Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Conyngham Township v. PUC, Aplt.

Official source
                                       [J-32-2026]
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                    MIDDLE DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


  CONYNGHAM TOWNSHIP,                               :   No. 34 MAP 2025
                                                    :
                          Appellee                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                    :   Commonwealth Court at No. 113
                                                    :   CD 2024, dated October 4, 2024,
                 v.                                 :   Vacating and Remanding the
                                                    :   Decision of the Public Utility
                                                    :   Commission at No. C-2021-
  PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY                       :   3023624 dated January 18, 2024
  COMMISSION,                                       :
                                                    :   ARGUED: April 16, 2026
                          Appellant                 :


                                          OPINION
 JUSTICE McCAFFERY                                       DECIDED: October 29, 2026

       For more than 80 years, municipal authorities throughout the Commonwealth have

 operated largely without regulation by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

 (Commission).        Under the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316, the

 Commission exercises regulatory authority over public utilities and municipal entities

 providing utility service to customers beyond their corporate boundaries. Since 1945, the

 prevailing law has been that the Commission lacks regulatory authority over municipal

 authorities incorporated under the Municipality Authorities Act (MAA), 53 Pa.C.S. §§

 5601-5623.    The MAA is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing municipal

 authorities that places jurisdiction over disputes involving their rates and service

 exclusively with the courts of common pleas. With one exception, 1 municipal authorities

 established under the MAA historically have not been regulated by the Commission, even


 1 The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, discussed infra, is the sole exception.
when they provide service outside the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities.

However, in 2024, the Commonwealth Court concluded the Commission possessed

jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a municipal authority’s failure to obtain Commission

approval, in the form of a certificate of public convenience (certificate), before extending

its utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of the incorporating municipality.

We granted discretionary review to consider the propriety of that decision.

       We hold the Commission’s jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as defined

in the Code, does not extend to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA,

because the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over

municipal authorities’ rates and services. We further hold that municipal authorities

incorporated under the MAA are not subject to Commission regulation when they operate

beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. Therefore, we reverse the

Commonwealth Court’s order.



I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       In 1973, the Borough of Shickshinny (Borough), a municipality in Luzerne County,

filed Articles of Incorporation with the Secretary of the Commonwealth establishing the

Sanitary Sewer Authority of the Borough of Shickshinny (Authority) as a municipal

authority for the purpose of constructing, improving, furnishing and equipping a sanitary

sewage system and sewage treatment works.            See Certified Record at 909a-912a.

Shortly thereafter, the Secretary issued a Certificate of Incorporation “evidencing the

incorporation of [the A]uthority under the provisions of [the Municipality Authorities Act of

1945 (1945 MAA)].” Id. at 917a. The Borough is the Authority’s sole member.

       The Authority treats domestic wastewater and discharges the treated wastewater

into the Susquehanna River in accordance with a permit issued by the Pennsylvania




                                      [J-32-2026] - 2
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP).           The Authority operates a sewage

processing plant on Authority-owned property in adjacent Conyngham Township

(Township). The Authority provides sewage treatment services to the Borough, a portion

of the Township, and a few other areas beyond the Borough limits. The Township’s sewer

lines are owned and maintained by the Conyngham Township Sewer Authority (CTSA)

and convey wastewater to the Authority’s processing plant via a single point of

connection, where it is treated by the Authority. The Township is not within the Borough’s

corporate limits and has no representation on the Authority’s governing board.

       In 1992, the Authority and the Township entered into a Sewage Treatment

Agreement, wherein the Authority agreed to provide sewage treatment and disposal

services to the CTSA as a single bulk customer. At that time, the Authority provided

sewer services to approximately 220 residential customers and 8 commercial customers

in the Township as well as the Township itself, which received service at its municipal

building. For 28 years, the Authority directly billed the CTSA for its bulk sewage treatment

services. The CTSA, in turn, directly billed residential and commercial customers in the

Township a flat $134 quarterly rate for sewer services.

       In September 2020, the Authority notified the Township it was cancelling the

Sewage Treatment Agreement due to the Township’s failure to address influx and

infiltration issues for the prior three years. 2 Consequently, in January 2021, the Authority

began directly billing individual Township customers $75 per quarter for its sewer

services. Between January 2021 and September 2021, the Authority collected nearly

$55,000 from Township customers.



2 In 2020, the Authority also filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

against the Township and the CTSA, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. That suit was still pending as of the date of
the Commission’s decision in this case. See Certified Record at 1165a.

                                      [J-32-2026] - 3
       A. Agency Proceedings

       In January 2021, the Township filed a Formal Complaint with the Commission,

alleging the Authority was operating as a public utility in the Township and directly billing

Township customers without a Commission-issued certificate. Under Section 1102(a)(5)

of the Code, a certificate is required “[f]or any municipal corporation to acquire, construct,

or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the rendering or furnishing

to the public of any public utility service beyond its corporate limits.” 66 Pa.C.S. §

1102(a)(5). In its Formal Complaint, the Township asked the Commission to “order [the

Authority] to immediately stop billing residents of [the] Township and return all monies

collected until after a valid [c]ertificate … is obtained.” Certified Record at 3a.

       In September 2021, the Commission’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement

(Bureau) filed a Notice of Intervention in the matter, seeking a civil penalty against the

Authority. The Bureau asserted that following its preliminary investigation, it determined

“the Authority’s termination of the Sewage Treatment Agreement with the Township[] …

and its subsequent provision of wastewater services to numerous Township residents for

compensation renders it … a public utility subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.”

Certified Record at 142a.

       When the parties were unsuccessful in resolving their dispute through mediation,

the matter proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Before the

hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts. The ALJ held an evidentiary

hearing in October 2022 and closed the record in March 2023.

       The ALJ issued an Initial Decision sustaining the Township’s Formal Complaint.

The ALJ concluded the Township met its burden of proving the Authority was improperly

operating as a public utility in the Township without a Commission-issued certificate,

specifically finding the Authority “provided sewer treatment service beyond its Borough




                                       [J-32-2026] - 4
limits for compensation in violation of Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code.” Certified Record

at 1115a. The ALJ directed the Authority to file an application for a certificate with the

Commission and to issue partial refunds to Township customers, but he denied the

Bureau’s request for a civil penalty. Notably, in reaching his decision, the ALJ did not

consider or address the applicability of the MAA, even though the Authority raised the

issue in its brief filed with the ALJ.

       The Authority then filed exceptions to the ALJ’s Initial Decision, asserting the

Commission lacked jurisdiction over the Authority under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA,

which provides, in pertinent part:
       Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by
       an authority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the
       authority’s services, including extensions thereof, may bring suit
       against the authority in the court of common pleas of the county where
       the project is located or, if the project is located in more than one county, in
       the court of common pleas of the county where the principal office of the
       project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
       jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.

53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). The Authority averred the threshold question

before the Commission was whether its jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as

defined in the Code, also extends to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA.

Relying on Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, the Authority asserted: (1) the MAA vests the

courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over municipal authorities’ rates and

services, and (2) municipal authorities are not subject to Commission regulation, even

when they operate beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities.

       The Commission granted in part and denied in part the Authority’s exceptions.

Specifically, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over municipal authorities

providing service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities under the

MAA. The Commission explained that although it historically exercised jurisdiction over



                                         [J-32-2026] - 5
municipal corporations providing services outside their boundaries and issued

certificates to those entities, the 1945 amendments to the MAA explicitly removed

municipal authorities from the Commission’s jurisdiction. Section 5607(d)(9) of the

present MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over the rates

and services of municipal authorities.      The Commission noted that Pennsylvania’s

intermediate appellate courts have similarly interpreted Section 5607(d)(9) and held the

MAA gives the courts of common pleas, not the Commission, exclusive jurisdiction over

a municipal authority’s rates and service, both within and beyond the boundaries of the

incorporating municipality.

