Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Commonwealth v. Outlaw, B., Aplt.

Official source
                                   [J-60-2025]
                     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.


     COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,               :   No. 48 EAP 2024
                                                 :
                       Appellee                  :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                 :   Superior Court at No. 1788 EDA
                                                 :   2022, at 

2023 PA Super 255

,
                v.                               :   entered on December 6, 2023,
                                                 :   affirming the Judgment of Sentence
                                                 :   of the Philadelphia County Court of
     BASILE OUTLAW,                              :   Common Pleas at No. MC-51-MD-
                                                 :   0000031-2022, entered on June 21,
                       Appellant                 :   2022.
                                                 :
                                                 :   ARGUED: September 9, 2025


                                        OPINION


 JUSTICE WECHT                                              DECIDED: October 29, 2026
         In this appeal from a direct criminal contempt conviction, we consider whether a

 courtroom spectator who called a judge a vulgar insult in open court “obstruct[ed] the

 administration of justice” within the meaning of the Judicial Code.1 We conclude that he

 did not. Thus, we reverse.

         In June 2022, Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Judge Roxanne E.

 Covington was holding a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence in Marquis McClain’s

 criminal case. Seated in the gallery of the courtroom was McClain’s acquaintance, Basile



 1      42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) (stating that “the several courts of this Commonwealth” may
 “issue attachments and [] impose summary punishments for contempts of court” for “the
 misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the
 administration of justice”).
Outlaw.   After Judge Covington announced that she would be denying McClain’s

suppression motion, Outlaw stood up and said “the judge is a cocksucker” loud enough

for Judge Covington to hear. Judge Covington responded, “What did you say?” Outlaw

replied: “Never mind. I’m leaving.”2 Outlaw then exited the courtroom.

       A deputy sheriff and a court employee began searching the building for Outlaw.

The trial court recessed the suppression matter to allow McClain’s defense attorney to

confer with his client in the wake of the court’s suppression ruling. The court subsequently

adjourned, but Judge Covington asked McClain’s attorney to “stick around for another

moment . . . just in case.”3 Around this time, Outlaw came back to the courtroom on his

own, at which time he was taken into custody for direct criminal contempt.

       The trial court held a brief contempt hearing, at which Judge Covington recounted

the above facts. A deputy sheriff who witnessed the outburst also testified. His version

of events was consistent with Judge Covington’s account. Outlaw did not contest the

facts. The court appointed counsel for Outlaw and set bail at $75,000. Outlaw’s attorney

conceded that the outburst constituted direct criminal contempt, and he asked the court

to proceed immediately to sentencing. Judge Covington declined to do so, scheduling a

sentencing hearing for the following week.

       At the subsequent hearing, Judge Covington restated her factual findings. Judge

Covington recounted that:

       As I was making my findings on the motion, at the end of my findings, Mr.
       Outlaw stood up and interrupted the court and yelled out[:] the judge is a
       cocksucker. Upon doing so, I stopped the proceeding and stated, What did
       you say? And he said, never mind. I’m leaving. I’m leaving, and proceeded
       to walk out the door. I inquired of the sheriff if he could go and stop him.



2      Outlaw’s remark was not transcribed by the court reporter.
3      Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 6/16/2022, at 58.


                                      [J-60-2025] - 2
       . . . Shortly thereafter Mr. Outlaw returned to the courtroom . . . and the
       sheriff then took him into custody.4

       Outlaw expressed remorse for his actions at the suppression hearing, saying that

he had returned to Judge Covington’s courtroom after the incident “to apologize for the

outburst and disrespect.”5 Defense counsel requested Outlaw’s immediate release from

custody, assuring the court that Outlaw regretted his actions and was remorseful. The

court ultimately sentenced Outlaw to fifteen to thirty days’ incarceration.6

       Outlaw appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient

to support his conviction because he did not obstruct the administration of justice.7 The

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, represented by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s

Office, conceded on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Outlaw’s

conviction.8 Notwithstanding the Commonwealth concession, the Superior Court affirmed

Outlaw’s judgment of sentence. The court began by setting forth the applicable law,

explaining that an obstruction to the administration of justice occurs when the conduct at

issue “significantly disrupt[s] judicial proceedings,” either by “actual, imminent prejudice


4      N.T., 6/21/2022, 4-5.
5      Id. at 16-18.
6     Outlaw sought parole after serving his minimum sentence, but the trial court never
acted on his motion. Outlaw served his entire sentence.
7      A conviction for direct criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of: (1) misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to
obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs the administration of justice. Commonwealth
v. Falana, 

696 A.2d 126, 128

 (Pa. 1997); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) (stating that courts
may “impose summary punishments” for contempt of court for “misbehavior of any person
in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice”).
8      See Superior Court Brief for the Commonwealth, 

2023 WL 4065057

, at *6 (“[T]he
Commonwealth is constrained to conclude that although defendant’s outburst was
patently unacceptable, uttered in the court’s presence, and intended to undermine the
authority of the court, it did not delay or otherwise obstruct the proceedings. Accordingly,
the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction.”).


