Administrative United Kingdom

IJ v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Official source

First-tier Tribunal
(Immigration and Asylum Chamber)

Appeal Number: PA/60425/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Heard at Hatton Cross
On 20 October 2026

Before

FIRST-TIER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Seelhoff

Between

IJ
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

Appellant

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT

Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms Jegarajah, Counsel instructed by KT Solicitors Ltd

For the Respondent: Ms Gorolay, Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is the decision of the Tribunal in the appeal of the Appellant against the decision of the Respondent made on 7 March 2025 to refuse his asylum claim originally made on the 24th November 2023.

Anonymity

2. In making this decision I have considered that justice being administered openly and in public is a fundamental tenet of the justice system but it may be qualified by the interests of the parties and family members. I have decided to make an anonymity direction because this is a protection claim and there are risks associated with publicising the facts of a an asylum claim.

Background

3. The Appellant is a national of Sri Lanka who claims to have had covert involvement with the LTTE since 1983. The Appellant claims to have worked for the LTTE in Sri Lanka, and Saudi Arabia, including as a Bus Conductor for the Ceylon transport board and then for as a prison officer. The Appellant claims that in about 2005 he stopped being asked to work for the LTTE in 2005 after internal power struggles but remained in post as a prison officer until just before he came to the UK.

4. In 2015 a former LTTE leader known as Pillayan was arrested on suspicion of involvement in the murder of another Tamil leader 10 years earlier. This is a relatively well known incident in the recent political history of Sri Lanka and Pillayan is a well known former LTTE member who has since been involved in government in Sri Lanka. The Appellant claims that Pillayan was placed in the prison that the Appellant worked at and recognised the Appellant as a former LTTE worker and approached him for help whilst he was in prison threatening to disclose his past LTTE connections. Pillayan also demanded money from the Appellant on two occasions which the Appellant paid. The Appellant claims to have felt unsafe after this which was a factor in a decision to send his daughter to the UK to study,

5. In early 2024 the Appellant received a further call from Pillayan demanding money but was not able to pay and so he refused. A few days later the Appellant was arrested and recognised one of the individuals as a TID officer. The Appellant claims he was held for about five days and tortured and that he believes this is because Pillayan reported his past association with the LTTE.

6. The Appellant was ultimately released after the payment of a bribe. The Appellant and his wife assert that she approached the Superintendent of his prison for help and that he told them that Pillayan had reported the Appellant to the intelligence services.

7. The Appellant went into hiding and then he and his wife applied for UK visit visas with the assistance of an agent. They stated that they were coming for the daughter’s graduation which was true. The couple applied for asylum once neighbours reported that people were still looking for them in Sri Lanka.

8. In refusing the application the Respondent accepts that the Appellant worked for the prison service in Sri Lanka but does not accept that his account of persecution is true. The Respondent does not recognise in the decision that the Appellant is expressing fear not only of the government but also of former LTTE associates.

The Hearing

9. The hearing took place face to face. It was recorded using the Cloud Video Platform. That recording is the record of proceedings and should be consulted in the event of any dispute about what was said at the hearing.

10. At the outset of the hearing it was agreed that the Appellant ought to be treated as a vulnerable witness in light of the medical evidence which I address in greater detail below.

11. We also discussed the issues and agreed that the case largely turned on credibility in the context of the statutory framework.

Issues

12. The parties agreed that the issues the Tribunal must decide are:

Asylum

(i) On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?

(ii) On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

(iii) Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return for that Convention reason?

Article 8

(iv) Does the appellant face very significant obstacles to integration in the country of return?

(v) Would the appellant's removal give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences such that it is disproportionate and therefore unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998?

13. It is accepted that if the account is true and that there is risk on return there would not be sufficient protection available or a reasonable opportunity to relocate internally,

Evidence

14. The Appellant gave evidence first and was cross examined. He was followed by his wife and then his daughter. All three witnesses gave evidence with the assistance of a Tamil interpreter and were cross examined.