       The Commission also relied on the parties’ stipulation that the Authority is a

municipal authority, noting that municipal authorities and municipal corporations are

distinct entities under Pennsylvania law.       Section 1301 of the Code establishes

Commission jurisdiction over the rates charged by municipal corporations when those

entities provide public utility service beyond their corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1301.

Section 1501 of the Code gives the Commission jurisdiction over the quality, reliability,

and adequacy of services of municipal corporations under similar terms. See 66 Pa.C.S.

§ 1501. However, the Commission concluded its jurisdiction does not extend to municipal

authorities because the 1945 amendments to the MAA expressly removed municipal

authorities from its jurisdiction, and that provision remains codified in Section 5607(d)(9)

of the present MAA.

       The Township appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

       B. Commonwealth Court’s Decision

       On October 4, 2024, the Commonwealth Court vacated the Commission’s order

and remanded the matter to the Commission. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub.

Util. Comm’n, 

325 A.3d 885

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). The Commonwealth Court began by




                                      [J-32-2026] - 6
explaining that Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code allows, “[u]pon the application of any public

utility and the approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its

[Certificate] first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, ... [f]or any

municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or

other facilities for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service

beyond its corporate limits.” 

Id. at 888

 (citation omitted; emphasis and some alterations

in original). Further, Section 102 of the Code expressly includes an “authority” within the

definition of “municipal corporation.” 

Id.

 (citation omitted). The Commonwealth Court

also relied on Section 1501 of the Code, which provides that “[a]ny public utility service

being furnished or rendered by a municipal corporation beyond its corporate limits

shall be subject to regulation and control by the [C]ommission as to service and

extensions, with the same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by

a public utility.” 

Id.

 (citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).

       The Commonwealth Court acknowledged, however, that Section 5607(d)(9) of the

MAA gives the courts of common pleas jurisdiction to determine “the reasonableness or

uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of

the authority’s services, including extensions thereof” and further provides that “[t]he court

of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving

rates or service.” Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 888 (citation omitted; emphases

in original). Based on this statutory language, the Commonwealth Court found “the MAA

does not confer jurisdiction on the common pleas courts for all disputes involving

municipal authorities but, rather, only those involving ‘rates or service.’” Id. at 888-889

(emphases in original).

       In rejecting the Commission’s claim that its jurisdiction extends only to municipal

corporations and municipalities, the Commonwealth Court found the cases on which the




                                       [J-32-2026] - 7
Commission relied involved challenges to rates, which are expressly covered by the

MAA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts. The Commonwealth Court observed

those cases did not address the Commission’s “jurisdiction over municipal authorities

concerning the Code’s mandate that municipal authorities obtain [c]ertificates when

furnishing service beyond their corporate limits.” Conyngham Twp., 325 A.3d at 889; see

Elizabeth Township v. Mun. Auth. of McKeesport, 

447 A.2d 245

 (Pa. 1982); Rankin v.

Chester Mun. Auth., 

68 A.2d 458

 (Pa. Super. 1949).

       The Commonwealth Court reasoned that to conclude the common pleas courts

have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim that a municipal authority failed to obtain a

certificate before operating beyond its corporate limits, the Court would need to construe

the certification requirement as relating to “the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate

fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of the authority’s

services” pursuant to Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA. Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d

at 889-890 (citation omitted; emphases in original). However, the Commonwealth Court

declined to do so, because it determined the certification requirement “does not ‘involv[e]

rates or service.’” Id. at 890 (citation omitted; brackets in original).

       To reach that conclusion, the Commonwealth Court looked to the provisions of the

Code governing the issuance of certificates. In particular, Section 1103(a) of the Code

provides a certificate “shall be granted by order of the [C]ommission, only if the

[C]ommission shall find or determine that the granting of such [C]ertificate is

necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the

public.”   Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 890 (citation omitted; emphasis and

alterations in original). According to the Commonwealth Court, the primary consideration

for obtaining a certificate is whether it is “necessary or proper[,]” which it opined does not

implicate rates or service. Id. (citation omitted).




                                        [J-32-2026] - 8
       Lastly, the Commonwealth Court found the Commission’s argument that it lacked

jurisdiction over this action was undermined by the fact that the Commission previously

issued certificates to municipal authorities in two prior cases. Conyngham Township, 325

A.3d at 890-891 (citing E. Dunkard Water Auth. v. Sw. Pa. Water Auth., 

2020 WL 6707503


(Pa. Cmwlth. filed Nov. 16, 2020) (unreported); Middle Smithfield Twp. Mun. Auth. v.

Maula, 

2008 WL 9404647

 (Pa. Cmwlth. filed Oct. 24, 2008) (unreported)). Therefore, the

Commonwealth Court concluded “the Commission had jurisdiction to consider the

Township’s [Formal] Complaint challenging the Authority’s operation [in the Township]

without a [c]ertificate.” 

Id. at 891

.



II. ISSUE

      The issue before this Court is whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding

the Commission has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the MAA

when the authority provides utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of its

incorporating municipality. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

340

A.3d 272

 (Pa. 2025). 3


3 The Dissent takes issue with our use of the term “jurisdiction” throughout this decision,

opining that we improperly conflate subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute with
regulatory authority over a municipal authority. Dissenting Opinion at 2. According to the
Dissent, this appeal is not about the Commission’s regulatory authority over municipal
authorities generally, but only whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to
determine if Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA applies to the underlying dispute, consistent
with the Commonwealth Court’s limited holding. While the Commission did raise that
issue in its Petition for Allowance of Appeal (PAA), Allocatur Docket No. 657 MAL 2024,
both parties also clearly raised the overarching question of whether the Commission has
any authority to regulate a municipal authority’s rates and service following the MAA’s
enactment. See, e.g., PAA, 12/23/2024, at 32 (asserting the Commonwealth Court’s
decision “has broad practical implications for previously unregulated entities that will now
be considered to fall under Commission jurisdiction”); Answer to PAA, 12/31/2024, at 1
(asserting this appeal “involves the fundamental question of whether a municipal authority
can operate as a public utility outside its jurisdictional limits without obtaining the requisite
(continued…)

                                        [J-32-2026] - 9
III. OVERVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY LAWS

       We granted discretionary review in this case to resolve an apparent conflict

between two statutes governing public utility service in Pennsylvania — the Code and the

MAA — specifically as they relate to municipal authorities. 4 Before we address the issue

on appeal, we will provide a brief overview of both statutes.

       A. Public Utility Code

       The Code governs privately owned entities that provide water, electric, gas, sewer,

and similar services to the public, as well as municipalities and municipal corporations

that provide utility service to customers beyond their geographic boundaries. See 66

Pa.C.S. §§ 1101, 1102(a). 5 The present-day Code was enacted in 1978 and was a

codification, without substantial change, of the former Public Utility Law, which was in

effect from 1937 to 1978. The Code grants the Commission “general administrative

[c]ertificate … and submitting itself to Commission oversight and regulation”). In fact, that
broader issue comprised the bulk of the parties’ appellate briefs and was the focus of their
oral arguments before this Court. This is not surprising, since the question we directed
the parties to address was: “Did the Commonwealth Court err when it held the
[Commission] has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the [MAA]?”
Conyngham Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

340 A.3d 272

, 273 (Pa. 2025). Based on the
parties’ arguments, it is clear they understood that our use of the word “jurisdiction” meant
not only subject matter jurisdiction over the underling dispute, but, more broadly,
regulatory authority and oversight over municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA.
Hence, it is confounding that the Dissent opines that this broader legal issue is not actually
before the Court.
4 The question before us, which involves the interplay between the Code and the MAA, is

one of statutory interpretation. Thus, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of
review is plenary. See Leight v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Physicians, 

243 A.3d 126

, 136 (Pa.
2020).
5 “The [Commission] regulates the rates and service of investor-owned water and
wastewater companies, along with some municipal systems that serve customers outside
their boundaries.” A History of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission at 2, available
at https://www.puc.pa.gov/general/pdf/PUC_History.pdf (last accessed October 26,
2026).

