Tax United Kingdom

OMID DJALILI v THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Official source

Neutral Citation: [2026] UKFTT 01501 (TC)

Case Number: TC 10081

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL

TAX CHAMBER

By remote video hearing

Appeal reference: TC/2025/03109

PROCEDURE—Application for permission to bring a late appeal—Application refused

Heard on: 23 October 2026

Judgment date: 28 October 2026

Before

TRIBUNAL JUDGE DR CHRISTOPHER STAKER KC

JULIAN STAFFORD

Between

OMID DJALILI

Appellant

and

THE COMMISSIONERS FOR HIS MAJESTY’S REVENUE AND CUSTOMS

Respondents

Representation:

For the Appellant: Hartley Foster of counsel, instructed through direct access

For the Respondents: Matthew Bignell of counsel, instructed by the General Counsel and Solicitor to HM Revenue and Customs

DECISION

1. The Tribunal refuses the Appellant’s application dated 17 June 2025, made pursuant to s 49G(3) of the Taxes Management Act 1970, for permission to bring a late appeal against the partial closure notice for the tax year ended 5 April 2010 and the final closure notices for the tax years ended 5 April 2011 to 2015 inclusive.

REASONS

Summary

2. In this decision, the Tribunal considers and refuses an application for permission to bring a late appeal against closure notices. The Tribunal applies the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in Martland v Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC). The notice of appeal was filed with the Tribunal 13 months and 28 days after expiry of the 30-day time limit for appealing. The Tribunal finds that the evidence does not support the Appellant’s claim as to the reason for the delay, namely the claim that he was advised that he needed to wait until he had obtained certain documents that were in the possession of HMRC but which HMRC were refusing to disclose. On the evidence, the Tribunal finds on a balance of probability that the Appellant initially decided for a period of about 10-13 months not to appeal. Evaluating and balancing the circumstances as a whole, the Tribunal finds that permission to bring a late appeal should not be granted.

Background facts

3. From 2008/09, Mr Omid Djalili (the “Appellant” or the “Appellant in the present proceedings”) participated in a disclosed tax avoidance scheme known as the Scion Structured Products Ltd Scheme (the “Scion Scheme” or “Scion Arrangements”). The Appellant contends that some 190 individuals participated in the scheme.

4. The Appellant has provided the following brief description of the scheme:

The object of the Scion Arrangements was to enable participants to carry out a sole trade of exploiting film rights. In broad terms, under the Scion Arrangements as described by Scion, each participant acquired film rights from one Scion entity and exploited those film rights by assigning them under a Distribution Agreement to another Scion entity. The receipts that were ostensibly payable under the Distribution Agreement comprised a fixed element, described as “Minimum Annual Payments” (“MAPs”) and an entitlement to a variable element, described as “Defined Proceeds”, that would be derived from the gross receipts of the particular films that were chosen.

5. Between January 2012 and August 2016, HMRC opened enquiries in respect of the Appellant’s tax returns for the tax years ended 5 April 2009 to 2015.

6. On 15 January 2020, the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber) (“FTT”) gave its decision in Good v Revenue and Customs [2020] UKFTT 25 (TC) (“Good FTT”). In this case, the FTT dismissed appeals by two other participants in the Scion Scheme (a Mr Good and a Mr Ryan). The FTT found that the “Minimum Annual Payments” (“MAPs”) provided for in the Scion Scheme were income from a non-trade business to which Mr Good and Mr Ryan were entitled, such that they were liable to income tax on the MAPs under ss 609 and 611 of the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005 (“ITTOIA”), without any deduction for interest payments on loans that the MAPs were used to repay and without deduction of other expenses that had been claimed.

7. The Appellant in the present case contends as follows. The HMRC amended statement of case in Good FTT, dated 12 December 2017, included references to five documents (the “Transaction Documents” or “MissingTransaction Documents”). Individual participants in the Scion Scheme were not parties to these documents (they were concluded by Scion entities with other Scion entities or third parties). Individual participants in the Scion Scheme were not provided with copies of these documents, which HMRC had obtained from Scion using its formal information powers. HMRC did not subsequently adduce these documents in evidence in Good FTT, and HMRC subsequently refused to disclose copies of these documents to individual participants in the Scion Scheme.

8. On 18 November 2021, the Upper Tribunal gave its decision in Good v Revenue and Customs [2021] UKUT 281 (TCC) (“Good UT”), in which it dismissed an appeal by Mr Good against Good FTT.

9. On 10 February 2023, the Court of Appeal gave its judgment in Good v Revenue and Customs [2023] EWCA (Civ) 114 (“Good CA”), in which it dismissed an appeal by Mr Good against the decision in Good UT. The Court of Appeal found at [80], [84] and [109] that the appellant in that case “was entitled to the MAPs for the purposes of s 611 ITTOIA and the MAPs were income from the film business in which the taxpayer was participating for the purposes of s 609 ITTOIA”.

