Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Conyngham Township v. PUC, Aplt.
[J-32-2026]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
CONYNGHAM TOWNSHIP, : No. 34 MAP 2025
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court at No. 113
: CD 2024, dated October 4, 2024,
v. : Vacating and Remanding the
: Decision of the Public Utility
: Commission at No. C-2021-
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY : 3023624 dated January 18, 2024
COMMISSION, :
: ARGUED: April 16, 2026
Appellant :
OPINION
JUSTICE McCAFFERY DECIDED: October 29, 2026
For more than 80 years, municipal authorities throughout the Commonwealth have
operated largely without regulation by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
(Commission). Under the Public Utility Code (Code), 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-3316, the
Commission exercises regulatory authority over public utilities and municipal entities
providing utility service to customers beyond their corporate boundaries. Since 1945, the
prevailing law has been that the Commission lacks regulatory authority over municipal
authorities incorporated under the Municipality Authorities Act (MAA), 53 Pa.C.S. §§
5601-5623. The MAA is a comprehensive statutory scheme governing municipal
authorities that places jurisdiction over disputes involving their rates and service
exclusively with the courts of common pleas. With one exception, 1 municipal authorities
established under the MAA historically have not been regulated by the Commission, even
1 The Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, discussed infra, is the sole exception.
when they provide service outside the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities.
However, in 2024, the Commonwealth Court concluded the Commission possessed
jurisdiction to consider a challenge to a municipal authority’s failure to obtain Commission
approval, in the form of a certificate of public convenience (certificate), before extending
its utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of the incorporating municipality.
We granted discretionary review to consider the propriety of that decision.
We hold the Commission’s jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as defined
in the Code, does not extend to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA,
because the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over
municipal authorities’ rates and services. We further hold that municipal authorities
incorporated under the MAA are not subject to Commission regulation when they operate
beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities. Therefore, we reverse the
Commonwealth Court’s order.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1973, the Borough of Shickshinny (Borough), a municipality in Luzerne County,
filed Articles of Incorporation with the Secretary of the Commonwealth establishing the
Sanitary Sewer Authority of the Borough of Shickshinny (Authority) as a municipal
authority for the purpose of constructing, improving, furnishing and equipping a sanitary
sewage system and sewage treatment works. See Certified Record at 909a-912a.
Shortly thereafter, the Secretary issued a Certificate of Incorporation “evidencing the
incorporation of [the A]uthority under the provisions of [the Municipality Authorities Act of
1945 (1945 MAA)].” Id. at 917a. The Borough is the Authority’s sole member.
The Authority treats domestic wastewater and discharges the treated wastewater
into the Susquehanna River in accordance with a permit issued by the Pennsylvania
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Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The Authority operates a sewage
processing plant on Authority-owned property in adjacent Conyngham Township
(Township). The Authority provides sewage treatment services to the Borough, a portion
of the Township, and a few other areas beyond the Borough limits. The Township’s sewer
lines are owned and maintained by the Conyngham Township Sewer Authority (CTSA)
and convey wastewater to the Authority’s processing plant via a single point of
connection, where it is treated by the Authority. The Township is not within the Borough’s
corporate limits and has no representation on the Authority’s governing board.
In 1992, the Authority and the Township entered into a Sewage Treatment
Agreement, wherein the Authority agreed to provide sewage treatment and disposal
services to the CTSA as a single bulk customer. At that time, the Authority provided
sewer services to approximately 220 residential customers and 8 commercial customers
in the Township as well as the Township itself, which received service at its municipal
building. For 28 years, the Authority directly billed the CTSA for its bulk sewage treatment
services. The CTSA, in turn, directly billed residential and commercial customers in the
Township a flat $134 quarterly rate for sewer services.
In September 2020, the Authority notified the Township it was cancelling the
Sewage Treatment Agreement due to the Township’s failure to address influx and
infiltration issues for the prior three years. 2 Consequently, in January 2021, the Authority
began directly billing individual Township customers $75 per quarter for its sewer
services. Between January 2021 and September 2021, the Authority collected nearly
$55,000 from Township customers.
2 In 2020, the Authority also filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
against the Township and the CTSA, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. That suit was still pending as of the date of
the Commission’s decision in this case. See Certified Record at 1165a.
[J-32-2026] - 3
A. Agency Proceedings
In January 2021, the Township filed a Formal Complaint with the Commission,
alleging the Authority was operating as a public utility in the Township and directly billing
Township customers without a Commission-issued certificate. Under Section 1102(a)(5)
of the Code, a certificate is required “[f]or any municipal corporation to acquire, construct,
or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the rendering or furnishing
to the public of any public utility service beyond its corporate limits.” 66 Pa.C.S. §
1102(a)(5). In its Formal Complaint, the Township asked the Commission to “order [the
Authority] to immediately stop billing residents of [the] Township and return all monies
collected until after a valid [c]ertificate … is obtained.” Certified Record at 3a.
In September 2021, the Commission’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement
(Bureau) filed a Notice of Intervention in the matter, seeking a civil penalty against the
Authority. The Bureau asserted that following its preliminary investigation, it determined
“the Authority’s termination of the Sewage Treatment Agreement with the Township[] …
and its subsequent provision of wastewater services to numerous Township residents for
compensation renders it … a public utility subject to the Commission’s jurisdiction.”
Certified Record at 142a.
When the parties were unsuccessful in resolving their dispute through mediation,
the matter proceeded to a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). Before the
hearing, the parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts. The ALJ held an evidentiary
hearing in October 2022 and closed the record in March 2023.
The ALJ issued an Initial Decision sustaining the Township’s Formal Complaint.
The ALJ concluded the Township met its burden of proving the Authority was improperly
operating as a public utility in the Township without a Commission-issued certificate,
specifically finding the Authority “provided sewer treatment service beyond its Borough
[J-32-2026] - 4
limits for compensation in violation of Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code.” Certified Record
at 1115a. The ALJ directed the Authority to file an application for a certificate with the
Commission and to issue partial refunds to Township customers, but he denied the
Bureau’s request for a civil penalty. Notably, in reaching his decision, the ALJ did not
consider or address the applicability of the MAA, even though the Authority raised the
issue in its brief filed with the ALJ.
The Authority then filed exceptions to the ALJ’s Initial Decision, asserting the
Commission lacked jurisdiction over the Authority under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA,
which provides, in pertinent part:
Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by
an authority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the
authority’s services, including extensions thereof, may bring suit
against the authority in the court of common pleas of the county where
the project is located or, if the project is located in more than one county, in
the court of common pleas of the county where the principal office of the
project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.
53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). The Authority averred the threshold question
before the Commission was whether its jurisdiction over municipal corporations, as
defined in the Code, also extends to municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA.
Relying on Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, the Authority asserted: (1) the MAA vests the
courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over municipal authorities’ rates and
services, and (2) municipal authorities are not subject to Commission regulation, even
when they operate beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities.
The Commission granted in part and denied in part the Authority’s exceptions.
Specifically, the Commission concluded it lacked jurisdiction over municipal authorities
providing service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities under the
MAA. The Commission explained that although it historically exercised jurisdiction over
[J-32-2026] - 5
municipal corporations providing services outside their boundaries and issued
certificates to those entities, the 1945 amendments to the MAA explicitly removed
municipal authorities from the Commission’s jurisdiction. Section 5607(d)(9) of the
present MAA vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over the rates
and services of municipal authorities. The Commission noted that Pennsylvania’s
intermediate appellate courts have similarly interpreted Section 5607(d)(9) and held the
MAA gives the courts of common pleas, not the Commission, exclusive jurisdiction over
a municipal authority’s rates and service, both within and beyond the boundaries of the
incorporating municipality.
The Commission also relied on the parties’ stipulation that the Authority is a
municipal authority, noting that municipal authorities and municipal corporations are
distinct entities under Pennsylvania law. Section 1301 of the Code establishes
Commission jurisdiction over the rates charged by municipal corporations when those
entities provide public utility service beyond their corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. § 1301.
