Administrative United Kingdom
MR H.C. v THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Appeal Numbers: PA/73406/2024
PA/73408/2024
PA/73409/2024
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Heard at Nottingham Decision Promulgated
On 02/09/2026 On 31/10/2026
Before
First-tier tribunal judge mills
Between
Mr H.C.
Master M.C.
Miss K.C.
(anonymity direction Made)
Appellant
and
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Panagiotopolou, counsel instructed by Shanti & Co. Solicitors
For the Respondent: No appearance
DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. The Appellants are citizens of Turkey, from the city of Gaziantep. The first appellant (hereafter ‘the appellant’) was born in 1995 and is now 31 years of age. He arrived in the UK on 29/06/2023 in the company of his family members, being his wife, Mrs G.C, along with their two children, Master M.C. (now aged 8) and Miss K.C. (now aged 4). While the appellant’s wife is dependent upon his appeal, the two children have appealed in their own right, although it is not disputed that any claimed risk for them arises from their father’s situation.
2. The appellant is Kurdish, and of the Alevi faith. He claims to have faced discrimination as a result of his ethnicity and religion throughout his life in Turkey, particularly during his compulsory military service, and that these experiences made him sympathetic towards those who campaigned for equality for Kurds and other minority groups in Turkey. He says these views became further entrenched when, having married his wife who is of Turkish ethnicity, the couple faced yet further discrimination for this reason.
3. The appellant says he became actively involved in supporting the HDP (Halkların Demokratik Partisi, or ‘Peoples' Democratic Party’) from 2020 onwards. The HDP was founded in 2012, as the latest political party attempting to represent the interests of Kurds in Turkey. The HDP, like many of its predecessors, was perceived by the Turkish government as the political wing of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê, or ‘Kurdistan Workers' Party’), an armed group who had been involved in sporadic guerilla warfare with the Turkish state since it was itself founded in 1978, and are thus designated as a terrorist group by Turkey. As a result, some supporters of the HDP, despite it never having been formally banned, are reported to have been conflated by the Turkish government with supporters of the PKK, thus perceived as being at least sympathetic to terrorism, and so targeted for political repression.
4. As an HDP supporter, the appellant says he attended various protests and marches, as well as distributing leaflets to promote the party’s activities. Though such activities were legal he says that they were viewed with suspicion by the authorities, and that as a result his involvement in them he was beaten by the police on several occasions.
5. He also says that he was detained on two separate occasions, the first being on 21/03/2023 when attending Newroz celebrations, where he was holding the Kurdish flag while shouting Kurdish slogans, following which he was arrested and detained for two days by the police. During this detention he says that he was fingerprinted and photographed, further beaten, and accused of being a PKK supporter, which he denied. He says he was finally released without charge, but with a warning that he must cease his ‘PKK activities’, and that they would be monitoring him.
6. The appellant explains that his second detention began on 10/6/2023, when the authorities attended his family home. He says that he was beaten in front of his wife and their then 5-year-old son, and was then dragged out of the house and taken to the police station. Once there, he was again interrogated and accused of being a PKK supporter, being told that his name had been provided to them by an informer. He again denied any link to the PKK, and was again subjected to repeated beatings.
7. The appellant says that he was eventually released after three days, having been worn down by the ill-treatment received to the point that he agreed to their condition that he become a police informer himself. He says he was also made to sign a blank page, which he was warned could be turned into a confession that they could use to have him thrown into prison is he did not follow their instructions. He says they also threatened to harm his family if he did not co-operate with them.
8. The appellant explains that he did not intend to comply with the condition, and instead having returned home immediately began to plan for his family’s escape from Turkey. He explains that his father and brother assisted them to leave Gaziantep to travel to Istanbul, where they obtained the help of a smuggler who put the family into the back of a lorry on 22/06/2023, in which they left Turkey to travel into Europe. He says that the smuggler assisted them in travelling all the way to the ‘jungle’ in northern France, from where they crossed the Channel on a small boat on 29/06/2023, claiming asylum on arrival in the UK.
9. The appellant says that his parents have informed him that the police have come the family home looking for him since his departure, and told them that they would prosecute him for his connection to the PKK on his return to Turkey.
10. In addition, the appellant says that he has continued his political activities since in the UK, attending various demonstrations with other Kurds in London, though not as many as he would have wished given that the family were dispersed to Nottingham and, as his wife is very unwell (with arthritis, stage 2/3 kidney disease, and hypertension), most of his time is spent looking after the children. He relies both on the problems he had in Turkey, and his belief that his sur place activities will be known to the Turkish authorities, to contend that he would undoubtedly be persecuted if returned.