                                      [J-32-2026] - 10
power and authority to supervise and regulate all public utilities doing business within this

Commonwealth.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 501(b).

       Under the Code, a “public utility,” as defined in the statute, is required to obtain a

certificate to legally operate and always is subject to the Commission’s regulation.

Section 1501 of the Code provides:
       Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and
       reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes,
       alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such
       service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the
       accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and
       the public. Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without
       unreasonable interruptions or delay. Such service and facilities shall be
       in conformity with the regulations and orders of the [C]ommission.
       Subject to the provisions of this part and the regulations or orders of the
       [C]ommission, every public utility may have reasonable rules and
       regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to
       render service….

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). A public utility is required to obtain a certificate

before it “begin[s] to offer, render, furnish or supply” utility service or “abandon[s] or

surrender[s], in whole or in part, any service[.]”        66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1)-(2).     The

issuance of a certificate, in effect, subjects the public utility provider to the Commission’s

regulation and oversight in the provision of utility service to ratepayers. The Commission

will grant a certificate only if it “determine[s] that the granting of such certificate is

necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public”

and “may impose such conditions as it may deem to be just and reasonable.” 66 Pa.C.S.

§ 1103(a). Through its regulation, the Commission ensures that public utility providers

meet strict insurance, safety, and operational standards and provide safe, reliable, and

reasonable service to the public at established rates.

       In addition, “[a c]ertificate … makes it lawful for [a] public utility to provide service

within a defined territory, and imposes on the public utility an obligation to provide


                                       [J-32-2026] - 11
service in that territory.” Lukens Steel Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

499 A.2d 1134

, 1136

n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis added); see Borough of Lansdale v. Phila.

Elec. Co., 

170 A.2d 565

, 567 (Pa. 1961) (recognizing the Commission has jurisdiction to

determine a public utility’s authority under its certificate, as well as its “rights to serve [a]

particular territory”). Section 1101 of the Code provides that a certificate issued by the

Commission “shall include a description of the nature of the service and of the territory in

which it may be offered, rendered, furnished or supplied.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1101.

       Unlike a privately owned utility, which always is subject to the Commission’s

regulation, a municipal corporation that provides public utility service is subject to the

Commission’s regulation only when it provides service to customers beyond its municipal

boundaries. Section 1501 of the Code provides in relevant part:
       Any public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal
       corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation
       and control by the [C]ommission as to service and extensions, with the
       same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a public
       utility.

66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). Thus, before a municipal corporation may furnish

service beyond its corporate limits, it must obtain the Commission’s approval in the form

of a certificate, as set forth in Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code:
       Upon the application of any public utility and the approval of such
       application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its certificate of public
       convenience first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing
       laws, it shall be lawful[] … [f]or any municipal corporation to acquire,
       construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities
       for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service
       beyond its corporate limits.

66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5) (emphases added); see Borough of Phoenixville v. Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm’n, 

280 A.2d 471, 474

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1971) (en banc) (“As soon as a [municipality]

holds itself out to render uncertificated extraterritorial service and renders such service, it



                                       [J-32-2026] - 12
is within the jurisdiction of the Commission to determine whether extension of such

service should be granted[]” because “the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the

extent of the extraterritorial utility service area for the municipality.”).

       The reason municipal corporations are exempt from Commission regulation when

they provide utility service to customers within their borders is because those customers,

as residents of the municipality, have the power to elect the local officials who set the

utility’s rates and service standards. However, when a municipal corporation serves

customers beyond its borders, those customers have no political representation, so the

Commission steps in to provide state-level oversight and consumer protection. See

County of Dauphin v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

634 A.2d 281, 283

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)

(“[T]he purpose of subjecting a municipally operated public utility which renders service

beyond its corporate limits to the jurisdiction of the [Commission] is to protect users of the

service who are not residents of the municipality.”); 

id. at 282

 (agreeing that “the reason

for regulating extraterritorial service is so that the municipality cannot discriminate against

users who are outside of the corporate limits”).

       B. Municipality Authorities Act

       The MAA is a comprehensive scheme specifically governing municipal authorities.

A municipal authority is a special-purpose entity created by one or more municipalities for

the purpose of acquiring, constructing, financing, and operating public works projects.

See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(a). 6 A municipal authority is run by a board appointed by the



6 According to the Pennsylvania Department of State website, a municipal authority is “‘a

body politic and corporate’ created to finance and/or operate specific public works
projects without tapping the general taxing powers of the municipality. Authorities
(sometimes known as special districts in other states) are alternate vehicle[s] for
accomplishing public purposes rather than through [the] direct action of counties,
municipalities and school districts.”             Municipal and Other Authorities,
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/programs/business/types-of-filings-and-
registrations/municipal-and-other-authorities (last accessed October 26, 2026).

                                        [J-32-2026] - 13
governing body of the municipality but functions independently of the local government

that incorporated it. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5610.

       Before the current version of the MAA, there were two prior iterations: the

Municipality Authorities Act of 1935 (1935 MAA), which was repealed and replaced 10

years later by the 1945 MAA. The 1945 MAA existed without significant change for almost

60 years. 7

       In 2001, the General Assembly codified the present-day MAA, which includes the

following statements, in relevant part, of the statute’s purpose and intent:
       (2) The purpose and intent of this chapter being to benefit the people of the
       Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health,
       safety and prosperity and not to unnecessarily burden or interfere with
       existing business by the establishment of competitive enterprises[.]
                                            …



7 The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development has
described the history of municipal authorities in Pennsylvania as follows:

       Municipal authorities in Pennsylvania, as in many other states, had their
       beginning in the 1930s Depression. As part of its fiscal recovery policy, the
       federal government granted money to states and municipalities for public
       works construction to stimulate employment and provide needed public
       facilities. These grants had to be matched by the recipient unit, but many
       states and localities were unable to pay their share, due both to reduced
       revenues and restrictive debt limits. A number of states, including
       Pennsylvania, then created state authorities to borrow outside
       constitutional debt limits by making use of revenue bonds. Pennsylvania
       was one of three states that passed general enabling legislation to allow
       their municipalities to create authorities. This was the [1935 MAA].

       The 1935 [MAA] was repealed and replaced in 1945 by the present [MAA],
       which gave greater flexibility in operation and financing. The [MAA] was
       officially codified in the P[ennsylvania] Consolidated Statutes in 2001.

Municipal Authorities in Pennsylvania (Eleventh Edition, April 2020) at 1, available at
https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in-
pennsylvania/?wpdmdl=57758&refresh=6a5f743862d8b1784640568 (last accessed
October 26, 2026).

                                     [J-32-2026] - 14
      (3) It is the intent of this chapter in specifying and defining the authorized
      purposes and projects of an authority to permit the authority to benefit the
      people of this Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their
      commerce, health, safety and prosperity while not unnecessarily burdening
      or interfering with any municipality which has not incorporated or joined that
      authority.

53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(2)-(3).

      The MAA explicitly allows incorporated municipal authorities to establish their own

rates and services. Section 5607(d)(9) provides, in pertinent part:
      Every authority may exercise all powers necessary or convenient for the
      carrying out of the purposes set forth in this section, including, but without
      limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following rights and powers:
                                            ...
      (9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in the area
      served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be
      determined exclusively by it for the purpose of providing for the payment
      of the expenses of the authority, the construction, improvement, repair,
      maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties … and to
      determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements
      required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service, including
      extensions thereof, in the areas served. If the service area includes more
      than one municipality, the revenues from any project shall not be expended
      directly or indirectly on any other project unless such expenditures are made
      for the benefit of the entire service area.

53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). Thus, unlike public utilities governed by the

Code, municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA have the power to “exclusively”

determine their rates and “the services and improvements” necessary to provide utility

service to their customers. Id.

