Civil United Kingdom
THOMAS HOLDINGS LIMITED (R on the application of) v THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS
Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 1369
Case No: CA-2025-002065
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING’S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
MRS JUSTICE EADY
[2025] EWHC 1660 (Admin)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Date: 30/10/2026
Before:
LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
LADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING
and
LADY JUSTICE FALK
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Between:
| THE KING on the application of (1) THOMAS HOLDINGS LIMITED (2) THOMAS ESTATES LIMITED (3) MECHANISED PROJECT MANAGEMENT (4) MPM INVESTMENTS (5) WM NOBLE (AUTOMATICS) LIMITED (6) SUMMIT LEISURE (CLAYTON) LIMITED (7) BJ’S LEISURE LIMITED (8) SUMMIT LEISURE (NORTHUMBERLAND) LIMITED |
Claimants/ Appellants |
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| – and – | ||
| THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS | Defendants/ Respondents |
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Kieron Beal KC (instructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) for the Appellants
Eleni Mitrophanous KC and James Abernethy (instructed by HMRC Legal Group) for the Respondents
Hearing dates: 6, 7 and 8 October 2026
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Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 2.00pm on 30 October 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
………………………..
Lady Justice Falk:
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against a decision of Eady J (the “Judge”) dismissing an application for judicial review of four decisions (the “Decisions”) made by HM Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”). By the Decisions, HMRC rejected the claimants’ claims that two extra-statutory concessions had the effect of relieving them from liability for under-declared excise duty, referred to in these proceedings as amusement machine licence duty (“AMLD”), to which they had been assessed in respect of certain slot machines located in bingo halls and amusement arcades (the “disputed machines”).
2. The claimants were at the relevant time members of two corporate groups, the Thomas group (the first and second appellants) and the Noble group (the third to eighth appellants). Like the Judge, I will refer to them as the Thomas claimants and the Noble claimants respectively, and collectively as the claimants.
3. The assessments in question were made in February 2008. In the case of the Thomas claimants the amount assessed was £845,355 in respect of the period from 7 December 2004 to 31 July 2006. In the case of the Noble claimants the amount assessed was £2,408,700 in respect of the period from 22 January 2005 to 31 July 2006. Three of the Decisions were made in 2008 and 2009, and the fourth in 2022. The applications for judicial review were initially made in June 2008 and January 2010 by the Thomas and Noble claimants respectively, but were stayed for a substantial period behind the long-running Rank litigation referred to below.
4. The common end date in the periods assessed reflected a change of law that was announced at the Pre-Budget Report in December 2005 and came into effect for VAT purposes from 6 December 2005 and from 1 August 2006 for AMLD purposes. I will refer to the period covered by the assessments, between December 2004 and July 2006, as the “relevant period”.
5. We heard submissions from Mr Kieron Beal KC for the claimants and from Ms Eleni Mitrophanous KC and Mr James Abernethy for HMRC. We are grateful for their assistance.
The legislative and factual background in outline
6. At relevant times, the regulatory framework (referred to as the “social law”) was provided by the Gaming Act 1968 (“GA”) and the Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976 (“LAA”). Section 16 of the GA and section 21 of the LAA drew a distinction between gaming by means of a machine to which the regulatory regime in Part III of the GA applied – referred to in these proceedings as “gaming machines” – and other forms of gaming. Relevantly, Part III of the GA applied to machines constructed or adapted for playing a game of chance where “…the element of chance in the game is provided by means of the machine” (section 26(2) of the GA). Machines that did not meet this definition have been referred to as “s16/21 machines”, or as “non-gaming machines”.
7. During the relevant period, the provision of facilities for games of chance was exempted from VAT by item 1 of Group 4 of Schedule 9 to the Value Added Tax Act 1994 (“VATA”). However, gaming machines were carved out of the exemption by note (1)(c) to Group 4, such that they were within the charge to VAT. The definition of gaming machine in note (3) required that “the element of chance in the game is provided by means of the machine”. It will be noted that this is in the same terms as section 26(2) of the GA.
8. AMLD was imposed by the Betting and Gaming Duties Act 1981 (“BGDA”). Section 21 of that Act required amusement machines to be licensed and section 22 imposed excise duty on the licences granted. It is worth clarifying that these licences were for duty purposes. They should be distinguished from the regulatory licences that operators were required to hold for the premises in question, which were administered by the Gaming Board.
9. By section 23 of the BGDA, the amount of duty depended on the category of the machine. Category A, which covered “any machine which is not a gaming machine”, incurred a duty of £250 per annum. This compared with £1,915 under the other relevant category, category E. The definition of gaming machine in section 25(1A)(c) of the BGDA required that “the outcome of the game is determined by the chances inherent in the action of the machine”. This is similar to, but not quite the same as, the wording in the GA and VATA.
10. Like other slot machines, the disputed machines relied on a so-called random number generator (“RNG”) to control software in the machine that determined whether a player won or lost. The location of the RNG for the disputed machines is central to this dispute.
11. The background to the deployment of the disputed machines included the development and growth in use of Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (“FOBTs”). FOBTs were appearing in bookmakers’ premises and were perceived to be contributing towards a fall in the turnover of amusement arcades and bingo halls. FOBTs were being treated as non-gaming machines for VAT purposes, and so they were exempt from VAT. Under the different regulatory regime applicable to bookmakers, the RNGs for FOBTs had to be located off-site. In practice they were often offshore. The terminals relied on a remote server which contained the RNG and communicated with individual terminals via a modem.
12. In contrast, the regulatory regime for amusement arcades and bingo halls required (or at least was believed to require) the RNG to be located on licensed premises. In practice, and given that Wi-Fi proved unreliable at the time, the disputed machines were configured using a wired connection to the RNG, and – unlike the position with FOBTs and some other machines, including machines considered in the Rank litigation – one RNG served one terminal rather than multiple terminals. However, rather than being integrated into the terminal, the RNGs for the disputed machines were physically separate, apart from the connecting wires.
13. In outline, the claimants’ position is that during the relevant period they understood HMRC and their predecessor HM Customs and Excise (“Customs”) to accept that machines configured with a physically separate RNG would attract VAT exemption and only category A AMLD, on the basis that it was the RNG rather than the machine itself that determined the outcome of a game, such that they were not “gaming machines” as defined for VAT and AMLD purposes. HMRC’s position is that this had been accepted by them to be the case during the relevant period only for “remote” RNGs, and that the RNGs for the disputed machines were not “remote” because they were physically close to the terminals, often fixed on the wall behind, on an adjacent terminal or on a separator between terminals – what HMRC termed before us “next-to-terminal-RNG machines”. The assessments accordingly treated the disputed machines as falling within category E. The claimants maintain that this position reflected a change of view that came about after the relevant period.
14. In fact, it became apparent much later that the focus on physical separation of any degree was misplaced. In Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v The Rank Group plc [2015] UKSC 48, [2015] 1 WLR 3472 (“Rank SC”) the Supreme Court decided that separation of the RNG could not prevent a machine from being a gaming machine for VAT purposes. This was because the element of chance was provided by the player’s interaction with the machine, such that the machine was the active means by which the winning or losing combination was generated. The RNG was merely part of the process, and its location was irrelevant.
15. The effect of Rank SC was that the disputed machines were gaming machines for VAT purposes. It is undisputed that the reasoning in Rank SC applied equally for AMLD purposes; in other words, the difference in the wording of the legislation was immaterial. The effect of this was that, as a matter of law, the disputed machines fell within category E. Leaving to one side the effect of the concessions on which the claimants rely, the assessments to AMLD were therefore correctly raised, albeit for reasons that were not established until some years later.
16. Although Rank SC appeared to have the effect that the claimants should also have paid VAT on takings generated by the disputed machines, the relevant VAT assessments were withdrawn by HMRC following the decision of the Upper Tribunal in The Rank Group Plc and Another v HMRC [2020] UKUT 117 (TCC), [2020] STC 960, which confirmed that exemption should have been conferred during the relevant period on grounds of fiscal neutrality. This was because the exempt treatment of FOBTs during that period had remained undisturbed. Fiscal neutrality is a principle of EU law which did not affect the AMLD position.
The key statements
17. There was a significant amount of evidence before the Judge. However, three items stand out which I will describe at this stage, because they are in my judgment the most important. The first two are letters dated 18 August and 3 September 2004 from Mr Brian O’Kane, a senior officer and policy lead in Customs’ gambling duties team, to the industry trade association, the British Amusement and Catering Trades Association (“BACTA”). These letters were clearly intended for dissemination to members; indeed, the first specifically requested that “you…publicise this decision among your membership”. The third is a statement in an internal Customs manual that was published in January 2005 (the “Manual Statement”). What are now HMRC manuals are produced as guidance for officers, but they have for some time been published to taxpayers.
18. The two letters to BACTA were in a similar form. Both referred to a meeting on 14 July 2004 where s16/21 machines were discussed and agreed not to be gaming machines, with Customs being content at the time that they should instead be subject to bingo duty. The letters explained that Customs had now concluded that the approach of applying bingo duty was incorrect, and then continued as follows (using the wording from the second letter, the differences from the first being immaterial for present purposes):
“While these terminals undoubtedly provide gaming opportunities as described in the 68 and 76 Acts [a reference to the GA and LAA] they cannot be classed as gaming machines so long as they rely on a random number generator that is not an integral part of the terminal, i.e. a random number generator that is remote from the terminals. Instead, it is our view that for tax purposes these terminals (if they rely on a remote RNG to determine the outcome of their ‘virtual games’) will be required to hold a Category A Licence (£250 per 12 months) under s23(3) of the Betting and Gaming Duties Act (BGDA) 1981 – “any machine which is not a gaming machine”.
