Administrative United Kingdom

MP & Ors v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal

(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: PA/81655/2025,

PA/81658/2025, PA/81660/2025,

PA/81663/2025, PA/81665/2025,

PA/81667/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Birmingham IAC

On 26 October 2026

Before

first-tier tribunal JUDGE S. Aziz

Between

MP (First Appellant)

MM2 (Second appellant)

mm3 (third appellant)

mm4 (fourth appellant)

mm5 (fifth appellant)

ma (sixth appellant)

(anonymity direction Made)

Appellants

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms A. Jones, Counsel instructed by Privity Legal

For the Respondent: MrE. Twum-Boateng, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The principal appellant is MP (first appellant). He is a national of Pakistan. His wife and children (the other appellants) are dependants upon his protection claim.

2. The appellants all entered the United Kingdom on 8 July 2023 and claimed asylum. Their protection and human rights applications were refused by the respondent on 10 July 2025. Notices of appeal against the decisions were lodged on 23 July 2025.

Anonymity Direction

3. I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. However, in the particular circumstances of this case, it is necessary and proportionate to conceal the appellants’ identities in order to protect their right to privacy and the importance of facilitating the discharge of the obligations of the United Kingdom under the Refugee Convention outweighs the principle of open justice in this case.

HEARING AND ISSUES IN DISPUTE

4. The background to this appeal is set out in the documentation contained on myHMCTS.

5. The hearing was recorded and that recording shall stand as the record of proceedings.

Appellants’ cases

6. The first appellant is a national of Pakistan who claims international protection on the basis of his political opinion. He became an active member of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (“PTI”) in 2018 and was involved in organising local party meetings and protests in Rawalpindi. As a result of his political activities, he was arrested by the authorities on three occasions between April 2022 and January 2023. During those detentions he was physically assaulted, threatened and compelled to sign undertakings not to participate in further political activity. Notwithstanding those threats, he continued to support the PTI because of his political convictions.

7. The political situation for PTI supporters deteriorated significantly following the arrest of Imran Khan in May 2023 and the subsequent crackdown on PTI members. He came to be at risk of arrest and ill-treatment by the Pakistani authorities because of his political profile and perceived involvement in opposition activity. He went into hiding before departing Pakistan and fears arrest, detention and persecution if returned.

8. The first appellant additionally relies upon threats said to arise from his former wife. He claims that she is connected to a local land mafia with links to influential political and security figures. She threatened him and his family following the breakdown of their relationship, assisted the authorities in attempting to locate him, and continued to search for him after he had left Pakistan. These threats provide a further basis for his fear of return.

The Respondent’s Case

9. The respondent accepts the first appellant's identity, nationality and membership of the PTI. The respondent also accepts that, if established, the treatment feared by the first appellant would be capable of amounting to persecution. However, the respondent does not accept that the first appellant has demonstrated a real risk of persecution or serious harm.

10. The respondent contends that the first appellant's account contains significant inconsistencies concerning the nature of his role within the PTI, the circumstances of his alleged arrests, and his knowledge of significant political events involving Imran Khan. The respondent further relies upon the first appellant's failure to mention political involvement during his screening interview and considers that his explanations for those omissions are not credible.

11. The respondent also rejects the first appellant's claim that he faces harm from his former wife or persons connected to a land mafia. It is submitted that the first appellant has provided insufficient detail to substantiate those allegations and that his ability to obtain a visa, attend biometric appointments and depart Pakistan lawfully on his own passport undermines the claim that he was of adverse interest to either the authorities or his former wife.

12. The respondent concludes that the first appellant has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, entitlement to humanitarian protection or any basis for a grant of leave under Article 8 ECHR.

Issues of Dispute

13. Following discussions with the representatives, it was agreed that I needed to resolve the following issues in dispute.

Protection claim: fear of the Pakistani authorities arising from political activities

14. The first appellant claims to be at risk on return to Pakistan as a result of his support for and activities on behalf of the PTI. The issues arising under this aspect of the claim are:

(a) Whether the first appellant has given a credible account of the events said to have led him to leave Pakistan.