11. The appellant also relies on a human rights claim under Article 8 of the ECHR, stating that it is in his children’s best interest to remain in the UK, and that the family would face very significant obstacles to returning to Turkey, given that he would very likely face imprisonment, while his wife is not well enough to look after the children on her own, and could not turn to her family for support as they ostracised her due to her decision to marry a person of a different ethnicity and faith.
12. The Appellant underwent a screening interview on 02/07/2023, and a full asylum interview on 22/08/2024. The respondent refused the appellants’ claims in a joint decision issued on 01/10/2024. In her decision, the respondent accepted that the appellant was a Kurd from Turkey, and did not dispute that he was also of the Alevi faith. However, she did not accept that the appellant had been politically active with the HDP, nor that he had been targeted by the Turkish authorities as a consequence. The respondent did not accept that the appellant, or any of his other family members, would be at risk of persecution or ill-treatment if returned to Turkey. The claim was also considered on human rights grounds under both Articles 3 & 8 of the ECHR, and rejected on both, with the view being taken that it was safe and proportionate for the whole family to return to their country of origin together.
13. The Appellant appealed against that decision, leading to the present proceedings. As stated above his two children have each lodged separate appeals, while his wife is dependent upon his own appeal, but the family group has been linked and case managed together throughout the appeal process, it being agreed that the children do not put forward any independent basis to fear return separate to their father’s issues with the Turkish government, and that as such it is appropriate to provide one combined judgment addressing all three appeals together.
14. The appellant’s representatives set out his case in a skeleton argument (ASA), supported by a bundle of further evidence uploaded to the online portal on 26/09/2025. The respondent reviewed that evidence but, in a document uploaded on 30/11/2025, she upheld the decision to refuse on all grounds. The review also raised a new point which had not been in the original decision, which was to dispute that the appellant belonged to the Alevi faith.
15. On 06/05/2026 the appellant’s representatives uploaded further evidence to the portal, consisting of an ‘additional bundle’, of 13 pages, primarily containing further evidence of the appellant’s sur place activity, as well as 11 videos showing him at demonstrations in the UK. On 25/08/2026 the appellant’s representatives uploaded a ‘supplementary bundle’ consisting of 23 pages, which again contained evidence of sur place political activity, but also documentation said to prove the appellant’s Alevi faith.
16. There was no further written review of the case by the respondent prior to the hearing.
HEARING
17. The appeal came before me, sitting at Nottingham, on 02/09/2026. This was a face-to-face hearing with the Appellant attending along with his representative, Ms Panagiotopolou of counsel, instructed by Shanti & Co. Solicitors.
18. The Appellant was assisted by a court-appointed interpreter speaking the Turkish language, with whom good understanding was established at the outset. The appellant did not bring any other witnesses to the hearing, including his wife who remained at home in order to care for their children.
19. The Respondent did not send a presenting officer to represent her at the hearing. An email was received by the Tribunal the day prior to the hearing, from the respondent’s Birmingham Presenting Officer’s Unit, stating that they were unable to provide anyone to cover my court that day due to staffing shortages. However, it was confirmed that they were not seeking adjournments of the hearings in my list, and were content for the Tribunal to proceed in their absence.
20. I paused to consider Procedure Rule 28, and whether it was just to proceed with the hearing in the absence of a representative for the respondent, given that credibility was in issue in the appeal, and also because there were documents submitted more recently in relation to which the respondent had not provided a written statement of her position. However, in light of the clear indication from the respondent that they were content for me to proceed, I concluded that it was in the interests of justice to do so.
21. In terms of documentary evidence in the appeal, I confirmed with Ms Panagiotopolou that she and I had the same documents, as follows:
(a) Stitched bundle, compiling the respondent’s bundle, ASA, and appellant’s first bundle, for a total of 392 pages;
(b) Appellant’s ‘additional bundle’, 13 pages, as well as 11 videos which I confirmed that I had viewed pre-hearing;
(c) Appellant’s ‘supplementary bundle’, 21 pages, as well as 5 pages of translations of documents in this bundle, submitted shortly thereafter;
22. Ms Panagiotopolou confirmed that she had no other evidence to submit, though she would be inviting me to have regard to the following documents which were not found within the bundle, but were freely available in the public domain:
(a) IA & others (Risk-Guidelines-Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT;
(b) Country Policy and Information Note – Turkey: Kurds – V5.0 – July 2025
(c) Country Policy and Information Note – Turkey: PKK – V6.0 – July 2025
(d) Country Policy and Information Note – Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party / Green Left Party (HDP/YSP) – V5.0 – October 2023
23. I confirmed that I would admit the late evidence, and also consider the online reports and country guidance referred to above.
