Miscellaneous Etats-Unis
Commonwealth v. Outlaw, B., Aplt.
[J-60-2025]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 48 EAP 2024
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court at No. 1788 EDA
: 2022, at
,
v. : entered on December 6, 2023,
: affirming the Judgment of Sentence
: of the Philadelphia County Court of
BASILE OUTLAW, : Common Pleas at No. MC-51-MD-
: 0000031-2022, entered on June 21,
Appellant : 2022.
:
: ARGUED: September 9, 2025
OPINION
JUSTICE WECHT DECIDED: October 29, 2026
In this appeal from a direct criminal contempt conviction, we consider whether a
courtroom spectator who called a judge a vulgar insult in open court “obstruct[ed] the
administration of justice” within the meaning of the Judicial Code.1 We conclude that he
did not. Thus, we reverse.
In June 2022, Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas Judge Roxanne E.
Covington was holding a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence in Marquis McClain’s
criminal case. Seated in the gallery of the courtroom was McClain’s acquaintance, Basile
1 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) (stating that “the several courts of this Commonwealth” may
“issue attachments and [] impose summary punishments for contempts of court” for “the
misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the
administration of justice”).
Outlaw. After Judge Covington announced that she would be denying McClain’s
suppression motion, Outlaw stood up and said “the judge is a cocksucker” loud enough
for Judge Covington to hear. Judge Covington responded, “What did you say?” Outlaw
replied: “Never mind. I’m leaving.”2 Outlaw then exited the courtroom.
A deputy sheriff and a court employee began searching the building for Outlaw.
The trial court recessed the suppression matter to allow McClain’s defense attorney to
confer with his client in the wake of the court’s suppression ruling. The court subsequently
adjourned, but Judge Covington asked McClain’s attorney to “stick around for another
moment . . . just in case.”3 Around this time, Outlaw came back to the courtroom on his
own, at which time he was taken into custody for direct criminal contempt.
The trial court held a brief contempt hearing, at which Judge Covington recounted
the above facts. A deputy sheriff who witnessed the outburst also testified. His version
of events was consistent with Judge Covington’s account. Outlaw did not contest the
facts. The court appointed counsel for Outlaw and set bail at $75,000. Outlaw’s attorney
conceded that the outburst constituted direct criminal contempt, and he asked the court
to proceed immediately to sentencing. Judge Covington declined to do so, scheduling a
sentencing hearing for the following week.
At the subsequent hearing, Judge Covington restated her factual findings. Judge
Covington recounted that:
As I was making my findings on the motion, at the end of my findings, Mr.
Outlaw stood up and interrupted the court and yelled out[:] the judge is a
cocksucker. Upon doing so, I stopped the proceeding and stated, What did
you say? And he said, never mind. I’m leaving. I’m leaving, and proceeded
to walk out the door. I inquired of the sheriff if he could go and stop him.
2 Outlaw’s remark was not transcribed by the court reporter.
3 Notes of Testimony (“N.T.”), 6/16/2022, at 58.
[J-60-2025] - 2
. . . Shortly thereafter Mr. Outlaw returned to the courtroom . . . and the
sheriff then took him into custody.4
Outlaw expressed remorse for his actions at the suppression hearing, saying that
he had returned to Judge Covington’s courtroom after the incident “to apologize for the
outburst and disrespect.”5 Defense counsel requested Outlaw’s immediate release from
custody, assuring the court that Outlaw regretted his actions and was remorseful. The
court ultimately sentenced Outlaw to fifteen to thirty days’ incarceration.6
Outlaw appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction because he did not obstruct the administration of justice.7 The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, represented by the Philadelphia District Attorney’s
Office, conceded on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Outlaw’s
conviction.8 Notwithstanding the Commonwealth concession, the Superior Court affirmed
Outlaw’s judgment of sentence. The court began by setting forth the applicable law,
explaining that an obstruction to the administration of justice occurs when the conduct at
issue “significantly disrupt[s] judicial proceedings,” either by “actual, imminent prejudice
4 N.T., 6/21/2022, 4-5.
5 Id. at 16-18.
6 Outlaw sought parole after serving his minimum sentence, but the trial court never
acted on his motion. Outlaw served his entire sentence.