                                      [J-60-2025] - 3
to a fair proceeding or prejudice to the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and

authority.”9 “While ‘[n]either injudicious remarks nor affronts to the dignities or sensibilities

of the court,’ without more, constitute an obstruction to the administration of justice, the

element is met where there has been a ‘significant disruption’ of the proceedings.”10

Applying those principles to the circumstances of this case, the Superior Court concluded

that Outlaw’s conduct significantly disrupted the suppression hearing.               The panel

explained that:

       [t]he court took evidence on the day of the contempt demonstrating that
       Outlaw called the judge an obscene name while the judge was on the
       bench, in a voice loud enough for the judge and the deputy sheriff to hear
       and then left the courtroom. At the continued hearing, the court stated the
       incident occurred as it was concluding its business for the day, that it asked,
       “What did you say?,” and that it stopped what it was doing in response.
       Outlaw did not object to the court’s statement of the facts, including that the
       judge asked, “what did you say,” and stopped the proceedings. Here, the
       judge “observed . . . with [her] own eyes what happened,” which “is
       sufficient support for a finding of direct criminal contempt.” Commonwealth
       v. Moody, 

125 A.3d 1, 11

 (Pa. 2015). Accordingly, the evidence was
       sufficient to find Outlaw’s conduct obstructed the administration of justice.11




9   Commonwealth v. Outlaw, 

306 A.3d 406, 411

 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Williams, 

753 A.2d 856, 863

 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
10      

Id.

 (quoting Commonwealth v. Mutzabaugh, 

699 A.2d 1289, 1293

 (Pa. Super.
1997)); accord Williams v. Williams, 

721 A.2d 1072, 1074

 (Pa. 1998) (holding that
“momentary” or “transient” disruptions, even “reprehensible” ones, do not obstruct the
administration of justice within the meaning of Subsection 4132(3)); Matter of
Campolongo, 

435 A.2d 581, 584

 (Pa. 1981) (“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of
the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”);
Commonwealth v. Rubright, 

414 A.2d 106

 (Pa. 1980) (reversing a criminal contempt
conviction where the contemnor’s “impertinent” comments “were of momentary nature”
and did not impede the progress of the hearing); Commonwealth v. Meehan, 

235 A.3d
1284

 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“The record shows that the exchange between Appellant and
the trial court was of a momentary nature and that the progress of the administration of
justice was not impeded thereby.”).
11     Outlaw, 

306 A.3d at 413

 (citation modified).


                                        [J-60-2025] - 4
      Alternatively, the panel reasoned, even if Outlaw did not significantly disrupt the

suppression hearing, his behavior was still contemptuous because he caused “actual,

imminent prejudice” to “the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and the court’s

authority.”12 The Superior Court stated that such prejudice occurs when the conduct at

issue creates “an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such flagrant

defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public that, if not instantly

suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.”13 In this

case, the panel opined, Outlaw caused actual prejudice to the trial court’s authority

because his comment “demonstrated his disrespect for the court and its command of the

courtroom.”14 The Superior Court therefore concluded that the evidence was sufficient to

prove that Outlaw obstructed the administration of justice.

      Outlaw then petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, asking us to consider

whether “a single act of profane name-calling directed at the judge constitute[s] direct

criminal contempt when it did not in any way, let alone any significant way, obstruct the

proceedings.”15 Because the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office concurs with Outlaw

that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, we invited the Pennsylvania

Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) to participate in this matter as amicus curiae.16




12    

Id.

 at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 

753 A.2d 856, 863

 (Pa. Super.
2000)).
13     

Id.

 at 413 (citing Moody and Commonwealth v. Garrison, 

386 A.2d 971, 976

 (Pa.
1978) (plurality)). The panel also theorized that, “if not punished, Outlaw’s conduct would
potentially encourage others to commit similar disruptions.” 

Id.

14    

Id.