      The MAA also does not place geographic limits on where a municipal authority

may provide utility service. Our case law holds that, whether incorporated under the

present MAA, the 1945 MAA, or the 1935 MAA, “municipal authorities are not the

creatures, agents or representatives of the municipalities which organize them, but rather

are ‘independent agencies of the Commonwealth and part of its sovereignty.’”


                                    [J-32-2026] - 15
Commonwealth v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth., 

281 A.2d 882, 884

 (Pa. 1971) (citation

omitted; emphasis added); see Marshall v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty., 

568 A.2d 931,

939

 (Pa. 1990) (“[Municipal] authorities must be state created, and they must be separate

and distinct entities from the municipalities which compose them.”) (Papadakos, J.,

dissenting) (emphasis in original). Municipal authorities, as independent agencies of the

Commonwealth, “ha[ve] no boundaries within which [they] must limit [their] services.”

White Rock Sewage Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

578 A.2d 984, 987

 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1990) (en banc); see In re Application of Mun. Auth. of Upper St. Clair, 

184 A.2d 695, 698


(Pa. 1962) (recognizing “the fundamental nature of an [a]uthority as a corporate agency

of the state, and not the child of a municipality”). 8

       A municipal authority’s right to define its service area is embodied in Section

5607(d)(9) of the MAA, which authorizes an incorporated authority “to determine by itself

exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and

reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. §

5607(d)(9). This “exclusive” power addresses the authority’s independence from its

organizing municipality, but, as discussed more fully below, does not affect the court of

common pleas’ jurisdiction to review the legality of the authority’s actions under the MAA.

See Yezioro v. N. Fayette Cnty. Mun. Auth., 

164 A.2d 129, 137

 (Pa. Super. 1960) (“The

[MAA] provision to the effect that the services provided by the authority are to be

determined ‘by itself exclusively’ must certainly have been intended to make it clear that

the authority itself, not the creating municipality or some other instrumentality, controlled

the initial determination of the service.”).



8 While a municipal authority is an independent agency of the Commonwealth, the MAA

provides that “[a]n authority may not pledge the credit or taxing power of the
Commonwealth” and the authority’s obligations “are not obligations of the
Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(e)(1)-(2).

                                       [J-32-2026] - 16
IV. REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES

        With this background in mind, we now turn to the present dispute, which involves

the conflict between the Code and the MAA regarding the regulation of municipal

authorities that provide public utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating

municipalities. To resolve this conflict, we will review the statutory language, engage in

a statutory construction analysis, and examine prior case law interpreting both statutes

and their predecessor laws.

        Generally, under the Code, the Commission regulates the rates and services of

public utilities and municipal corporations that provide utility service beyond their

boundaries, whereas municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA establish their

own rates and services, without Commission approval.

        The conflict in this case arises, specifically, from the definition of “municipal

corporation” in the Code.     The Code defines “municipal corporation” as “[a]ll cities,

boroughs, towns, townships, or counties of this Commonwealth, and also any public

corporation, authority, or body whatsoever created or organized under any law of this

Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public

utility.”   66 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphases added).          In other words, the Code defines

“municipal corporation” as including both municipalities — cities, boroughs, towns, and

townships — and “authorit[ies] … created or organized under any law of this

Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public utility.”

66 Pa.C.S. § 102. “Authority” is not defined separately in the Code. Under the plain

language of Section 1501 of the Code, then, authorities are regulated in the same manner

as public utilities when they provide extraterritorial service, meaning they are subject to

Commission regulation and must obtain a certificate before operating beyond their

corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102(a)(5), 1501.




                                     [J-32-2026] - 17
       Given the Code’s inclusion of “authority” in its definition of “municipal corporation,”

the question then becomes whether municipal authorities incorporated under the

MAA are subject to Commission regulation. The Township asserts that a municipal

authority created under the MAA is clearly encompassed within the Code’s definition of

“municipal corporation,” since it is “created or organized under [a] law of this

Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering [a] service similar to that of a public utility.”

66 Pa.C.S. § 102. The Township posits that since authorities are municipal corporations

under the Code, and the Commission has jurisdiction over municipal corporations

operating beyond their boundaries, a municipal authority operating beyond the

boundaries of its incorporating municipality — such as the Authority here — is subject to

Commission regulation in the same manner as a public utility. Were this Court to look

only to the provisions of the Code, we might agree. However, because the Authority in

this case specifically was established under, and is governed by, the MAA, we also must

consider the provisions of that statute.

       The MAA defines “authority” as “[a] body politic and corporate created under this

chapter,” the 1935 MAA, or the 1945 MAA. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5602. As explained earlier, the

MAA explicitly grants municipal authorities the power to set their own rates and manage

their own operations. More importantly, the MAA contains an express jurisdictional

provision, which vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over

disputes involving the rates and services of incorporated municipal authorities. See 53

Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9).      This jurisdictional limitation over municipal authorities first

appeared in the 1945 MAA and remains in the present MAA substantially unchanged. 9


9 Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA stated:



       Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of any rate fixed
       by any [a]uthority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the
(continued…)

                                      [J-32-2026] - 18
       Unlike the Code, the MAA does not subject municipal authorities to Commission

regulation. The only state-level approval the MAA requires before an authority can legally

operate, regardless of its service area, is that of the Secretary of the Commonwealth.

See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5603(e). While the Code includes municipal authorities in its definition

of “municipal corporation” subject to Commission jurisdiction when they serve customers

beyond their boundaries, Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA appears to remove them from

the Commission’s jurisdiction.     Consequently, with respect to municipal authorities

providing utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities, the

MAA is in direct conflict with the Code.

       The Commission asserts that although the Code includes “authorities” in its

definition of municipal corporations, its jurisdiction no longer encompasses municipal

authorities because the 1945 MAA explicitly removed them from the Commission’s

jurisdiction, and that provision remains in effect in the present MAA. On the other hand,

the Township acknowledges that under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, jurisdiction over

disputes involving the “reasonableness or uniformity” of a municipal authority’s rates or

the “adequacy, safety, and reasonableness” of its services lies exclusively with the courts

of common pleas. However, the Township contends that Section 5607(d)(9) does not

divest the Commission of all jurisdiction over municipal authorities. In particular, the

Township asserts that before an incorporated municipal authority may provide utility



       [a]uthority’s services, including extensions thereof, may bring suit against
       the [a]uthority in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the
       project is located, or if the project is located in more than one county then
       in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the principal office of
       the project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
       jurisdiction to determine all such questions involving rates or service.

Graver v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

469 A.2d 1154, 1156

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (quoting 53
P.S. § 306B(h) (repealed)).

                                     [J-32-2026] - 19
service beyond its borders, the Code mandates that it obtain Commission approval in the

form of a certificate.

       To resolve this conflict between the Code and the MAA, we are guided by the

Statutory Construction Act of 1972, which states that the object of all statutory

interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1

Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). While “[t]he best indication of legislative intent is the plain language

of the statute,” we identify the plain meaning by considering “the statutory language in

context and give words and phrases their ‘common and approved usage.’” Crown Castle

NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

234 A.3d 665

, 674 (Pa. 2020) (citations omitted).

We do not read the provisions in isolation, but instead understand each provision in the

context of the entire statute. See Green Analytics N., LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 

343

A.3d 1086

, 1094 (Pa. 2025).

       Where, as here, conflicting language appears in two different statutes, the

Statutory Construction Act instructs: “Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be

in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be

construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. Further,

in interpreting conflicting statutory provisions, we presume the General Assembly did not

intend a result that is “absurd, impossible of execution[,] or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. §

1922(1).