24. It was agreed with Ms Panagiotopolou that the following issues were to be determined by the Tribunal in this appeal:
(a) Asylum (political opinion)
(i) Whether the Appellant’s account of being a supporter of the HDP, and of being arrested, detained and ill-treated for that reason, is credible.
(ii) The respondent accepts that if it is true, then the appellant will be at real risk of persecution by the Turkish state, such that there is no possibility of avoiding this risk of persecution through either an appeal to state protection, or through internal relocation.
(b) Humanitarian protection
(i) No free-standing claim.
(c) Article 3 ECHR
(i) On same grounds as asylum claim.
(d) Article 8 ECHR
(i) Very significant obstacles to integration under Paragraph PL.5.1(b)
(ii) Proportionality under Paragraph GEN.3.2, including consideration of the best interests of the appellant’s children.
25. I proceeded to hear the Appellant’s oral evidence. Ms Panagiotopolou confirmed that it was not contended that he was a vulnerable witness, and that no adjustments to the proceedings were required. She had the appellant identify himself and then adopt his witness statements, and indicated that she had no other questions for him.
26. In the absence of a presenting officer to undertake cross-examination, I considered the Surendran guidelines set out in the starred decision of MNM (Surendran guidelines for Adjudicators) (Kenya) [2000] UKIAT 00005. I took the view that the credibility issues raised in the respondent’s decision letter had all been the subject of specific response from the appellant in his detailed appeal statement, and so there was no need for me to request that Ms Panagiotopolou investigate those matters further, nor for me to put any questions to the appellant myself.
27. I indicated that I would take the respondent’s decision letter and later review as being their position in this appeal, and then invited closing submissions from Ms Panagiotopolou on behalf of the Appellant, before reserving my decision which I now provide with my written reasons. I confirm that I kept a note of proceedings which I have read to refresh my memory before producing this judgment.
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
28. In an asylum appeal, the appellant holds the burden of proof to show that they fall within the definition of a refugee found in the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006, read with Article 1(A) of the Refugee Convention. An appellant must show that they are outside of their country of nationality or former habitual residence, by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution and that they are unable or unwilling, owing to such fear, to avail themselves of the protection of that country. Persecution here means ill-treatment on the basis of either race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.
29. As this asylum claim was made after 28/06/2022, I must apply a two-stage approach to the standard of proof when considering whether the appellant is a refugee, pursuant to s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. The approach to be taken has recently been clarified by a presidential panel in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC), and is as follows:
“2. In an appeal to which s32 NABA 2022 applies (in which the claim for international protection was made after 28 June 2022) the proper approach is to address each of the statutory questions expressly and sequentially.
a) Question 1 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has a characteristic which could cause them to fear persecution for one of the five reasons set out in the Refugee Convention. This calls for a specific finding of fact about the asylum seeker.
b) Question 2 is whether, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant “does in fact fear” such persecution. This is the ‘subjective fear’ test.
c) Questions 3-5 are matters of objective evaluation and must each be determined on the lower standard of proof: ‘a reasonable degree of likelihood’; i.e. is it reasonably likely that there is:
(i) a risk of harm (question 3)
(ii) an absence of state protection (question 4), and
(iii) no reasonable internal flight alternative (question 5)
3. In answering question 1, it may often be relevant to consider evidence concerning events alleged to have taken place in the past as well as present circumstances.
4. Question 2 must be answered separately and requires assessment of the appellant’s credibility. The question of whether an appellant does in fact fear persecution may be informed by findings about the probable likelihood of the truth of their account of their past experiences; the likely truth of their account of their present circumstances; section 8 Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants etc) Act 2004; significant change in circumstances.
5. NABA does not require a decision maker to consider Questions 3-5 where Questions 1-2 have been answered in the negative, and a failure to do so will not be an error of law. However, the guidance set out in JCK that it may be a “sensible ‘belt and braces’ approach” to do so, is endorsed.
6. NABA does not displace established principles governing the assessment of evidence outlined in Karanakaran v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11 and does not require a decision-maker to decide whether each alleged material fact, taken in isolation, is more likely than not to be true.
7. When answering each of the five questions set out at sections 32(2)-32(5), the decision-maker must continue to evaluate the evidence in the round, taking all of the evidence into account and giving it whatever weight it is due. The only matters to be determined on the balance of probabilities are questions 1 and 2.”
30. As such it can be seen that, if satisfied to the civil standard that the appellant has a genuine subjective fear of persecution for a convention reason, I must go on to determine whether the appellant’s fear is objectively well-founded, applying the long-established lower standard of proof. This has been expressed in the authorities in various ways, including ‘a real risk’, 'a reasonable chance', or 'a serious possibility'. In MAH (Egypt) [2023] EWCA Civ 216, the Court of Appeal confirmed that this threshold is far below the civil standard of the balance of probabilities, and that “even a 10% chance that an applicant will face persecution may satisfy the test”.