 (cleaned up).
15      Commonwealth v. Outlaw, 

322 A.3d 144

 (Pa. 2024) (table) (per curiam order
partially granting Outlaw’s petition for allowance of appeal).
16    We also granted the OAG’s subsequent request to participate in oral argument.


                                     [J-60-2025] - 5
       The power of courts in this Commonwealth to issue contempt orders is limited by

Section 4132 of the Judicial Code, which states that:

       The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments
       and to impose summary punishments for contempts of court shall be
       restricted to the following cases:

             (1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively.

             (1.1) The willful failure of the officers of such courts to disclose a
             person’s complete criminal history record information when
             requested.

             (2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses
             of or to the lawful process of the court.

             (3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court,
             thereby obstructing the administration of justice.17
       Specifically at issue here is Subsection 4132(3).            A conviction under that

Subsection “requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the

presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) which

obstructs the administration of justice.”18 This Court has held that, “[f]or conduct to

constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt

judicial proceedings.”19      This means that “[r]emarks that are injudicious, or even

disrespectful, will not, without more, justify a summary conviction for contempt of court.”20

       To illustrate these principles, consider Williams v. Williams, where a pro se

attorney in a custody dispute reacted injudiciously to a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling:


       The Court: Objection is sustained.


17     42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
18     Falana, 

696 A.2d at 128

.
19     Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d at 584

.
20     Id.


                                         [J-60-2025] - 6
       Williams: He’s such a fucking asshole.
       Opposing Counsel: I heard him say that you are such a fucking asshole.
       I heard it as an officer of the court. And the stenographer is nodding her
       head. That’s exactly what he said, “He is such a fucking asshole.” And he
       said it under his breath. And as an officer of the court, I am standing here,
       and I am testifying that that’s exactly what he said.21

       The trial court held Williams in contempt. On appeal, however, this Court held that

Williams’ remark did not obstruct the administration of justice because, although “there

was a momentary break in the proceedings” due to Williams’ comment, “the hearing

resumed quickly,” “[t]he entire incident encompassed just three and a half pages of

hearing transcript,” and “[s]uch a transient delay is not an obstruction of justice.”22

Expounding upon the statutory requirement that the contemnor must “obstruct[t] the

administration of justice,”23 we explicitly stated that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered

conduct which does not obstruct or delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”24

       Consistent with Williams is Behr v. Behr,25 where a pro se litigant brought to family

court a box of documents that had the word “DEATH” scrawled on it in faint orange

highlighter. The box remained under the litigant’s table for the entire hearing, and only

after the proceeding concluded did anyone notice it. The trial court held the litigant in

contempt, but this Court reversed, concluding that the litigant’s conduct did not




21 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1073.
22     

Id.

23     42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).

24 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 

681 A.2d 181, 183

 (Pa.
Super. 1996)).
25     

695 A.2d 776

 (Pa. 1997).


                                       [J-60-2025] - 7
significantly disrupt the judicial proceeding.26 We also rejected the trial court’s suggestion

that a significant disruption occurred when the presence of the box triggered an

investigation and subsequent contempt hearing. We called this “circular reasoning”

because, if we accepted the argument, it would mean that “any time a court reconvenes

a hearing to investigate alleged misconduct, the alleged contemnor has automatically

obstructed the administration of justice.”27

       The circumstances of this appeal are analogous to those in Williams. The insult

that Outlaw directed at the court here (“the judge is a cocksucker”) is offensive in a

manner similar to the remark made in Williams (“He’s such a fucking asshole.”). Both

comments fall well below the expected standard of courtroom decorum, and both

contemnors made their comments in response to judicial rulings with which they

disagreed. Furthermore, the delay to the proceedings in this case was limited to the judge

asking Outlaw “What did you say?”, followed by Outlaw responding “Never mind. I’m

leaving.”28   This is the exact sort of “transient delay” or “momentary break in the

proceedings” that we held in Williams cannot serve as the basis for a conviction under

Subsection 4132(3).29


26     Behr, 

695 A.2d at 779

 (“The mere presence of a box with the word “DEATH”
scrawled in faint orange ink, which appears to be from a highlighting marker cannot
sustain a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant disrupted the proceedings.”).
27     

Id.

28    N.T., 6/21/2022, at 4-5 (“As I was making my findings on the motion, at the end of
my findings, Mr. Outlaw stood up and interrupted the court and yelled out the following
phrase: the judge is a cocksucker. Upon doing so, I stopped the proceeding and stated,
What did you say? And he said, never mind. I’m leaving. I’m leaving, and proceeded to
walk out the door.”).

