Miscellaneous Etats-Unis

State of Indiana v. Christopher Johnson

Official source
       Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any
                     action in reliance upon this Opinion until it is certified.




                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                         State of Indiana,                                         FILED
                                          Appellant-Plaintiff                                  Oct 29 2026, 9:54 am

                                                                                                   CLERK
                                                                                               Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                                                  Court of Appeals
                                                    v.                                              and Tax Court




                                      Christopher Johnson,
                                         Appellee-Defendant


                                           October 29, 2026
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          26A-CR-1368
                              Appeal from the Carroll Circuit Court
                             The Honorable Shane M. Evans, Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                         08C01-2502-F6-17


                                 Opinion by Judge Bradford
                               Judges Bailey and Altice concur.


Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026                    Page 1 of 7
      Bradford, Judge.



      Case Summary
[1]   After being charged with Level 6 felony marijuana possession, Christopher

      Johnson entered into a plea agreement with the State, which called for an

      eighteen-month sentence with twelve months suspended to probation.

      Pursuant to the plea agreement, and claiming that he had completed his term of

      probation, Johnson petitioned the trial court to reduce his conviction from a

      Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor, which was granted. The State argues

      that the trial court misinterpreted the plea agreement and prematurely granted

      Johnson’s petition. Because we agree, we reverse and remand.



      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   On February 13, 2025, the State charged Johnson with possession of at least

      thirty grams of marijuana, elevated to a Level 6 felony by virtue of a prior drug-

      related conviction. On June 24, 2025, Johnson entered into a plea agreement

      with the State, in which he pled guilty to the Level 6 felony charge. The plea

      agreement, in relevant part, provided as follows:


              Defendant will plead guilty to: POSSESSION OF
              MARIJUANA 30G OR MORE, WITH A PRIOR
              CONVICTION, A LEVEL [6] FELONY

              Sentenced to: 18 MONTHS DOC
              Credit for one actual day served plus good time credit of one day
              6 MONTHS EXECUTED which may be served on community

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026        Page 2 of 7
              corrections so long as eligible and at [a] level determined by
              Tippecanoe [Community Corrections]
              12 months suspended to probation supervision
              substance abuse terms shall apply during community corrections
              and probation
              $500 fine and court costs
              $200 drug interdiction fee

              Defendant may petition for and receive modification of
              conviction to Class A misdemeanor, if he successfully completes
              all sentence terms within to [(sic)] original time period prescribed.


      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27 (emphases in original).


[3]   On July 17, 2025, the sentencing court held a change of plea and sentencing

      hearing. During the hearing, the sentencing court read aloud the terms of the

      plea agreement, and Johnson confirmed that he understood. After finding that

      there was a factual basis to support Johnson’s guilty plea, the sentencing court

      accepted Johnson’s guilty plea and entered a judgment of conviction.


[4]   The sentencing court then sentenced Johnson to “545 days; 365 of those days

      are suspended.” Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Thereafter, the sentencing court issued its

      plea and sentencing order, which stated, “The Defendant is Ordered to serve a

      sentence of 545 days. 365 days of this sentence shall be suspended.”

      Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 35 (emphases in original). The bottom of the plea

      and sentencing order, however, stated that “the defendant is placed on

      probation for 90 days[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 35 (emphasis in original).

      The sentencing court also issued an abstract of judgment, which indicated that



      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026            Page 3 of 7
      Johnson had been sentenced to 545 days, of which 365 days had been

      suspended to probation.


[5]   On March 10, 2026, pursuant to the plea agreement, Johnson petitioned for

      “Misdemeanor treatment[,]” claiming that as of “February 7, 2026, [he] has

      timely and successfully completed all terms of probation.” Appellant’s App.

      Vol. II p. 43. The case was then transferred from the sentencing court to the

      trial court.


[6]   On April 21, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on Johnson’s motion. At the

      hearing, Johnson testified that he had been required to complete “[n]inety days

      house arrest and probation in Tippecanoe, and 90 days probation in Carroll

      County.” Tr. Vol. II p. 16. Johnson’s counsel explained that Johnson had

      contacted him multiple times seeking to modify his conviction from a Level 6

      felony to a Class A misdemeanor because his probation officer had told

      Johnson that he had completed probation.