Section 1501 of the Code gives the Commission jurisdiction over the quality, reliability,
and adequacy of services of municipal corporations under similar terms. See 66 Pa.C.S.
§ 1501. However, the Commission concluded its jurisdiction does not extend to municipal
authorities because the 1945 amendments to the MAA expressly removed municipal
authorities from its jurisdiction, and that provision remains codified in Section 5607(d)(9)
of the present MAA.
The Township appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
B. Commonwealth Court’s Decision
On October 4, 2024, the Commonwealth Court vacated the Commission’s order
and remanded the matter to the Commission. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub.
Util. Comm’n,
325 A.3d 885
(Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). The Commonwealth Court began by
[J-32-2026] - 6
explaining that Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code allows, “[u]pon the application of any public
utility and the approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its
[Certificate] first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, ... [f]or any
municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or
other facilities for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service
beyond its corporate limits.”
Id. at 888
(citation omitted; emphasis and some alterations in original). Further, Section 102 of the Code expressly includes an “authority” within the definition of “municipal corporation.”
Id.
(citation omitted). The Commonwealth Court also relied on Section 1501 of the Code, which provides that “[a]ny public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation and control by the [C]ommission as to service and extensions, with the same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a public utility.”
Id.
(citation and footnote omitted; emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth Court acknowledged, however, that Section 5607(d)(9) of the
MAA gives the courts of common pleas jurisdiction to determine “the reasonableness or
uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of
the authority’s services, including extensions thereof” and further provides that “[t]he court
of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving
rates or service.” Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 888 (citation omitted; emphases
in original). Based on this statutory language, the Commonwealth Court found “the MAA
does not confer jurisdiction on the common pleas courts for all disputes involving
municipal authorities but, rather, only those involving ‘rates or service.’” Id. at 888-889
(emphases in original).
In rejecting the Commission’s claim that its jurisdiction extends only to municipal
corporations and municipalities, the Commonwealth Court found the cases on which the
[J-32-2026] - 7
Commission relied involved challenges to rates, which are expressly covered by the
MAA’s grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the courts. The Commonwealth Court observed
those cases did not address the Commission’s “jurisdiction over municipal authorities
concerning the Code’s mandate that municipal authorities obtain [c]ertificates when
furnishing service beyond their corporate limits.” Conyngham Twp., 325 A.3d at 889; see
Elizabeth Township v. Mun. Auth. of McKeesport,
(Pa. 1982); Rankin v. Chester Mun. Auth.,
(Pa. Super. 1949).
The Commonwealth Court reasoned that to conclude the common pleas courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over a claim that a municipal authority failed to obtain a
certificate before operating beyond its corporate limits, the Court would need to construe
the certification requirement as relating to “the reasonableness or uniformity of a rate
fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of the authority’s
services” pursuant to Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA. Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d
at 889-890 (citation omitted; emphases in original). However, the Commonwealth Court
declined to do so, because it determined the certification requirement “does not ‘involv[e]
rates or service.’” Id. at 890 (citation omitted; brackets in original).
To reach that conclusion, the Commonwealth Court looked to the provisions of the
Code governing the issuance of certificates. In particular, Section 1103(a) of the Code
provides a certificate “shall be granted by order of the [C]ommission, only if the
[C]ommission shall find or determine that the granting of such [C]ertificate is
necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the
public.” Conyngham Township, 325 A.3d at 890 (citation omitted; emphasis and
alterations in original). According to the Commonwealth Court, the primary consideration
for obtaining a certificate is whether it is “necessary or proper[,]” which it opined does not
implicate rates or service. Id. (citation omitted).
[J-32-2026] - 8
Lastly, the Commonwealth Court found the Commission’s argument that it lacked
jurisdiction over this action was undermined by the fact that the Commission previously
issued certificates to municipal authorities in two prior cases. Conyngham Township, 325
A.3d at 890-891 (citing E. Dunkard Water Auth. v. Sw. Pa. Water Auth.,
2020 WL 6707503
(Pa. Cmwlth. filed Nov. 16, 2020) (unreported); Middle Smithfield Twp. Mun. Auth. v. Maula,
2008 WL 9404647
(Pa. Cmwlth. filed Oct. 24, 2008) (unreported)). Therefore, the Commonwealth Court concluded “the Commission had jurisdiction to consider the Township’s [Formal] Complaint challenging the Authority’s operation [in the Township] without a [c]ertificate.”
Id. at 891
.
II. ISSUE
The issue before this Court is whether the Commonwealth Court erred in concluding
the Commission has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the MAA
when the authority provides utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of its
incorporating municipality. See Conyngham Township v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
340
A.3d 272
(Pa. 2025). 3
3 The Dissent takes issue with our use of the term “jurisdiction” throughout this decision,
opining that we improperly conflate subject matter jurisdiction over a dispute with
regulatory authority over a municipal authority. Dissenting Opinion at 2. According to the
Dissent, this appeal is not about the Commission’s regulatory authority over municipal
authorities generally, but only whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to
determine if Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA applies to the underlying dispute, consistent
with the Commonwealth Court’s limited holding. While the Commission did raise that
issue in its Petition for Allowance of Appeal (PAA), Allocatur Docket No. 657 MAL 2024,
both parties also clearly raised the overarching question of whether the Commission has
any authority to regulate a municipal authority’s rates and service following the MAA’s
enactment. See, e.g., PAA, 12/23/2024, at 32 (asserting the Commonwealth Court’s
decision “has broad practical implications for previously unregulated entities that will now
be considered to fall under Commission jurisdiction”); Answer to PAA, 12/31/2024, at 1
(asserting this appeal “involves the fundamental question of whether a municipal authority
can operate as a public utility outside its jurisdictional limits without obtaining the requisite
(continued…)
[J-32-2026] - 9
III. OVERVIEW OF PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY LAWS
We granted discretionary review in this case to resolve an apparent conflict
between two statutes governing public utility service in Pennsylvania — the Code and the
MAA — specifically as they relate to municipal authorities. 4 Before we address the issue
on appeal, we will provide a brief overview of both statutes.
A. Public Utility Code
The Code governs privately owned entities that provide water, electric, gas, sewer,
and similar services to the public, as well as municipalities and municipal corporations
that provide utility service to customers beyond their geographic boundaries. See 66
Pa.C.S. §§ 1101, 1102(a). 5 The present-day Code was enacted in 1978 and was a
codification, without substantial change, of the former Public Utility Law, which was in
effect from 1937 to 1978. The Code grants the Commission “general administrative
[c]ertificate … and submitting itself to Commission oversight and regulation”). In fact, that
broader issue comprised the bulk of the parties’ appellate briefs and was the focus of their
oral arguments before this Court. This is not surprising, since the question we directed
the parties to address was: “Did the Commonwealth Court err when it held the
[Commission] has jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the [MAA]?”
Conyngham Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
340 A.3d 272
, 273 (Pa. 2025). Based on the parties’ arguments, it is clear they understood that our use of the word “jurisdiction” meant not only subject matter jurisdiction over the underling dispute, but, more broadly, regulatory authority and oversight over municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA. Hence, it is confounding that the Dissent opines that this broader legal issue is not actually before the Court. 4 The question before us, which involves the interplay between the Code and the MAA, is one of statutory interpretation. Thus, our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See Leight v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Physicians,
243 A.3d 126
, 136 (Pa.
2020).
5 “The [Commission] regulates the rates and service of investor-owned water and
wastewater companies, along with some municipal systems that serve customers outside
their boundaries.” A History of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission at 2, available
at https://www.puc.pa.gov/general/pdf/PUC_History.pdf (last accessed October 26,
2026).
[J-32-2026] - 10
power and authority to supervise and regulate all public utilities doing business within this
Commonwealth.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 501(b).