(b) In particular:

(i) Whether the first appellant was an active member and supporter of the PTI in the manner claimed.

(ii) Whether he was arrested, detained and mistreated on three occasions because of his political activities.

(iii) Whether he remains of interest to the Pakistani authorities.

(iv) Whether, on return to Pakistan, he would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm on account of his actual or imputed political opinion.

Protection claim: fear of honour-based violence

15. The first appellant also claims to be at risk from his former wife and individuals connected to a land mafia.

16. The issues arising under this aspect of the claim are:

(a) Whether the first appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason and, in particular, whether he falls within a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.

(b) Whether the first appellant faces a real risk of harm from his former wife, and/or persons connected to a land mafia.

(c) Whether there would be a sufficiency of protection available to the first appellant from the Pakistani authorities.

(d) Whether it would be reasonable and not unduly harsh for the appellants to relocate internally within Pakistan.

17. Ms Jones conceded at the outset of the hearing that the appellants’ human rights claims stand or fall with the outcome of the protection claims. Accordingly, no separate issues arise under Article 8 ECHR.

Evidence and Submissions

18. I heard from the first appellant. He adopted his witness statement as his evidence-in-chief. Mr Boateng then cross-examined him on the issues of dispute. After the evidence was heard, closing submissions were made by both representatives.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

19. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the Appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the Appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the Appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Taking the Appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a convention reason?

(b) Does the Appellant fear persecution for that convention reason?

If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c) The Appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;

(d) There would not be sufficient protection available; and

(e) The Appellant could not internally relocate.

20. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the Appellants must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the Appellants.

FINDINGS

21. The first appellant is the principal appellant in this appeal and his wife and children (the other appellants) are dependent upon him. There are two separate strands to his protection claim. Firstly, there is a protection claim based on his political activities for the PTI. Secondly, a protection claim based on a fear of the first appellant’s former wife and her links to the land mafia. I explore each ground in turn, dealing firstly with the first appellant’s fear of his former wife.

The first appellant's former wife and alleged connections to a land mafia

22. Refugee Convention: As a starting point, the respondent does not accept that the Refugee Convention is engaged in relation to this aspect of the claim. At the outset of the hearing, I sought clarification from Ms Jones as to the Convention reason relied upon. She submitted that the first appellant fell within a ‘particular social group’ on the basis that he was at risk of gender-based violence. Beyond reliance upon the appellants’ skeleton argument, no substantive submissions were advanced in support of that contention. In particular, no submissions were made as to how the proposed group satisfied the requirements of the Refugee Convention, nor was any authority or country evidence identified in support of the proposition that men at risk of gender-based violence in Pakistan constitute a ‘particular social group’.

23. The skeleton argument itself does not identify with precision the proposed social group or develop the legal basis upon which that contention is advanced. In appeals to which the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 applies, a claimant must establish both that the group shares an innate characteristic, a common background that cannot be changed, or a characteristic so fundamental to identity or conscience that its members should not be required to renounce it, and that the group has a distinct identity within the relevant society because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding community. On the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that either limb of that test has been established. There is no country or expert evidence demonstrating that men at risk of gender-based violence in Pakistan are perceived as a distinct social group, nor is there evidence capable of establishing the remaining requirements of the statutory test.

24. In those circumstances, I am not satisfied that the first appellant has established a Refugee Convention reason in respect of this aspect of his claim. I therefore consider his fear of harm from his former wife, her family, and any associated land mafia solely through the prism of Article 3 ECHR.

25. Alleged connection to a land mafia: Having considered the evidence in the round, I am not satisfied, even to the lower standard of proof, that the first appellant has established that his former wife was connected to a land mafia or organised criminal group. The respondent has identified a number of significant credibility concerns, to which I now turn.