15. After the evidence I heard submissions from both representatives and then reserved my decision.

Legal Framework

16. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s32 of the 2022 Act, in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

(a) Does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them?

(b) Does the appellant in fact fear persecution for that Convention reason?

17. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

(c) The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason; and

(d) Sufficient protection would not be available to the appellant.

(e) I must also consider whether there is a part of the country where the appellant would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and whether the appellant could reasonably be expected to travel to and remain in that part of the country.

18. I consider the above issues in accordance with the guidance in DS (NABA s.32(2)(a); JCK amended) Afghanistan [2026] UKUT 00413 (IAC).

19. The relevant provisions of the Immigration Rules in this appeal are those in Appendix Private Life.

20. In so far as they rely on article 8 outside the Rules it is for the appellant to show that article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged and if so, it is for the respondent to show that the decision was in accordance with the law, made in pursuance of a legitimate aim and that it was proportionate to the legitimate aim. The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Sections 117A to 117D of the 2002 Act are relevant to any assessment under article 8 of the ECHR outside the Rules.

Findings

21. I have assessed the evidence on the basis that the Appellant is a vulnerable witness in line with the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010: Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance.

22. In terms of medical evidence for the Appellant, GP records confirm symptoms of PTSD and depression and that he had disclosed a history of torture to them in 2025. It also confirms problems with alcohol when he first arrived in the UK. The Appellant was assessed by a consultant psychiatrist in January 2026. There was no challenge to the methodology of the psychiatrist nor of the process taken in preparing the report before me. The psychiatrist had access to the GP records when preparing his report. The psychiatrist concluded that the Appellant did not have PTSD but that he had adjustment disorder. The psychiatrist did not feel able to tell after just one appointment whether the symptoms were being feigned, but in any even the decision as to credibility is for me.

23. I note that the medical history includes an incident in which the Appellant and his wife fought physically. This led to them being housed separately for a while and he clearly struggled being away from his family. Whilst the family have since reconciled, this is not the sort of series of events that you might expect to be manufactured but in my view reflects the Appellant genuinely being out of control whilst struggling to adjust in the UK.

Issue (i) – On the balance of probabilities, does the appellant possess a characteristic falling within one of the Refugee Convention reasons, or would such a characteristic be attributed to them by an actor of persecution?

24. Considering this entails an assessment of the Appellant’s credibility on the balance of probabilities.

25. The challenges to the Appellant’s credibility are set out in paragraph 8 of the decision letter. The first point is that the Appellant has failed to explain why LTTE activities between 1983 and 1991 place him at risk. The Appellant provided the historic details as background to his case. The risk to him arises from whatever Pillayan reported to the authorities in 2024 and whatever the authorities may suspect he has done in his role as a longstanding and senior prison officer who concealed longstanding LTTE activities. There is also a potential risk from Pillayan and his associates.

26. The decision says that it is inconsistent that the Appellant says both that he supported the LTTE and that he was forced to work for them. That shows a lack of historical understanding on the part of the decision maker. The background evidence confirms that Tamils have been repressed for many years in Sri Lanka. The majority of the Tamil community supported the goals of the LTTE, however the LTTE was also an aggressive paramilitary force who expected all Tamils to support them. In this historic context it is entirely plausible that the Appellant would support the LTTE yet also be forced to undertake activities for them that he would not necessarily have chosen to do were he not pressured into it.

27. The decision criticises the Appellant for providing a lack of detail as to how he gathered money for the LTTE whilst he was in Saudi Arabia. The Appellant has explained that he was essentially a middle man in the process, that he did not collect money directly himself but that it would be handed to him to pass on. That is not inherently implausible.

28. The Respondent says it is not consistent that the Appellant said he was scared to return to Sri Lanka after being in Saudi Arabia due to the risk of arrest because he also said the government did not know about his work with the LTTE. The Appellant was obviously expressing that he was scared the government would have found out about the work.