31. In a Humanitarian Protection appeal, the burden of proof again rests on the appellant to satisfy the Tribunal that they are entitled to such protection under paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules. The lower standard of proof is applicable to this ground. An appellant must show that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if returned, they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm and that they are unable or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of the country of return, and that they cannot relocate internally to a safe area. Serious harm is defined as the death penalty, unlawful killing, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life due to indiscriminate violence arising from armed conflict.
32. The appellant also appeals on human rights grounds, relying on Article 3 (the prohibition on torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), where the lower standard of proof continues to be applicable, with the burden remaining on the appellant.
33. The appellant also relies on a claim to enjoy a private life in the UK that engages Article 8 of the ECHR. Any such rights are qualified, and my assessment must therefore involve a balancing exercise weighing that private life against the public interest in effective immigration control. I must first ascertain the correct position under the immigration rules, both because a finding that the appellant meets the rules will generally be determinative of the appeal, and also because the nature and extent of any failure to meet the rules will provide an indication of the appropriate weight to be attached to the public interest in the balance.
34. The appellant relies on the following part of the private life section of the immigration rules:
Paragraph PL 5.1 – Where the applicant is aged 18 or over on the date of application:
(b) where the applicant has not been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years, the decision maker must be satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave the UK.
35. If the appellant does not qualify under the rules, then the appeal will fail unless it is shown that the refusal of leave to remain would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant or his family members, such that the decision would not be proportionate, this being the test set out in GEN.3.2 of Appendix FM of the immigration rules, and approved by the Supreme Court in Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11. In asking this proportionality question I must take into account the statutory factors set out in S.117 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
36. In Article 8 cases the appellant holds the burden of proof to establish the factual circumstances on which they rely on the civil standard of proof, normally expressed as the balance of probabilities.
37. In the discharge of her immigration functions the Secretary of State is under a duty, by virtue of s.55 of the Borders Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, to have regard to the need to safeguard the welfare of children, and the Tribunal must also take this into account as a primary consideration when considering the proportionality of the respondent’s decision.
38. Guidance on the approach to be taken by judges to the interests of children was provided by Lady Hale in ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v SSHD [2011] UKSC 4. It was recognised that the need to treat the best interests of a child as ‘a primary consideration’ was not the same as making it ‘the primary consideration’, still less the ‘the paramount consideration’. Lady Hale said that this meant that identifying the child’s best interests would not lead inexorably to a decision in conformity with those interests. As such, provided that the Tribunal did not treat any other consideration as inherently more significant than the best interests of the children, it could conclude that the strength of the other considerations outweighed the interests of any affected children.
FINDINGS
39. A key element in assessing the credibility of a claim for asylum, is assessing the account given by an appellant against the background evidence relating to events in the country from which they have fled, in order to see if their claim is consistent with the country situation. I was referred by Ms Panagiotopolou to three of the respondent’s Country Policy and Information Notes (CPINs), namely “Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party/Green Left Party (HDP/YSP) – version 5” which was published in October 2023, as well as “Turkey: Kurds – version 5” and “Turkey: PKK – version 6”, both of which were published in July 2025, in support of her contention that the appellant’s account was indeed consistent with the situation in Turkey.
40. Having considered those sections of the CPINs to which I was referred, as well as the country guidance decision of IA & others (Risk-Guidelines-Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034 which, while now of some vintage, is agreed by the respondent in the CPINs to continue to reflect the position in Turkey today, I find that the appellant’s overall account is broadly consistent with the country information.
41. Specifically, such details as being supportive of Kurdish rights and so taking part in activities for the HDP, being detained following attendance at demonstrations, in particular around Newroz (Kurdish new year) celebrations, being interrogated and accused of being a PKK supporter and therefore a terrorist, facing physical violence in detention along with warnings of worse if he did not cease his activities, being released but then arbitrarily re-detained, as well as being forced to agree to act as a police informer, all accord with the background evidence of the Turkish government’s approach to Kurdish people.
42. This is an indicator of the potential credibility of the claim, though certainly not enough on its own, given that it stands to reason that even a fabricated claim would be rooted in real conflicts in an appellant’s country and area of origin, with which they are very likely to be familiar even if they were not directly involved. Nevertheless, I do place some weight upon this point when assessing the credibility of the account.
43. Turning to the various credibility issues raised by the respondent in her decision and letter and later review, I will consider each in turn, deciding if they are made out, and if so, how much weight they carry in my assessment. I set these issues out in no particular order, and confirm that I will only reach an overall conclusion on the credibility of the appellant’s account having considered all of the issues together in the round.