       Between 1937 (when the Code’s predecessor, the Public Utility Law, was first

enacted) and 1945, the Commission exercised regulatory authority over privately owned

utilities as well as municipalities and municipal authorities that provided utility service

beyond their boundaries.     However, the Commission’s power over municipal-owned

utilities was significantly limited in 1945, when the General Assembly added a provision

to the MAA, now codified at 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9), granting the courts of common pleas




                                     [J-32-2026] - 20
exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and service of municipal authorities incorporated

thereunder. Since that time, according to the Commission and its amici, the Commission

generally has not exercised jurisdiction or regulatory authority over municipal authorities

incorporated under the MAA.

      In 1949, the Superior Court first recognized the apparent conflict between the

former Public Utility Law and the then-newly enacted 1945 MAA with regard to municipal

authorities providing service beyond their boundaries. In Rankin, the Superior Court

explained that Section 2(15) of the Public Utility Law included public authorities in the

definition of “municipal corporation,” and Section 301 (as amended in 1939) vested the

Commission with jurisdiction over controversies involving the rates charged by a

municipal corporation to customers outside its borders. Rankin, 

68 A.2d at 460

-461

(citing 66 P.S. §§ 1102(15) and 1141 (repealed)). Recognizing that these provisions were

enacted in 1937 and 1939, the Superior Court held the 1945 MAA, being the later

enactment, “impliedly repealed” the inconsistent provisions of the Public Utility Law,

noting that “separate legislation, complete in itself, may have an amendatory effect upon

other and uncited statutes by implication or indirection[.]” Rankin, 

68 A.2d at 461

. The

Superior Court concluded:
      The principle is well established that where, as here, there is a positive
      repugnancy between provisions of separate laws enacted at different
      sessions of the legislature, the earlier provision is impliedly repealed….
      Both by actual intendment and construction, it appears abundantly clear
      there was a definite limitation imposed upon the operation and effect
      of [Section] 301 of the Public Utility Law by the [1945 MAA], whereby
      the determination of issues involving reasonableness of rates beyond
      the corporate limits of the municipality creating the [a]uthority—as
      well as within—now lies exclusively with the court of common pleas.




                                     [J-32-2026] - 21

Id.

 (emphasis added). 10

       Subsequently, in 1978, the General Assembly repealed the Public Utility Law and

replaced it with the Code. Section 301 of the former Public Utility Law — providing that

municipal corporations that serve customers beyond their corporate limits are subject to

Commission regulation — now appears in Section 1501 of the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §

1501. The definition of “municipal corporation” in the former Public Utility Law, which

includes public authorities, now appears in Section 102 of the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §

102.

       With regard to repealed statutes, Section 1962 of the Statutory Construction Act

provides:
       Whenever a statute is repealed and its provisions are at the same time
       reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms by the repealing
       statute, the earlier statute shall be construed as continued in active
       operation. All rights and liabilities incurred in such earlier statute are
       preserved and may be enforced.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1962. Thus, the provisions of the former Public Utility Law that were repealed

and reenacted, in substantially the same form, in the Code must be construed as in active

operation. However, that is not the end of the analysis, because we have an intervening

statute, the 1945 MAA, which purportedly created an exclusive jurisdiction provision

applicable to municipal authorities.    On this issue, Section 1963 of the Statutory

Construction Act instructs:



10 Subsequently, this Court partially overruled Rankin “to the extent [Rankin] appear[ed]

to sanction an equity proceeding as a medium for passing upon the reasonableness of
an [a]uthority’s rates.” Calabrese v. Collier Twp. Mun. Auth., 

240 A.2d 544, 548

 (Pa.
1968). However, on the issue of jurisdiction over municipal authorities, we held: “The
[1945 MAA] provides an [e]xclusive remedy for passing upon the reasonableness of the
rates of a municipal [a]uthority by a proceeding before a tribunal to which it has given
[e]xclusive jurisdiction to determine such questions. Such tribunal is not a court of
common pleas sitting as a chancery court, … but a common law court of common
pleas.” 

Id.

 (emphasis added).

                                    [J-32-2026] - 22
      A statute which reenacts the provisions of an earlier statute shall not be
      construed to repeal an intermediate statute which modified but did not
      effect an amendment to such earlier statute. Such intermediate statute
      shall be construed to remain in force and to modify the reenactment in
      the same manner as it modified the earlier statute.

1 Pa.C.S. § 1963 (emphases added). Hence, we must determine whether Section 4B(h)

of the 1945 MAA, the predecessor to Section 5607(d)(9), modified the former Public Utility

Law. If we conclude that it did, then Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA — and, in turn,

Section 5607(d)(9) of the present MAA — must be construed to modify the Code in the

same manner as it modified the Public Utility Law.

      Since the Code’s enactment in 1978, our courts have consistently held the courts

of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and services of municipal

authorities incorporated under the MAA, even though the Code continues to define a

“municipal corporation” as including an “authority.” In Elizabeth Township, this Court

concluded that Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA was intended to preclude challenges to

municipal authorities’ rates from being heard by the Commission:
      Prior to the enactment of the [1945 MAA], a municipal corporation which
      had not formed an authority to provide utility services was subject to rate
      challenges in one of two forums. If the rate challenge arose out of services
      provided by the corporation within its corporate boundaries, the challenge
      was to be brought in the courts of common pleas. If the challenge arose
      out of services provided outside the corporate boundaries, the challenge
      was to be brought before the [Commission], in the same manner as rate
      challenges brought against public utilities.
      The predecessor to the [1945 MAA], the [1935 MAA], contained neither an
      express provision authorizing challenges to rates set by a municipal
      authority nor a provision allocating jurisdiction over such disputes between
      the courts of common pleas and the [Commission]. In construing the [1935
      MAA] in the context of a challenge to the rates of a municipal authority as
      applied outside the boundaries of the municipal corporation creating the
      authority, the Superior Court relied upon statutory and decisional law
      relating to municipal corporations to hold that these challenges are within




                                    [J-32-2026] - 23
       the jurisdiction of the [Commission]. State College Borough Auth[.] v. [Pa.
       Pub. Util. Comm’n], … 

31 A.2d 557

 ([Pa. Super.] 1943).[11]
       When viewed against this background, it is clear that the provision of
       [S]ection 4B(h) of the [1945 MAA,] which states that the courts of
       common pleas shall have “exclusive jurisdiction” over all challenges
       to the rates set by a municipal authority[,] was intended to reject the
       holding of State College that had permitted challenges to the rates of
       municipal authorities to be heard by the [Commission]. However,
       nothing in this reallocation of jurisdiction over rate challenges from the
       [Commission] to the courts of common pleas was designed to alter the
       manner in which the rate challenge is to be conducted. That portion of
       [S]ection 4B(h) specifically authorizing rate proceedings merely confirmed
       the power of the courts of common pleas to scrutinize ratemaking
       discretion in the same fashion as the [Commission].

Elizabeth Township, 

447 A.2d at 247-248

 (some internal citations omitted; emphases

added). 12

       Following Elizabeth Township, the Commonwealth Court applied the principles set

forth in Sections 1962 and 1963 of the Statutory Construction Act and concluded that

“Section 4B(h) of the [1945 MAA] … modifie[d] the Public Utility Code in the same manner

as it modified the Public Utility Law.”     Graver, 

469 A.2d at 1157

.       Specifically, the

Commonwealth Court held that, under the 1945 MAA, the courts of common pleas “have

jurisdiction to determine questions of the reasonableness of rates fixed or of the services

provided by a municipal authority beyond the limits of the municipality which created it[.]”

11 In State College, the Superior Court held that “[S]ection 301 [of the Public Utility Law],

in the light of the definition which includes a municipal authority within the term ‘municipal
corporation,’ … gives the [C]omission regulatory jurisdiction over the public utility service
of municipalities and their authorities beyond the corporate limits of the municipality[.]”
State College, 

31 A.2d at 559

. Shortly after the Superior Court’s decision in State College,
the General Assembly enacted the 1945 MAA, which clarified the legislature’s intent with
regard to jurisdiction over municipal authorities.
12 Although Elizabeth Township specifically involved a rate challenge, the “reallocation of

jurisdiction” referenced by this Court necessarily includes challenges to an authority’s
service. Both the 1945 MAA and the present MAA grant the courts of common pleas
“exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.” 53 Pa.C.S. §
5607(d)(9) (emphasis added); see Graver, 

469 A.2d at 1156

.

