputing that the plaintiff has committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for an offence which was the subject of a spent conviction.

(3) Subject to subsections (5) and (6) below, nothing in section 4(1) above shall prevent the defendant in an action to which this section applies from relying on any defence under section 2[2] or 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 which is available to him or any defence of absolute or qualified privilege which is available to him, or restrict the matters he may establish in support of any such defence.

(5) A defendant in any such action shall not by virtue of subsection (3) above be entitled to rely upon a defence under section 2 of the Defamation Act 2013 if the publication is proved to have been made with malice.

Case law

29. There has been some discussion in cases about the nature of the protections under s.4 ROA.

30. Hussain v Waltham Forest LBC [2019] UKUT 339 (LC) (Hussain UT) concerned decisions of a local authority about fitness to hold licences in respect of houses regulated under the Housing Act 2004. The specific issue was whether the authority was entitled to take into account the fact that the first applicant had provided forged gas safety certificates, for which she had been convicted of offences. These offences had become spent by the time of the refusals.

31. The Upper Tribunal identified five “protections” in s.4 ROA, at [82-100]:

(1) The first protection relates to the text in section 4(1) preceding sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), that a rehabilitated person “shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed… the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction”.

(2) The second is the admissibility of evidence in judicial proceedings under s.4(1)(a).

(3) The third is the questioning of rehabilitated persons in judicial proceedings under s.4(1)(b).

(4) The fourth is a protection against questioning outside judicial proceedings, under s.4(2).

(5) The fifth is protection against disclosure outside judicial proceedings, under s.4(3).

32. As to the “first protection” – which is the broadest in language – the UT held as follows at [88]:

In our judgment, as a matter of plain language, this provision has the following consequences (subject to any legal rule to the contrary):

(i) A person becomes rehabilitated under this provision as regards the relevant conviction in respect of which the rehabilitation period has expired.

(ii) That person is to be treated for all purposes in law as not having committed the offence the subject of that conviction or charged with, prosecuted for, convicted of, or sentenced for that offence. In law those matters are disregarded in the treatment of that rehabilitated person.

(iii) However, that disregard does not extend any further. In particular, there is no disregard of the conduct or behaviour itself. Instead, it is the legal consequences of that behaviour under the criminal law, namely that it involved a criminal offence and resulted in a conviction and sentence, which are disregarded.

(iv) Behaviour amounting to a criminal offence but not resulting in a conviction is not disregarded.

(v) The fact that conduct not only involved committing a criminal offence but also a civil wrong, such as a breach of housing law or landlord and tenant law, is not something which is to be disregarded under this provision.

33. The Upper Tribunal made clear that the significance of the general statement at the outset of s.4(1) was not as broad as it might on initially appear (“that disregard does not extend any further…”).

34. The Court of Appeal upheld the Upper Tribunal’s determination that the FTT could receive evidence or submissions dealing with relevant conduct of a rehabilitated person, including conduct which has been treated under the criminal law as an offence and resulted in a conviction which is now spent. It reasoned that s.4(1)(a) does not proscribe the admission of evidence of the conduct for which a person is convicted. In his shorter judgment in Hussain CA, Hickinbottom LJ was less expansive in discussion of the significance of the general statement at s.4(1), at [16]:

In its opening lines, section 4(1) provides a general statement (that “a person who has become a rehabilitated person for the purposes of this Act in respect of a conviction shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence or offences which were the subject of that conviction”); which is followed by particular ways in which that is to be effected in proceedings before a judicial authority (sections 4(1)(a) and (b), and 4(3)(a)) and otherwise than before such an authority (sections 4(2), and 4(3)(a) and (b)).

35. In NT1 and NT2 v Google LLC [2018] EWHC 799 (QB), Warby J, as he was then, considered the claims of businessmen against Google, which had refused requests to remove search results which featured links to third party reports about their spent convictions. He concluded that nothing in the ROA therefore required Google to delist the search results linking to third party reports about NT1’s spent convictions [170].