Under the Code, a “public utility,” as defined in the statute, is required to obtain a
certificate to legally operate and always is subject to the Commission’s regulation.
Section 1501 of the Code provides:
Every public utility shall furnish and maintain adequate, efficient, safe, and
reasonable service and facilities, and shall make all such repairs, changes,
alterations, substitutions, extensions, and improvements in or to such
service and facilities as shall be necessary or proper for the
accommodation, convenience, and safety of its patrons, employees, and
the public. Such service also shall be reasonably continuous and without
unreasonable interruptions or delay. Such service and facilities shall be
in conformity with the regulations and orders of the [C]ommission.
Subject to the provisions of this part and the regulations or orders of the
[C]ommission, every public utility may have reasonable rules and
regulations governing the conditions under which it shall be required to
render service….
66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). A public utility is required to obtain a certificate
before it “begin[s] to offer, render, furnish or supply” utility service or “abandon[s] or
surrender[s], in whole or in part, any service[.]” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1)-(2). The
issuance of a certificate, in effect, subjects the public utility provider to the Commission’s
regulation and oversight in the provision of utility service to ratepayers. The Commission
will grant a certificate only if it “determine[s] that the granting of such certificate is
necessary or proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public”
and “may impose such conditions as it may deem to be just and reasonable.” 66 Pa.C.S.
§ 1103(a). Through its regulation, the Commission ensures that public utility providers
meet strict insurance, safety, and operational standards and provide safe, reliable, and
reasonable service to the public at established rates.
In addition, “[a c]ertificate … makes it lawful for [a] public utility to provide service
within a defined territory, and imposes on the public utility an obligation to provide
[J-32-2026] - 11
service in that territory.” Lukens Steel Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
, 1136 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (en banc) (emphasis added); see Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co.,
170 A.2d 565
, 567 (Pa. 1961) (recognizing the Commission has jurisdiction to
determine a public utility’s authority under its certificate, as well as its “rights to serve [a]
particular territory”). Section 1101 of the Code provides that a certificate issued by the
Commission “shall include a description of the nature of the service and of the territory in
which it may be offered, rendered, furnished or supplied.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1101.
Unlike a privately owned utility, which always is subject to the Commission’s
regulation, a municipal corporation that provides public utility service is subject to the
Commission’s regulation only when it provides service to customers beyond its municipal
boundaries. Section 1501 of the Code provides in relevant part:
Any public utility service being furnished or rendered by a municipal
corporation beyond its corporate limits shall be subject to regulation
and control by the [C]ommission as to service and extensions, with the
same force and in like manner as if such service were rendered by a public
utility.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1501 (emphasis added). Thus, before a municipal corporation may furnish
service beyond its corporate limits, it must obtain the Commission’s approval in the form
of a certificate, as set forth in Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code:
Upon the application of any public utility and the approval of such
application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its certificate of public
convenience first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing
laws, it shall be lawful[] … [f]or any municipal corporation to acquire,
construct, or begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities
for the rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service
beyond its corporate limits.
66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5) (emphases added); see Borough of Phoenixville v. Pa. Pub. Util.
Comm’n,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1971) (en banc) (“As soon as a [municipality]
holds itself out to render uncertificated extraterritorial service and renders such service, it
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is within the jurisdiction of the Commission to determine whether extension of such
service should be granted[]” because “the Commission has jurisdiction to determine the
extent of the extraterritorial utility service area for the municipality.”).
The reason municipal corporations are exempt from Commission regulation when
they provide utility service to customers within their borders is because those customers,
as residents of the municipality, have the power to elect the local officials who set the
utility’s rates and service standards. However, when a municipal corporation serves
customers beyond its borders, those customers have no political representation, so the
Commission steps in to provide state-level oversight and consumer protection. See
County of Dauphin v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (“[T]he purpose of subjecting a municipally operated public utility which renders service beyond its corporate limits to the jurisdiction of the [Commission] is to protect users of the service who are not residents of the municipality.”);
(agreeing that “the reason
for regulating extraterritorial service is so that the municipality cannot discriminate against
users who are outside of the corporate limits”).
B. Municipality Authorities Act
The MAA is a comprehensive scheme specifically governing municipal authorities.
A municipal authority is a special-purpose entity created by one or more municipalities for
the purpose of acquiring, constructing, financing, and operating public works projects.
See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(a). 6 A municipal authority is run by a board appointed by the
6 According to the Pennsylvania Department of State website, a municipal authority is “‘a
body politic and corporate’ created to finance and/or operate specific public works
projects without tapping the general taxing powers of the municipality. Authorities
(sometimes known as special districts in other states) are alternate vehicle[s] for
accomplishing public purposes rather than through [the] direct action of counties,
municipalities and school districts.” Municipal and Other Authorities,
https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/programs/business/types-of-filings-and-
registrations/municipal-and-other-authorities (last accessed October 26, 2026).
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governing body of the municipality but functions independently of the local government
that incorporated it. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5610.
Before the current version of the MAA, there were two prior iterations: the
Municipality Authorities Act of 1935 (1935 MAA), which was repealed and replaced 10
years later by the 1945 MAA. The 1945 MAA existed without significant change for almost
60 years. 7
In 2001, the General Assembly codified the present-day MAA, which includes the
following statements, in relevant part, of the statute’s purpose and intent:
(2) The purpose and intent of this chapter being to benefit the people of the
Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health,
safety and prosperity and not to unnecessarily burden or interfere with
existing business by the establishment of competitive enterprises[.]
…
7 The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development has
described the history of municipal authorities in Pennsylvania as follows:
Municipal authorities in Pennsylvania, as in many other states, had their
beginning in the 1930s Depression. As part of its fiscal recovery policy, the
federal government granted money to states and municipalities for public
works construction to stimulate employment and provide needed public
facilities. These grants had to be matched by the recipient unit, but many
states and localities were unable to pay their share, due both to reduced
revenues and restrictive debt limits. A number of states, including
Pennsylvania, then created state authorities to borrow outside
constitutional debt limits by making use of revenue bonds. Pennsylvania
was one of three states that passed general enabling legislation to allow
their municipalities to create authorities. This was the [1935 MAA].
The 1935 [MAA] was repealed and replaced in 1945 by the present [MAA],
which gave greater flexibility in operation and financing. The [MAA] was
officially codified in the P[ennsylvania] Consolidated Statutes in 2001.
Municipal Authorities in Pennsylvania (Eleventh Edition, April 2020) at 1, available at
https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in-
pennsylvania/?wpdmdl=57758&refresh=6a5f743862d8b1784640568 (last accessed
October 26, 2026).
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(3) It is the intent of this chapter in specifying and defining the authorized
purposes and projects of an authority to permit the authority to benefit the
people of this Commonwealth by, among other things, increasing their
commerce, health, safety and prosperity while not unnecessarily burdening
or interfering with any municipality which has not incorporated or joined that
authority.
53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(2)-(3).
The MAA explicitly allows incorporated municipal authorities to establish their own
rates and services. Section 5607(d)(9) provides, in pertinent part:
Every authority may exercise all powers necessary or convenient for the
carrying out of the purposes set forth in this section, including, but without
limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following rights and powers:
...
(9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in the area
served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be
determined exclusively by it for the purpose of providing for the payment
of the expenses of the authority, the construction, improvement, repair,
maintenance and operation of its facilities and properties … and to
determine by itself exclusively the services and improvements
required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service, including
extensions thereof, in the areas served. If the service area includes more
than one municipality, the revenues from any project shall not be expended
directly or indirectly on any other project unless such expenditures are made
for the benefit of the entire service area.
53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphases added). Thus, unlike public utilities governed by the
Code, municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA have the power to “exclusively”
determine their rates and “the services and improvements” necessary to provide utility
service to their customers. Id.