29 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074 (“While there was a momentary break in the
proceedings, the hearing resumed quickly. . . . Such a transient delay is not an
obstruction of justice.”). Although there was a brief search for Outlaw in the courthouse
after his outburst, and although the court did eventually reconvene for a contempt hearing
(continued…)

                                       [J-60-2025] - 8
       Arguing for affirmance of Outlaw’s conviction, the OAG argues that the phrase

“obstructing the administration of justice” has “ancient roots in the common law” and

necessarily includes “insulting remarks that cast doubt upon judicial authority in the public

eye, regardless of whether the remarks substantially delayed or repeatedly interrupted a

proceeding.”30 According to the OAG, when the legislature codified the judicial contempt

powers in Section 4132, it “did not signal an intent to abandon the common law meaning

of the phrase ‘obstructing the administration of justice’ as encompassing disrespect that

undermines judicial authority in the eyes of the public.”31 Thus, the OAG maintains that

“Section 4132(3), as a reenacted codification of the common law, must be interpreted as

encompassing blatant, in-court disrespect of a judge in the execution of her duties,

irrespective of any delay or repeated interruption in the underlying case.”32 In the OAG’s

view, for conduct to be contemptuous, it must either significantly disrupt the proceedings

or undermine the court’s authority in the eyes of the public.

       The OAG is correct that, at common law, judges had broad authority to impose

contempt for insulting remarks that undermine the court’s authority with the public. This

sweeping authority continued to be enforced well into the twentieth century. In Appeal of

Levine,33 for example, we affirmed the contempt conviction of a District Attorney who

responded to a scheduling misunderstanding by saying to a trial judge: “that’s the way

with this court, always mixing things up; everything is set on one day.”34 Upholding the

after he was found, the court’s own investigative efforts cannot form the basis of the
obstruction per Behr.
30     Brief for OAG at 14.
31     Id. at 16-17.
32     Id. at 17.
33     

95 A.2d 222

 (Pa. 1953).
34     

Id. at 224

.


                                      [J-60-2025] - 9
contempt conviction, this Court described the inherent contempt powers possessed by

trial courts in extremely broad terms, saying that: “[g]enerally speaking, one is guilty of

contempt when his conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into

disrespect.”35

       Appeal of Levine represents perhaps the zenith of judicial contempt authority in

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Appeal of Levine Court itself admitted that the

judicial power to punish all disrespectful conduct committed in the court’s presence is

“arbitrary in [] nature and liable to abuse.”36 Following Appeal of Levine, the judicial

contempt powers were codified and limited by the General Assembly’s enactment of 42

Pa.C.S. § 4132. Our decisions interpreting that statutory codification, including Williams,

Behr, and Campolongo, retreated from Appeal of Levine’s maximalist approach and

stressed that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does not obstruct or

delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”37

These decisions also emphasized that “trial judges are supposed to be persons of

fortitude who are able to thrive in a hardy environment, and they must be on guard against

confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction of the administration of justice.”38

       The OAG’s argument cannot be squared with these contemporary precedents.

Under the OAG’s proposed approach, virtually all disrespectful remarks or profane

35     Id. at 225.
36     

Id.


37 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d at 584

 (“For conduct
to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt
judicial proceedings.”); Behr, 

695 A.2d at 779

 (“To obstruct justice, conduct must
significantly disrupt proceedings.”); Rubright, 

414 A.2d at 106

 (reversing a criminal
contempt conviction where the contemnor’s “impertinent” comments “were of momentary
nature” and did not impede the progress of the hearing).

38 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d at 584

 (“Mere affront
to the trial judge is not enough.”).


                                      [J-60-2025] - 10
language would be contemptuous, so long as the comment can be said to risk

undermining the court’s authority in the minds of the public.39 Indeed, the OAG maintains

that “spewing” vulgar language of any kind while court is in session constitutes an

obstruction to the administration of justice (even if it does not delay the proceedings)

because such language “weakens the public’s faithful adherence to a court’s judgments

and rules of decorum.”40 The OAG’s view of the law is not compatible with this Court’s

precedent, which holds that there can be no obstruction of the administration of justice

within the meaning of the Judicial Code absent a significant disruption to the judicial

proceeding.41

      The OAG’s argument also cannot be reconciled with the outcome in Williams,

where we reasoned that calling a jurist a “fucking asshole” was insufficient to support a

contempt conviction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) because the remark did not significantly

disrupt the underlying proceeding. Contrary to the OAG’s argument, the Williams Court

limited its analysis to the significant disruption requirement, never once suggesting that

the case turned on whether the contemnor’s conduct undermined the court’s authority