36. From [15], Warby J considered the 1974 Act. At [17] he also observed that the significance of the general statement in s.4(1) was less than might appear:

Section 4 of the 1974 Act is headed “Effect of rehabilitation” and begins:

“(1) Subject to sections 7 and 8 below, a person who has become a rehabilitated person for the purposes of this Act in respect of a conviction shall be treated for all purposes in law as a person who has not committed or been charged with or prosecuted for or convicted of or sentenced for the offence or o›ences which were the subject of that conviction . . .”

The emphasis is mine. It highlights wording of exceptional breadth that might at first sight be thought to provide a complete and ready answer to these claims. But nobody suggests that this is its effect. All parties have treated section 4(1) as embodying a legal policy to which the court should have regard in resolving the issues before it. The weight to be given to that policy generally, and in this case in particular, is controversial…

37. At [21], Warby J drew particular attention to s.8 ROA. A defendant who is sued for defamation in respect of a publication imputing the commission by the claimant of a criminal offence which is the subject of a spent conviction can rely on any reporting privilege that may exist and/or on a defence of truth or honest opinion, unless the publication is proved to have been made with malice. So absent malice, a statement by one person of the fact of another person’s spent conviction is not unlawful defamation.

38. The limited nature of the protections under ROA was also a point made by the Court of Appeal in L v Law Society [2008] EWCA Civ 811. That considered the nature and extent of rights under the ROA in the context of an application for a private hearing of an appeal against a revocation of student membership of the Law Society. The application was advanced on the basis that the appeal would involve consideration of that appellant’s spent convictions. Sir Anthony Clarke MR made a number of points in rejecting the application. In particular, he rejected the contention that the ROA rendered spent convictions confidential:

24. The question therefore arises whether the details of the appellant’s spent convictions are confidential information. The first of the two bases on which he submits that they are confidential is that the protection afforded by the 1974 Act renders them confidential. I cannot accept that this is correct. The contention that the 1974 Act renders spent convictions confidential misunderstands the Act’s intention and its ambit. If it were to render spent convictions confidential it would have (as it were) to seal that part of an individual’s criminal record such that no-one except perhaps the individual concerned had access to it. It does not do so.

25. It would also have to render private convictions that were matters of public record and may well have been, as in this case, reported in the press. Notwithstanding the obvious practical difficulty of rendering secret a public judgment which had been freely and properly reported in the press, the Act does not purport to have that effect and does not, in my opinion, do so. It simply ensures, for instance, that an individual cannot be questioned about such convictions in defined contexts or be prejudiced if details of the spent convictions come to the attention of a current employer during the course of that employment. As Maurice Kay J held in R (Pearson) v DVLA [2002] EWHC 2482 (Admin) at 15, with which I agree, “the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act confers certain privileges. . .”. It does not attempt to go beyond the grant of those limited privileges to provide a right of confidentiality in respect of spent convictions. While the 1974 Act in some respects may place an individual with spent convictions in the same position as someone with no convictions, it does not do so by rendering the convictions confidential; it does so simply by putting in place a regime which protects an individual from being prejudiced by the existence of such convictions. For these reasons I reject the submission that the 1974 Act renders the appellant’s convictions confidential. However, if, contrary to that view, it were the case that the effect of the 1974 Act rendered details of the appellant’s convictions confidential, that protection cannot extend to the present proceedings because of the effect of the 1975 Order.

39. While the facts of L and the legal context was different to the present (concerning an application process to become a solicitor, being exempt from the terms of section 4(2) of the ROA under The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975), it is nevertheless of note that the Court of Appeal again was again stressing that the protections under the ROA were limited, and did not impart confidentiality to the fact of a spent conviction.

Discussion on Issue 1

40. I do not consider that the Appellant has a substantive right directly under the ROA to anonymity.

41. First, there is no explicit right articulated in the ROA to anonymity in court proceedings where the fact of a spent conviction might arise.

42. Second, I do not consider that such a right can be implied into the general statement at the outset of s.4(1):

(1) The import of the authority discussed above is that rights under the ROA are limited. Considering the provisions as a whole, there are specific rights about court process in the ROA, and limitations on those rights (such as a court having the power to admit evidence under s.7(3) of a spent conviction): it is harder to read a right to anonymity into s.4(1) in circumstances where other rights have been specifically articulated.