26. The first appellant's account is that he became aware of his former wife's alleged links to a land mafia in 2020 after reading messages on her mobile telephone. He stated that the messages referred to land plots and land prices and led him to believe that she was involved with a criminal organisation. He further claims that she subsequently threatened him, his first wife and his children and that she had connections to influential political figures and individuals within the authorities.

27. I do not accept that account. As the respondent observed, messages referring to land transactions, land prices or plots of land are not, without more, indicative of involvement in organised criminal activity. The first appellant has produced no documentary, independent or corroborative evidence capable of demonstrating that his former wife was connected to a land mafia. I also find his account lacking in detail. Whilst he repeatedly asserted that his former wife possessed significant influence and criminal connections, he was unable to provide cogent evidence explaining the nature of those connections, how he became aware of them, or why he concluded that they amounted to involvement in a land mafia as opposed to legitimate property-related activity.

28. In his witness statement, the first appellant describes discovering messages which he considered threatening in tone and says that those messages caused him to fear that his former wife was connected to dangerous individuals. However, these assertions are largely conclusory. The evidence lacks sufficient detail to demonstrate either the existence of a land mafia connection or that his former wife possessed the level of influence alleged. I therefore find that the first appellant has not established that his former wife was connected to a powerful criminal organisation.

29. Alleged influence over the authorities: The first appellant further claims that, following the events of 9 May 2023, his former wife assisted the authorities in attempting to locate him and that he was forced to move between locations whilst in hiding. He asserts that both the authorities and his former wife were actively seeking him. However, these allegations depend substantially upon the premise that his former wife possessed the influence and connections he attributes to her. For the reasons already given, I am not satisfied that this premise has been established.

30. The respondent also challenges the first appellant's claim that his former wife possessed sufficient influence, through political or military contacts, to place his name on the Exit Control List or otherwise interfere with his ability to leave Pakistan. I find merit in that challenge. The first appellant was able to obtain a visa, travel within Pakistan, attend biometric enrolment appointments and leave the country using his own passport and in his own identity. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that he was successful in litigation connected with the divorce and was not required to make the financial payments sought by his former wife. Those matters are inconsistent with the claim that she exercised significant influence over state institutions, governmental processes or the courts.

31. The first appellant accepted that his former wife did not herself hold any official position. Rather, his case is that she exercised influence indirectly through contacts with powerful individuals. However, when this aspect of his evidence was tested, he was unable to provide a satisfactory explanation as to how a person with the degree of influence alleged would have been unable to prevent his departure from Pakistan or otherwise use those connections to locate him. I found his evidence on this issue speculative and unsupported.

32. I have considered the first appellant's explanation that he was able to leave Pakistan only because he kept his travel plans secret from his former wife and others. I accept that secrecy may assist a person in avoiding unwanted attention. However, even taking that explanation at its highest, it does not overcome the broader difficulty in his account. If his former wife truly possessed the extensive political, military and criminal connections alleged, I would reasonably have expected some evidence that those connections manifested themselves in a tangible way. Instead, the first appellant was able to obtain the necessary travel documentation, attend appointments, travel openly and depart Pakistan without interference. His lawful and uneventful departure from Pakistan materially undermines his claim that his former wife possessed the power, means or influence to mobilise state authorities against him or otherwise prevent him from leaving the country.

33. Risk on return: Drawing these findings together, I am not satisfied that the first appellant has established that his former wife was connected to a land mafia, that she possessed the degree of political, military or institutional influence alleged, or that she has the means to mobilise state authorities against him. Nor am I satisfied that the evidence establishes that she and her associates continue to present a real risk of serious harm to him on return to Pakistan.

34. Accordingly, I find that the first appellant has failed to establish a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR arising from his former wife, her family or any alleged land mafia connections. I therefore reject this aspect of the claim.

Political Activities for the PTI and Risk on Return

35. The First Appellant's Political Profile: I begin by considering the first appellant's profile within the PTI. The respondent accepts that the first appellant is a member of the PTI. This is an important concession. It is also common ground that he did not hold a senior or prominent position within the party.