44. The first issue raised is that the appellant failed to mention any of his political activity, or subsequent problems with the Turkish authorities, in his original screening interview that took place soon after his arrival, only raising them for the first time in his substantive interview more than a year later.
45. This criticism is unquestionably accurate, with the appellant’s answers at the screening including that he had never been accused of having committed any criminal offences (Q5.3), had never been detained in any country (Q5.4), had never been involved in any political organisations (Q5.5), and had never been suspected of involvement in terrorism (Q5.7). At Q4.1, when asked to ‘briefly explain all of the reasons why you cannot return to your home country’, the appellant speaks only of issues with family as a result of the mixed ethnicity marriage.
46. Notwithstanding the well recognised shortcomings of screening interviews, and the necessary caution that must therefore be exercised in relation to them, I consider that the respondent is correct to say that, generally, an asylum seeker can be expected to give an account in the screening that is consistent with that which they later rely upon in their main interview and appeal, and any inconsistency will damage their credibility.
47. The appellant’s explanation in paragraph 22 of his appeal statement is firstly to blame the circumstances of the interview, namely that it took place soon after arrival when the family were tired and traumatised by their journey to the UK, and also via a telephone interpreter causing some difficulty in communication, a point which he raised at the outset of the main interview when asked to comment upon the screening.
48. While I appreciate that the journey may well have been traumatic, especially the final stretch in an overcrowded small boat with two young children, I do not accept that this is a reason not to have mentioned the political aspect of the claim in the screening, some two days after arrival, especially given that he was able to describe the mixed-marriage aspect in quite some detail. Nor do I accept that the telephone interpreter caused such a barrier that he was unable to mention the political claim, again because he had no difficulty in providing a detailed account of the rest of his claim.
49. It is of note that, by the time of the interview, the appellant was no longer even relying on the other part of the claim regarding ill-treatment from due to the mixed ethnicity marriage, seemingly accepting that the answer to any such problems was internal relocation, and that the appeal therefore turned on the political aspect. I consider that this is all the more reason why he should have mentioned it in the screening, and his failure to do so does point to this being a later, fabricated, embellishment.
50. The appellant goes on in his statement to suggest that he made a conscious choice not to mention the political aspect because he was concerned that the family made be promptly returned to Turkey, and that what he said in his interview might be conveyed to the Turkish authorities by the British government, thereby placing them at even greater risk on return. He implies the smugglers had indicated that this could happen.
51. I find that this explanation, at face value, can carry greater weight than the first, it being perhaps understandable that a person coming from a country with an authoritarian government, and with a claimed personal history of arbitrary detention and ill-treatment, would be hesitant about being fully open with the government officials of another country to which he had only just arrived. At the same time, the very fact that he had paid to get his family to the UK in order to seek asylum, would suggest that he must have thought that this was a safe country where he could trust the authorities to protect them, thus undermining this explanation.
52. In the circumstances, I do find that the failure to make any mention in his screening of his political activity, or the resulting problems with the Turkish authorities, which by the time of the appeal before me was effectively the sole ground on which he relied, does damage the appellant’s credibility.
53. The next point relied upon by the respondent in the decision is that the claim initially put forward was that the families of the appellant and his wife were both antagonistic towards them because they disapproved of their marriage due to their different ethnicities and religions, to the point that the appellant’s mother is said to have physically attacked his wife, but that this was inconsistent with the account he gave at the main interview his family had been supportive of them in relation to his political problems, and had actively assisted them in escaping the country. It was also considered to be inconsistent with his claim at the main interview to still be in regular contact with the family back in Turkey.
54. In paragraph 23 of his appeal statement the appellant responds by saying that these two things are not mutually exclusive, and the reality is that his family is antagonistic towards his wife, but was still willing to assist them when they faced being targeted by the Turkish state.
55. I consider this to be a relatively weak explanation. While I appreciate the possibility that family squabbles might be put aside when an outside threat arises, the account given in the screening was not that the wider families were simply antagonistic towards the marriage of the appellant and his wife, but that he genuinely feared that they would be killed by their respective families if they returned to Turkey. It seems to me that there are two most likely scenarios here, one that the appellant was massively exaggerating the problems with the family in the screening, and the other that they are antagonistic but that he never had to call upon them for aid as the claimed problems with the Turkish police are a fabrication and never took place at all.
56. The respondent goes on in the decision letter to state that the appellant had been inconsistent in relation to the problems he faced in Turkey due to being Kurdish, as in his screening interview he talked only about issues with his wife’s family since they were Turkish ethnicity so disapproved of him, while in the main interview he spoke about ethnic discrimination during both his time in school, and during military service.