10. On 24 February 2023, HMRC issued to the Appellant in the present proceedings partial closure notices for the tax years ended 5 April 2009 and 2010, and final closure notices for the tax years ended 5 April 2011 to 2015. HMRC issued the closure notices having concluded that the MAPs provided for in the Scion Scheme were taxable income under s 609 ITTOIA, that “No expenditure under the scheme is deductible against the income so taxable”, and that “This has been approved by [Good FTT and Good UT]”.

11. On 24 March 2023, by a letter from the Appellant’s agent Evelyn Partners, the Appellant appealed to HMRC against the closure notices.

12. On 25 July 2023, the Supreme Court refused an application for permission to appeal against Good CA.

13. On 11 October 2023, HMRC offered the Appellant a review of the closure notices, and set out the HMRC view of the matter.

14. On 10 November 2023, by a letter from the Appellant’s agent Evelyn Partners, the Appellant accepted HMRC’s offer of a review. This letter maintained that the decisions in the Good case were not binding on the Appellant, and contended that the Appellant advanced his case on a different factual basis in relation to the MAPs. The letter went on to refer to the Transaction Documents (see paragraph 7 above), and stated that “when the contractual documents that were before the Tribunal [in Good] are reviewed in conjunction with the Transaction Documents”, they would show that the MAPs were not taxable income.

15. In about February 2024, another participant in the Scion Scheme, a Mr Adams, filed an appeal relating to the tax consequences of participation in the scheme (appeal reference TC/2024/01576 (now also appeal reference TC/2024/04121)) (the “Adams case”).

16. On 21 March 2024, HMRC provided its review conclusion letter to the Appellant in the present proceedings, upholding the decisions under appeal. That letter confirmed the HMRC position that the MAPs constituted income of a non-trade business on which the Appellant was liable to income tax pursuant to ss 609 and 611 ITTOIA, and that no scheme-related expenditure incurred by him could be deducted from the MAPs in determining his liability for income tax. That letter added that consideration of the Transaction Documents gave HMRC no reason to suppose that the facts of the Appellant’s case could be distinguished from Good FTT and Good UT in such a manner as to give grounds for departing from those precedents.

17. During the course of 2024, some 13 other participants in the Scion Scheme commenced their own separate Tribunal appeals. Some of these appeals were brought within time, and some were late appeals accompanied by applications for permission to bring a late appeal. These appellants, together with Mr Adams, are referred to as the “Scion MAP Appellants”. All of these appeals raise the same substantive issue as in the Adams case, namely whether the MAPs constitute income on which the respective appellants were taxable under s 609 ITTOIA.

18. On 18 November 2024, the Tribunal directed that 11 of the appeals of Scion MAP Appellants be stayed until 90 days after the case management decision expected to be given in the Adams case following a case management hearing that was due to be held in the Adams case on 21 January 2025. The appeals to be stayed were listed in a document referred to as the “Schedule of Scion Appellants”. Two further appellants were subsequently added to that schedule.

19. On 21 January 2025, the case management conference was held in the Adams case. Following this, on 28 January 2025, the FTT in the Adams case issued directions which included a direction requiring HMRC to provide copies of the Transaction Documents to the appellant in the Adams case within 28 days.

20. On 14 February 2025, HMRC disclosed the Transaction Documents to the appellant in the Adams case.

21. The Appellant in the present proceedings says that he subsequently became aware that HMRC had disclosed the Transaction Documents in the Adams case, and that he subsequently obtained copies of those documents himself. His position is that he would not have received the copies of these documents but for their disclosure by HMRC in the Adams case.

22. On 17 June 2025, the Appellant commenced the present Tribunal appeal proceedings, to appeal against the partial closure notice for the tax year ended 5 April 2010 and final closure notices for the tax years ended 5 April 2011 to 2015 inclusive. The Appellant acknowledges that his appeal raises the same substantive issue as the Adams case and the other appeals in the Schedule of Scion Appellants. His notice of appeal indicates that his appeal relies on the Transaction Documents.

23. The Appellant’s notice of appeal was accompanied by his application for permission to notify a late appeal. That application states that “It was not until after the Appellant was made aware that HMRC had provided copies of the Missing Transaction Documents to another participant in the Scion Arrangements [in the Adams case] and was able to obtain sight of these documents, that he was able to obtain legal advice as regards the potential impact of those documents on his appeal”, and that he then acted timeously in obtaining such professional legal advice and bringing his appeal.

24. On 5 August 2025, the FTT directed that the stay of the appeals listed in the Schedule of Scion Appellants be extended until after the final determination of the appeal in the Adams case. The Tribunal understands the effect of this direction to be as follows. In the case of those appeals listed in the Schedule of Scion Appellants that have been brought out of time, the applications for permission to bring a late appeal will not be decided until after the final determination of the Adams case. In the case of those appeals listed in the Schedule of Scion Appellants that raise other ancillary issues, those ancillary issues will be decided, if and to the extent necessary, only after the final determination of the Adams case.