36. Following re-examination, I sought clarification from the first appellant regarding the nature of his political activities for the PTI. He described himself as a local organiser operating at a grassroots level. His role involved encouraging people to vote for the PTI and encouraging attendance at rallies and demonstrations. He accepted that his position was a low-level one. His evidence, however, was that it was individuals performing these organisational functions who became the focus of official attention following the crackdown on PTI members and supporters.

37. At the outset of closing submissions, I invited Mr Boateng to clarify the respondent's position regarding the first appellant's account of his political activities. As noted above, it was conceded he was a low-level member of the PTI. I therefore asked him to clarify whether the respondent accepted his role within the organisation as outlined in his oral evidence (detailed in the above paragraph). Mr Boateng indicated that he left the matter to the Tribunal and its assessment of the evidence.

38. Ms Jones submitted that the first appellant's account should be regarded as credible, emphasising that he had not sought to exaggerate either his status or his responsibilities within the party.

39. Having heard the first appellant give evidence, I accept that he was an active but low-level PTI member. I accept that his activities were broadly as described by him, namely grassroots organisational work, encouraging attendance at rallies and demonstrations, and promoting electoral support for the party within his local area.

40. I next address what I consider, on the evidence before me, to be the principal issues in dispute between the parties regarding the first appellant's activities for the PTI, and the extent to which those activities contribute to his profile as a PTI member and, in turn, whether they place him at risk on return to Pakistan.

41. Alleged Inconsistency Regarding Persons Reporting to Him: The respondent submits that the first appellant gave inconsistent accounts of his role within the PTI. In his first asylum interview, he stated that nobody reported to him because he was a "low-profile" member who reported to others. In his third interview, he stated that four or five people reported to him when organising events.

42. The first appellant's explanation is that the two answers related to different aspects of the same role. When he stated that nobody reported to him, he was referring to his formal position within the party hierarchy. When he later stated that individuals reported to him, he was referring to volunteers working under his direction during specific events and demonstrations.

43. Having heard from the first appellant, I accept his explanation. His two answers are capable of reconciliation and do not represent a material inconsistency. I therefore attach no adverse weight to this aspect of the evidence.

44. The Three Arrests:The respondent doubts the credibility of the first appellant’s claim to have been arrested on three occasions. Although the first appellant stated that he signed undertakings not to participate in further protests following his first arrest (AIR3 Q50), he claimed to have continued protesting and to have been arrested again. When asked why the authorities repeatedly released him despite those breaches, he gave differing explanations, stating both that the authorities would have records of the agreement and that they probably would not due to the large number of participants involved (AIR3 Q54–Q55).

45. The first appellant states that he was arrested in April 2022, October 2022 and January 2023. He explains that he was forced to sign agreements after the arrests under duress and fear, believing he could suffer serious harm if he refused. He maintains that the authorities' practice at the time was to detain large numbers of PTI supporters, force them to sign undertakings, and then release them. He rejects the suggestion that repeated release undermines his account, arguing that it reflected a broader pattern of intimidation against PTI workers. As to why he continued protesting despite the undertakings, he states that he felt a moral obligation to oppose what was happening to PTI supporters and remained committed to the party despite the risks.

46. Having considered the first appellant's evidence in the round, I accept his explanation for the three arrests. I found his account of being arrested, required to sign undertakings and subsequently released to be broadly consistent with the objective evidence relating to the treatment of rank-and-file PTI supporters. For example, see section 3.1.2 of the ‘Country Policy and Information Note Pakistan: Political parties and affiliation’ (February 2026).

47. Against that background, I do not find it implausible that the first appellant could have been arrested, required to sign undertakings, released and subsequently come to the adverse attention of the authorities on further occasions. Nor do I regard his continued participation in political activity, notwithstanding the undertakings he had signed, as inherently implausible given his evidence that he remained committed to the PTI and felt a moral obligation to continue supporting the party despite the risks. The objective evidence is capable of supporting the first appellant's account that short-term detention and release were used as a means of deterrence and intimidation against PTI supporters and activists.