(2) In L, the Court of Appeal specifically refused a claim to anonymity on the basis of the ROA and did not find that there was any right to confidentiality arising from the ROA. That judgment would not be consistent with a right to anonymity under s.4(1).

(3) The Hussain cases indicate that there is no such substantive entitlement under the ROA. Ms Hussain was there named, along with the fact of her spent convictions. Although there was no discussion of anonymity, the ROA was extensively discussed, and there is no suggestion that either the Upper Tribunal or Court of Appeal considered that the naming of the Appellant alongside disclosure of her spent conviction breached her rights under the ROA.

43. I conclude therefore that the ROA alone does not provide a basis for granting the Anonymity Application.

Issue 2: The Appellant’s case under Article 8 read with the ROA

The HRA and ECHR rights

44. Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right, and that includes a court or tribunal, unless if the authority could not have acted differently as a result of a provision of primary legislation.

45. Article 8 provides the right to respect for private and family life:

1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.

2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

46. Article 10 provides for freedom of expression:

1 Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2 The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

The FTT Rules

47. The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009 include two rules of immediate relevance to the present application.

(1) Rule 2 requires the Tribunal seeks to give effect to the overriding objective of dealing with cases fairly and justly when exercising any power under the Rules.

(2) Rule 14 enables the Tribunal to make an order prohibiting the disclosure or publication of specified information relating to the proceedings, or of “any matter likely to lead members of the public to identify any person whom the Tribunal considers should not be identified.”

48. Because the Anonymity Application is not an application for a private hearing, I do not consider rule 32 is directly in play. Rule 32 provides all hearings must be held in public, subject to stated exceptions, for example if restricting access to the hearing is justified in order to protect a person's right to respect for their private and family life. Here, the question is not whether the hearing should be in public, but whether at that hearing, and then in any public decision that follows, the Appellant’s name should be anonymised. Such anonymisation is in substance a restriction of the disclosure during the proceedings and thereafter of the Appellant’s name, under rule 14. The equivalent rule in the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 was identified as giving the power to make an anonymity ruling in Dettori [2024] UKUT 364 (TCC) at[11].

Case law

49. The common law principle of open justice is long established. In Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417, Lord Atkinson at p463 observed:

The hearing of a case in public may be, and often is, no doubt, painful, humiliating, or deterrent both to parties and witnesses, and in many cases, especially those of a criminal nature, the details may be so indecent as to tend to injure public morals, but all this is tolerated and endured, because it is felt that in public trial is to found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means for winning for it public confidence and respect.

50. There were two qualifications mentioned by Earl Loreburn.

(1) The first, at p445, is where the subject-matter of the action would be destroyed by a hearing in open Court, as in a case of some secret process of manufacture:

An aggrieved person, entitled to protection against one man who had stolen his secret, would not ask for it on the terms that the secret was to be communicated to all the world. There would be in effect a denial of justice.

(2) Second, where publicity would reasonably deter the claimant from seeking justice at all at p446:

…in all cases where the public has been excluded with admitted propriety the underlying principle, as it seems to me, is that the administration of justice would be rendered impracticable by their presence, whether because the case could not be effectively tried, or the parties entitled to justice would be reasonably deterred from seeking it at the hands of the Court.

Applying this principle to proceedings for nullity, if the Court is satisfied that to insist upon publicity would in the circumstances reasonably deter a party from seeking redress, or interfere with the effective trial of the course, in my opinion an order for hearing or partial hearing in camera may lawfully be made.