As noted above, these are not gaming machines, but do provide gaming opportunities. As such, they would continue to enjoy VAT exemption under Group 4 of Schedule 9 to the VAT Act .
…
While your members may have been content to include their income from these machines in their duty calculations for bingo or gaming duty I am sure you will agree that it is important that the proper duty is accounted for and it would be inappropriate for Customs to take payment of a duty that is not due in law.”
The letters gave details of how to claim refunds of duty from the Greenock Accounting Centre and noted the need to obtain retrospective AMLD licences. The second letter concluded:
“DCMS have clearly stated their intention to use their Gambling Bill to reclassify these as gaming machines. In the meantime we will continue to regard such gaming terminals as being liable to AMLD under Category A but, as with all other taxes, this will be subject to review in the annual Budget cycle.”
19. It is apparent from later correspondence with the Greenock Accounting Centre that the approach taken in practice was to leave bingo duty calculations undisturbed for periods prior to September 2004 (corresponding no doubt to the date of the second letter to BACTA), but for periods from September 2004 to issue retrospective category A licences and require payment of outstanding excise duty on that basis.
20. The Manual Statement was set out at paragraph 12.4.2 of V1-7 Chapter 19 – Betting and Gambling, and read as follows:
“Fixed Odds Betting Terminals (FOBTS) and Section 16 and Section 21 Gaming Terminals
FOBTs look like traditional gaming machines and can be played for cash. They allow a variety of simulated games to be played on them including roulette, virtual horse and dog racing, golf, and number games. A central feature of their operation is that the terminal is connected to a remote server, which contains a random number generator (RNG). It is this RNG that creates the chance element of the games. The FOBT itself contains the visualisation software. They are located at bookmaker’s premises.
Section 16 and Section 21 terminals are similar to bookmakers’ FOBTs. They offer games of chance, usually roulette-based games, and again are driven by a remotely sited, random number generator. They have a maximum stake of 50p, a maximum cash prize of £25 and can also offer non-cash prizes. In bingo clubs, the non-cash prizes are restricted to a maximum value of £500. These gaming terminals are being provided under the terms of The Lotteries and Amusements Act 1976 and the Gaming Act 1968. Under this social law, it is only premises that hold the appropriate permits that are allowed to provide these gaming facilities.
Because the element of chance is not provided by the terminals themselves, but by a RNG, which is outside the machine, both bookmaker’s FOBTS and Section 16 and Section 21 terminals cannot be treated as gaming machines. Consequently, if the terminals offer the facilities for the placing of bets or for playing any games of chance, they will be exempt from VAT under Schedule 9, Group 4, Item 1 of the VAT Act 1994.”
BACTA guidance
21. In October 2004, BACTA issued a code of practice for its members in respect of s16/21 machines. The code of practice reminded members that the games could only be located in licensed premises, stating that “the RNG can be in the gaming or office area but the terminals must be in the adult only gaming area” and that the RNG “must be independent and physically separate from the player terminals, other than connecting wires etc.”. The accompanying fact sheet stated that the RNG had to be “remote” and that the machines were VAT exempt and required a category A licence. It reported Customs as having confirmed as at 3 September 2004:
“• S16 machines are ‘gaming terminals’ and not gaming machines
• Bingo clubs have been including the income from S21 machines in their calculations for bingo duty, however the games provided by these terminals do not constitute bingo and should not therefore fall within the scope of bingo duty
• These terminals cannot be classed as gaming machines so long as they have a random number generator that is remote from the terminals
• For tax purposes these terminals will be required to hold a Category A Licence…”
The extra-statutory concessions
22. The two extra-statutory concessions in issue are 3.4 and 3.5, both of which have since been withdrawn. They apply in terms to VAT only, but HMRC accepted that they should be applied to AMLD as well. They are in the following terms:
“3.4 VAT: Misunderstanding by a VAT trader
VAT undercharged by a registered trader on account of a bona fide misunderstanding may be remitted provided all the following conditions are fulfilled: (a) There is no reason to believe that the tax has been knowingly evaded; (b) There is no evidence of negligence; (c) The misunderstanding does not concern an aspect of the tax clearly covered in the guidance published by Customs and Excise or in specific instructions to the trader concerned; and (d) The tax due was not charged, could not now reasonably be expected to be charged to customers, and will not be charged.”
“3.5 VAT: Misdirection
If a Customs and Excise officer, with the full facts before him, has given a clear and unequivocal ruling on VAT in writing or, knowing the full facts, has misled a registered person to his detriment, any assessment of VAT due will be based on the correct ruling from the date the error was brought to the registered person’s attention.”
I will refer to these as the misunderstanding and misdirection concessions respectively.
The Decisions
23. The Decisions in respect of the Thomas claimants were dated 11 March and 21 April 2008, and were made by a Mr Simmons. They were addressed to the Thomas claimants’ adviser, PwC. The letters focus principally on VAT but, as already indicated, HMRC accept that the same principles would apply to AMLD. Although the Decision on the misunderstanding concession in respect of the Thomas claimants was withdrawn in July 2008 pending the outcome of the Rank litigation, it was never re-made and the parties have proceeded on the basis that it should be treated as having been confirmed.
24. The first letter rejected the application of both concessions but its reasoning is limited to the misdirection concession. It referred to submissions by BACTA but indicated that the concession would not be applied on a “global” basis. It stated that the letter to BACTA dated 3 September 2004 “was written following a meeting with BACTA and was in relation to very specific circumstances which were discussed at that meeting” and could not be accepted as supporting a claim of misdirection. It also rejected an argument based on a letter to the Thomas claimants dated 13 May 2005 from Mrs Elizabeth Way at the Greenock Accounting Centre. That letter referred to the fact that the position had been “researched…at length” and confirmed that as from September 2004 “Section 16/21 machines were liable for Gaming Machine Duty and traders had to obtain Category A Gaming Machine Licences to operate them”. The Decision letter maintained that this was correct for “genuine” s16/21 machines, whereas the disputed machines were gaming machines. The licences granted by the Greenock Accounting Centre were based wholly on information supplied by PwC’s client.
25. The second letter was prompted by a further letter from PwC which pointed out that the four conditions in the misunderstanding concession had not been addressed and requested reconsideration of that decision. The second letter did not comment further on the threshold requirement for a bona fide misunderstanding. It took no issue with condition (a). It considered condition (b) (no evidence of negligence) to be “less straightforward”, on the basis that the published guidance to which the letter referred – none of which is relied on by the claimants – was “incapable” of leading PwC’s client to the decisions it made, so it could be argued that it did not act reasonably in failing to seek clarification. As to (c) (no clear guidance etc.) the letter referred to the same published guidance and maintained that it could not reasonably be responsible for the client’s actions. The letter added that HMRC’s internal guidance, although publicly available, was not intended for use by businesses in making decisions about tax. As to (d), a point was raised in relation to VAT but there was no mention of AMLD, which (unlike VAT) is not charged to customers.
26. The letter also addressed an internal HMRC discussion paper dated 12 January 2007 prepared by Mr John Alderman, which PwC had by then seen and referred to in their request for reconsideration. Mr Alderman had during the relevant period held a senior role as the National Business Manager within Customs with responsibility for large businesses in the betting and gaming sector. The letter disagreed with a view expressed in the paper that there was a case for misunderstanding, on the basis that the letter to BACTA dated 3 September 2004 could not “be regarded as general guidance to be relied on by all those in the trade”, and further disagreed with Mr Alderman’s view that, on balance, “the department placed insufficient, clear information to [sic] the public”. Misunderstandings within Customs were irrelevant and the published guidance was said to have neither guided nor confused PwC’s client.
27. The Decisions in respect of the Noble claimants were dated 14 October 2009 and 12 August 2022.
28. The first Decision, which was made by a panel rather than an individual officer, dealt with the misunderstanding concession. It reported that the pre-December 2005 policy position was that terminals with dedicated RNGs were gaming machines for VAT purposes “whether or not the RNG had been detached” and that:
“Our view before December 2005 was that FOBTs and FOBT-like machines, which had RNGs situated offshore with each RNG servicing a number of machines were exempt. Everything else was taxable…”
It will be noted that s16/21 machines, which appear to be the “FOBT-like” machines referred to, could not have their RNGs offshore: see [12] above.
29. The letter attached a paper setting out the reasoning for rejecting the application of the misunderstanding concession in some detail, but focusing on the existence or otherwise of a misunderstanding rather than on the four conditions. In summary, the paper identified a “difference of opinion about what the law meant” rather than the misunderstanding asserted by the Noble claimants as to the emphasis now placed on the proximity or remoteness of the RNG. It set out some of the background. This included the letter to BACTA dated 18 August 2004, quoting its reference to “…not an integral part of the terminal, i.e. a random number generator that is remote from the terminals”, and a meeting with Mr McPhee of the Gaming Board on 7 October 2004 at which the Noble claimants had demonstrated a prototype machine using Bluetooth technology. The paper noted that the machines ultimately used relied on wired connections and that Mr McPhee had advised that the tax position be clarified with Customs. It then referred to a visit from Mr Alderman on 21 October 2004 and a letter from him dated 26 October 2004, on which the Noble claimants had relied. It was pointed out that Mr Alderman was shown no machines.