The MAA also does not place geographic limits on where a municipal authority
may provide utility service. Our case law holds that, whether incorporated under the
present MAA, the 1945 MAA, or the 1935 MAA, “municipal authorities are not the
creatures, agents or representatives of the municipalities which organize them, but rather
are ‘independent agencies of the Commonwealth and part of its sovereignty.’”
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Commonwealth v. Erie Metro. Transit Auth.,
(Pa. 1971) (citation omitted; emphasis added); see Marshall v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cnty.,
939
(Pa. 1990) (“[Municipal] authorities must be state created, and they must be separate and distinct entities from the municipalities which compose them.”) (Papadakos, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Municipal authorities, as independent agencies of the Commonwealth, “ha[ve] no boundaries within which [they] must limit [their] services.” White Rock Sewage Corp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (en banc); see In re Application of Mun. Auth. of Upper St. Clair,
(Pa. 1962) (recognizing “the fundamental nature of an [a]uthority as a corporate agency
of the state, and not the child of a municipality”). 8
A municipal authority’s right to define its service area is embodied in Section
5607(d)(9) of the MAA, which authorizes an incorporated authority “to determine by itself
exclusively the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and
reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. §
5607(d)(9). This “exclusive” power addresses the authority’s independence from its
organizing municipality, but, as discussed more fully below, does not affect the court of
common pleas’ jurisdiction to review the legality of the authority’s actions under the MAA.
See Yezioro v. N. Fayette Cnty. Mun. Auth.,
(Pa. Super. 1960) (“The
[MAA] provision to the effect that the services provided by the authority are to be
determined ‘by itself exclusively’ must certainly have been intended to make it clear that
the authority itself, not the creating municipality or some other instrumentality, controlled
the initial determination of the service.”).
8 While a municipal authority is an independent agency of the Commonwealth, the MAA
provides that “[a]n authority may not pledge the credit or taxing power of the
Commonwealth” and the authority’s obligations “are not obligations of the
Commonwealth.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(e)(1)-(2).
[J-32-2026] - 16
IV. REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES
With this background in mind, we now turn to the present dispute, which involves
the conflict between the Code and the MAA regarding the regulation of municipal
authorities that provide public utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating
municipalities. To resolve this conflict, we will review the statutory language, engage in
a statutory construction analysis, and examine prior case law interpreting both statutes
and their predecessor laws.
Generally, under the Code, the Commission regulates the rates and services of
public utilities and municipal corporations that provide utility service beyond their
boundaries, whereas municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA establish their
own rates and services, without Commission approval.
The conflict in this case arises, specifically, from the definition of “municipal
corporation” in the Code. The Code defines “municipal corporation” as “[a]ll cities,
boroughs, towns, townships, or counties of this Commonwealth, and also any public
corporation, authority, or body whatsoever created or organized under any law of this
Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public
utility.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphases added). In other words, the Code defines
“municipal corporation” as including both municipalities — cities, boroughs, towns, and
townships — and “authorit[ies] … created or organized under any law of this
Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering any service similar to that of a public utility.”
66 Pa.C.S. § 102. “Authority” is not defined separately in the Code. Under the plain
language of Section 1501 of the Code, then, authorities are regulated in the same manner
as public utilities when they provide extraterritorial service, meaning they are subject to
Commission regulation and must obtain a certificate before operating beyond their
corporate limits. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 1102(a)(5), 1501.
[J-32-2026] - 17
Given the Code’s inclusion of “authority” in its definition of “municipal corporation,”
the question then becomes whether municipal authorities incorporated under the
MAA are subject to Commission regulation. The Township asserts that a municipal
authority created under the MAA is clearly encompassed within the Code’s definition of
“municipal corporation,” since it is “created or organized under [a] law of this
Commonwealth for the purpose of rendering [a] service similar to that of a public utility.”
66 Pa.C.S. § 102. The Township posits that since authorities are municipal corporations
under the Code, and the Commission has jurisdiction over municipal corporations
operating beyond their boundaries, a municipal authority operating beyond the
boundaries of its incorporating municipality — such as the Authority here — is subject to
Commission regulation in the same manner as a public utility. Were this Court to look
only to the provisions of the Code, we might agree. However, because the Authority in
this case specifically was established under, and is governed by, the MAA, we also must
consider the provisions of that statute.
The MAA defines “authority” as “[a] body politic and corporate created under this
chapter,” the 1935 MAA, or the 1945 MAA. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5602. As explained earlier, the
MAA explicitly grants municipal authorities the power to set their own rates and manage
their own operations. More importantly, the MAA contains an express jurisdictional
provision, which vests the courts of common pleas with exclusive jurisdiction over
disputes involving the rates and services of incorporated municipal authorities. See 53
Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9). This jurisdictional limitation over municipal authorities first
appeared in the 1945 MAA and remains in the present MAA substantially unchanged. 9
9 Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA stated:
Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of any rate fixed
by any [a]uthority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the
(continued…)
[J-32-2026] - 18
Unlike the Code, the MAA does not subject municipal authorities to Commission
regulation. The only state-level approval the MAA requires before an authority can legally
operate, regardless of its service area, is that of the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5603(e). While the Code includes municipal authorities in its definition
of “municipal corporation” subject to Commission jurisdiction when they serve customers
beyond their boundaries, Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA appears to remove them from
the Commission’s jurisdiction. Consequently, with respect to municipal authorities
providing utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities, the
MAA is in direct conflict with the Code.
The Commission asserts that although the Code includes “authorities” in its
definition of municipal corporations, its jurisdiction no longer encompasses municipal
authorities because the 1945 MAA explicitly removed them from the Commission’s
jurisdiction, and that provision remains in effect in the present MAA. On the other hand,
the Township acknowledges that under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, jurisdiction over
disputes involving the “reasonableness or uniformity” of a municipal authority’s rates or
the “adequacy, safety, and reasonableness” of its services lies exclusively with the courts
of common pleas. However, the Township contends that Section 5607(d)(9) does not
divest the Commission of all jurisdiction over municipal authorities. In particular, the
Township asserts that before an incorporated municipal authority may provide utility
[a]uthority’s services, including extensions thereof, may bring suit against
the [a]uthority in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the
project is located, or if the project is located in more than one county then
in the court of common pleas of the county wherein the principal office of
the project is located. The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine all such questions involving rates or service.
Graver v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1984) (quoting 53
P.S. § 306B(h) (repealed)).
[J-32-2026] - 19
service beyond its borders, the Code mandates that it obtain Commission approval in the
form of a certificate.
To resolve this conflict between the Code and the MAA, we are guided by the
Statutory Construction Act of 1972, which states that the object of all statutory
interpretation “is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly.” 1
Pa.C.S. § 1921(a). While “[t]he best indication of legislative intent is the plain language
of the statute,” we identify the plain meaning by considering “the statutory language in
context and give words and phrases their ‘common and approved usage.’” Crown Castle
NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
234 A.3d 665
, 674 (Pa. 2020) (citations omitted). We do not read the provisions in isolation, but instead understand each provision in the context of the entire statute. See Green Analytics N., LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Health,
343
A.3d 1086
, 1094 (Pa. 2025).
Where, as here, conflicting language appears in two different statutes, the
Statutory Construction Act instructs: “Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be
in conflict with a special provision in the same or another statute, the two shall be
construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. Further,
in interpreting conflicting statutory provisions, we presume the General Assembly did not
intend a result that is “absurd, impossible of execution[,] or unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. §
1922(1).
Between 1937 (when the Code’s predecessor, the Public Utility Law, was first
enacted) and 1945, the Commission exercised regulatory authority over privately owned
utilities as well as municipalities and municipal authorities that provided utility service
beyond their boundaries. However, the Commission’s power over municipal-owned
utilities was significantly limited in 1945, when the General Assembly added a provision
to the MAA, now codified at 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9), granting the courts of common pleas
[J-32-2026] - 20
exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and service of municipal authorities incorporated
thereunder. Since that time, according to the Commission and its amici, the Commission
generally has not exercised jurisdiction or regulatory authority over municipal authorities
incorporated under the MAA.