57. The appellant responds to this in paragraph 24 of his appeal statement, suggesting that the point taken in the decision letter is misconceived, as it is his case that the discrimination faced due to growing up as a Kurd in Turkey, along with the problems it caused within his family when he married a non-Kurd, are the background to his interest in Kurdish rights, his subsequent political activity, and his problems with the Turkish state which are the core of his claim.
58. I consider this to be a sound explanation for the issue raised by the respondent, and do not see any particular discrepancy in his answers on this subject during his two interviews, and so find that this point does not damage his credibility.
59. The respondent then goes on to say in the decision that, since the appellant says that he is only a supporter of HDP and not a member, it is improbable that the Turkish authorities would have shown an interest in him on political grounds.
60. The appellant’s response in paragraph 25 of the statement is to say that the fact he was not a member of HDP was irrelevant to the question of whether the police would have been interested in him, since he was detained at a pro-Kurdish event when he was seen waving the Kurdish flag and chanting Kurdish slogans.
61. I am inclined to agree with the appellant on this point, the country guidance case of IK & others, along with the evidence in the above-mentioned CPINs, not drawing a significant distinction between members and supporters of Kurdish political parties, the key point being the perception of the Turkish state of an appellant’s ties to pro-Kurdish political activity, rather than whether or not they hold a membership card. I find that this point does not damage the appellant’s credibility in any meaningful way.
62. I find that the next point raised by the respondent in the decision, that the second arrest and detention was based simply on ‘hearsay’, i.e. that he does not know that anyone reported him, this is simply what he was told, similarly carries no real weight. As the appellant points out in paragraph 26 of his statement, it does not really matter whether he had been reported, or if the police simply came after him because they could, the fact is that, if the account is true, they did detain and ill-treat him a second time, showing ongoing interest beyond the incident at the Newroz celebration.
63. The final point made in the decision is expressed as follows:
“The Turkish government allows access to an electronic system where any Turkish citizen may see if there is any impending prosecution against and have access to previous detainments and charges records, as such it is to be expected that when asked if you could provide evidence of your previous arrests and if you know of any charges currently against you in Turkey you could provide us with this evidence or with an answer based on facts, instead you failed to provide evidence of your previous arrests and told us that you believe there are charges against you based on speculation and hearsay”
64. The respondent provides no source for this assertion in the decision letter, and nor was I able to locate any clear information about the electronic government system mentioned in any of the CPINs to which I have been referred. Paragraph 7.62 of the PKK CPIN does talk about such a system, the ‘UYAP’, but only in the context of it being available to the police to run checks on returnees, with no suggestion that it is accessible to members of the public.
65. At the same time, I note that the appellant does not appear to dispute that such a facility may exist, since his response at paragraph 27 of his appeal statement is to say that he is unwilling to use the ‘Turkish government portal’ since he believes it would require a Turkish SIM card, and accessing it could alert them to his location, and thus put him at even greater risk.
66. In the circumstances, given that I have no real information on this alleged government portal, and in any case the appellant’s reasons for not wanting to access such a service even if he could, I have decided to place no weight on this issue.
67. The respondent does not rely on section 8 of the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 in her decision and review, presumably because of the appellant’s account of being put into a lorry in Istanbul, and never being apart from the smugglers until put on the small boat to cross the Channel just 7 days later. As such, I conclude that the provisions of section 8 do not apply in this case.
68. The only other credibility point raised by the respondent in her review was to dispute the appellant’s claim to be of the Alevi faith, something which had not been explicitly addressed in the decision letter. The reasons given are that in his screening interview at Q1.12 he identified himself as ‘Muslim (Sunni)’, at Q4.1 he did not mention a differing faith as part of the dispute between the two families, and in his main interview he did not mention being Alevi when asked repeatedly to explain what problems he had in Turkey (Q12, 17 & 18).
69. In response to this Ms Panagiotopolou did not dispute that the appellant had never expressed that he was Alevi in the screening interview, but suggested that his answer at Q1.12 was not inconsistent, as Alevism is a sect of Islam. However, it is well understood that Alevi are not part of Sunnism, being closer to Shi’ism, and so I do find the answer at Q1.12 is indeed inconsistent.
70. I was also referred to the letter from the ‘Nottingham Alevi Cultural Centre’, found at page 1 of the supplementary bundle, as corroboration of the appellant’s Alevi faith. However, this letter simply records that the appellant and his family are members of the community and, given that Mrs G.C. does not herself claim to be Alevi, it is evident that a person can join in with the activities of this cultural centre without being part of the Alevi faith. Indeed, the September 2025 letter does not state how long the family have been involved with the organisation, nor detail any checks that were made on the family before allowing them to join. In the circumstances, I do not find that this letter carries much evidential weight on this issue at all.