30. Although not set out in the paper, it is convenient to note here that Mr Alderman’s letter included the following:
“We discuss[ed] section 16 and section 21 machines[.] I stated that I would confirm their tax treatment. It is our view that for tax purposes these terminals (if they rely on a remote random number generator to determine the outcome of their ‘virtual games’) will be required to hold a Category A Licence…
…
The liability of these machines is retrospective from their introduction. If you have accounted for duty in some other way you will be entitled to a refund although you must put a retrospective licence in place.”
The paper considered this to mirror the approach in Mr O’Kane’s letter to BACTA. The paper also referred to the BACTA code of practice and fact sheet referred to at [21] above with their references to “physically separate” and “remote”.
31. The paper referred to observations made by HMRC officers when seeing disputed machines on Noble premises for the first time in October 2005, to the effect that the RNG had been “removed” from the machines and hung on the wall behind or a specially made plinth. (As to this see [41] and [42] below.) The paper then considered dictionary meanings of “remote”, interpreted that as a “long way away from the terminals” and observed that the panel had not been able to understand how the misunderstanding arose. The reference in the January 2005 guidance to “outside” the machine needed to be read in the context of the reference to “remotely sited”. The failure to seek specific confirmation was relied on. The panel understood that the Noble claimants felt that they had “not appreciated the emphasis that the department placed” on the location of the RNG, but why that was the case was not understood.
32. The second letter, from a Mrs Burt, addressed misdirection. It relied on that fact that there was no evidence that Mr Alderman had seen or discussed s16/21 machines at the meeting on 21 October 2004, stated that HMRC’s knowledge of such machines was still developing at the time and did not accept that Mr Alderman’s letter dated 26 October amounted to a clear and unequivocal ruling, as opposed to repeating general points made to BACTA. The letter added that in any event it would still need to be shown that there was profound unfairness or an abuse of power, with detrimental reliance being a powerful factor. A submission that commercial and financial decisions were taken on the basis that s16/21 machines fell within category A did not provide evidence of real and significant detriment, and there was no evidence that enforcement would result in a high degree of unfairness. The fact that overpaid VAT was being reclaimed was relevant to whether there would be financial hardship.
33. The Judge also referred to an earlier, initial, decision in respect of the Noble claimants that was communicated via a letter dated 16 February 2009. This was not the operative decision, but it is worth noting that it states that, because a misunderstanding had not been identified, the issue of negligence had not been considered.
The Judgment
Findings of fact
34. A preliminary point to note is that one of the issues before the Judge was the extent to which the court’s task was limited to a rationality review rather than its own assessment of the evidence. HMRC’s case was that the assessment was for the decision-maker rather than the court, whereas the claimants’ case was that irrationality was demonstrated by an appreciation of the factual context. Given the nature of the claimants’ case the Judge regarded the dispute as “essentially academic”, and she made findings of fact as the claimants had urged that she should: see at [83] and [95] of her judgment (the “Judgment”).
35. As already mentioned, the Judge had before her a significant amount of evidence. But as she correctly indicated at [94] of the Judgment, the best evidence available was provided by the contemporaneous documents, rather than witness statements prepared many years later.
36. The Judgment contains, at [13]-[60], a detailed description of the evolution of the disputed machines, HMRC’s interactions with BACTA, BACTA’s meeting with Customs in July 2004 and its code of practice, correspondence with the Noble claimants in October 2004 and with the Thomas claimants in May 2005, and subsequent events. What follows is a summary of the most salient aspects.
37. Customs started to become aware of s16/21 machines during 2004. The Judge recorded at [15] that one of the relevant officers, Mr Billy Blyth, had visited premises on 25 March 2004 and seen an RNG in a back office, adjacent to a room in which the terminals using it were sited. Customs approached BACTA in May 2004 to learn more about how s16/21 machines worked, the size of the market and how they were being treated for tax purposes. There were internal discussions within Customs and evidence of differences in view. At the meeting with BACTA on 14 July 2004 Mr Simon Thomas (at the time, the managing director of the Thomas claimants) explained that he did not consider that many s16/21 machines were in use due to considerations of cost and longevity of use. The internal debate continued and resulted in the letters to BACTA described above. While there was a concern that placing s16/21 machines in category A would make the machines very attractive, it was offset by the cost of the machines and the understanding that proposed statutory reforms would re-categorise them as gaming machines. (Judgment at [22]-[26].)
38. Following the visit from the Gaming Board on 7 October 2004 ([29] above), Mr David Biesterfield, legal and development director of the Noble claimants, emailed the Gaming Board to explain that the “remote” RNG would be located on the site in question and could be connected by wire rather than Bluetooth. The email stated that Customs had now “indicated that Section 16 terminals of this sort are to be regarded as Category A machines”. The Gaming Board’s response on 8 October 2004 confirmed that the machine shown appeared to be compliant with guidelines, and added:
“With regards taxation I would advise that you seek clarification from Customs and Excise, though I understand you[r] view to be correct at this time.” (Judgment at [33] and [34].)
I pause here to note that I would not read much into the suggestion that clarification be obtained, a comment on which HMRC now relies. It is natural that an official should make clear that their confirmation is limited to the area for which they are responsible. I would add that it is also noteworthy that the Gaming Board shared Mr Biesterfield’s understanding of Customs’ position.
39. The Judge found that the number of disputed machines doubled between December 2004 and May 2005, while discussions continued about legislative change between HM Treasury and what became HMRC by the merger of Customs and the Inland Revenue in April 2005. On 7 and 29 July 2005 Mr O’Kane emailed the General Counsel of BACTA, Mr Leslie Macleod-Miller. In those emails Mr O’Kane contrasted machines constructed to fall outside the definition of a gaming machine (“eg they are reliant on a remotely-sited RNG”) with evidence seen of machines “that purport to be s16 machines but are driven by a random number generator that is a fixed part of the machine (bolted to the base of the cabinet)”, and to an RNG “incorporated within the cabinet”, which he considered sufficient to make them gaming machines for regulatory and AMLD purposes. He expressed his view internally as follows in an email dated 31 August 2005:
“… The entitlement to a licence as a Category A machine is predicated on the random number generator being remote from the playing terminal (this requirement is also reflected in the Gaming Board’s code of practice for so-called s16 machines). When the random number generator is fitted inside the player terminal or simply affixed to the housing (e.g. bolted to the back or to the base) we believe that is sufficient to bring the machine within the definition of a gaming machine.”
As the Judge recorded, the reference to the Gaming Board’s code of practice should be understood as referring to BACTA’s code of practice. (Judgment at [38]-[40].)
40. The Gaming Board also raised concerns with Mr Thomas about the siting of RNGs, emailing him on 15 September 2005 about a machine his company had manufactured and which another user was using with the RNG attached to the plinth on which the terminal sat. The email commented “I know you are aware this makes the machine a Part III Gaming machine”. Mr Thomas’s response referred to a “moving feast” of conflicting messages by some manufacturers, said that he had asked BACTA to “issue chapter and verse” to clarify the position and stated his understanding that “the RNG has to be physically separate to the machine”, such as on the wall behind. BACTA produced a “clarification note” and revised guidance in October 2005 which referred to the need for RNGs to be “independent and physically separate”, which they would not be “if they appear to be an integral part of the machine”. RNGs which hung or sat inside the machine or inside the plinth would “not be deemed to be separate for these purposes”. (Judgment at [42]-[45].)
41. At [46]-[50] the Judge made findings about the configuration of the claimants’ machines. A visit by HMRC officers to the Noble claimants in early October 2005 recorded RNGs being “removed” from inside and attached to the terminal by a hook or in some instances to the wall behind, although it was noted that the group was proposing to install separators to which the RNGs would be attached, so as to comply with the recent BACTA guidance. HMRC’s note recorded that it had been conveyed at the meeting that HMRC were reviewing the correct licensing, VAT and duty treatment of the machines, the BACTA guidance being “only guidelines”.
42. The Judge concluded that, in fact, the relevant machines had been designed to operate with a separate RNG, and recorded clarification by a Noble employee at a later meeting that no-one on site would have “taken anything outside the machine”. However, she considered that evidence of the visit in October 2005 revealed HMRC’s limited understanding of the design of the machines.
43. In relation to the Thomas claimants, the Judge found that the RNGs were bolted to the back of the terminals while in transit but were then removed and attached to the wall behind or another terminal.
44. The Judge then recorded that, in October 2005, the claimants joined many others in seeking repayment of VAT on gaming machines on grounds of fiscal neutrality (as compared to other machines not subject to VAT), relying on Case C-453/02 Finanzamt Gladbeck v Linneweber [2008] STC 1069 (“Linneweber”). This prompted a proposal for an immediate change in the law to bring all machines used for gambling within the scope of VAT and subject to an “appropriate” level of AMLD. The Ministerial submission referred to avoidance by machines being “reconfigured/reconstructed (by removing the RNG from the machine housing) in an attempt to fall outside the social law definition of a gaming machine”. The changes were announced on 5 December 2005 by Business Brief 23/05. As already indicated, the VAT change became effective the following day. The Explanatory Memorandum to the statutory instrument that made that change referred to the definitions of a gaming machine for VAT and excise duty having “traditionally followed those in the social law” and the fact that the social law definition had now been updated by the Gambling Act 2005. It also referred to “clarification” of the VAT liability of machines whose RNGs were not located within the outer casing, “in light of recent attempts at avoidance through reconfiguring machines”, by “putting it beyond doubt” that location was irrelevant. (Judgment at [51]-[53].)