48. Imran Khan's Arrest Date: The respondent places reliance upon the fact that the first appellant incorrectly stated that Imran Khan was arrested in October 2022 rather than May 2023.

49. The first appellant accepts that he gave the wrong date. He attributes the error to confusion arising from the prolonged and turbulent political events involving Imran Khan, coupled with the passage of time. I accept that explanation. Whilst the error is capable of being relied upon by the respondent, I do not regard it as material when considered in the context of the evidence as a whole. A mistake as to a date does not, in the circumstances of this case, undermine the credibility of the first appellant's broader account.

50. Failure to Disclose Political Activities at Screening: The respondent further relies upon the first appellant's failure to disclose his political involvement during his Screening Interview. This is a matter which has caused me some concern. On its face, the respondent's criticism has force. A person claiming to fear persecution because of political activity might ordinarily be expected to disclose that activity at the earliest opportunity.

51. The first appellant's explanation is that he arrived in the United Kingdom with his wife and children holding entry clearance as the dependant of a Skilled Worker visa holder. Upon arrival, that leave was cancelled. He states that the family had intended to escape their difficulties in Pakistan by relocating to the United Kingdom for the duration of their visas and that he was shocked to find himself facing the prospect of return shortly after arrival. He accepts that he deliberately failed to disclose his political activities during his Screening Interview. His explanation is that he feared disclosure would increase the risk of his return to Pakistan. He believed that PTI supporters were being targeted by the Pakistani authorities, was aware of reports of individuals being returned to Pakistan after disclosing political activities, and feared that the same outcome might befall him and his family. He therefore chose not to reveal this aspect of his claim at that stage, whilst the family was still at the airport.

52. Having considered the matter carefully, I am prepared to accept the first appellant's account. Whilst the omission is not insignificant, it must be viewed in its proper context. The respondent has subsequently accepted that the first appellant was a member of the PTI. In those circumstances, the fact omitted at the Screening Interview was ultimately accepted by the respondent following further enquiry (at least to the extent that he was a low-level member of the PTI, even if they went onto reject his substantive asylum claim). Whilst that does not excuse the omission, it provides some support for the first appellant's account of why he chose not to disclose his political affiliations at that stage. Looking at the evidence in the round, I accept that fear of return was the principal reason for his failure to disclose his political activities during the Screening Interview. I therefore do not regard that omission as materially damaging to his overall credibility.

53. The First Appellant’s Profile Following my Findings of Fact: Drawing these matters together, I find that the first appellant has established the following profile:

(a) He has been a PTI member since 2018.

(b) He was an active grassroots organiser within the party.

(c) His activities included encouraging support for the PTI, promoting attendance at rallies and demonstrations, and encouraging electoral participation.

(d) He was arrested and detained on three occasions between April 2022 and January 2023 because of his PTI activities. During his detentions he was ill-treated.

(e) He was required to sign undertakings not to engage in further political activity.

(f) Notwithstanding those undertakings, he continued his involvement with the PTI and thereby came to the continuing attention of the authorities.

54. Risk on Return: I have carefully considered the country evidence before me, including the February 2026 CPIN and the additional objective material contained within the appellants’ supplementary bundle.

55. The February 2026 CPIN (see sections 3.1.1-3.1.2) draws a distinction between ordinary members, supporters and sympathisers of opposition parties and those who hold a higher profile, engage in political activism, or have otherwise attracted adverse attention from the authorities. It states that ordinary members and supporters are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm, and that arrests of rank-and-file members are generally short-term and deterrent in nature. By contrast, those with a more prominent political profile, particularly individuals who are active organisers, vocal critics, or who have previously come to the attention of the state, may face a real risk depending upon their circumstances.

56. If the first appellant's claim rested solely upon his membership of the PTI, I would not find the objective evidence sufficient to establish a real risk of persecution on return. The CPIN is clear that ordinary members and sympathisers will not generally face such a risk.