In 1949, the Superior Court first recognized the apparent conflict between the
former Public Utility Law and the then-newly enacted 1945 MAA with regard to municipal
authorities providing service beyond their boundaries. In Rankin, the Superior Court
explained that Section 2(15) of the Public Utility Law included public authorities in the
definition of “municipal corporation,” and Section 301 (as amended in 1939) vested the
Commission with jurisdiction over controversies involving the rates charged by a
municipal corporation to customers outside its borders. Rankin,
-461 (citing 66 P.S. §§ 1102(15) and 1141 (repealed)). Recognizing that these provisions were enacted in 1937 and 1939, the Superior Court held the 1945 MAA, being the later enactment, “impliedly repealed” the inconsistent provisions of the Public Utility Law, noting that “separate legislation, complete in itself, may have an amendatory effect upon other and uncited statutes by implication or indirection[.]” Rankin,
. The
Superior Court concluded:
The principle is well established that where, as here, there is a positive
repugnancy between provisions of separate laws enacted at different
sessions of the legislature, the earlier provision is impliedly repealed….
Both by actual intendment and construction, it appears abundantly clear
there was a definite limitation imposed upon the operation and effect
of [Section] 301 of the Public Utility Law by the [1945 MAA], whereby
the determination of issues involving reasonableness of rates beyond
the corporate limits of the municipality creating the [a]uthority—as
well as within—now lies exclusively with the court of common pleas.
[J-32-2026] - 21
(emphasis added). 10
Subsequently, in 1978, the General Assembly repealed the Public Utility Law and
replaced it with the Code. Section 301 of the former Public Utility Law — providing that
municipal corporations that serve customers beyond their corporate limits are subject to
Commission regulation — now appears in Section 1501 of the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §
1501. The definition of “municipal corporation” in the former Public Utility Law, which
includes public authorities, now appears in Section 102 of the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §
102.
With regard to repealed statutes, Section 1962 of the Statutory Construction Act
provides:
Whenever a statute is repealed and its provisions are at the same time
reenacted in the same or substantially the same terms by the repealing
statute, the earlier statute shall be construed as continued in active
operation. All rights and liabilities incurred in such earlier statute are
preserved and may be enforced.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1962. Thus, the provisions of the former Public Utility Law that were repealed
and reenacted, in substantially the same form, in the Code must be construed as in active
operation. However, that is not the end of the analysis, because we have an intervening
statute, the 1945 MAA, which purportedly created an exclusive jurisdiction provision
applicable to municipal authorities. On this issue, Section 1963 of the Statutory
Construction Act instructs:
10 Subsequently, this Court partially overruled Rankin “to the extent [Rankin] appear[ed]
to sanction an equity proceeding as a medium for passing upon the reasonableness of
an [a]uthority’s rates.” Calabrese v. Collier Twp. Mun. Auth.,
(Pa. 1968). However, on the issue of jurisdiction over municipal authorities, we held: “The [1945 MAA] provides an [e]xclusive remedy for passing upon the reasonableness of the rates of a municipal [a]uthority by a proceeding before a tribunal to which it has given [e]xclusive jurisdiction to determine such questions. Such tribunal is not a court of common pleas sitting as a chancery court, … but a common law court of common pleas.”
(emphasis added).
[J-32-2026] - 22
A statute which reenacts the provisions of an earlier statute shall not be
construed to repeal an intermediate statute which modified but did not
effect an amendment to such earlier statute. Such intermediate statute
shall be construed to remain in force and to modify the reenactment in
the same manner as it modified the earlier statute.
1 Pa.C.S. § 1963 (emphases added). Hence, we must determine whether Section 4B(h)
of the 1945 MAA, the predecessor to Section 5607(d)(9), modified the former Public Utility
Law. If we conclude that it did, then Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA — and, in turn,
Section 5607(d)(9) of the present MAA — must be construed to modify the Code in the
same manner as it modified the Public Utility Law.
Since the Code’s enactment in 1978, our courts have consistently held the courts
of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over the rates and services of municipal
authorities incorporated under the MAA, even though the Code continues to define a
“municipal corporation” as including an “authority.” In Elizabeth Township, this Court
concluded that Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA was intended to preclude challenges to
municipal authorities’ rates from being heard by the Commission:
Prior to the enactment of the [1945 MAA], a municipal corporation which
had not formed an authority to provide utility services was subject to rate
challenges in one of two forums. If the rate challenge arose out of services
provided by the corporation within its corporate boundaries, the challenge
was to be brought in the courts of common pleas. If the challenge arose
out of services provided outside the corporate boundaries, the challenge
was to be brought before the [Commission], in the same manner as rate
challenges brought against public utilities.
The predecessor to the [1945 MAA], the [1935 MAA], contained neither an
express provision authorizing challenges to rates set by a municipal
authority nor a provision allocating jurisdiction over such disputes between
the courts of common pleas and the [Commission]. In construing the [1935
MAA] in the context of a challenge to the rates of a municipal authority as
applied outside the boundaries of the municipal corporation creating the
authority, the Superior Court relied upon statutory and decisional law
relating to municipal corporations to hold that these challenges are within
[J-32-2026] - 23
the jurisdiction of the [Commission]. State College Borough Auth[.] v. [Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n], …
([Pa. Super.] 1943).[11]
When viewed against this background, it is clear that the provision of
[S]ection 4B(h) of the [1945 MAA,] which states that the courts of
common pleas shall have “exclusive jurisdiction” over all challenges
to the rates set by a municipal authority[,] was intended to reject the
holding of State College that had permitted challenges to the rates of
municipal authorities to be heard by the [Commission]. However,
nothing in this reallocation of jurisdiction over rate challenges from the
[Commission] to the courts of common pleas was designed to alter the
manner in which the rate challenge is to be conducted. That portion of
[S]ection 4B(h) specifically authorizing rate proceedings merely confirmed
the power of the courts of common pleas to scrutinize ratemaking
discretion in the same fashion as the [Commission].
Elizabeth Township,
(some internal citations omitted; emphases
added). 12
Following Elizabeth Township, the Commonwealth Court applied the principles set
forth in Sections 1962 and 1963 of the Statutory Construction Act and concluded that
“Section 4B(h) of the [1945 MAA] … modifie[d] the Public Utility Code in the same manner
as it modified the Public Utility Law.” Graver,
. Specifically, the Commonwealth Court held that, under the 1945 MAA, the courts of common pleas “have jurisdiction to determine questions of the reasonableness of rates fixed or of the services provided by a municipal authority beyond the limits of the municipality which created it[.]” 11 In State College, the Superior Court held that “[S]ection 301 [of the Public Utility Law], in the light of the definition which includes a municipal authority within the term ‘municipal corporation,’ … gives the [C]omission regulatory jurisdiction over the public utility service of municipalities and their authorities beyond the corporate limits of the municipality[.]” State College,
. Shortly after the Superior Court’s decision in State College, the General Assembly enacted the 1945 MAA, which clarified the legislature’s intent with regard to jurisdiction over municipal authorities. 12 Although Elizabeth Township specifically involved a rate challenge, the “reallocation of jurisdiction” referenced by this Court necessarily includes challenges to an authority’s service. Both the 1945 MAA and the present MAA grant the courts of common pleas “exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphasis added); see Graver,
.
[J-32-2026] - 24
; see also Borough of Sewickley Water Auth. v. Mollica,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1988) (distinguishing “between a municipality providing water service and a
municipal authority providing water service,” the latter of which lies exclusively within
the jurisdiction of the common pleas courts) (emphasis in original).