7 A conviction for direct criminal contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt
of: (1) misconduct, (2) in the presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to
obstruct the proceedings, (4) that obstructs the administration of justice. Commonwealth
v. Falana,
(Pa. 1997); see 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) (stating that courts may “impose summary punishments” for contempt of court for “misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court, thereby obstructing the administration of justice”). 8 See Superior Court Brief for the Commonwealth,
2023 WL 4065057
, at *6 (“[T]he
Commonwealth is constrained to conclude that although defendant’s outburst was
patently unacceptable, uttered in the court’s presence, and intended to undermine the
authority of the court, it did not delay or otherwise obstruct the proceedings. Accordingly,
the evidence was insufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction.”).
[J-60-2025] - 3
to a fair proceeding or prejudice to the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and
authority.”9 “While ‘[n]either injudicious remarks nor affronts to the dignities or sensibilities
of the court,’ without more, constitute an obstruction to the administration of justice, the
element is met where there has been a ‘significant disruption’ of the proceedings.”10
Applying those principles to the circumstances of this case, the Superior Court concluded
that Outlaw’s conduct significantly disrupted the suppression hearing. The panel
explained that:
[t]he court took evidence on the day of the contempt demonstrating that
Outlaw called the judge an obscene name while the judge was on the
bench, in a voice loud enough for the judge and the deputy sheriff to hear
and then left the courtroom. At the continued hearing, the court stated the
incident occurred as it was concluding its business for the day, that it asked,
“What did you say?,” and that it stopped what it was doing in response.
Outlaw did not object to the court’s statement of the facts, including that the
judge asked, “what did you say,” and stopped the proceedings. Here, the
judge “observed . . . with [her] own eyes what happened,” which “is
sufficient support for a finding of direct criminal contempt.” Commonwealth
v. Moody,
(Pa. 2015). Accordingly, the evidence was
sufficient to find Outlaw’s conduct obstructed the administration of justice.11
9 Commonwealth v. Outlaw,
(Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams,
(Pa. Super. 2000)). 10
(quoting Commonwealth v. Mutzabaugh,
(Pa. Super. 1997)); accord Williams v. Williams,
(Pa. 1998) (holding that “momentary” or “transient” disruptions, even “reprehensible” ones, do not obstruct the administration of justice within the meaning of Subsection 4132(3)); Matter of Campolongo,
(Pa. 1981) (“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”); Commonwealth v. Rubright,
(Pa. 1980) (reversing a criminal contempt conviction where the contemnor’s “impertinent” comments “were of momentary nature” and did not impede the progress of the hearing); Commonwealth v. Meehan,
(Pa. Super. 2020) (“The record shows that the exchange between Appellant and the trial court was of a momentary nature and that the progress of the administration of justice was not impeded thereby.”). 11 Outlaw,
(citation modified).
[J-60-2025] - 4
Alternatively, the panel reasoned, even if Outlaw did not significantly disrupt the
suppression hearing, his behavior was still contemptuous because he caused “actual,
imminent prejudice” to “the preservation of the court’s orderly procedure and the court’s
authority.”12 The Superior Court stated that such prejudice occurs when the conduct at
issue creates “an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such flagrant
defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public that, if not instantly
suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court’s authority will follow.”13 In this
case, the panel opined, Outlaw caused actual prejudice to the trial court’s authority
because his comment “demonstrated his disrespect for the court and its command of the
courtroom.”14 The Superior Court therefore concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
prove that Outlaw obstructed the administration of justice.
Outlaw then petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, asking us to consider
whether “a single act of profane name-calling directed at the judge constitute[s] direct
criminal contempt when it did not in any way, let alone any significant way, obstruct the
proceedings.”15 Because the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office concurs with Outlaw
that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, we invited the Pennsylvania
Office of the Attorney General (“OAG”) to participate in this matter as amicus curiae.16
12
at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams,
(Pa. Super. 2000)). 13
at 413 (citing Moody and Commonwealth v. Garrison,
(Pa. 1978) (plurality)). The panel also theorized that, “if not punished, Outlaw’s conduct would potentially encourage others to commit similar disruptions.”
14
(cleaned up). 15 Commonwealth v. Outlaw,
322 A.3d 144
(Pa. 2024) (table) (per curiam order
partially granting Outlaw’s petition for allowance of appeal).