25. On 23 September 2025, the Appellant’s representative wrote to HMRC proposing that the Appellant’s appeal be added to the Schedule of Scion Appeals. On 29 September 2026, HMRC responded to the Appellant’s representative that they did not agree.

26. On 10 November 2025, HMRC submitted their notice of objection to the Appellant’s application for permission to bring a late appeal.

27. On 12 November 2025, the Appellant’s representative applied to the Tribunal to add the Appellant’s appeal to the Schedule of Scion Appeals.

28. On 6 January 2026, the Tribunal made case management directions for the hearing of the Appellant’s application for permission to bring a late appeal.

29. On 12 January 2026, the Appellant made an application to the Tribunal seeking directions that the 6 January 2026 directions be set aside, and that the Appellant’s 12 November 2025 application be considered prior to the application for permission to bring a late appeal. On 23 February 2026, HMRC filed representations opposing this application, to which the Appellant replied on 24 February 2026.

30. On 13 April 2026, the Tribunal issued directions refusing the Appellant’s applications dated 12 November 2025 and 12 January 2026, and providing for the hearing of the Appellant’s application for permission to bring a late appeal to proceed. The Tribunal stated in these directions that it considered that “In the circumstances of this particular appeal … the overriding objective is best served by first determining the application for permission to submit a late appeal”.

31. The Tribunal is informed that the substantive hearing in the Adams case was held from 14-17 September 2026, and that the decision in that case is awaited.

32. The hearing of the Appellant’s application for permission to bring a late appeal, on which this decision is now given, was held on 23 October 2026. The Appellant produced a witness statement dated 15 June 2026 (the “Appellant’s witness statement”) and gave oral evidence at the hearing. For the hearing, the Tribunal was provided with a hearing bundle of 1,239 pages, a further bundle of exhibits to the Appellant’s witness statement of 729 pages, an authorities bundle of 595 pages, and a skeleton arguments of the Appellant dated 15 October 2026 (the “Appellant’s skeleton argument”).

The law

Legislation

33. Section 49G of the Taxes Management Act 1970 relevantly provides:

(1) This section applies if—

(a) HMRC have given notice of the conclusions of a review in accordance with section 49E …

(2) The appellant may notify the appeal to the tribunal within the post-review period.

(3) If the post-review period has ended, the appellant may notify the appeal to the tribunal only if the tribunal gives permission.

…

(5) In this section “post-review period” means—

(a) in a case falling within subsection (1)(a), the period of 30 days beginning with the date of the document in which HMRC give notice of the conclusions of the review in accordance with section 49E(6) …

Guidance given by the Upper Tribunal

34. The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) has given the following guidance to the FTT (see Martland v Revenue and Customs [2018] UKUT 178 (TCC) at especially [44]-[47]; Revenue and Customs v Katib [2019] UKUT 189 (TCC) (“Katib”) at especially [17]; Medpro Healthcare Ltd v Revenue and Customs [2026] EWCA Civ 14 (“Medpro”) at especially [45], [57]-[59], [60], [61]).

(1) The starting point is that an application for permission to appeal out of time should not be granted unless the FTT is satisfied on balance that it should be, but there is no requirement that circumstances be exceptional before the FTT can grant such an application.

(2) In considering whether an application for permission to appeal out of time should be granted, the FTT should follow the following three-stage process:

(a) establish the length of the delay;

(b) establish the reason(s) why the default occurred;

(c) evaluate all the circumstances of the case in a balancing exercise that assesses the merits of the reason(s) for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission.

(3) If the length of delay is very short, that is to say, neither serious nor significant, then the FTT is unlikely to need to spend much time on the second and third stages in (2) above, although some consideration of the second and third stages is required even for very short delays.

(4) The balancing exercise in the third stage in (2) above should take account of the following.

(a) The FTT should take into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.

(b) The FTT must exercise its judicial discretion taking account of all relevant factors, and there is no particular checklist to be followed.

(c) The FTT should normally decline to embark on an investigation of the merits of the appeal and firmly discourage argument directed to them. However, in those cases where the FTT can see without much investigation that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak, the FTT can have regard to that obvious strength or weakness. This is a matter that goes to the question of prejudice, since there is much greater prejudice for an applicant to lose the opportunity of putting forward a really strong case than a very weak one. Consequently:

(i) if the appeal has some merit, the FTT should at least consider in outline the arguments which the applicant wishes to put forward and the respondents’ reply to them so that it can form a general impression of its strength or weakness to weigh in the balance, and the applicant should be afforded the opportunity to persuade the FTT that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his/her favour and the respondents the corresponding opportunity to point out the weakness of the applicant’s case; but

(ii) the FTT should not take into account evidence which is in dispute, and should not descend into a detailed analysis of the underlying merits of the appeal.