This interpretation makes sense when we consider the language and purpose of
the MAA. The stated purpose of the MAA is “to benefit the people of the Commonwealth
by, among other things, increasing their commerce, health, safety and prosperity” and by
“specifying and defining the authorized purposes and projects of an authority”
incorporated under the MAA. 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5607(b)(2)-(3), 5620. Unlike a municipality
that provides utility service, a municipal authority incorporated under the MAA, while
created by a municipality (or, in the case of a joint authority, municipalities), is an agency
of the Commonwealth, not the municipality that created it, and has the power to determine
its own rates, service, and service area. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9); see also White
Rock,
(municipal authorities established under the MAA “are independent
agencies of the Commonwealth and a part of its sovereignty” and, therefore, have “no
boundaries within which [they] must limit [their] services”). The MAA authorizes an
incorporated municipal authority to engage in projects that “benefit the people of the
Commonwealth,” so long as it does not “unnecessarily burden[] or interfer[e] with any
municipality which has not incorporated or joined that authority.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3);
see 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d) (outlining an authority’s broad rights and powers). The service
area of an authority is, in effect, wherever it chooses to provide or extend its service,
subject to certain statutory limitations. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b). 13 As stated earlier,
13 For example, one limitation the MAA places on municipal authorities is when they seek
to acquire buildings or land in “any municipality which has not incorporated or joined that
authority.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3). In such instances, the governing body of the non-
member municipality must either approve the acquisition by resolution or, if the property
acquired is not subject to tax abatement, enter an agreement with the municipality
(continued…)
[J-32-2026] - 25
Section 5607(d)(9) specifically empowers an authority “to determine by itself exclusively
the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable
service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9). 14
The MAA does not require an authority to obtain the Commission’s approval before
extending its utility service to areas beyond the boundaries of the incorporating
municipality. 15 Unlike public utilities governed by the Code, incorporated municipal
authorities are self-governing and operate autonomously, without Commission oversight.
See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5610; see also 53 Pa.C.S. § 5617 (“The use of the facilities of the
authority and the operation of its business shall be subject to the rules and regulations as
adopted by the authority.”).
As the Commission’s amici point out, many incorporated municipal authorities
serve multiple areas across municipal boundary lines. See Upper St. Clair,
698
(“[M]any [authorities] exercise certain powers and perform certain functions both within and without the municipal limits of the incorporating municipality, within certain constitutional and statutory limitations, and rightly so.”); White Rock,
regarding the payment of taxes. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(b)(3); see also 53 Pa.C.S. § 5615 (governing an authority’s acquisition of lands or water rights by purchase or eminent domain). 14 The MAA defines “[i]mprovement” as “[e]xtension, enlargement and improvement. The term ‘to improve’ shall mean and include to extend, to enlarge and to improve all in such manner as may be deemed desirable.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5602. 15 However, a municipal authority does need Commission approval when it seeks to acquire any existing facilities or equipment owned by a public utility regulated by the Commission. See White Oak Borough Auth. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
(Pa. Super. 1954) (stating the MAA “requires approval by the … Commission where the
[a]uthority acquires a project, a substantial portion of which is subject to the jurisdiction of
the Commission”); 53 Pa.C.S. § 5613(b)(1). An authority also needs Commission
approval to construct tunnels, bridges, and other structures “to effect or permit the
abolition of a grade crossing[,]” as railroad grade crossings fall within the Commission’s
jurisdiction. 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(25); see 66 Pa.C.S. § 2702.
[J-32-2026] - 26
(recognizing the municipal authority at issue “may provide services to many different
areas in the Commonwealth”). Indeed, the MAA contemplates that a municipal authority’s
service area may encompass non-member municipalities, particularly in the provision of
water and sewer services. 16 See, e.g., 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5607(d)(9) (“If the service area
includes more than one municipality, the revenues from any project shall not be expended
directly or indirectly on any other project unless such expenditures are made for the
benefit of the entire service area.”); 5610(a.1) (setting forth the procedure for appointing
a governing board where “a water or sewer authority incorporated by one municipality
provides water or sewer services to residents in at least two counties and has water or
sewer projects in more than two counties where the combined population of the served
municipalities, excluding the incorporating municipality, is at least five times the
population of the incorporating municipality”); 5607(d)(24)(i)(C)(V)(e) (addressing the
method for calculating tapping fees for sewer or water systems “[i]f an authority[’s] service
area is not entirely within a municipal boundary but is entirely within a county or other
geographic area within Pennsylvania”).
As a practical matter, the Commission cannot regulate the rates and service of an
incorporated municipal authority the same way it regulates a municipality or municipal
corporation providing service beyond its “corporate limits.” 66 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(5). That
is because an incorporated municipal authority does not have “corporate limits” like a
municipality does. The corporate limits of a municipality are its legally defined geographic
16 “Water and sewer authorities commonly serve more than one municipality to take
advantage of the economies of scale and natural drainage areas.” Municipal Authorities
in Pennsylvania (Eleventh Edition, April 2020) at 2, available at
https://dced.pa.gov/download/municipal-authorities-in-
pennsylvania/?wpdmdl=57758&refresh=6a5f743862d8b1784640568 (last accessed
October 26, 2026).
[J-32-2026] - 27
boundaries within which it exercises jurisdiction and taxing power. 17 While a municipal
authority is “incorporated” by a municipality or municipalities under the MAA, the “limits”
of an incorporated authority’s service, as recognized in the MAA, are its project limits.
See 53 Pa.C.S. §§ 5602 (defining “[p]roject”); 5607(a) (identifying the “[s]cope of projects
permitted”). 18 Here, consistent with the language of the MAA, the Authority’s Articles of
Incorporation do not delineate a specific service area or any physical boundaries within
which it will provide service, broadly stating “[t]hat the projects which shall be undertaken
by the [Authority] shall be to construct, improve, furnish and equip a sanitary sewage
system and treatment works and to acquire necessary land for such purposes and to do
and perform all necessary things incident thereto.” Certified Record at 911a; see 53
Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(4). Under Section 5607(c) of the MAA, where an incorporating
municipality “fail[s] to specify the project or projects to be undertaken, then the authority
shall be deemed to have all the powers granted by this chapter.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(c). 19
Notably, since the MAA’s enactment, only one municipal authority incorporated
thereunder, the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority, was specifically brought within the
17 The Code does not define “corporate limits.”
18 In addition to public utility service, municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA
provide a wide variety of public services, including parks and recreation, refuse collection,
incinerator plants, steam heating plants, playgrounds, public school facilities, and
hospitals and health centers. See 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(a).
19 The Dissent disagrees with our interpretation of a municipal authority’s “enumerated
powers” in Section 5607(d)(9) as permitting an authority to determine its own service
areas. Dissenting Opinion at 5. Specifically, the Dissent believes the phrase “in the areas
served” in Section 5607(d)(9) “presupposes that there are[] … some boundaries within
which the municipal authority is authorized to serve.” Id. Respectfully, we do not read “in
the areas served” as limiting language, but as evincing a municipal authority’s broad
power to choose how and where it will provide service. In other words, the only
“boundaries” are those determined by the municipal authority. As explained above,
our interpretation is supported by the MAA’s stated purpose, the surrounding statutory
provisions, and the case law holding that municipal authorities, as independent agencies
of the Commonwealth, have no boundaries within which they must limit their services.
[J-32-2026] - 28
Commission’s jurisdiction by legislative fiat. In 2017, the General Assembly enacted Act
65 of 2017, adding Chapter 32, titled “Water and Sewer Authorities in Cities of the Second
Class,” to the Code. See 66 Pa.C.S. §§ 3201-3209. Section 3201 defines “authority,” for
purposes of Chapter 32, as a “body politic and corporate established by a city of the
second class” under the 1935 MAA or the 1945 MAA. 66 Pa.C.S. § 3201 (emphasis
added). The City of Pittsburgh is the only city of the second class in the Commonwealth.
Section 3202(a)(2) requires the Pittsburgh Water and Sewer Authority to obtain a
Commission-issued certificate before providing utility service “beyond the areas served
as of” April 1, 2018, the amendment’s effective date. 66 Pa.C.S. § 3202(a)(2). To date,
the General Assembly has not amended the Code to expressly grant the Commission
jurisdiction over any other municipal authority incorporated under the MAA. This further
suggests that, in enacting the MAA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision, the General
Assembly intended to remove incorporated municipal authorities from the Commission’s
purview.