16 We also granted the OAG’s subsequent request to participate in oral argument.
[J-60-2025] - 5
The power of courts in this Commonwealth to issue contempt orders is limited by
Section 4132 of the Judicial Code, which states that:
The power of the several courts of this Commonwealth to issue attachments
and to impose summary punishments for contempts of court shall be
restricted to the following cases:
(1) The official misconduct of the officers of such courts respectively.
(1.1) The willful failure of the officers of such courts to disclose a
person’s complete criminal history record information when
requested.
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses
of or to the lawful process of the court.
(3) The misbehavior of any person in the presence of the court,
thereby obstructing the administration of justice.17
Specifically at issue here is Subsection 4132(3). A conviction under that
Subsection “requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) of misconduct, (2) in the
presence of the court, (3) committed with the intent to obstruct the proceedings, (4) which
obstructs the administration of justice.”18 This Court has held that, “[f]or conduct to
constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt
judicial proceedings.”19 This means that “[r]emarks that are injudicious, or even
disrespectful, will not, without more, justify a summary conviction for contempt of court.”20
To illustrate these principles, consider Williams v. Williams, where a pro se
attorney in a custody dispute reacted injudiciously to a trial judge’s evidentiary ruling:
The Court: Objection is sustained.
17 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132.
18 Falana,
. 19 Matter of Campolongo,
.
20 Id.
[J-60-2025] - 6
Williams: He’s such a fucking asshole.
Opposing Counsel: I heard him say that you are such a fucking asshole.
I heard it as an officer of the court. And the stenographer is nodding her
head. That’s exactly what he said, “He is such a fucking asshole.” And he
said it under his breath. And as an officer of the court, I am standing here,
and I am testifying that that’s exactly what he said.21
The trial court held Williams in contempt. On appeal, however, this Court held that
Williams’ remark did not obstruct the administration of justice because, although “there
was a momentary break in the proceedings” due to Williams’ comment, “the hearing
resumed quickly,” “[t]he entire incident encompassed just three and a half pages of
hearing transcript,” and “[s]uch a transient delay is not an obstruction of justice.”22
Expounding upon the statutory requirement that the contemnor must “obstruct[t] the
administration of justice,”23 we explicitly stated that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered
conduct which does not obstruct or delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”24
Consistent with Williams is Behr v. Behr,25 where a pro se litigant brought to family
court a box of documents that had the word “DEATH” scrawled on it in faint orange
highlighter. The box remained under the litigant’s table for the entire hearing, and only
after the proceeding concluded did anyone notice it. The trial court held the litigant in
contempt, but this Court reversed, concluding that the litigant’s conduct did not
21 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1073. 22
Id.
23 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).
24 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074 (quoting Williams v. Williams,
(Pa. Super. 1996)). 25
(Pa. 1997).
[J-60-2025] - 7
significantly disrupt the judicial proceeding.26 We also rejected the trial court’s suggestion
that a significant disruption occurred when the presence of the box triggered an
investigation and subsequent contempt hearing. We called this “circular reasoning”
because, if we accepted the argument, it would mean that “any time a court reconvenes
a hearing to investigate alleged misconduct, the alleged contemnor has automatically
obstructed the administration of justice.”27
The circumstances of this appeal are analogous to those in Williams. The insult
that Outlaw directed at the court here (“the judge is a cocksucker”) is offensive in a
manner similar to the remark made in Williams (“He’s such a fucking asshole.”). Both
comments fall well below the expected standard of courtroom decorum, and both
contemnors made their comments in response to judicial rulings with which they
disagreed. Furthermore, the delay to the proceedings in this case was limited to the judge
asking Outlaw “What did you say?”, followed by Outlaw responding “Never mind. I’m
leaving.”28 This is the exact sort of “transient delay” or “momentary break in the
proceedings” that we held in Williams cannot serve as the basis for a conviction under
Subsection 4132(3).29
26 Behr,
(“The mere presence of a box with the word “DEATH” scrawled in faint orange ink, which appears to be from a highlighting marker cannot sustain a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant disrupted the proceedings.”). 27
28 N.T., 6/21/2022, at 4-5 (“As I was making my findings on the motion, at the end of my findings, Mr. Outlaw stood up and interrupted the court and yelled out the following phrase: the judge is a cocksucker. Upon doing so, I stopped the proceeding and stated, What did you say? And he said, never mind. I’m leaving. I’m leaving, and proceeded to walk out the door.”).