45. The Judge went on at [54]-[60] to refer to events during 2006, and in particular to an internal HMRC report by Mrs Alex Vale dated 23 August 2006 (the “Vale report”) which is considered further below. Mrs Vale was part of an anti-avoidance team tasked with looking at s16/21 machines. In short, the Vale report recommended that “the so-called s16/21 machines should always have been subject to VAT and AMLD in the same way as all other gaming machines”. This was followed by the publication of a Business Brief in September 2006 (Business Brief 15/06) which referred to attempts to avoid VAT by “reconfiguring and developing” machines so that the RNG was sited outside the machine, and stated that HMRC considered that “the majority of these machines were in fact gaming machines” even before December 2005. The Judge noted consideration within HMRC of whether there had been an earlier misdirection, both in the Vale report and separately by Mr Alderman, and the response by the anti-avoidance team to Mr Alderman’s view of that risk. That response referred to the team’s main priority being to “safeguard HMRC’s defence against Linneweber claims, and if possible improve it” and to all now agreeing that:
“…‘game of chance’ machines with RNG’s [sic] located anywhere on the same premises were gaming machines – as opposed to FOBTs that were operated in betting shops far remote from the source of generation of the element of chance.”
46. The Judge also set out extracts from the discussion paper from Mr Alderman dated 12 January 2007 referred to at [26] above, in which, after referring to the Gaming Board’s approach of focusing on physical separation, Mr Alderman had concluded:
“56. While the taxpayer should not rely on social law criteria with little information in the public domain they made assumptions.
57. This is not a clear cut case of misunderstanding. I believe that on balance the department placed insufficient, clear information to the public to allow them to be aware of the liability issues, this allowed room for other legislation to take precedence. No action was taken to correct this view until the issue of business brief 15/06…”
The Judge’s reasoning
47. At [77]-[83] the Judge considered the approach to take to claims to rely on extra-statutory concessions by reference to the case law, including (most recently) Murphy v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2023] EWCA Civ 497, [2023] STC 944 (“Murphy”) and the earlier authorities of R v Inland Revenue Commissioners, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1990] 1 WLR 1545 (“MFK Underwriting”), R (Teleos plc) v The Commissioners of HM Customs and Excise [2004] EWHC 1036 (Admin) (“Teleos”), R (Accenture Services Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 851 (Admin), [2009] STC 1503 (“Accenture”), R (Medical Protection Society Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2009] EWHC 2780 (Admin), [2010] STC 555 (“Medical Protection Society”) and R (ELS Group Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2016] EWCA Civ 663, [2016] STC 2417 (“ELS”). She concluded from her consideration of the case law that the principles applicable to legitimate expectation should inform her approach, referring to the misdirection concession in that connection and its consideration in Medical Protection Society. She also concluded that the misunderstanding concession should be construed narrowly.
48. The Judge’s analysis and conclusions are set out at [92]-[135]. The Judge agreed that there was a change in position by HMRC following the Vale report, but considered the position for the relevant period to be more nuanced than the claimants were suggesting. There had been earlier unease about the VAT exemption for FOBTs and increasing concerns about avoidance in the latter part of 2005, combined with the Linneweber issue. There had also been a lack of real understanding within HMRC as to how the disputed machines worked. This contrasted with the position of the claimants, who were “clear” (see at [99]) about the way in which machines needed to be configured so as not to be gaming machines, namely that all that was required was physical separation of the RNG. The Judge compared this with HMRC’s starting point of the machines being similar to FOBTs, and considered that in that context the degree of separation could be relevant.
49. The Judge concluded that the letters to BACTA dated 18 August and 3 September 2004, which she considered with the BACTA guidance and fact sheet produced in October 2004, could only reasonably have given rise to an expectation that HMRC would not treat machines as “gaming machines” if they used an RNG that was “remote from the terminals” ([104]). This remained HMRC’s position up to July 2006. Increased scepticism in late 2005 reflected machines where the RNG was plainly not “remote”, being bolted to the base or incorporated within the machine cabinet ([105]). The claimants’ position suggested an element of motivated thinking, and their own view as to the relevant distinction may have informed their reading of the word “remote”. The use of that term could not be ignored and HMRC’s position was certainly not clear, unambiguous and devoid of qualification ([106]).
50. Further, Mrs Way’s letter to the Thomas claimants dated 13 May 2005 simply assumed the facts to be as specified in the letter to BACTA dated 3 September 2004 ([108]-[110]). As to Mr Alderman’s letter to the Noble claimants dated 26 October 2004, there was no basis to think that it was written with a configuration of machines in mind that was not seen until HMRC’s visits in October 2005 and subsequently ([112]-[115]).
51. In rejecting the claims based on the misdirection concession at [116]-[121], the Judge concluded that HMRC did not have the full facts as to the position of the RNGs. The only direction was that category A AMLD would apply if the RNG was “remote”. At its highest this was ambiguous. Guidance was not sought as to what that entailed.
52. Turning to the misunderstanding concession, the Judge considered that the issue of “bona fide misunderstanding” should be answered by reference to the four conditions, and that, when applied to AMLD, condition (d) required an assessment of fairness similar to that required in the assessment of detriment under the misdirection concession ([123]).
53. For the Thomas claimants, the substance of the relevant Decision was clear. The guidance required RNGs to be “remote from the terminals” and, to the extent there was ambiguity, it was for the taxpayer to make the necessary enquiries. While HMRC might be best placed to assess the standard of care required, the Judge agreed that the failure to seek clarification was evidence of negligence ([126]-[128]).
54. Similarly for the Noble claimants, the substance was clear. The conclusion that there was a difference of opinion rather than a bona fide misunderstanding was not irrational. It was not open to the Noble claimants to ignore the language used both to BACTA and in Mr Alderman’s letter, and there had been no detailed explanation of the machines as there had been to the Gaming Board. To the extent that HMRC had decided that there was evidence of negligence, that was also a permissible conclusion. A communication by a Ms Bloxham of HMRC in November 2007 indicating that there was no material difference between the Noble claimants’ disputed machines and those generally in use took matters no further. (Judgment at [131]-[134].)
The grounds of appeal and Respondent’s notice
55. There are six grounds of appeal. Grounds 1, 3 and 5 are based on alleged procedural irregularity or unfairness, related to a failure to disclose an unredacted version of the Vale report and the Judge’s approach to making findings against the claimants which it is said had not been made in the Decisions. (Ground 5 was withdrawn in relation to the Noble claimants at the hearing.) Grounds 2, 4 and 6 relate to alleged errors in the Judge’s approach to construing and applying extra-statutory concessions generally and the misunderstanding and misdirection concessions specifically. It is also asserted that the Judge reached evaluative conclusions that were not open to her on the evidence.
56. The Respondent’s notice seeks to uphold the Judge’s decision for the reasons she gave but also relies on additional reasons. These include an emphasis on HMRC’s position that, apart from construction of the concessions, other matters are for the decision-makers, subject only to a rationality review. I will address the points raised in the Respondent’s notice below, so far as required.
Discussion
57. For the reasons that follow, and in respectful disagreement with the Judge, I have concluded that the bases on which HMRC rejected the application of the misunderstanding concession were flawed. In the circumstances I do not consider it necessary to reach a conclusion on the misdirection concession, so I will make only limited comments about it.
58. There are two further preliminary points to make, the first about the relevance of decisions in the Rank litigation and the second about the effect of success in the claimants’ judicial review challenge.
59. Mr Beal made some detailed submissions about factual findings and judicial observations in the Rank litigation. While I understand why Mr Beal wished to draw them to our attention, I have generally disregarded them on the basis of the principle in Hollington v Hewthorn [1943] KB 587 (which concerns the general inadmissibility of factual findings in separate proceedings). I note, however, that in the Court of Appeal’s decision in Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Rank Group plc [2013] EWCA Civ 1289, [2014] STC 470, Rimer LJ, with whom Beatson and Floyd LJJ agreed, expressed views about the Manual Statement and HMRC’s changing views that are consistent with my own: see in particular at [47]-[49].
60. The second point is this. Success in the judicial review challenge will lead to the Decisions being quashed, which will in turn require fresh decisions by HMRC. However, we have heard very full argument, and both parties argued the case to a significant extent by reference to whether the terms of the concessions actually applied on the facts. With that in mind, I have considered whether objections not referred to in the Decisions could rationally be raised.
The correct approach
61. The general approach to the question of whether a person may claim the benefit of a concession, or rely on some other statement by what is now HMRC that does not or may not reflect the effect of the statutory regime, is well-settled. It was summarised by Newey LJ in Murphy at [28]-[32]. For reasons which will become apparent, I will divide the significant elements into two categories, the first addressing whether the concession or other statement is of a kind that can bind HMRC and the nature of the claim that it should, and the second relating to interpretation.