51. These qualifications reflect the fact that open justice and access to justice can sometimes exist in tension.

52. However, the case law is clear that a degree of intrusion into the taxpayer’s privacy is inevitable in a tax appeal and does not form a basis to depart from the principle of open justice. In HMRC v Banerjee (no 2) [2009] EWHC 1229 (Ch), Henderson J at [35]:

…taxation always has been, and probably always will be, a subject of particular sensitivity both for the citizen and for the executive arm of government. It is an area where public and private interests intersect, if not collide; and for that reason there is nearly always a wider public interest potentially involved in even the most mundane-seeming tax dispute. Nowhere is that more true, in my judgment, than in relation to the rules governing the deductibility of expenses for income tax. Those rules directly affect the vast majority of taxpayers, and any High Court judgment on the subject is likely to be of wide significance, quite possibly in ways which may not be immediately apparent when it is delivered. These considerations serve to reinforce the point that in tax cases the public interest generally requires the precise facts relevant to the decision to be a matter of public record, and not to be more or less heavily veiled by a process of redaction or anonymisation. The inevitable degree of intrusion into the taxpayer’s privacy which this involves is, in all normal circumstances, the price which has to be paid for the resolution of tax disputes through a system of open justice rather than by administrative fiat.

53. Nicklin J in EGC v PGF NHS Trust [2022] EWHC 1908 (QB) observed that an order anonymising a party is a derogation from the principle of open justice that requires justification.

54. In Dettori v HMRC [2024] UKUT 364 (TCC), [2025] 1 WLR 1668 (Dettori), the Upper Tribunal considered the question of anonymisation of its earlier decision. In that case, the Upper Tribunal reiterated the well-established principles derived from Lord Neuberger in H v News Group Newspapers Ltd (Practice Note) [2011] 1WLR 1645:

In a case such as this, where the protection sought by the claimant is an anonymity order or other restraint on publication of details of a case which are normally in the public domain, certain principles were identified by the judge, and which, together with principles contained in valuable written observations to which I have referred, I would summarise as follows:

(1) The general rule is that the names of the parties to an action are included in orders and judgments of the court.

(2) There is no general exception for cases where private matters are in issue.

(3) An order for anonymity or any other order restraining the publication of the normally reportable details of a case is a derogation from the principle of open justice and an interference with the article 10 rights of the public at large.

(4) Accordingly, where the court is asked to make any such order, it should only do so after closely scrutinising the application, and considering whether a degree of restraint on publication is necessary, and, if it is, whether there is any less restrictive or more acceptable alternative than that which is sought.

(5) Where the court is asked to restrain the publication of the names of the parties and/or the subject matter of the claim, on the ground that such restraint is necessary under article 8, the question is whether there is sufficient general, public interest in publishing a report of the proceedings which identifies a party and/or the normally reportable details to justify any resulting curtailment of his right and his family’s right to respect for their private and family life.

(6) On any such application, no special treatment should be accorded to public figures or celebrities: in principle, they are entitled to the same protection as others, no more and no less.

(7) An order for anonymity or for reporting restrictions should not be made simply because the parties consent: parties cannot waive the rights of the public.

(8) An anonymity order or any other order restraining publication made by a judge at an interlocutory stage of an injunction application does not last for the duration of the proceedings but must be reviewed at the return date.

(9) Whether or not an anonymity order or an order restraining publication of normally reportable details is made, then, at least where a judgment is or would normally be given, a publicly available judgment should normally be given, and a copy of the consequential court order should also be publicly available, although some editing of the judgment or order may be necessary.

(10) Notice of any hearing should be given to the defendant unless there is a good reason not to do so, in which case the court should be told of the absence of notice and the reason for it, and should be satisfied that the reason is a good one.

55. The Upper Tribunal went on to discuss the approach where an applicant for anonymity seeks to rely on their article 8 rights, by reference to the Divisional Court case of R (Marandi) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2023] 2 Cr App R 15. First, it must be determined whether the disclosure of the claimant’s name would amount to an interference with his article 8 rights, which requires proof that the effects would attain a certain level of seriousness. Next, there would be a balancing exercise, i.e. would the consequences of disclosure be so serious an interference with the claimant’s rights that it was necessary and proportionate to interfere with the ordinary rules of open justice.