29 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074 (“While there was a momentary break in the
proceedings, the hearing resumed quickly. . . . Such a transient delay is not an
obstruction of justice.”). Although there was a brief search for Outlaw in the courthouse
after his outburst, and although the court did eventually reconvene for a contempt hearing
(continued…)
[J-60-2025] - 8
Arguing for affirmance of Outlaw’s conviction, the OAG argues that the phrase
“obstructing the administration of justice” has “ancient roots in the common law” and
necessarily includes “insulting remarks that cast doubt upon judicial authority in the public
eye, regardless of whether the remarks substantially delayed or repeatedly interrupted a
proceeding.”30 According to the OAG, when the legislature codified the judicial contempt
powers in Section 4132, it “did not signal an intent to abandon the common law meaning
of the phrase ‘obstructing the administration of justice’ as encompassing disrespect that
undermines judicial authority in the eyes of the public.”31 Thus, the OAG maintains that
“Section 4132(3), as a reenacted codification of the common law, must be interpreted as
encompassing blatant, in-court disrespect of a judge in the execution of her duties,
irrespective of any delay or repeated interruption in the underlying case.”32 In the OAG’s
view, for conduct to be contemptuous, it must either significantly disrupt the proceedings
or undermine the court’s authority in the eyes of the public.
The OAG is correct that, at common law, judges had broad authority to impose
contempt for insulting remarks that undermine the court’s authority with the public. This
sweeping authority continued to be enforced well into the twentieth century. In Appeal of
Levine,33 for example, we affirmed the contempt conviction of a District Attorney who
responded to a scheduling misunderstanding by saying to a trial judge: “that’s the way
with this court, always mixing things up; everything is set on one day.”34 Upholding the
after he was found, the court’s own investigative efforts cannot form the basis of the
obstruction per Behr.
30 Brief for OAG at 14.
31 Id. at 16-17.
32 Id. at 17.
33
(Pa. 1953). 34
.
[J-60-2025] - 9
contempt conviction, this Court described the inherent contempt powers possessed by
trial courts in extremely broad terms, saying that: “[g]enerally speaking, one is guilty of
contempt when his conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect.”35
Appeal of Levine represents perhaps the zenith of judicial contempt authority in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The Appeal of Levine Court itself admitted that the
judicial power to punish all disrespectful conduct committed in the court’s presence is
“arbitrary in [] nature and liable to abuse.”36 Following Appeal of Levine, the judicial
contempt powers were codified and limited by the General Assembly’s enactment of 42
Pa.C.S. § 4132. Our decisions interpreting that statutory codification, including Williams,
Behr, and Campolongo, retreated from Appeal of Levine’s maximalist approach and
stressed that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does not obstruct or
delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”37
These decisions also emphasized that “trial judges are supposed to be persons of
fortitude who are able to thrive in a hardy environment, and they must be on guard against
confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction of the administration of justice.”38
The OAG’s argument cannot be squared with these contemporary precedents.
Under the OAG’s proposed approach, virtually all disrespectful remarks or profane
35 Id. at 225.
36
Id.
37 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo,
(“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”); Behr,
(“To obstruct justice, conduct must significantly disrupt proceedings.”); Rubright,
(reversing a criminal contempt conviction where the contemnor’s “impertinent” comments “were of momentary nature” and did not impede the progress of the hearing).
38 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo,
(“Mere affront
to the trial judge is not enough.”).
[J-60-2025] - 10
language would be contemptuous, so long as the comment can be said to risk
undermining the court’s authority in the minds of the public.39 Indeed, the OAG maintains
that “spewing” vulgar language of any kind while court is in session constitutes an
obstruction to the administration of justice (even if it does not delay the proceedings)
because such language “weakens the public’s faithful adherence to a court’s judgments
and rules of decorum.”40 The OAG’s view of the law is not compatible with this Court’s
precedent, which holds that there can be no obstruction of the administration of justice
within the meaning of the Judicial Code absent a significant disruption to the judicial
proceeding.41
The OAG’s argument also cannot be reconciled with the outcome in Williams,
where we reasoned that calling a jurist a “fucking asshole” was insufficient to support a
contempt conviction under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3) because the remark did not significantly
disrupt the underlying proceeding. Contrary to the OAG’s argument, the Williams Court
limited its analysis to the significant disruption requirement, never once suggesting that
the case turned on whether the contemnor’s conduct undermined the court’s authority
39 Brief for OAG at 26 (arguing that when “commentary openly and defiantly belittles
the court with abusive language, to let the conduct stand is to degrade judicial authority
in the eyes of the public, thereby obstructing the administration of justice”).