62. As to the first category:
a) Taxpayers may be able to hold HMRC to extra-statutory concessions and other statements that do or may depart from the effect of tax legislation “in any case falling clearly within them” (MFK Underwriting at p.1569, per Bingham LJ; see also Accenture at [7]). This requires the relevant statement to be “clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification”; clarity of a representation also “depends in part upon the identity of the person to whom it is made” (R (Davies) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2011] UKSC 47, [2011] 1 WLR 2625 (“Davies”) at [29], per Lord Wilson).
b) A claim to benefit from an extra-statutory concession is in the nature of a claim to benefit from an enforceable substantive legitimate expectation (Accenture at [8], per Sales J). I would add that the same approach must apply to other statements that satisfy a) above.
63. As to the second category, interpretation:
a) The interpretation of extra-statutory concessions and other statements by public bodies is an objective question for the court.
b) Extra-statutory concessions and other published statements by HMRC (or predecessor bodies) are interpreted from the perspective of an “ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer”, such a person being taken to be representative of those to whom the concession is directed (Davies at [29], approving Bingham LJ’s statement to that effect in MFK Underwriting at p.1569).
c) An extra-statutory concession should not be interpreted as if it was a statute. And bearing in mind that it takes effect as a decision not to collect tax that is statutorily due, it should not be given “any greater scope than a fair and normal reading of the language” dictates (ELS at [35], per Patten LJ). Again, the same approach should apply to other statements that have that effect.
64. In this case there is no dispute about the interpretation of either concession. This is also not a case where HMRC are contending that, despite falling within their terms, the benefit of the concessions should not be conferred (a course of action which would be possible in the absence of a high degree of unfairness, taking account of the public interest in the collection of tax: see the discussion by Rose LJ in R (Aozora GMAC Investment Ltd) v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2019] EWCA Civ 1643, [2020] 1 All ER 803 (“Aozora”) at [48]-[52]).
65. Rather, the issues in this case relate to the application of the misunderstanding and misdirection concessions to the facts. HMRC’s position is that this is a matter for the decision-maker, subject only to a rationality review. The claimants’ position is that the court should determine the application of the concessions for itself.
66. As a general proposition, the submission that the application of a concession to the facts is primarily for the decision-maker has considerable force. For example, in Accenture Sales J concluded at [34]-[37] that, to the extent that the application of a concession to the facts depended on evaluative judgments of the kind in issue in that case (whether staff were being supplied by an employment business, as defined in the legislation), HMRC should be treated as the primary decision-maker, subject to review to ensure that their judgment was not irrational in the light of the evidential material before them at the time. Sales J observed that if HMRC rationally concluded that the concession did not apply on the facts then it could not properly be said that the taxpayer clearly fell within it. I agree, and note that a similar approach was taken by this court to the application of a concession to the facts in ELS: see at [37]. As Ms Mitrophanous pointed out, this accords with the approach that is generally taken to the application by a public authority of its policy to the facts.
67. However, Mr Beal relied on the fact that the concessions in issue in this case are of a different nature to those considered in Accenture and ELS. In each of those cases the relevant concession related to the application of the substantive tax code (as it happens, in both cases an aspect of the VAT treatment of the supply of staff), and the claimants had sought to rely on the concessions in organising their affairs. The misunderstanding and misdirection concessions do not address the operation of particular provisions of the tax code, and the claimants did not seek to rely on them when they were organising their affairs during the relevant period. Rather, the misunderstanding and misdirection concessions are relied on after the event. They focus on the positions of the taxpayer and HMRC at the relevant times and (more obviously for the misdirection concession) their interactions through other policy statements by HMRC. Mr Beal pointed to the obvious similarities between the terms of the misdirection concession and the common law test of legitimate expectation.
68. In a claim based on legitimate expectation, it is for the court to determine both whether such an expectation has been established and, if so, whether departure from it would involve unfairness amounting to an abuse of power. For example, this was the approach taken in Aozora to a claim that an extra-statutory concession had given rise to a legitimate expectation. Where relevant, the court’s investigation would extend to matters such as whether the full facts had been disclosed before the ruling relied upon was given.
69. Mr Beal submitted that the same approach should be followed in relation to both the misdirection and misunderstanding concessions. He relied on Medical Protection Society, a case which considered the misdirection concession (also referred to in that case as the Sheldon statement) in the context of misdirection by omission as well as common law legitimate expectation. In Medical Protection Society Sales J did not confine himself to a rationality review of the refusal to apply the concession on the grounds of lack of disclosure.
70. Ms Mitrophanous sought to distinguish Medical Protection Society on the basis that it concerned common law legitimate expectation as well as the misdirection concession, such that Sales J’s approach was a pragmatic one in the circumstances. Ms Mitrophanous submitted that it would not be the correct approach to adopt where only the misunderstanding or misdirection concession was in issue. Thus, she submitted, all matters relevant to the application of those concessions, including the interpretation of the relevant statements by Customs as to the treatment of s16/21 machines, were for the decision-makers, subject only to a rationality review.
71. I cannot accept that argument. Clearly, the application of a concession will often involve evaluative judgments that are primarily for the decision-maker and not for the court. Which matters fall into that category will depend on the particular concession and the circumstances of the case. But the submission goes well beyond that and extends to the interpretation of statements of policy by a public authority.
72. The letters to BACTA dated 18 August and 3 September 2004 were sent to the industry trade association and were intended to provide guidance for dissemination to members. They were, in effect, a published statement of Customs’ policy. The same applies to the Manual Statement. There is no reason to approach them in a different way to any other published statement by a public body that describes an approach that does not or may not accord with the statutory position. Thus, the principles summarised at [63] above apply to their interpretation, just as they apply to extra-statutory concessions and other statements of policy.
73. Any other approach would in my judgment be wrong in principle. Leaving matters of interpretation of policy to a decision-maker runs counter to the now well-established principle that it is not for public bodies to interpret their own guidance: see for example (in a planning context) Tesco Stores Ltd v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13, [2012] PTSR 983 at [18]-[21], per Lord Reed, as well as the cases referred to in Murphy at [30].
74. I therefore do not agree with Ms Mitrophanous that all matters relevant to the application of the misunderstanding and misdirection concessions were for the decision-makers, subject only to a rationality review. As a minimum, the interpretation of policy statements made by Customs or HMRC is a matter for the court.
75. For the reasons that follow, it is not necessary to decide the extent to which other matters relevant to the application of the concessions fall into the same category. However, the close analogy between the misdirection concession and common law legitimate expectation would indicate that, at least for that concession, the approach of the court should be the same. In contrast, the position under the misunderstanding concession is more nuanced.There is force in the argument that some aspects of it involve evaluative judgments that are primarily matters for HMRC. This may include whether there was evidence of negligence (condition (b)). That was the approach taken by Moses J in Teleos: see at [154]. In contrast, the issue of whether the matter is clearly covered by guidance (condition (c)) is more obviously one for the court to review for itself, since it involves the interpretation of statements by a public authority.
Interpretation of the misunderstanding concession
76. As I have mentioned, the interpretation of the concessions is not in dispute. I do however need to address two specific points made by the Judge about the misunderstanding concession, namely that the issue of “bona fide misunderstanding” should be answered by reference to the four conditions, and that condition (d), when applied to AMLD, requires an assessment of fairness (see [52] above).
77. I regret that I am unable to agree. On a fair and normal reading, the existence or otherwise of a bona fide misunderstanding is a separate issue from the four conditions. It is the threshold requirement for the concession to be engaged. If it is satisfied, then the four conditions fall for consideration. HMRC correctly accepted this in their Respondent’s notice.
78. As to condition (d), and again on a fair reading, the issue of fairness is not engaged by that condition. Rather, the question is simply whether tax was or will, or could reasonably be, charged to customers. Its wording no doubt reflects the fact that the misunderstanding concession was designed to apply to VAT rather than to taxes that are not conventionally charged to customers.
79. This leads me to the more general point made by the Judge at [81], that the principles applicable to legitimate expectation should inform her approach to the claims. While I understand her point in relation to the misdirection concession given the obvious analogy between the misdirection concession and a claim in legitimate expectation, the misunderstanding concession is different in nature.
80. In particular, that concession requires that a bona fide misunderstanding exists, not that it was created by a communication from Customs (albeit that, on the facts of this case, such communications are critical). So, while the principle referred to at [62(a)] above (the need for a statement to be clear, unambiguous and devoid of relevant qualification) applies to the terms of the concession itself, it is not directly relevant to the existence or otherwise of a misunderstanding. Its relevance is indirect, to the extent that the misunderstanding was created or reinforced by a communication from Customs, or the existence of such a communication is relevant to the issue of negligence.
81. Similarly, while a claim to benefit from the misunderstanding concession can itself be compared to a claim to benefit from an enforceable substantive legitimate expectation ([62(b)] above), the legitimate expectation in issue is the one conferred by the terms of the concession, rather than by the underlying material that is said to be the basis of the misunderstanding. A claim to rely on the misunderstanding concession is not dependent on underlying material having created a legitimate expectation, but on whether the terms of the concession are met.
82. A final point worth making on interpretation of the misunderstanding concession relates to condition (c), namely that the misunderstanding does not concern an aspect of the tax clearly covered in the guidance published by Customs (or in specific instructions to the trader concerned). Fairly interpreted, this must relate to situations where the correct tax treatment is clearly covered by guidance etc. The point of the concession is that, where it applies, a taxpayer is relieved of tax that would otherwise be due. If the correct tax treatment is indeed clearly covered by guidance then there is no good reason not to enforce it.