56. An example of a balancing of Article 8 and Article 10 in the context of anonymity orders is In re Guardian News and Media Ltd [2010] UKSC 1. In that case, the Supreme Court considered the appeal of M¸ who had been granted anonymity which the press had applied to be set aside. At [28], Lord Rodger noted that the issuing of a judgment using an initial instead of a name is a way by which a court ensures it acts lawfully if it considers by publishing its judgment in the usual form, it would itself act unlawfully under s.6 HRA because it would thereby infringe a party’s article 8 rights. He distinguished this situation from an anonymity order directed to other people, in effect to the press, which is what the orders in question went to. He therefore analysed the case as being one where the court has to weigh the competing claims of M and his family under article 8 and of the press under article 10 [43].

57. At paragraph [63], Lord Rodger considered article 10 arguments against an anonymity order:

What’s in a name? “A lot”, the press would answer. This is because stories about particular individuals are simply much more attractive to readers than stories about unidentified people. It is just human nature. And this is why, of course, even when reporting major disasters, journalists usually look for a story about how particular individuals are affected. Writing stories which capture the attention of readers is a matter of reporting technique, and the European court holds that article 10 protects not only the substance of ideas and information but also the form in which they are conveyed…

58. He went on to observe that in the present cases, a report which did not reveal the identities of the appellants would be disembodied “Certainly, readers would be less interested and, realising that, editors would tend to give the report a lower priority. In that way informed debate about freezing orders would suffer.” Lord Rodger acknowledged that the identity of the claimants could not affect the answers of the court to the legal questions in the substantive appeals, such that the identities may not matter particularly to the judges. He went on “But the legitimate interest of the public is wider than the interest of judges qua judges or of lawyers qua lawyers. Irrespective of the outcome, the public has a legitimate interest in not being kept in the dark about who are challenging the [Terrorism Orders] and the AQO [Al Quaida Order].” He also went on, at [73], to observe that the purpose of a freezing order is public, so it was not a situation where the press were wanting to publish a story about some aspect of an individual’s private life, “Rather, they are being prevented from publishing a complete account of an important public matter involving this particular individual, for fear of the incidental effect that it would have on M’s private and family life”. On the one hand, the court considered that the potential effect on M’s private and family life was not particularly compelling, the evidence being very general, and M having gone out of his way to put into the public domain what he said were the effects of the freezing order on his family life. On the other, publication of his identity would make a material contribution to a debate of general interest [75]. The court concluded that there is a public interest which justifies curtailment of his and his family’s article 8 rights.

59. In R(T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police [2014] UKSC 35, the Supreme Court reiterated that the fact of a spent conviction is part of a person’s private life that engages article 8. That decision concerned challenges against enhanced criminal record certificates, which, in the first case, revealed warnings issued to the claimant when he was 11 years old. At [16-18], Lord Wilson addressed the first question, as to whether the fact of the cautions was an aspect of the claimants’ private life, and referred to the earlier case of R (L) v Comr of Police of the Metropolis [2010] 1 AC 410 as giving an authoritative affirmative answer. He cited Lord Hope in that earlier decision, including the following passage

“This line of authority from Strasbourg shows that information about an applicant’s convictions which is collected and stored in central records can fall within the scope of private life within the meaning of article 8.1, with the result that it will interfere with the applicant’s private life when it is released. As it recedes into the past, it becomes a part of the person’s private life which must be respected.”

60. At [18], Lord Wilson adopted the formulation suggested by Liberty, the intervenor, that the point at which a conviction recedes into the past and becomes part of a person’s private life will usually be the point at which it becomes spent under the ROA. The Supreme Court held therefore that the disclosure of the warnings constituted an interference with article 8 and so had to be meet the requirements of article 8.2 to be justified, i.e. that it must be in accordance with law and necessary in a democratic society for one of the stated purposes in that article.

Discussion

61. The first question is whether the identification of the Appellant by name by the Tribunal ahead of the hearing, by way of notices of the parties in the hearing, by those at the hearing, and by the Tribunal in any published decision, would interfere with his article 8 rights.