[7]   The trial court noted the different timelines provided in the plea agreement and

      the plea and sentencing order. The State argued that Johnson had not yet

      completed his probation, pointing out that the plea agreement called for “six

      months executed, followed by 12 months of probation.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. After

      listening to the plea and sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that


              [t]he Judge was silent as to the number of days that [Johnson is]
              to serve on probation. He did state 365 days would be
              suspended, but didn’t say to what term of probation. So, I
              couldn’t tell from the record what was in Judge’s mind, whether

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026        Page 4 of 7
              the 90 days listed on the plea and sentencing order is what he
              intended to do, or was a scrivener’s error and it should’ve been
              365 days.


      Tr. Vol. II p. 23. Finding ambiguity in the actual length of Johnson’s

      probation, the trial court granted his petition to modify his conviction from a

      Level 6 felony to a Class A misdemeanor.



      Discussion and Decision
[8]   At the outset, we note that Johnson did not file an appellee’s brief. In such a

      case, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the

      Appellee’s behalf.” Miller v. State, 

19 N.E.3d 779, 783

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)

      (brackets omitted).


[9]   The State argues that the trial court prematurely granted Johnson’s petition to

      modify his conviction because he had not yet completed his full term of

      probation. Specifically, the State contends that the trial court erroneously

      determined that the term of probation outlined in Johnson’s plea agreement

      was ambiguous. “[A] plea agreement is a contract, ‘an explicit agreement

      between the State and defendant,’ which, if accepted by the trial court, is

      binding upon all parties.” Bethea v. State, 

983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144

 (Ind. 2013)

      (quoting Griffin v. State, 

756 N.E.2d 572, 574

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001)). Contract

      interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Anderson v. State,

      

269 N.E.3d 817

, 824 (Ind. 2025).



      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026       Page 5 of 7
[10]   “Like any contract, we ‘begin with its plain language.’” 

Id.

 (quoting Berry v.

       State, 

10 N.E.3d 1243, 1247

 (Ind. 2014). “Any ambiguity is construed against

       the State, as the agreement’s drafter.” 

Id.

 The plea agreement, which Johnson

       signed, provides that he was to be sentenced to eighteen months, with six

       months executed on community corrections and “12 months suspended to

       probation supervision.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27. The sentencing court

       read the plea agreement aloud to Johnson during the plea and sentencing

       hearing, and he subsequently confirmed that he understood. The plea

       agreement’s plain language reflects the parties’ intention for Johnson to

       complete a full year of supervised probation. Barton v. State, 

192 N.E.3d 970

,

       977 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“The overarching goal of contract interpretation is to

       determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement.”), trans.

       denied.


[11]   Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that although the plea agreement “is

       clear and unambiguous that 12 months of the 18 month sentence was

       suspended,” it “does not clearly call for 12 months of probation supervision.”

       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 49. We disagree. The plea agreement, in bolded

       letters, clearly provides for “12 months suspended to probation supervision” to

       follow Johnson’s six months on community corrections. Appellant’s App. Vol.

       II p. 27. The term “supervision” means “the act, process, or occupation of

       supervising[.]” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 2296 (Phillip

       Babcock Gove et al. eds., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1966). The terms of the plea

       agreement plainly included twelve months of “probation supervision.”


       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026        Page 6 of 7
       Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 27. Moreover, the sentencing court’s statements

       during the guilty plea and sentencing hearing, as well as its abstract of

       judgment1—which served as its instructions to the Department of Correction

       regarding the terms of Johnson’s sentence—clearly indicate that the sentencing

       court had understood the terms of Johnson’s plea agreement to include a full

       year of supervised probation and had intended to impose a sentence consistent

       with the terms of the plea agreement. In granting Johnson’s motion to modify

       his conviction, the trial court erred in determining that the sentencing court’s

       intent in this regard had not been clear.


[12]   We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings

       consistent with this opinion.


       Bailey, J., and Altice, J., concur.


       ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
       Theodore E. Rokita
       Indiana Attorney General

       Ian McLean
       Supervising Deputy Attorney General
       Indianapolis, Indiana




       1
         “In Indiana, the trial courts use the Abstract of Judgment to convey the final judgment to the receiving
       authority.” Robinson v. State, 

799 N.E.2d 1202, 1204

 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 26A-CR-1368 | October 29, 2026                                Page 7 of 7

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