83. In contrast, if the basis of the misunderstanding was a statement or statements by Customs, then the fact that they are clear should support, rather than undermine, the claim to rely on the concession. Accordingly, the comments made about condition (c) in the letter dated 21 April 2008, referred to at [25] above, did not properly address whether that condition was met. There was certainly no clear guidance informing taxpayers of the true tax position, namely that the disputed machines were subject to Category E AMLD.
Customs’ statements about s16/21 machines: relevance and interpretation
84. I have described at [17]-[20] above what I consider to be the key relevant statements of policy, namely the letters dated 18 August and 3 September 2004 to BACTA and the Manual Statement (together, the “Statements”). I have also explained at [72] above that the principles summarised at [63] above apply to their interpretation. In context, the “ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer” would be the sort of person who was a member of BACTA. Their “sophistication” would obviously involve some understanding of the machines to which the guidance related, and of the industry in which they were being operated.
85. The Decisions in relation to the misunderstanding concession take different approaches, but the substance of each includes a rejection of the relevance of the Statements. The Thomas claimants were told that the BACTA correspondence related to “very specific circumstances” and could not be regarded as “general guidance to be relied on by all those in the trade”, and that internal guidance could not be relied on ([24-[26] above). The relevant letter to the Noble claimants focused on the meaning of “remote”, the reference to “remotely sited” in the Manual Statement and the failure to seek a specific confirmation, and concluded that there was a difference of opinion as to the law ([29]-[31] above).
86. There is no rational basis to assert that the BACTA correspondence could not be regarded as general guidance or that it related to (unstated) specific circumstances, and indeed HMRC do not now rely on either of those points. It clearly was general guidance, explicitly intended for dissemination to BACTA members, and there is no indication that it was intended to be confined to circumstances not set out in the letters. As to internal guidance, whether or not the Manual Statement would be sufficient to found a claim in legitimate expectation or under the misdirection concession, it was of obvious relevance to determining whether there was, in fact, a bona fide misunderstanding and whether there was any evidence of negligence.
87. However, the core issue is the one spelt out to the Noble claimants about the use of the expression “remote” or “remotely sited”. On this, I differ from both the decision-maker and the Judge.
88. While the most obvious meaning of “remote” connotes something at a distance, each of the Statements needs to be construed as a whole, from the perspective of the ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer.
89. The critical wording in the letters to BACTA is the reference to an RNG “that is not an integral part of the terminal, i.e. a random number generator that is remote from the terminals”. This equates “remote” from the terminals with “not an integral part”. It gives no indication that any element of distance is required. Rather, the concept of integration indicates that what is important is the existence of physical separation rather than its degree.
90. HMRC’s case assumes that the word “remote” necessarily requires an element of distance, or at least that its use introduced an element of ambiguity. I disagree. “Remote” can denote the nature or function of the items in question rather than distance. Mr Beal gave the commonplace example of a remote control. A remote control for a television set remains a remote control whether it has been left on (or down the back of) the sofa, or – more sensibly for the next user – on the cabinet on which the television sits. As to ambiguity, the use of the word “remote” in isolation would certainly be ambiguous given its range of meanings, but in the letters to BACTA it was used in a manner that explicitly equated it with the absence of integration.
91. The Manual Statement refers first to FOBTs and notes that they rely on a remote server containing the RNG. It then draws an analogy between FOBTs and s16/21 terminals on the basis that “again” they are driven by a “remotely sited” RNG, and makes express reference to the need for “these gaming facilities” to be located on premises that have the necessary permits. It then explains in the final paragraph that because the element of chance is provided by an RNG “outside the machine”, “…Section 16 and Section 21 terminals cannot be treated as gaming machines” (see [20] above).
92. The statement in the final paragraph that “Section 16 and Section 21 terminals cannot be treated as gaming machines” is an unqualified one. It does not refer to remoteness or distance. It gives the clear impression that the tax treatment will follow the social law classification. It explains why that is so, namely that the RNG is “outside” the machine, which was the very distinction drawn by the Gaming Board and in the correspondence with BACTA with its reference to not being an “integral part”. It makes no difference to that explanation how far the RNG was located from the terminal; the point was that it had to be physically located outside the terminal.
93. Ms Mitrophanous pointed to the comparison with FOBTs, where the RNG would inevitably be at some distance, and often offshore, and the use of the term “remotely sited”. She submitted that the reference to “outside the machine” merely provided a rationale rather than giving an indication of the circumstances in which an RNG would be accepted as “remotely sited”. At the time, she submitted, HMRC had an incomplete understanding of s16/21 machines and were basing their approach on FOBTs, where the RNG clearly was remote. Mr Abernethy also submitted that the evidence did not demonstrate that Customs officers were aware in 2004 that RNGs for s16/21 machines had to be on the premises.
94. I have significant reservations about the last point (see further below), but in any event what is more important to the misunderstanding concession is how the Manual Statement would reasonably have been understood. The most significant point is that the final paragraph is clear and unqualified. The rationale it sets out is consistent only with the claimants’ position as to how the word “remote” was being used. Given that rationale, the term “remotely sited” would reasonably be understood to connote physical separation rather than distance, just as in the BACTA correspondence it was equated to non-integrated. As discussed further at [104] below, interpreting “remote” as meaning no more than outside or non-integrated also made sense in terms of a legislative scheme that gave no indication that distance could be relevant.
95. Further, a taxpayer of the kind referred to at [84] above would be well aware that RNGs for the disputed machines, unlike those for FOBTs, needed to be on the premises, and would also reasonably understand Customs to share that belief. The Manual Statement makes express reference to the social law and refers to the need for “these gaming facilities” to be provided on licensed premises. The Manual Statement, like the BACTA correspondence, gives no hint that Customs were unclear about what machines they were talking about or about the social law position, or considered that only some of the infinite variety of potential layouts of licensed premises might be capable of providing compliant machines. (A further point is that, given the view that the element of chance was provided by the RNG rather than by the terminal, the reference to “these gaming facilities” needing to be provided on licensed premises, in contrast to the use of the word “terminals”, demonstrates a specific understanding that the RNG as well as the terminal needed to be on the premises. However, I do not need to rely on this last, arguably over-subtle, point.)
Other relevant correspondence
96. The Decisions also refer to correspondence from Mrs Way to the Thomas claimants and from Mr Alderman to the Noble claimants.
97. I should first make clear that I do not accept the submission by Ms Mitrophanous that the Thomas claimants had based their claim to the benefit of the concessions only on the correspondence from Mrs Way. In its letter of claim on behalf of the Thomas claimants dated 16 January 2008, PwC expressly relied on submissions by BACTA that the concessions applied. BACTA’s submissions are referred to in the Judgment at [61], where the Judge explains that they placed particular reliance on Mr O’Kane’s letter of 3 September 2004 and HMRC’s apparent knowledge of the industry and the machines in issue. The claim in respect of the Noble claimants (dated 21 February 2008) also relied on BACTA’s submissions in addition to the interactions with Mr Alderman.
98. The correspondence from Mrs Way must be read in the context of what was said in the Statements. Mrs Way’s observation that the position had been “researched…at length” confirms what a reasonable reader would in any event derive from the Statements, namely that Customs had undertaken whatever investigations they considered were required before giving guidance about s16/21 machines. The position is further reinforced by the fact that her letter went on to state that the machines required retrospective category A licences and to provide a breakdown of outstanding duty, before explaining that (on a discretionary basis) assessments would be raised in a lower figure. Such assessments were then raised, together with a default notice for the failure to have the correct licences. There is no hint that some s16/21 machines might not be treated as “genuine” for tax purposes, or that further information might be required before the quantum of the assessment could be fixed. Rather, and as with the Statements, the correspondence proceeded on the basis that tax and social law were aligned. The observation in the letter that “the onus remains with the trader to ensure that machines are correctly licensed” was obviously correct, but it was far too general to put the Thomas claimants on notice of a potential difficulty that was not otherwise apparent.
99. As far as the Noble claimants are concerned, the relevant part of Mr Alderman’s letter dated 26 October 2004 is set out at [30] above. It referred to s16/21 machines being required to hold category A licences “if they rely on a remote random number generator”. The decision-maker proceeded on the basis that this followed the same approach as the one set out in the correspondence with BACTA. I agree. There is nothing to suggest that Mr Alderman was doing anything more than restating what had very recently been explained to BACTA in a more shorthand way.
The claimants’ misunderstanding
100. The Decisions only explicitly address the existence or otherwise of a bona fide misunderstanding in respect of the Noble claimants. Essentially, what is said is that it was not understood how a misunderstanding could have arisen based on what Customs had said, given that “remote” meant a long way from the terminals. As far as the Thomas claimants are concerned the BACTA correspondence was rejected as being confined to specific circumstances and Mrs Way’s letter as being confined to “genuine” s16/21 machines.
101. I have addressed these points. Interpretation of the Statements is a matter for the court, and in each case the decision-maker erred for the reasons already given. The statements relied on were not qualified in the way that HMRC now contend that they were, and “remote” was not understood to mean far away. That is sufficient to establish that the Decisions were made on a flawed basis.