39     Brief for OAG at 26 (arguing that when “commentary openly and defiantly belittles
the court with abusive language, to let the conduct stand is to degrade judicial authority
in the eyes of the public, thereby obstructing the administration of justice”).
40     Id. at 9; accord id. at 9-10 (arguing that Outlaw’s conception of “obstructing the
administration of justice” “fails to capture offensive remarks that serve no legitimate
purpose and create the impression that the public is free to disregard a judge’s orders
and rules of courtroom decorum.”).
41     Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d at 584

 (“For conduct to constitute an obstruction
of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”);
Williams, 

721 A.2d at 1074

 (“Inappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does
not obstruct or delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 4132(3).”).


                                    [J-60-2025] - 11
with the public. Indeed, the OAG’s view of the law is identical to the views expressed by

the dissenting justices in Williams.42

        Furthermore, even if the OAG were correct that a significant disruption is not

required, and the relevant inquiry becomes whether the contemnor undermined the

court’s public authority, then we fail to see why the contempt conviction in Williams should

not have been affirmed. While we will not endeavor to rank the various obscenities

discussed here in order of offensiveness, we do not believe that calling a judge a “fucking

asshole” “create[s] the impression that the public is free to disregard a judge’s orders and

rules of courtroom decorum” any more or less than calling a judge a “cocksucker” would.43

        The OAG attempts to distinguish Williams, but we are not persuaded by that

argument. According to the OAG, the remark in Williams, unlike Outlaw’s remark, did not

undermine the trial court’s public authority and thus could have constituted obstruction

only if it significantly disrupted the proceedings (which it did not). The OAG’s argument

hinges on the fact that the contemnor in Williams was said to have made the offensive

remark “under his breath,” whereas Outlaw did not.44 Specifically, the OAG maintains

that:

        Williams’ frustrated murmurings, unlike Outlaw’s, are an example of non-
        obstructive misconduct. While it is indeed misconduct to call a judge a
        “fucking asshole,” whispering profanity does not threaten the court’s
        authority in future proceedings. Because he made the remarks under his
        breath, they were not a public display of disrespect for the court’s rulings
        and its control of the courtroom. His grumblings did not send a message to
        members of the public that it is acceptable for spectators to protest rulings

42 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1075 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“Counsel’s remarks were not
only injudicious and disrespectful—the epithets directed at the Court were an affront to
the authority and dignity of the tribunal and thus alone sufficient to constitute interference
with the due and orderly administration of justice.”).
43      Brief for OAG at 9-10.

44 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074.


                                         [J-60-2025] - 12
       they do not like while the court conducts business. There simply was no
       threat to the public’s adherence to the rule of law. If Outlaw also had quietly
       muttered his chosen epithet, there would be no obstruction here either. But
       that’s not what Outlaw did.45

       Even if we agreed with the OAG that statements which undermine the court’s

public authority can support a contempt conviction in the absence of a substantial

disruption, we would still decline the OAG’s invitation to distinguish Williams based upon

the amplitude of the derogatory comment. For one thing, it is not entirely clear that the

expletive in Williams was actually “whisper[ed],” as the OAG suggests. While opposing

counsel in that case informed the judge that Williams made the offensive remark “under

his breath,” the comment was delivered loudly enough for both opposing counsel and the

court reporter to hear it. And the comment also was transcribed by the court reporter,

unlike Outlaw’s remark. We believe that these circumstances illustrate the impracticability

of the OAG’s approach, which calls upon appellate courts reviewing cold transcripts to

deduce the contemnor’s volume level and to speculate regarding whether the offensive

comment was delivered loudly enough to “weake[n] the public’s faithful adherence” to

courtroom “rules of decorum.”46

       In any event, the OAG’s argument is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent, which

holds that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does not obstruct or

delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”47

Because we conclude that no such obstruction or delay occurred here, we reverse the

decisions below and vacate Outlaw’s judgment of sentence.



45     Brief for OAG at 31 (emphasis added).
46     Id. at 9.

47 Williams, 721

 A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d at 584

 (“For conduct
to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt
judicial proceedings.”); Behr, 

695 A.2d at 779

 (same).


                                      [J-60-2025] - 13
        Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Brobson and McCaffery join

the opinion.

        Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justices Dougherty and Brobson

join.