(d) Shortage of funds (and consequent inability to instruct a professional adviser), and the fact that the applicant is a litigant in person, should not of itself generally carry any weight in the FTT’s consideration of the reasonableness of the applicant’s explanation of the delay.

(e) The fact that refusal of permission to bring a great appeal would cause financial hardship to the applicant is generally insufficient to justify a late appeal, as this is a common feature of many appeals.

35. The FTT may depart from the above guidance if it gives sound reasons for doing so (Medpro at [45], [60], [61]).

Application of law

36. In an application for permission to bring a late appeal, the burden is on the applicant to establish to the Tribunal’s satisfaction that permission should be granted.

(1) The burden is on the applicant for permission to bring a late appeal to persuade the Tribunal that in all the circumstances, the application should be granted (see, by analogy, Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1537, [2014] 1 WLR 795 at [12], quoted and approved in Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906 (“Denton”) at [12] and [24]). There is no burden on the Respondents to persuade the Tribunal that permission should not be granted. If the applicant fails to persuade the Tribunal, the application will be refused (see paragraph 34(1) above).

(2) In accordance with ordinary principles, except where facts are agreed by both parties, the claimed facts on which the application is based must be established by the applicant by evidence according to the standard of proof of a balance of probability. The Respondents are not required to prove that facts claimed by the applicant are not correct.

(3) The Tribunal when hearing one case cannot take judicial notice of procedural developments in another case before the FTT or another court or tribunal. If an applicant for permission to bring a late appeal wishes to rely on developments that are said to have taken place in another case before the Tribunal or before another court or tribunal, the applicant must provide evidence of those developments.

37. The Tribunal should adopt neither an unduly draconian approach nor an unduly relaxed approach to applications for permission to bring late appeals: rules and rule compliance should not be trip wires, and compliance is not an end in itself that is superior to doing justice in the particular case. Permission for a late appeal can be given even if there is no good reason for the delay, if it would be manifestly unjust and disproportionate to refuse permission. (See, by analogy, Denton at [37]-[38].)

38. It is generally insufficient to justify a late appeal that the time limit for appealing was missed because an adviser was incompetent, did not give proper advice, failed to appeal on time, and/or told the applicant that matters were in hand when they were not. In most cases, failures by an applicant’s adviser should be treated as failures by the litigant because (i) it is better that it be the client than another party to the litigation that suffers from the failures of the former’s adviser; (ii) the disgruntled client may in appropriate cases have a remedy against the adviser in damages or in respect of wasted costs; and (iii) it would become a charter for the incompetent if the position were otherwise. (See Katib at [49], [52]-[61].)

39. The question whether permission for a late appeal should be granted in a particular case should be determined independently in relation to that particular appeal. The fact that the appeal raises issues that are raised also in other pending appeals, and the fact that the appeal could therefore conveniently be heard together with those other appeals, is not a reason for granting permission to bring a late appeal in a case where permission would otherwise be refused. Otherwise, the question whether a late appeal should be permitted could turn on the happenstance that, at the time the application is considered, there are other appeals to which it might be joined, which would be unfair. (See the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Revenue and Customs v Websons (8) Ltd [2020] UKUT 154 (TCC) at [46]-[49], which prevails over any contrary authority of the FTT (the Appellant cited Cummine v HMRC [2021] UKFTT 0067 (TC) at [118(5)], and Mateola v HMRC [2019] UKFTT 179 (TC) at [82]).

Arguments of the parties

Arguments of the Appellant

40. The Appellant argues as follows.

41. The reasons why the appeal was late are that (1) the Appellant was advised, and reasonably accepted such advice as accurate, that the dispute in respect of the potential tax consequences of MAPs was being resolved via correspondence with HMRC; and (2) the review conclusion letter was based on HMRC’s interpretation of the Transaction Documents, which documents HMRC refused to disclose and did not disclose until 14 February 2025, such that it was only after that date that the Appellant was able to obtain advice in respect of the impact of those documents on his tax affairs and prepare grounds of appeal that addressed these documents.

42. It is not a precondition for permission being granted by the Tribunal that it is established that the reasons for the delay are “good” (relying on Animal Comfort Ltd v HMRC [2026] UKFTT 01377 (TC), at [95]). In this case, the reasons for the delay are good or, at the very least, understandable.

43. In the light of the newly obtained documents, the Appellant’s case is strong. These documents demonstrate conclusively that the Appellant never obtained an entitlement to the MAPs consequent on his participation in the Scion Arrangements. The HMRC case is weak; it is simply bare assertion. HMRC would therefore obtain a substantial windfall in the event that it is able to collect the amounts of tax and interest.

