Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Commonwealth v. Pierre

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25-P-1415                                              Appeals Court

                 COMMONWEALTH   vs.   GERALD PIERRE.


                          No. 25-P-1415.

      Suffolk.      September 16, 2026. - October 29, 2026.

            Present:   Desmond, Ditkoff, & Toone, JJ.


Motor Vehicle, Operating under the influence. Alcoholic
     Liquors, Motor vehicle. Evidence, Blood alcohol test,
     Breathalyzer test, Field sobriety test. Practice,
     Criminal, Admission to sufficient facts to warrant finding,
     Plea, Conduct of government agents.



     Complaint received and sworn to in the Dorchester Division
of the Boston Municipal Court Department on April 7, 2014.

     A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, filed on August 10,
2023, was heard by Erika P. Reis, J.


     Alexander Conley for the defendant.
     Mackenzie Slyman, Assistant District Attorney, for the
Commonwealth.


    DITKOFF, J.   In 2015, the defendant, Gerald Pierre,

admitted to sufficient facts in the Boston Municipal Court to

warrant a guilty finding on the offense of operating a motor

vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI),
                                                                    2


G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).   In 2023, after evidence came to

light of government misconduct involving the calibration of

Alcotest 9510 breathalyzer devices,1 the defendant moved to

withdraw his admission, and a judge (not the plea judge) denied

the motion.   Concluding that the motion judge properly found

that the defendant had failed to demonstrate a reasonable

probability that he would not have admitted to sufficient facts

had he known of the government misconduct, we affirm.

     1.   Background.   On April 7, 2014, at approximately

2:04 A.M., the defendant passed a State trooper while driving on

an Interstate Highway 93 on-ramp.2   The defendant was driving at

eighty-five miles per hour.   The posted speed limit was fifty-

five miles per hour.    The trooper stopped the defendant and

approached his vehicle.   While the trooper stood at the side of

the vehicle, the defendant lifted his foot from the brake,

causing the vehicle to "jump[] forward."    The trooper observed

the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the




     1 For an account of the nature and discovery of the
misconduct, see Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 

491 Mass. 730

, 733-743
(2023).

     2 The plea colloquy took place over eleven years ago and any
record of its exact content has since been destroyed in
accordance with ordinary retention procedures. See S.J.C. Rule
1:11, § 7, as appearing in 

480 Mass. 1322

 (2018). Accordingly,
we, like the parties, take the operative facts from the
application for the complaint. See Commonwealth v. Sylvester,

476 Mass. 1

, 2 n.3 (2016).
                                                                      3


defendant's vehicle and noticed the defendant's bloodshot,

glassy eyes.    When the defendant spoke, his speech was slurred,

and the odor of alcohol grew stronger.

     The trooper asked the defendant to step out of the vehicle.

The defendant complied with difficulty after several requests.

The defendant explained that he was coming from a bar in Boston

and that he had consumed two shots of liquor between 11:30 P.M.

and midnight.   The defendant confirmed that he had no medical

problems, was not medicated, and did not suffer from any

injuries.   The trooper administered five field sobriety tests to

the defendant, all of which he failed to complete to the

trooper's satisfaction.3   As a result, the trooper arrested the

defendant and placed him into his cruiser, where he again

noticed a strong odor of alcohol.

     On arriving at the barracks, the defendant asked to use the

restroom, where he urinated heavily.     The defendant consented to

a breathalyzer test, but during the observation period prior to

the test, he requested a cup of water, which he drank in less

than ten seconds.   While waiting to take the test, the defendant




     3 Specifically, in reciting the alphabet, the defendant
recited the letters "in no particular order" after L. He was
unable to count down from eighty-three to sixty-four. He
repeatedly stepped off the line, stopped walking, and used his
arms for balance in walking and turning. He fell backwards
during the one-leg stand test, and it had to be terminated for
his own safety. He failed to spell Massachusetts correctly.
                                                                    4


fell asleep.   The test revealed the defendant's blood alcohol

content to be 0.13 percent.   During booking, the defendant

vomited heavily for several minutes.   The trooper noted that the

defendant was in possession of a $156 nightclub receipt, as well

as the payment card associated with the receipt.