40 Id. at 9; accord id. at 9-10 (arguing that Outlaw’s conception of “obstructing the
administration of justice” “fails to capture offensive remarks that serve no legitimate
purpose and create the impression that the public is free to disregard a judge’s orders
and rules of courtroom decorum.”).
41 Matter of Campolongo,
(“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”); Williams,
(“Inappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does
not obstruct or delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 4132(3).”).
[J-60-2025] - 11
with the public. Indeed, the OAG’s view of the law is identical to the views expressed by
the dissenting justices in Williams.42
Furthermore, even if the OAG were correct that a significant disruption is not
required, and the relevant inquiry becomes whether the contemnor undermined the
court’s public authority, then we fail to see why the contempt conviction in Williams should
not have been affirmed. While we will not endeavor to rank the various obscenities
discussed here in order of offensiveness, we do not believe that calling a judge a “fucking
asshole” “create[s] the impression that the public is free to disregard a judge’s orders and
rules of courtroom decorum” any more or less than calling a judge a “cocksucker” would.43
The OAG attempts to distinguish Williams, but we are not persuaded by that
argument. According to the OAG, the remark in Williams, unlike Outlaw’s remark, did not
undermine the trial court’s public authority and thus could have constituted obstruction
only if it significantly disrupted the proceedings (which it did not). The OAG’s argument
hinges on the fact that the contemnor in Williams was said to have made the offensive
remark “under his breath,” whereas Outlaw did not.44 Specifically, the OAG maintains
that:
Williams’ frustrated murmurings, unlike Outlaw’s, are an example of non-
obstructive misconduct. While it is indeed misconduct to call a judge a
“fucking asshole,” whispering profanity does not threaten the court’s
authority in future proceedings. Because he made the remarks under his
breath, they were not a public display of disrespect for the court’s rulings
and its control of the courtroom. His grumblings did not send a message to
members of the public that it is acceptable for spectators to protest rulings
42 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1075 (Saylor, J., dissenting) (“Counsel’s remarks were not only injudicious and disrespectful—the epithets directed at the Court were an affront to the authority and dignity of the tribunal and thus alone sufficient to constitute interference with the due and orderly administration of justice.”). 43 Brief for OAG at 9-10.
44 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074.
[J-60-2025] - 12
they do not like while the court conducts business. There simply was no
threat to the public’s adherence to the rule of law. If Outlaw also had quietly
muttered his chosen epithet, there would be no obstruction here either. But
that’s not what Outlaw did.45
Even if we agreed with the OAG that statements which undermine the court’s
public authority can support a contempt conviction in the absence of a substantial
disruption, we would still decline the OAG’s invitation to distinguish Williams based upon
the amplitude of the derogatory comment. For one thing, it is not entirely clear that the
expletive in Williams was actually “whisper[ed],” as the OAG suggests. While opposing
counsel in that case informed the judge that Williams made the offensive remark “under
his breath,” the comment was delivered loudly enough for both opposing counsel and the
court reporter to hear it. And the comment also was transcribed by the court reporter,
unlike Outlaw’s remark. We believe that these circumstances illustrate the impracticability
of the OAG’s approach, which calls upon appellate courts reviewing cold transcripts to
deduce the contemnor’s volume level and to speculate regarding whether the offensive
comment was delivered loudly enough to “weake[n] the public’s faithful adherence” to
courtroom “rules of decorum.”46
In any event, the OAG’s argument is foreclosed by this Court’s precedent, which
holds that “[i]nappropriate and even ill-mannered conduct which does not obstruct or
delay the trial falls short of the misbehavior punishable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132(3).”47
Because we conclude that no such obstruction or delay occurred here, we reverse the
decisions below and vacate Outlaw’s judgment of sentence.
45 Brief for OAG at 31 (emphasis added).
46 Id. at 9.
47 Williams, 721
A.2d at 1074; Matter of Campolongo,
(“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings.”); Behr,
(same).