We conclude that Section 4B(h) of the 1945 MAA — and, in turn, Section
5607(d)(9) of the present MAA — must be construed to modify the Code in the same
manner as it modified the Public Utility Law. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1963. Although the Code
broadly defines “municipal corporation” to include an “authority,” this definition no longer
includes municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA, which are governed by their
own comprehensive statutory scheme. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933. That statutory scheme
imposes its own requirements on municipal authorities that undertake public utility
projects and includes an express jurisdictional provision, vesting the courts of common
pleas with “exclusive jurisdiction” over disputes involving a municipal authority’s rates and
service.
[J-32-2026] - 29
Requiring municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA to obtain a certificate
before providing utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating municipalities
would contravene both the language and the purpose of the MAA. The MAA gives
municipal authorities the exclusive power to establish their own rates, service, and
service areas and grants the common pleas courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear disputes
involving the adequacy, safety, and reasonableness of their rates and service. 20 It seems
incongruous that the General Assembly would require an incorporated municipal authority
to obtain a certificate to begin serving customers in non-member municipalities — thereby
placing the authority under the Commission’s jurisdiction — but then preclude the
Commission from hearing any challenges to the rates or services the authority provides
to those customers. This would be an absurd result. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1) (in
ascertaining a statute’s legislative intent, we must presume “the General Assembly does
not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or unreasonable”). 21
20 See Butler Twp. Area Water & Sewer Auth. v. Dep’t of Env’t Res.,
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (stating that, under the MAA’s exclusive jurisdiction provision,
“[q]uestions involving ‘service[,’] such as ‘the adequacy, safety and reasonableness’ of
the service, concern matters of the size of a distribution area and whether and/or how a
particular service is to be provided”).
21 The Dissent “would conclude that the Commission, as the tribunal that generally has
primary jurisdiction to interpret the Code’s provisions, would be the appropriate tribunal
to decide whether Section 1102 [of the Code] requires a municipal authority to obtain a
[certificate].” Dissenting Opinion at 4. Putting aside the fact that the Commission has
already answered that question (in fact, that is the reason for this appeal), allowing the
Commission to answer that question in the affirmative would require every municipal
authority providing service beyond its geographic boundaries to obtain a certificate,
thereby subjecting the authority to the jurisdiction and regulatory authority of the
Commission. Such a result would completely vitiate the MAA and its express command
that “[t]he court of common pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine questions
involving rates or service.” 53 Pa.C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphasis added). A municipal
authority provides “service” to its ratepayers and charges them “rates.” Every action
taken by a municipal authority is, by necessity, in pursuit of its “service” to its ratepayers.
“Exclusive,” as used in the MAA, means just that — exclusive. It does not confer
coextensive jurisdiction to the Commission and the courts of common pleas, as the
Dissent would contemplate.
[J-32-2026] - 30
To effectuate the purposes of both statutes, we conclude the General Assembly
intended to treat municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA differently than
municipal corporations, as they are distinct legal entities. See George A. Bibikos, Esq.,
Municipal Corporations and Public Utility Service in Pennsylvania, 13 Widener L.J. 879,
881 (2004) (“Municipalities and municipal authorities are separate legal entities created
by separate laws. The primary distinction is that municipalities are politically created
sovereigns, while municipal authorities are essentially independent agencies of the
[C]ommonwealth.”) (footnotes omitted). As agencies of the Commonwealth, municipal
authorities have no boundaries within which they must limit their service, and the MAA
empowers them to exclusively determine the “reasonable and uniform rates” to charge
their customers and “the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe
and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa.C.S. §
5607(d)(9). This grant of authority includes the power to determine the area in which an
authority will provide service, both “within and without the municipal limits of the
incorporating municipality.” Upper St. Clair,
.
Once the General Assembly enacted the 1945 MAA, it removed municipal
authorities from the Commission’s jurisdiction and placed jurisdiction over their rates and
services in the courts of common pleas. See Elizabeth Township,
(concluding the General Assembly’s intent in vesting exclusive jurisdiction over “rates and services” with the common pleas courts was to preclude such challenges from being heard by the Commission); Graver,
. Consequently, we conclude that
municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are not required to obtain a
[J-32-2026] - 31
Commission-issued certificate before operating beyond the boundaries of their
incorporating municipalities. 22
Contrary to the Township’s contention on appeal, Township residents who receive
sewage treatment service from the Authority are not without statutory protections. The
MAA provides those customers with remedies for unreasonable rates or service failures
and further provides that “[a]ny person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity of a
rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and reasonableness of the authority’s
services” may file suit against the Authority in the court of common pleas. 53 Pa.C.S. §
5607(d)(9). As this Court recognized in Elizabeth Township, “the court of common pleas
… ‘sits, in effect, as a public utility commission’” when hearing disputes involving
municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA. Elizabeth Township,
(citation omitted in original). In addition, municipal authorities providing wastewater
service, like the Authority here, are regulated by DEP. Therefore, even absent
22 The Dissent would uphold the Commonwealth Court’s remand to the Commission to
interpret the Code and the MAA and decide “the merits of the underlying issue, i.e.,
whether Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code required the Authority to obtain a [certificate] to
continue offering utility services in the Township.” Dissenting Opinion at 5-6.
Respectfully, this proposed disposition makes little practical sense. That is because the
Commission has already answered that question implicitly in its two written opinions
in this case. See Commission’s Opinion, 11/1/2023, at 25 (concluding, after analyzing
the relevant statutory provisions and case law, that “the Commission’s jurisdiction
presently extends only to municipalities, not municipal authorities” and “the Commission
has no authority over entities created and operating under the [MAA]”); Commission’s
Opinion, 1/18/2024, at 10 (concluding that “under the [MAA], jurisdiction over the rates
and services of municipal authorities, beyond, as well as within, the limits of the
municipality which created the authority, is vested exclusively with the courts of common
pleas” and “the Commission lacks jurisdiction over the issues raised by the Township’s
Complaint against [the Authority]”). As explained in footnote 3 above, the Commission
also maintained, throughout this appeal, that it lacks regulatory authority over a municipal
authority incorporated under the MAA. Consequently, we cannot discern what purpose
would be served by remanding this matter to the Commission to rule on an issue it has
already decided. Rather, in holding municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA
are not subject to Commission regulation when they provide utility service beyond their
boundaries, we have resolved the merits of the underlying dispute as a matter of law.
[J-32-2026] - 32
Commission oversight, there are regulatory and other safeguards in place to protect the
customers of municipal authorities, both within and beyond the boundaries of their
incorporating municipalities.
V. CONCLUSION
While the Code grants the Commission jurisdiction over municipalities and
municipal corporations that provide public utility service beyond their boundaries,
municipal authorities are distinct legal entities established under, and governed by, a
separate statutory scheme. We hold the Commission’s jurisdiction over municipal
corporations, as defined in the Code, does not extend to municipal authorities
incorporated under the MAA, because the MAA vests the courts of common pleas with
exclusive jurisdiction over those authorities’ rates and services. We further hold that
municipal authorities incorporated under the MAA are not subject to Commission
regulation when they provide utility service beyond the boundaries of their incorporating
municipalities. Accordingly, we reverse the Commonwealth Court’s order.
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty and Mundy join the opinion.
Justice Brobson files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Wecht joins.