    The defendant was charged with the offense of OUI, as well

as civil infractions of speeding and unsafe operation of a motor

vehicle.   On September 1, 2015, the defendant admitted to

sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding on the OUI offense.

The case was continued without a finding for one year, the

defendant's license was suspended for forty-five days, and the

defendant was placed on probation and required to complete a

program under G. L. c. 90, § 24D, as well as a substance use

education program.   He was found not responsible for both civil

infractions.   His probation was extended but ultimately

completed, and the OUI charge was dismissed on January 13, 2017.

    On August 10, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to

withdraw his admission to sufficient facts.   The defendant

supported his motion with his own affidavit asserting, "If I had

known that the breathalyzer results were presumptively

unreliable and inadmissible, I believe that I would not have

admitted to sufficient facts."   He also presented an affidavit

from plea counsel stating, "Had I known the extent of the issues

surrounding the breath test in this matter, I would have
                                                                       5


explained this to [the defendant], and advised him accordingly

as it related to his admission."   After a hearing, a judge who

was not the plea judge denied the defendant's motion, finding

that he had failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that

he would not have admitted to sufficient facts.    This appeal

followed.

    2.   Standard of review.   "A motion to vacate an admission

to sufficient facts is treated as a motion for a new trial."

Commonwealth v. Muniur M., 

467 Mass. 1010, 1011

 (2014).       "Under

Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b)[, as appearing in 

435 Mass. 1501


(2001)], a judge may grant a motion for a new trial any time it

appears that justice may not have been done."    Commonwealth v.

Lewis, 

96 Mass. App. Ct. 354

, 357 (2019), quoting Commonwealth

v. Williams, 

89 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387

 (2016).    "We review a

judge's decision on such a motion 'for abuse of discretion or

significant error of law.'"    Commonwealth v. Crump, 

105 Mass.

App. Ct. 307

, 312 (2025), quoting Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 

491

Mass. 730

, 744 (2023).

    3.   Application.    "Under Hallinan, 491 Mass. at 731,

'defendants [charged with OUI] who pleaded guilty or who were

convicted after trial, and the evidence against whom included

breath test results from an Alcotest 9510 device last calibrated

and certified prior to April 18, 2019, . . . are entitled to a

conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct' and
                                                                     6


the exclusion of the breath test results from trial."     Crump,

105 Mass. App. Ct. at 312, quoting Hallinan, supra.     "Such a

defendant is permitted to rely on that presumption in a motion

to withdraw a guilty plea or for a new trial."   Crump, supra.

To obtain relief, the defendant must "demonstrate a reasonable

probability that [the defendant] would not have pleaded guilty

had [the defendant] known of [the government] misconduct."        Id.,

quoting Hallinan, supra at 750.   "'Establishing such a

reasonable probability requires examining the totality of the

circumstances,' guided by several factors, which include

    '(1) whether evidence of the government misconduct could
    have detracted from the factual basis used to support the
    guilty plea, (2) whether the evidence could have been used
    to impeach a witness whose credibility may have been
    outcome-determinative, (3) whether the evidence is
    cumulative of other evidence already in the defendant's
    possession, (4) whether the evidence would have influenced
    counsel's recommendation as to whether to accept a
    particular plea offer, and (5) whether the value of the
    evidence was outweighed by the benefits of entering into
    the plea agreement.'"

Crump, supra, quoting Hallinan, supra.