102. As to whether there was any other basis on which it could rationally have been concluded that there was no bona fide misunderstanding on the part of the claimants, I can detect none. The basis of the claimants’ claims to benefit from both concessions was their understanding of Customs’ position, namely that category A was the correct classification if the RNG was not an integral part of the terminal, and that that was what “remote” meant. Although Ms Mitrophanous drew attention to the fact that the claimants did not waive privilege in respect of the legal advice they received, the claimants’ witness evidence as to what they understood Customs’ position to be is clear and was uncontroverted. Any legal advice they received would not strictly be relevant to the existence of that misunderstanding, which was about Customs’ position rather than statutory interpretation in what was then an unsettled area of the law.
103. Further, that witness evidence indicates no doubt on the part of the claimants. Their understanding was that the social and tax law positions were aligned at the time, and that what was announced in December 2005 was a change in the law rather than a “clarification”. As far as they were concerned, there was no ambiguity.
104. The fact that this was so is reinforced by the point that the interpretation of remote as meaning non-integrated rather than far away makes sense in the context of the legislation. The critical wording was whether the “element of chance…is provided by means of the machine” (social law and VAT legislation) or “the outcome…is determined by the chances inherent in the action of the machine” (AMLD legislation). At the time, wrongly as it turned out, it was thought that the RNG should be distinguished from the terminal and that it was the RNG that provided the element of chance. If so, it is hard to see why it should make any difference how far away the RNG was from the terminal or (for example) whether they were separated by an internal wall. The point of distinction turned on the function of the RNG, not on its degree of separation. There was nothing in the legislative scheme to suggest that distance could be relevant.
105. Further, no one was suggesting that the difference in wording between the VAT and AMLD legislation was material, and the VAT wording was the same as the social law definition. Put together with what Customs had actually said and the point that they should be taken to be aware of the need for the RNG to be on the premises (see [95] above), it was entirely understandable to proceed on the basis that Customs were taking the same approach as the Gaming Board.
106. Ms Mitrophanous submitted that the interactions between Mr Thomas and the Gaming Board in September 2005, before BACTA’s revised guidance was issued (see [40] above) indicated the existence of confusion on his part rather than a clear understanding of the position. That is not my reading of the correspondence. Mr Thomas was clear, as the Gaming Board recognised, but some manufacturers were spreading conflicting messages such that industry-wide clarification was worthwhile.
107. Ms Mitrophanous also submitted that PwC’s letter of claim dated 16 January 2008 ([97] above) indicated confusion on the part of the claimants because there is a reference to “even HMRC’s policy team were unclear”. I do not consider that is a fair reading of the letter as a whole. What was being relied on was statements by Customs that were stated to be clear, and what was being said was, in effect, that it was appropriate to rely on them because the underlying legal position was unclear, as was apparent from the fact that Customs had themselves considered the position at length.
108. My assessment was shared by the Judge. As I noted at [48] above, she considered that the claimants were clear about the way in which the machines needed to be configured.
Evidence of negligence (condition (b) of the misunderstanding concession)
109. The Decisions in respect of the Noble claimants did not expressly cover the question of negligence. The only point identified as arguably negligent as far as the Thomas claimants were concerned was the absence of published guidance that could have led them to the view they held.
110. For the reasons already given, that conclusion cannot stand. There were clear statements produced by Customs that did not leave the claimants in doubt.
111. HMRC now place heavy reliance on the claimants’ failure to obtain specific confirmations about the configuration of their machines, which were not seen by Customs officers until (in the case of the Noble claimants) the visit in October 2005. As far as the misunderstanding concession is concerned, this point is relevant to the question of negligence.
112. The question raised by HMRC’s submission is whether, even if the claimants were in fact not in any doubt about the position and thought that Customs’ position was clear, a reasonable person in their position would not have shared their confidence, and would instead have shown the disputed machines to Customs or described their precise configuration.
113. This point is largely addressed by the points that I have already made. The Statements must be interpreted from the perspective of the “ordinarily sophisticated taxpayer”. That notional taxpayer must be taken to have the attributes noted at [84] above. In considering the question of negligence in this context, the obvious question to ask is whether a reasonable person with those attributes would have been left in a state of doubt.
114. For the reasons already given, I do not consider that they would. I have already explained that the Statements focused on the question of non-integration (or being outside the machine) as the defining test, and equated “remote” with that. The correspondence from Mrs Way and Mr Alderman did not take a different approach: see above. That approach made sense in the context of how the legislation was understood at the time, and in the context of the knowledge that the RNGs needed to be on the premises: see in particular [95], [104] and [105] above.
115. Properly understood, therefore, the fact that the claimants relied on their understanding of Customs’ position as communicated by the Statements and other correspondence without further checking should not be treated as amounting to evidence of negligence.
Conditions (a), (c) and (d) of the misunderstanding concession
116. None of these conditions were specifically relied on in HMRC’s submissions, so I will address them briefly.
117. There has been no suggestion at any stage that condition (a) (knowing evasion) could be in issue.
118. I have addressed the interpretation of condition (c) at [82] and [83] above. It follows from what I have said there that HMRC could not rationally have refused the application of the misunderstanding concession on the basis of condition (c). What they said about that condition in the second letter to the Thomas claimants does not meet the point.
119. As far as condition (d) is concerned, I commented on what the Judge said about that at [78] above. On the facts, I do not see how it could rationally be said not to be satisfied. The AMLD was clearly not charged to customers and could not now be charged to them.
Customs’ internal position: introduction
120. What I have said so far would be sufficient to dispose of the appeal. However, I will add some further observations about a subject that occupied a substantial amount of time in submissions, namely the internal position of Customs (and then HMRC) during the relevant period and associated applications by the claimants to admit fresh evidence, including but not limited to an unredacted version of the Vale report.
121. There are two reasons for these further observations. First, there is a point of principle relating to the Vale report that I should address. Secondly, the unredacted Vale report, in combination with the evidence that was before the Judge, demonstrates that during the relevant period Customs’ approach was in fact in line with the claimants’ understanding. That is of some forensic relevance in reinforcing the claimants’ case as to the existence of their own bona fide misunderstanding, but it also undermines HMRC’s case that the claimants should have sought a specific confirmation about the tax treatment of the disputed machines and that their failure to do so was evidence of negligence. That case obviously implies that, if they had asked, they would have been informed that the RNGs were insufficiently “remote”. In short, the evidence provides no support for that, and instead indicates that the claimants’ own understanding would have been reconfirmed.
Fresh evidence and the Vale report
122. Dealing first with the Vale report, the Judge had available to her a version of the Vale report that had been redacted on grounds of legal advice privilege. In fact, however (and unknown to those dealing with this litigation at HMRC), an unredacted version of the report had been produced for inspection during one phase of the Rank litigation, had been included in a bundle for a hearing before the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) in October 2009 and had been referred to at that hearing (the relevant FTT decision is The Rank Group plc v HMRC [2009] UKFTT 363 (TC)). As a result, HMRC no longer seek to maintain privilege and also do not seek to restrain collateral use of the unredacted version under any tribunal equivalent of CPR 31.22(2).
123. However, HMRC nonetheless object to the claimants’ application to admit the unredacted Vale report, on the grounds that it is fresh evidence which does not meet the test set out in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 (namely: (1) the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at first instance; (2) if given, the evidence would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and (3) the evidence is such as is presumably to be believed). In particular, the reason the unredacted Vale report came to light was because, following the Judge’s decision, PwC conducted a further review of papers they already held. Among those papers was a “Rank disclosure file” which included the unredacted report. In other words, the document was already available to the claimants. They had simply failed to appreciate that the version in that file was unredacted, but would have done so had they looked through it. Further, an application for specific disclosure of the unredacted report or a “proper explanation” of the redactions had been made below but the claimants had elected not to pursue it before the Judge.
124. I do not agree that this is a case where the application of the Ladd v Marshall criteria is appropriate. The Vale report was before the Judge. The existence of redactions did not mean that it was a different document from the unredacted version. It was just a redacted version of the same document. Further, those redactions had been undertaken by the very party who now accepts that privilege should not have been asserted, but nonetheless objects to the contents of the redactions being made available to the court.
125. The general position is that the full version of any relevant document should be provided to the court, not least because the court will want to ensure that it can gain a proper understanding of the context of any part of the document that is relied on. Redactions on legal privilege grounds are a necessary exception to this, but the exercise of making redactions always risks compromising the court’s ability to understand the proper import of the document as a whole. For that reason, redactions should be made only to the extent that it is actually necessary to do so in order to maintain privilege. That is all the more important if redactions risk removing relevant material that may be of assistance to the other party.
126. It has now become apparent that no redactions should have been made to the Vale report, because an unredacted version had already been deployed in proceedings in public. A full version should therefore have been before the Judge. Since privilege is no longer asserted, the starting point must be that, in line with the normal approach to the review of relevant documents, the court should see the whole document rather than allow the error below to be perpetuated.
127. I accept that the redacted elements of a document can be characterised as evidence not before the lower court, which may be admitted only by an exercise of the discretion under CPR 52.21(2)(b). However, the determining consideration in the exercise of that discretion is the furtherance of the overriding objective. As Popplewell LJ pointed out in Al Sadeeq v Dechert LLP [2024] EWCA Civ 28, [2024] KB 1038 at [141], the test in Ladd v Marshall provides important guidance but it does not confine the limits of the discretion. In particular, it will not do so where its application would be contrary to the interests of justice.
128. This is not a case where the party opposing the admission of the evidence would be unfairly prejudiced by its introduction. Those conducting the litigation for HMRC were well aware of the contents of the redacted passages all along. Those conducting the litigation for the claimants were not, and I do not consider that it makes all the difference that they could have been had they conducted a further review of available documents.