                                    [J-60-2025] - 14

Concurring opinion

                             [J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.]
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
                                 EASTERN DISTRICT


 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                       :   No. 48 EAP 2024
                                                     :
                      Appellee                       :   Appeal from the Order of the
                                                     :   Superior Court at No. 1788 EDA
                                                     :   2022, at 

2023 PA Super 255

,
               v.                                    :   entered on December 6, 2023,
                                                     :   affirming the Judgment of
                                                     :   Sentence of the Philadelphia
 BASILE OUTLAW,                                      :   County Court of Common Pleas
                                                     :   at No. MC-51-MD-0000031-2022,
                      Appellant                      :   entered on June 21, 2022.
                                                     :
                                                     :   ARGUED: September 9, 2025


                                  CONCURRING OPINION


JUSTICE MUNDY                                                DECIDED: October 29, 2026
       Outlaw’s conduct was abhorrent. The issue, however, is whether it was punishable

under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132. As aptly observed by the Majority, contemporary precedents

set by this Court have seemingly narrowed the scope of conduct punishable under

Section 4132(3). See, e.g., Matter of Campolongo, 

435 A.2d 581, 584

 (Pa. 1981) (“For

conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly

disrupt judicial proceedings. Mere affront to the trial judge is not enough. Remarks that

are injudicious, or even disrespectful or insulting, will not, without more, justify a summary

conviction for contempt of court” (internal citations omitted)); Williams v. Williams, 

721

A.2d 1072, 1074

 (Pa. 1988) (finding murmuring made by a litigant, calling a trial judge a

“fucking asshole” during child custody proceedings, did not rise to the level of criminal

contempt because “the inappropriate remark caused no significant disruption” to the

proceedings). Here, we have not been asked to reconsider our holdings in these cases,
and absent such a request, this Court must adhere to these decisions.                     See

Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 

360 A.3d 828

, 844 (Pa. 2026)

(“The basic legal principle of stare decisis generally commands judicial respect for prior

decisions of this Court and the legal rules contained in those decisions” (citation omitted)).

Accordingly, I am constrained to concur in the result reached by the Majority today.

       I write separately to emphasize my agreement with Chief Justice Emeritus Saylor’s

dissent in Williams:

       While not every intemperate remark will cross the line which separates
       zealous advocacy from contemptuous conduct, in my view the vulgar and
       insulting language at issue was appropriately punishable summarily as
       direct contempt. [Williams’] remarks were not only injudicious and
       disrespectful-the epithets directed at the Court were an affront to the
       authority and dignity of the tribunal and thus alone sufficient to constitute
       interference with the due and orderly administration of justice.

Williams, 

721 A.2d at 1075

. Like my esteemed former colleague, on a clean slate, I too

would have found Williams’ conduct punishable under Section 4132(3).

       In fact, I find the use of the word “significant” throughout the majority in Williams,

amongst other cases, when discussing disruptions that constitute “obstruction of the

administration of justice” to be nebulous and subject to disparate interpretations.

Merriam-Webster defines “significant” as, inter alia, “having meaning[,]” “large enough to

be noticed or to have an effect[,]” and “having or likely to have influence or effect.”

Significant, https://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant (last visited Sept. 8,

2026). Clearly, the trial court found the interruption caused by Outlaw’s vulgar outburst

to be “large enough to be noticed[.]” 

Id.

 While I understand “that trial judges are supposed

to be persons of fortitude who are able to thrive in a hardy environment,” see Majority Op.

at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted), I find the act of calling a judge a “cocksucker” to

be an “affront to the authority and dignity of the tribunal[,]” see Williams, 

721 A.2d at 1075

,

which was historically adequate to support a finding of contempt. See, e.g., Appeal of


                              [J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
Levine, 

95 A.2d 22

 (Pa. 1953) (“Generally speaking, one is guilty of contempt when his

conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect.”).

       Finally, I am not convinced that “[t]he circumstances of this appeal are analogous

to those in Williams.” Majority Op. at 8. Unfortunately, the record in this case leaves

much to be desired, as Outlaw’s obscene comment was not transcribed and thus, it is

unclear whether Outlaw made his remarks during the proceedings or after court had

recessed. That said, as contempt findings are necessarily fact-specific, had the record

been more robust, I may have been inclined to find that Outlaw’s vulgar outburst was

sufficient to justify his conviction under Section 4132(3).

       Justices Dougherty and Brobson join this concurring opinion.




                              [J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3

For advice on a matter of this kind in France, contact our criminal law attorney.


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