    We agree with the defendant that an excessive focus on

whether the breathalyzer was the "crown jewel," Hallinan, 491

Mass. at 750, or, as the motion judge put it, the "center piece"

of the Commonwealth's case is not particularly helpful.     As we

stated in Crump, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 313, "While the

breathalyzer test result may have been the 'crown jewel' in

Hallinan, that is not the standard that every defendant must
                                                                     7


meet."    The proper focus is on whether, in light of the

disposition and the nonbreathalyzer evidence, there is a

reasonable probability that the defendant would not have

admitted to sufficient facts had he known that the breathalyzer

results were inadmissible.    The regal jewelry status of the

breathalyzer results is merely one factor to be considered in

making this determination.

    Here, the motion judge properly concluded that the

defendant had not established such a reasonable probability.

Even without the breathalyzer evidence, the evidence of

intoxication was overwhelming.    The defendant was driving thirty

miles per hour over the speed limit on an on-ramp and failed at

first to stop his vehicle fully.    He had bloodshot, glassy eyes,

slurred his speech, and gave off an odor of alcoholic beverage.

He had difficulty balancing, counting, spelling, and reciting

the alphabet.    He admitted to drinking two shots of liquor, and

a nightclub receipt showing purchases of $156 was found on his

person.   Once arrested, he urinated heavily, drank water

profusely, fell asleep, and then vomited for several minutes.

See Commonwealth v. Canty, 

466 Mass. 535, 545

 (2013)

(overwhelming evidence based on "observations of the defendant's

erratic driving, his bloodshot eyes, the odor of alcohol, his

apparent inability to put his vehicle in 'park,' his poor

performance on the field sobriety test, his admission that he
                                                                    8


had been drinking alcohol, and the discovery of a half-empty

bottle of liquor in his vehicle").   Accord Commonwealth v.

Gallagher, 

91 Mass. App. Ct. 385

, 390-391 (2017).   Contrast

Commonwealth v. Baez, 

106 Mass. App. Ct. 219

, 221, 224 (2025)

(not overwhelming evidence where defendant ran red light after

coming to complete stop, stepped off line during walk and turn

test, admitted to drinking alcohol, and had slurred speech and

odor of alcohol, and booking video showed defendant was alert,

attentive, and compliant with directions).   In light of this

overwhelming evidence, there was no reasonable probability that

the defendant would not have admitted to sufficient facts if he

had known the breathalyzer evidence was inadmissible.   See

Crump, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 316 (listing factors this court has

considered when assessing strength of Commonwealth's case).

    The ambiguous affidavits submitted by the defendant reflect

this reality.   Plea counsel's affidavit recites, "Had I known

the extent of the issues surrounding the breath test in this

matter, I would have explained this to [the defendant], and

advised him accordingly as it related to his admission."      The

affidavit does not "state[] unequivocally" (or even equivocally)

that plea counsel "would have advised the defendant to proceed

to trial," as was the case in Hallinan.   Crump, 105 Mass. App.

Ct. at 316, quoting Hallinan, 491 Mass. at 751.   It is telling

that the evidence against the defendant was so strong that plea
                                                                   9


counsel could not assert that the absence of the breathalyzer

test result would have resulted in his advising a different

course of action.

    As for the defendant's affidavit, it states that he

"believe[s] that [he] would not have admitted to sufficient

facts."   Even setting aside the equivocal nature of that

statement, the defendant's subjective belief is not

determinative.   "'[B]ecause a judge cannot evaluate whether the

defendant is telling the truth about a decision the defendant

never made,' the court is required to 'evaluate [the

defendant's] assertion under a reasonable person standard.'"

Crump, 105 Mass. App. Ct. at 317, quoting Commonwealth v.

Lavrinenko, 

473 Mass. 42

, 55 n.16 (2015).   In light of the

overwhelming evidence against the defendant, the motion judge

here did not err in discrediting his "self-serving affidavit."

Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 

473 Mass. 606, 621

 (2016), quoting

Commonwealth v. Colon, 

439 Mass. 519, 530

 (2003).

                                    Order denying motion to
                                      withdraw admission to
                                      sufficient facts affirmed.

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