                                      [J-32-2026] - 24

Id. at 1155

; see also Borough of Sewickley Water Auth. v. Mollica, 

544 A.2d 1122, 1124


(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (distinguishing “between a municipality providing water service and a

municipal authority providing water service,” the latter of which lies exclusively within

the jurisdiction of the common pleas courts) (emphasis in original).

       This interpretation makes sense when we consider the language and purpose of

the MAA. The stated purpose of the MAA is “to benefit the people of the Commonwealth

by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity” and by

“specifying and defining the authorized purposes and projects of an authority”

incorporated under the MAA. 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5607(b)(2)-(3), 5620. Unlike a municipality

that provides utility service, a municipal authority incorporated under the MAA, while

created by a municipality (or, in the case of a joint authority, municipalities), is an agency

of the Commonwealth, not the municipality that created it, and has the power to determine

its own rates, service, and service area. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9); see also White

Rock, 

578 A.2d at 987

 (municipal authorities established under the MAA “are independent

agencies of the Commonwealth and a part of its sovereignty” and, therefore, have “no

boundaries within which [they] must limit [their] services”). The MAA authorizes an

incorporated municipal authority to engage in projects that “benefit the people of the

Commonwealth,” so long as it does not “unnecessarily burden[] or interfer[e] with any

municipality which has not incorporated or joined that authority.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3);

see 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d) (outlining an authority’s broad rights and powers). The service

area of an authority is, in effect, wherever it chooses to provide or extend its service,

subject to certain statutory limitations. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b). 13 As stated earlier,

13 For example, one limitation the MAA places on municipal authorities is when they seek

to acquire buildings or land in “any municipality which has not incorporated or joined that
authority.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3). In such instances, the governing body of the non-
member municipality must either approve the acquisition by resolution or, if the property
acquired is not subject to tax abatement, enter an agreement with the municipality
(continued…)

                                      [J-32-2026] - 25
Section 5607(d)(9) specifically empowers an authority “to determine by itself exclusively

the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable

service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9). 14

The MAA does not require an authority to obtain the Commission’s approval before

extending its utility service to areas beyond the boundaries of the incorporating

municipality. 15   Unlike public utilities governed by the Code, incorporated municipal

authorities are self-governing and operate autonomously, without Commission oversight.

See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5610; see also 53 Pa.C.S. § 5617 (“The use of the facilities of the

authority and the operation of its business shall be subject to the rules and regulations as

adopted by the authority.”).

       As the Commission’s amici point out, many incorporated municipal authorities

serve multiple areas across municipal boundary lines. See Upper St. Clair, 

184 A.2d at

698

 (“[M]any [authorities] exercise certain powers and perform certain functions both

within and without the municipal limits of the incorporating municipality, within certain

constitutional and statutory limitations, and rightly so.”); White Rock, 

578 A.2d at 987




regarding the payment of taxes. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3); see also 53 Pa.C.S. §
5615 (governing an authority’s acquisition of lands or water rights by purchase or eminent
domain).
14 The MAA defines “[i]mprovement” as “[e]xtension, enlargement and improvement.      The
term ‘to improve’ shall mean and include to extend, to enlarge and to improve all in such
manner as may be deemed desirable.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5602.
15 However, a municipal authority does need Commission approval when it seeks to

acquire any existing facilities or equipment owned by a public utility regulated by the
Commission. See White Oak Borough Auth. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

103 A.2d 502, 505

(Pa. Super. 1954) (stating the MAA “requires approval by the … Commission where the
[a]uthority acquires a project, a substantial portion of which is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission”); 53 Pa.C.S. § 5613(b)(1). An authority also needs Commission
approval to construct tunnels, bridges, and other structures “to effect or permit the
abolition of a grade crossing[,]” as railroad grade crossings fall within the Commission’s
jurisdiction. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(25); see 66 Pa.C.S. § 2702.

                                       [J-32-2026] - 26
(recognizing the municipal authority at issue “may provide services to many different

areas in the Commonwealth”). Indeed, the MAA contemplates that a municipal authority’s

service area may encompass non-member municipalities, particularly in the provision of

water and sewer services. 16 See, e.g., 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5607(d)(9) (“If the service area

includes more than one municipality, the revenues from any project shall not be expended

directly or indirectly on any other project unless such expenditures are made for the

benefit of the entire service area.”); 5610(a.1) (setting forth the procedure for appointing

a governing board where “a water or sewer authority incorporated by one municipality

provides water or sewer services to residents in at least two counties and has water or

sewer projects in more than two counties where the combined population of the served

municipalities, excluding the incorporating municipality, is at least five times the

population of the incorporating municipality”); 5607(d)(24)(i)(C)(V)(e) (addressing the

method for calculating tapping fees for sewer or water systems “[i]f an authority[’s] service

area is not entirely within a municipal boundary but is entirely within a county or other

geographic area within Pennsylvania”).

       As a practical matter, the Commission cannot regulate the rates and service of an

incorporated municipal authority the same way it regulates a municipality or municipal

corporation providing service beyond its “corporate limits.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5). That

is because an incorporated municipal authority does not have “corporate limits” like a

municipality does. The corporate limits of a municipality are its legally defined geographic




16 “Water and sewer authorities commonly serve more than one municipality to take

advantage of the economies of scale and natural drainage areas.” Municipal Authorities
in   Pennsylvania     (Eleventh  Edition,   April      2020) at   2,   available    at
https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in-
pennsylvania/?wpdmdl=57758&refresh=6a5f743862d8b1784640568 (last accessed
October 26, 2026).



                                      [J-32-2026] - 27
boundaries within which it exercises jurisdiction and taxing power. 17 While a municipal

authority is “incorporated” by a municipality or municipalities under the MAA, the “limits”

of an incorporated authority’s service, as recognized in the MAA, are its project limits.

See 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5602 (defining “[p]roject”); 5607(a) (identifying the “[s]cope of projects

permitted”). 18 Here, consistent with the language of the MAA, the Authority’s Articles of

Incorporation do not delineate a specific service area or any physical boundaries within

which it will provide service, broadly stating “[t]hat the projects which shall be undertaken

by the [Authority] shall be to construct, improve, furnish and equip a sanitary sewage

system and treatment works and to acquire necessary land for such purposes and to do

and perform all necessary things incident thereto.” Certified Record at 911a; see 53

Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(4).     Under Section 5607(c) of the MAA, where an incorporating

municipality “fail[s] to specify the project or projects to be undertaken, then the authority

shall be deemed to have all the powers granted by this chapter.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(c). 19

       Notably, since the MAA’s enactment, only one municipal authority incorporated

thereunder, the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, was specifically brought within the


17 The Code does not define “corporate limits.”


18 In addition to public utility service, municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA

provide a wide variety of public services, including parks and recreation, refuse collection,
incinerator plants, steam heating plants, playgrounds, public school facilities, and
hospitals and health centers. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(a).
19 The Dissent disagrees with our interpretation of a municipal authority’s “enumerated

powers” in Section 5607(d)(9) as permitting an authority to determine its own service
areas. Dissenting Opinion at 5. Specifically, the Dissent believes the phrase “in the areas
served” in Section 5607(d)(9) “presupposes that there are[] … some boundaries within
which the municipal authority is authorized to serve.” Id. Respectfully, we do not read “in
the areas served” as limiting language, but as evincing a municipal authority’s broad
power to choose how and where it will provide service. In other words, the only
“boundaries” are those determined by the municipal authority. As explained above,
our interpretation is supported by the MAA’s stated purpose, the surrounding statutory
provisions, and the case law holding that municipal authorities, as independent agencies
of the Commonwealth, have no boundaries within which they must limit their services.