[J-32-2026] - 33
Dissenting opinion
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
MIDDLE DISTRICT
CONYNGHAM TOWNSHIP, : No. 34 MAP 2025
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Commonwealth Court at No. 113
: CD 2024, dated October 4, 2024,
v. : Vacating and Remanding the
: Decision of the Public Utility
: Commission at No. C-2021-
PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY : 3023624 dated January 18, 2024
COMMISSION, :
: ARGUED: April 16, 2026
Appellant :
DISSENTING OPINION
JUSTICE BROBSON DECIDED: October 29, 2026
The Majority provides a thorough review of the history of the Municipality
Authorities Act (MAA), 53 Pa. C.S. §§ 5601-5623, and its effect on the Public Utility Code
(Code), 66 Pa. C.S. §§ 101-3316, and I agree with many of the general principles
contained in its opinion. Among these principles, however, the Majority makes a few
novel declarations of law with which I cannot agree. Primarily, I disagree with the
Majority’s conclusion that a dispute regarding a municipal authority’s service area is a
“question[] involving . . . service” under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA, 53 Pa. C.S.
§ 5607(d)(9), and, as a result, the Public Utility Commission (Commission) lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over such dispute. (See Majority Op. at 29-30.) Beyond these explicit,
and inaccurate, declarations of law, I also take issue with the Majority’s loose use of the
term “jurisdiction” to cover both the traditional concept of personal and subject matter
jurisdiction, as well as the concept of regulatory authority over an entity.
To begin, the Majority, arguably guided by the question on which this Court granted
review, frames the issue presented in this appeal as whether “the Commission has
jurisdiction over a municipal authority established under the MAA when the authority
provides utility service to customers beyond the boundaries of its incorporating
municipality.” (Id. at 9 (citing Conyngham Twp. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
340 A.3d 272
(Pa. 2025) (per curiam)).) In doing so, the Majority conflates the concepts of subject
matter jurisdiction and regulatory authority. These concepts, while similar in many
regards, are not interchangeable. This case concerns not regulatory authority but, rather,
whether the Commission has subject matter jurisdiction to interpret a provision of the
Code and to determine whether that provision applies to a municipal authority. To the
extent the Majority answers this inquiry in the negative, I dissent.
To better understand my concern, I must revisit the Commonwealth Court’s
decision below. Ultimately, the Commonwealth Court held that the Commission had
jurisdiction to consider a complaint filed by Conyngham Township (Township), wherein
the Township asserted that Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code 1 required the Sanity Sewer
Authority of the Borough of Shickshinny (Authority), a municipal authority incorporated
under the MAA, to obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) to continue offering
utility services in the Township. The Commonwealth Court reached this conclusion after
1 Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code provides:
(a) General rule.--Upon the application of any public utility and the
approval of such application by the [C]ommission, evidenced by its [CPC]
first had and obtained, and upon compliance with existing laws, it shall be
lawful:
....
(5) For any municipal corporation to acquire, construct, or
begin to operate, any plant, equipment, or other facilities for the
rendering or furnishing to the public of any public utility service
beyond its corporate limits.
66 Pa. C.S. § 1102(a)(5).
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 2
conducting an independent statutory construction analysis of Section 1102(a)(5) of the
Code, as well as Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA. 2 I find no error in the Commonwealth
Court’s analysis and conclusion.
There is no dispute that Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA grants exclusive jurisdiction
to the court of common pleas over certain challenges involving a municipal authority;
namely, “questions involving rates or service.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9). This broad
statement, however, should not be read in isolation. Section 5607(d)(9) provides
clarification of the scope of the court of common pleas’ jurisdiction in the immediately
preceding sentence. That sentence provides that “[a]ny person questioning the
reasonableness or uniformity of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and
reasonableness of the authority’s services” has the right to bring suit against the municipal
authority in the court of common pleas. Id. (emphases added). Thus, in order “[t]o
conclude that courts of common pleas have exclusive jurisdiction over complaints
2 Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA provides, in relevant part:
(d) Powers.--Every authority may exercise all powers necessary or
convenient for the carrying out of the purposes set forth in this section,
including, but without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following
rights and powers:
....
(9) To fix, alter, charge and collect rates and other charges in
the area served by its facilities at reasonable and uniform rates to be
determined exclusively by it . . . and to determine by itself exclusively
the services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe
and reasonable service, including extensions thereof, in the areas
served. . . . Any person questioning the reasonableness or uniformity
of a rate fixed by an authority or the adequacy, safety and
reasonableness of the authority's services, including extensions
thereof, may bring suit against the authority in the court of common
pleas . . . . The court of common pleas shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to determine questions involving rates or service.
53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9).
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 3
involving a municipal authority’s failure to obtain a [CPC],” we would also have to conclude
that such a challenge falls under one of these two categories. Conyngham Twp. v. Pa.
Pub. Util. Comm’n,
325 A.3d 885
, 889 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). It does not.
Section 1103(a) of the Code sets forth the procedure to obtain a CPC. It provides,
in pertinent part, that the Commission shall grant a CPC “only if the [C]ommission shall
find or determine that the granting of such certificate is necessary or proper for the
service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public.” 66 Pa. C.S. § 1103(a).
This “necessary or proper” determination, while related to services in the general sense,
does not involve the “adequacy, safety and reasonableness” of services that a municipal
authority provides. See, e.g., Elite Indus., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
432
(Pa. 2003) (quoting Seaboard Tank Lines, Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
762, 764-65
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1985) (explaining that General Assembly broadly intended for “necessary or proper” inquiry to prevent utilities from “engag[ing] in unrestrained and destructive competition, which activity was thought to be, by its very nature, at odds with the public interest”)). Accordingly, I find no support for the Majority’s conclusion that an inquiry into whether a municipal authority is required to obtain a CPC qualifies as a “question[] involving . . . service” under Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA such that the court of common pleas would have exclusive jurisdiction. Rather, I would conclude that the Commission, as the tribunal that generally has primary jurisdiction to interpret the Code’s provisions, would be the appropriate tribunal to decide whether Section 1102 requires a municipal authority to obtain a CPC. See Borough of Lansdale v. Phila. Elec. Co.,
170 A.2d 565
, 566-67 (Pa. 1961) (“[N]o principle has become more firmly established in
Pennsylvania law than that the courts will not originally adjudicate matters within the
jurisdiction of the [Commission]. Initial jurisdiction in matters concerning the relationship
between public utilities and the public is in the [Commission]—not in the courts.”); see
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 4
also id. at 567 (“It has been so held [that the Commission has initial jurisdiction in matters]
involving . . . rights to serve particular territory.” (citation omitted)).
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Majority relies upon another phrase
contained within Section 5607(d)(9) of the MAA that provides municipal authorities with
certain enumerated powers. Namely, the Majority cites the portion of Section 5607(d)(9)
that provides a municipal authority with the power to “determine by itself exclusively the
services and improvements required to provide adequate, safe and reasonable service,
including extensions thereof, in the areas served.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9). The Majority
interprets this language as granting municipal authorities “the exclusive power to establish
their own . . . service areas.” (Majority Op. at 30 (emphasis omitted).) I disagree.
Section 5607(d)(9), read in its entirety, clearly provides that a municipal authority can only
carry out its exclusive power to determine the services and improvements required “in the
areas served.” 53 Pa. C.S. § 5607(d)(9) (emphasis added). This language presupposes
that there are, in fact, some boundaries within which the municipal authority is authorized
to serve. What those boundaries consist of and who the appropriate authority is for
determining those boundaries is separate from the question of jurisdiction now before us.
Accordingly, I would not answer it.
At present, this Court need only answer whether the Commission has jurisdiction
to consider a complaint seeking to interpret a provision of the Code and its application to
a particular entity. Having found no applicable provision of the MAA that would remove
jurisdiction from the Commission on this question, I would conclude that the matter was
properly before the Commission. Consequently, I would affirm the Commonwealth
Court’s order, which vacated the Commission’s inconsistent order and remanded the
matter to the Commission for further proceedings on the merits of the underlying issue,
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 5
i.e., whether Section 1102(a)(5) of the Code required the Authority to obtain a CPC to
continue offering utility services in the Township.
Justice Wecht joins this dissenting opinion.
[J-32-2026] [MO: McCaffery, J.] - 6
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