57. However, I do not find that the first appellant falls within that category. On my findings, he was not merely a passive supporter. Rather, he was actively involved in organising and mobilising supporters. More significantly, I accept that he was arrested and detained on three occasions because of those activities and was required to sign undertakings not to continue them.

58. The CPIN demonstrates a continuing pattern of state action directed not only towards senior PTI figures but also towards individuals involved in political mobilisation and protest activity. While the evidence indicates that low-level supporters who have not come to the attention of the authorities are generally unlikely to face adverse treatment, it also records arrests, detentions and prosecutions of PTI activists, workers and organisers, particularly in the context of political demonstrations (see sections 9.4.5, 9.4.8 and 12.2.9). The evidence therefore supports the proposition that a person who has previously attracted adverse state attention because of PTI activism faces a materially greater risk than an ordinary supporter whose political involvement has remained unknown to the authorities.

59. The objective material contained within the appellants’ supplementary bundle is broadly consistent with that assessment. The EUAA guidance continues to distinguish between prominent PTI figures and ordinary rank-and-file members, indicating that mere party membership will not ordinarily give rise to a risk of persecution. However, the more recent material from 2026 documents a continuing crackdown upon PTI activity in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including preventive arrests, detentions, raids and restrictions targeting workers, activists and those involved in political mobilisation. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that whilst low-level membership alone is insufficient to establish risk, participation in protests, organisational activity, or otherwise coming to the attention of the authorities materially increases that risk.

60. This has not been an easy aspect of the appeal to determine. The country information presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, the February 2026 CPIN indicates that ordinary PTI members are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution and places the onus on an individual claimant to demonstrate otherwise. On the other hand, the more recent objective evidence demonstrates that those who engage in political activism, mobilisation or protest activity, and who have already attracted adverse state attention, may face a significantly different risk profile.

61. Whilst much of the evidence concerns office-holders, elected representatives and prominent activists, it nevertheless reinforces the broader proposition that individuals already known to the authorities because of PTI-related activities face a greater level of risk than ordinary supporters who have not previously been targeted.

62. I have found that the first appellant is a relatively low-level member of the PTI. However, I have also found that he has been arrested and detained on three occasions because of his political activities and that he has engaged in political mobilisation on behalf of the party. The more recent country evidence indicates a deterioration in the political climate and a continuing crackdown upon PTI activists, workers and those involved in protest and organisational activity. Whilst the question is a finely balanced one, and recognising the lower standard of proof, I am persuaded that there is sufficient objective evidence to support the contention that a person with the first appellant’s profile faces a real risk of attracting adverse state attention on return.

63. Taking the evidence as a whole, and applying the lower standard of proof, I am satisfied that the first appellant’s accepted history of political activism, repeated arrests and previous adverse attention from the authorities place him outside the category of an ordinary PTI supporter identified in the CPIN. I am satisfied that there is sufficient objective material to demonstrate a real risk that he would again come to the adverse attention of the authorities on return and would face further detention and ill-treatment for reasons of his actual or imputed political opinion.

64. Given my finding that the feared harm emanates from the state, I am satisfied that there would not be a sufficiency of protection available to the first appellant. For the same reason, internal relocation would not provide a viable means of avoiding risk. The authorities whose adverse attention he fears exercise authority throughout Pakistan and there is no evidential basis upon which I could conclude that relocation would remove that risk.

65. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the first appellant has established a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason, namely his actual or imputed political opinion. The appeal therefore succeeds on asylum grounds and under Article 3 ECHR. As the second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth appellants are dependent upon the first appellant's claim, their appeals likewise succeed.

NOTICE OF DECISION

The protection appeals are allowed.

DIRECTION

Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant to rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

TO THE RESPONDENT

FEE AWARD

Although I have allowed the appellants appeals, they were so based on evidence adduced at the appeal hearing and not before the original decision-maker. In the circumstances, I do not find it appropriate to make a fee award in favour of the appellants.

Signed Date 28 October 2026

S. Aziz

First-tier Tribunal Judge S. Aziz

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