                                      [J-32-2026] - 28
Commission’s jurisdiction by legislative fiat. In 2017, the General Assembly enacted Act

65 of 2017, adding Chapter 32, titled “Water and Sewer Authorities in Cities of the Second

Class,” to the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 3201-3209. Section 3201 defines “authority,” for

purposes of Chapter 32, as a “body politic and corporate established by a city of the

second class” under the 1935 MAA or the 1945 MAA. 66 Pa.C.S. § 3201 (emphasis

added). The City of Pittsburgh is the only city of the second class in the Commonwealth.

Section 3202(a)(2) requires the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority to obtain a

Commission-issued certificate before providing utility service “beyond the areas served

as of” April 1, 2018, the amendment’s effective date. 66 Pa.C.S. § 3202(a)(2). To date,

the General Assembly has not amended the Code to expressly grant the Commission

jurisdiction over any other municipal authority incorporated under the MAA. This further

suggests that, in enacting the MAA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, the General

Assembly intended to remove incorporated municipal authorities from the Commission’s

purview.

       We conclude that Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA — and, in turn, Section

5607(d)(9) of the present MAA — must be construed to modify the Code in the same

manner as it modified the Public Utility Law. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1963. Although the Code

broadly defines “municipal corporation” to include an “authority,” this definition no longer

includes municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA, which are governed by their

own comprehensive statutory scheme. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. That statutory scheme

imposes its own requirements on municipal authorities that undertake public utility

projects and includes an express jurisdictional provision, vesting the courts of common

pleas with “exclusive jurisdiction” over disputes involving a municipal authority’s rates and

service.




                                      [J-32-2026] - 29
       Requiring municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA to obtain a certificate

before providing utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities

would contravene both the language and the purpose of the MAA. The MAA gives

municipal authorities the exclusive power to establish their own rates, service, and

service areas and grants the common pleas courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes

involving the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of their rates and service. 20 It seems

incongruous that the General Assembly would require an incorporated municipal authority

to obtain a certificate to begin serving customers in non-member municipalities — thereby

placing the authority under the Commission’s jurisdiction — but then preclude the

Commission from hearing any challenges to the rates or services the authority provides

to those customers. This would be an absurd result. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (in

ascertaining a statute’s legislative intent, we must presume “the General Assembly does

not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable”). 21

20 See Butler Twp. Area Water & Sewer Auth. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res., 

664 A.2d 185, 188


(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (stating that, under the MAA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision,
“[q]uestions involving ‘service[,’] such as ‘the adequacy, safety and reasonableness’ of
the service, concern matters of the size of a distribution area and whether and/or how a
particular service is to be provided”).
21 The Dissent “would conclude that the Commission, as the tribunal that generally has

primary jurisdiction to interpret the Code’s provisions, would be the appropriate tribunal
to decide whether Section 1102 [of the Code] requires a municipal authority to obtain a
[certificate].” Dissenting Opinion at 4. Putting aside the fact that the Commission has
already answered that question (in fact, that is the reason for this appeal), allowing the
Commission to answer that question in the affirmative would require every municipal
authority providing service beyond its geographic boundaries to obtain a certificate,
thereby subjecting the authority to the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of the
Commission. Such a result would completely vitiate the MAA and its express command
that “[t]he court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions
involving rates or service.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphasis added). A municipal
authority provides “service” to its ratepayers and charges them “rates.” Every action
taken by a municipal authority is, by necessity, in pursuit of its “service” to its ratepayers.
“Exclusive,” as used in the MAA, means just that — exclusive. It does not confer
coextensive jurisdiction to the Commission and the courts of common pleas, as the
Dissent would contemplate.

                                      [J-32-2026] - 30
      To effectuate the purposes of both statutes, we conclude the General Assembly

intended to treat municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA differently than

municipal corporations, as they are distinct legal entities. See George A. Bibikos, Esq.,

Municipal Corporations and Public Utility Service in Pennsylvania, 13 Widener L.J. 879,

881 (2004) (“Municipalities and municipal authorities are separate legal entities created

by separate laws. The primary distinction is that municipalities are politically created

sovereigns, while municipal authorities are essentially independent agencies of the

[C]ommonwealth.”) (footnotes omitted). As agencies of the Commonwealth, municipal

authorities have no boundaries within which they must limit their service, and the MAA

empowers them to exclusively determine the “reasonable and uniform rates” to charge

their customers and “the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe

and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. §

5607(d)(9). This grant of authority includes the power to determine the area in which an

authority will provide service, both “within and without the municipal limits of the

incorporating municipality.” Upper St. Clair, 

184 A.2d at 698

.

      Once the General Assembly enacted the 1945 MAA, it removed municipal

authorities from the Commission’s jurisdiction and placed jurisdiction over their rates and

services in the courts of common pleas. See Elizabeth Township, 

447 A.2d at 248


(concluding the General Assembly’s intent in vesting exclusive jurisdiction over “rates and

services” with the common pleas courts was to preclude such challenges from being

heard by the Commission); Graver, 

469 A.2d at 1155

. Consequently, we conclude that

municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are not required to obtain a




                                     [J-32-2026] - 31
Commission-issued certificate before operating beyond the boundaries of their

incorporating municipalities. 22

       Contrary to the Township’s contention on appeal, Township residents who receive

sewage treatment service from the Authority are not without statutory protections. The

MAA provides those customers with remedies for unreasonable rates or service failures

and further provides that “[a]ny person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of a

rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the authority’s

services” may file suit against the Authority in the court of common pleas. 53 Pa.C.S. §

5607(d)(9). As this Court recognized in Elizabeth Township, “the court of common pleas

… ‘sits, in effect, as a public utility commission’” when hearing disputes involving

municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA. Elizabeth Township, 

447 A.2d at 248


(citation omitted in original).    In addition, municipal authorities providing wastewater

service, like the Authority here, are regulated by DEP.          Therefore, even absent


22 The Dissent would uphold the Commonwealth Court’s remand to the Commission to

interpret the Code and the MAA and decide “the merits of the underlying issue, i.e.,
whether Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code required the Authority to obtain a [certificate] to
continue offering utility services in the Township.” Dissenting Opinion at 5-6.
Respectfully, this proposed disposition makes little practical sense. That is because the
Commission has already answered that question implicitly in its two written opinions
in this case. See Commission’s Opinion, 11/1/2023, at 25 (concluding, after analyzing
the relevant statutory provisions and case law, that “the Commission’s jurisdiction
presently extends only to municipalities, not municipal authorities” and “the Commission
has no authority over entities created and operating under the [MAA]”); Commission’s
Opinion, 1/18/2024, at 10 (concluding that “under the [MAA], jurisdiction over the rates
and services of municipal authorities, beyond, as well as within, the limits of the
municipality which created the authority, is vested exclusively with the courts of common
pleas” and “the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the issues raised by the Township’s
Complaint against [the Authority]”). As explained in footnote 3 above, the Commission
also maintained, throughout this appeal, that it lacks regulatory authority over a municipal
authority incorporated under the MAA. Consequently, we cannot discern what purpose
would be served by remanding this matter to the Commission to rule on an issue it has
already decided. Rather, in holding municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA
are not subject to Commission regulation when they provide utility service beyond their
boundaries, we have resolved the merits of the underlying dispute as a matter of law.

                                       [J-32-2026] - 32
Commission oversight, there are regulatory and other safeguards in place to protect the

customers of municipal authorities, both within and beyond the boundaries of their

incorporating municipalities.



V. CONCLUSION

       While the Code grants the Commission jurisdiction over municipalities and

municipal corporations that provide public utility service beyond their boundaries,

municipal authorities are distinct legal entities established under, and governed by, a

separate statutory scheme.      We hold the Commission’s jurisdiction over municipal

corporations, as defined in the Code, does not extend to municipal authorities

incorporated under the MAA, because the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with

exclusive jurisdiction over those authorities’ rates and services. We further hold that

municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are not subject to Commission

regulation when they provide utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating

municipalities. Accordingly, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order.

       Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.

       Justice Brobson files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Wecht joins.




                                    [J-32-2026] - 33

Dissenting opinion

                           [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 MIDDLE DISTRICT


 CONYNGHAM TOWNSHIP,                                :   No. 34 MAP 2025
                                                    :
                      Appellee                      :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                    :   Commonwealth Court at No. 113
                                                    :   CD 2024, dated October 4, 2024,
               v.                                   :   Vacating and Remanding the
                                                    :   Decision of the Public Utility
                                                    :   Commission at No. C-2021-
 PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY                        :   3023624 dated January 18, 2024
 COMMISSION,                                        :
                                                    :   ARGUED: April 16, 2026
                      Appellant                     :


                                  DISSENTING OPINION


JUSTICE BROBSON                                          DECIDED: October 29, 2026
       The Majority provides a thorough review of the history of the Municipality

Authorities Act (MAA), 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5601-5623, and its effect on the Public Utility Code

(Code), 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-3316, and I agree with many of the general principles

contained in its opinion. Among these principles, however, the Majority makes a few

novel declarations of law with which I cannot agree.         Primarily, I disagree with the

Majority’s conclusion that a dispute regarding a municipal authority’s service area is a

“question[] involving . . . service” under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, 53 Pa. C.S.

§ 5607(d)(9), and, as a result, the Public Utility Commission (Commission) lacks subject

matter jurisdiction over such dispute. (See Majority Op. at 29-30.) Beyond these explicit,

and inaccurate, declarations of law, I also take issue with the Majority’s loose use of the

term “jurisdiction” to cover both the traditional concept of personal and subject matter

jurisdiction, as well as the concept of regulatory authority over an entity.
       To begin, the Majority, arguably guided by the question on which this Court granted

review, frames the issue presented in this appeal as whether “the Commission has

jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the MAA when the authority

provides utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of its incorporating

municipality.” (Id. at 9 (citing Conyngham Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

340 A.3d 272


(Pa. 2025) (per curiam)).) In doing so, the Majority conflates the concepts of subject

matter jurisdiction and regulatory authority.    These concepts, while similar in many

regards, are not interchangeable. This case concerns not regulatory authority but, rather,

whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to interpret a provision of the

Code and to determine whether that provision applies to a municipal authority. To the

extent the Majority answers this inquiry in the negative, I dissent.

       To better understand my concern, I must revisit the Commonwealth Court’s

decision below. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Court held that the Commission had

jurisdiction to consider a complaint filed by Conyngham Township (Township), wherein

the Township asserted that Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code 1 required the Sanity Sewer

Authority of the Borough of Shickshinny (Authority), a municipal authority incorporated

under the MAA, to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to continue offering

utility services in the Township. The Commonwealth Court reached this conclusion after

1 Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code provides:


               (a) General rule.--Upon the application of any public utility and the
       approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its [CPC]
       first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, it shall be
       lawful:
               ....
                     (5) For any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or
               begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the
               rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service
               beyond its corporate limits.
66 Pa. C.S. § 1102(a)(5).


                            [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 2
conducting an independent statutory construction analysis of Section 1102(a)(5) of the

Code, as well as Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA. 2 I find no error in the Commonwealth

Court’s analysis and conclusion.

       There is no dispute that Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA grants exclusive jurisdiction

to the court of common pleas over certain challenges involving a municipal authority;

namely, “questions involving rates or service.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9). This broad

statement, however, should not be read in isolation.          Section 5607(d)(9) provides

clarification of the scope of the court of common pleas’ jurisdiction in the immediately

preceding sentence.      That sentence provides that “[a]ny person questioning the

reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and

reasonableness of the authority’s services” has the right to bring suit against the municipal

authority in the court of common pleas. Id. (emphases added). Thus, in order “[t]o

conclude that courts of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over complaints


2 Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA provides, in relevant part:


              (d) Powers.--Every authority may exercise all powers necessary or
       convenient for the carrying out of the purposes set forth in this section,
       including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following
       rights and powers:
              ....
                      (9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in
              the area served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be
              determined exclusively by it . . . and to determine by itself exclusively
              the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe
              and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas
              served. . . . Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity
              of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and
              reasonableness of the authority's services, including extensions
              thereof, may bring suit against the authority in the court of common
              pleas . . . . The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
              jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.
53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9).


                            [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 3
involving a municipal authority’s failure to obtain a [CPC],” we would also have to conclude

that such a challenge falls under one of these two categories. Conyngham Twp. v. Pa.

Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

325 A.3d 885

, 889 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). It does not.

       Section 1103(a) of the Code sets forth the procedure to obtain a CPC. It provides,

in pertinent part, that the Commission shall grant a CPC “only if the [C]ommission shall

find or determine that the granting of such certificate is necessary or proper for the

service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 1103(a).

This “necessary or proper” determination, while related to services in the general sense,

does not involve the “adequacy, safety and reasonableness” of services that a municipal

authority provides. See, e.g., Elite Indus., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

832 A.2d 428,

432

 (Pa. 2003) (quoting Seaboard Tank Lines, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 

502 A.2d

762, 764-65

 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (explaining that General Assembly broadly intended for

“necessary or proper” inquiry to prevent utilities from “engag[ing] in unrestrained and

destructive competition, which activity was thought to be, by its very nature, at odds with

the public interest”)). Accordingly, I find no support for the Majority’s conclusion that an

inquiry into whether a municipal authority is required to obtain a CPC qualifies as a

“question[] involving . . . service” under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA such that the court

of common pleas would have exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, I would conclude that the

Commission, as the tribunal that generally has primary jurisdiction to interpret the Code’s

provisions, would be the appropriate tribunal to decide whether Section 1102 requires a

municipal authority to obtain a CPC. See Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co.,

170 A.2d 565

, 566-67 (Pa. 1961) (“[N]o principle has become more firmly established in

Pennsylvania law than that the courts will not originally adjudicate matters within the

jurisdiction of the [Commission]. Initial jurisdiction in matters concerning the relationship

between public utilities and the public is in the [Commission]—not in the courts.”); see




                            [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 4
also id. at 567 (“It has been so held [that the Commission has initial jurisdiction in matters]

involving . . . rights to serve particular territory.” (citation omitted)).

       In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Majority relies upon another phrase

contained within Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA that provides municipal authorities with

certain enumerated powers. Namely, the Majority cites the portion of Section 5607(d)(9)

that provides a municipal authority with the power to “determine by itself exclusively the

services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service,

including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9). The Majority

interprets this language as granting municipal authorities “the exclusive power to establish

their own . . . service areas.” (Majority Op. at 30 (emphasis omitted).) I disagree.

Section 5607(d)(9), read in its entirety, clearly provides that a municipal authority can only

carry out its exclusive power to determine the services and improvements required “in the

areas served.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphasis added). This language presupposes

that there are, in fact, some boundaries within which the municipal authority is authorized

to serve. What those boundaries consist of and who the appropriate authority is for

determining those boundaries is separate from the question of jurisdiction now before us.

Accordingly, I would not answer it.

       At present, this Court need only answer whether the Commission has jurisdiction

to consider a complaint seeking to interpret a provision of the Code and its application to

a particular entity. Having found no applicable provision of the MAA that would remove

jurisdiction from the Commission on this question, I would conclude that the matter was

properly before the Commission.          Consequently, I would affirm the Commonwealth

Court’s order, which vacated the Commission’s inconsistent order and remanded the

matter to the Commission for further proceedings on the merits of the underlying issue,




                              [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 5
i.e., whether Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code required the Authority to obtain a CPC to

continue offering utility services in the Township.

       Justice Wecht joins this dissenting opinion.




                            [J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 6

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