62. In my judgment, the answer to this is yes. It will not be possible to have either a hearing of this appeal or to make a decision in respect of this appeal without referring to the Conviction. The reliance of the Respondent upon the Conviction is one of the grounds on which the Appellant argues that the Refusal is unlawful. It will not be possible to address that ground without discussing the Conviction. As a result, if the Appellant’s name is not anonymised, anyone attending the hearing, or reading the published decision, will learn of the fact of the Appellant’s Conviction. As the Conviction is a spent conviction under the ROA, it is part of the Appellant’s private life protected by Article 8, as clear from the Supreme Court decision in R(T). In the light of R(T), I am satisfied that the significant threshold for establishing interference with article 8 is met, and the public identification of the Appellant as having the spent Conviction in the hearing or in a published decision would interfere with his person’s right to privacy under article 8.

63. That being so, we must turn to the second stage, which is to determine if that interference is justified under the second limb of article 8. As to this:

(1) Open justice is itself a potential justification for an interference with article 8 rights, because article 8.2 allows for restrictions as “are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society… for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. As evident in the passage from Scott v Scott, open justice is inextricably linked to the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. In public hearings is to found the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice.

(2) Additionally, the disclosure of the name of an appellant in an appeal also serves the purpose of protecting the right of freedom of expression under article 10. An anonymity order would restrict the words used during the appeal and also is a restriction, at least in theory, upon the media, because media reporting is affected by anonymity, for the reasons explained by Lord Rodger in In re Guardian above. Therefore article 10 is also at play.

(3) However, these two interests do not necessarily result in the Anonymity Application being rejected. What is necessary is an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights in the individual case.

(4) In the present case, there is no evidence that the appeal is a matter of likely press interest, in the way that was a significant element in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in In re Guardian. The impact upon the right of freedom of expression is therefore not as significant as in some other cases.

(5) Likewise, this is not a case like L, where the subject matter of the appeal was about entry to a regulated profession. So the observations of Sir Anthony Clarke MR in that case, about public confidence in the solicitors’ profession, do not apply in the same way here.

(6) As regards the principle of open justice, the anonymisation of the Appellant’s name would be a significant impingement on that principle. However, the appeal proceedings would remain public and any full decision would be published, so the impact on open justice is more limited than in some of the cases, such as L, where the application was that the appeal be heard in private.

(7) While this not a case where the hearing of the appeal without anonymity would defeat the purpose of the appeal, I do consider that there is a tension between access to justice and open justice in this case. The Appellant is claiming in his appeal that the Respondent should never have referred to his Conviction in the first place. Yet without anonymisation, the price of his pursuing the appeal, even if successful, would be a published decision which would itself publicly identify the Appellant as having a spent Conviction.

(8) In all the circumstances¸ asking myself the question identified in Dettori at (5), I do not consider that there is sufficient general, public interest in publishing a report of the proceedings which identifies the Appellant to justify the interference with the Appellant’s article 8 rights.

(9) As regards the necessity and proportionality of the anonymity in this case, as an interference with open justice and article 10, I consider that the order would be no more than is necessary. I consider that the alternatives, of a private hearing and/or not publishing the decision in the Appellant’s appeal at all (assuming it was a full facts and reasons decision), would be a much more substantial interference with the principle of open justice than the more limited derogation of anonymisation.

64. I conclude that in all the particular circumstances of this case, without anonymity, the Appellant’s article 8 rights would be interfered with, and such interference would not be necessary and proportionate for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary and/or for the protection of the article 10 rights of others. Conversely the interference with article 10 that anonymity would involve is justified as necessary and proportionate for the protection of the Appellant’s Article 8 rights.

Conclusion

65. For these reasons, I allow the Appellant’s application for anonymity.

Right to apply for permission to appeal

66. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

27 October 2026

Notes

[1] Section 7(2) provides that “Nothing in section 4(1) above shall affect the determination of any issue, or prevent the admission or requirement of any evidence, relating to a person's previous convictions or to circumstances ancillary thereto” in specified proceedings. An appeal before the Tribunal is not one of these.

[2] Section 2(1): “It is a defence to an action for defamation for the defendant to show that the imputation conveyed by the statement complained of is substantially true.”


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