[J-60-2025] - 13
Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Dougherty, Brobson and McCaffery join
the opinion.
Justice Mundy files a concurring opinion in which Justices Dougherty and Brobson
join.
[J-60-2025] - 14
Concurring opinion
[J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
EASTERN DISTRICT
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 48 EAP 2024
:
Appellee : Appeal from the Order of the
: Superior Court at No. 1788 EDA
: 2022, at
,
v. : entered on December 6, 2023,
: affirming the Judgment of
: Sentence of the Philadelphia
BASILE OUTLAW, : County Court of Common Pleas
: at No. MC-51-MD-0000031-2022,
Appellant : entered on June 21, 2022.
:
: ARGUED: September 9, 2025
CONCURRING OPINION
JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: October 29, 2026
Outlaw’s conduct was abhorrent. The issue, however, is whether it was punishable
under 42 Pa.C.S. § 4132. As aptly observed by the Majority, contemporary precedents
set by this Court have seemingly narrowed the scope of conduct punishable under
Section 4132(3). See, e.g., Matter of Campolongo,
(Pa. 1981) (“For conduct to constitute an obstruction of the administration of justice, it must significantly disrupt judicial proceedings. Mere affront to the trial judge is not enough. Remarks that are injudicious, or even disrespectful or insulting, will not, without more, justify a summary conviction for contempt of court” (internal citations omitted)); Williams v. Williams,
A.2d 1072, 1074
(Pa. 1988) (finding murmuring made by a litigant, calling a trial judge a “fucking asshole” during child custody proceedings, did not rise to the level of criminal contempt because “the inappropriate remark caused no significant disruption” to the proceedings). Here, we have not been asked to reconsider our holdings in these cases, and absent such a request, this Court must adhere to these decisions. See Punxsutawney Hunting Club, Inc. v. Pa. Game Comm’n,
360 A.3d 828
, 844 (Pa. 2026)
(“The basic legal principle of stare decisis generally commands judicial respect for prior
decisions of this Court and the legal rules contained in those decisions” (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, I am constrained to concur in the result reached by the Majority today.
I write separately to emphasize my agreement with Chief Justice Emeritus Saylor’s
dissent in Williams:
While not every intemperate remark will cross the line which separates
zealous advocacy from contemptuous conduct, in my view the vulgar and
insulting language at issue was appropriately punishable summarily as
direct contempt. [Williams’] remarks were not only injudicious and
disrespectful-the epithets directed at the Court were an affront to the
authority and dignity of the tribunal and thus alone sufficient to constitute
interference with the due and orderly administration of justice.
Williams,
. Like my esteemed former colleague, on a clean slate, I too
would have found Williams’ conduct punishable under Section 4132(3).
In fact, I find the use of the word “significant” throughout the majority in Williams,
amongst other cases, when discussing disruptions that constitute “obstruction of the
administration of justice” to be nebulous and subject to disparate interpretations.
Merriam-Webster defines “significant” as, inter alia, “having meaning[,]” “large enough to
be noticed or to have an effect[,]” and “having or likely to have influence or effect.”
Significant, https://www. merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant (last visited Sept. 8,
2026). Clearly, the trial court found the interruption caused by Outlaw’s vulgar outburst
to be “large enough to be noticed[.]”
While I understand “that trial judges are supposed to be persons of fortitude who are able to thrive in a hardy environment,” see Majority Op. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted), I find the act of calling a judge a “cocksucker” to be an “affront to the authority and dignity of the tribunal[,]” see Williams,
,
which was historically adequate to support a finding of contempt. See, e.g., Appeal of
[J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 2
Levine,
95 A.2d 22
(Pa. 1953) (“Generally speaking, one is guilty of contempt when his
conduct tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect.”).
Finally, I am not convinced that “[t]he circumstances of this appeal are analogous
to those in Williams.” Majority Op. at 8. Unfortunately, the record in this case leaves
much to be desired, as Outlaw’s obscene comment was not transcribed and thus, it is
unclear whether Outlaw made his remarks during the proceedings or after court had
recessed. That said, as contempt findings are necessarily fact-specific, had the record
been more robust, I may have been inclined to find that Outlaw’s vulgar outburst was
sufficient to justify his conviction under Section 4132(3).
Justices Dougherty and Brobson join this concurring opinion.
[J-60-2025] [MO: Wecht, J.] - 3
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