44. There would be little or no prejudice occasioned to HMRC if the late appeal is allowed. The other appeals on the Schedule of Scion Appellants raise the same substantive issue, and these other appeals will need to be dealt with by HMRC in any event. HMRC’s resources would therefore not be diverted from considering in-time appeals in order to consider the Appellant’s appeal.

45. There would be considerable prejudice to the Appellant if his late appeal is not allowed to proceed. He has incurred costs and time seeking to resolve the issues with HMRC without recourse to the Tribunal. It is common ground that no MAPs were actually received by the Appellant pursuant to the Scion Scheme, such that if he cannot appeal, he will be liable to tax on income that may never have arisen, that he did not receive, and to which he had no entitlement. The quantum of tax (and interest) at stake is highly significant for an individual taxpayer, who is by no means a high net worth individual. It would be a harsh result for him if he is not allowed to proceed.

46. If this late appeal application is allowed, the resulting litigation could be efficiently and proportionately managed by adding the present appeal to the Schedule of Scion Appellants.

Arguments of HMRC

47. HMRC argue as follows.

48. The other appeals in the Schedule of Scion Appellants were all brought before disclosure of the Transaction Documents was directed by the FTT in the Adams case. No explanation has been provided by the Appellant as to why he could not similarly have brought his appeal before this occurred, when the other appellants were all able to do so.

49. Even after HMRC disclosed the Transaction Documents in the Adams case in February 2025, the Appellant did not act timeously since his appeal was not filed until June 2025. The bringing of the appeal was not contingent or predicated upon the resolution of any separate appeal matters before the Tribunal.

50. If a late appeal is allowed, HMRC would be prejudiced in that they will have to divert resources to defend an appeal which they were entitled to consider closed, especially given the significant length of the delay. Other taxpayers will be prejudiced as the resources of HMRC and the Tribunal that would otherwise have been used in respect of those who have made appeals in accordance with statutory time limits will be diverted to consider the Appellant’s appeal.

51. Allowing such a late appeal would be inconsistent with the principles of good administration of justice which require litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost. HMRC should be entitled to rely on the time limits set out in legislation.

Determination

52. The length of the delay in bringing this appeal was 13 months and 28 days.

(1) It is common ground that this was the length of the period of delay, calculated as the period from the expiry of the time limit for appealing (30 days from the date of the review conclusion letter dated 21 March 2024) until the date of filing of the Tribunal notice of appeal in this case (17 June 2025).

(2) It is also common ground that the length of the delay is “serious and significant” within the meaning of the Upper Tribunal’s guidance (see paragraph 34(3) above).

53. The Appellant bears the burden of establishing the facts on which he relies in support of his application for permission to bring a late appeal (paragraph 36(2) and (3) above). The Tribunal’s findings of fact in this decision are based on the evidence presented by the Appellant in support of this application for permission to bring a late appeal, and these findings of fact are made solely for purposes of this decision on that application.

54. In determining the reasons for the delay, the Tribunal finds that it needs to consider separately (1) the period from the time of expiry of the deadline for appealing to the Tribunal (April 2024) until the time that the Appellant obtained copies of the Transaction Documents (said to be approximately Spring 2025), and (2) the period from the time that the Appellant obtained copies of the Transaction Documents (said to be approximately Spring 2025) until the time that he commenced these Tribunal proceedings (17 June 2025).

55. In relation to the first of these periods, there is little evidence concerning the Appellant’s state of mind, and such evidence as there is lacks detail.

(1) The Appellant’s original application for permission to notify a late appeal, which accompanied the notice of appeal filed on 17 June 2025, does not address this first period. It addresses the second of these two periods only, stating simply that “It was not until after the Appellant was made aware that HMRC had provided copies of the Missing Transaction Documents to another participant in the Scion Arrangements and was able to obtain sight of these documents, that he was able to obtain legal advice as regards the potential impact of those documents on his appeal”.

(2) The Appellant’s witness statement says in relation to this first period: “EP [Evelyn Partners] was advising me at this time. It was liaising with HMRC, particularly HMRC’s debt management team, and particularly in relation to seeking to agree a payment plan with HMRC in relation to my tax liabilities. I understood that it was addressing all tax related matters on my behalf and I was not made aware of any steps or action that I needed to take in relation to the Scion arrangements”.

(3) The Appellant’s skeleton argument does not address this first period, other than to say that “Mr. Djalili was advised, and accepted such advice as accurate, that the dispute in respect of the potential tax consequences of MAPs was being resolved via correspondence with HMRC”, and that “It was reasonable for Mr. Djalili to have accepted as accurate the advice that he received that the dispute was being resolved via correspondence with HMRC”.