71. Ms Panagiotopolou also referred me to the ‘concluding questions’ at the end of the main interview, at which the appellant stated, in response to the question ‘Are there any other reasons you want to remain in the UK’, after which the appellant states …’my wife is Sunni, so we did experience problems’. It was argued that the way this was expressed necessarily implied that the appellant was not Sunni, and that the most likely explanation in the context of the demography of Turkey was therefore that he is Alevi, even if it was never expressly stated in the interview, since he was never asked about his religion during this main interview. This is a better explanation for this issue, on which I am willing to place some weight. However, I do still consider that the failure to mention being Alevi prior to the September 2025 appeal statement, and the inconsistency in the screening interview where the appellant self-identifies as Sunni, do undermine his credibility.
72. The appellant relies on further post-decision evidence in order to seek to corroborate his claim of being of adverse attention to the Turkish state on political grounds, in the form of a letter said to come from his parents, at page 2 of the supplementary bundle, in which they describe later visits to their home by police searching for their son.
73. The initial problem with this document is that only an automated translation using AI technology was provided in the bundle, which clearly contained numerous mistakes, however this was later resolved with a certified translation served shortly after the bundle itself was uploaded.
74. If true, evidence that the police had come looking for the appellant in September 2023, and again in March and then July 2024, would support his contention that he had already come to the adverse attention of the Turkish state prior to his departure in June 2023. However, I consider the letter has little independent value in itself, since none of the claims within it are supported by any corroborative documentation (such as an arrest warrant, for example), and as it comes from strongly interested parties who are likely to have little compunction in providing whatever evidence their son requested of them in order to support his claim, whether it was true or not.
75. In those circumstances, there is little to do with this evidence other than consider it in the round with the appellant’s overall credibility, applying the principles established in Tanveer Ahmed (Documents unreliable and forged) Pakistan * [2002] UKIAT 00439.
76. Finally, the appellant relies upon the evidence of his sur place activity as corroborating his claim to have been politically active prior to his arrival, as well as increasing the risk on return due to the possibility that he has been observed by agents of the Turkish state in this country taking part in protests and other events in the Kurdish diaspora.
77. I have considered the sur place evidence carefully, including having viewed the 11 videos uploaded to the portal. I find that this evidence tends to show that the appellant only became involved in political activity in the UK more recently, after his claim was refused, and only in a very limited way even after that.
78. At his August 2024 interview, at Q113, he is asked if he was politically active in the UK, and he only mentions attending one event, a Newroz celebration in London. I consider that such an event is not necessarily a political event anyway, but even if it were, this is very limited activity for a person who had by that point been in the UK for more than a year, and who was now in a country where he could take part in political activity without fear of harm. I find that the fact he had not chosen to do so very much undermines his claim to have been a regular and committed activist while in Turkey.
79. The more recent evidence shows the appellant in large crowds at two or three different events, and is not a leader or organiser of either. It is unclear what group has organised the events. He appears to be a simple ‘hanger-on’. This is not the level of sur place activity that is likely to have brought him to the attention of the Turkish embassy in the UK, and I do not consider that it adds a great deal to his risk on return. I consider that it is more likely than not to be insincere, designed to bolster his claim to have been a political activist in Turkey, rather than a genuine indication of his political opinion.
80. Weighing up all of the above matters together, I find that the appellant has failed to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that he was a political activist in Turkey, and therefore I do not find that he has a characteristic which could cause him to be at risk of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason on return to Turkey (it not having been suggested that his Kurdish ethnicity, which is conceded, or his Alevi faith, which is disputed, and I have not accepted, are sufficient to give rise to a risk of persecution without the political element).
81. I find, again applying the balance of probabilities, that the appellant has failed to make out his claim to have been politically active in support of the HDP in Turkey, and to have been detained and ill-treated on two occasions by the Turkish police as a result. Nor do I accept that he has established that the letter from his parents is reliable, and reject the claim that the police have continued to look for him since he left Turkey.
82. I consider that this whole account is a fabrication, and at the very most the height of his claim was that he and his wife had some problems with their respective families because he is Kurdish, and she is Turkish, (though very likely far less than expressed at the screening interview) before realising that this would be inadequate to found a successful claim for asylum, given the opportunity to rely on internal relocation to avoid any such problems, leading to the decision to embellish the claim at the later interview with the invention of political activity and problems with the Turkish authorities.