29. The decision asserts that the Appellant gave inconsistent dates for his work with the LTTE between questions 93 and 96 of his second asylum interview. The Appellant did get a little confused about whether he had last worked for them officially in 2002, 2003 or 2025 but explained that confusion at interview. This is a minor point especially given the nature of the work and that it was 20 years ago.

30. The Appellant is criticised for failing to explain why the authorities would be interested in him over 20 years after he last worked with the LTTE. This reflects the misunderstanding of the significance of Pillayan allegedly reporting the Appellant.

31. The Appellant is accused of not giving much detail about his arrest by the TID at his second interview. The Respondent does not identify what additional detail they consider the Appellant could have given at interview. He answered all the questions he was asked and was not asked for more detail so I do not consider this to be a fair criticism.

32. The Respondent says the lack of adverse attention between the Appellant’s release in February 2024 and his departure from the country in July 2024 indicates that no one has an ongoing interest in him. The Appellant claims he was in hiding and so I attach only moderate weight to this.

33. The Respondent asserts that were the Appellant wanted by the authorities he would not have been able to leave the country through the airport. It has long been known that the authorities in the airports in Sri Lanka are extremely susceptible to bribery as set out in paragraph 275 of GJ and others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 00319 (IAC).

34. The Respondent says that the Appellant’s documents whilst they show he was employed by the prison service, do not show a link to the LTTE. The Appellant does not suggest that the documents show anything more than that and so this does not damage his credibility.

35. The Respondent says that there is nothing to show that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations has come to the attention of the Sir Lankan authorities. That runs contrary to what is said in KK and RS (Sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 00130 (IAC) about the monitoring of demonstrations in the UK.

36. I have considered the Respondent’s review. It does not add any new grounds for challenging the Appellant’s credibility.

37. In submissions before me Ms Goroaly did raise additional challenges to credibility and I will focus on points I have not already addressed. Ms Gorolay noted that the Appellant’s evidence at interview changed in resect of whether he saw how much money was being collected in Saudi Arabia because in the first interview he recalled amounts, and the second he said he did not. Before me the Appellant explained that initially the envelopes would be unsealed so he could see, but sometimes they would be sealed. This is not implausible and I do not consider the apparent inconsistency to be material.

38. It was suggested that the Appellant would not have needed the sponsorship of an MP to secure work in Sri Lanka, but the Appellant referenced the quota system that used to operate in Sri Lanka whereby MPs could sponsor individuals for a certain number of jobs.

39. It was suggested that the Appellant’s evidence had changed as to whether he had paid money to Pillayan. The Appellant in the longer form narratives such as at question 11 of the first interview explained that he did initially give Pillayan money. The Appellant was entitled to proceed on the basis that he had already described those incidents when he subsequently discussed his refusal to pay further bribes as the reason for the persecution.

40. Ms Gorolay asserted that it is not credible that the Appellant’s Superintendent of prisons would have helped secure his release if he knew the Appellant was associated with the LTTE. That does not necessarily follow given that it was only very historic involvement. As Ms Jegerajah highlighted the Appellant had primarily got on the wrong side of a very controversial but powerful figure in the Tamil community.

41. Ms Gorolay suggested that the Appellant’s claim to have been able to see his watch whilst restrained in a van is implausible. I do not agree. In the course of a 5 ½ hour drive it is plausible that the Appellant would have occasionally been able to see his watch even if he was blindfolded or hooded.

42. Ms Gorolay suggested that the motivation of the Appellant was to come to the UK for a better life which was reflected in their initially sending their daughter here to study. That does not sit well with the accepted evidence that the Appellant had been a prison officer for 26 years. The Appellant had a stable long standing job in Sri Lanka. He was 57 when he came to the UK which is an age at which starting over could be expected to be difficult and when migrating to the UK might not result in a better life. The Appellant appear to have left stability and security for an uncertain future in the UK.

