Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

Cooper Wesley v. State of Arkansas

Official source
                                  Cite as 

2026 Ark. 159

                SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                      No. CR-25-618

                                               Opinion Delivered:   October 29, 2026
 COOPER WESLEY
                              APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE CRAWFORD
                                        COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                        [NO. 17CR-23-689]
 V.
                                               HONORABLE MARC MCCUNE,
                                               JUDGE
 STATE OF ARKANSAS
                                APPELLEE AFFIRMED.




                         SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

       A Crawford County jury convicted Wesley Cooper of two counts of capital murder.

He appeals only one of those convictions, arguing that the circuit court’s admission of a

statement from a deceased witness violated his confrontation rights. Although the circuit

court erred in admitting this testimony, we affirm because the error was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.



                                       I. Background

       In 2023, Cooper Wesley shot and killed his neighbor, Donald Lewis, and his uncle,

Terry Brasuell. Wesley, a drug user, erroneously believed that Lewis and Brasuell had killed

his parents and sister when he was unable to get in touch with them (they were on a camping

trip in an area with no cell-phone service). After concocting this theory, Wesley went to

the Van Buren Walmart to buy black clothes for his homicidal “mission” to supposedly
avenge his family. He also broke into his father’s safe and took two handguns, a Taurus

9mm and a Ruger .380. Wesley then drove to Lewis’s home and shot Lewis in the head as

he opened the door. From there, he drove around looking for Brasuell, eventually finding

him at the home of his own grandmother, Shirley.

       Shirley was talking to her neighbor, Melinda Ball, when Wesley jumped out of his

truck and accused Brasuell of killing his family before shooting him twice in the head.

Wesley then fled the scene as another neighbor called 911 to report the shooting. A

responding officer’s dash-cam footage captured Ball telling an officer that she saw a man pull

a gun on Brasuell and accuse Brasuell of killing his family before shooting him twice in the

head. Police asked another neighbor, Helene Plonski, to write down this eyewitness

statement from Ball.

       After receiving a 911 call about Brasuell’s murder––during which it was mistakenly

reported that the murder had taken place near Lewis’s home––police responded and found

Lewis dead in his doorway. After developing Wesley as a suspect, police arrested him, and

he confessed to both murders.

       Prior to trial, Ball died. Wesley subsequently filed a motion in limine to exclude

Ball’s written statement as both hearsay and as a violation of his confrontation rights. At a

pretrial hearing on the motion, Wesley argued that her statement was testimonial and that

he had no opportunity to cross-examine her before her death. The circuit court denied the

motion in limine, finding that Ball’s statement was admissible as a present sense impression

and excited utterance, but it did not rule on the confrontation issue at that hearing. Ball’s

statement was later introduced at trial through Plonski.


                                              2
       After the State rested, Wesley renewed his objection to Ball’s statement, again

claiming that it was both hearsay and a violation of his confrontation rights. The circuit

court again denied the motion but again made only a hearsay finding. Then, at the close of

all evidence, Wesley renewed his motion once more, which the circuit court generally

denied without explicitly addressing either the hearsay or the confrontation-clause argument

separately.

       The jury convicted Wesley of two counts of capital murder and sentenced him to

two life sentences without the possibility of parole. This timely appeal followed, which this

court has jurisdiction over because Welsey received a life sentence.1



                                          II. Discussion

       Wesley’s only argument on appeal is that the circuit court violated his right to

confront Ball about her testimony. Because this testimony concerns only his conviction for

killing Brasuell, he does not challenge his conviction for killing Lewis.



                                         A. Preservation

       As a threshold matter, the State argues that Wesley’s argument is unpreserved because

the circuit court never ruled on his confrontation-clause challenge. When a criminal




       1
           Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(2).