(4) In his oral evidence, the Appellant confirmed that he had received the 21 March 2024 HMRC review conclusion letter and had personally read it, and that he was aware at the time of the 30-day time limit for appealing which was stated in that letter. He confirmed that Evelyn Partners were his tax advisers at the time, and said that they are still his tax advisers today. He further said that shortly after he received the review conclusion letter, he had a telephone conversation with Evelyn Partners, in which he was advised that he would have to wait for the Transaction Documents before appealing to the Tribunal.

(5) In his oral evidence, the Appellant also said that he was at the time a member of a group called the “Sole Trader Action Group” (“STAG”). The 10 November 2023 letter from Evelyn Partners to HMRC accepting the offer of a statutory review refers to this group as “a group of taxpayers with similar tax affairs in relation to the Scion arrangements”. There is however little evidence about this group before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was informed that other Scion MAP Appellants are members of STAG, and that Evelyn Partners acts for at least some of the other Scion MAP Appellants on the Schedule of Scion Appellants. In his oral evidence, the Appellant said that his intention had been to go along with what the rest of the STAG group were doing, and to appeal when the rest of the STAG group appealed, but that other members of the STAG group then submitted their Tribunal appeals without him being informed of this. He said that he was surprised when he subsequently learned that other STAG group members had commenced Tribunal appeals without him being informed. He said that he “somehow fell out of the STAG group” and did not understand how this had happened. At one point in his oral evidence he said “It could be my fault but I do not understand why”. At another point he said that he found himself “outside the friendship group” and did not understand what he had done.

56. On its consideration of the evidence, the Tribunal finds on a balance of probability that the Appellant initially decided for a period of about 10-13 months not to appeal.

(1) Of the two periods of delay in this case (see paragraph 54 above), by far the longest was this first period from the time of expiry of the deadline for appealing to the Tribunal (April 2024) until the time that the Appellant obtained copies of the Transaction Documents. It will have been apparent to the Appellant that the justification for this first period of delay would be a highly important issue in determining the application for permission to bring a late appeal. The Tribunal finds that the weight that it can attach to the Appellant’s evidence concerning the reasons for the delay in this period is undermined by the failure of the Appellant to address this period in the original application for permission to notify a late appeal, and by his failure to address in his witness statement the specific matters that he subsequently described in his oral evidence (the telephone call with Evelyn Partners and his reliance on STAG), and the lack of any further evidence in relation to those matters.

(2) The Appellant stated in oral evidence that Evelyn Partners are still “very much” his tax advisers, and he has expressed no dissatisfaction with the service he has received from them. Given that Evelyn Partners act also for some of the other Scion MAP Appellants who did bring appeals in 2024, it is unlikely that they would have failed to inform the Appellant that he should appeal in 2024, if the Appellant had indicated to them an inclination to appeal whenever the time was right. The fact that other clients of Evelyn Partners appealed in 2024 before the Transaction Documents had been disclosed in the Adams case also makes it unlikely that Evelyn Partners would have advised the Appellant in the present proceedings that he should not appeal until the Transaction Documents had been obtained. Indeed, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Evelyn Partners had reason to think, at the time that the other the other Scion MAP Appellants for whom they acted filed their appeals in 2024, that the Transaction Documents ever would be disclosed by HMRC. The Tribunal understands that the application for disclosure in the Adams case was made only in January 2025.

(3) The Appellant’s witness statement says that Evelyn Partners were at the time in particular “liaising with HMRC, particularly HMRC’s debt management team, and particularly in relation to seeking to agree a payment plan with HMRC in relation to my tax liabilities”. This wording is consistent with an intention on the part of the Appellant not to appeal, but instead to find a way to pay the tax that had been assessed. The general statement in his witness statement that “I understood that [Evelyn Partners] was addressing all tax related matters on my behalf” is not evidence of any positive belief on the part of the Appellant that Evelyn Partners had taken on the responsibility of advising him in due course to bring a Tribunal appeal, if and when the time was right.

(4) As to the Appellant’s claimed reliance on the STAG group, the vagueness of the evidence makes it impossible for the Tribunal to make findings about exactly what happened. The Tribunal considers it unlikely that STAG ever advised the Appellant not to appeal until the Transaction Documents were obtained even if this meant allowing the time limit for a Tribunal appeal to expire, since other STAG members appealed before the Transaction Documents were obtained, and a majority of those on the Schedule of Scion Appellants brought these appeals in time.

(5) In fact, the Appellant does not contend that STAG ever advised him to delay appealing, but rather, he claims that STAG simply failed to inform him that other STAG members were appealing. The Tribunal is unable to conclude on the evidence that circumstances existed that made it reasonable for the Appellant to expect that he would be informed by STAG whenever other STAG members brought Tribunal appeals. The Appellant’s evidence that he does not know why STAG did not inform him is not a sufficient basis for a finding by the Tribunal that it was reasonable for him to expect this. That is all the more so, given that the Appellant said at one point in his evidence that “It could be my fault”.