43. It was suggested that it was implausible that the Appellant’s wife could have safely visited him in Sri Lanka when he was in hiding. I do not attach significant weight to this criticism given the accounts of how the visits were infrequent and concealed.

44. In terms of the Appellant’s sur place activities he does not claim to have done anything more than attend events, and readily acknowledged that he often cannot afford to attend events. I do not consider that this reflects playing a significant role in the diaspora activities, but it also does not reflect exaggeration of his evidence.

45. Ms Gorolay did not highlight any further specific challenges to the credibility of the Appellant’s wife and daughter.

46. I have considered the evidence in the round. I do not consider that the Respondent has identified any major inconsistencies in the account as a whole. The account is plausible in the context of the history of Sri Lanka. Whilst the documents do not confirm past involvement with the LTTE, they do corroborate the Appellant’s claimed background.

47. In that context I find that the account is credible on the balance of probabilities. I accept that the Appellant was actively involved with the LTTE for a period of approximately 20 years, but that his involvement then dropped away. I accept that the Appellant was approached and effectively blackmailed by Pillayan as claimed and I accept that subsequently the Appellant was arrested and detained as claimed before being released on payment of a bribe and coming to the UK.

48. I accept that the Appellant is an individual who has in the past supported the LTTE and will be perceived as supporting the LTTE. I accept that there is therefore risk due to his political opinions and ethnic origins.

Issue (ii) – On the balance of probabilities does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

49. In light of my findings on issue (i) I can deal with this issue summarily. I find that the Appellant does fear persecution for that reason and on the basis of the recent persecution.

Issue (iii) – Is it reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted on return for that Convention reason?

50. I have considered the risk to the Appellant in the round and have applied the guidance in both GJ and KK and RS which I have cited above.

51. In this case it is not known what Pillayan said to the authorities about the Appellant but it was enough to trigger his arrest. Pillayan is reasonably likely to have suggested that the Appellant continued to work for the LTTE or separatist goals for many years in the trusted role of prison officer. The Appellant then fled and on the evidence I have accepted the authorities have been to his home looking for him since. I find that it is reasonably likely that there is now an arrest warrant for him or that he would now appear on a stop list and accordingly would be within categories 7 (a) and 7 (d) as set out in the headnote of GJ.

52. In light of GJ this would be enough to make the Appellant a Refugee.

53. In terms of the sur place activities I find that the Appellant has not yet played a significant role in campaigning for separatism, although any association he now has will aggravate the risks to him and what he might be suspected of on return.

54. Ms Jegarajah also drew my attention to PS (Ltte – Internal Flight – Sufficiency of protection) Sri Lankan CG [2004] UKIAT 00297 and AN & SS (Tamils – Colombo – risk?) Sri Lanka CG [2008] UKAIT 00063 which remain good law and address potential risks from the LTTE. I note that risk from Pillayan would not necessarily fall within the Refugee convention as they are motivated by quasi criminal activities and the Appellant’s refusal to bribe him but it is possible that Pillayan would also suggest to Tamil separatists that the Appellant was a traitor.

Issue (iv) and (v) Article 8 Under and Outside the Rules

55. Ms Jegarajah did not make extensive submissions on article 8 acknowledging that the primary obstacles to integration are the facts of the claim. Were I not satisfied that the asylum claim were well founded I would not have allowed the appeal on article 8 grounds under or outside the rules.

Determination of the Issues

56. The Appellant meets the requirements of the Refugee Convention.

Notice of Decision

57. The appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

ANONYMITY ORDER

58. Unless and until the Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal, or, a Court orders otherwise, pursuant To rule 13(1)(b) of the Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) Rules 2014, the appellant his wife and daughter, are granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal either directly or indirectly any information, including their names or their addresses, that is likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

To the Respondent – Fee Award

No fee is paid or payable and therefore there can be no fee award.

Signature

Signed A.Seelhoff Date 2nd November 2026

First-tier Tribunal Judge Seelhoff

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