                                                3
defendant makes both a hearsay and a confrontation-clause challenge to testimony, he must

obtain a ruling from the circuit court on both issues to preserve the arguments for appeal.2

       At first glance, the situations in Bertrand and Proctor appear to be similar to what

unfolded here. Bertrand moved to exclude testimony on both hearsay and confrontation

grounds, and while the circuit court specifically ruled that the witness’s testimony was not

hearsay, it did not rule on the confrontation-clause challenge.3 Because of this failure to

obtain a ruling on his confrontation–clause argument, we held “that it is not preserved for

our review.”4 Likewise, Proctor made both an evidentiary and a confrontation-clause

challenge to testimony that the State sought to introduce at trial from his bond-revocation

hearing.5 While the circuit court did rule on the Rule 804 evidentiary issue, it did not

specifically rule on Proctor’s confrontation-clause claim.6 As a result, this court held that

“[i]n view of Proctor’s two-fold argument below and the trial court’s failure to specify the

basis for its ruling, we cannot say that Proctor failed to obtain a ruling on his Confrontation

Clause argument.”7




       2
       Bertrand v. State, 

363 Ark. 422, 429

, 

214 S.W.3d 822

, 826–27 (2005); Proctor v. State,

349 Ark. 648

, 662–63, 

79 S.W.3d 370, 379

 (2002).
       3
           Bertrand, 

363 Ark. at 428

, 

214 S.W.3d at 826

.
       4
           

Id. at 429

, 214 S.W.3d at 826–27.
       5
           Proctor, 

349 Ark. at 662

, 

79 S.W.3d at 379

.
       6
           

Id.

       7
           

Id.

 at 662–63, 

79 S.W.3d at 379

.

                                               4
       But unlike the defendants in Bertrand and Proctor, Wesley did obtain a general denial

of his entire motion, which included his confrontation-clause objection, when he renewed

his motion at the close of all evidence. For purposes of this appeal, we conclude that such a

ruling preserved Wesley’s confrontation-clause claim, and we will address it on the merits.



                              B. Confrontation-Clause Violation

       Wesley is right that the admission of Ball’s statement violated his right to confront

witnesses against him. A criminal defendant “enjoy[s] the right to . . . be confronted with

witnesses against him[.]”8 As the Supreme Court has explained, “[t]estimonial statements

of witnesses absent from trial [can] be[] admitted only where the declarant is unavailable,

and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”9 While Ball

was obviously unavailable for trial because she died before it began, Wesley never had the

chance to cross-examine her. Moreover, Ball’s statement that Wesley said to Brasuell,

“[Y]ou killed my family” before shooting him—and detailing the shooting itself—was

testimonial.

       A statement is testimonial when, “in light of all the circumstances” and “viewed

objectively,” its “primary purpose . . . was to create an out-of-court substitute for trial

testimony.”10 As the Supreme Court explained in Davis v. Washington, while “[s]tatements


       8
           U.S. Const. amend VI.
       9
           Crawford v. Washington, 

541 U.S. 36, 59

 (2004).
       10
        Ohio v. Clark, 

576 U.S. 237, 245

 (2015) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted).


                                               5
are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances

objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police

assistance to meet an ongoing emergency,” statements “are testimonial when the

circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the

primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant

to later criminal prosecution.”11

       The latter is the case here because Plonksi took Ball’s written statement, at the

direction of police, after an ambulance had taken Brasuell to the hospital and after Ball had

already relayed her eyewitness account to an officer.12 It is clear then that the primary

purpose of Ball’s written statement, to the objective viewer, was “to establish or prove past

events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” 13 The State does not challenge

this; instead, it jumps ahead to argue that any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

On that point, the State is right.

       When a defendant’s right to confront witnesses is violated, the “inquiry is whether,

assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a

reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable

doubt.”14 “Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of


       11
         

547 U.S. 813, 822

 (2006).
       12
         See Davis v. State, 

2011 Ark. 373

, at 4–5 (explaining that a statement to police in
the course of a homicide investigation is testimonial for purposes of the confrontation
clause).
       13
            Davis, 

547 U.S. at 822

.
       14
            Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 

475 U.S. 673, 684

 (1986).


                                               6
factors,” including “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case,

whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating

or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-

examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s

case.”15

       Other eyewitness testimony corroborated Ball’s statement. Additionally, and most

importantly, Wesley confessed to killing Brasuell as Ball had described. Under the standard

articulated in Van Arsdall and in light of this other evidence, the admission of Ball’s

statement, while erroneous, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.



                                       III. Conclusion

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Wesley’s conviction for capital murder and

sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Although the admission of

Ball’s statement through Plonski violated Wesley’s right to confront the witnesses against

him, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

       Affirmed.

       Special Justice CORY COX joins.

       WEBB, J., not participating.

       Mylissia M. Bacon, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: A. Evangeline Bacon, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.




       15
            

Id.


                                              7

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