(6) The Tribunal finds it improbable that a group like STAG would not have informed the Appellant that other STAG members were bringing in-time appeals, if STAG was generally informing its members of what other members were doing in relation to Tribunal appeals, and if the Appellant was an active member of the group who was known by other members of the group to be one of those who intended to appeal in line with the other group members.

(7) The Tribunal finds that the evidence is more consistent with the Appellant having formed an initial intention not to bring a Tribunal appeal. The Appellant appears to have revisited that decision after he obtained a copy of the Transaction Documents, which was some 10-13 months after expiry of the deadline for appealing (see paragraph 57(3) below).

57. In relation to the second of the periods referred to in paragraph 54 above, namely the period from the time that the Appellant obtained copies of the Transaction Documents until the date that he filed his appeal, the Tribunal is unable to conclude that he acted timeously.

(1) The Appellant’s evidence is vague about when and how he obtained the Transaction Documents, and about when he learned that other STAG members had appealed. The Transaction Documents were disclosed by HMRC to the appellant in the Adams case in February 2025. The Appellant said in oral evidence that he could not remember how he himself then obtained a copy of them, but that he had obtained a copy in about Spring 2025, and possibly in April or May 2025.

(2) Given the importance that the Appellant is said to attach to his desire to bring a late appeal, the Tribunal finds it implausible that he would not remember how and when he obtained a copy of the Transaction Documents, or not remember exactly what he did after he received them. The Appellant’s claimed inability to remember or provide these details undermines the weight that the Tribunal can attach to his evidence.

(3) The absence of any evidence as to exactly when the Appellant received a copy of the Transaction Documents makes it impossible for the Tribunal to determine how long it took for him thereafter to file his appeal. The Transaction Documents were disclosed by HMRC to the appellant in the Adams case in February 2024, some 4 months before the Appellant filed his notice of appeal with the Tribunal. Even if it is accepted that the Appellant only received a copy of the documents as a result of the disclosure by HMRC in the Adams case, the Appellant might have had the documents any time after 14 February 2025. If he received his copy in February 2025, then the first of the periods referred to in paragraph 54 above lasted some 10 months, and the second period lasted some 4 months. If he received his copy in May 2025, then the first of the periods referred to in paragraph 54 above lasted some 13 months, and the second period lasted only 1 month. The Tribunal is unwilling to conclude that he only received his copy in April or May 2025, merely because he claims that he cannot remember exactly how and when he received them. The Tribunal proceeds on the basis that he had them for possibly up to 4 months before bringing his Tribunal appeal.

(4) Given that the Appellant’s appeal raises the same substantive issue as the appeals of other members of the STAG group, given that Evelyn Partners represents also some of the other members of the STAG group who had already filed appeals in 2024, and given that the Appellant’s legal representative is also the legal representative of the appellant in the Adams case, as well as of other Scion MAP Appellants, there is no apparent reason why it should have taken any substantial length of time for the Appellant in the present proceedings to obtain legal advice on the Transaction Documents or to formulate grounds of appeal. The Tribunal does not consider that it should have taken more than a month to do so.

(5) The Tribunal is therefore unable to conclude on the evidence that he acted timeously after receiving a copy of the Transaction Documents.

58. Upon evaluation of all the circumstances of the case and all relevant factors, including an assessment of the merits of the reasons given for the delay and the prejudice which would be caused to both parties by granting or refusing permission to appeal out of time, the Tribunal is not satisfied on balance that permission should be granted, and permission is accordingly refused (see paragraphs 34(1) and 36(1) above).

(1) The Tribunal takes into account the particular importance of the need for litigation to be conducted efficiently and at proportionate cost, and for statutory time limits to be respected.

(2) The Tribunal takes into account the length of the period of the delay (see paragraph 52 above). In general, the longer the period of delay, the more compelling the reasons for allowing a late appeal will need to be in order to justify permission being granted. Significant justification for a late appeal would be required in this case given the length of the delay.

(3) The Tribunal takes into account that the Appellant’s appeal is based on documents that were not in his possession, but which were in the possession of HMRC, at the time that the time-limit for appealing expired. The Tribunal also takes into account that these documents were specifically referred to in the Appellant’s request for a statutory review and in the HMRC review conclusion letter (paragraphs 14 and 16 above). However, there are factors that limit the weight that can be given to this consideration.

(a) The Appellant was aware of the Transaction Documents and of their claimed significance for his case by 10 November 2023, the date of his request for statutory review which expressly refers to them. That letter asked HMRC to provide the Appellant with copies of the Transaction Documents, and it appears to be undisputed that HMRC did not do so. However, there is no evidence of the Appellant ever making any other request to HMRC for copies of these documents. Nor is there any evidence of the Appellant ever taking steps to obtain these documents by other means. The Appellant’s witness statement says that he just “concluded” that he would not be able to obtain copies of the documents from Scion, because it “seemed unlikely” that Scion would be willing to help, and “seemed to me, at the least, reasonably unlikely” that Scion would have retained copies of the documents in any event. Thus, the only evidence of any active step being taken by the Appellant to obtain these documents prior to the deadline for appealing consists of the single request made to HMRC in the letter requesting statutory review.