83. Turning to the question of risk on return, now applying the lower standard of proof, I remind myself of the risk factors listed in the country guidance in IA & others, which the CPIN accepts continues to be applicable, and which states as follows:
The following are the factors which inexhaustively we consider to be material in giving rise to potential suspicion in the minds of the authorities concerning a particular claimant:
a) The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
b) Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.
c) Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.
d) Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.
e) The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.
f) Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP (or now, HDP).
g) How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.
h) Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.
i) Kurdish ethnicity.
j) Alevi faith.
k) Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.
l) Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.
m) Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.
n) Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.
o) If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return. Following Sepet of course this alone is not a basis for a refugee or human rights claim.
84. In light of the adverse credibility findings already made, I consider that the only risk factors that apply to the appellant are that he is a Kurd, and that he is seemingly without a current passport, having travelled to the UK illegally. This is plainly inadequate to give rise to a real risk of persecution on return to Turkey, and for these reasons I dismiss these appeals on asylum grounds.
85. Turning to humanitarian protection, and Article 3 ECHR, the appellant does not rely on any different claim than the asylum claim. The only material difference to my consideration of the claim on these two grounds is that the 2022 Act does not apply, and so it is the lower standard of proof that applies throughout.
86. Quite simply, I state that for all of the reasons given above in the asylum consideration, I do not find that the appellant has demonstrated that his claim to have been politically active and consequently ill-treated in Turkey is reasonably likely to be true. He has therefore failed to demonstrate that he faces a real risk of facing serious harm, or ill-treatment breaching Article 3, if returned to Turkey. I therefore dismiss these appeals on these alternative grounds as well.
87. Finally, I turn to Article 8 ECHR, and first of all the question of very significant obstacles to reintegration. This is a high threshold, and in light of my finding that the appellant does not face any problems with the state there, something more must be shown by the appellant to meet it.
88. I have not accepted the credibility of the appellant’s claim that he and his wife had problems with their respective families due to their mixed marriage, but even if they had been ostracised, the appellant is fit and healthy and able to work to support his wife and children, and I see no reason why they could not move to another part of Turkey away from their families, to avoid any family strife, where they could achieve self-sufficiency. Being Kurdish, or in a mixed-marriage, has not been shown to preclude relocation to any part of the country. Far more likely, I find that they will be able to return to their home area, and enjoy the assistance of caring extended families.
89. The only other issue the appellant prays in aid in this respect is his wife’s ill-health, which the medical evidence submitted shows includes Stage 2/3 chronic kidney disease, along with arthritis and hypertension. He provides no evidence that these issues, which clearly pre-date their travel to the UK, were not being adequately treated in Turkey, and I find that they would be.
90. In the circumstances, I do not accept that the appellant has shown that he, or his wife, face very significant obstacles to reintegrating into Turkey, and so cannot succeed under the immigration rules under paragraph PL.5.1(b) of Appendix PL.
91. Turning to general proportionality, I firstly find that the appellant’s children, now aged 8 and 4 and having been in the UK for a little over 3 years, will have established a degree of connection to this country. However, the majority of their life is taken up by their family life within the household in which they live, together with their parents, and with whom they would be returned to their country of origin. I find that it is in their best interest to go with their parents, wherever they may be.
92. Given the limited period of time that the family have been in the UK, their private life ties are relatively weak, and in any case attract little weight in the balance given that they have been established while in the UK with precarious status, applying S.117B(5) of the 2002 Act.
93. In those circumstances, I find that the public interest in effective immigration control readily outweighs their ties to the UK, and so also dismiss the appeals on Article 8 grounds, their removal being proportionate since they have not shown that it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for any member of the family.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The appeals are dismissed on asylum grounds.
The appeals are dismissed on humanitarian protection grounds.
The appeals are dismissed on human rights grounds (both Articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR).
DIRECTION REGARDING ANONYMITY – RULE 13(1)(B) OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEDURE (FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL) (IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER) RULES 2014
Given the issues in this case, I have decided to make an anonymity direction. Until these appeals are finally determined, the Appellant and the members of his immediate family are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant, or members of his immediate family.
Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. This order does not restrict disclosure of information relating to this appeal to law enforcement or regulatory agencies, the Bar Council, the Solicitors Regulatory Authority, the Law Society, OISC, or where disclosure is otherwise required by law.
Unless the Upper Tribunal or a court directs otherwise, this order expires when the appeals are finally determined i.e. when the Appellant becomes appeals rights exhausted at the conclusion of the proceedings, including any onward appeal to the Upper Tribunal or court, or when the appeals are abandoned, withdrawn (or treated as withdrawn) or lapses. If there is an onward appeal or challenge, an application to amend or vary the anonymity order must be made to the Upper Tribunal or court concerned.
FEE AWARD
I have dismissed the appeals, and so make no fee awards.
Signed: Dated: 31/10/2026
First-Tier Tribunal Judge Mills
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