129. Further, while material covered by legal advice privilege, in particular insofar as it comprises or reflects advice from rather than communications to lawyers, will often not be of particular relevance to what the court has to decide (since the court will reach its own view of the law), this is a case where the understanding that Customs had of the legal position during the relevant period is itself in issue. Indeed, the redactions extended not just to material that disclosed legal advice, but to the views of a non-lawyer, Mrs Vale, in expressing her disagreement with that advice. Whether or not that level of redaction could have been justified absent the deployment of the document in the Rank litigation does not need to be decided, but the relevance of that disagreement, discussed below, points strongly to the conclusion that the interests of justice require the unredacted version to be admitted.
130. I would therefore grant the claimants’ application to admit the unredacted Vale report. In contrast, I would refuse their further applications to admit other evidence comprising transcripts of cross-examination of HMRC officers in the Rank litigation in the FTT and additional email correspondence dating from January 2005. As to those, the Ladd v Marshall criteria are more apt. The fact that transcripts had been created was evident from material disclosed by HMRC and (for one FTT hearing) the published decision itself, and yet they were not requested, despite other specific requests for disclosure that extended to a witness statement of one of the officers and transcripts of the hearing in the High Court on appeal from one of the decisions. In any event, the Judge’s focus on contemporaneous documents rather than later recollections was entirely apt. The relevant email was within a chain that was referred to in a disclosed document but was similarly not requested, and in any event appears to be of limited assistance.
Customs’ internal position: the facts
131. The relevance of the unredacted Vale report is that, when combined with other evidence, it makes clear that HMRC’s argument that “remote” means far away was not a contemporary view but a product of later thinking. It was developed first by Mrs Vale in her report in August 2006, after the end of the relevant period. Indeed, it has continued to develop with the argument in this court that while “remote” excluded so-called “next-to-terminal-RNGs” it did not necessarily exclude cases where RNGs were located in a separate room.
132. As already explained, Mrs Vale was part of an anti-avoidance team tasked with considering s16/21 machines in the context of the threat posed by Linneweber claims. The report noted that, for social law reasons, the RNG had to be on the premises and was “always no more than a few feet away” from the terminal. Under a heading addressing the treatment of s16/21 machines for AMLD purposes, it referred (in a previously redacted section) to an email dated 21 April 2004 from Mr Robert Bartlett. Mr Bartlett was a solicitor in Customs with a specialism in excise duty. Mrs Vale explained that Mr Bartlett had concluded in the email that a s16/21 machine would fall outside the definition of a gaming machine and within category A “simply because the RNG is no longer inside the machine”. She noted that he had also used the phrase “remote from the machine”. (A later part of the unredacted version of the report referred to another solicitor, Ms Candida Stockton, initially disagreeing with Mr Bartlett but subsequently retracting that view and agreeing with him.)
133. After summarising Mr Bartlett’s advice, and in a passage that was also previously redacted, Mrs Vale commented on and disagreed with it. She considered that Mr Bartlett had been provided with limited information and had not considered the physical location of the RNGs. The VAT and AMLD wording was not so dissimilar as to justify diverse views. Rather, and consistently with a view that had previously been put forward for VAT purposes, the machine was determining the outcome of the game. It will be noted that this is a version of the case that ultimately succeeded in the Rank litigation.
134. In a section considering misdirection, Mrs Vale considered dictionary definitions of “remote” as confirming that it generally means distant or far away, and noted the position of FOBTs. She queried whether a different view would be taken for RNGs located in an office in the same building as the terminals, but (noting the need to avoid trailing wires) they were in fact “always a mere few feet away” for s16/21 machines. She recommended that all “so-called” s16/21 machines should have been subject to VAT and AMLD.
135. That recommendation no doubt informed the Business Brief issued in September 2006 that maintained that the “majority” of s16/21 machines were gaming machines even before December 2005, and the response to Mr Alderman contrasting FOBTs with “far remote” RNGs: see [45] above. It also explains the reference in the letter to the Noble claimants dated 14 October 2009 that machines with:
“…RNGs situated offshore with each RNG servicing a number of machines were exempt. Everything else was taxable…” (See [28] above.)
136. In other words, the decision-maker proceeded on the basis that “remote” meant that s16/21 machines could never, in fact, qualify as non-gaming machines, which would render the Statements of no practical application. While HMRC’s position in this court is more nuanced (no doubt recognising that readers of the Statements would reasonably believe that Customs appreciated the social law constraints), it does not appear to have been developed in that way when the relevant Decisions were made.
137. This approach sits in sharp contrast with the position actually adopted for AMLD purposes during the relevant period. Mr Bartlett’s advice – which, it is to be noted, included the use of the word remote – was obviously reflected in the Statements, and continued to be applied.
138. By way of example, that advice is clearly reflected in the distinction drawn by Mr O’Kane in the internal email dated 31 August 2005 referred to at [39] above between a “remote” RNG and one where it was “fitted inside the player terminal or simply affixed to the housing” (a point also reflected in BACTA’s October 2005 revised guidance), as well as in his earlier emails to BACTA referred to in that paragraph. In another internal email dated 26 August 2005, not referred to by the Judge, Mr O’Kane answered queries from an excise officer by agreeing that a distinction should be drawn between cases where the RNG was attached by a length of wire, “perhaps dangling loosely or secured to the wall away from the machine”, and those where it was “physically attached to the body of the machine or is fitted internally in the body of the machine”, the latter being regarded as part of the machine and making it a gaming machine. As Mr O’Kane also recognised in the 31 August email, this was consistent with the dividing line being adopted for regulatory (i.e. social law) purposes.
139. Much earlier, in internal email exchanges in August 2004, before Mr O’Kane’s first letter to BACTA, there are apparently interchangeable references to “remote” RNGs and their being “outside the box”, in the context of VAT specialists being prepared to accept “Excise’s view”, an apparent reference to the view formed on the basis of Mr Bartlett’s advice.
140. Mr O’Kane’s internal email dated 26 August 2005 referred to confirmation of the position being sought from HMRC Solicitors’ Office as a matter of priority. However, the Vale report contains nothing to indicate that there was a departure from Mr Bartlett’s previous advice at that stage. On the contrary, in other previously redacted passages there are references to advice from another solicitor, Mr Angelos Agathangelou, in October and November 2005 which appears to have been more muted but broadly consistent with it. The terms of the Business Brief issued on 5 December 2005 are also essentially consistent, announcing that s16/21 machines “will become” gaming machines for AMLD purposes and advising those with them who paid category A AMLD to “continue to do so until Budget 2006”. The Explanatory Memorandum referred to at [44] above that accompanied the VAT change also referred to the legislation having previously followed the social law. Further, the Budget announcement on 22 March 2006 stated that s16/21 machines would be “brought within the scope of AMLD” from 1 August 2006. An Information Notice dated 1 July 2006 was to a similar effect, and advised that appropriate licences be sought. In contrast to the Business Brief issued in September 2006, there was nothing to suggest that the majority of s16/21 machines were gaming machines all along.
141. I also have significant reservations about HMRC’s objection that Customs officers had an insufficient understanding of the machines and were proceeding on the basis that they were analogous to FOBTs. As the Judge found, Mr Blyth had seen an RNG in a room “adjacent” to the terminals as early as March 2004 (see [37] above). It is hard to believe that any of the Statements were issued without Customs first obtaining further information about how the machines were routinely being operated, if matters such as the degree of separation of the RNG were relevant. They had approached BACTA in May 2004 to find out what they wanted to know. In any event, they had undoubtedly gained plenty of information by the date of Mr O’Kane’s emails in July and August 2005. It is also telling that when officers finally saw the machines operated by the Noble claimants in October 2005, their reaction was not to say that their configuration could not comply with the remoteness requirement. Rather, they said that the position was under review. That was an accurate statement given the developing views in the light of the exposure to Linneweber claims and the proposal to change the law, but it takes HMRC no further than that.
142. In summary, therefore, the evidence shows that, following internal debate in which different views were expressed, the view that Customs adopted by August 2004 was the view expressed by Mr Bartlett and reflected in the Statements. That view remained Customs’ position (and from April 2005 that of HMRC) throughout the relevant period. It was consistent with the view of the Gaming Board and so accorded with the understanding of the claimants that the social and tax law positions were aligned. Against that background, HMRC’s assertion that what was meant by “remote” was all along different is, at best, an unattractive one.
Conclusion
143. In conclusion, I would allow the appeal in relation to the misunderstanding concession and quash the Decisions insofar as they refused to apply it. That being so, it is unnecessary to reach any conclusion in respect of the misdirection concession.
Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing:
144. I agree.
Lord Justice Arnold:
145. Subject only to one very minor reservation, I agree that the appeal should be allowed for the reasons given by Falk LJ. The reservation concerns paragraph 127 above. It seems to me to be arguable that the Vale report as a document was in evidence before the judge, and that all that has happened since then is that redactions which had formerly been made on the ground of privilege are no longer maintained by HMRC, with the consequence that this Court can now see the formerly redacted passages. We did not receive any detailed argument on the question of whether a document may be partially in evidence and partially not. Even if that is the correct analysis, I agree with Falk LJ that this Court should admit the redacted passages as fresh evidence for the reasons she gives in paragraphs 128 and 129.
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