(b) The Appellant did not need to wait until he had a copy of the Transaction Documents before deciding to bring a Tribunal appeal. Other Scion MAP Appellants made in-time appeals before obtaining a copy of the Transaction Documents.

(4) The Tribunal has found on the evidence that for an initial period of some 10-13 months, the Appellant decided not to appeal to the Tribunal (paragraph 56 above). In circumstances where an appellant initially decides not to appeal, and has a change or mind or change of heart some time after the time limit for appealing has expired, there will generally be no justification for allowing a late appeal. While this may not be an invariable rule, very particular circumstances would be needed to justify allowing a late appeal in such a situation.

(5) The Tribunal has been unable to find that the Appellant acted timeously after obtaining a copy of the Transaction Documents (paragraph 57 above).

(6) In principle, the Tribunal cannot give weight to the fact that there are other appeals raising similar issues pending before the FTT (see paragraph 39 above).

(7) The Tribunal takes into account the fact that some of the other appeals on the Schedule of Scion Appeals are also late appeals, and that the question of whether permission to bring a late appeal should be granted in these other cases has been stayed pending the final determination of the appeal in the Adams case (see paragraphs 18 and 24 above). The Appellant asks why his case should be treated differently to the other late appeals. However, it has already been decided by the Tribunal in its directions dated 13 April 2026 that the Appellant’s application for a late appeal will not be stayed behind the final determination of the appeal in the Adams case, and that that application is to be decided now (see paragraphs 27-30 above). The present hearing of this late appeal application is not an occasion to revisit the directions dated 13 April 2026. This Tribunal has to decide now whether permission to bring a late appeal will be granted to this Appellant. The Tribunal cannot know what decision will be taken in relation to the applications for late appeals of the other Appellants.

(8) The Tribunal finds that it can cannot give significant weight to the claimed fact that the Appellant has incurred costs and time seeking to resolve the issues with HMRC without recourse to the Tribunal, the claimed fact that the quantum of tax (and interest) at stake is significant for the Appellant, or the claim that it would be a harsh result for the Appellant if he is not allowed to proceed with his appeal to the Tribunal. The guidance issued by the Upper Tribunal indicates that these are generally not matters that of themselves could justify a late appeal (see paragraph 34(4)(e) above). The Tribunal finds that matters such as these might be of some potential relevance when considering the issue of prejudice. For instance, an appellant who is denied the possibility of appealing against a decision that will cause that person’s bankruptcy might be said to suffer greater prejudice than an appellant who is denied the possibility of appealing against a decision imposing a trivial liability. Similarly, an appellant who has already invested large amounts in contesting an HMRC decision at the pre-Tribunal stage will suffer greater prejudice from a decision to refuse a late appeal than an appellant who has so far spent little or nothing on the matter. However, the argument works both ways. The greater the amount that is at stake for an appellant, the more it is to be expected that the appellant will act diligently to protect that interest. The Tribunal is aware of the amount at stake in the appeal, but has no detailed evidence of the Appellant’s means or the amounts that he has invested in this matter so far.

(9) The Appellant has had the opportunity to seek to persuade the Tribunal that the merits of the appeal are on the face of it overwhelmingly in his favour, and the Appellant has addressed the prima facie merits of the appeal. The Tribunal has given consideration to the Appellant’s submissions in this respect. However, the Tribunal finds that without significantly more detailed consideration of the arguments on the merits, it is unable to conclude that the grounds of appeal are either very strong or very weak. In the circumstances, it would be inappropriate for the Tribunal to examine the merits of the proposed appeal in further detail (see paragraph 34(4)(c) above).

(10) The Tribunal takes into account the potential prejudice to HMRC of allowing the late appeal. In this particular case, the Tribunal finds this consideration to be accounted for adequately under consideration (1) above. Every late appeal requires HMRC to devote resources to a matter that HMRC would otherwise be entitled to regard as closed.

(11) The Tribunal takes into account the consideration in paragraph 37 above.

59. The Tribunal finds that there are no sound reasons for departing from the guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in relation to applications for late appeals.

RIGHT TO APPLY FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL

60. This document contains full findings of fact and reasons for the decision. Any party dissatisfied with this decision has a right to apply for permission to appeal against it pursuant to Rule 39 of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009. The application must be received by this Tribunal not later than 56 days after this decision is sent to that party. The parties are referred to “Guidance to accompany a Decision from the First-tier Tribunal (Tax Chamber)” which accompanies and forms part of this decision notice.

Release date:

28 October 2026

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